NATO

THE FIRST FIVE YEARS
1949-1954

by Lord Ismay
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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VII
INTRODUCTION

The signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in April, 1949, marked the beginning of a revolutionary and constructive experiment in international relations. In signing the Treaty twelve independent sovereign states – later to be joined by others – undertook pledges which called for immediate and continuous collective action, not only in the military, but also in the political, economic and social fields.

This survey is an attempt to relate in a concise form why the Treaty was signed, what it means, how the machinery, both civil and military, for implementing its terms has been evolved, how that machinery works and what has been accomplished in the first five years of the Alliance – from 1949 until July 1954. It is primarily intended to serve as a work of reference for all who are concerned with NATO affairs, either in the various agencies of the Organization itself or in their own countries. But it is hoped that it may also be helpful to the parliaments of member countries and indeed to the citizens of the whole Atlantic Community, on whose understanding and co-operation the future of the Alliance so greatly depends.

The survey bears witness to the wisdom of the statesmen who negotiated the Treaty. They did not attempt, at the outset, to draw up a blueprint of the international organization which should be set up, or to lay down any hard and fast rules of procedure. They realised that these could only be evolved step by step in the light of practical experience, and they proceeded accordingly. Thus, it was after much patient research and prolonged discussions by technical experts and numerous committees, after much experiment and not a few errors, that the Organization as it exists today was brought into being. Let it not be thought for a moment that the present arrangements are final: on the contrary they can, and will, be improved as time goes on and further experience is gained.

Nevertheless, many people will, I believe, be surprised at the range of activities covered by NATO, impressed by the lengths to which the principle of alliance has been carried, and encouraged by the achievements of NATO’s first five years. In summary these are: a Council in permanent session, with effective power of decision, meeting once, twice or even thrice a week—at half-an-hour’s notice if need be—served by an International Staff, and a large number of committees and working groups, working day in, day out, on a wide variety of NATO problems; a military organization established to defend all NATO territories against armed attack, including a network of commands covering the North Atlantic Ocean and the European continent from the North Cape to North Africa and from the Channel to the Caucasus mountains; a shield of armed forces, not yet strong enough to resist an all-out attack but, according to the Supreme Commander in Europe, sufficiently strong not to be overcome by the forces which the Russians
at present maintain outside the Soviet Union proper; remarkable cohesion between the armed forces of the member nations; impressive achievements in infrastructure; valuable studies of all those measures which go to ensure that the home fronts would be able to stand the strain if war should unhappily be forced upon them.

These are noteworthy achievements: but there is another achievement which is perhaps even more valuable — namely the remarkable degree of unity which characterises all the NATO agencies. A visitor to the NATO Defence College will see officers of eight or ten different nations working in the same study group and lunching together afterwards, learning each others’ viewpoints and making friendships that will endure perhaps for a lifetime. There is the same atmosphere at all NATO military headquarters. General Gruenther, for instance, recently said: ‘In my 35 years of service I have been in many headquarters but I have never had experience with a happier one than SHAPE’. A visit to the international manoeuvres which go on practically the whole year round in the NATO area is an encouraging experience. Here, in peacetime, men belonging to different nations, speaking different languages, wearing different uniforms, carry out together, with admirable precision, exercises of impressive magnitude. The forces of NATO are no longer a dream, they are a reality.

On the civil side, no member of the International Staff regards himself as a national of his own country. They all feel themselves members of an international team dedicated to the service of the Alliance as a whole.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is now entering upon a new phase which should demonstrate once again its adaptability to change and its capacity for progress. As this Introduction goes to the printer, the problem of closely associating the Federal Republic of Germany with the free countries of the West is, we hope, about to be resolved. The solution in prospect will be different in kind, but not in purpose, from the one originally proposed as far back as 1950 under the name of the European Defence Community, and later formally endorsed by the North Atlantic Council. On the 22nd October, 1954, the Council, meeting in Paris, welcomed the decisions of the Nine-Power London Conference, aimed at furthering the security of Europe by reinforcing and extending the Brussels Treaty. On the same day, the fourteen member governments of NATO approved the text of a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany*. Once parliaments have ratified the agreements, the North Atlantic Alliance, fifteen members strong, should find itself considerably reinforced — first politically, later militarily. This should enable us to look to the future with renewed optimism and confidence.

Many difficulties, however, still remain, and others will surely arise as time goes on. Our community of free nations, with interests extending to many parts of the world, is bound to be constantly faced with new problems requiring new solutions. Indeed, we in NATO will need, for years to come, a great deal of imagination and energy in order to develop by collective action the defensive power of our Alliance and to tighten in all fields the bonds between member states on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Complacency and weariness are among the evils we must guard against. The longer a man carries a load, the heavier it seems to become: and all the member

* The agreements, protocols and communiqués resulting from the Nine-Power and Fourteen-Power October Conferences are of such importance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization that it has been thought appropriate to add them to this survey as a special appendix, in spite of the fact that they do not relate to the period of NATO’S First Five Years.
countries have been carrying a heavy load of defence expenditure for a long time. There is a feeling too, that with our growing strength and cohesion, and the apparent change of the technique of the Soviet leaders since the death of Marshal Stalin, the danger of aggression has somewhat receded. Nevertheless, the threat remains and it would be a mockery of all the exertions and sacrifices that have been made if the members of the North Atlantic Alliance were, under whatever pretext, to allow their unity to be disrupted.

At the momentous Conference of October 1954, the member governments reaffirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty remains a basic element in their foreign policies. Let us keep these words uppermost in our minds. Our fate is in our own hands. If we remain united, true to ourselves and to each other, we will avoid the unspeakable horrors of a third world war and be able to devote to the tasks of peace an ever increasing measure of our energies and resources.

ISMAY

1st November, 1954.
Palis de Chaillot, Paris, France.
PART I

HISTORY
CHAPTER I

ORIGINS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

THE MORROW OF VICTORY

On the 26th June, 1945, shortly after the collapse of Nazi Germany and a few weeks before the capitulation of Japan, the representatives of fifty nations signed the Charter of the United Nations in San Francisco. People the world over dared to hope that after one of the most devastating wars in history an era of peace had at last dawned. True, they remembered that the League of Nations had attempted to build up a system of collective security and had failed. But this time things were different. All the surviving Great Powers were founder members of the new international organization. Practically all the remaining strength and wealth of the world were at its service.

The Charter was founded on two assumptions. First, that the five Powers holding permanent seats in the Security Council – China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union – would be able to reach lasting agreement on major matters. Secondly, that apart from Russia’s known claims on Japan, none of these Powers sought any territorial aggrandizement. Unfortunately, neither of these assumptions proved correct. When we look back over the events of the past nine years, we can see that no sooner had Hitler’s empire crumbled than the Western countries – some of them hardly liberated from enemy occupation – were again faced by another peril, coming this time from Communist Russia. The defeat of the two great military and industrial countries, Germany and Japan, had left a vast vacuum of strength to the west and to the east of the Soviet Union. The history of the immediate post-war period is largely that of how the Kremlin, aided by exceptionally favourable circumstances, used the combined strength of the Red Army and world Communism to carry forward expansionist policies, and of how the rest of the world reacted.

Even in 1945 the most confirmed optimist could not claim that the international sky was clear: and Prime Minister Churchill was not alone in the anxieties which he expressed in his telegram* of 12th May to President Truman.

*I am profoundly concerned about the European situation*, he cabled. *I learn that half the American Air Force in Europe has already begun to move to the Pacific theatre. The newspapers are full of the great movements of American armies out of Europe. Our armies also are, under previous arrangements, likely to undergo a marked reduction. The Canadian Army will certainly leave. The French are weak... In a short space of time our armed power on the Continent will have vanished, except for moderate forces to hold down Germany.*

*Meanwhile what is to happen about Russia?... I feel deep anxiety because of

* Quoted in ‘Triumph and Tragedy’, by Sir Winston Churchill.
their misinterpretation of the Yalta decisions, their attitude towards Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans, excepting Greece, the difficulties they make about Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the territories under their control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field. What will be the position in a year or two when the British and American Armies have melted and the French have not yet been formed on any major scale... and when Russia may choose to keep 200-300 divisions on active service?

'An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind... A broad band of many hundreds of miles will isolate us from Poland.

'Meanwhile, the attention of our peoples will be occupied in inflicting severities upon Germany, which is ruined and prostrate, and it would be open to the Russians in a very short time to advance, if they chose, to the waters of the North Sea and the Atlantic...'

THE WEST DISARMS

Notwithstanding all these uncertainties the Western democracies were for a long time reluctant to face the implications of Soviet policy. True to wartime pledges and to popular demand America and Britain quickly withdrew the bulk of their armies from the Continent. Except for occupation forces and for units committed in other parts of the world, they demobilised most of their troops. The soldiers wanted to get home; the peoples were war weary and wanted to forget; and the formidable task of reconstruction was absorbing the energy of the European nations.

On the day that Germany surrendered, the American armed strength in Europe amounted to 3,100,000 men: within one year it had melted to 391,000. On VE Day the British armed strength in Europe was 1,321,000: one year later there were only 488,000 left. On VE Day Canada had 299,000 men in Europe: within a year they had all gone home. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union continued to maintain their forces on a war footing and to keep their armament production going at full blast. How futile the good faith of the Western Powers and their sincere efforts to cooperate with Soviet Russia were to prove, will be shown by a brief summary of the governing events of the next four years.

CONCILIATION FAILS

The Western Powers, remembering the splendid fighting qualities of the Red Army and the sufferings of the Soviet people at the hands of the Nazi invaders, went to the very limit of conciliation in their efforts to reach an accommodation with the Soviet Government, and to make the United Nations an effective instrument for the preservation of world peace. They met with nothing but obstruction.

At San Francisco in 1945, Poland had no seat at the conference table because Russia and the Western Powers had been unable to agree on the composition of the Polish provisional Government. At the London Conference of Foreign Ministers in September, barely three months after the signature of the United Nations Charter, Mr. Molotov blocked any discussion of Mr. Ernest Bevin's proposals for an independent enquiry into conditions in Rumania and Bulgaria. It was only after making concessions about the Far East that the Western Ministers were
able, two months later, to secure Russian agreement on a procedure for framing peace treaties with Italy, Finland and with Germany's former satellites in the Balkans. The Peace Conference opened in Paris on the 29th July, 1946, and on the 10th February, 1947, treaties of peace were signed with Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.

In March, 1947, the Foreign Ministers met in Moscow to discuss the drafting of peace treaties for Germany and Austria. They were unable to agree on what Germany's fate should be; and when the Western Ministers left Moscow at the end of April, with the problem no nearer solution, the schism in the alliance which had defeated the Axis Powers appeared irreparable. Yet another Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in London in November, 1947. It only confirmed the stalemate. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet Representatives walked out of the Allied Control Council in Berlin.

It is true that the Foreign Ministers met once again in Paris in May, 1949, to discuss German and Austrian problems, and that their deputies spent 109 days at the ill-fated Conference at the Palais Rose in Paris in 1951, preoccupied with the single task of attempting to draw up an agenda for another meeting at ministerial level. But for all practical purposes the Moscow Conference of 1947 marked the end of post-war co-operation between Russia and the democratic countries.

SOVIET EXPANSION

Meanwhile, Soviet expansion, which had in fact started during the war with the outright annexation of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and areas in Finland, Poland, Rumania, North Eastern Germany and Eastern Czechoslovakia—representing a haul of 200,632 square miles and almost 25 million people—continued inexorably after the surrender of Germany. The presence of the victorious Red Armies in the heart of Europe, coupled with Soviet political technique, compelled Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to fall under Soviet domination. These countries, covering approximately 392,439 square miles with a population of about 87 million non-Russian people and national incomes equivalent to about half that of the USSR, were incorporated into the Soviet empire by a process of 'conquest without war'. Soon the satellite countries were being firmly bound to Moscow and to each other by a network of political, economic and military agreements: 23 such treaties were signed in Eastern Europe between 1943 and 1949*.

M. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign affairs,

* By 31st March, 1949, the USSR had treaties of mutual assistance with the following states in Central and Eastern Europe: Czechoslovakia (12 Dec. 1943); Yugoslavia (11 April 1945); Poland (21 April 1945); Rumania (4 Feb. 1948); Hungary (16 Feb. 1948); Bulgaria (18 March 1948).

The European 'people's democracies' were linked by similar treaties: Poland-Yugoslavia (18 March 1946); Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia (9 May 1946); Albania-Yugoslavia (9 July 1946); Czechoslovakia-Poland (10 March 1947); Bulgaria-Yugoslavia (27 Nov. 1947); Hungary-Yugoslavia (8 Dec. 1947); Albania-Bulgaria (16 Dec. 1947); Rumania-Yugoslavia (19 Dec. 1947); Bulgaria-Rumania (16 Jan. 1948); Hungary-Rumania (24 Jan. 1948); Czechoslovakia-Bulgaria (23 April 1948); Bulgaria-Poland (29 May 1948); Poland-Hungary (18 June 1948); Hungary-Bulgaria (16 July 1948); Czechoslovakia-Rumania (21 July 1948); Poland-Rumania (26 Jan. 1949). Counting the agreement of 16 April 1949, between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and eliminating the seven treaties with Yugoslavia which were unilaterally denounced by the Soviet bloc later in 1949, there remain sixteen treaties covering Eastern Europe. The treaties with ex-enemy states were concluded only after the entry into force of the Peace Treaties with Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Finland.
summed up the story of Soviet expansion in striking language. He told the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948: 'There is but one Great Power that emerged from the war having conquered other territories, and that Power is the USSR'.

Mention may also be made here of the pressure, direct and indirect, which was exercised by the Soviet in various parts of the world: in Northern Persia, where the Russians sought in vain, after the war, to maintain their troops; in Turkey, where both the government and the people resisted all Russian attempts at intimidation; in Greece, where the guerrilla warfare which had started in 1944 developed by 1946 into a very serious conflict, the rebels being supported from bases in neighbouring Communist states. In Asia, the Soviet Union greatly expanded its influence by the occupation in 1945 of most of Manchuria and of North Korea. With the climax of the civil war in China came an intensification of Communist agitation throughout South-East Asia where the French and their associates in Indo-China had been waging for some time important operations against a Communist-led rebellion. Likewise, large British forces were tied down by Communist guerrillas in Malaya.

SUPPORT FROM AMERICA

The situation all over the world was going from bad to worse. It was proving impossible to reach agreement with the Soviets on any international issue. At Lake Success repeated attempts of the free countries to negotiate a general scheme of disarmament and to devise a method of controlling the production and the use of atomic energy, had failed entirely. From behind the Iron Curtain came nothing but slander and bullying. But 1947 was to witness helping hands stretched out to suffering Europe from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

In March of that year, the issue of the struggle in Greece hung in the balance. It seemed certain that without the continuance of the substantial military and financial aid which Britain had given but could no longer afford, Greece would succumb to the Communists and be dragged behind the Iron Curtain. Turkey and the Middle East would then be left to the mercy of the Soviet Union.

American reaction was prompt and decisive. ‘It must be the policy of the United States of America’, President Truman told Congress on the 12th March, 1947, ‘to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities, or by outside pressure’. Following that statement, which became known as the ‘Truman Doctrine’, the Congress of the United States authorised the appropriation of $ 400 million for aid to Greece and Turkey up to June, 1948, and the despatch to those countries of American civilian and military missions.

The ‘Truman Doctrine’ was designed to deal with the specific threat to Greece and Turkey. But the situation throughout Western Europe was no less alarming. Up to the present, the free countries of Europe had approached the tasks of post-war reconstruction as a number of individual national problems. In spite of emergency aid received by each of them from the United States to relieve the most pressing shortages, the mechanism of European economy remained badly jammed. Western Europe would shortly be on the brink of economic ruin.

It was in this critical situation that General of the Army George C. Marshall (then United States Secretary of State) made the speech at Harvard on the 5th June, 1947, which initiated the European Recovery Programme. ‘The truth of the matter’, he said, ‘is that Europe’s requirements for the next three or four years of foreign goods and other essential products – principally from America – are so much greater than her ability to pay that she must have substantial ad-
ditional help, or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character'.

General Marshall believed that it was logical for the United States to help. He suggested that the European countries should agree on their requirements and that the programme to be prepared by their governments should be 'a joint one, agreed by a number, if not all, of the European Nations'.

At the same time, he made it abundantly clear that American policy was 'directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos': indeed the Soviet Union itself and the other countries behind the Iron Curtain were included in the offer of economic assistance. But Stalin refused American aid for Russia and, despite initial interest on the part of Czechoslovakia and Poland, forced these governments to do likewise. His answer was to set up the Cominform. Its membership included Communist parties from nine countries on the continent; and its aim was to fight the Marshall Plan as 'an instrument of American imperialism'.

But the danger to the Western democracies was not only economic. Russia had paralysed the work of the United Nations Security Council by the abuse of her power of veto. She had armed forces amounting to some 4½ million men on a war footing and equipped, for the most part, with the latest weapons. In addition, she was engaged on organizing the armies of her satellites on Soviet lines, despite the fact that to rearm Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary was a direct violation of the Peace Treaties signed with those three countries in 1947. Finally, the Soviet armament industries were working at high pressure.

In the face of this threat, the armed forces of the West were weak, uncoordinated, and drastically short of modern equipment. There was, in fact, nothing — except America's possession of the atomic bomb — to deter the Soviet from overrunning Western Europe. The only hope of even beginning to restore the balance of power lay in the free European countries combining together, not only for the sake of economic recovery, but also for the defence of their hearths and homes. Let us see how they met this challenge.

THE BRUSSELS TREATY

The idea of a defensive alliance between like-minded nations, within the framework of the United Nations, had already been mooted by Mr. Churchill in a speech at Fulton, Missouri, in March, 1946. Although cold-shouldered at the time, the idea was not forgotten, and over a year later it was taken up and amplified by Mr. Louis S. St. Laurent, then Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1947, Mr. St. Laurent expressed the concern of the peace-loving nations at the inability of the Security Council to ensure their protection. 'If forced', he said, 'these nations may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security'. Events soon confirmed his opinion.

On the 22nd January, 1948 the proposal for a form of western union, consisting of a network of bilateral agreements, was put forward by Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons. He quoted the Dunkirk Treaty of March, 1947, which had laid a firm basis for collaboration between France and Britain, and spoke of the need to conclude similar arrangements with Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, thus making 'an important nucleus in Western Europe'. He went on to say: 'We
shall have to consider the question of associating other historic members of European civilisation, including the new Italy, in this great concept... We are thinking of Western Europe as a unit.

Mr. Bevin had already advised the United States Secretary of State of his desire to launch 'some form of union in Western Europe, backed by the Americans and the Dominions'. His idea was warmly welcomed by General Marshall. It was felt in Washington, however, that as the Dunkirk Treaty had been aimed expressly against a renewed German aggression, a more suitable model might be the Rio Treaty between the United States and the Latin American countries, a collective defence arrangement aimed against any aggression. The three Benelux governments also informed London and Paris that they considered arrangements of the Dunkirk type inadequate.

While these problems were under discussion the Communist coup d'état in Prague on the 22nd February, 1948, came as a sharp reminder that time was running short. Stalin was proving proficient in Hitler’s technique of devouring his victims one by one.

On the 4th March, 1948, representatives of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to discuss a treaty of mutual assistance. On that same day, the French Foreign Minister, M. Georges Bidault sent an eloquent message to Secretary of State Marshall:

'The moment has come', he wrote, 'to strengthen on the political level and, as soon as possible, on the military level, the collaboration of the old and of the new world, both so closely united in their attachment to the only civilisation which counts'. M. Bidault declared that France, with Great Britain, was determined to do everything in her power to organize the common defence of the democratic countries of Europe. He expressed great gratitude for the economic assistance given by the United States but stressed, as Mr. Bevin had done in previous messages, that the resolve of the European countries to resist aggression could be effective only with American help. He proposed political consultations and the examination of technical problems 'concerned with common defence against a peril which can be immediate'.

A few days later, Mr. Bevin warned Washington of the possibility of a Soviet demand on Norway to negotiate a mutual defence agreement (a similar demand had been presented to Finland one year before) and asked for early discussion concerning the security of the North Atlantic area. In his reply to M. Bidault, General Marshall repeated what had already been told Mr. Bevin, that although the United States Government fully shared French preoccupations, the countries of Western Europe must show what they were prepared to do for themselves and for each other before asking for further American assistance.

On the 17th March, 1948, the Treaty of Brussels was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It pledged them to set up a joint defensive system as well as to strengthen their economic and cultural ties. The supreme body of the Brussels Treaty Organization was to be the Consultative Council, consisting of the five Foreign Ministers. Under it was to be a Western Defence Committee consisting of the Defence Ministers. Article IV of the Treaty stated that should any of the Parties be the object of an 'armed attack in Europe', the others would afford the attacked Party 'all the military and other aid and assistance in their power'. The duration of the Treaty was fifty years*.

* For extracts of the Brussels Treaty see Appendix II, page 168.
On the day the Treaty was signed, President Truman told the American Congress: 'I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them'. This was an important statement. The Brussels Powers certainly trusted that American planning would go beyond a promise of help after attack, and after Soviet occupation, which, in the words of the French Prime Minister, M. Henri Queuille, might amount to no more than attempting to 'liberate a corpse'.

The ink was scarcely dry on the signatures of the Brussels Treaty when the Soviet started their blockade of West Berlin; this was to last for 323 days and to be defeated by the prodigious feat of the air-lift. It was against this background of defiance and tension that plans for the defence of the West and negotiations for a North Atlantic treaty were pressed forward.

On the 30th April, 1948, the Defence Ministers and the Chiefs-of-Staff of the five Brussels Treaty countries met in London to study their military equipment needs, with a view to determining how much they could meet from their own production and how much supplementary aid should be requested from the United States. It is to be particularly noted that from July, 1948, onwards, American and Canadian experts attended these meetings with a 'non-member status'. Here was a foretaste of things to come.

In September, it was decided to create a military agency under the name of Western Union Defence Organization. Field Marshal Montgomery (UK) was appointed permanent Chairman of the Land, Naval and Air Commanders-in-Committee, with headquarters in Fontainebleau, France. Commanders-in-Chief were nominated: General de Lattre de Tassigny (France) for the Army, Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb (UK) for the Air, and Vice-Admiral Janjard (France) for the Navy.

Western Union was destined to make a most important contribution to the defence of the free world. Its existence in peacetime was a proof that the member countries were determined to combine to resist aggression. Apart from that, as will be seen later in this survey, it laid foundations which were to prove invaluable to NATO in the civilian as well as in the military fields.

THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION

The greatest step forward was still to be taken. On the 11th April, 1948, Secretary of State Marshall and Under-Secretary Robert M. Lovett began exploratory talks with Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally on the security problems of the North Atlantic area. On the 28th April, 1948, the idea of a single mutual defence system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty system, was publicly put forward by Mr. St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons. It was welcomed a week later in Westminster by Mr. Bevin. At about the same time Senator Vandenberg prepared, in consultation with the State Department, a resolution which recommended in part 'the association of the United States by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security', and the United States... 'contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 (of the United Nations Charter) should any armed attack occur affecting its national security' *.

* For the full text of the Vandenberg Resolution see Appendix III, page 171.
On the 11th June, 1948, Resolution 239 – better known as the Vandenberg Resolution – was passed by the United States Senate by 64 votes to 4. This marked a striking evolution in American foreign and defence policies in time of peace, and it made it possible for the United States to enter an Atlantic Alliance.

NEGOTIATING THE ATLANTIC TREATY

On the 6th July, 1948, the preliminary talks which led to the North Atlantic Treaty began in Washington between the State Department and the Ambassadors of Canada and of the Brussels Treaty Powers. It was agreed from the start that any treaty for common defence, linking countries from both sides of the Atlantic, should be within the framework of the United Nations’ Charter. These talks ended on the 9th September, 1948, with a report to governments recommending inter alia that the proposed treaty should:

- promote peace and security;
- express determination of the Parties to resist aggression;
- define the area in which it should be operative;
- be based on self-help and mutual aid;
- be more than military: that is, promote the stability and well-being of the North Atlantic peoples;
- provide machinery for implementation.

The report was duly considered by governments, and at the end of October the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty was able to announce ‘complete agreement on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic and on the next steps to be taken in this direction’. The ‘next steps’ were the actual drafting of the North Atlantic Treaty which started in Washington on the 10th December, 1948, between representatives of the seven Powers.

It had become clear during the summer that the original idea of an association between the United States and the Brussels Treaty Powers would be superseded by a larger grouping of countries. On the 13th October, 1948, the Canadian Government had announced their willingness to join such a group. There were also other countries which the negotiators wished to bring in, e.g., the Irish Republic and Sweden (neither of which joined), Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Italy – the inclusion of Italy being particularly urged by France. At the same time, the French obtained agreement to the inclusion of the three Algerian Departments of France in the area to be covered by the Treaty.

The position of Denmark and Norway in relation to the Treaty had been uncertain. The separate Scandinavian Pact, which they had been engaged in negotiating, had fallen through because the Swedish policy of full neutrality could not be reconciled with Norway’s insistence that any Scandinavian defence association would have to co-operate with the Western Powers. On the 5th February, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Halvard Lange, started for Washington to enquire about the Atlantic Treaty. A few hours before leaving Oslo he was handed a note from the Soviet Union inviting Norway to conclude a non-aggression pact. Norway made her choice. It was a brave one. She declined the Russian offer, and on the 3rd March decided to join the Atlantic Alliance, while making it clear that she would not allow armed forces of foreign Powers to be stationed on Norwegian territory as long as the country had not been attacked, or threatened with attack. Norway then took part in the latter stages of the negotiations. Portugal also decided to join the other Atlantic Powers, once it was ascertained that her close
co-operation with Spain would not be prejudiced by the Treaty and that foreign troops would not be stationed in the Azores in peacetime.

On the 15th March, 1949, the Brussels Treaty Powers, Canada and the United States, formally invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal to adhere to the Treaty. On the 18th March, two weeks before its signature, the text of the Treaty was made public.

Throughout these negotiations the Soviet Government did their best to prevent the conclusion of the Treaty. On the 29th January, 1949, they inveighed against the Brussels Pact and warned all Europeans that a North Atlantic Alliance was simply an instrument for furthering the imperialist aims of the Anglo-Saxon Powers. On the 31st March, they presented a memorandum to the twelve prospective signatories claiming that the Treaty was contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The twelve countries replied in a joint note delivered to Russia two days later. It stated quite simply, in a mere 21 lines, that the text of the Treaty was the best answer to Soviet allegations, since it showed beyond a shadow of doubt that the Alliance was not aimed against any nation or group of nations, but only against armed aggression.

The climax came on the 4th April, 1949. On that date, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium (M. Paul-Henri Spaak), Canada (Mr. Lester B. Pearson), Denmark (Mr. Gustav Rasmussen), France (M. Robert Schuman), Iceland (Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson), Italy (Count Carlo Sforza), Luxembourg (M. Joseph Bech), the Netherlands (Dr. D. U. Stikker), Norway (Mr. Halvard M. Lange), Portugal (Dr. José Caerio da Matta), the United Kingdom (Mr. Ernest Bevin), the United States (Mr. Dean Acheson). It was ratified by the parliaments of the member countries within five months. Later, Greece and Turkey were invited to join the Alliance, to which they formally acceded on the 18th February, 1952.
CHAPTER II

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The North Atlantic Treaty* is a short document which expresses the practical resolution and the idealism of the nations which have signed it. By its terms they have pledged themselves, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to maintain international peace and security and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

LINK WITH THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The Treaty was written within the framework of the United Nations Charter and was based on Article 51 of Chapter VII which stipulates: 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain and restore international peace and security'.

