Summary Record of a meeting of the Council held at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, on Wednesday, 7th April at 10.15 a.m.

PRESENT
Chairman - The Lord Ismay
Mr. A. de Staercke (Belgium) Mr. N. Hommel (Luxembourg)
Mr. L.D. Wilgress (Canada) Jonkheer A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer (Netherlands)
Mr. J.A. Vestbirk (Denmark) Mr. A. Skaug (Norway)
Mr. P. Baraudeau (France) Count de Tovar (Portugal)
Mr. G. Exintaris (Greece) Mr. Fatin R. Zorlu (Turkey)
Mr. H. Andersen (Iceland) Sir Christopher Steel (United Kingdom)
Mr. A. Rossi Longhi (Italy) Mr. J.C. Hughes (United States)

INTERNATIONAL STAFF
Mr. S. Fenoaltea (Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs)
Mr. L.P. Weicker (Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics)
Mr. R. Sergent (Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance)
Mr. R.D. Coleridge (Executive Secretary)

ALSO PRESENT
Vice-Admiral R. Dick (Standing Group Liaison Officer)
Mr. Lloyd (Chairman, Food and Agriculture Planning Committee)
Mr. Ventura (Chairman, Industrial Raw Materials Committee)
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1. The CHAIRMAN said he was sure it would be the wish of the Council to convey to the Norwegian Government their deepest sympathy at the untimely death of Crown Princess Martha, who had endeared herself not only to her own people but to all with whom she had come in contact.

The Council then stood in silence as a tribute to the Crown Princess' memory.

2. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he was deeply grateful to the Council for the sympathy and respect it had shown.

I. FIRST REPORT OF THE FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PLANNING COMMITTEE

Previous reference: C-R(54)9
Document: C-M(54)19

3. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Council of the object of the work undertaken by the emergency planning committees. Their task was not to produce a wartime master plan and programme of action, but to study the effect of various assumptions on wartime economy, to exchange ideas, and to propose what steps might be taken now to ease wartime difficulties. In this connection, he drew the Council's attention to the last sentence of paragraph 12 of the report, which read:

"It should be emphasised, of course, that this was a purely hypothetical exercise designed to throw up the problems which would arise in war".

4. Mr. LLOYD (Chairman of the Food and Agriculture Planning Committee) said that the report was primarily a progress report on the work of the Committee. He paid tribute to his colleagues on the Committee, who had worked harmoniously as a team and had endeavoured to consider Western European problems in this field as a whole. He stressed the fact that the exercise suggested in paragraph 41 was purely hypothetical, and that a cut of 50% in imports would be unbearable for a number of countries except for a very short period and provided there had been sufficient stockpiling. At the same time, the Committee felt that an exercise of the kind suggested would be of value. Later they hoped to have an opportunity to consider the results brought out by the exercise. All that the Committee asked was that the Council take note of the report, and approve the recommendations contained in it. Among the recommendations, it attached the greatest importance to the one dealing with rationing.

5. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE expressed his Government's appreciation of the work done by the Committee. His Government believed that it was very important for countries to study these problems in peacetime, and that the exercise proposed in the report would give valuable experience in this kind of planning. At the same time, food was not the only problem involved, and it would be wise to consider other problems, such as industrial raw materials, at the same time, insofar as this was possible.

6. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he could accept the recommendations in the report (document C-M(54)19), but could not approve paragraphs 41 and 42 of the document. He was opposed to the basis on which the grouping system had been worked out, urging that it was essential to take into account the standard of living as well as the present volume of imports.
7. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE referred to paragraph 10 of Annex A in which the Committee stated that it considered that stockpiling, particularly of wheat, was of the greatest importance to NATO countries. The difficulty was that there were certain countries which needed to stockpile and were willing to do so, but were without the funds to finance it. Stockpiling was an expensive process. He suggested that the Committee might examine ways in which stockpiling could be financed and make recommendations to the Council. If it could suggest no solution, then the Council should examine the problem.

8. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the Italian Representative that paragraphs 41 and 42 were unacceptable. He did not think that they could work on the basis proposed, even as an exercise. He was not opposed to a grouping system, but what his Government could not accept was a grouping system based on an automatic cut in the average level of imports over recent years. The question of the standard of living must also be taken into account, since countries with a comparatively low standard of living could not afford import cuts as easily as countries with a higher standard of living.

9. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that the exercise proposed in paragraph 41 would be useful. It would only form a basis for theoretical study and would not pre-judge the factual decisions which would have to be taken if war broke out. The objections raised by the Italian and Portuguese Representatives, therefore, did not seem to him very real. He then stressed the importance of preparing in peacetime a rationing system which could enter into effect without delay if it became necessary. His Government had pushed ahead a long way with its plans in this connection, and he thought it important that other countries should do the same.

10. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that it would not be difficult for his Government to enforce a rationing system, if necessary, since it had the machinery easily available in the co-operatives.

