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WORKING GROUP ON TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY

THE ROLE OF CHINA IN SOVIET POLICY

Note by the Chairman

At a meeting on 17th February, 1953 the Working Group on Trends in Soviet Policy directed the Chairman to prepare, in consultation with members of the Group, a draft synopsis for a paper on "The Role of China in Soviet Policy".

Attached hereto is the requested draft synopsis incorporating proposals of France, Italy and the United Kingdom.

The draft synopsis will be considered at a meeting of the Working Group to be held on Thursday, 19th February at 4 p.m.

(Signed) HUGH S. CUMMING

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is a supplement to the paper "Trends in Soviet Policy" (Document C-1(52)116). It is prepared following a suggestion made by M. Schuman, French Minister of Foreign Affairs at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 16th December 1952 (Document C-R(52)38) and pursuant to a directive of the Council at its meeting on 21st January 1953 (Document C-R(53)2).

I. THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA (1921 - 1949)

1. Foundation of Chinese Communist Party - Was founded in 1920 under the direct inspiration of the October revolution in Russia: "The gunfire of the October revolution brought us Marxism - Leninism". (Mao Tse-tung).

2. Period of close co-operation of Soviet-inspired Communism and Chinese Nationalist Movement: 1923 - 1927

(a) Sun Yat-sen - Joffe meeting January 1923.

(b) Close directives and guidance given by the Comintern - activities in China of such Russians as Borodin, Bluecher, etc. - from 1924 joint membership in the Communist Party and the Kuomintang permitted.

3. Break between Chinese Nationalists and Russians

(a) First open breach between Chinese Nationalists and Russians: Chiang Kai shek's coup at Shanghai April 1927.

(b) Breach between Hankow Government (left Kuomintang) June 1927, followed by reunion of Nationalist forces.

(c) December 1927 - crushing of Communist rising at Canton and final break between Soviet Government and Nationalist Government established at Nanking.

4. In 1928 - 1933 Mao Tse-tung's activities in rural areas remote from the control of the Central Committee which took "disastrous decisions" leading to its eclipse in 1931.

5. Establishment of firm control of Mao Tse-tung and his faction - the "Long March" (1935) - absorption of leaders of rival factions (Li Li-san, Cheu En-lai, etc.).

6. From 1937 to 1945 there was no evidence of Soviet advisers or direct assistance to the Chinese Communist Party, whose headquarters were established at Yen-an.

7. Equivocal and confused course of Soviet policy towards China in 1945 - 1949, during which period there were possibly

hesitations and uncertainties in Moscow. Nevertheless Mao Tse-tung throughout expressed the orthodoxy of Chinese Communism, his debt to the example set by the Soviet Union and the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, and dependence of the Chinese revolution on the world revolution.

8. Appropriate reference might be made to the Civil War in China (renewed in 1941) and to the resistance to the Japanese intrusions in China.

II. EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY CURRENT EVENTS

(Political relations between China and the U.S.S.R.)

1. Establishment of the Peking Government in 1949 and of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.
2. Mao Tse-tung's trip to Moscow and the Treaty of Alliance of February 1950.
3. Sino-Soviet discussions: August - September 1952.
4. General: Since 1949 there has been a great display of solidarity with the Soviet Union, reorientation of Chinese economy towards the U.S.S.R.; and administrative and social changes modelled on the Soviet pattern. Soviet Union and Chinese Communists act together in the Peace Campaign, cold war and South-East Asia policies. In return Soviet Union supports China in international affairs and apparently pays some attention to Chinese susceptibilities. The Chinese five-year plan and military requirements both call for Soviet help in advisors, arms and capital equipment, thus furnishing openings for increased penetration of Soviet influence. Addition of China to the group of Communist nations has provided some accretion of strategic strengthening to the Soviet bloc; on the other hand, the provision of material aid is a certain drain on Soviet bloc resources. The question arises whether, in the long run, China will be an asset or a liability to the Soviet bloc. In the cultural and social fields there has been penetration of Soviet books, Soviet instructors and pedagogical methods, and Soviet artists and scientists.

III. THE KOREAN WAR AND INDO-CHINESE OPERATIONS

1. In Korea there has been a close co-ordination of policies which, despite many obscure factors, reveals no important divergencies. China provides manpower and the Soviet Union arms, equipment (especially air power) and technical advice, and perhaps training. Course of Korean war has perhaps increased dependence in China on the Soviet Union.

2. In the Indo-Chinese operations the Viet Minhs providing the fighting manpower but China, in comparison with the Soviet Union, is taking the leading role of the provision of assistance though some Soviet equipment is being provided.

IV. POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND COMMUNIST CHINA

1. Border Regions:

- (a) Korea
- (b) Manchuria (Dairan, Port Arthur, rail problems)
- (c) Mongolia
- (d) Sinkiang

2. China proper: The provision of Soviet advisers and aid of all types might lead eventually to differences of opinion regarding their utilization.

3. Doctrine: "The thought of Mao Tse-tung" is said by Chinese Communists to mean the integration of the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete experience of the Chinese revolution. Nevertheless, Mao Tse-tung's unique position among non-Soviet exponents of Marxism-Leninism is a potential cause of friction with Stalinist variations.

4. The leadership of Asia: Presently there appears to be accord between the Soviet Union and Communist China on the latter's role in world affairs. However, in the Soviet Union, warning has been given that the Chinese revolution should not be regarded "as some kind of stereotype for the people's democratic revolution in other countries"; on the other hand, some Chinese Communists have held out the Chinese revolution as a model to be followed in other colonial and semi-colonial areas. This difference of emphasis does not appear to be especially important now, but might be if Communist China's internal strength should continue to develop with a corresponding increase in her influence in Asia. In the future - near or distant - and depending on the nature of the outcome of the Korean war and the Indo-Chinese operations, Sino-Soviet rivalry may develop with respect to Japan or India or South East Asia.

V. CONCLUSION

The Chinese Communist Party achieved power in China largely by its own efforts. China is now a world power in its own right. China and the Soviet Union, closely united under Communism, pursue the same aims by the same methods. While potential areas of difference exist and may acquire more importance later, any differences which occur now are likely to be submerged in the dominant identity of interests. The relationship of China to the Soviet Union is rather that of a junior partner in an axis than a satellite. Chinese policy evolves at present without apparent strain or friction within the framework of Soviet world strategy. Soviet policy must take into account the factor of Chinese power and influence.