This article was included in the Charter on the proposal of the United States who wished the fundamental right of self-defence to be specifically expressed. All states possess this 'inherent' right, whether members of the United Nations or not: it is important to remember this since two of the NATO countries, Italy and Portugal, are not members of the United Nations. Furthermore, it was pointed out by one of the United States delegates at the San Francisco Conference, Senator Vandenberg, that a community of interests could exist between nations not situated in the same geographic area, and that the Charter should sanction the establishment of such communities, which may not be strictly 'Regional Arrangements', as provided under Article 53 of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

The failure to distinguish between associations of nations linked by a community of interests on the one hand, and the regional associations determined primarily by geographic considerations on the other, has led to misunderstanding in the past, and is still the cause of some confusion. The distinction is that under the Charter measures of self-defence, whether individual or collective, do not require the prior authorisation of the Security Council, while, on the other hand, enforcement actions by regional agencies (as contemplated under Article 53 of

Chapter VIII) do require this authorisation. The Atlantic Treaty provides insurance against a situation which the Security Council might be unable to control, but it in no manner impugns the Council’s authority. It recognises (in Article 7) ‘the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security’, and it states (in Article 5) that any measures taken by the NATO countries as the result of an armed attack upon them ‘shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security’.

It is thought unnecessary in this survey to embark on a detailed analysis of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is more properly a task for international lawyers. On the other hand, a brief commentary on the practical effects of some of the more important articles of the Treaty may serve as a useful introduction to the story of NATO.

THE ESSENTIAL CLAUSE

Let us look first at Article 5. This is the core. By its terms ‘the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’.

There is a wealth of meaning behind those short, simple phrases. They make clear to any would-be aggressor that his attack would be met by the combined resistance of all the member states. They mean that the United States has in set terms abandoned its traditional peacetime isolationism from the affairs of Europe and has linked its fate to that of the free countries of Europe for mutual self-defence. Article 5 also means that some of the European countries have abandoned the habit of mind which in the past led them to refrain up to the last moment from committing themselves in advance to joint defence policies.

The formal obligation under Article 5 of the Treaty is to take action – individually and in concert – but the kind of action is left to the judgment of each member state in relation to the facts of the situation. Speaking to the United States Senate on the 6th July, 1949, Senator Vandenberg defined the obligation this way: ‘The pledge dependably means that whoever is attacked will have dependable allies who will do their dependable part, by constitutional process, as swiftly as possible to defeat the aggressor by whatever means it deems necessary’.

MUTUAL AID AND CONSULTATION

But a promise to stand together in the event of an armed attack is no real deterrent to an aggressor unless it is backed by armed strength. There lies the reason for Article 3 of the Treaty, which provides that ‘the Parties separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack’.

The expression ‘mutual aid’ requires explanation. It was intended by the negotiators of the Treaty to mean the contribution by each state, taking into
account its geographic location, resources and economic capabilities, of such mutual aid as it could reasonably be expected to furnish in whatever form it would be most effective – for instance, manpower, productive capacity, logistical facilities or military equipment.

It was not very long before it became obvious that collective capacity to resist armed attack could not be effectively developed unless there were unity of command, unified planning and uniformity of military training, procedure and, as far as possible, equipment. And so it came about that by the end of 1950, sovereign states were to entrust their forces to international commanders, assisted by international staffs. Never in history have the principles of alliance been carried to such a pitch in time of peace.

The mutual guarantees provided by Articles 3 and 5 are strengthened by Article 4, under which the Parties undertake to consult whenever one of them considers that there is a threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of them. This Article provides for consultation before an armed attack has taken place. It applies if the security of one or more of the NATO countries is threatened.

THE NATO AREA

The NATO area is defined in Article 6 (as amended after Greece and Turkey joined NATO, by Article II of the Greece-Turkey Protocol). It provides that Article 5 would come into force in case of an armed attack:

1. 'on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
2. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer'.

As has already been pointed out, NATO is not a regional organization in the strict sense of the term. Nor is the NATO area a geographical entity, since by no means all the countries border on the North Atlantic or its inlets. To quote a legal expert on the Treaty: 'Insofar as there is a regional character at all in the North Atlantic Treaty, it lies in common interest in the peace and security of a certain area, and not necessarily in the possession of territory within a certain area'*. 

ORGANIZATIONAL CLAUSES

In Article 9 provision is made for creating a machinery to plan defence and assist the NATO countries to fulfil their Treaty obligations. This Article establishes a North Atlantic Council on which each member state is represented, 'so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time' and empowered to 'set up such subsid-

iary bodies' as may be necessary to implement the terms of the Treaty. In view of the novel character of the experiment on which the Parties had embarked, and the consequent absence of any precedents which could be taken as a guide, this machinery has had to be evolved step by step in the light of experience.

It is to be noted from Article 10 that membership of the North Atlantic Alliance is not exclusive. This Article says that any European state may be invited to join the Treaty if all the members agree that it is in a position to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. It was under this provision that invitations were extended to Greece and Turkey in 1951.

Articles 12 and 13 deal with the duration of the Treaty and its review. In point of fact, no definite term is laid down, but it is provided that after twenty years, i.e. in 1969, any Party may withdraw from the Treaty by giving one year's notice of its intention to do so. The idea of the member governments was that the Treaty should last as long as it was useful and that from co-operation for defence should develop a durable co-operation in wider fields of human endeavour.

**BROADER AIMS**

From what has been said above, it might be thought that the Treaty is exclusively a military alliance. This is not the case. It is, of course, true that the Treaty was born of collective insecurity and that the energies of the Treaty Powers have hitherto been primarily directed to strengthening their collective defence against aggression. Nevertheless, the Preamble and the first two articles of the Treaty make it crystal clear that the member countries believe they belong to a community of nations within which co-operation should be developed not only for defence, but in all fields. In the Preamble, they affirm 'their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments', and in Article 1, to abide by the principles of the Charter and to refrain from the use of force in any way not consistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2 proclaims the will of the Parties to strengthen their free institutions and promote conditions 'of stability and well-being'. Peace is not merely the absence of war: its maintenance requires continuous co-operation by governments in the economic, social and cultural as well as in the military field.

Some member governments attached great importance to the inclusion in the Treaty of a positive provision of this kind. The purpose of a North Atlantic association, said Mr. St. Laurent as early as April, 1948, 'would not be merely negative. It would create the dynamic counter-attraction to Communism – the dynamic attraction of a free, prosperous and progressive society, as opposed to the totalitarian and reactionary society of the Communist world'*. The steps that have been and are being taken to implement Article 2 are described in Chapter XIV.

**CONCLUSION**

When five years ago the Foreign Ministers of the founder countries met in Washington to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, they started an experiment in international relations unprecedented in peacetime. The Treaty has become the frame-

* Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1948, IV, 3449.
work for the common defence of over 380 million people on both sides of the Atlantic. Is it going too far to claim that if any comparable arrangement had existed in 1914 or 1939, the history of the twentieth century would have taken another course, and the world would have been spared the carnage and waste of two world wars?
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

**Article 1**

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

**Article 2**

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

**Article 3**

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

**Article 4**

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties*.

ARTICLE 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

* Modified by the Greece-Turkey Protocol.
ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the governments of the other signatories.
ANNEX B

THE GREECE-TURKEY PROTOCOL

London, 22nd October, 1951

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949,
Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty,
Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry in force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article II of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:
‘For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
(i) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
(ii) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.’

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall
inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

**ARTICLE IV**

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by the Government to the governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.
### Population, Area and Density of Population of NATO Countries

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population December 1953 (Thousands)</th>
<th>Area (Sq. Miles)</th>
<th>Density December 1953</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Sq. Kilometers)</td>
<td>(Persons per sq. Mile)</td>
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<td>Total NATO</td>
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### Notes:

The population figures are based on member countries' latest official estimates available, adjusted (when necessary) by the OEEC Staff or the NATO International Staff so as to show estimated population at 31st December, 1953. Resident (de jure) population is reported in the case of eight countries, present in area (de facto) population for the other six. Adjustment to include armed forces and merchant seamen out of the country has been made in two of the latter cases (France and the United Kingdom).

Both the population and the area figures include close-lying islands (e.g. Sicily and Sardinia for Italy, Corsica for France) but exclude overseas departments, possessions and distant islands (e.g. Algeria for France, the Azores for Portugal).

The area figures normally include inland freshwater areas but exclude salt water.
CHAPTER III

THE FIRST STEPS

In the North Atlantic Treaty, the member governments had undertaken collective obligations which called for immediate and continuous action. Clearly, therefore, their first task was to devise and create collective machinery which would enable them to fulfil these obligations. They were in fact specifically committed to doing so by Article 9 of the Treaty; and a Working Group had been set up two days before the Treaty was actually signed to make recommendations as to the agencies which should be established, and the methods which should be adopted, to prepare a collective plan of defence for the protection of the North Atlantic area.

Meanwhile, it had already become clear — as shown in Chapter I — that the countries of Europe could not play their part without American assistance, and that without the assurance of such assistance any common defence plans would be woefully inadequate.

THE MUTUAL DEFENCE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME

On the 5th April, 1949, the day after the signature of the Treaty, the five Brussels Treaty Powers submitted a formal request for military and financial assistance to Washington. Similar requests were made by Denmark, Italy, and Norway.

The United States Administration tackled the problem at once. Within a few weeks they had prepared an overall programme of military assistance to the countries of the world whose independence and freedom were threatened. The programme amounted to $1,450,000,000 for the fiscal year 1950, of which a sum of about $1,130,000,000 (later reduced to one billion dollars) was destined for European NATO countries.

On the 27th April, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson gave a clear definition of the attitude of the United States Administration towards mutual aid. Addressing the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, he said: ‘... Article 3 (of the North Atlantic Treaty) does not bind the United States to the proposed military assistance programme, nor indeed to any programme. It does bind the United States to the principle of self-help and mutual aid. Within this principle, each Party to the Pact must exercise its own honest judgment as to what it can and should do to develop and maintain its own capacity to resist and to help others. The judgment of the executive branch of this Government is that the United States can and should provide military assistance to assist other countries in the Pact to maintain their collective security’.

On the 25th July, 1949, immediately after signing the bill ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty, President Truman submitted the Mutual Defence Assistance Bill to Congress. Mr. Acheson told the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs
Committee on the 28th July that military aid was ‘an extremely urgent necessity’. He stressed that the overall one-year programme represented no more than one-fifth of the defence expenditure made by the beneficiary nations for themselves and mutually.

The following day, General Omar N. Bradley, the Army Chief-of-Staff, also emphasised the urgency of the assistance programme. On the 10th August, 1949, he stated that the American Joint Chiefs-of-Staff had during a European visit examined the defence concept of Western Union and found it ‘in accordance with their own strategic thinking’.

During the summer, modifications to the Military Assistance Bill were put forward in Senate committees. Senators Vandenberg and Dulles sponsored seven of them, with the purpose of ‘making clear the supremacy of the North Atlantic Treaty’. Among the amendments accepted by the committees was one requiring recipient countries to use the arms to be provided under mutual aid to promote the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area in accordance with defence plans to be drawn up under the provisions of the Atlantic Treaty. Another amendment permitted Congress, by a simple majority vote of both Houses, to terminate the programme; similar authority had already been given to the President. Still another permitted the President or Congress to ‘recapture or retain’ any arms earmarked for NATO countries if no longer required under the terms of the Treaty.

The Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 was signed by the President on the 6th October – only two weeks, incidentally, after it had been publicly revealed that the first atomic explosion in the USSR had been detected. On the 7th October, Mr. Truman nominated a Director of the Military Assistance Programme and in the following month, the United States Defence Department set up an Office of Military Assistance to co-ordinate arms aid to the North Atlantic countries. On the 27th January, 1950, bilateral agreements implementing the aid programme were signed in Washington between the United States and the eight European NATO countries who had requested military assistance. The first shipments to Europe left the shores of the United States on the 8th March, when the French aircraft carrier Dixmude took on a consignment of Hellcat and other US naval fighter and dive-bomber aircraft at Norfolk, Virginia.

**FIRST MEETING OF THE COUNCIL**

Now let us trace the beginnings of the Organization set up to implement the North Atlantic Treaty. The report of the Working Group mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter was considered by the North Atlantic Council at their first session in Washington on the 17th September, 1949. The principal decisions may be summarised as follows:

1. the normal composition of the Council was to be the Foreign Ministers of member countries;
2. the Council were to meet in ordinary session annually and at such other times as might be deemed desirable, and extraordinary sessions under Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty could be called at the request of any Party invoking one of these Articles;
3. the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson, was to be the first Chairman of the Council; thereafter, the Chairmanship was to be held annually in turn by the Foreign Minister of each member
country according to the alphabetical order in the English language;*

4. English and French were to be the two official languages of the Organization;

5. a Defence Committee was to be established, consisting ordinarily of Defence Ministers and charged with the task of drawing up unified defence plans for the North Atlantic area. The Committee was to be convened at least once a year at a location determined by the Chairman;

6. it was suggested to the Defence Committee that the military organization should include a Military Committee (composed of one military representative of each member country, preferably a Chief-of-Staff) which would, among other duties, provide policy guidance of a military nature to its executive body, the Standing Group, composed of one representative of each of the Chiefs-of-Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and functioning continuously in Washington;

7. five Regional Planning Groups were to be set up: the Northern European Group (Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom); the Western European Group (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom); the Southern European-Western Mediterranean Group (France, Italy and the United Kingdom); the Canadian-United States Group (Canada and the United States); and the North Atlantic Ocean Group (all member countries except Italy and Luxembourg). The United States was requested and agreed to 'participate actively in the defence planning, as appropriate' of all planning groups. In the same way, Canada agreed to participate actively in the work of the Western European Group. These Planning Groups were instructed 'to develop and recommend to the Military Committee, through the Standing Group', plans for the defence of their respective regions.

CREATION OF ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AGENCIES

At this first session the Council recognised that comprehensive questions of military production and supply, and of economic and financial factors would have to be studied. At their second session held in Washington on the 18th November, 1949, it was decided to set up two new agencies, namely: a Defence Financial and Economic Committee, and a Military Production and Supply Board.

The Defence Financial and Economic Committee was to be composed generally of Finance Ministers and to report direct to the Council. It was to have, in particular, the following tasks:

1. to develop, in co-operation with the Military Committee (including the Standing Group) and the Military Production and Supply Board, overall financial and economic guides to, and limits of, future defence programmes which North Atlantic Treaty countries as a group and individually should undertake within available financial and economic resources;

2. to appraise the financial and economic impact on member countries

* For the list of the Chairmen of the North Atlantic Council, see Chapter VI, Annex A, page 66.
The Organization in December 1949

**North Atlantic Council**
(FOREIGN MINISTERS)

**Defence Committee**
(DEFENCE MINISTERS)

**Military Production and Supply Board**

**Permanent Working Staff**

**Military Committee**
(CHAIRS OF STAFF)

**Standing Group**
FRANCE
U.K.
U.S.A.

**Regional Planning Groups**

**North Atlantic Ocean**
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
France
Iceland

**Canada - United States**
Canada
U.S.A.

**Western Europe**
Belgium
Canada
France
Luxembourg
Netherlands

**Northern Europe**
Denmark
Norway
U.K.
U.S.A.

**Southern Europe**
Western Mediterranean

*Consulting Members*
of major individual defence projects formulated by the Military Production and Supply Board or the Military Committee (including the Standing Group); to consider also the availability of raw materials, capital equipment and manpower; and to make recommendations as to action on such projects;

3. to recommend financial arrangements for executing military defence plans, and particularly financial arrangements for the interchange among North Atlantic Treaty countries of military equipment, surplus stocks, or materials and equipment to be used in producing military equipment;

4. to measure and to recommend steps to meet the foreign exchange costs of imports of materials and equipment from non-member countries required by defence programmes under the North Atlantic Treaty;

5. to consider, as may be found desirable and appropriate, plans for the mobilisation of economic and financial resources in time of emergency.

The Military Production and Supply Board was to report to the Defence Committee. Its functions were to recommend ways and means of increasing available supplies when they fell short of military requirements and to promote more efficient production of military equipment.

Both the Defence Financial and Economic Committee and the Military Production and Supply Board were to have permanent working staffs in London, composed of qualified personnel from the interested countries.

Thus NATO now had the nucleus of an organization and a scheme on which to work. Nevertheless, as is only natural, the preparation of collective defence plans between sovereign states using different official procedures, different technical definitions, different languages and different currencies, was to prove extremely complicated. There were any amount of teething troubles to overcome, and work proceeded at a slow pace.

**AGREEMENT ON A STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

On the 1st December, 1949, the Defence Committee, meeting in Paris, agreed on a strategic concept for the 'integrated defence of the North Atlantic area', and on the methods by which a programme of production and of deliveries of military weapons and equipment should be devised. The Committee had, of course, taken into account the studies carried out in 1948 by Western Union, and later by the United States Joint Chiefs-of-Staff.

The Defence Committee's recommendations were approved by the North Atlantic Council at their third session in Washington on the 6th January, 1950. The Council stressed that 'these recommendations embody the principles of self-help and mutual aid and will provide the basis for the common defence of the Parties'. On the 27th January, the day of the signing of the bilateral military aid agreements, President Truman approved the 'master Defence Plan' for the North Atlantic area. *

* It had been specified by Congress that out of the $1,000,000,000 allocated to NATO countries under the Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949, $900,000,000 could only be released after the President had approved the recommendations for the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area made by the North Atlantic Council and the Defence Committee.
One more step forward was made on the 1st April, 1950 when the Defence Committee, meeting in The Hague, approved the first draft of a detailed four-years' defence plan (subsequently called the Medium Term Defence Plan) which had been prepared by the Regional Planning Groups, the Standing Group and the Military Committee. At this meeting it devoted particular attention to problems such as the financing of military production and the standardisation of equipment.

Meanwhile, the Defence Financial and Economic Committee had begun work on a number of projects aimed at:

- obtaining data on current and planned defence expenditures of member countries;
- ascertaining the resources available for military production and for mutual assistance;
- examining the financial arrangements for the transfer of military materials and equipment;
- developing formulae for measuring the cost of defence.

This was the beginning of the discussions on an eventual 'common fund' and on a fair 'burden sharing', which were to be frequently debated later on.

When the Council met in London on the 15th May, 1950, they were brought up against the fact that there was a lack of co-ordination between NATO's military and civilian agencies. The military authorities were awaiting information from the Defence Financial and Economic Committee on what resources would be available to meet the Medium Term Defence Plan: this required a much higher level of forces than member countries were actually planning. At the same time, the Defence Financial and Economic Committee was awaiting specific information from the military authorities about the priorities and especially the costs of the plan. Long memoranda were being exchanged on the subject without much result. Ministers also showed concern at the considerable financial burden implied in the Medium Term Defence Plan.

THE COUNCIL DEPUTIES

In this somewhat confused situation the Council decided that the time had come for the creation of a permanent civilian body which would be responsible for carrying out the policies of the NATO governments in the intervals between meetings of the North Atlantic Council. Accordingly, they established the Council Deputies to meet in continuous session in London. Each government was to be represented by a Deputy to its Council Representative (i.e. its Foreign Minister). The Deputies were enjoined to select a permanent chairman from among their own membership and to establish a 'suitable full-time organization composed of highly qualified persons contributed by member governments'. The Council also established a Planning Board for Ocean Shipping to deal with all matters relating to merchant shipping in defence planning.

The Council defined the numerous tasks of the Deputies and stated that 'the problem of adequate military forces and the necessary financial costs should be examined as one, and not as separate problems'. They also said that 'the combined

* It may be recalled that, one month earlier, the French Prime Minister, M. Georges Bidault, had stated in a speech that 'it would be wise and opportune to create a Supreme Atlantic Council to order and direct the development of the Atlantic Community in the two inseparable spheres of defence and economics' His views, however, were not debated at the NATO Council Meeting.
resources of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty were sufficient, if properly co-ordinated and applied, to ensure the progressive and speedy development of adequate military defence without impairing the social and economic progress of these countries and they urged the member governments to concentrate on the creation of 'balanced collective forces in the progressive build-up of the defence of the North Atlantic area'.

Two expressions here need to be qualified and stressed. The first is 'balanced collective forces', which marked a new development in NATO's thinking. The idea was to conceive the military build-up so that all effort be directed in the best possible way and to the best possible place. Duplication and overlapping were to be avoided; a government should not be wasting its money on building, say ships, if it could do more important work, equally useful to North Atlantic defence, in some other field.

The second expression worth noting is 'progressive build-up of defence'. This reflected the rather leisurely pace of Western rearmament during that period. Clearly the NATO countries intended to take their time about rebuilding their armed strength; and each of them, before deciding on costly and somewhat unpopular measures, had a tendency to 'wait and see what the other fellow was doing'.

**THE MILITARY SITUATION IN MAY, 1950**

Let us now pause to take stock of the situation a little over a year after the signing of the Treaty. The Council, the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee had had a number of meetings. Their subsidiary agencies had been continuously at work on the complicated and novel problems that confronted them. Much useful experience had been gained and much useful information collected. The habit of working together was growing sensibly. So far so good.

On the other hand, international tension all over the world had in no way relaxed and in Europe the military situation was fraught with danger. To the west of the Iron Curtain the members of the Atlantic Alliance had about 14 divisions on the Continent and less than 1,000 aircraft. These divisions were of varying quality both in training and equipment and several were below strength. They were not controlled by any single authority and arrangements for their effective command in case of war would have had to be hastily improvised. On the other side of the Iron Curtain Russia had about 25 divisions stationed outside the Soviet Union, supported by about 6,000 aircraft available for immediate attack, the whole under a centralised command: and behind these 'forward' Russian units was the massive bulk of the Red Army and air forces.

The figures alone make the picture bleak enough from the Allied point of view, but they do not tell the whole story. The Allied forces in Germany and Austria, apart from lacking the advantages of cohesion and unified direction, were disposed for easy administration, without any regard for their operational role. The three zones of Western Germany, American, British and French, had been demarcated as zones of occupation, not zones of defence - with the result that the line running from the Elbe down to Austria was not a defensive line in any sense of the word. One or two examples will illustrate this: the British troops were supplied through Hamburg, about an hour's drive down the autobahn from Lübeck, itself only 10 minutes from the Russian garrison. The only British armoured division was placed slightly behind its main base, and the British
infantry division behind the armour. It is difficult to imagine dispositions that could be more unsuitable for operations in the event of an aggression. The American forces were just as badly placed. Their line of supply ran from Bremen parallel to the direction from which attack might come, and right through the British zone. Nor were the French forces prepared for anything beyond the administration of German territory.

These dispositions may in retrospect look extraordinary; but, as explained above, the forces maintained in Germany after the end of World War II by the Western democracies had not been organized with any idea of warlike operations. This situation was graphically described by Field Marshal Montgomery, Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee, Western Union, in a report to the governments of the Brussels Treaty Powers dated the 15th June, 1950: ‘As things stand today and in the foreseeable future’, wrote the Field Marshal, ‘there would be scenes of appalling and indescribable confusion in Western Europe if we were ever attacked by the Russians’.
CHAPTER IV

THE PACE QUICKENS

The London session of the Council ended on the 18th May, 1950. On the 25th June, there occurred an event which was to have a profound influence on the evolution of NATO. North Korean Communist divisions crossed the 38th parallel, delivered a sudden attack on the poorly armed forces of South Korea and advanced rapidly on Seoul. On the 26th June, at the request of the United States, the United Nations Security Council (from which the Russians were absent) met and ordered a cease fire. This order was ignored. On the 27th June, President Truman instructed United States air and naval forces to support the South Korean units, and directed the 7th US Fleet to protect Formosa. He also announced that American aid to Indo-China and the Philippines would be increased.

On the same day, the Security Council denounced North Korea as the aggressor, decided on economic and military sanctions and requested that all member nations should go to the rescue of the South Korean Republic. This was the first time in history that a decision to apply military sanctions had been taken by an international organization. A number of free nations, boldly led by the United States - which committed its land forces in Korea on the 1st July - at once rallied to resist the invader. This was clear proof of the solidarity of the free world; and it showed that when the democracies spoke of defence against aggression they really meant what they said. It was obvious that the sort of outrage which had taken place in far-away Korea could easily be repeated elsewhere. For NATO the period of cautious optimism and slow methodical progress was over.

Thus, it was in a changed atmosphere that on the 25th July, 1950, the newly-appointed Council Deputies met for the first time in London, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Charles M. Spofford, who had been selected by his colleagues to preside at the Deputies’ meetings; he was also the United States Deputy. In the same month, the speeding up of deliveries of United States military equipment had been announced. In Europe, the Defence Ministers of the Brussels Treaty Powers had conferred on rearmament measures.

On the 28th July, Mr. Spofford informed the Council Deputies that the United States Administration, in order to document the need for an additional aid programme, had requested all NATO countries to indicate ‘the nature and extent of the increased effort each proposed to make’. The recognition by governments of the urgency of rearmament was evident from the speed with which they answered: all replies were in by the 31st August. Nevertheless, many governments, while planning to expand their national defence effort, were gravely concerned with the financial and economic difficulties involved.
DECISION TO BUILD AN INTEGRATED FORCE

When the North Atlantic Council met in New York on the 15th September, 1950, their discussions were centred on a single problem: how to defend the NATO area from an aggression similar to that which had taken place in the Far East. On the one hand, there was complete agreement that a ‘forward strategy’ should be adopted in Europe, i.e. that any aggression should be resisted as far to the east as possible, in order to ensure the defence of all NATO European countries. On the other hand, it was obvious that existing forces were wholly inadequate to give effect to that strategy. The Council therefore decided that member countries should take urgent measures to increase their military strength and that the Medium Term Defence Plan should be revised. An ‘integrated force under a centralised command, adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe’, was to be created and placed under a Supreme Commander to be appointed by NATO. The Standing Group was to assume the ‘higher strategic direction’. The Council requested the Defence Committee to recommend the measures necessary to bring the force into being ‘at the earliest possible time’.

PLANS FOR A GERMAN CONTRIBUTION

This fifth session of the Council was held in two parts. After conferring for three days and issuing a communiqué on the proposed ‘integrated force’, the Council adjourned for several days to enable Ministers to consult their governments. The reason for this procedure was that a momentous development had taken place during the first part of the talks. Secretary of State Acheson had informed his colleagues that his government was prepared to ‘participate in the immediate establishment of an integrated force in Europe, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, adequate to ensure the successful defence of Western Europe, including Western Germany, against possible aggression’. Furthermore, he had specified that the force in question should involve ‘the participation of German units and the use of German productive resources for its supply’. The United States Government favoured definite limitations and guarantees: for instance, the biggest German unit would not exceed a division, and each German unit would be integrated in larger Allied forces. The creation of a German General Staff would not be permitted, and German forces would be dependent upon other nations for vital military equipment which was not to be produced by German industry.

The United States proposal entailed a reversal of the Allied policy of disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany. German participation in Western defence had been mooted several times in the preceding months, and the anxiety caused by the Korean war had brought the question to a head. Moreover, a feeling of insecurity was growing in Western Germany, particularly since the Soviets had encouraged Eastern Germany to raise a militarised ‘People’s Police’, 50,000 strong and heavily armed. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had urged the creation of a West German police force of similar size and strength and had repeatedly suggested that the United States should despatch more divisions, particularly armoured divisions, to Europe. He had also declared in a public statement on the 23rd August, 1950, that he favoured the creation of a unified Western European Army, adding that ‘if Germany is called upon to provide a contingent for this army, she is ready, under certain conditions, to make sacrifices for her own and Western Europe’s sake’.