11. Mr. LLOYD said that the Committee recognised that it had a difficult and tough assignment, even in working on a purely hypothetical basis. To allay the fears expressed by certain representatives, he said that it was hoped that the normal flow of coastal traffic would be subject to less interference in time of war than the flow of ocean-going, long-distance traffic. He added that it was hoped that Turkey would be able to build up a considerable surplus in bread grains and, assuming that coastal traffic in the Mediterranean was not seriously disrupted, these would be available for other Mediterranean countries. The Committee would take note of the views that had been expressed, and in the light of the experience gained by the exercise would try to get a reasonable picture of what cuts might be expected in the early days of war. Finally, he stressed again the importance attached by the Committee to the preparation of a rationing system which, at need, could be enforced without delay.

12. The COUNCIL:

(1) noted that the report before them was simply a progress report of the work so far done by the Committee;
expressed their appreciation of the work done by the Food and Agriculture Planning Committee;

approved the recommendations contained in paragraph 2 of C-M(54)19;

agreed that the Committee should continue its work, taking account of the points made during the discussion.

II. STOCKPILING

Documents: C-M(54)2
C-M(54)23

13. Mr. VENTURA (Chairman of the Industrial Raw Materials Planning Committee) said that the Council was aware that NATO governments were likely to be confronted with serious shortages of industrial raw materials, if war broke out, for various reasons: normal supplies might be cut off temporarily or for a long period; transport, and in particular maritime transport, might be seriously dislocated; and there would be a considerably increased consumption of certain raw materials if war broke out. A number of NATO countries had had considerable experience of these problems during the Second World War, and they were convinced, in particular the United States, that it was essential to build up adequate stockpiles in time of peace to balance the dislocation which would inevitably take place in the early months of a war. The Committee was willing to continue its study of the problem, provided the Council would support the principle that stockpiling was essential and would consider means by which it could be financed.

14. Mr. SERGENT (Chairman of the Committee on Wartime Commodity Problems) said that some time had elapsed between the appearance of the Industrial Raw Materials Committee's report and that of his own Committee. The reason was that his Committee, in preparing its report, had encountered a number of difficulties, which were still with them. These difficulties were of three main kinds:

(a) Financial: stockpiling was an expensive business, and though it was termed "strategic", that did not mean that finance could be diverted from other defence requirements for stockpiling purposes.

(b) Commercial: stockpiling had an immediate and considerable effect on the market, and the problems resulting from this fact were difficult and delicate.

(c) The question of the maintenance and liquidation of stocks.

15. In consequence, it would be found that certain paragraphs of the report were very cautiously worded. There was, however, general agreement in the Committee on two broad principles:

(a) that stockpiling was important, if means of financing it could be found;

(b) governments might take advantage of opportunities which sometimes arose to stockpile when surpluses of certain raw materials were available.
16. Finally, he said that his Committee realised that the problems before it were difficult and delicate, but believed that it would be wise for governments to take action on those occasions when no special difficulties in connection with the political situation or the economic position seemed to be present.

17. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he could accept both the reports before the Council. At the same time, he hoped that the Committee on Wartime Commodity Problems would keep in close touch with the specialised committees and would not attempt to be too ambitious in any plans for international financing of stockpiling. Members of the Council were aware of the difficulties that had been met with in common financing of infrastructure, and any attempt to develop a similar system for the financing of stockpiling would be doomed to failure. The main basis of stockpiling must remain the individual efforts of national governments.

18. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE endorsed the views of the United Kingdom Representative. The specialised committees should focus their attention on the technical aspects of the problems before them, and the Committee on Wartime Commodity Problems should consider from a more general point of view the financial and economic problems involved, remaining in close contact with the specialised committees. He stressed the point made in paragraph 23 of the report of the Committee on Wartime Commodity Problems, that the primary responsibility for accumulating and maintaining individual stockpiles must rest with individual NATO governments. He also stressed the point made in paragraph 15 of the report that, insofar as surpluses were used for strategic stockpiling, special care should be taken to ensure that such stockpiling did not interfere with normal parts of production and trade.

19. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE felt that the reports of the two Committees represented an important step forward in a difficult field. He suggested that the Committee on Wartime Commodity Problems should consider at an early meeting the possibilities of stockpiling partly financed by governments; i.e. the position where governments invited private traders to carry greater stocks than they would normally hold, which could be taken over by governments in case of need.

20. The COUNCIL:

(1) approved the recommendations contained in paragraph 25 of the report of the Committee on Wartime Commodity Problems (C-M(54)23);

(2) noted the points made by the United Kingdom, the Canadian and Norwegian Representatives in the course of the discussion;

(3) expressed its appreciation of the work done by the Industrial Raw Materials Committee and the Committee on Wartime Commodity Problems;

(4) invited the two Committees to carry on their work and to submit progress reports to the Council from time to time.
III. DELAY IN COMPLETION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

Previous reference: C-R(54)9
Document: C-M(54)26

21. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Council that at their meeting on 24th March they had invited the Secretariat, in advance of further reports by a special Working Group on progress in the execution of infrastructure projects, to prepare a paper outlining some of the main causes of the delay in implementing infrastructure programmes. That report was now before the Council (C-M(54)26).

22. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the report might put him in a somewhat embarrassing position vis-à-vis his Government, since for the past six months he had been emphasising the dangers of delay and stating that there had been considerable delay, whereas the report was somewhat optimistic in its terms. As an example of this, he quoted paragraph 9 of the report, listing the number of airfields completed and ready for use. He wondered whether the position was really as satisfactory as the report indicated.

23. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE thought it important to stress the fact that there should be no time-lag between the completion of projects and the availability of the units for which the projects were intended. For example, so long as airfields were ready by the time the squadrons which were to use them were available, then it could be considered that progress was satisfactory. He thought that the Council should encourage the joint Working Party made up of representatives of SHAPE and the Secretariat, since the work they were doing in this field was of great value. Finally, he urged that there should be no relaxation of financial control.

24. The STANDING GROUP LIAISON OFFICER said that the Standing Group fully agreed that the question of delays in implementation of infrastructure programmes needed looking into. The Standing Group in no way wished to try to assign responsibility for the delays, but simply to see how they could be avoided in future. The report now before the Council had been, he understood, deliberately couched in very general terms, and for that reason it did not call for specific detailed comments by the Standing Group. At the same time, he was somewhat concerned by an impression that might be derived from the remarks of the United Kingdom Representative, which might seem to imply that all was well in the infrastructure field. That, in fact, was far from being the case. Although it had been stated and issued to the Press that some 120 airfields were available, in fact there were over 80 which could only be used by day and provided weather conditions were good. Many of them were short of pipeline and radar facilities, and those facilities were essential to a regular, wartime use of the fields. The military authorities realised that financial control was necessary, but were, and had been for a long time, alarmed at the slow rate at which funds were committed. He hoped that the arrangements for financial control could be kept so organized that they should not bring delay to the commitment of funds.

25. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE thought the report a useful one, but agreed that it was very general in character. They were all aware of the importance of this question, and hoped
that the detailed report to be prepared by the special Working Group would be available as soon as possible. He assured the Standing Group Liaison Officer that the military authorities could count on the co-operation of all of them. Finally, he had some misgivings as to the suggestion in paragraph 25 (g) of the report that financial control procedures could be simplified. He was in favour of simplification where possible, but was afraid that simplification in this case might lead to a loss of efficacy in control.

26. The CHAIRMAN said that, though the report might give a somewhat optimistic picture of the position, they were all aware that progress was slow in connection with infrastructure projects. He pointed out that the procedure for programming and carrying out the projects was a very complicated and lengthy one and, in view of this, they might feel some satisfaction in what had been achieved; at the same time, they certainly had no grounds for complacency. He added that the military authorities were not blameless in the matter, since paragraph 14 of the report referred to delays and difficulties relating to the determination of firm military requirements, the training and adequacy of administrative and technical staffs, and the establishment of military standards and technical specifications.

27. The STANDING GROUP LIAISON OFFICER said that the Standing Group fully realized that the military authorities had their share of responsibility to consider in connection with delays. However, as he had said earlier, the Standing Group were concerned more with cutting out delays in future than in assessing responsibility for past delays.

28. Mr. WEICKER (Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics) said that the purpose of the present report was not to replace the detailed report which would be submitted after the progress on some 1400 projects had been examined, but to outline some of the main causes of delay. It was for that reason that it had been drawn up on very general lines. It had been discussed informally with the Standing Group Liaison Office, with SHAPE and with the Infrastructure Committee. If the Council examined the recommendations contained in paragraph 16 of the report, and if representatives would draw the attention of their governments to those recommendations, he believed delays in future could be substantially cut.

29. The COUNCIL:

(1) took note of the report on delays in the completion of Infrastructure Projects (C-M(54)26);

(2) invited Permanent Representatives to examine the report with their governments, with the objective of expediting the construction of NATO common infrastructure works;

(3) invited the Infrastructure Committee, the NATO military authorities and the International Staff to take all appropriate action to further the implementation of the common infrastructure projects.
IV. COMPLETION OF THE ANNUAL REVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE, 1954

30. Mr. SERGENT (Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance) reminded the Council that on 17th March it had been informed that the military sections of the Questionnaire (Sections A and B) had already been despatched to governments and that the section calling for information on the financial and economic aspects of defence was under active preparation. He could now inform the Council that the major part of that section had been completed and had been despatched to governments on Ist April, in accordance with the timetable for this year's Review. It was expected that the remaining part, dealing with the special and important problem of annual recurring costs, would be ready for despatch within a week or two. Most of the information required by countries to complete the military section of the Questionnaire would be despatched to delegations by the end of the present week. New directives concerning the calculation of army attrition rates in wartime, on which the Standing Group was now seeking the agreement of national authorities, would have to be issued later. This, however, affected only a minor part of the Questionnaire and should not prejudice a good start being made on the rest.