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The proposal to rearm Germany was bound to provoke conflicting reactions amongst the governments and the peoples of the NATO countries for reasons too evident to need explanation. Suffice it to say that during the Council's discussions, all the arguments for and against German participation in Western defence were examined and weighed. From a military point of view, the main argument in favour of participation was that NATO's forward strategy made it imperative to defend Europe on German soil: this was hardly conceivable without the military and political participation of the German Federal Republic.

A POLITICAL IMPASSE

When the Council interrupted their session on the 18th September, all the members were prepared to accept the principle of German participation in the NATO forces, with the exception of the French Foreign Minister, M. Robert Schuman. He held the view that, while certain methods of securing a German contribution to defence might be acceptable, e.g. in the fields of production and of military construction, the raising of German troops would at this stage 'do more harm than good'. Being thus unable to reach agreement, the Council adjourned in order to allow the Ministers – and particularly those of the three Occupying Powers – to re-examine the matter.

On the 19th September, the Foreign Ministers of the three Occupying Powers, who had been holding separate meetings in New York, issued a statement in which, amongst other matters, they dealt with the security of Western Germany. They declared that they would 'increase and reinforce their forces in Germany', and that they would consider 'any attack against the Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves'. They recognised that 'the creation of a German national army would not serve the best interests of Germany and Europe', and added that 'the question raised by the problems of the participation of the German Federal Republic in the common defence of Europe was at present the subject of study and exchange of views'.

This, however, was as far as they got. Consequently, when the North Atlantic Council reconvened on the 26th September, their final communiqué was couched in intentionally vague terms. All it stated was that Germany 'should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defence of Western Europe'. The Defence Committee was invited to make recommendations as to how this should be done.

THE FRENCH PROPOSALS

On the 24th October, 1950, the French Prime Minister, M. René Pleven, submitted to the French Assembly a plan for 'the creation of a European army linked to the political institutions of a united Europe'. Under this project there would be 'a complete fusion of all the human and material elements' of the proposed force. A European Minister of Defence responsible to a European Assembly would be appointed by the participating governments. His authority would extend over the execution of the armament and equipment programmes. The financing of the projected army would be effected by a common budget. Finally 'the European forces would be placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic force and would operate in accordance with the contractual obligations of the Atlantic Pact'.

This plan was presented to NATO's Defence Committee on the 28th October.
by M. Jules Moch, French Minister of National Defence, as an alternative to the American proposals. There had been no time for a detailed examination of its vast implications; furthermore the positions of the United States and of France were too divergent to be reconciled at that particular session. In these circumstances the Defence Committee* were bound to admit their inability to take final decisions on NATO’s military organization in Europe and on the command structure. They instructed the Military Committee and the Council Deputies to pursue the study of these questions.

A REPORT ON THE GERMAN PROBLEM

The two bodies conducted their investigations separately while keeping each other informed of progress. The negotiations were delicate: a large part of the credit for their success should go to Mr. Spofford, who played an important personal role in presenting compromise proposals (involving modifications of both the French and United States positions) which he defended with skill and patience. On the 13th December, the Council Deputies and the Military Committee held a joint meeting, and were able to forward an agreed report to the Defence Committee and to the North Atlantic Council.

The essence of their recommendations was that ‘an acceptable and realistic defence of Western Europe and the adoption of a forward strategy could not be contemplated without active and willing German participation’, and that certain provisional measures in respect of a German contribution should be initiated in the immediate future – for example, ‘preliminary work on the military organization’. The report dealt with the maximum size of future German units and with the various limitations and controls which should be applied to the German defence contribution, particularly with respect to air power, naval power, armoured units, atomic power and military production.

The report recognised that ‘any system of German participation must be within the NATO structure’ and mentioned the various solutions which had been discussed – without, at this point, making a choice between them. The broad alternatives were the incorporation of German units either in NATO’s integrated defence force (United States proposal) or in the unified European Army (French proposal). The Netherlands, moreover, had put forward the idea of appointing a NATO High Commissioner in Western Germany with responsibilities for all armed forces stationed in Western Germany, and German forces in particular.

THE BRUSSELS MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

When the Council met in Brussels on the 18th December, 1950, for their sixth session, they stated ‘that German participation would strengthen the defence of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’. They also took the first steps to bring about this participation: on the one hand, the Council invited the governments of the three Occupying Powers to ‘explore the matter’ with the Government of the German Federal Republic; on the other, they took note of the French Government’s intention of calling a conference of the European Powers which might participate in the organization of a unified European Army.

* General Marshall had become United States Secretary of Defence, and was Chairman at this meeting.
At this same session, the Council took important decisions on defence matters. The first related to organization. The Standing Group was in future to determine, on behalf of the Military Committee, the requirements of the projected NATO force, composed of contingents from the member countries. Accordingly the Military Committee established in Washington a permanent Committee of Military Representatives from all the NATO countries. In addition, a Standing Group Liaison Office was to be established in London, to ensure closer co-operation between the Council Deputies and the NATO military authorities.

The second and most far-reaching decision of the Council was that an integrated force should be constituted under the supreme command of an American officer. The words 'integrated force' and 'supreme command' at once brought to mind the name of Dwight D. Eisenhower. Of him Prime Minister Churchill at the end of the Second World War had written to President Truman: 'In General Eisenhower we have a man who set the unity of the Allied Armies above all nationalistic thoughts. In his Headquarters unity and strategy were the only reigning spirits'.

The Council had no hesitation in requesting President Truman to designate General Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Commander of the integrated force. The President agreed, and the Council duly appointed General Eisenhower to this vital post. It was announced that he would establish his headquarters in Europe early in 1951 and would 'have the authority to train the national units assigned to his command and to organize them into an effective integrated force'. He was to be supported by 'an international staff drawn from the nations contributing to the force'.

It was indeed fortunate for the free world that a man of General Eisenhower's unique prestige, qualifications and experience was available at this critical juncture. His name was associated with victory in the minds of millions and millions of people, and his appointment was a tremendous psychological asset to the Alliance.

**First forces assigned to NATO**

The effect of General Eisenhower's appointment was reinforced by immediate and weighty assurances at the same session of the North Atlantic Council: 'I am authorised by the President', said Secretary of State Acheson, 'to say that before this day is out he will place under the command of the Supreme Commander the United States forces in Europe. We hope that this action will be matched as soon as possible by other governments belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty - all the other governments who have forces . . . The President again authorises me to say that he will increase the forces of the United States under the command of the Supreme Commander'. The French Minister of Defence, M. Jules Moch, announced that the three French divisions stationed in Germany would be placed under General Eisenhower and that two other divisions would be added in 1951. Several other member governments were soon to state their intention of taking similar measures.

NATO had taken an enormous step forward. An organization was to be brought into being which would have the authority and the power to ensure that, from Norway to the Mediterranean, national forces allocated to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (henceforward to be known as SHAPE) were properly
Le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord ayant pris, conformément à la recommandation du Comité de Défense, les dispositions nécessaires pour l'établissement sous un Commandant Suprême de la force unifiée pour la défense de l'Europe, et ayant demandé au Président des États-Unis d'Amérique de désigner un officier américain pour remplir les fonctions de Commandant Suprême, le Président des États-Unis d'Amérique ayant désigné le Général d'Armée Dwight D. Eisenhower, le Conseil déclare en conséquence que le Général d'Armée Dwight D. Eisenhower est nommé Commandant Suprême avec toutes les fonctions et pouvoirs spécifiés au document sur les forces qui seront affectées à ce commandement.

The North Atlantic Council having made provision, in accordance with the recommendation of the Defence Committee, for the Integrated Force for the defence of Europe under a Supreme Commander, and having requested the President of the United States to designate an officer of the United States to fill the position of Supreme Commander, and the President of the United States having designated General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Council therefore declares that General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower is appointed the Supreme Commander, with the powers and functions specified in over the forces to be assigned to his command.
assembled and trained into an effective integrated force. There was, in fact, to be the unprecedented arrangement of a unified command in time of peace.

The Brussels session of the Council had indeed borne fruit. It is moving to recall the words of the United Kingdom Representative, Mr. Bevin, who was already a very sick man, and who was to die a few months later. Speaking to a close friend after the meeting he said: 'It is given to few men to see their dreams fulfilled. Three times in the last year I know I have nearly died, but I kept myself alive because I wanted to see this North Atlantic Alliance properly launched. This has been done today'.

**The First Integrated Command**

No time was lost in giving effect to the Brussels decisions. In World War II General Eisenhower had proved himself to be adept in picking the right men for the right jobs. Almost his first act as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) designate was to select as his Chief-of-Staff Lieutenant-General Alfred M. Grune­ther (the present Supreme Allied Commander in Europe). General Gruneth­er in turn picked four or five United States officers who at once began to study the problems of organization and command.

Paris was chosen as Headquarters, largely because of its central position and excellent communications; the Hotel Astoria, near the Etoile, was made available and quickly fitted up to receive the United States officers who constituted the SHAPE planning group. They arrived in January 1951 and were soon joined by the representatives of eight other member nations. * This small band of pioneers laboured together so that SHAPE could get into action as quickly as possible.

For General Eisenhower himself the first and foremost task was to form his own estimate of the chances of success of the enterprise which he had been called upon to lead. Accordingly, in January 1951 he made a whirlwind tour of the capitals of all the countries in Europe which had signed the Treaty. He was thus able to meet, and in many cases to renew acquaintance with the principal civil and military personalities of all the NATO nations, and to learn at first hand their resources, their existing plans and their intentions.

As a result of this tour he became convinced of the determination of NATO governments to afford him every possible support. He found that although the forces currently at his disposal were small, there existed on all sides the will and ability to increase them. He was therefore able, at the end of January 1951, to tell the United States Congress in Washington, that the European members of NATO were determined to defend themselves, and that the preservation of free America required American participation in the defence of Western Europe.

Meanwhile, General Grunether and his officers in Paris were wrestling with manifold problems of a novel character. The North Atlantic Council at their New York session in September 1950 had laid it down that the Supreme Commander should be 'supported by an international staff representing all nations contrib­uting to the force'. How was this staff to be organized? On the American system, which was not unlike the French? Or on the British system, which was different from both? How were the staff appointments to be distributed among the various nationalities so as to ensure that each and all were fairly represented? What was to be the command structure through which the Supreme Commander would

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* Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom.
exercise control? Where were Headquarters to be situated? These were some of
the problems which kept the lights in the Hotel Astoria burning till after mid­
night seven nights a week for the first three hectic months.

It was, indeed, fortunate for the planners of SHAPE that the Western Union
Command Organization had already studied analogous problems and had pre­
pared the plans which served as a foundation for future dispositions. Western
Union had also created the precedent of an international and inter-service staff,
working together in time of peace and using the same two official languages as
NATO – French and English. In addition, they had bequeathed to SHAPE not
only their many studies of the defence of what was to be the central sector of the
SHAPE Command, but, more important, a number of officers of different
nationalities with the invaluable experience of working together as an allied team.

In addition, there were available to the SHAPE planners all the studies carried
out by three of the Regional Planning Groups which had been set up by the
Council at its first session. * These Groups had small international staffs working
in Europe who had for some time studied the defence problems of the area that
was now to become Allied Command Europe.

Thanks to the work of their predecessors and their own unremitting labours,
the SHAPE planners were able to settle most of the fundamental problems by
the time General Eisenhower got back to Paris from Washington. On the 2nd
April, 1951, SHAPE assumed operational control. It did not, however, leave its
cramped quarters in the Hotel Astoria until June of that year when it moved
into prefabricated buildings, which had been erected in approximately three
months by French Army engineers on a splendid site donated by France in the
Versailles area. So, where the Presidents of the French Republic once invited
guests to shoot pheasants there now exists the nerve centre of the military
organization controlling a defence line of 4,000 miles, from the North Cape to the
Caucasus.

* See Chapter III.
The period following the Brussels Conference witnessed no relaxation in the tension between the free nations and the Communist world. In Korea and Indochina fighting continued. In the United Nations there was a stalemate. The disarmament plans were at a deadlock, as were the proposals for controlling atomic energy. In Paris, the attempts of the deputies of the Foreign Ministers of the four Occupying Powers to arrange talks on Germany were a total failure.

Throughout the world the Communists continued their campaign of hate against the Western democracies, unscrupulously using the magic word 'peace' in an attempt to divide and confuse Western public opinion and to foster the Kremlin's aims. Behind the Iron Curtain, however, there was anything but peace. The rearmament and reorganization of the armed forces of the European satellite countries were relentlessly pursued. Mysterious purges took place. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, leading Communist Party leaders and even a Foreign Minister were tried and eventually hanged for 'plotting against the State'.

During the same period the democracies took a number of steps which, while technically unrelated, were aimed at increasing the unity of the free world and its ability to resist. In 1951, mutual security pacts were signed between the United States and the Philippines, and the United States, Australia and New Zealand. At San Francisco, forty-eight nations signed a peace treaty with Japan (with the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland abstaining) and on the same day Japan signed a bilateral security pact with the United States which was to be supplemented, in March 1954, by a mutual defence assistance agreement. In Europe, the European Payments Union started to function; the Coal and Steel Community was established; and progress was made with the negotiations on Western Germany's participation in European defence. France, the United Kingdom and the United States granted first economic aid, and then military assistance, to Yugoslavia. Various attempts were made, without success, to organize Middle East defence with the participation of Egypt and of other states in that area.

There were other important developments more directly related to NATO. The question of the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Alliance, which had already been considered by the Council in 1950, was the subject of prolonged consultation in 1951. In May 1951 the Greek and Turkish Governments renewed their claim for membership. It was felt, on the one hand, that the addition of these countries to the coalition would carry obvious advantages; on the other hand, that it would involve extending NATO's strategical commitments as far east as the Caucasus. Moreover, some member governments feared that the admission of Turkey, which had a common frontier with Soviet Russia and Bulgaria, might aggravate international tension.

NATO studied the problem in both its political and military aspects. The out-
come was favourable; and a protocol inviting Greece and Turkey to join the
Atlantic Treaty (which modified the definition of the territories and forces contained
in Article 6 of the Treaty) was signed by the Council Deputies on the 22nd
October, 1951.* The formal accession of Greece and Turkey took effect on the 18th
February, 1952.

During 1951, several agreements related to Western defence were made by the
United States: with France (28th March) for the establishment of an air base at
Châteauroux and for the installation of seven bases in Morocco (12th July); with
Denmark (27th April) for the defence of Greenland; with Iceland (7th May) for
the joint defence of that country, and with Portugal (6th September) about air-
fields in the Azores.

Meanwhile, NATO member states were increasing their defences. Reference
has been made in Chapter IV to the important decision taken by the United
States to send additional forces to Europe. On the 15th February, 1951, Secre-
tary of Defence Marshall announced that four United States divisions would
soon join the forces already stationed in Western Germany, bringing the total of
American forces in Europe in 1952 to 400,000 men. A month later, he stated that
the total armed forces of the United States had doubled in the last nine months
and was now 2,900,000 men. America was to devote 58 per cent of her budget
for the fiscal year 1951-52 on defence expenditure. Canada too was increasing her
national forces and had decided to send one brigade and eleven fighter squadrons
to Europe. Corresponding efforts were being made by the European members of
NATO. It soon became apparent, however, that plans for increasing forces and
military production were lagging as a result of financial difficulties.

THE ECONOMIC IMPASSE

It has been shown in Chapter III that already in 1950 member governments had
shown growing concern at the economic consequences of rearmament. Most
NATO countries were still recovering from the economic disturbances which had
beset them in one form or another in the previous years. With the outbreak of
the Korean war came a great surge of speculative buying. Prices rose alarmingly:
the dollar cost of some basic raw materials practically doubled in six months.

The situation was difficult for all, but the European countries were particularly
hard hit. The rise in import prices added greatly to their international payment
problems. Scarcity of essential raw materials hampered production, while the rise
in internal prices threatened to start a vicious spiral of inflation.

It was clear that something must be done to check the deteriorating economic
situation if rearmament was to be carried out successfully. In October 1950, the
Council Deputies set up a working group to make an analysis of the economic
problems arising from the defence effort of the NATO countries during the three-
years period, July 1951-July 1954, to assess each country’s capacity to devote
economic resources to defence purposes, and to give a general view on an equitable
distribution of the defence burden. In addition, the Deputies set up an advisory
body to study the raw materials situation, and requested the Standing Group
for a detailed costing of the Medium Term Defence Plan. At the end of the year,
the Council also set up a Defence Production Board, responsible to the Council
Deputies, to replace the Military Production and Supply Board and its agencies.**

* For text of this Protocol, see Chapter II, Annex B, page 20.
** See Chapter XI, Development of Defence Production.
On the 26th February, 1951, the French Deputy, M. Hervé Alphand, drew once more the attention of his colleagues to 'the continuing deterioration of the Western economic system' which weakened the cohesion and power of endurance of Europe. He reported that 'the budget estimates designed to meet the requirements of a specific rearmament programme had been rendered completely inaccurate by the rise in prices, to such an extent that, in certain cases, the very implementation of such programmes might be imperilled'. He added that the North Atlantic Council had responsibilities in this matter, deriving from Article 2 of the Treaty, and suggested that they should 'recommend and supervise the execution of future measures designed to ensure not only the security but also the economic equilibrium of the Atlantic Community'.

THE REORGANIZATION OF 1951

It was becoming more and more apparent that political, military and financial problems could not, as in the past, be considered separately by different committees of Ministers, and that NATO, to be effective, must be further simplified and streamlined. Accordingly, acting on a Canadian proposal it was decided (and announced on the 3rd May, 1951) that the North Atlantic Council, originally composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member governments, would thereafter incorporate the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee, and thus become 'the sole ministerial body in the Organization' charged with 'the responsibility of considering all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty'. The Council would be composed of Foreign, Defence or Finance Ministers as governments saw fit. It would be a Council of governments, not one of individual Ministers.

The status of the Deputies was also enhanced. Instead of being the 'deputies' of the Foreign Ministers only, they now represented all Ministers in their government concerned with NATO matters. The Council Deputies thus became 'the permanent working organization of the North Atlantic Council'. An international secretariat, paid from a budget to which all member states contributed, was set up under the direction of the 'Députés' Chairman, Mr. Charles M. Spofford. A new body, the Financial and Economic Board (FEB), responsible to the Council Deputies, was established in Paris. It replaced all existing NATO committees and groups working in that field.

During the spring and summer of 1951 much work was done by the Council Deputies and their subsidiary agencies. The Deputies, for instance, successfully negotiated an 'Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces': this determined the legal position of the officers and soldiers of one member country called to serve under NATO command in another member country. It was signed on the 19th June, 1951. A similar agreement, relating to the civilian side of NATO - 'Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff' - was also negotiated and signed in September 1951. Another important matter was to decide how international military headquarters would be jointly financed by member governments. In August 1951, a cost-sharing for-
mula was agreed for financing SHAPE and its subordinate headquarters. During the same period, the common financing of the infrastructure which SHAPE urgently needed was the subject of prolonged discussions, but without success.*

All of these problems raised far-reaching political and financial issues. In fact, they were a test of just how far the members of the Atlantic Alliance were prepared to go along the path of collective action and collective responsibility.

**THE OTTAWA CONFERENCE**

In September, 1951, the North Atlantic Council met in Ottawa. The Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers, for the first time in joint session, examined reports from the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board,** the Financial and Economic Board and the Military Committee (including a separate report from General Eisenhower). These reports, as Mr. Spofford stated in a personal report to the Council, focussed attention on 'the most urgent tasks facing NATO if planning... is to be translated into effective collective defence'. Their common theme was that each NATO agency was still being hampered in its work for lack of information from the others. It was clear that further reorganization of NATO was essential.

The Military Committee reported that the aggregate of the defence contributions offered by member governments fell short of the level of forces and equipment which the military authorities regarded as essential for the defence of the North Atlantic area. It therefore pressed for increases to 'fill the gap'. In supporting this request General Eisenhower stated that he found the military effort to be 'so closely interlocked with economic, financial and social matters that it was often impracticable, and indeed quite unrealistic, to consider one of these fields without giving due attention to the others'.

The interim report of the Defence Production Board concentrated attention on the position of the continental European member countries, and pointed out that, whilst there were serious equipment deficiencies, there was also considerable unused capacity for arms production. The principal limiting factor in developing a programme was the impossibility of obtaining a commitment from governments to provide the money.

The Financial and Economic Board also presented an interim report containing the first systematic analysis of the financial and economic problems arising from the national defence programmes. This report considered the question of how to achieve the 'equitable' sharing of the defence burden between member countries - a subject which had been frequently discussed within NATO during the last year. It stressed that no simple and generally acceptable formula could be devised: the complex factors which determined each country's capacity to undertake defence could not be reduced to mathematical terms.

On the vital question of assessing the desired increase in the total NATO defence effort, the FEB pointed out that it was impossible to arrive at final conclusions in the absence of close military guidance. So far, the common defence plan had not been worked out in detail: the first rough estimates of its cost were just being prepared and governments were very unwilling to commit themselves to additional expenditure until they knew what the total demand on them was

* See Chapter X, NATO Common Infrastructure.
** See Chapter XI, Development of Defence Production.
likely to be. Still more important was the fact that the existing defence programmes of many countries were already causing considerable economic strain. The FEB urged that any final decision about the size of the defence burdens should await a careful appraisal of the economic risks involved in undertaking increases against the military risks of not doing so. That was a task which the Board was neither empowered nor competent to perform.

It should here be recalled that the Defence Production Board and the Financial and Economic Board had been in existence for only a few months. It is a tribute to them that they were able so quickly to bring these issues to a head.

The dilemma in which the NATO agencies found themselves could obviously not be resolved by the North Atlantic Council in a single session of a few days. Accordingly, they decided to set up a Temporary Council Committee (TCC) charged with reconciling the requirements of ‘fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defence of Western Europe and the realistic political-economic capabilities of the member countries’. In short, the TCC had to decide whether the military authorities were asking too much or whether governments were offering too little. It was empowered to ask for information, advice and assistance from all member governments, and from all the military and civilian agencies of NATO.

Apart from the creation of the TCC the Council took other important decisions. They formally recommended to member governments that the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey should be invited to accede to the Treaty. They decided to examine the possibility of extending NATO’s activities in the non-military field and established a Ministerial Committee composed of representatives from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway, to consider the best means of strengthening the Atlantic Community and of implementing Article 2 of the Treaty. * They also noted that during the session the Council Deputies had finally agreed on a cost-sharing formula for financing the Second Slice of the infrastructure programme. **

THE TCC AT WORK

When the Ministers ended their talks in Ottawa, they left on the lap of the TCC the prodigious task of cutting through the ‘vicious circle’ of problems which had so far prevented NATO from developing an acceptable and comprehensive plan of forces build-up, and of defence production. The Temporary Council Committee, which met in Paris early in October 1951, consisted of representatives of the twelve member countries under the chairmanship of Mr. W. Averell Harriman (USA). It decided, however, to delegate its detailed work to an Executive Board of three – Mr. Averell Harriman, M. Jean Monnet (France) and Sir Edwin Plowden (UK) – men who had already won international reputations for their experience in economic planning. They were nicknamed the ‘Three Wise Men’.

The TCC worked fast. An international secretariat was established in Paris, drawn from all NATO agencies and from national delegations. Questionnaires were sent to member countries calling, on very short notice, for detailed information on defence programmes for the next three years and on the economic resources available to meet them. The TCC wanted to know about the numbers of regular

* See Chapter XIV, Non-Military Co-operation.
** See Chapter X, NATO Common Infrastructure.
and reserve troops countries were proposing to raise, the state of their training, the types of equipment available for future defence production and the plans for using it. Questions were asked about the cost of defence programmes, their impact on all sectors of the economy, the measures which were being taken to meet this impact, and additional measures which could be taken by the countries, acting together, to strengthen their economies.

As the replies came in from the countries they were analysed by committees of experts working under the Executive Board. An important innovation was the Screening and Costing Committee headed by General McNarney (USA), which scrutinised each country's military plans in consultation with its senior military representatives, recommending changes designed to cut out unnecessary frills and to concentrate efforts in the direction likely to produce the most valuable results. At the same time, the Executive Board was consulting the NATO military authorities and making up its mind about the sort of total defence plan necessary to meet the estimated military threat.

After these preliminaries the Board conferred with the representatives of each member government. Defence as well as economic policies came under fire and governments recognised the urgency of the occasion by sending senior Ministers to represent them. The Wise Men pulled no punches. They were armed by their advisers with precise proposals for improving each country's defence programme, for welding all programmes into a collective, balanced defence effort, and for the financial and economic measures which would be necessary to support this effort. It should be noted, moreover, that they and their staff were not acting as national representatives: they had been commissioned by the Council to do a specific job for NATO as a whole. That sovereign governments submitted to this searching cross-examination by an international staff, parted with some of their most jealously guarded secrets and debated in common measures affecting matters of high policy, was a signal victory for the NATO spirit. No one who participated in the TCC exercise will forget the arduous labour and long hours of work; but neither will they forget the sense of pride in being able to make a contribution to this remarkable task.

THE ROME CONFERENCE

The Council held their eighth session in Rome between the 24th and the 28th November, 1951, in order to receive progress reports on the work initiated at Ottawa, and to pave the way for final decisions at their next session in Lisbon.

The Conference on the European Defence Community called by the French Government in Paris had, by November, 1951, made some progress on a final draft treaty. The Council therefore decided to instruct the Council Deputies to consider this draft and to make recommendations at the next session as to the relationship which should obtain between NATO and the EDC.

The Military Committee reported upon the state of readiness and effectiveness of forces assigned or earmarked for NATO Commands. General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and his Chief-of-Staff, General Gruenther, reported upon the military situation in Western Europe in the light of the combined manoeuvres which had been held there during the autumn.

The TCC had not yet completed its task, but it submitted an interim report as did the Committee on the North Atlantic Community. As a result of the TCC's report, the Council Deputies were directed to make recommendations at the next
meeting of the Council on the changes that might again be required in the organization of the civilian agencies of NATO.

THE TCC REPORT

On the 18th December, 1951, the Temporary Council Committee forwarded its final report to member governments. In the words of the Chairman, Mr. Harriman: ‘It is the first comprehensive review of how the resources of the member countries under peacetime conditions can best be employed in the interest of common security. . . The TCC has made an appraisal of the present status of NATO defence, the maximum effective forces which can be achieved in the short-term future and the steps that need to be taken now for future build-up. Specific proposals have been made for force targets and military standards, which are to be considered as firm goals for the coming year and as provisional goals and guidance for the years thereafter’.

The basis of the report was a study of each country’s defence programme: proposals were made for improvement in the light of the TCC’s assessment of the country’s capacity. The document had this to say about the level of defence appropriate to each country: ‘The assessment has taken into consideration the evident desirability that the contributions to the common defence should be equitably distributed among the member countries; this suggests that, other things being equal, the greater the level of income or the potential rate of increase in income expected in a country, the higher can be the proportion of national income devoted to defence. Careful consideration was given to the specific obstacles limiting the efforts of each country and the extent to which these could be overcome by appropriate national and international action’.

The report reaffirmed the principle, fundamental to the Atlantic Treaty, that defence must rest on a sound economic and social basis. It recommended action to be taken by countries, separately or together, to help resolve problems of inflation, the dollar gap, scarcity of raw materials and excess population. Among the proposals to relieve the balance of payments difficulties, specific emphasis was put on the role of ‘offshore’ purchases (not then begun), on United States participation in common infrastructure and on other North American military expenditures abroad. This is significant in view of the part which these expenditures have since played in helping to solve the dollar problems of several member countries.*

The TCC also emphasised that the agencies of NATO needed to be strengthened and co-ordinated. It recommended that something akin to the TCC exercise be made a regular feature of NATO’s work, so as to ensure a continuous appraisal of defence programmes in the light of economic and political developments. This was the origin of what we now call the ‘Annual Review’.**

The action taken by the Council at Ottawa in appointing the TCC had been wholly justified. At the conclusion of the exercise (i.e., at the meeting of the Council in Lisbon) the military authorities were presented with a three years’ plan of what they were likely to obtain from the member countries. This was less than they wanted, but it did represent more than they had previously been offered: the TCC believed that most member states could make a defence effort somewhat

* See Chapter XII, Self-Help and Mutual Aid.
** For description of the Annual Review, see Chapter VIII.
greater than that already planned. It should be recorded for the sake of accuracy that not all member countries were happy about the TCC conclusions and that there was also a feeling, among some governments, that the defence capabilities of the larger members of the Alliance had not been explored with sufficient thoroughness.