31. The STANDING GROUP LIAISON OFFICER said that the question of attrition rates in wartime, particularly with regard to ammunition, had been discussed at great length. A new wartime rate had been suggested, but national approval of it had to be obtained and that was a slow process. However, as Mr. Sergent had pointed out, this need not hold up work on replies to the Questionnaire, and the decision on the wartime rates was expected shortly. He added that there was a very difficult problem to be faced in connection with annual recurring costs, that is, the problem of obsolescence. That was a technical problem, and there was a divergence of view on the best way to handle the matter. He merely wished to draw attention to the fact that this problem was at present unsolved.

32. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Council that at its meeting on 15th December, 1953, in the resolution on the 1954 Annual Review, it had "urged member governments to make every effort to forward their replies to the military section of the Annual Review Questionnaire by 1st July, 1954, and their replies to the remainder of the Questionnaire by 31st July, thus enabling a meeting of the Council to consider the report to take place in November". He therefore invited Permanent Representatives to urge their governments to start work on the parts of the Questionnaire calling for information on military forces and their equipment in order that replies might be available by 1st July. He very much hoped that this year there would not be the delays which in the past had disrupted their work and rendered an orderly procedure impossible.

33. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statements by the Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance, the Standing Group Liaison Officer, and the Chairman.

V. CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE PAYMENTS AND PROGRESS COMMITTEE

34. The CHAIRMAN said that he was sure that the Council would be sorry to learn that Mr. van Tets of the Netherlands
Delegation, who had been Chairman of the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee for a long period with great distinction and success, had been appointed to another post. He thought the Council would wish to express its appreciation of the very valuable work done by Mr. van Tets as Chairman of the Committee. There remained the question of a successor for Mr. van Tets. The chairmanship of the Committee was an exacting task which necessitated the closest possible contact with the Infrastructure Section of the International Staff. If delegations should find it difficult to provide a suitable candidate with sufficient time to carry out this task, he would be willing to make a member of the International Staff available as Chairman.

35. The COUNCIL:

(1) recorded its appreciation of the very valuable work done by Mr. van Tets as Chairman of the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee;

(2) agreed to take a decision as to the successor to Mr. van Tets at its next meeting.

VI. ALLIED COMMANDER CHANNEL AND SOUTHERN NORTH SEA

36. The COUNCIL:

confirmed the appointment of Admiral Sir George Creasy to relieve Admiral Sir John Edelsten as NATO Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel and Southern North Sea in September 1954.

VII. SECURITY OF COUNCIL DOCUMENTS ON TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET POLICY

37. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that at recent Ministerial Meetings a certain journalist had had access to and had quoted from each of the Council's papers on trends of Soviet policy. This could only bring into disrepute the security system of NATO, since each of the documents had been classified as at least Secret. He asked whether delegations would like to have the distribution of this document, which was to be submitted for the next Ministerial Meeting, restricted.

38. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that countries which had secret information available on questions of this kind might be reluctant to make it available to NATO unless they were convinced that there would be no question of leakage.

39. Some doubt was expressed as to whether leakages would be prevented merely by restricting the number of copies of such documents issued.

40. The COUNCIL:

agreed that the distribution of the new document on trends and implications of Soviet policy should be restricted to 6 copies per delegation.

VIII. BRIEFING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS BY GENERAL GRUENTHER

41. The CHAIRMAN said that the Standing Group Liaison Officer
had informed him that the way was clear for the briefing in question so far as the Standing Group was concerned. The latter had authorised SACEUR to carry out the briefing, having been made aware of the Council feeling in the matter. He thought that, unfortunately, there might have been some misunderstanding of the Standing Group position in that the Council discussion at an earlier meeting seemed to give the impression that members of the Council felt that the Standing Group were opposed to the proposal that Ministers should be briefed by SACEUR at SHAPE. What the Standing Group had felt, and the Standing Group Liaison Officer had confirmed this, was that the question at issue was one of timing more than of principle. That is, the Standing Group were concerned that a briefing of Foreign Ministers, if at all publicised at this time, would lead to the Ministerial Meeting going into military questions, which would seem to require the presence of Ministers of Defence, when the meeting was in fact intended essentially as a political discussion.

42. The COUNCIL:

(1) noted that SACEUR would be available to brief those Foreign Ministers who so desired it on the morning of Saturday, 24th April;

(2) agreed that Ministers would take a decision as to whether or not they wished for a briefing on Friday, 23rd April;

(3) invited the Standing Group Liaison Officer to inform SACEUR of the above decisions of the Council.

IX. INVITATION OF THE COUNCIL TO ALLIED HEADQUARTERS MEDITERRANEAN

43. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that so far only three delegations had indicated a desire to accept Lord Mountbatten's invitation to visit his headquarters at the end of July in connection with Exercise Med-Flex Baker. Would Permanent Representatives inform his private office whether no members, one member, or two members of their delegation would be able to accept the invitation? Two members per delegation was the maximum.