The NATO defence programmes have since been modified but this implies no contradiction of the Committee’s findings. The international scene has changed, and some of the prerequisites on which the success of the TCC programme depended – such as a specific rate of expansion of the free countries’ economies – have not been realised. The Committee had anticipated such changes when it insisted on flexibility as to long-term goals and the need for a continuous review of its proposals. All in all, General Eisenhower did not exaggerate when he called the Temporary Council Committee exercise ‘a truly monumental piece of work’. It had performed a wonderful emergency operation.

THE LISBON CONFERENCE

On the 20th February, 1952, the North Atlantic Council met at Lisbon. As a result of the vast amount of preparatory work which had been done, they had a great deal of business to transact. The decisions which the Council took at Lisbon have made that session a landmark in the history of NATO.

The main item on the agenda was the ‘co-ordinated analysis of NATO defence plans’. Governments had had time to comment on the TCC report, and their answers had been studied in a supplementary TCC paper. The Council adopted the military targets suggested in the report: firm goals for 1952, provisional estimates for 1953 and 1954. Member governments agreed to build up by the end of 1952 about 50 divisions, 4,000 aircraft and ‘strong naval forces’.

The Council also considered the problem of German participation in Western defence. Negotiations, as we have seen, had taken place on this subject throughout the previous year. Although the talks between the three Occupying Powers and Germany had completely failed, the Paris Conference on a European Army had resulted in a draft treaty drawn up by the representatives of Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Thus the Council at Lisbon had three papers on the European Defence Community plan before them, namely, the report of the Paris Conference, a report by the Council Deputies, and a report by the Military Committee giving its assessment of the technical value of the plan. The Council’s reaction was favourable. They approved these reports in principle and recommended that the member countries of NATO should sign a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the guarantees to be given to member countries of the European Defence Community based on the provisions of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. * In doing so they ‘re-affirmed the urgency, for the defence of Western Europe, of establishing at the earliest possible date a militarily effective European Defence Force, including a German contribution’. It may be added that the EDC Treaty was signed in Paris three months later (on the 27th May, 1952), together with the Protocol mentioned above.

Among the other business dealt with by the Ministers at Lisbon was the financing of the Third Slice of NATO’s infrastructure programme. ** The Council also

* For text of the Protocol see Annex B, page 50.
** See Chapter X, NATO Common Infrastructure.
considered the report of the Atlantic Community Committee. This document, which covered topics ranging from political consultation to the liberalisation of trade, from the mobility of labour to cultural relations, did not pretend to be a blueprint for NATO action: but it rendered useful service in sorting out the problems to which the Alliance should devote its attention in the future.*

Last but not least, the Council acted upon a report by the Council Deputies and recommendations by the TCC and drastically reorganized the civilian agencies of NATO. Henceforth, the Council were to be in permanent session in Paris, served by a Secretary General and an international staff, absorbing all the existing civilian agencies. How this reorganization was carried out and the structure which resulted from it is described in the next chapter.

**THE END OF A PERIOD**

The increasing responsibilities assigned to NATO by member governments necessitated the centralisation and simplification of the civilian agencies still too complex and scattered despite the measure of co-ordination already achieved by the Deputies, whose work had been outstanding. Their main triumphs lay in the political field: it was they who practised and daily developed what might be called the NATO method, i.e. the technique whereby the representatives of twelve (later fourteen) sovereign governments reach unanimous agreement without formal vote. By bringing to bear on their governments the weight of opinion in NATO they assisted the attainment of an agreed common view which normally received the assent of the Council without further ado. For instance, it was largely due to the Deputies that Scandinavian hesitations about the inclusion of Greece and Turkey were overcome; it was they who did the most to obtain agreement on the principle of a German contribution to the defence of the NATO area; and it was they who reached agreement on the financial contribution to be made by governments to NATO military and civilian agencies.

From their central position as the permanent political body, the Deputies were able to see NATO as a whole, in all its aspects. Great credit must be given to their Chairman, Ambassador Spofford, and to the tact and ability with which he discharged his sometimes invidious role of being international Chairman and at the same time, the head of the United States Delegation. NATO saw him leave with regret; but NATO was indeed fortunate in that many of the other Deputies, with all their accumulated knowledge of the Alliance, were made available by their governments as the Permanent Representatives on the reorganized Council in Paris.**

* See Chapter XIV, Non-Military Co-operation.
** For the names of Council Deputies, see Annex A, page 49.

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# ANNEX A

## NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL DEPUTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Deputy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>M. André de Staercke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Mr. L. Dana Wilgress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>M. de Steensen-Leth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>M. Hervé Alphand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>M. P. Pipinelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>M. Gunnlaugur Pétursson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>M. Alberto Rossi Longhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>M. André Clasen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>M. Dag Bryn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Dr. Ruy Ennes Ulrich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>M. Huseyin Ragip Baydur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Mr. Charles M. Spofford</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ANNEX B

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON GUARANTEES GIVEN BY THE PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY TO THE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY

Paris, 27th May, 1952

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949,

Being satisfied that the creation of the European Defence Community set up under the Treaty signed at Paris on 27th May, 1952 will strengthen the North Atlantic Community and the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area, and promote the closer association of the countries of Western Europe, and

Considering that the Parties to the Treaty setting up the European Defence Community have signed a Protocol, which will enter into force at the same time as the present Protocol, giving to the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty guarantees equivalent to the guarantees contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

An armed attack
(i) on the territory of any of the members of the European Defence Community in Europe or in the area described in Article 6(i) of the North Atlantic Treaty, or
(ii) on the forces, vessels or aircraft of the European Defence Community when in the area described in Article 6(ii) of the said Treaty,

shall be considered an attack against all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, within the meaning of Article 5 of the said Treaty, and Article 5 shall apply accordingly.

The expression 'member of the European Defence Community' in paragraph (i) of this Article means any of the following States which is a member of the Community, namely, Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

ARTICLE II

The present Protocol shall enter into force as soon as each of the Parties has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance and the Council of the European Defence Community has notified the North Atlantic Council of the entry into force of the Treaty setting up the European Defence Community. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.
ARTICLE III

The present Protocol shall remain in force for so long as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Treaty setting up the European Defence Community remain in force and the Parties to the latter Treaty continue to give, in respect of themselves and the European Defence forces, guarantees to the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty equivalent to the guarantees contained in the present Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and of all the Parties to the Treaty setting up the European Defence Community.
PART II

HOW NATO WORKS
CHAPTER VI

THE CIVIL STRUCTURE

Reference was made in the previous Chapter to the far-reaching decisions which were taken by the Council at Lisbon in regard to the reorganization of the civilian agencies of NATO. In summary, these were as follows:

1. the terms of reference of the North Atlantic Council should continue to be the North Atlantic Treaty;
2. the Council should continue to be a Council of governments, represented by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and/or Ministers of Defence and/or other competent Ministers, especially those responsible for financial and economic affairs, as required by the agenda of each meeting. When appropriate, member countries, could be represented by heads of governments;
3. Ministerial Meetings should be held at least three times a year;
4. the Chairmanship of the Council should continue to rotate annually, as has been done hitherto. The Secretary General (see 6 below) should serve as Vice-Chairman of the Council and preside in the absence of the Chairman;
5. in order to enable the Council to function in permanent session with effective powers of decision, each government should appoint a Permanent Representative to represent his government on the Council when Ministers were not present. Permanent Representatives could be of Ministerial rank or senior officials, according to the practice of the state concerned. In any case, they should be sufficiently close to their governments and entrusted with adequate authority to enable the Council to discharge their collective tasks and to reach prompt decisions. Each Permanent Representative should head a national delegation, comprising the advisers and experts necessary to assist him in all phases of the Council’s work;
6. a Secretary General should be appointed by, and be responsible to, the Council. He should not be a member of any national delegation. He should be responsible for organizing the work of the Council and directing the work of the International Staff/Secretariat (see below). He should initiate and prepare matters for Council action and ensure that appropriate steps are taken to follow up Council decisions. He should have direct access to all NATO agencies and to governments;
7. the International Staff/Secretariat should be unified and strengthened so as to play an effective role in the initial preparation and follow-up of action in all matters for which the Council are responsible. They should perform analytical and planning functions at...
the request of the Council, including preparatory work for the annual TCC-type review;

8. the Council should assume responsibility for the tasks hitherto performed by the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board, as well as for those initiated by the Temporary Council Committee;

9. the Permanent Headquarters of the Council should be located in the general area of Paris;

10. the position of the North Atlantic Council in relation to the military agencies of NATO should continue unchanged. Liaison arrangements between the Council and those agencies should be strengthened;

11. the new arrangements should become effective and the new Treaty agencies should assume their functions at a date to be fixed by the Council Deputies. On that date, the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board should cease to exist.

The Council Deputies, on their return to London, hastened to give effect to the Lisbon decisions and to wind up their affairs. On the 12th March, 1952, they appointed Lord Ismay, then a Cabinet Minister of the United Kingdom Government, to be Vice-Chairman of the Council and Secretary General of NATO. On the 4th April – the third anniversary of the signing of the Treaty – they held their final meeting.

In his concluding speech, their Chairman, Ambassador Spofford, said: ‘As we have progressed from planning to performance, we have reached agreement on changes in the organization which will be adapted to the increasing tempo, scope and nature of NATO activities... Today the North Atlantic Council goes into permanent session... It is now my privilege to turn over this Chair, this gavel, this microphone to Lord Ismay, and... to declare him Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’. With those words, the Council Deputies, and with them the Defence Production Board and the Financial and Economic Board came to an end.

THE MOVE TO PARIS

The move of office equipment, records, etc., from 13 Belgrave Square, London, to the new temporary Headquarters in the Palais de Chaillot*, was begun forthwith. Within the next fortnight the members of the former central staff and of the Defence Production Board who were to be employed in the new Staff/Secretariat moved to this Headquarters, where they were joined by those members of the Financial and Economic Board in Paris who were to continue to serve in NATO. Simultaneously, the Permanent Representatives – of which eight had been Council Deputies – together with their delegations were assembling in Paris.

Within a space of three weeks, the new Organization was ready to start work: and on the 28th April, 1952, the reconstituted Council held its first meeting. In a speech of welcome, the French Foreign Minister, M. Robert Schuman, defined the main task of the new International Secretariat as the ‘day-to-day assistance to

* The prefabricated annex to the Palais de Chaillot which was erected for the United Nations General Assembly in 1951.
NATO CIVIL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION
JULY 1954

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN: Changes Annually
VICE-CHAIRMAN: The Secretary General

MILITARY COMMITTEE

SECURITY GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT

STANDING GROUP
LICION OFFICE

COUNCIL COMMITTEES

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC

CANADA-U.S. REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP

CHANNEL COMMITTEE
CHANNEL COMMANDS
member governments to harmonise their resources and means with the demands of defence'. He told the Council: 'Our unity must be apparent in every aspect of our undertaking. That is the task of our governments and parliaments, a task in which you, Gentlemen, will participate both as our counsellors and as our spokesmen'.

It was at this very first meeting that the Council were called upon to decide a question of the highest importance. General Eisenhower had asked to be released from his Command in order to interest himself actively in United States politics. His replacement was a matter of urgency. The Council decided that the Supreme Command in Europe should continue to be held by an officer of the United States Armed Forces: and on the nomination of President Truman, they appointed General Matthew B. Ridgway to this vital position. General Gruenther remained as Chief-of-Staff.

THE COUNCIL: HOW THEY WORK

It was also at this meeting that the Council agreed upon the general lines on which they would conduct their business. Among other things it was decided to hold meetings of the Council every Wednesday. This has been the established practice ever since: but the pressure of day-to-day business has often necessitated more than one meeting a week, while emergency business has occasionally required the Council to be assembled on any day of the week, or at any hour of the day, at half-an-hour's notice.

There are three different types of Council meetings. First, the normal sessions, to which the members can bring four advisers, or more if business so requires. Secondly, there are restricted sessions for the consideration of particularly confidential business. These are attended by one or, at the most, two advisers from each delegation. Thirdly, there are informal sessions, which are strictly private and, as a general rule, attended only by the Permanent Representatives themselves. These informal meetings, at which there is no agenda, no record, no commitments – and therefore no formal decisions – are characterised by the utmost frankness. They enable Permanent Representatives to inform their governments of the climate of opinion in the Council, and in particular to report the preliminary views of their colleagues on important questions which are destined to come up later for Council decision. Governments are thus able to take those views into account in their own instructions to their Permanent Representatives.

Since the move to Paris, on the 28th April, 1952, up to the 1st July, 1954, the Council held 185 meetings, * of which 57 were informal.

Experience has shown that, now that the Council are in permanent session with effective powers of decision, it is not normally necessary for Ministers to meet as frequently as was decided at the Lisbon session, namely three times a year. Nevertheless, periodical Ministerial Meetings are, of course, essential.

They provide an opportunity for the Ministers principally concerned with NATO affairs in all the member states, to keep in touch with each other, to discuss general political developments which affect the North Atlantic Alliance, either directly or indirectly, to make a common assessment of problems of common interest, and to learn at first hand how the manifold activities of NATO are progressing. It is, in any case, most important that Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers should meet to take stock of the military situation as set out in the

* Nineteen meetings took place during the four Ministerial Sessions.
report on the Annual Review, and to take decisions regarding the military build-up.

Of the four Ministerial Meetings held in Paris, the first three were attended by the Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers of most of the member countries. The fourth was attended by Foreign Ministers only. The results of the discussions at these meetings are to be found in the communiqués issued at the time *. It was agreed at the Ministerial Meeting held on the 26th April, 1953, that in future there should be normally two Ministerial Meetings a year.

The Council have no written rules of procedure; nor has the need for such rules ever been felt. As agreed at the very first session in Washington on the 17th September, 1949, business is conducted in the two official languages, English and French. Decisions are unanimous; there is no voting. When governments hold divergent views, negotiation continues until unanimous agreement has been attained. There is no question of, say, ten nations forcing four to do what they do not want to do. The Council are no supranational body; their members are representatives of sovereign states. It is true that unanimity is not always achieved without considerable patience and a good deal of give and take; but it has always been reached in the end. That is because the interests and objectives of all NATO countries are fundamentally the same, and because the habit of thinking alike and acting alike for the common good is growing daily.

COUNCIL COMMITTEES

It was agreed at Lisbon that the Council 'should, whenever necessary... set up, on a permanent or temporary basis, committees to assist it'. It was also agreed that 'specialised functions, such as those now assigned to the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping... should continue to be directed by the Council'. Accordingly, the Council have set up a number of standing committees. In addition, it is their practice to set up working groups as required.

Standing committees are permanent bodies, whereas working groups are set up on an ad hoc basis and dissolved when they have completed the tasks for which they were established. Membership of committees and working groups is open to all member countries. The Chairman of each is appointed by the Council. He may be a Permanent Representative, a member of one of the delegations or a senior member of the International Staff. The general character and scope of the work of the various boards, committees and working groups which are directed by the Council may be judged from the chart on page 59: while there are more detailed references to the problems and progress of many of them in other chapters of this survey.

THE COUNCIL: WHAT THEY DO

The work of the military authorities of NATO can be roughly explained in a sentence – the creation of integrated international forces out of the various national contingents of member countries, and the preparation of defence plans. It is much more difficult to explain the work of the civil authorities. Their terms of reference are perfectly simple, namely the North Atlantic Treaty: but this obviously requires amplification.

* See Appendix IV, page 172.
First, the Council are a forum where all questions of policy directly and indirectly affecting NATO can be discussed. For example, the three members who are representatives of the Occupying Powers in Germany – France, the United Kingdom and the United States – exchanged views with their eleven colleagues on the Council before the Four Power Conference of Foreign Ministers was held in Berlin early in 1954. Moreover, throughout the course of the Conference those three governments made it their business to see that their partners in NATO were kept informed of what was happening. Similarly, the Council as a whole had discussions on the Soviet Note of the 31st March, 1954, to the three Occupying Powers, which included *inter alia* the astonishing suggestion that the Soviet Government were ready ‘to consider jointly with the interested governments the question of the participation of the USSR in the North Atlantic Treaty’. The views put forward by the other NATO governments were taken fully into account by those of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in drafting their reply.

Secondly, the Council have continuing administrative and financial responsibilities. They control the budgets of both the military and civilian agencies of NATO. They decide upon the proportionate expenditure which should be borne by each member country, not only to finance NATO headquarters, but also for common infrastructure, and so forth.

Thirdly, the Council have considerable responsibility towards the military authorities. In each country there is a government whose military advisers are the Chiefs-of-Staff, and these in turn direct the commands. On that analogy the Council are an international cabinet. Their military advisers are the Military Committee, which in turn gives directions to the Supreme Commanders. Thus the Council are responsible for giving political guidance to the military authorities and for providing them, so far as economic capabilities permit, with the men, equipment and the infrastructure which they require for the discharge of their responsibilities to defend the NATO area. They do this through the medium of the Annual Review*.

As was decided at Lisbon in 1952, liaison between the military agencies and the Council has been strengthened. The permanent link is provided by the Standing Group Liaison Officer and a staff drawn from many member countries**. But in addition, the civil and military authorities do their utmost to keep in personal touch with each other’s affairs. For example, the Standing Group which is resident in Washington makes a practice of periodical visits to Paris for consultation with the Council. In addition, the Council have paid visits to the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and of the Commanders-in-Chief Channel, in order to learn about their work at first hand. Finally, they pay occasional visits to international manoeuvres, e.g., in September 1952 they went to Oslo for a big naval exercise, in November 1952 to the Eastern Mediterranean to witness amphibious landings and other naval operations, and in the autumn of 1953 to Western Germany and to Channel Command.

Fourthly, the Council do what they can to ensure that the ‘home fronts’ will stand the strain of war, if unhappily it should be forced upon them. Thus, the Council encourage proper civil defence arrangements and action in order that the morale of all the peoples may be sustained by knowledge of the aims and purposes of the Alliance. Further, it is their duty to see that emergency plans are prepared

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* See Chapter VIII, The Annual Review.

** See Chapter VII, The Military Structure.
in the non-military fields, such as the allocation of food, of raw materials, of shipping, and of inland transport. Clearly the direct responsibility for all these matters must rest with national governments, but it is the business of the Council to initiate, stimulate and co-ordinate, and to ensure that all the experience is pooled*.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT

The organization of the staff is shown in the diagram on page 63. At its head is the Secretary General, whose terms of reference have been quoted earlier in this Chapter. His office gives him unique opportunities to make proposals not only about the technical aspects of NATO but also about the current and future affairs of the Alliance. The terms of reference also say that he should have direct access to all NATO agencies and to governments. Accordingly, since his appointment the Secretary General has made official visits to all member governments (except that of France to which naturally he has constant access). In each country he enjoyed the privilege of consultations with the Ministers primarily concerned with NATO affairs and of addressing the press as well as various unofficial groups and institutes. These personal contacts have proved of the greatest value.

Assisting the Secretary General in all the aspects of his work is the Deputy Secretary General, Mr. H. van Vredenburch (Netherlands). In the absence of the Secretary General he presides over Council meetings. There are also three Assistant Secretaries General, whose duties are mentioned below.

The International Staff/Secretariat is drawn from the nationals of all fourteen member countries. There is no hard and fast rule as to the proportion of appointments to be held by each country, but every effort is made to ensure an equitable distribution. This principle to some extent restricts the choice of candidates for any particular post, but there is no question of any one country having a permanent claim on any particular appointment. It is generally recognised as undesirable that an international organization should be frozen into a rigid pattern.

It was laid down by the Council at Lisbon that the staff should be recruited on the basis of quality rather than quantity. This principle has been strictly enforced, and no new appointment is made unless the need for it has been clearly demonstrated. As a result, very few additions have been made during the past two years and at the 1st July, 1954, the officer strength, including interpreters and translators, was 189. On the same date, the total strength of the civilian Headquarters, including messengers, security guards and general service grades, was 596. All members of the staff are international servants who take their orders from the Secretary General and not from their own governments. They are paid out of international funds provided on a cost-sharing basis. The total annual budget, including current and capital expenditure, is approximately 3.6 million dollars.

The term 'Staff/Secretariat' emphasises the dual role of the civilian organization. The Secretariat consists of the Office of the Secretary General. It is directed by an Executive Secretary, Captain R.D. Coleridge (UK), who is also Secretary to the Council. He is responsible for supervising the general processing of the work of the Council and their committees, including provision of all secretarial assistance, as well as supervision of the administrative services of the Staff/Secretariat.

* See Chapter XIII, Emergency Planning.
itself. Thus the Secretariat provides secretaries to all the Council's principal committees and working groups - apart from those of a strictly technical nature - and ensures co-ordination between them. This arrangement, sometimes known as the 'Cabinet System', was introduced into NATO by Mr. Spofford when the international central staff was formed in London during 1951.

On the Staff side there are three main divisions corresponding to the three principal aspects of NATO's work, each under an Assistant Secretary General. Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea (Italy) heads the Political Affairs Division, M. René Sergent (France) the Economics and Finance Division, and Mr. Lowell P. Weicker (USA) the Production and Logistics Division. The Divisions' tasks are to prepare, in close touch with delegations, proposed action in their respective fields for consideration by the appropriate committee or by the Council.

In addition to the main divisions there are three other offices working directly to the Secretary General. These are the Office of Statistics (Mr. Loring Wood of the USA), the Financial Comptroller's Office (M. A. J. Bastin of Belgium), and the Division of Information (Mr. Geoffrey Parsons, Jr. of the USA). The Information Division, besides providing material about NATO for the use of member governments, (it does not engage in independent operations), is also the press and public relations branch of the civilian authority.

ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS

In view of the fact that NATO has to handle much secret and confidential material, great care has to be exercised in the recruitment of staff. Only nationals of the member countries are eligible and before appointment their records have to be checked and approved by national authorities.

Many of the officers of the International Staff are government servants of the various member countries who are seconded for a period of service with NATO of, say, two or three years. This has the disadvantage of lack of continuity; on the other hand, it ensures that member governments have in their service an increasing number of officers with special knowledge of NATO affairs. The remaining officers of the staff, especially technical experts, are recruited outside government circles, but generally on the nomination of their own governments. Some of them intend to devote their careers to NATO. Thus there will, in course of time, be built up a permanent body of international NATO civil servants. A start has been made.

It was always intended that NATO should remain in the temporary Headquarters at the Palais de Chaillot only until permanent Headquarters could be built. In November 1952, the French Government offered a site at Le Chesnay (Seine-et-Oise), which was provisionally accepted by the Council. It subsequently transpired, however, that practically none of the delegations was prepared to move so far from their embassies, on which they are dependent for communication with their governments and other facilities. The French Government therefore, at the Council's request, sought another solution. In April 1954, they were able to offer a site near the Porte Dauphine in Paris. The Council have gratefully accepted it and it is proposed to start building as soon as possible.

Shortly before he returned to the United States, General Eisenhower told the International Staff in a farewell talk that he believed they were 'the only body in the whole free world meeting day by day and studying objectively the real issues and problems that are of concern to all of us'. They are certainly conscious
of being, in a very real sense, the trustees of the Atlantic Community. They know that their work, their constancy, and perhaps above all their team-spirit are very necessary elements in the pursuit of the great tasks entrusted to NATO.
ANNEX A

CHAIRMEN OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

1949-1950  Mr. Dean G. Acheson  (United States)
1950-1951  M. Paul van Zeeland  (Belgium)
1951-1952  Mr. Lester B. Pearson  (Canada)
1952-1953  M. Ole Bjørn Kraft  (Denmark)
1953-1954  M. Georges Bidault  (France)
1954-      M. Stephanos Stephanopoulos  (Greece)

PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

July 1954

Belgium  M. André de Staercke
Canada   Mr. L. Dana Wilgress
         (succeeded Mr. A. D. P. Heeney)
Denmark  M. J. A. Vestbirk
         (succeeded M. de Steensen-Leth)
France  M. Hervé Alphand*
Greece   M. G. Exintaris
         (succeeded M. Pipinelis)
Iceland M. H. G. Andersen
         (succeeded M. Gunnlaugur Pétursson)
Italy    M. Adolfo Alessandrini
         (succeeded M. Alberto Rossi Longhi)
Luxembourg M. Nicolas Hommel
         (succeeded M. A. Wehrer)
Netherlands Jonkheer A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer
Norway   M. Arne Skaug
Portugal Comte de Tovar
Turkey   M. Fatin R. Zorlu
United Kingdom Sir Christopher Steel
         (succeeded Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar)
United States Mr. John A. Hughes
         (succeeded Mr. William H. Draper Jr.)

* Succeeded in September, 1954, by M. Maurice Couve de Murville.
ANNEX B

NATIONAL REPRESENTATION
IN THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF

On the 1st July, 1954, the authorised strength of the International Staff was 627. The total number of appointments at that date was 596 for all grades. The following list is a breakdown of the International Staff by nationalities for officer grades.

*July 1954*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States</th>
<th>Officers down to and including Grade 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL:** 189
CHAPTER VII

THE MILITARY STRUCTURE

THE HIGHER DIRECTION

The military structure of NATO has changed beyond recognition since it was first set up in September 1949. It has been built up step by step in the light of experience: some of its early developments have been described in previous chapters, for the sake of chronology.

The supreme military authority is now the Military Committee. This consists normally of one Chief-of-Staff from each member country*. The Chairmanship of the Committee changes annually. It has hitherto been provided by the country which holds the Chair of the Council for the year in question**. The Military Committee is responsible for providing the Council with military advice, and the subordinate military authorities with direction and guidance.

Meetings of the Military Committee take place periodically, but it was realised from the outset that these would have to be few and far between, since Chiefs-of-Staff must reside alongside their own governments. It was also realised that so large a Committee was not suitable for day-to-day work. Consequently, a three-member executive agency was set up. This is known as the Standing Group.

This body is in permanent session in Washington. It is composed of representatives of the Chiefs-of-Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States (or, when appropriate, a Chief-of-Staff*** from each of these countries). The Chairmanship changes quarterly. The Standing Group is served by a number of staff teams drawn from France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The Standing Group provides strategic direction, co-ordinates and integrates defence plans originating in NATO commands and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group, and, in addition, controls and directs the work of a number of agencies which deal with special types of military activity****.

In order to ensure, on the one hand, that all member nations not represented on the Standing Group are kept in touch with its work and, on the other hand, that the Standing Group is kept informed of the points of view of those other nations, there has been established in Washington, as described in Chapter IV, a permanent organization entitled the Military Representatives Committee. This consists of the three members of the Standing Group, and one member from each of the other countries*****. The Standing Group is empowered to take

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* Iceland has no military forces, but can be represented on the Military Committee by a civilian.
** For the list of Chairmen of the Military Committee, see Annex A, page 82.
*** In the case of the United States, a special arrangement exists whereby the same officer now represents the United States on all occasions.
**** See chart 8, page 69.
***** Except Iceland which has no military forces, and Luxembourg which is represented by Belgium.
decisions on certain specific subjects, and in conditions of urgency without reference to the Military Representatives Committee. But its normal practice is to consult that Committee fully and obtain its approval before any recommendations are finalised.

The link between the North Atlantic Council Headquarters in Paris and the Standing Group in Washington is provided by a Standing Group Liaison Officer (Vice-Admiral Royer Dick, UK) whose offices are at the Headquarters of the North Atlantic Council. This appointment is held in turn by the Standing Group countries. The Standing Group Liaison Officer is assisted by a staff of some sixteen naval, army and air force officers drawn from member countries. He is responsible for presenting the views of the Standing Group to the North Atlantic Council and for conveying the instructions and views of the Council to the Standing Group. He is also responsible for giving the Council the advice of the Standing Group on military problems of a more technical nature, such as the Annual Review and infrastructure, and for providing military representation on any council committees considering problems with military implications. He also maintains contact with the various Commanders to ensure that when commands deal directly with the International Staff, there is co-ordination between command views and those of the Standing Group.

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

The origins of the Allied Command Europe and the establishment of its Headquarters (SHAPE) in the Versailles area in June, 1951, have been described in Chapter IV. The story will now be continued from that point; and since it is the first example of the setting up of an international headquarters in time of peace, it will be told in some detail.

General Eisenhower remained as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) until May, 1952, when he was succeeded by General Matthew B. Ridgway (USA). In July, 1953, General Ridgway was nominated Chief-of-Staff of the United States Army and was succeeded by General Alfred M. Gruenther (USA) who had been Chief-of-Staff to both the former Supreme Commanders.

Field Marshal Montgomery (UK), from the outset, has been Deputy Supreme Commander. There are two other deputies. The First Air Deputy was Air Chief Marshal Saunders (UK). He was succeeded in 1953 by General Norstad (USA) with extended responsibilities (described later in this Chapter). The first Naval Deputy was Admiral Lemonnier (France) who still holds that appointment.

The staff system is based on the American concept of four bureaux, one for Administration, one for Intelligence, one for Plans and Operations, one for Logistics, with certain additions such as special sections for Finance (which was most necessary in an enterprise supported by so many various currencies), and for Signals (of paramount importance in any command controlling such scattered forces, and particularly so in this new and complex organization).

The Chief-of-Staff was allotted two Deputy Chiefs-of-Staff, one French and one British: the first to control Logistics and Administration, which would involve many questions where negotiation with the French Government would be necessary; the second to deal with Plans and Operations. SACEUR has forces actually assigned to him in peacetime. The term ‘assigned forces’ needs some explanation. The military forces of the member nations can be divided into three categories:
1. forces assigned to NATO;
2. forces earmarked for NATO;
3. forces remaining under national command.

Assigned forces are those which have already been placed under the operational command of a NATO Commander. Earmarked forces are those which nations have agreed to place under the operational command of a NATO Commander at some future date in peace, or automatically in the event of mobilisation or war. National forces are those which remain under national control. For example, a French soldier serving in Germany is almost certainly a member of assigned forces; a French soldier who finished his military service a year ago and is now a reservist is probably a member of earmarked forces; while a French soldier serving in Indo-China is a member of national forces.

SACEUR has operational control over all the forces assigned to his Command in time of peace, and is responsible for ensuring that they are properly organized, equipped and trained. He is entitled to deal direct with national authorities in these matters, to settle with them how their forces should be deployed in peacetime and to determine with them the priority in which earmarked forces should be mobilised and come under his Command. Each nation is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, but SACEUR is responsible for ensuring that these national arrangements are co-ordinated.

SACEUR is responsible, under the general guidance of the Military Committee, for the preparation of plans to meet the contingency of aggression. In time of war he would be responsible for the overall conduct of all operations under his Command.

Command Structure

Let us first look at the original command structure in Europe. It was decided that the three Regional Planning Groups which SHAPE replaced would serve as a basis for the subordinate commands which would each be under a Commander-in-Chief. The area from Northern Norway to the Mediterranean falls geographically and strategically into three sectors. In the centre is the peninsula of Western Europe; on its northern flank Scandinavia, the North Sea and the Baltic; on its southern flank Italy and the Mediterranean. Because of the overwhelming importance of the central sector, General Eisenhower decided that he should himself exercise control over all operations and appointed General (now Marshal) Juin (France) as his Land Forces Commander, General Norstad as his Air Force Commander, and Vice-Admiral Jaujard (France) as Flag Officer Western Europe. These three officers were to have their Headquarters at Fontainebleau, till now the seat of the Western Union Defence Organization. In the north, where the jagged rocky coastline of Norway is of immense length and where naval action could usefully support land forces, Admiral Brind (UK)* was selected as the Commander-in-Chief, with his Headquarters at Oslo. Under his control he had an American General commanding the Air Forces, a Norwegian Land Forces Commander and a Danish Land Forces Commander. It was not considered wise to place under the control of one man the Land Forces of Denmark and Norway, which, because of their geographical separation, could not be mutually self-supporting. Both the Northern and Central Commands were formally established on the 2nd April, 1951, the date when SHAPE came into being.

* Later succeeded by General Sir Robert Mansergh (UK).
The problem of command in the southern area was more difficult to resolve, complicated as it was by the special position of the British Naval Force which had for so long wielded control of the Mediterranean. However, in June, 1951, Admiral Carney (USA) – succeeded in 1953 by Admiral Fechteler (USA) – was selected to be Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe. Under his command was an Italian General commanding Land Forces, an American General commanding the Air Forces and an American Admiral to control the powerful 6th US Fleet. The solution of the Mediterranean Command was to wait for two years.

The command structure of SACEUR has been considerably modified since General Eisenhower left Europe in May, 1952. In the first place, the forces of Greece and Turkey have been added to the Command; secondly, the Mediterranean Command has been created; and thirdly, the Central Command has been reorganized.

Greece and Turkey

With the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty in February, 1952, SACEUR was faced with the problem of how the forces of these two new allies were to be fitted into his command structure. As a temporary measure, Admiral Carney, who was the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces in the South, was given the overall responsibility for these forces, but they remained under their own national Commanders pending a final decision on this question.

One alternative was to create an entirely new command for the Greek and Turkish forces: another was to place them under the command of the Land Forces Commander Southern Europe, stationed at Verona. The objection was that this Commander would not only have been very far away from his new charges, but also he might, in the event of war, be involved in simultaneous operations on three fronts.

Finally, it was decided in August, 1952 that a separate command, entitled ‘Allied Land Forces South-Eastern Europe’ should be set up to control the Greek and Turkish forces, and that this new Command should be subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief South. The site chosen for this new Headquarters was Izmir, Turkey, with an advance post in Salonika.

Mediterranean Command

At the end of 1952 it was decided that a further subordinate command should be set up under SACEUR, with the title ‘Allied Forces Mediterranean’, and with Headquarters at Malta. The first Commander-in-Chief was Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma (UK)*, and his Headquarters came into being in March, 1953. Later that year, the various national forces under his control were organized into six separate areas, each commanded by an Admiral: one French, one Greek, one Turkish, one Italian and two British. In time of war, Admiral Mountbatten would be responsible for the security of the line of communications through the Mediterranean.

Central Command

Shortly before General Ridgway was succeeded by General Gruntenher, an important change gave Allied Command Europe the form which it has today. This was

* Succeeded in December, 1954, by Admiral Sir Guy Grantham (UK).
indeed a double change, involving not only the reorganization of the Central Command, but also an extension of the responsibilities of the Air Deputy.

When General Eisenhower first devised his command structure in 1951, he decided, as has already been said, to maintain direct control of the Central area himself. In July, 1953, however, it was decided that the Central Command should have its own Commander-in-Chief, as was the case in the North and in the South. Marshal Juin assumed the title and responsibilities of Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe, and a French Land Forces Commander was appointed to be directly subordinate to him. His Command includes the Northern Army Group, consisting of Belgian, Canadian, Netherlands and United Kingdom Forces, and the Central Army Group consisting of French and United States Forces. Vice-Admiral Jaujard remained as Commander Allied Naval Forces Central Europe. General Norstad moved to SHAPE as Air Deputy (to replace Air Chief Marshal Saunders) and was himself replaced by Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry (UK) as Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe. The latter controls two Allied Tactical Air Forces, one of which would give air support to the Northern Army Group, the other to the Central Army Group.

To sum up, SACEUR has four principal Commanders-in-Chief who report to him direct: General Mansergh in the North (CINCNORTH), Marshal Juin in the Centre (CINCENT), Admiral Fechteler in the South (CINCSOUTH) and Admiral Mountbatten in the Mediterranean (CINCAFMED)*.

**Air Deputy**

General Norstad took over the appointment of Air Deputy on the 27th July, 1953. His responsibilities are considerably wider than those of his predecessor, and his staff is correspondingly larger. Hitherto the post of Air Deputy had carried with it no executive responsibilities. It was decided, however, that with the increase in air power available to the Supreme Commander, both from assigned air forces and from external sources (the United States Strategic Air Command and the United Kingdom Bomber Command), a single central authority was necessary. Only in this way could the expanding allied air forces derive full advantage from the flexibility which is an outstanding characteristic of air power.

Consequently, General Norstad is concerned with the development of the air forces of Allied Command Europe and with planning for the most effective utilisation of those forces. In addition, he is responsible for ensuring that the great air striking power available to SACEUR from the United States Strategic Air Force and United Kingdom Bomber Command is applied to the best advantage.

**ATLANTIC COMMAND**

Let us now cross the Atlantic. The Council at Brussels, in December, 1950, decided to appoint a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic as soon as possible after the appointment of SACEUR. During the following year decisions were reached on the nationality of the Commander and the scope of his authority concerning certain inshore waters. Towards the end of 1951, an advance planning staff was gra-

* The abbreviations between brackets stand for:
  Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe.
  Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe.
  Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe.
  Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean.
dually assembled, and began to take over from the North Atlantic Ocean Region­al Planning Group. The Atlantic Command, the first international ocean Com­mand in history in peacetime, was finally established in January, 1952, at Nor­folk, Virginia. Admiral Lynde D. McCormick (USA) took up his duties as Supreme Commander on the 10th April, 1952. Two years later, Admiral Jerauld Wright (USA), a former Deputy to the Standing Group, relieved Admiral McCormick. Vice-Admiral J. F. Stevens (UK) relieved Vice-Admiral Sir William Andrewes as Deputy Supreme Commander in 1953.

The Staff of SACLANT is drawn from the navies, armies and air forces of eight countries: Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In addition, these nations, as well as Belgium and Iceland, have national liaison representatives accredited to SACLANT. Direct liaison is maintained with SACEUR through the SACLANT Representative in Europe.

SACLANT Headquarters are organized in seven divisions: Personnel and Ad­ministration; Intelligence; Plans, Policy and Operations; Logistics; Communi­cations; Budget and Finance; and Public Information. In general, the staff di­visions, in the assignment of personnel, reflect the international character of the Command, with as many as seven nationalities represented in one division.

The Atlantic Command extends from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer, and from the coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa, ex­cept for the English Channel and waters around the British Isles. It is at present divided into two major geographical command areas.

The Western Atlantic area is commanded by an American Naval Commander-in-Chief, at present SACLANT himself. The Eastern Atlantic area is under the joint command of a British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Michael Denny, and a British Air Commander-in-Chief, Air Marshal Sir John Boothman. Both areas are further divided into sub-areas (as shown in the diagram on page 76).

The important Atlantic Islands such as Iceland, Greenland, the Azores, Bermuda, the Faroes, are placed for military defence purposes under island Commanders, all but one of whom is a national of the sovereign island Power.

A third area, the Iberian Atlantic Command, covering the south-easterly por­tion of the Atlantic Command, has been defined but not yet established. Pending a decision, responsibility for the area in the event of emergency has been assigned by SACLANT to the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic.

The division of the Atlantic region into the three above mentioned area com­mands calls for a brief explanation. In the North Atlantic Ocean, the main ship­ping lanes form roughly a triangle, which has its apex on the coast of North Amer­ica, and its base along the western seaboard of Europe, between the United King­dom and Gibraltar. Each angle of the triangle constitutes a focal area in which shipping concentrates, and which would be of vital importance in times of war.

Directly subordinate to SACLANT, and an operational rather than a geogra­phical Commander, is the Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic. This fleet is a force of heavy surface ships, aircraft carriers and necessary supporting units. Its role in time of war would be to undertake offensive and support operations, rather than the direct defence of the Atlantic trade routes. It is contemplated that the Striking Fleet would furnish support to other NATO Supreme Commanders be­sides SACLANT.

Another important operational command is that of the Commander Submarine Force Eastern Atlantic who is responsible, under the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic, for co-ordinating the operations of all submarines assigned to
those waters. Submarines from six nations have already undergone combined training.

SACLANT, like his colleague SACEUR, is directly responsible to the Standing Group. His peacetime duties are: (1) to develop defence plans; (2) to organize and conduct combined training exercises; (3) to make recommendations to the Standing Group and to national authorities on military questions which will affect his ability to discharge his wartime and peacetime responsibilities; (4) to establish an efficient organization suitable as a nucleus for wartime expansion.

SACLANT, like SACEUR, has the right of direct communication with all the governments which have forces earmarked for his Command.

SACLANT's primary task in time of war would be to provide NATO with security in the Atlantic Ocean by guarding its sea lanes and denying its use to an enemy. In other words, his mission would be to protect the life-lines of the free world in the Atlantic. This weighty responsibility requires sufficient escort vessels and aircraft to protect an intricate convoy system, adequate hunter-killer forces to combat the underseas menace, a highly mobile striking fleet, and an effective submarine force.

In time of peace forces are periodically placed at SACLANT's disposal for combined training*, but he has no forces permanently assigned to him. The reason for this arrangement can easily be explained. The Atlantic maritime Powers of NATO naturally maintain naval forces and maritime air forces to protect their national interests in those waters in time of peace. To have created a separate NATO naval force for the specific purpose of guarding Atlantic Ocean life-lines in time of war would have been impossibly expensive. It was therefore decided by the countries with interests in the Atlantic that the naval forces which they maintain there in time of peace for their own national purposes should be dedicated in time of war to the common cause of protecting the life-lines across the Atlantic Ocean. Seven countries have therefore earmarked forces for SACLANT. Naturally enough these forces are predominantly naval, but some ground forces and land-based air forces are included.

**CHANNEL COMMITTEE AND CHANNEL COMMAND**

Under the Brussels Treaty Organization, the Western Union Chiefs-of-Staff agreed in 1949 to give control of the Channel and the southern waters of the North Sea (with the exception of small national coastal areas) to the British Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth.

When the NATO organizations for the European and Atlantic Commands were framed, it was decided to set up a 'Channel Committee' composed of the Chiefs-of-Naval-Staff (or their representatives) of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. A special arrangement of this kind was considered essential, since it was thought that the Standing Group would be too far away and too occupied with matters of high strategy to attend to the detailed problems which would arise in the small but vital Channel area.

It is interesting to recall that there is a historical precedent for the Channel Committee dating back to the 16th Century. It consisted of a protestant navy which waged war against Spanish power in Europe and against the Catholic elements of French and Flemish shipping. The ships, which numbered one hun-

* See Chapter IX, The Increase in Strength.
dred sail, operated under the guiding hands of Admiral Coligny, Sir William Cecil and the Prince of Orange.

Directly under the Channel Committee is the Channel Command. This Command was established in February, 1952, under the joint command of an Allied Commander-in-Chief and an Allied Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir John Edelsten (UK), is also the British Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth. The Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Boothman, holds two other appointments. He is Air Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic, and also Commander-in-Chief British Coastal Command. This ensures the most flexible and economical use of the maritime air forces.

In peacetime, the Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel, in conjunction with the Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief, is responsible for preparing plans for the control and defence of the Channel area, and for co-ordinating these with other NATO and national plans.

In time of war, these Commanders-in-Chief would have the following joint responsibilities:

1. to control the Channel and North Sea area and deny it to the enemy;
2. to protect the sea lanes of communication;
3. to support operations conducted by SACEUR and SACLANT.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief, together with the Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief, organizes and conducts inter-allied exercises in agreement with the national authorities concerned, and in consultation with SACEUR and SACLANT.

Responsibility for certain coastal tasks, such as inshore minesweeping and harbour defence, rests not with the Channel Command, but with the Commanders of coastal areas acting under their respective national authorities. Forces earmarked for the defence of the area in war are, therefore, divided into two categories:

1. those which are to be placed entirely at the disposal of the Channel Command;
2. those which are to remain at the disposal of the coastal area Commanders for the discharge of their national duties.

THE CANADA-UNITED STATES REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP

The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group works in Washington. Directed by the Chiefs-of-Staff of the United States of America and of Canada, it is the only survivor of NATO’s original five Regional Planning Groups. It is responsible for making plans for the defence of the North American continent and for making recommendations on military requirements. Its defence plans are seen by other NATO nations and approved by the Standing Group, in the same way as are those of the Supreme Commanders.

THE MILITARY AGENCIES

This survey of the military structure of NATO would be incomplete without a short description of the various agencies which work under the general direction of the Standing Group. Their activities differ very widely, but their aims are identical – namely, to promote uniformity among the armed forces of NATO and to improve their efficiency.
NATO Defence College

The NATO Defence College was set up in 1951 on the recommendation of General Eisenhower. Its broad purpose was to provide a body of officers who are trained in international co-operation, and who have a good understanding of the problems, methods and achievements of the Alliance as a whole.

The College is housed in part of the Ecole Militaire building in Paris. The course of study is for six months; the first course started in November, 1951. The appointment of Commandant is held by France, the United Kingdom and the United States in rotation, and the tour of duty is for two years. The first Commandant was Admiral Lemonnier (France) who was succeeded by Air Marshal L. Darvall (UK) in 1953. The directing staff, both civil and military, come from several NATO countries. There are approximately fifty students per term, drawn from officers of all three services of the rank of colonel or equivalent and from civilian officials. The languages used are French and English.

Five courses have already been completed and more than two hundred graduates of the College are now serving in international headquarters throughout NATO and in key positions in the ministries and armed forces of their respective countries. Apart from the military and technical benefits which the Atlantic Community derives from the College, a most encouraging feature has been the friendships which have been made between many officers and officials of different nationalities.

Military Agency for Standardisation

Two of the limitations to effective co-operation between armed forces of a coalition of nations are:

1. plurality of types of weapons and equipment;
2. differences in systems of staff work and military doctrine.

The former complicates the problem of supply and maintenance, while the latter render close team work much more difficult.

It was with those limitations in mind that the Military Agency for Standardisation was set up in London in January, 1951. Directly responsible to the Standing Group, its task is to study and foster the standardisation throughout the armed forces of member countries of:

1. operational and administrative practice;
2. war material.

The Agency has three Service Boards, one for the Navy, one for the Army and one for the Air Force. These have under them a considerable number of working parties whereon military experts from the interested governments are brought together to examine problems of infinite variety. When agreements are reached they are embodied in formal recommendations from the Agency to the governments concerned.

Considerable uniformity has already been achieved in the standardisation of operational and administrative practice (usually known as non-material standardisation). This is evident to any witness of recent combined exercises. A large number of NATO publications dealing with various aspects of this problem have been distributed and are now in use.

Progress has however been much slower in the standardisation of war material because of the inherent difficulties of the problem. For example, standardisation very often involves the great expense of scrapping existing equipment and re-
toothing production lines. Again, there is much military equipment, such for example as vehicles, which is based on the designs in everyday civilian use; and nations naturally prefer to rely on their own models.

Thus standardisation is to some extent limited to items of war material which are of purely military design; and the best chance of achieving it occurs when new designs are about to be put into production. The agreement that was eventually reached on the new, 30 calibre small arms ammunition is a good example of this.

The standardisation of component parts, and of materials which are used in large quantities, has presented fewer difficulties, and good progress has been achieved in such matters as the refuelling and servicing connections for aircraft and ships, the dimensions of certain equipment within ships and aircraft, and aviation fuels.

The following are examples of work that is being pressed forward:

1. various new types of aircraft are being tested in an attempt to select a standard jet trainer for use throughout the air forces of NATO;
2. the interchangeability of the various types of ammunition at present being used by NATO forces is being studied.

Aeronautical Research and Air Training

Working towards the same end as the Military Agency for Standardisation, but in more specialised fields, are two groups whose efforts are bent towards making the NATO air forces more efficient. The first is concerned with aeronautical research, the second with air training.

The Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD) was established on a trial basis for a period of two years in January, 1952. It is composed of one or two scientific representatives from each NATO country and it is under the Chairmanship of Dr. Theodore Von Karman (USA). Its object is to bring together leading aeronautical experts so that the research and skill of all the member countries can best be used for the common good. Examples of the problems which have been the subject of study and exchange of information are the operation of jet engines at high altitudes, wind tunnels, and the advances of medicine applied to high speed aviation. Incidentally, AGARD has proved that much useful co-operation is possible in the field of scientific research and development without infringing national security policies.

Another Group, called the Air Training Advisory Group (ATAG) was formed, in July, 1952, to help nations achieve the required standard of pilot training and to advise how their available resources could best be used to meet the air-crew requirements of the European Air Forces of NATO.

The ATAG Squadron, which is based at Villacoublay airfield, near SHAPE, is manned by highly qualified flying instructors of the various NATO countries. Its task is to visit flying training schools throughout Europe and, by flying with instructors and pupils, to check the standards of training and to suggest means of improvement. The ATAG staff is located at SHAPE, although until recently it was not a SHAPE agency, but reported directly to the Standing Group. This arrangement had more drawbacks than advantages; and on the 1st January, 1954, the functions of ATAG were absorbed by the Air Inspection Directorate of the Air Deputy at SHAPE. This is expected to give ATAG more authority and to facilitate co-operation with the other SHAPE divisions.

Probably the most productive of ATAG's achievements was the setting up of a
Flying Instructors’ School for the Italian Air Force at Foggia. The success of its other efforts will only be known in the future when its effects upon the training standard of the NATO air forces become apparent.

**Communications**

In modern war, good communications are a vital necessity, and the need for co-ordinating the communication systems of Continental Europe has been evident since the early days of Western Union. It would be beyond the scope of this survey to do more than indicate some of the technical problems which are being studied – the co-ordination of radio frequencies, the use of the national telephone systems of the many countries involved, the standardisation of teleprinters, collaboration between the civil and military authorities, the co-ordination of European naval communications, and so forth. A number of signals agencies which work directly under the Standing Group and in close liaison with the Signals Division of SHAPE are studying these problems and many others*.

* The signals agencies include:
  - European Military Communications Co-ordinating Committee (EMCCC),
  - European Long Lines Agency (ELLA),
  - European Radio Frequency Agency (ERFA),
  - European Naval Communications Agency (ENCA).
ANNEX A

CHAIRMEN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

1949–1950  General Omar N. Bradley (USA)
1951–1952  Lieutenant General Etienne Baele (Belgium)
1952      Lieutenant General Charles Foulkes (Canada)
1953      Admiral E. J. C. Qvistgaard (Denmark)
1954      General Ely
          General Guillaume (France)

MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE

1st July, 1954

BELGIUM AND LUXEMBOURG  Major General André E. L. Bigwood
CANADA                    Rear Admiral H. G. DeWolf
DENMARK                   Rear Admiral Svend Ramlau-Hansen
FRANCE                    Lieutenant General Valluy
GREECE                    Lieutenant General Stylianos Pallis
ITALY                     Lieutenant General Cesare Gandini
NETHERLANDS               Major General Th. Carp
NORWAY                    Rear Admiral Erling G. Hostvedt
PORTUGAL                  Major General Humberto Delgado
TURKEY                    Rear Admiral Aziz Ulusan
UNITED KINGDOM            General Sir John Whiteley
UNITED STATES             General J. Lawton Collins

Note:
Iceland, having no military forces, is not represented.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Succeeded By</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>General Valluy</td>
<td>(succeeded General Ely)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED KINGDOM</td>
<td>General Sir John Whiteley</td>
<td>(succeeded Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord Tedder</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General Sir William Morgan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>General J. Lawton Collins</td>
<td>(succeeded Vice-Admiral Arthur C. Davis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>General of the Army Omar N. Bradley)</td>
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</tbody>
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ANNEX C

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

1st July, 1954

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

General Alfred M. Gruenther (USA)

DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER: Field Marshal the Viscount
                                   Montgomery of Alamein (UK)

NAVAL DEPUTY: Admiral Lemonnier (France)

AIR DEPUTY: General Lauris Norstad (USA)

1. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ALLIED FORCES NORTHERN EUROPE
   General Sir Robert Mansergh (UK)

   (a) Commander Allied Land Forces Norway
       Major General R. Holterman (Norway)

   (b) Commander Allied Land Forces Denmark
       Lt. Gen. E. C. V. Meller (Denmark)

   (c) Commander Allied Air Forces Northern Europe
       Major General W. R. Carter (USA)

   (d) Commander Allied Naval Forces Northern Europe
       Vice-Admiral Sir Evans Lombe (UK)

2. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ALLIED FORCES CENTRAL EUROPE
   Marshal Juin (France)

   (a) Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe
       General Carpentier (France)

   (b) Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe
       Air Chief Marshal Sir Basil Embry (UK)

   (c) Commander Allied Naval Forces Central Europe
       Vice-Admiral Jaujard (France)

3. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ALLIED FORCES SOUTHERN EUROPE
   Admiral W. M. Fechteler (USA)

   (a) Commander Allied Land Forces South East Europe
       Lt. Gen. P. W. Kendall (USA)

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4. **COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ALLIED FORCES MEDITERRANEAN**
Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma (UK)*

(a) **Commander Gibraltar**
Rear Admiral H. P. Currey (UK)

(b) **Commander Western Mediterranean**
Vice-Admiral Sala (France)

(c) **Commander Central Mediterranean**
Vice-Admiral M. Girosi (Italy)

(d) **Commander Eastern Mediterranean**
Vice-Admiral P. Lappas (Greece)

(e) **Commander South East Mediterranean**
Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma (UK)*

(f) **Commander North Eastern Mediterranean**
Admiral S. Altincan (Turkey)

* To be succeeded in December, 1954, by Admiral Sir Guy Grantham (UK).
ANNEX D

ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC

1st July, 1954

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC

Admiral Jerauld Wright (USA)

DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER: Vice-Admiral John F. Stevens (UK)

1. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA

Admiral Jerauld Wright (USA)

(a) Commander United States Atlantic Sub-area
    Vice-Admiral Laurance T. DuBose (USA)

(b) Commander Canadian Atlantic Sub-area
    Rear Admiral R. E. S. Bidwell (Canada)

(c) Air Commander Canadian Atlantic Sub-area
    Air Commodore A. D. Ross (Canada)

(d) Commander Ocean Sub-area
    Admiral Jerauld Wright (USA)

2. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF EASTERN ATLANTIC AREA

Admiral Sir Michael M. Denny (UK)

AIR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF EASTERN ATLANTIC AREA

Air Marshal Sir John N. Boothman (UK)

(a) Commander Northern Sub-area
    Rear Admiral W. G. A. Robson (UK)

(b) Air Commander Northern Sub-area
    Air Vice-Marshal R. L. Ragg (UK)

(c) Commander Central Sub-area
    Admiral Sir Alexander C. G. Madden (UK)

(d) Air Commander Central Sub-area
    Air Vice-Marshal T. G. Traill (UK)

(e) Commander Bay of Biscay Sub-area
    Vice-Admiral Jourdain (France)
(f) Commander Submarine Forces Eastern Atlantic
   Rear Admiral G. B. H. Fawkes (UK)

3. COMMANDER STRIKING FLEET ATLANTIC
   Vice-Admiral Edmund T. Wooldridge (USA)
ANNEX E

CHANNEL COMMITTEE

1st July, 1954

BELGIUM: Commodore L. J. J. Robins
          Permanent Representative: Commander B. Depoorter

FRANCE: Admiral Nomy
        Permanent Representative: Rear Admiral Le Hagre

NETHERLANDS: Vice-Admiral A. de Booy
             Permanent Representative: Captain K. J. F. Krediet

UNITED KINGDOM: Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rhoderick McGregor
                 Permanent Representative: Rear Admiral L. F. Elkins

CHANNEL COMMAND

1st July, 1954

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF CHANNEL AND SOUTHERN NORTH SEA:
        Admiral Sir John Edelsten (UK) *
        (succeeded Admiral Sir Arthur J. Power (UK))

AIR COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF CHANNEL AND SOUTHERN NORTH SEA:
        Air Marshal Sir John Boothman (UK)

* Succeeded in September, 1954, by Admiral Sir George Creasy (UK).
CHAPTER VIII

THE ANNUAL REVIEW

The two words ‘Annual Review’ are probably heard more frequently in the offices of NATO Headquarters than any other combination of words in the English language. It will be recalled that the North Atlantic Council decided at Lisbon in February, 1952, that there should be ‘comprehensive Annual Reviews of the requirements for building and maintaining adequate defensive strength on a realistic foundation of politico-economic capabilities’, and that the International Staff/Secretariat should be so organized as to carry out these Annual Reviews. Thus, what is now known as the Annual Review is a normal outgrowth, and continuation, of the process first undertaken by the Temporary Council Committee in the autumn of 1951. It has become an essential part of the NATO defence build-up.