44. The COUNCIL:

took note of the statement by the Chairman.

X. FUTURE MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL

Formal meeting: Tuesday, 20th April at 4 p.m., unless urgent business made it necessary to convene a meeting of the Council at an earlier date.

XI. CONTINUATION OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE LATEST SOVIET NOTE

Previous reference: C-R(54)11

45. The CHAIRMAN suggested to Permanent Representatives that, in conformity with the decision of the Council at its last meeting, this was an appropriate moment for them to make known the views of their governments in order that those views could be
taken into account in the preparation of the reply to the Soviet
Note by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to
whom the Soviet Note had been addressed.

46. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE thought that the
personal views expressed at the last meeting were a valuable
background for the present discussion. He and his colleagues
of France and the United Kingdom, thought that it was of great
importance that the views of the other members of NATO should
be fully expressed for communication to the three Governments
to whom the Note was addressed in helping them to draft their
reply. The reply to the Note was of great importance, and was
of concern to all NATO countries. There had been general agree-
ment at the previous meeting that the basic purpose of the Note
was propaganda, and that it was intended to divide opinion in
NATO countries and to hold up ratification of the EDC Treaty.

47. He then informed the Council that a Tri-partite Working
Group had been set up in Paris to draft a reply to the Note, and
that it had had its first preliminary discussion the previous
day. It was therefore of great importance for Permanent Represent-
atives to make known their views, which would be passed on to the
Working Group at the earliest possible moment.

48. A brief discussion followed as to whether it would be
better to wait until a first draft had been prepared by the
Working Group and then to examine it, or to have an exchange of
views for the information of the Working Group. It was generally
agreed that since the Soviet Note was of direct concern to all
NATO countries, the views of member governments should be made
available to the Working Group to help them in the preparation of
their reply. It was also hoped that the reply itself could be
considered by the Council before it was dispatched.

49. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government
agreed that the reply to the Soviet Note was a question of the
greatest importance. The Note was addressed more to the peoples
of the West and to the Iron Curtain countries than to the
Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States.
In other words, his Government agreed that the essential purpose
of the Note was propaganda and that, if the proposals contained
in it were meant sincerely, they should be followed up by the USSR
in a realistic manner. His Government wondered, for example,
whether the USSR was ready to submit to a detailed control of
its defence plans, as it would have to do if it really wanted to
become a member of NATO; whether it was ready to agree to free
elections in Germany as a first step to the solution of the
German problem; whether it was ready to accept the same standards
of free democratic rights as were observed in NATO countries.
If the USSR showed real proof that it was prepared to do all this,
then the substance of the proposals would have to be taken
seriously. His Government did not believe that this was the
case.

50. He added that he thought that one might take the
position at the end of the Second World War as a starting point.
UNO had then been considered by the democratic countries as the
basis on which a system of collective security could be built.
In consequence, the Western Powers had made considerable reductions
in their armed forces, while the USSR had shown no sign of doing so.
Next, the work of the Security Council of the United Nations had
been paralysed by the USSR use of the veto. In 1948, therefore, since the position continued to deteriorate, the Western Powers had been forced to agree that there could be no universal security on the basis of UNO, and it was for that reason that NATO had come into being. In other words, if no universal basis for security could be found, security had to be built up on a regional basis. He felt that an effective reply to the Soviet Note could be prepared by analysing Soviet policy and actions since 1945, highlighting its unwillingness to take any constructive steps to strengthen peace.

51. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would confine himself to emphasising the main points which, in the view of his Government, should be included in the reply to the Soviet Note. These points were as follows:

(a) The Western countries had consistently adopted a policy of strengthening peace and security, and were therefore ready to discuss any constructive proposal. They had already proposed certain measures relating to disarmament and the abolition of atomic weapons, such as the plan put forward by President Eisenhower.

(b) The Atlantic Pact, based upon common defence and the development of free democratic constitutions, had a well-defined regional character. The attempt to transform it into an anti-German pact, implicit in the Soviet proposal, was unrealistic and did not make sense.

(c) Further, the Soviet proposal would mean in effect duplication of the work of the United Nations, while the unanimity rule followed by NATO would put the USSR in the easy position of being able to prevent any work being done by NATO by abuse of their right of veto, as they were already doing in UNO.

(d) A general European treaty of security could not be taken into serious consideration until two fundamental problems had been equitably solved: the problems of Austria and Germany. NATO could not accept any proposal reaffirming the partition of Germany.

(e) If the USSR really wanted to eliminate the causes of world tension, they would very soon have an opportunity of giving real proof of their goodwill at the Geneva Conference.

52. Since the Soviet Note was a very clever document from the point of view of propaganda, the Italian Delegation recommended that in the drafting of the reply repercussions on the public opinion of NATO peoples should be borne constantly in mind.

53. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that he had two suggestions which he would like to make so far as the reply to the Note was concerned:
(a) the Note laid emphasis on the fact that the Soviet Government had taken the initiative in UNO in proposing a general arms reduction and the prohibition of atomic and other weapons of wholesale annihilation. This was a point on which a clear cut answer must be given. The reasons why it had proved impossible at UNO to take any action to reduce armaments and to prohibit atomic weapons must be clearly stated. Those reasons were, of course, the difficulties that had been encountered, difficulties which were directly attributable to the policy of the USSR and in no way due to the Western Powers.

(b) the Note, not for the first time, presented NATO as an aggressive organization. That presentation must be countered, not merely by stressing the defensive character of NATO, but by going further and pointing out that NATO had come into being solely as a result of the aggressive policy of the USSR. In this connection, the political position in 1948 should be recalled: if this were done, the fact that the West had been obliged to set up the defensive organization which was NATO could be clearly shown.

54. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE agreed that the reply to the Note was a question of the greatest importance and that, whatever they might feel as to the sincerity of the proposals made, the reply must be very carefully studied. Previous notes from the Soviet to France, the United Kingdom and the United States had been concerned with Germany and, since those were the three powers occupying Germany, NATO as a whole had been only concerned indirectly. On this occasion, all NATO governments were concerned, since the USSR had proposed that it should become a member of NATO. For that reason he thought it appropriate that the three powers, in their reply to the Note, should state that the Note and the terms of the reply had been discussed in the Council of NATO.

55. The first point which, he thought, should be emphasised in the reply was the fundamental insincerity of almost the first sentence of the Note, which read as follows: "The Soviet Union has consistently pursued a policy of peace and of improving relations between countries". A lead-in of this kind falsified the whole of the arguments which were subsequently developed. NATO countries could agree about the danger inherent in an armaments race and in the development of two blocs, but NATO should make it completely clear that the armaments race and the existence of two blocs was the fault of the USSR. The reply to the Note could do this by stressing the fundamental insincerity of the sentence he had just quoted, pointing out that nine years after the war had ended there was still no peace treaty with Austria and Germany, that the problem of the satellite countries remained acute, and that recent events in Korea and Indo-China falsified the Soviet claim that it had been pursuing a policy of peace.

56. He thought that the reply should stress the fact that NATO countries would be glad to see discussions of the problems which remained unsettled taking place in the appropriate forum.
the German and Austrian problem by the four powers, the rearmaments
test and the question of atomic weapons in UNO, and Far Eastern
problems in Geneva. The reply should emphasise that they would
welcome any arrangements which would lessen world tension,
provided that the principles in which they believed were not
abandoned.

57. Next, the reply should bring out the fact that the
European defence system which had been created had come into
being because of the aggressive attitude adopted by the USSR since
1945, and that the member countries of NATO and the EDC had the
same general outlook on the importance of freedom and genuine
democracy, and a common cultural background. It was therefore
impossible for them to renounce the links that bound them as a
result of their common culture.

58. Finally, he said that he had been greatly struck by a
recent speech by Mr. Pearson, the Foreign Minister of Canada, in
which he had said that NATO countries had "a common devotion to
freedom, law and justice ..... and a common belief in the
supremacy of the individual over the state". He thought that
those remarks typified the character of NATO, and should be
stressed in the reply. On the other hand, it should be made
clear that any steps taken by the USSR which led to a general
relaxation of tension and to a real hope of peace in the world
would result in the military aspect of NATO becoming less
important.

59. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would speak
first on the substantive issues involved, and then on the form
which he thought the reply should take. With regard to the
substance, he made the following points:

(a) NATO should remain faithful to its declared policy,
    which was to strengthen the defence of the West, in,
    which the EDC was a vital factor, and at the same
time remain willing to consider any reasonable
    proposal by the USSR.

(b) There should be no question of any suggestion of
dropping the EDC as a result of the Soviet
    proposals.

(c) The entry of the USSR into NATO should be rejected
    as incompatible with, and dangerous to, the
    security which NATO gave the Western Powers.

(d) Careful study should be made to see whether the
    Soviet Note was really based on a desire to bring
    about relaxation of international tension, and the
    extent to which the system of guarantees included
    in the Note formed a valid basis for discussion.

60. So far as the form of the reply was concerned, it was
difficult to be precise, but he thought that it should make clear
exactly what NATO stood for. In this connection, he thought
four points should be stressed; even if they were not expressed
in the reply, they should always be borne in mind:

(a) NATO countries were attached to the principle
    of collective security within the framework of UNO;
The USSR had made it impossible to achieve this object; and that was why NATO had come into existence. It was a regional pact to achieve collective security.

It was within the power of the USSR to make NATO unnecessary in its military aspects by helping to bring about collective security in the framework of UNO.