There is nothing new in the process itself: indeed it is normal practice on a national level. The budget of each of the member governments is framed on the basis of separate estimates of expenditures compiled by each department in accordance with planning directives from cabinet level. These separate estimates must then be adjusted on the basis of an assessment of the maximum budget suitable for the country in the prevailing economic and political situation. So far as the Defence Budget is concerned, the first step is for the Chiefs-of-Staff to recommend, within the framework of their directives, a defence programme which they consider militarily desirable. Before being put to the national parliament for acceptance, this programme must be brought into line with other demands on the national economy and a realistic assessment of what the economy can stand.

The NATO Annual Review is precisely the same in principle; its novelty lies in the fact that for the first time in history it is being conducted on an international basis. It is also remarkable because the character and extent of information exchanged by the fourteen member governments on the details of their national military, production and fiscal programmes is more complete than allies have ever before exchanged either in war or in peace. The Annual Review can, in this sense, be described as the merging of the separate provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, for it has always been recognised that the strength of NATO depends as much on the economic and social well-being of the individual countries as upon the aggregate strength of the military forces.

The conduct of the Annual Review, dealing as it does with the defence, production and economic programmes of fourteen different countries, is obviously much more difficult and complicated than the same process within a single government. Despite differences in national fiscal accounting practices, figures that are entirely comparable the ones with the others must be secured from each government. This has required the formulation of agreed NATO definitions covering categories of forces, and methods of listing expenditures and costs for various aspects of the national defence programmes.
AIMS OF THE EXERCISE

The primary purpose of an Annual Review is to produce goals for the build-up of military forces which are within the political and economic capabilities of the member governments and which are accepted as national commitments. These goals are developed on the basis of recommendations for improvements in national forces put forward by the NATO military authorities – recommendations which seek to overcome any weaknesses which may have developed, and to ensure that the total forces of the Alliance are kept in balance as to service and type across the entire NATO front. In the course of the Review the military recommendations are adjusted in the light of assessments made of the total available resources, such as possible budgetary expenditures, indigenous production of equipment and availabilities under mutual aid programmes. This process is called the ‘reconciliation of defence requirements with politico-economic capabilities’. The word ‘reconciliation’ implies that, where at first sight the resources offered fall short of those demanded, changes will be negotiated both in the supply and in the demand. The Annual Review, as we know it today, provides the occasion for this operation.

A defence programme is by its very nature a relatively long-term undertaking, since it is clear that any planning in connection with the collective NATO programme which does not extend at least two to three years into the future makes little sense. At the same time, no democratic government can definitely commit itself to a programme extending over a longer period of time than that for which it has legislative authority. Although, therefore, an Annual Review covers a period of at least three years, governments are asked only for firm commitments for the following year and for ‘the present state of thinking’ about plans for later years. The actual terms used are: ‘firm goals’ for the following year, ‘provisional goals’ for the second year and ‘planning goals’ for the third year.

Each Annual Review starts with an assessment of accomplishments in reaching the firm goals for that year. Provisional goals of the previous Review are refined in the light of experience and changing circumstances to become the firm goals proposed in the current Review. Planning goals of the previous exercise are refined to become provisional goals, and planning is then projected one year further ahead. In this way, the Review process has become a continuous examination, and the goals set for the second and third years in each Review provide a direction and order of magnitude around which national and NATO military and civilian planning can be based.

It should be noted in passing that provisional and planning goals for the second and third years are essential to the adequate programming of production for equipment and any other facilities requiring a long construction period. For example, NATO infrastructure programmes* must be agreed for the forces which will exist at the end of the second year, in order to allow sufficient construction time to ensure that the facilities will be available. This is equally true of major items of equipment, of collective production and of mutual aid programmes**. The yardstick by which the need for these programmes is measured is the force goals emerging from an Annual Review.

* See Chapter X, NATO Common Infrastructure.
** See Chapter XI, Development of Defence Production and Chapter XII, Self-Help and Mutual Aid.
HOW THE ANNUAL REVIEW WORKS

The Annual Review process is essentially multilateral in character. The same questions are asked of all member governments at the same time, and the replies of each are made available to the thirteen other members of the Alliance as well as to the International Staff and the NATO military authorities. It will be recalled that at the Lisbon Conference in February, 1952*, the Council directed that ‘the Council and the International Staff/Secretariat should in particular be so organized as to perform the functions of reconciling the NATO programmes with politico-economic capabilities’. Accordingly, one of the first acts of the Council after moving to Paris was to set up an Annual Review Committee and to organize the International Staff with special sections on defence expenditures, cost analysis, economic capabilities and defence production for the purpose of conducting these reviews. Military advice is supplied continuously by the Standing Group Liaison Officer. The searching cross-examination of governments on their programmes, which was first done by the Temporary Council Committee, is now conducted by both the Annual Review Committee and the International Staff. It has become an accepted part of the work of NATO.

Annual Reviews have not only become continuous in that each successive Review builds on the foundation and within the framework of the previous Review, but the process itself extends over practically the whole year. Included within this process are the following separate components:

1. general assumptions for the conduct of the Review: these are established by the Council each year and are based, among other things, on an analysis of Soviet policy, an assessment of the military risk, and an evaluation of the general economic and political position of NATO;
2. a detailed questionnaire to governments designed to elicit information on national military programmes, budgets, production schedules and economic position;
3. military recommendations issued by Supreme Commanders to member countries for improvements in existing forces and guidance for future national defence programmes, and discussion of these recommendations with national authorities by representatives of Supreme Commanders;
4. analysis of national replies, carried out in the first instance separately by NATO military authorities, civilians on the International Staff and national delegations;
5. recommendations for adjustments in national plans, in the light of the above analysis, designed to ensure that they represent the maximum considered to be within the capabilities of member governments and are collectively balanced on the entire NATO front;
6. preparation of a final report setting force goals for each country and other specific recommendations forwarded to governments.

Before describing in greater detail the main elements in the Annual Review process it may be convenient to set down the time-table according to which the Review is carried out. In order to enable governments to include in their national programmes as many as possible of the conclusions emerging from the multilateral examination of defence programmes, the Review process should end at about the

* See Chapter V.
time at which member governments are preparing their budgets for presentation
to their parliaments. The ideal would be for all the NATO partners to have iden-
tical fiscal years. This, of course, is not the case. Six member governments operate
on a calendar year fiscal year; four have fiscal years commencing within three
months after the beginning of the new year; and the other four governments, in-
cluding the United States, operate on a July-June fiscal year. At the same time,
the calendar year basis is not inconvenient for the United States since the Presi-
dent traditionally submits his budget message as early as January: a Review that
is concluded in November or December enables the United States to take account
of the plans and commitments of its allies in developing recommendations on its
vitally important aid programme. It has been agreed that NATO should, for its
own planning, work on the calendar year basis.

It is therefore most desirable that the Annual Review for any one year should
be completed not later than December of that year. Of the three exercises con-
ducted so far, this has proved possible once only. The TCC produced its first
report by December, 1951, but force goals were not finally agreed until two
months later. In 1952, in conducting the first of the Annual Reviews, important
policy issues were put to the Council in December, but force goals were not finally
agreed until April, 1953. The delay in both cases was mainly attributable to the
difficulties of developing techniques, standard definitions and accurate inform-
ation for so immense an operation. With the development of these techniques,
and with improved collective knowledge of the NATO forces and resources, it
proved possible to complete the 1953 Review by mid-December. The 1954 Review
should be the first that more or less follows the ideal time schedule. The various
activities are planned to take place as follows:

January-March   drafting of the Questionnaire in the light of previous experience
                and agreeing on a modified procedure for the Review;
March-July       issue of planning guidance by Supreme Commanders, visits to
                each capital by special military teams, and completion of the
                Questionnaire by member governments;
July-October     analysis and discussion of national programmes and drafting
                of final report;
November        consideration of report by governments, followed by Council
                meeting at Ministerial level for adoption of force goals.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The fundamental requirement for any operation which demands an act of judg-
ment is good information on which to base that judgment. In order to enable
each member country to appreciate the defence efforts of its fellows and to make
recommendations for necessary modifications, a clear description of those efforts
is essential. An important part of the Annual Review process has therefore been
the development of a system for the presentation of information on a country-
wide basis. The document devised for this purpose is called the ‘Questionnaire’,
though it has little in common with forms more commonly known to private
citizens as questionnaires. The Annual Review Questionnaire consists of about
16 forms only, with various blank columns. Some forms need be completed once
only, others separately for each service, some for each major formation, and one
for possibly as many as 80 different items of equipment. With these forms there
are approximately 200 pages of instructions and definitions, set forth in great
detail in an effort to ensure that comparable information is received from each country.

Countries are asked in the Questionnaire to describe their defence efforts along the following lines: the actual programme in military terms of the forces they propose to raise; the matériel which is expected to be available, whether from home production, foreign purchase or mutual aid deliveries, and steps being taken to fill any deficiencies; the financial aspects of their plans and their relation to the economic capabilities of the country.

So far as the military part of the Questionnaire is concerned, the main problem has been to determine the precise amount of detail which each country can usefully be asked to supply. The course which was adopted in 1953, and which is being maintained for 1954, is to ask for a minimum of broad general information for the use of all concerned; this is supplemented by certain technical data for the use of the military authorities in assessing the efficiency of the forces. From this group of technical tables, it is possible to judge the make-up and condition of many individual units in the forces. For each army and air force unit and naval vessel, information is requested in respect of the personnel available, the state of training, the proportion of equipment to hand and other such details.

The equipment section of the Questionnaire concentrates on major items of equipment, selected because of their special importance from the many thousands of items in use by NATO forces. On these major items the Questionnaire attempts to bring out deficiencies, deliveries from new production and end-item aid, prospective losses from wear and obsolescence, and adjustments through changes in the units to be equipped. This information provides a major part of the reconciliation equation used to determine force goals and constitutes an important contribution towards other aspects of production and logistics planning.

In the economic field, NATO relies primarily on information collected by other international organizations for general economic background to the Annual Review. The Questionnaire does ask for certain additional information dealing specifically with the economic impact of the defence effort.

The financial section of the Questionnaire is mainly concerned with securing information on the financial aspects of the defence programme. For this purpose it has been necessary to agree on standard definitions of defence expenditures and financial procedure, so that the information provided by different countries can be readily compared.

**ANALYSIS OF REPLIES**

When replies to the Questionnaire are received, they are distributed to all other national delegations, the Standing Group and Supreme Commanders and the appropriate sections of the International Staff. The military tables are studied by the Standing Group and Supreme Commanders and particular attention is paid to those units in which weaknesses have previously been observed. In the light of this analysis, detailed comments and revised recommendations from the military standpoint are prepared, setting out the views of the NATO military authorities as to the next steps for each country to take in the military field.

The equipment tables are analysed by the Production and Logistics Division of the International Staff and by the military authorities. The main object here is to identify what progress has been made in meeting deficiencies both in individual countries and as a whole, and to plan how best to use available resources to meet the requirements of the forces. The information obtained from these tables is an
invaluable guide to those concerned with correlated production planning and mutual aid programmes.

The financial tables enable the International Staff to analyse the defence budgets of member countries and to relate them to planned forces. This analysis also provides the basis for a comparative study of each country’s defence outlays.

Simultaneously an economic appraisal of the country is under way. For this purpose NATO makes use of general data collected by other international organizations, and of the specific information concerning defence outlays, as provided to NATO by member countries. Armed with this information and with the results of discussions with country representatives, the International Staff form a tentative conclusion about the ability of each country to support its proposed defense programme. In some cases they may decide that the country is doing the utmost that its economic circumstances will permit; in other cases, they may suggest that the programme put forward is well within the country’s capabilities and that an increase would cause no hardship.

We have seen in Chapter V that in the early days of the Alliance, it was hoped to evolve some formula for expressing accurately the relative capacity of each country to bear defence burdens and, on that basis, to organize the provision of assistance from stronger to weaker nations. This, however, proved impossible. Attention has therefore shifted from the search for such a formula to the study of points of special strain in the economy of each country, which may indicate whether the burden being borne is heavier or lighter in proportion to that of other countries. It is the open, multilateral discussion of the details of each country’s defence efforts in the course of the Annual Review which permits such assessments being made, first by the International Staff and then by fellow members of the Alliance.

MILITARY RECOMMENDATIONS

The original criterion of the NATO defence build-up was a definition of the minimum requirements necessary for adequate defence of the NATO area. This definition, based on the agreed strategic plan, is constantly revised in the light of changing external circumstances and estimates of the effectiveness of new weapons. In a broad sense, however, the requirements remain an absolute and are not altered by goals agreed annually; the latter are interim targets or steps up the ladder towards the ultimate requirements.

In agreeing on the first set of force goals at Lisbon in February, 1952, the Council gave first priority to the rapid establishment of the largest possible front-line force. At their meeting in Paris the following December the Council directed that, while the build-up should continue, primary emphasis should be placed for the future on improving the quality rather than the quantity of the NATO forces. By this the Council meant that it was more important to create such support forces as artillery and anti-aircraft battalions, signals and tank companies, service and logistic support units, than to increase the number of front-line divisions, if sufficient resources were not available for both tasks. It also meant that the level of training and percentage of personnel and equipment on hand was to be raised in existing units before new units were created.

It is on the basis of such guidance, and within the general framework of the provisional and planning goals of the previous Review, that the military authorities approach each year the task of submitting recommendations for improvements in forces. These recommendations also draw from the conclusions of any
general studies which may have been conducted across the entire NATO front, such as the requirements for a satisfactory system of air control and warning networks – and from the experience of Supreme Commanders with respect to forces assigned to, or earmarked for, their commands. This experience is carefully buttressed by the use of high-ranking ‘visiting teams’ which go to each NATO country from the Supreme Headquarters during the period that governments are completing their replies to the Questionnaire. These teams know the military recommendations put to each government in the previous Annual Review as well as such adjustments as may be desirable in the pattern of forces to achieve better balance, and are able to discuss these first-hand with the national Chiefs-of-Staff. In their replies to the Questionnaire, governments submit proposals or comments on each of these recommendations.

In the Questionnaire, as has been pointed out above, each major unit is reported on separately, with information on the number of regular and reserve personnel, state of training and percentage of equipment on hand. No overall standard is applied in analysing these replies, but each unit is studied separately in the light of general directives, availability of equipment and capabilities of the country concerned. For example, one division may be reported in a given year as possessing 90 per cent of its required equipment, while another is reported as having 60 per cent only. In the first case the military authorities may recommend that the level of equipment be raised to 100 per cent in the following year, while in the second case successive increases to 75 per cent, 85 per cent and 90 per cent may be proposed over a three-year period. Similarly each of the many other problems involved in the development of the navy, army and air forces is studied separately and recommendations are put forward for consideration in the so-called ‘reconciliation’ process.

**RECONCILIATION**

The essential element of an Annual Review is what is called the ‘reconciliation’ between the number of improvements or changes in national plans considered desirable by the NATO military authorities and an assessment of the capability of the country concerned to implement these various recommendations. In the first instance, this reconciliation takes place among the experts who separately examine the military, production and economic sections of the national replies and agree upon the recommendations for additional action which, in their opinion, can validly be put before the government concerned. Next, these proposals are discussed by the International Staff and military advisers with that government. Draft recommendations to all fourteen governments are then tabled before the Annual Review Committee for multilateral discussion and analysis in the light of all information elicited during the Review, as to those changes which can be accepted by or addressed to each government in the final report.

A necessary link between the work of the military team and of the economic staff is provided by the analysis of the actual and comparative costs of all aspects of the defence programme. These analyses range from a table reconciling the total of defence expenditures with the individual entries in the country’s own budget documents, to detailed estimates of the cost of military recommendations. In between these extremes lie tables asking for forecasts of defence expenditures under a considerable number of headings. The review of these tables by the NATO staff provides indispensable indications of the nature of the strains which the defence programme is laying upon the country concerned. Enquiries are directed, where
they appear necessary, to verify that the defence expenditures reported do, in fact, correspond to the forces proposed, and to ascertain the cost of any marginal changes in those forces which may, in the course of the Review, be suggested by the military authorities or accepted by the country concerned.

From this point onwards, the work of an Annual Review is focused on the physical result of the exercise— which is the voluminous report submitted to governments. The 1953 report contained some 360 pages of typescript, and was divided into three main parts. Part I was a short introduction and summary, designed to highlight the major considerations which emerged from the Review. Part II, some 50 pages in length, consisted of a series of chapters on the NATO-wide aspects of different topics which appeared of special importance. For example, one chapter was devoted to military problems, another to major equipment deficiencies and a third to the long-range problems of the maintenance of NATO forces. Part III consisted of fourteen country chapters describing the defence effort, the unsolved military problems and the economic situation of each country, and concluding with a series of recommendations.

The preparation of such a report clearly calls for two kinds of synthesis of the data collected. On the one hand, the country chapters require a careful presentation of the problems and possibilities in each separate country. On the other, there emerges from these national studies a wider view of NATO problems as a whole, to be brought together under subjects for the earlier chapters.

The crucial element in the chapters is the series of recommendations. These are based upon the comments and recommendations of the NATO military authorities limited by the staff to those which, in their judgment, the political and economic circumstances of the country would enable it to undertake. Most but not all the recommendations necessarily involve additional expenditure. An estimate of their cost, prepared as described above, together with a list of the order of priority in which they are regarded by the military authorities, are the foundations on which the staff work. Nearly all the recommendations will prove to be of a military character, but in a few cases some with an industrial or economic bearing may be included.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REVIEW

The Annual Review is one of the most important tasks performed by NATO. It is indeed the main instrument for co-ordinating the defence effort of the Alliance. It has proved an efficient means for collecting precise information, sifting it, drawing conclusions from it and then acting. Through the Annual Review, deficiencies in equipment, units below the required standard, bottlenecks in production and other weaknesses can be quickly identified; the cost and economic impact of proposed remedies can be estimated, and a means provided for reaching agreement on what is both desirable and practicable.

Only the agreed force goals for the following year are firm national commitments. The other recommendations are not regarded as national commitments until accepted by the government to which they are addressed. In many respects it might be argued that the main results from an Annual Review are obtained when governments complete their replies to the Questionnaire with the knowledge that these replies will be examined by their thirteen allies—and, long afterwards, when the various additional recommendations put forward are used as guidance in shaping long-term national plans. But increasingly, as governments have come
to place confidence in the process of assessment that leads to the recommendations, they have shown a tendency to accept recommendations which at first they opposed. In the final report on the 1953 Annual Review there were 84 separate recommendations addressed to various governments; nearly half of these had been accepted before the end of the Ministerial session which adopted the new force goals.

The Annual Review has a significance beyond that of its immediate objectives. Here are fourteen member countries voluntarily exposing to the scrutiny of fellow members the details of their individual defence efforts and budgets, and then explaining and defending their plans in open discussion with their colleagues. As a result, all member governments are acquiring the habit of working together on a very intimate basis and learning to appreciate their respective problems.

Furthermore, the civilian staff of NATO, delegations and national administrations are now becoming well acquainted with the details of military requirements in a form relevant to their work, while military staffs both national and international, are obtaining valuable experience in civilian procedures. In this respect it is stimulating to see how countries have adapted their own modes of work to meet the demands of the Annual Review. Mention has already been made of the question of common definitions of defence activities; these are, of course, used in the Review itself, but they are gradually being adopted for general use. Methods of accounting for defence expenditures to fit in with the definitions and the time-table of the Review have been evolved, and countries have readily exchanged ideas with each other and with visiting teams from the International Staff on these matters. As staff changes take place, both in NATO itself and in national administrations, the number of officials with experience of this type of co-operative work and with a broad international outlook is steadily increasing.

In its present form the Annual Review will continue to serve a valuable purpose in focusing this process of mutual scrutiny and in enabling defence efforts to be dovetailed with increasing efficiency.
PART III

WHAT NATO HAS ACCOMPLISHED
CHAPTER IX

THE INCREASE IN STRENGTH

It would be easier to describe the progress that has been made in increasing the armed strength of NATO during the last five years if this had resembled a line of guardsmen on parade advancing steadily in review order. But it has not, of course, been anything like that. Progress was slow at first, suddenly feverish, galvanised by the shock of the aggression in Korea, then steady and sustained. The point has now been reached at which much has been achieved, but a great deal still remains to be done.

Owing to the multiplicity of human endeavour and the large geographical area involved, progress was faster in some areas and some directions than in others. For instance, fighting units were raised more quickly than the logistic support necessary for them to take part in sustained operations. In our attempt to describe these changes in tempo, and to summarise the achievements of such a considerable undertaking, let us not forget that all figures of divisions or ships or aircraft are only approximations. A division, for example, may consist of anything from 10,000 to 25,000 men, of whom probably half would actually come to grips with the enemy. The rest exist to ensure that the rifleman or the tank crew can be brought to the front line and supplied with ammunition, food, clothing and the necessities of life. If the communications in one division are bad, if the junior leadership in another is poor, or if the Commander of a third proves incompetent, then the value of each formation is lowered: but by how much it is impossible to say. So ‘division counters’ – those who would judge the fighting quality of armies by the criterion of numbers only – are on dangerous ground.

THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

In order to determine the size and pattern of the forces required for any particular purpose, the first essential is to have a strategic concept based on an estimate of the intentions and capabilities of the potential enemy. The next step is to determine the broad strategic plan. Thereafter the size and pattern of the forces that are required follow more or less automatically: but the speed with which they are raised depends on a number of factors, foremost of which are the estimate of the imminence and magnitude of the threat, and the economic conditions of the contributing countries.

The strategic concept approved by the North Atlantic Council in January, 1950, laid down that the primary mission of the military forces of NATO was to deter aggression. Only if this mission was unsuccessful were these forces to be used against armed attack. This concept has never changed. It is as valid today as it was four years ago. We saw in Chapter IV that the broad strategic plan
resulting from this concept was to hold the potential enemy as far to the east in Europe as possible. Today, this ‘forward strategy’ is even more necessary in view of the tremendous range of modern weapons, guided missiles, rockets and long-range artillery – perhaps using atomic heads. German participation in the defence of the West is therefore a stern necessity, and German participation postulates a defence covering as much as possible of Western Germany.

Early in 1950, the Standing Group issued strategic guidance to the Regional Planning Groups and instructed them to make plans on the hypothesis that war would break out in 1954. Needless to say, the reason for the selection of this date was purely academic: it was sufficiently far ahead for long-range planning, but not too remote to make plans unrealistic. These plans, when completed, were coordinated by the Standing Group which then estimated roughly the total aggregate forces required to defend the NATO area. The Regional Planning Groups also produced emergency plans to be used in the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities.

After the establishment in April, 1951, of Allied Command Europe, the military planning of NATO changed not only in tempo but in character. The Regional Planning Groups had produced plans – the outcome of committee work – at a time when there were no NATO assigned forces. The plans produced by Supreme Headquarters were backed by the personality of a Commander who would himself wield operational control in time of war, who had the prestige necessary to obtain results, and who had forces definitely assigned to him.

THE STAGES OF THE BUILD-UP

A summary comparison of the forces available in December, 1949, (when planning began), in April, 1951, (when SHAPE was activated) and in December, 1951, (eight months later) provide a good illustration of the variations in tempo. In December, 1949, the forces available to NATO were estimated at about 12 divisions, 400 aircraft and a proportionate number of naval vessels. Fifteen months later, in April, 1951, there were only ‘fifteen NATO Divisions’ and ‘fewer than 1,000 operational aircraft’. The increase in forces and aircraft had, in fact, been inconsiderable, although the position from a naval point of view was somewhat better. But eight months later, in December, 1951, the prospect was brighter. By that date the NATO forces were approximately 35 divisions, in varying states of readiness, slightly less than 3,000 aircraft and 700 naval vessels.

A comparison of numbers alone, however, does not give the full picture of the change in combat effectiveness. By December, 1951, the NATO forces were no longer a mere collection of national units; their training had been substantially improved by a series of manoeuvres held in the autumn and they were beginning to gain cohesion. In addition, a great effort was being made to provide them with better logistic support: this included the construction of airfields, the improvement and extension of communications and the provision of support troops. Finally, not only was SHAPE itself a going concern, but its subordinate Headquarters in the North and South were already functioning satisfactorily, as of course were the Headquarters in the Centre, which had been established in late 1948 under the Western Union Defence Organization.

A new phase in the build-up came after the meeting of the Council at Lisbon in February, 1952. As a result of the consideration of the report of the Temporary

* SACEUR’s First Annual Report to the Standing Group, April, 1952.
Council Committee*, the goals to be achieved by December, 1952, were set at 50 divisions (of which 25 were to be active), about 4,000 aircraft, and a large number of naval vessels.

The basic idea was that the active forces should form a shield capable of withstanding the initial shock of any aggression, and that the reserve forces should be mobilised and moved up to support the shield as rapidly as possible.

**THE POSITION IN APRIL, 1952**

Two months after the Lisbon Conference, General Eisenhower was able to report** that substantial progress had been made in the year since SHAPE was activated. 'Already', he wrote, 'our active forces have increased to a point where they could give a vigorous account of themselves, should an attack be launched against us. In terms of army divisions whether in service or quickly mobilisable, our forces in Western Europe have nearly doubled in numbers. The national units pledged to this command a year ago were for the most part poorly equipped, inadequately trained and lacking essential support in both supplies and installations. Because of their weakness on all fronts and the absence of central direction, they could have offered little more than token resistance to attack. Today, the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly. Readjustments in their deployment have enhanced their potential effectiveness against the threat from the East. Behind them is a steadily expanding supply system, and a command organization to plan and direct their co-ordinated efforts... the tide has begun to flow our way and the situation of the free world is brighter than it was a year ago'.

This encouraging account of progress was, however, qualified by General Eisenhower on the first page of the same Report: 'There is no real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only a beginning'.

During 1952, the build-up gathered momentum and as a result the goals which had been set by the Council at Lisbon were for the most part substantially achieved numerically by the end of the year. Nevertheless, the state of readiness of the forces was not in all cases as high as had been planned, and there were still serious deficiencies in support units, equipment and supplies.

As the forces grew, so the military structure of NATO expanded. As shown in Chapter VII, the Atlantic Command and the Channel Command both came into being during the spring of 1952, and later that year Headquarters were set up at Izmir to control NATO forces in Greece and Turkey. In addition the details of the Mediterranean Command were agreed in November, 1952: the Headquarters at Malta did not, however, become operational until the following year.

The great design was beginning to take shape; but there were no grounds for immoderate optimism, still less for any relaxation of effort. For, while the Atlantic Alliance was gaining in strength, so also were the Soviets and their European satellites. The equipment of the Soviet Army was being constantly improved; the Soviet air forces were being largely re-equipped with jet aircraft; airfield construction was proceeding apace throughout Eastern Europe; the Soviet naval programme included the construction of a growing number of ocean-going sub-

* See Chapter V.

** SACEUR's First Annual Report to the Standing Group, April, 1952.

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marines as well as a large number of surface vessels, and the forces of Russia's satellites were rapidly increasing in numbers and improving in quality. * Despite, therefore, the remarkable progress in the military strength of NATO, it was clear that further sustained efforts were required.

This was made abundantly clear by General Ridgway in his Annual Report to the Standing Group of May, 1953:

"...Within the strictly military field", he wrote, "I find the disparity between our available forces and those which the Soviet rulers could bring against us so great as to warrant no other conclusion than that a full-scale Soviet attack within the near future would find Allied Command Europe critically weak to accomplish its present mission".

The disparity of which General Ridgway spoke was not merely a question of numbers. To be equal to their task it was necessary for the forces of NATO to be, not only sufficiently numerous, but also of high quality, properly supported logistically, well-equipped and backed by adequate and efficient reserves. With these considerations in mind the Council decided in December, 1952, that, while there was a continuing need for progressively increasing the number of NATO forces, the emphasis during 1953 should be on improving combat efficiency.

INTERNATIONAL EXERCISES

There are several ways in which the combat efficiency of forces can be improved. Perhaps the most obvious is by training. During 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO Commanders. All of these revealed the spirit of co-operation which has now become characteristic of NATO. Among them were the 'indoor exercises' conducted at SHAPE by Field Marshal Montgomery, on behalf of the Supreme Commander, to study the major problems confronting the Higher Command. There were, in addition, Command Post exercises destined to test the efficiency of subordinate Headquarters. But the vast majority of exercises involved operations by the fighting forces themselves.

As an example of the character and scope of these exercises, let us take the story of Exercise 'Mariner'. This took place at the end of the summer of 1953 and was the largest international naval exercise ever held. It was sponsored jointly by SACLANT, SACEUR and the Channel Commanders. Nine countries, almost fifty different types of ships, and twenty types of aircraft took part. The exercise lasted nineteen days, and included convoy protection, naval control of shipping and striking fleet operations in northern waters. In order to make the training as realistic as possible, the enemy role was taken by surface raiders, submarines and land-based air elements drawn from NATO forces.

In summing up the value of these combined exercises Admiral McCormick** stated that the errors which had taken place were fully understandable in view of the tremendous task of co-ordinating international forces of such size and complexity, and that the lessons learned would be invaluable to future planning.

Lest the number and variety of ships and aircraft having undergone NATO training present too optimistic a picture of the forces available to SACLANT for the accomplishment of his mission, it must be placed on record that there is at present a grave shortage of escort vessels and maritime aircraft.

* For detailed estimate of Soviet and satellite forces, see Annex B, page 97.
** Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic until April, 1954.

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In Allied Command Europe most of the manoeuvres were designed to integrate the forces of countries, unaccustomed to working together, into a co-ordinated fighting machine, and to practise headquarters and staffs in their wartime role. During division and corps manoeuvres the co-operation of air forces with ground forces was stressed, logistical support was emphasized, and inter-allied liaison co-operation practised when possible. The following are examples of exercises held in Allied Command Europe in 1953:

1. Exercise ‘Italic Weld’ was conducted in the general area of Northern Italy during August. It involved the land, air and naval forces of the United States and Italy, together with the air forces of Greece and Turkey.

2. Exercise ‘Weld Fast’ was conducted in the general area of Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea during October, and involved naval and air forces of the NATO Southern Command and the Greek and Turkish air and land forces. It was designed to test the training and co-operation of assigned and earmarked forces in Southern Europe.

3. Exercise ‘Grand Repulse’ was held in Germany near Osnabrück during September by the British Army of the Rhine and the Netherlands Corps together with considerable air participation from the Allied air forces of Central Europe.

4. Although atomic conditions had been simulated in earlier exercises, Exercise ‘Monte Carlo’, conducted by the Central Army Group during September, was the first instance of a NATO air-ground exercise in which atomic weapons were simulated for manoeuvre purposes. The forces included United States, Belgian and French troops, and the area of manoeuvre was in Germany along the east bank of the Middle Rhine.

The combat efficiency of the armed forces of a coalition largely depends on the extent to which the various national components are trained on uniform lines and use the same systems of staff work and the same operational procedures and techniques. As explained in Chapter VII, the Military Agency for Standardisation is responsible, inter alia, for studying and fostering the standardisation of operational and administrative practices throughout the armed forces of all member countries: and international exercises have provided opportunities for these ‘back-room’ studies to be tested out in practice. As a result, remarkable progress has been made in all directions, particularly in respect of naval and air forces.

It must of course be remembered that the North Atlantic coalition started off with the advantage that many of the member countries had had experience of working together as Allies in World War II; and that there were a number of officers and men still serving in the armed forces of those countries who were available to apply that experience to the new conditions and to place it at the disposal of the Allies as a whole.

THE TRAINING OF RESERVES

While Supreme Commanders are responsible for international manoeuvres, the training of reserves is a national responsibility. Reserve training liability varies considerably amongst the NATO countries. The importance of this training can hardly be exaggerated, since the successful defence of Western Europe would
largely depend upon the combat efficiency of the reserve formations and the speed with which they can be mobilised and brought into action.

The limiting factor is money. Indeed two member states carried out no reserve training in 1953 simply because they could not afford it. On the other hand, the larger proportion of European members of the Alliance did carry out practice mobilisation and training of reserves in varying degrees in 1953 and 1954.

Belgium mobilised a complete division, which trained for 30 days and carried out divisional manoeuvres. It also called up certain other non-divisional troops for training. France called up sufficient reservists to bring three semi-active divisions to full strength. These, as well as many corps and army troops, were then engaged in training. Luxembourg called up and trained a brigade headquarters and two battalions. The Netherlands mobilised one division which trained as a complete formation; another division was called up for brigade training. Portugal called up reservists for a divisional exercise. Greece, in this particular period, was only able to call up one battalion. In the United Kingdom, all Territorial Army formations, and some Army Emergency Reserve units carried out annual training, including fourteen days in camp. Early in 1954, Norway carried out winter manoeuvres which involved calling up three reservist brigades, two divisional headquarters with divisional supporting units and certain local defence units. Maneuuvres were then held involving two divisions.

Air Training Problems: To help nations, themselves lacking in the facilities for training aircrews, the United States and Canada have sponsored an important training scheme for pilots, navigators and radar observers from other NATO countries. Up to the end of 1953, approximately 2,200 pilots and 2,400 other specialised aircrew from other NATO countries had been trained in Canada and the United States. The United States has also provided trainer aircraft to enable European countries to expand their own training programmes. Mention has been made in Chapter VII of the Air Training Advisory Group which was established to advise and assist nations on air training problems. All these efforts have been successful not only in meeting the initial heavy demand for aircrews, but also in providing crews for the frontline aircraft which are planned to be available in 1955.

To improve NATO training as a whole, a number of specialist schools have accepted students from other NATO nations which do not have the same facilities. Amongst these are the French Combined Training Establishment at Arzew (Algeria), the School of Land-Air Warfare at Old Sarum (UK), the joint Anti-submarine School at Londonderry (UK), the technical and maintenance schools of the United States Army in Germany and the United States Weapons Schools at Garmisch, (Western Germany), which trains Allied Commanders and staff officers in the military implications of atomic weapons. In addition, SHAPE Military Missions are operating in the Netherlands, Portugal and Luxembourg, which all asked for help in their training problems.

During 1953, considerable progress was made towards improving the logistics situation. For example, reserve stocks of most of the member countries—which had been dangerously low, particularly in ammunition—were increased, although substantial shortages still exist today. The combat efficiency of NATO armed forces has also been considerably enhanced by the progress of the common infrastructure programme, described in the next chapter.

FORCES WITH SPECIALISED MISSIONS

There are certain military forces not assigned or earmarked to any of the
Supreme Commands, but which are nevertheless of great value to NATO. Although these forces are retained directly under national command their potential contributions to the defence of the West are massive and might be decisive. For example, the United States Strategic Air Command, based largely in North Africa, the British Isles and the United States, is of particular importance as a deterrent force. Similarly, the United Kingdom Bomber Command is equipped and trained for strategic air operations. The United Kingdom also has a large interceptor force for the defence of the British Isles. Finally, each NATO country is responsible for the defence of its own coastal waters, and therefore retains some naval forces primarily equipped for inshore minesweeping, harbour defence and similar tasks.

PROGRESS IN 1953

The progress made during the year 1953 may be summarised as follows. In land forces there was little numerical increase, but their efficiency had considerably improved as a result of combined training; while support units increased during the year by 40 per cent.

The number of aircraft increased by about 30 per cent, with again a major improvement in quality, particularly in the provision of modern jet types. At the same time there was a steady improvement in the numbers and quality of air and ground crews.

The naval forces actually in commission, and those immediately available in case of war, did not increase greatly in number during 1953, but they were better trained to work together.

If we now attempt to sum up NATO’s accomplishments in the military field, we find that three years after Allied Command Europe began to function, the land forces directly available to NATO have increased to some 100 divisions – both active and reserve – in varying states of combat readiness. It must be realised, of course, that this improvement is due partly to increases in the forces of the original member states, and partly to the addition of the Greek and Turkish forces which joined the Alliance in 1952; this latter contribution must be balanced against the additional responsibility accepted by NATO in South Eastern Europe. The progress is, nevertheless, impressive. In the air, NATO has almost doubled its strength, and there are some 125 air bases available to the NATO squadrons. As regards naval forces, large building and modernisation programmes have been undertaken, with the result that the number of additional ships available for commissioning after mobilisation has increased by some 30 per cent since 1951 and they are of higher technical quality.

On the 15th December, 1953, the North Atlantic Council met to carry out their annual examination of the progress of NATO forces, and to take decisions which would govern the future conduct of policy. They concluded that their assessment of Soviet policy and capabilities required that the military plans of the Alliance should be based on the expectations of a continuing threat to the security of the North Atlantic Community over a long period. Accordingly, they agreed that it would be necessary for member countries to support over a long period of years forces which, by their balance, quality and efficiency of armament, would be a major factor in contributing to the effective security of the NATO area. In other words the Council contemplated a ‘long haul’.

* See Chapter X, NATO Common Infrastructure.
In furtherance of this policy, the Council resolved that member governments, the International Staff, and the NATO military authorities should have as their future military objectives the development of a balanced collective force, both active and reserve, planned to meet a continuing threat, maintained in the highest practicable state of readiness, and supported by adequate reserves of material.

The NATO military authorities were directed, *inter alia*:

1. ‘to keep under continuous review, within the framework of the agreed strategic concept, the size and nature of the forces required to defend the NATO area, taking account of developments in military technology, Soviet capabilities, and the overall strategic situation, in order to provide general guidance to NATO defence planning’.
2. ‘to press on with their reassessment of the most effective pattern of military strength in the next few years within the resources which it is anticipated may be made available’.

**THE FUTURE**

The problem before NATO in 1954 has changed since the hectic days of early 1951, and even since the balanced appraisal at Lisbon in February, 1952. NATO’s present task is not only to maintain the armed strength in being, or coming into being, but also steadily to improve its quality, in spite of the fact that economic difficulties still persist, and that there is perhaps a diminished sense of urgency.

The advent of new weapons has also set a difficult problem, which is now being studied by NATO’s Supreme Commanders. When the results of these studies have been considered by the Standing Group and by the Military Committee, the Council will receive their recommendations, and make their decisions. Until this has been done, it would be both unwise and misleading to hazard any guess as to the future. At present it can only be surmised that the existing conventional forces will have to be maintained until and unless it is clearly shown that the advance of science has rendered them obsolete.

This chapter may well conclude with extracts from statements made by NATO Commanders in 1954.

In January, General Gruenther said: ‘We have... an air-ground shield which, although still not strong enough, would force an enemy to concentrate prior to attack. In doing so, the concentrating force would be extremely vulnerable to losses from atomic weapon attacks... We can now use atomic weapons against an aggressor, delivered not only by long-range aircraft, but also by the use of shorter range planes, and by 280 mm. artillery... This air-ground team constitutes a very effective shield, and it would fight very well in case of attack. We think that it is of such strength that the Soviets do not now have in occupied Europe sufficient air and ground forces to be certain of overwhelming this shield. Of course, the Soviets can move in additional forces to overcome that deficiency. But if they do, we should be able to get some warning of an impending attack. As a result of that warning, we ought to be able to increase our defensive strength considerably. In particular, we should be able to alert our air forces’.

In June, 1954, General Gruenther told the English-Speaking Union in London that NATO had available 90 to 100 divisions in varying degrees of readiness, i.e. three to four times as much land power available as when General Eisenhower first took command. ‘The air build-up has been even greater’, General Gruenther stated. Indeed, he went so far as to say that, in his judgment, the Soviet would in
the end be severely defeated if it attacked the Western Powers in 1954. Never­
theless, he added the warning that this situation might not endure, and that he
doubted whether time was on the side of the Alliance.

On the naval side, let us turn to Admiral McCormick’s report to the Standing
Group in April, 1954. He pointed out the considerable progress which has been
made within the Atlantic Command in the last two years. He stressed the mutual
benefit derived by all national components from the major NATO naval exer­
cises, and emphasized that, while these exercises provide the means for solving
many inherent problems, they also indicate the substantial inadequacy of the
forces presently earmarked for SACLANT when related to the mission entrusted
to him.

Admiral McCormick, in a BBC address, had previously said: ‘The desperate
days of World Wars I and II cannot be forgotten. Also I ask you not to forget the
tremendous number of ships and aircraft which were finally required in both
those wars to bring about the final days of victory. When I compare them to those
I now see available to me, I cannot say that I am happy . . . We must continue to
exert every pressure . . . to continue the planned build-up of NATO strength’.

The increase and improvement, during the last five years, of the forces of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization have enabled them to come nearer to achiev­
ing their main object – to deter aggression. How much our growing defensive
strength has already contributed to maintaining peace in Europe no one can
measure precisely. One thing at least is certain, and that is that peace has been
preserved.
TOTAL ARMED FORCES OF NATO COUNTRIES

1950

1951

1952

1953

TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES

(THOUSAND MILLION DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS)

LEGEND

Major Equipment & Ammunition,
Military Construction
Personal, Current Operations
& Maintenance, Other

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953

Breakdown estimated from data covering July 1949 to June 1950.
## ANNEX A

### TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES

**1949-1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Currency Unit</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1953</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Million Bel. Frs.</td>
<td>7,653</td>
<td>8,256</td>
<td>13,387</td>
<td>20,029</td>
<td>19,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Million Can. $</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>1,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Million Dan. Kroner</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Milliard Fr. Frs.</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>1,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Milliard Drachmae</td>
<td>1,630</td>
<td>1,971</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>2,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Milliard Lire</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Million Lux. Frs.</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Million Guilders</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>1,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Million Nor.Kroner</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>1,067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Million Escudos</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>1,565</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>1,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Million Lire</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Million £ Sterling</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>849</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>1,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Million US $</td>
<td>13,300</td>
<td>14,300</td>
<td>33,216</td>
<td>47,671</td>
<td>49,734</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,831</td>
<td>5,413</td>
<td>7,605</td>
<td>10,312</td>
<td>11,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO North America</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,672</td>
<td>14,795</td>
<td>34,436</td>
<td>49,546</td>
<td>51,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NATO</td>
<td>Million US Dollar equivalents</td>
<td>18,503</td>
<td>20,208</td>
<td>42,041</td>
<td>59,798*</td>
<td>62,773*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

These figures are on the basis of the NATO definition of defence expenditures, and represent actual payments made during the calendar year. They may differ considerably from the amounts given in national budgets, which frequently relate to budgetary classifications differing more or less widely from the NATO definition, and which in some countries include substantial amounts which may be carried over for actual expenditures in subsequent years, in accordance with varying national budgetary practices. The figures are not limited to expenditures for the support of NATO forces, but include other defence expenditures as well.

Figures for the United States and Canada include expenditures for the procurement of military equipment to be furnished as end-item aid to European NATO countries. Figures for European NATO countries do not include any allowance for the value of this equipment.

Economic and defence support aid is not included in the defence expenditures of the United States. The national currency counterpart of US economic and defence aid, to the extent used for defence purposes, is included in the defence expenditures of the recipient countries.

* Expendeditures financed from US Special Military Support are included in the figures for both the United States and France. These amount to 60 million dollars (21 milliard French francs) in 1952 and 148 million dollars (52 milliard French francs) in 1953. The 'TOTAL NATO' figures have been adjusted to eliminate double counting of these amounts.
Since 1947, the numerical strength of the Soviet ground forces has remained fairly constant at 175 divisions; but their mobility and fire-power have been greatly increased by mechanisation and modernisation of equipment. There are now 65 tank and mechanised divisions: the rifle divisions have been motorised and equipped with tanks and additional artillery. The Soviet potential in airborne troops has been considerably increased since World War II.

The number of satellite divisions has almost doubled since 1947, bringing their total to about 80 divisions.

The USSR, Eastern Germany and the East European satellites today have an aggregate of over six million men under arms. Approximately 4½ million of these are in the ground forces. A high state of preparedness is maintained by a rigorous training programme.

The USSR has a ready-made spearhead for a rapid advance into Western Europe. This is composed of 22 Soviet divisions in Eastern Germany. The bulk of these are armoured divisions with nearly a complete complement of tanks and self-propelled guns. Behind this spearhead there are an additional 60 Soviet divisions located in the Eastern European satellite countries and Western USSR. (This does not take into account satellite divisions).

The Soviet mobilisation system is tested periodically. It is estimated that, 30 days after mobilisation, the Soviet and satellite ground forces could number 400 divisions.

The numerical strength of the Soviet air forces in recent years has been constant at about 20,000 aircraft; but very considerable modernisation has taken place. In 1951, about 20 per cent of their fighters were jet types: by early 1954, almost all of their fighters were jet types. In early 1951, jet light bombers had not been introduced into operational units: by 1954, well over two-thirds of their light bomber force were jets. In the medium bomber category, the Soviets have, since 1951, doubled the number of Tu-4s (similar to the US B-29) in operational units. Still newer types of jet fighters have recently appeared. Newer types of medium and heavy bombers, including jet models, have also been observed.

The development of a comprehensive aviation training programme has substantially enhanced the capability of Soviet air power.

Up to 1951, the combat value of the satellite air forces was insignificant, and their aircraft were obsolete. By 1954, not only had their numerical strength been doubled, but nearly half of their fighters were jets. In addition their facilities have been improved, and training has reached a fairly satisfactory standard.

In the past three years the Soviets have about tripled the number of major airfields in Eastern Europe which will accommodate jet fighters. This construction is still proceeding, especial attention being directed to the provision of very long runways.

The growing complex of airfields throughout Eastern Europe, the aircraft control and warning systems and anti-aircraft artillery dispositions of the Soviet bloc are rapidly becoming capable of providing an effective air defence belt along the western perimeter of the USSR.
The Soviet navy has over 300 submarines in service, of which about half are large or medium ocean-going types. The current large-scale naval construction programme lays emphasis on the continued production of large ocean-going submarines. Moreover, the surface forces include three battleships, 24 cruisers and 150 destroyers.

There are large stock-piles of sea mines, and the Soviet have considerable power of minelaying both by sea and air.

There have been remarkable developments in the fields of atomic, chemical and biological warfare, and of guided missiles.

The Soviet economy has maintained a level of military production which has proved sufficient not only to provide equipment and supplies for the Soviet and satellite forces, but also to increase their stockpiles. They have, for example, more than enough tanks, mortars, and anti-tank guns for some 300-odd Soviet divisions, and their stockpile of field artillery and anti-aircraft artillery is several times that required to supply those divisions. Production of these items is continuing apace.
‘Common infrastructure’ is one of the many strange expressions that have now passed into everyday use in NATO. Planning in this field has given rise to problems that at times seemed almost insoluble and to arguments that seemed interminable. On the other hand, it has resulted in one of the most outstanding achievements of the Organization.

The word ‘infrastructure’ comes from France, where it has long been used to denote all the work that is necessary before a railway track can be laid, such as embankments, bridges, tunnels, etc. It had been adopted by NATO as a generic term to denote all those fixed installations which are necessary for the effective deployment and operations of modern armed forces, for example airfields, signals communications, military headquarters, fuel tanks and pipelines, radar warning and navigational aid stations, port installations, and so forth.

Installations which are set up for the maintenance and training of national forces in time of peace, and for the defence of the homeland in time of war, are called ‘national infrastructure’. They are of course paid for out of national budgets. Installations which are set up at the request of NATO international Commanders for the maintenance and training of NATO international forces in time of peace, and for their effective operation in time of war, are called ‘common infrastructure’. They are paid for collectively by member governments.

**THE FIRST PROJECTS**

The need for common infrastructure first became apparent — to the Western Union Defence Organization — in 1950. In those days there were very few forces available, and infrastructure requirements were correspondingly small — 30 airfields, one headquarters and about 34 signal communications projects. The estimated cost was about £32 million.* Most of these installations were to be set up in France and the Netherlands: but since they were intended for use by the forces of all members of the Brussels Treaty, it would obviously have been unfair to saddle those two countries with the whole cost of the construction to be undertaken in their territories. The five Powers therefore agreed to share the cost of this programme, which came to be known in the NATO vocabulary as the ‘First Slice’. This was the origin of the principle of cost-sharing which was adopted by NATO as the basis of all later infrastructure programmes.

The planning of the next programme — the Second Slice — of infrastructure

* Western Union estimated infrastructure projects in pounds sterling. NATO continued to estimate infrastructure projects in the same currency.
requirements was begun by Western Union and eventually taken over by SHAPE. By that time, as we have seen in Chapter V, countries felt they had probably gone very near to their financial limit in providing for the raising, paying, training and equipping of forces, and for the national military infrastructure which those forces would need. In these circumstances it was clearly going to be no easy matter for them to find additional funds for common infrastructure. The cost of the Second Slice – 13 new airfields, 8 extensions, 53 signal communications projects – was estimated at £ 79 million.*

THE COST-SHARING PROBLEM

The problem of sharing this cost was referred to the Council Deputies in March 1951. There were many different ideas as to how it should be done. One suggestion was that the contribution of each country should be based on its 'capacity to pay'. This seemingly straightforward arrangement is in fact fraught with difficulties because it is almost impossible for nations to agree on a formula to determine the capacity to pay of each member of the Alliance.

Another suggestion was that the 'user nation' criterion should be applied whereby the countries would pay in proportion to the extent to which their forces would use the facilities in question. But who could foretell the precise proportions in which member countries would use these facilities in time of war? This suggestion was therefore ruled out.

There was also some discussion as to the extent, if any, to which account should be taken of the economic benefits which host countries would derive from the carrying out of extensive projects in their territory – e.g. the receipt of hard currency, the improvement of their communications, the employment of labour and so forth. But against this, it could be argued that host countries would be put to considerable expense in the purchase of land, and – in the case of airfields – in the provision of the necessary power, water and sewage systems, all free of charge to NATO.

The Council Deputies, after protracted discussions, failed to agree to any of these criteria and the problem was still unsolved when the Council met in Ottawa in September 1951. After much hard bargaining, a cost-sharing formula for the Second Slice was negotiated by the Deputies and noted by the Council. Since the installations which were to be provided by this Slice were also to be used by the United States and Canadian forces assigned to SACEUR, the United States and Canada paid their share along with the Powers who had financed the First Slice. There were therefore seven contributing countries.

The Third Infrastructure Programme submitted by SHAPE at the beginning of 1952 was a much larger one. It consisted of 53 new airfields, 27 extensions to airfields already under construction, about 58 separate schemes for improving communications facilities and the construction of ten war headquarters. The estimated cost was £ 152 million.** Since some of the new installations were to be built in Denmark, Italy and Norway, these three countries became liable to bear a share of the cost, thus increasing the number of contributing countries to ten.

By this time, the Temporary Council Committee had made its report and pressure was being exerted on each member country progressively to increase its

* Subsequent estimates raised this figure to £ 124.76 million by December, 1953.
** Subsequent estimates raised this figure to £ 183.22 million by the 31st December, 1953.
armed forces and thus its national defence budget. To make matters worse it was already apparent that the actual cost of the Second Slice was going to be considerably in excess of the original estimate. Thus the provision of a further sum of £152 million, although only a fraction of the total defence expenditures, was rather like the proverbial last straw which broke the camel's back. It is therefore not surprising that at the Lisbon session in 1952 a Committee of Ministers had to devote no less than 16 hours to the problem of cost-sharing before agreement was reached.

NEW FACTORS

After the Lisbon Conference, infrastructure planning had to take into account several new factors, namely:

1. the establishment of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic. This involved the provision of new air bases and improved fleet facilities;
2. the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO. This involved the provision of installations of all kinds in these countries. It also meant of course that Greece and Turkey became contributing countries;
3. the immense quantities of fuel required by air forces equipped with jet aircraft. This made the provision of pipelines and storage systems imperative;
4. the necessity for the provision of training bases for NATO ground and air forces, and aids to air navigation.

As a result the Fourth Slice, as originally estimated by Subordinate Commanders, amounted to no less than £297 million. This demand was later reduced by Supreme Commanders to £182 million, by eliminating all items except those which, as far as they could then see, would be required by 1954. Unfortunately, however, when this programme was presented to the Council in Ministerial session at Paris in December 1952, the Annual Review for that year had not been completed. As a result, the cost-sharing discussions took place in an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the validity of the assumptions made by Supreme Commanders about the forces which would be available in 1954, and consequently of their estimate of the infrastructure installations needed to support them.

The Council, therefore, requested the military authorities, as a first step, to reduce their programme by leaving out of account for the moment all projects on which construction need not begin at once. The bill was thus reduced to £80 million. The Council eventually agreed on the cost-sharing of this sum, leaving the financing of the remainder of the Fourth Slice to be settled when the Annual Review was completed. All member countries, except Iceland, contributed towards the cost of the Fourth and subsequent Slices.

THE THREE YEARS' PROGRAMME

Immediately after the Ministerial session of December 1952, the Council decided that a determined effort must be made to avoid a repetition of the long drawn out discussions on cost-sharing which had taken place at the last three Ministerial sessions. Accordingly they evolved the idea of trying to agree on the cost-sharing of a long-term programme which would cover the military requirements up to the end of 1957. If this could be done, Ministers would be relieved of much detailed discussion; arbitrary cuts in the military programme would be obviated; pro-
CHART 13

COST ESTIMATES OF PROJECTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AND PLANNED

AS AT 31 MARCH 1954

DISTRIBUTION OF SLICE COST ESTIMATES
BY TYPE OF PROJECT

* Naval Bases, Fleet Facilities, Navigational Aids, Radar Warning Facilities, Training Installations
vision could be made for long-term construction, and governments would be able
to make adequate and timely budgetary provision for infrastructure expenditure.

Accordingly, the Council asked the military authorities for a broad forecast of
the cost, and a general outline of the probable content of their common infra­
structure requirement for three years ahead. The Military felt unable to estimate
more closely than to say that the sum would be somewhere between £ 235 million
and £ 315 million. The Council, after consideration, agreed that a sum of £ 250
million should be spent on the three years’ programme and set about negotiating
the percentages in which governments would contribute. Thanks to these nego­
tiations the Council, at its Ministerial session in Paris in April 1953, were able to
reach early agreement on the cost-sharing, not only of the three years’ programme,
but also of that portion of the Fourth Slice which had been left over from
their previous Ministerial Meeting – the Council by now having sealed this last
figure down to £ 67 million. The cost-sharing ghost, whose lugubrious presence
had haunted previous Ministerial sessions, had at last been laid.