The propaganda nature of the Note should be borne in mind, and from this point of view the drafting of the reply was extremely important. The reply ought to be short; short replies were good propaganda and did not encourage controversies. Some interesting points could be discovered in the Soviet Note as a starting point for a positive approach. As an example, there was the statement that the Soviet Government was acting on the principle that there were other, as yet unutilised, opportunities for building up peace. The reply should stress the fact that if there was progress in the thought of the USSR, there was no progress in its choice of means. The means proposed would lead to the exact contrary of the purpose avowed. To accept the Soviet proposal would place NATO in a state of weakness which would render any security impossible. The creation of NATO had not been simultaneous with and parallel to that of the Soviet bloc; the latter had been in existence at a time when, in the West, a community of nations was set up, the purpose of which was, with defensive aims, to achieve a balance of forces to meet an existing threat. In face of that the USSR had not only never reduced its armed forces, but had increased them, thus preventing the achievement of balance.

It should further be stated that the EDC was an essential part of the minimum security aimed at by the Atlantic Community. Finally, discussion of the security guarantees could only be effective if it was based on an equality or a balance of forces, and not on a basis which would leave the Atlantic Community in a position of inferiority.

The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government's study of the Note had led it to much the same conclusions as those expressed by the French Representative at the previous meeting, i.e., that it was intended primarily to prevent the EDC from coming into being and to rule out the possibility of German participation in the defence of the West. He had been interested in the point made by the French Representative as to the difference in tactics shown in this Note compared with Soviet tactics at Berlin. He did not propose to comment for the time being on the USSR proposal for a European Treaty which was under consideration at Ottawa. In any case, this was a question which did not concern Canada so directly as it did other countries. On the other hand, the proposal that the USSR should become a member of NATO was of direct concern to Canada. In his view, rejection of this proposal should be based on the following grounds:

(a) NATO was created precisely to organize the defence of the countries of the Atlantic Community because they felt themselves in grave peril of Soviet aggression and subversion and because the
Soviet Government had demonstrated its determination to prevent the United Nations Security Council (the only machinery for collective security then existing) from functioning.

(b) The Soviet Government had so far not shown by any deeds (as opposed to words) that this basic situation had changed; Soviet armed forces were still at a level which reflected a preponderance of military strength in Europe; rearmament continued to be pushed in the Soviet satellites; rearmament of Eastern Germany was going on apace (which was not true in Western Germany) while the Soviet Government blocked every effort to reunite Germany on a democratic basis; the Soviet Government continued to maintain sizeable occupation forces in Austria and refused to sign a peace treaty; Communist parties in Western Europe were still used as an instrument of Soviet policy to sabotage every effort at economic recovery and political co-operation.

(c) For these reasons NATO in its present form continued to be essential for the legitimate defence of the free world against possible Soviet aggression.

(d) NATO was also important - perhaps in the long run even more important - as a vehicle of ever closer co-operation between like-minded nations united in a community of interest.

(e) In both these rôles NATO was based on far-reaching obligations which involved the members in close and continuing co-operation and which required a high degree of mutual confidence and exchange of information in the military, political and economic fields.

64. Although the arguments against the Soviet proposal regarding NATO were clear and overwhelming, his Government thought it important to ensure that the impression was not created that it was being rejected without serious consideration. On the other hand, the reply should also try to ensure that the grounds for rejection were frankly stated and that the Soviet challenge was directly met.

65. He added, that if the USSR were genuinely desirous of co-operating in a collective security system, they could show this by their attitude and policy at the United Nations, as for example in regard to the talks on atomic matters.

66. To sum up:

(a) The Big Three in their answer should be frank and candid. This, he thought, would be helpful in emphasising the machiavellian character of the latest Soviet move.

(b) It would not be a bad idea in the reply to indicate very frankly why the Russians
could not join NATO. Such a line would make it necessary to admit frankly that while NATO had been saying all along that it was not directed against anybody in particular, it was directed defensively, at least, against the USSR.

(c) The major issue raised by the Soviet Note was that of security. The reply must meet the Russian challenge on the basis of NATO principles. The Russians suggested big power deals. What NATO must re-emphasise were the principles underlying the UN Charter. He thought that the reply should indicate what the democratic world and the free world wished to achieve as regards the organization of collective security. This would make it plain, incidentally, that if the Russians made it impossible to organize security on a world-wide basis, which was the primary objective, they could not be permitted to upset the second best arrangement which had been set up, i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

67. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government had studied the latest Soviet Note very attentively, taking into account during its study the information given by General Gruenther on the military position of NATO and the Communist bloc respectively.

68. The Turkish Government wished first of all to consider the reasons for which, recently, the Soviet Government had been pursuing its peace offensive policy. The present Note was a stage in that policy. In its opinion the USSR was fully aware of its inferiority with regard to atomic weapons and knew that it must win time to catch up in this field and to continue its aggressive purposes. In view of this inferiority, and taking into account its need to gain time, it was trying to influence public opinion of the Western democratic peoples to bring pressure to bear on their governments to obtain, first, the prohibition of atomic weapons. Secondly, it was trying to prevent the strengthening of European defence by German participation in it and to prevent also the entry into force of the EDC. It was, of course, aiming at disrupting NATO either by rendering it inoperative by becoming a member or by paralysing it by preventing the entry into force of the EDC. Further, one of the objects of Russia in inviting the West to settle an international problem such as the prohibition of atomic weapons was to compel the West to enter into relations with Communist China, the main ally of the Soviet.

69. A careful study of the reasons for the dispatch of the Note seemed to justify the conclusion that the USSR was trying:

(a) to build up military strength by a prohibition of atomic weapons which would leave it superior in the field of conventional arms;

(b) to prevent the participation of Germany in the defence of the West;

(c) to disrupt NATO by becoming a member.
70. The Turkish Government believed that this three-fold attempt to weaken the defence of the West should be categorically answered in the reply on the following lines:

(a) by emphasising the danger inherent in Soviet superiority in conventional arms and in linking this fact with the proposed prohibition of atomic weapons. It should also be stressed that it was Russia which had begun the armaments race and was continuing it, while other states had disarmed after the end of the Second World War;

(b) by pointing out, in contradiction to what the Russian Note implied, that NATO had come into existence late in the day and only to ensure the defence of Western countries in face of the Soviet threat which was continuing to grow;

(c) by pointing out that the EDC also represented no more than a cautious reply to the Soviet policy of arming the satellites and East Germany to the teeth;

(d) by rejecting categorically any question of participation of the Soviet in NATO, which the democratic countries had been obliged to set up because the idea of collective security with the participation of the USSR had been proved impracticable as a result of the aggressive Soviet policy in UNO;

(e) by stating clearly that the members of NATO were obliged to continue their defensive efforts in the framework of NATO so long as the threat of Soviet military force remained.

71. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had had no instructions from his Government, but wished to make the following points in his personal capacity:

(a) The Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy should examine the Note to see whether it bore any evidence of a real change in tactics or general strategy on the part of the USSR.

(b) The reply to the Note should be governed by a positive approach. The point should be made that the problems raised in the Note, such as the danger of an armaments race and of unconventional weapons, were of great concern to NATO countries as well as to the USSR and that NATO was anxious to find a solution to them.

(c) At the same time, though NATO countries wanted a solution, they did not consider that these were problems for NATO to solve. There was an appropriate forum in which such problems could be examined; NATO was a regional defence system which had come into being to meet a threat for which NATO countries were not responsible, and the problems to which he had referred should be solved elsewhere.
(d) He agreed with the Canadian Representative that it might be well to admit frankly that, while NATO was not directed aggressively against any country, it was directed from a defensive point of view against the bloc of countries whose aggressive policy had brought it into being.

(e) What was the timetable proposed with regard to the reply to the Soviet Note?

72. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that he agreed with the views expressed by previous speakers, and at the present stage wished to make only one point. They were all agreed that the essential purpose of the Note was propaganda, and that the Note had had a considerable effect on the public opinion of their countries. From that point of view it might have been desirable if an immediate reply could have been given. Since that had proved impossible, he thought that the reply should concentrate on showing the essentially defensive character of NATO and should quote the facts which had lead up to the signature of the treaty for defensive purposes. The real proof of a change of heart on the part of the USSR could be given at the Geneva Conference, and the reply should point out that it was only action at the Geneva Conference which could convince NATO that the USSR was genuinely anxious to see a relaxation of world tension.

73. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said that he was grateful to his colleagues who had expressed the views of their governments at the present meeting, and was convinced that in doing so they had made a valuable contribution to the three powers whose direct responsibility it was to prepare the reply to the Soviet Note. The views expressed at the meeting would be fully reported to the persons responsible for preparing the draft of the reply. The discussion had shown that there was no divergence of views among Permanent Representatives. So far as the question of timetable was concerned, two views were at present under consideration by his Government. The first, that the reply should be sent fairly rapidly, that is, before the Geneva Conference; the second, that the reply should be delayed until after that Conference. In favour of a fairly rapid reply was the fact that it was important to prevent public opinion from going astray as a result of the insidious suggestions contained in the Note. In favour of delaying the reply was the argument that, if it were sent before the Geneva Conference, that Conference might find itself held up by having to consider a problem not related to the problems of the Far East.

74. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he thought that it was desirable to send the reply before the Geneva Conference. He went on to say that he thought that the West could take advantage of the Soviet Note from a propaganda point of view by making it clear that so long as the threat from the USSR remained - as it certainly did at the moment - NATO could not relax its efforts. NATO had come into existence to meet this very danger, and the danger was still a real one. This fundamental point should be emphasised in the reply. In other words, the reply should concentrate on Soviet responsibility for the present tension in world relations.
75. The COUNCIL:

(1) agreed that a full record should be prepared of the present exchange of views;

(2) expressed the hope that the reply to be prepared by the three powers would be submitted to the Council for consideration sufficiently in advance of the time at which it was proposed to dispatch it for effective examination in the Council;

(3) agreed to meet as soon as any draft of a reply was submitted to it by the three powers;

(4) agreed to inform the press, if the latter put the question, that the Council had had an exchange of views on the Soviet Note at its present meeting.

Palais de Chaillot, Paris, XVIe.