To bring the story up to date, the first instalment of the three-year programme,
or Fifth Slice, of common infrastructure amounting to about £ 90 million was
approved by the Council in December, 1953. A considerable part of this Slice is
devoted to the completion of the jet fuel pipeline system by connecting it to the
ports of entry. Other features of the Slice are the improvement of naval bases,
particularly in the Mediterranean, the extension of the signals projects, partic­
ularly in Belgium, Greece, Italy and Turkey, and the provision of long-range
aids to navigation in the Eastern Atlantic.

THE CONTROL OF EXPENDITURE

Meanwhile, the Infrastructure Committee of the Council had been patiently at
work on devising techniques for the proper control of the expenditure of the funds
provided in common for infrastructure. The rules which have now been agreed
and are in operation represent a remarkable achievement in the solution of novel
international problems. There is a close parallel between these rules and those
by which each member government operates. Indeed, most of the constitutional
principles governing the expenditure of public money in individual member count­
tries are being followed in the administration of the NATO infrastructure prog­
ramme.

The executive branch of a government has to present to the legislature estimates
of the expenditure required by the military authorities. In NATO, the Military
Committee has to present to the Council detailed estimates of the infrastructure
programme. In an individual country, the legislature usually has a committee
which examines the estimates. In NATO, the Council have their Infrastructure
Committee consisting of members of the delegations, which ‘screens’ the infra­
structure programme. In an individual country, the legislature votes money on
the basis of the estimates: it being understood that, if possible, the work must be
done for less than the amount voted, and that if more than the amount voted is
required, the legislature must be asked for an additional authorisation. In NATO,
there is a rule that, when a host country has worked out its estimates for a par­
ticular piece of work, authority to spend the money on it must be given by the
Payments and Progress Committee which also consists of members of delegations.
This Committee has the right to scrutinise the estimates (with the aid of technical
experts on the NATO Staff) and to suggest alternative methods of doing the work
more cheaply but not less effectively.
A government department which is responsible for the spending of public money on, for example, the purchase of supplies for the forces or the construction of public buildings, is obliged to place the contract on the basis of fair competitive tendering. Similarly, contracts for common infrastructure works are open to competitive bidding from reputable firms in all the member countries. This system of international competitive bidding for infrastructure contracts has only recently been introduced, the underlying idea being that since thirteen NATO countries contribute towards the cost of a project, they should all have a chance to benefit from the economic advantages which result from its construction.

To pursue the analogy, government departments have to keep careful accounts of the way in which they spend sums voted by the legislature.

In most countries, auditors, responsible directly to the legislature and independent of the executive branch of governments, examine all the records and accounts of the spending department to ensure that the money has been spent on the items for which it was voted, and that every possible economy has been secured. The audit authority submits its reports direct to the legislature. Similarly in NATO there is a Board of Auditors for infrastructure accounts, which is independent of the individual host countries and directly responsible to the Council.

Government departments responsible for spending public money on, say, the building of airfields, employ civil engineers who are experts on how the work should be done and what it ought to cost. These experts draw up the specifications which form the basis of the tenders for the contract; they examine the tenders from the technical point of view, and they participate later in the inspection of the work to see that it has been done properly. Similarly, the International Staff of NATO have their experts in civil engineering, telecommunications and petroleum storage and pipelines. These members of the International Staff do not duplicate the work done by the experts of host countries. But it is their business to check the plans and specifications submitted by those experts and to assist in joint inspections of the work. In this way it is ensured that what NATO wanted is, in fact, done.

**HOW A PROGRAMME IS DEVISED**

In order to explain the parts played by the various agencies responsible for getting common infrastructure programmes under way, let us trace briefly the sequence of a typical programme. The first step is for Subordinate Commanders to submit to their Supreme Commanders proposals for infrastructure in their commands. The next step is for the Supreme Commanders to co-ordinate these plans and to satisfy themselves that the installations proposed are militarily essential to support the forces which have been agreed in the Annual Review and that they are for common use, in accordance with the established criteria. It is noteworthy that during this process Supreme Commanders have sometimes been able to make very substantial reductions in the proposals of their subordinates.

In the course of preparing their programmes Supreme Commanders draw up on the advice of the technicians of the International Staff in order to ensure that:

1. the cost estimates submitted by host nations are reasonable;
2. the projects are sound from a technical point of view;
3. military requirements are being met at the least possible cost to NATO.

The programme is then passed to the Standing Group and to the Infrastructure Committee of the North Atlantic Council. The Standing Group examines it from
the standpoint of military necessity and urgency and submits its comments to the Military Committee. The Infrastructure Committee examines it from the financial and technical point of view, and verifies that the projects are in fact for common use and therefore qualify for common financing. The final reports from the Military Committee and the Infrastructure Committee are then placed before the Council and considered simultaneously.

THE STORY OF AN AIRFIELD

It remains to explain how infrastructure projects are actually constructed. This too may be done by taking an example of a single project, say a typical NATO airfield in Europe.

As soon as financial approval has been given, the full responsibility for construction rests with the host country. Its first duty is to determine the exact site for the airfield, the Military having indicated only the general area. The next step is to complete the blueprint for the airfield and to acquire the land on which it is to be built. When it is remembered that a standard NATO airfield requires 1,100 acres and that this land is often owned by anything up to fifty different farmers, it will be realised that acquisition raises considerable financial, economic and social problems. So far as finance is concerned, the authorities in the host country have not only to purchase the land free of charge to NATO, but also in many cases to compensate the owner by the provision of alternative accommodation. However generous the purchase terms may be, the objections to uprooting a man whose family have owned the land for generations are obvious.

While the acquisition of the necessary land is being arranged, engineers of the host country draw up the master plan of the airfield. If it is a main airfield allocated for peacetime use, say, by the Royal Canadian Air Force or the United States Air Force, this master plan is drawn up in consultation with the Canadian or United States authorities in order that any special facilities which they require (and pay for) may be taken into account. The master plan is then sent to SHAPE for approval.

When the plan has been approved the host nation authorities prepare a detailed cost estimate of the construction, which must be passed by the Payments and Progress Committee of the North Atlantic Council before funds are actually committed. It often happens that this Committee can suggest modifications to the plan which result in considerable financial saving. In almost all cases the next stage is for the host nation authorities to invite all NATO nations to bid for the contract, and to notify delegations of opening and closing dates.

Construction starts as soon as the contractor has been selected. When it is under way technicians from the International Staff, representatives of the Supreme Commander and of the user nation, visit the site and in due course submit progress reports to the Infrastructure Committee of the Council and to the Supreme Commander. As work proceeds, the host nation authorities send NATO statements for the reimbursement of the money to be spent in the next quarter in accordance with the authorisation given by the Payments and Progress Committee. The money is then refunded according to the appropriate cost-sharing agreement.

It may be thought that the planning and construction of infrastructure projects are unnecessarily complicated and lengthy. To a certain extent this has to be accepted because of the complexities of multilateral agreements and the need for most stringent economy. It must be borne in mind, first, that a large number of
STORY OF A NATO AIRFIELD

NATO COMMANDS
HOST COUNTRY
(NATO TECHNICAL EXPERTS)
DEVELOPMENT OF INITIAL PLANS-
PRELIMINARY COST ESTIMATES

STANDING GROUP
MILITARY COMMITTEE
RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE COUNCIL

INFRASTRUCTURE
COMMITTEES
(INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTS)
SCREENING

NORTH ATLANTIC
COUNCIL
APPROVAL

USER AIR FORCE
OPERATION OF AIRFIELD

INTERNATIONAL BOARD
OF AUDITORS
AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS

INFRASTRUCTURE
COMMITTEES
ACCEPTANCE OF CONSTRUCTION

HOST COUNTRY
NATO COMMANDS
NATO TECHNICAL EXPERTS
DEVELOPMENT OF FINAL PLANS
& ENGINEERING COST ESTIMATES

INFRASTRUCTURE PAYMENTS
& PROGRESS COMMITTEE
NATO TECHNICAL EXPERTS
SCREENING OF PLANS & COST
ESTIMATES - AUTHORIZATION
TO COMMIT FUNDS

HOST COUNTRY
NATO COMMANDS
USER COUNTRY
NATO TECHNICAL EXPERTS
INSPECTION OF CONSTRUCTION

HOST COUNTRY
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE
BIDDING - CONSTRUCTION-
PROGRESS REPORTS

*ADVISORY

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authorities are involved in almost every transaction — the host country, the user country, the North Atlantic Council (working through the Infrastructure Committee, the Payments and Progress Committee and the International Staff), the Standing Group, the Supreme Commander and the Subordinate Commanders: secondly, that the installations are generally highly technical and of considerable variety, and that they must in all respects be up to the standards required by the Military: thirdly, that installations have to be set up in twelve different European countries: and finally, that, if NATO is to get full value for money, the most thorough check and cross-check and the most drastic screening and pruning are essential at all stages. Nevertheless, every effort is being made to find ways and means of simplifying and speeding up all these processes.

ACHIEVEMENTS UP TO DATE

This Chapter may well conclude with a summary of the achievements of NATO in the field of common infrastructure. Up to the 1st July, 1954, the expenditure of £ 700 million sterling had been approved, and detailed programmes costing £ 540 million had been worked out and accepted. The balance of £ 160 million sterling will be used for additional projects to be started in 1955 and 1956.

Airfields: In April, 1951, when General Eisenhower's Command became operational, there were 15 airfields available for use. By April 1954 General Gruenther had some 125 airfields ready for use — although not all of them were complete — and some 40 more were under construction which should be completed in 1955. Of the total programme 135 airfields are in member countries and the remainder in Germany. Every airfield conforms to the standards laid down by the military authorities of NATO and can be used by all types of aircraft, thereby permitting full freedom of deployment.

Signals Communications: In April, 1951, the signals communications available were wholly inadequate for military requirements. Today more than 300 new projects, from Northern Norway to Turkey, are under construction. About half of these are already completed and the rest are being completed in the course of 1954 and 1955. It is estimated that 16,000 km. of land lines, 10,000 km. of radio relay circuits, and 1,700 km. of submarine cables will then have been added to the existing civilian networks. These facilities, apart from their military value, will clearly be an appreciable reinforcement to some of the peacetime communications systems in Europe. New war headquarters are being constructed linked up with the signals network.

Fuel Supply Systems: The enormous consumption of jet fuel by modern aircraft has rendered obsolescent the conventional methods of fuel supply by rail and road. Consequently, jet fuel must, wherever possible, be supplied by a system of pipelines. The construction of this system was started during the autumn of 1953 after the basic standards and specifications had been worked out and agreed by all countries concerned. Orders for pipe, steel for storage tanks and pumping units have been placed, and the first pipelines have already been laid.

In Central Europe alone, more than 3,500 km. of inter-connected pipelines will be laid, with pumping units developing together more than 100,000 h.p. and storage tanks will be erected with a total capacity of over 700,000 cubic metres.
THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME

AS AT 31 MARCH, 1954

(APPROVED PROJECTS, SLICES II - V)

AIRFIELD PROGRAMME

AIRFIELDS - 135

SIGNALS NETWORK

RADIO LINKS - 6,220 Miles
10,000 Kilometres
LAND LINES AND SUBMARINE CABLES - 11,000 Miles
17,700 Kilometres

FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEM

PIPELINES - 3,800 Miles
6,100 Kilometres
STORAGE - 262,200,000 Imperial Gallons
1,263,000 Cubic Metres

OTHER PROJECTS

£ 156 Million
Smaller systems are under construction in Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway and Turkey. The whole system, totalling 6,100 km. of pipelines and 1,283,000 cubic metres of storage capacity, is expected to be in operation at the end of 1956.

More than three-quarters of the funds committed are devoted to the above types of project.

**Training Facilities:** Four air training bases are being constructed in the Mediterranean area where good flying weather prevails and the maximum number of flying hours can be obtained during the training period. These bases can accommodate 300 officers and 1,100 men at a time for training in air-to-air firing and bombing.

The land forces are being provided with training grounds which will permit simultaneous exercises of all elements of a single infantry division or a substantial portion of an armoured division. Tank training grounds will permit, all the year round, training of one tank battalion or equivalent unit at a time.

**Naval Projects:** About 26 naval projects are under construction for the use of naval forces. These consist mainly of storage facilities for oil, fuel lubricants and ammunition at naval bases. Nor have the needs of SACLANT been overlooked. He is being provided with fleet facilities, maritime airfields for his naval air forces, and a chain of stations providing navigational aids in the Eastern Atlantic giving his naval forces coverage in that area.

Among minor infrastructure projects worth mentioning, there are aids to air navigation and radar warning stations, where these are required to fill gaps in national systems.

To sum up, one cannot fail to be impressed by the magnitude of the co-operative achievement of NATO in the field of infrastructure. From the military point of view, a volume of infrastructure has been, and is being built that would have been unattainable by national or bilateral plans alone. From the financial and constitutional point of view a remarkable new technique in the expenditure of money contributed to an international undertaking has been evolved. From the political point of view the realisation of a common effort of such dimensions does resounding credit to the spirit of mutual understanding and joint purpose which has grown up in the Atlantic Community. In infrastructure, member countries have worked together for the success of an enterprise which serves each and every one of them. This is the very foundation of the North Atlantic Alliance.
The story of the development of NATO defence production is that of a tremendous expansion achieved in the face of difficulties which at first seemed overwhelming. The magnitude of the expansion can be illustrated by some total figures (expressed for the sake of uniformity in terms of dollars) of the size of national defence budgets, and of the amounts allocated to defence production, in 1949 and 1953. The aggregate of the defence budgets of all the NATO countries, including Greece and Turkey, amounted to $18,503 millions in 1949. By 1953 it had risen to $62,773 millions. Within these totals, the amount devoted to the production of arms and equipment rose from less than $3,000 millions in 1949 to about $25,000 millions—or nearly 40 per cent of the whole—by 1953. These figures are based on conversions at present exchange rates, and therefore conceal some differences in the true relative value of currencies. In the case of such countries as France, the United Kingdom and the United States, they include expenditures for defence commitments outside the NATO area. Nevertheless, the figures are impressive evidence of the effort which member countries are making in the production of arms and equipment for the defence of the free world.

The increases are the more remarkable if we consider the circumstances in which they were achieved. As a result of the Second World War, the armament industries of most countries of Western Europe had almost ceased to exist; the plants and factories had been destroyed, damaged or switched to civilian production. The economic situation of these countries made it impossible for them to devote a large proportion of their resources to defence production. They were, in particular, experiencing very severe balance of payments problems, which meant that they had considerable difficulty in supplementing their domestic production by imports of arms and equipment. The situation has gradually improved as a result of an easing of world economic conditions, and of aid from North America; but shortages of foreign exchange are still an obstacle to rational programmes of arms production.

In these circumstances, it was of supreme importance to the Atlantic Alliance that the vast resources and industrial power of its two North American members could be used through programmes of mutual aid. This aid took the form of 'end-items' (i.e. finished articles of military equipment) to equip the armed forces of countries whose armament industries could not deliver the vast range and quantity of material required. It also included offshore procurement orders and the provision of dollar grants and raw materials to help in recreating the European defence production industries.

* For detailed data on Mutual Aid, see Chapter XII.
EXPENDITURE BY NATO COUNTRIES FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT

LEGEND

IN THOUSAND MILLION DOLLAR EQUIVALENTS

AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES

CHART 16

9.7

23%

1951

20.8

35%

1952

24.8

40%

1953

* MAJOR EQUIPMENT & AMMUNITION; EXCLUDING GREECE & TURKEY, FOR WHICH FULL DATA ARE NOT AVAILABLE.
The development of aircraft production in Europe is a good example of the results achieved by co-operative efforts. Apart from work on a few prototype machines, there was in 1948 virtually no production of front-line aircraft in continental Europe. No jet engines of any type and almost no aeronautical instruments were being manufactured. Only in the United Kingdom were production lines still active.

The formation of Western Union provided the stimulus which set the European combat aircraft industry in motion again. Under a joint Benelux production programme, begun in 1949 and financed by national funds, Belgium undertook to manufacture Derwent jet engines for installation in Meteor aircraft to be built in the Netherlands. Furthermore, France undertook to build Vampire aircraft, to develop a fighter of her own design, and also to manufacture Nene jet engines. Appropriate licensing arrangements were negotiated with British firms. In the United Kingdom, production of Meteors, Vampires, Canberras and jet engines was stepped up.

From these beginnings we have advanced to the programme for the production of interceptor day-fighters, and certain other types of aircraft, for which contracts were signed in April 1953. Under these contracts, more than $550 millions worth of combat aircraft are being built in five countries of Western Europe, and about half the necessary funds will be contributed by the United States under offshore procurement arrangements.* The principal features of the programme are the production of Hawker Hunter and Vickers Supermarine Swift aircraft in the United Kingdom, of Marcel Dassault Mystère aircraft in France, the joint production of Hunter aircraft in Belgium and the Netherlands, and the assembly of American F. 86 all-weather fighters in Italy.

THE BEGINNING OF PRODUCTION PLANNING IN NATO

In the broadest sense, NATO, and Western Union before it, were the inspiration and driving force behind this considerable effort in rearmament. But NATO has also made a direct contribution. In the first place, national arms programmes have been co-ordinated in such a way that larger and more rapid deliveries can be achieved with the limited funds available; secondly, member nations have been brought together at the technical level in joint studies and in the interchange of information.

For rather more than the first two years of NATO, the work of defence production planning was carried out under a committee system. The Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB), established in November, 1949, was the first of these NATO committees. It closely resembled the former Western Union Board and worked in a similar way. The heads of national delegations to the MPSB met in committee at frequent intervals and each head of delegation made members of his staff available for ad hoc study groups. When highly technical studies were required, each delegate obtained qualified representatives from his country to serve on special sub-committees. This was the beginning of the system of 'groups of experts' to which further reference will be made later.

It soon became clear that this committee system did not permit sufficient con-

* See Chapter XII, Self-Help and Mutual Aid.
tinuity, a proper division of labour, or effective forward planning. Delegations had to represent not only their own national point of view but also an impartial corporate international point of view. The duality of their functions meant that collective recommendations might not always be entirely objective.

Accordingly, in December 1950, the MPSB was dissolved and replaced by the Defence Production Board (DPB). The earlier committee system was strengthened in two ways. First, arrangements were made whereby heads of delegations to the new Board were continuously available for meetings in London; secondly, an international staff was created under Mr. W. R. Herod, (USA), who was a member of the Board and had the title of Co-ordinator of Defence Production.

The first proposals for production drawn up by the DPB were based on studies conducted by certain 'Task Forces'. These comprised nine teams of senior production specialists from all countries concerned which, under the auspices of the MPSB, had visited NATO producing countries in the second half of 1950, conferred with national authorities and examined facilities. They had then drawn up a series of objective reports recommending means of increasing production in fields where deficiencies were greatest. The proposals, as they emerged from the DPB, covered artillery and infantry support weapons, tanks, transport vehicles, engineering equipment, escort vessels and minesweepers, and recommended production additional to that already planned by the countries themselves.

These proposals were referred to the Financial and Economic Board in Paris who, after exhaustive discussions, came to the conclusion that proposals for additional expenditure on defence production could not be considered in isolation. The situation was that the requirements in all fields including arms and equipment, as stated at that time by the military Commanders, raised acute financial problems for national governments. As explained in Chapter V, this was one of the reasons which led the Council at Ottawa in September, 1951, to set up the Temporary Council Committee, charged with the responsibility of submitting proposals for reconciling these military requirements as a whole with the capabilities of NATO countries for undertaking defence. The review conducted by the TCC, and subsequent Annual Reviews, have been designed to this end. These reviews, by evolving a balanced NATO defence plan, have made the important difference that NATO production planning is now carried out within the total funds made available by governments for production. Examination as to whether those funds are sufficient is decided in the course of the Annual Review. The frustration of preparing detailed production programmes which could be executed only in part or not at all has thus been avoided.

PLANNING AFTER 1952

After the move of NATO to Paris in April, 1952, the Production Division of the International Staff, under the Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics, carried on the activities of the earlier production agencies, and profited by their experience. The aim is to use available resources to the best possible advantage by correlating the production programmes of the member countries multilaterally at the planning stage. The activities of the Production Division fall into three main parts:

1. long-term production planning;
2. acting as the expert broker for the exchange of information, and guiding technical studies;
3. participating in the Annual Review, which involves analysis of
equipment requirements and resources for current and future years.

The Division works closely with national delegations, and each of these has a
defence production counsellor who sits in the Defence Production Committee
(set up in 1954) which now advises the Council on policy matters.

Progress in production planning has been both more rapid and more tangible,
largely due to the growth of United States offshore purchases. This planning
covers 'major' items of equipment which are of military importance, expensive
to produce, and needed in large quantities. Because the production of such equip­
ment usually raises complex engineering problems and involves heavy capital
costs, co-operation between member countries can be most rewarding. Conversely,
studies are not extended to simpler items like uniforms or quartermaster stores,
since they can easily be produced locally. The recommendations made to govern­
ments between January, 1953 and July, 1954 cover production to the value of
more than $2,000 million. Apart from aircraft, which have already been discus­
sed, the recommendations cover selected items of small-arms, field and anti-air­
craft artillery, army wireless sets, anti-aircraft radar, combat vehicles, escort
vessels and minesweepers, together with substantial quantities of ammunition.

The actual process of correlated production planning, as this has now develop­
ed, involves meetings of national experts and the NATO staff to look at proposals
of individual NATO countries and to suggest practical measures to extend the
joint production effort and to make it more economical and efficient. The type of
solution recommended varies considerably from item to item. For example, in
medium tank production, it is simplest for one or two NATO countries to meet
the needs of all. In other instances, where it is necessary and desirable to produce
a particular item in a number of countries, correlation studies are designed to
ensure that production is on a standard pattern or, at least, that the number of
models is reduced to a minimum. Examples from current programmes are light
anti-aircraft guns and army wireless sets.

The correlation of production is not an attempt to revolutionise overnight the
whole existing structure of defence production in Europe. This would disrupt vital
supplies of equipment and could give rise to severe economic and social problems.
The present efforts should be regarded as a beginning of a long-term task, involv­
ing gradual evolution of the production pattern.

The main studies on correlated production in Europe are accompanied by
others in specialised fields, but hardly of less importance; notably, studies for the
development in Europe of facilities for the production of spare parts for American
equipment. This equipment is now held in considerable quantities by the NATO
forces of European countries, and use of local production sources will save dollars
and simplify maintenance of equipment in case of war. Despite the complexity
of this task, a good measure of success has already been achieved. For example, it
is now possible to procure in Europe a wide range of spare parts for the three
most important types of transport vehicles, representing between them about 90
per cent of the total holdings of transport vehicles of United States origin in
European countries.

Similarly, efforts are being made to ensure that equipment employs interchange­
able components where this is useful and possible. Examples may be taken again
from the vehicle field, where specifications for interchangeable sparking plugs,
batteries, rims and tyres, lamp sockets, towing hooks and other components are
being evolved.
The co-operation between member countries in defence production matters has increased to a degree which ten years ago would have seemed unbelievable. It has now become the accepted practice for groups of experts, nominated by the various governments, not only to discuss their plans and problems around the table, but also to visit one another's factories and examine in the greatest detail technical processes and methods of production. Thus the benefits of the latest advances can be shared by all. To take two examples, experts in the manufacture of steel for weapons have now visited plants in all the major producing countries; while the expert group dealing with the techniques of electronic valve design and their standardisation has made an extensive tour of plants in Italy and the United States. In addition, members of the International Staff, as part of their day-to-day work, are constantly visiting national production ministries, arsenals and factories to keep abreast of the latest developments and to consult with, and advise, countries in all problems of defence production. Of course, nations have research and development secrets which they are not at the present time ready to share with others. The risks which are inherent in the wide circulation of any piece of information may outweigh the advantages of its early dissemination: but NATO is striving to reduce, so far as reasonable, security restrictions on the exchange of information.

More should perhaps be said about the groups of experts, since in the long run these may prove to be one of the most important developments which NATO has fostered in the field of defence production. Several were created in the days of Western Union; new ones have been set up as the need arose; some have finished their task and been disbanded. At present there are over twenty groups in existence. The groups may be broadly divided into two classes. First, those which have a continuing responsibility for surveying a field of production, e.g. air defence radar equipment or spare parts for vehicles; secondly, those which are convened to undertake a specific study and which are dissolved when they have completed their report and made recommendations for adoption by governments. For example, there are groups on conversion of engineering drawings, on the manufacture of steel cartridge cases, on the methods of producing gun steels, and on specifications for propellants and explosives. The group on the conversion of drawings has drawn up a procedure whereby United States drawings of spare parts for weapons, vehicles and ammunition can be converted to European scales and measures. The work of the group on steel cartridge cases has already proved outstandingly successful in encouraging the development of steel cartridge case production, with its large potential savings of copper in wartime, in the majority of the member countries.

In the groups of experts, as in the wider defence production activities of NATO, the intangible advantages flowing from the close and friendly contacts achieved between individuals at the working level must be added to the concrete results achieved.

**FUTURE PROSPECTS**

The procedures and activities which have been reviewed are all experiments in an entirely new field of co-operation between sovereign countries, and they will be extended, modified or discarded in the light of experience. The basic aim will remain to increase the quantity and effectiveness of NATO defence production and to place it on a firm long-term basis, with due regard for special needs that
may arise in the event of war. Particular importance is attached to building up in Europe a sound industrial base from which output of military equipment could be rapidly expanded in an emergency. The idea is that production by each member nation should form part of a correlated whole, designed to put all available resources to the most effective use in the common interest.

This Chapter has described defence production in NATO during a period of intensive build-up of the armed forces. In future, defence production programmes are likely to be directed increasingly towards (a) keeping up to strength existing holdings of conventional type weapons and equipment, replacing these as they wear out by models of improved design and performance; and (b) the production of new weapons, many of which are still several years off, and all of which are likely to raise formidable problems of cost and industrial technique. The range and volume of spare parts required will also increase. If the problems of the future are to be solved, there will be an even greater need for the wise measures of mutual collaboration and assistance which have been so successfully developed over the last years.
CHAPTER XII

SELF-HELP AND MUTUAL AID

One of the basic concepts of the North Atlantic Treaty is a recognition of the common interests, the inter-dependence and the developing unity within the North Atlantic Community. NATO is an operating coalition, which depends for its success on collective efforts. It will be recalled that Article 3 of the Treaty reads: 'In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'.

'Continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid' had been a cardinal principle of the Brussels Treaty of 1948, to provide for mutual defence of the five signatory Powers. It was also the basis of the European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan), associating the European NATO members and other European states in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), with which Canada and the United States have developed close working relations. As far as the United States itself was concerned, it was in June, 1948, that the Senate adopted the Vandenberg Resolution, affirming the right to collective self-defence and recommending the association of the United States with regional and collective arrangements based on self-help and mutual aid. Thus was the foundation laid for a North Atlantic mutual defence alliance.

It is clear from the history of the negotiations, as well as from the terms of the Treaty, that the undertakings of Article 3 envisaged action beyond the purely military sphere. It was recognised that the strength of the Alliance depended as much upon the economic soundness of the individual countries and upon the morale of their people as upon the number of military units available for the common defence and the aggregate of their armaments.

We saw in Chapter III that, in carrying out the provisions of Article 3, no country is bound to any specific programme of self-help or mutual aid. Each country merely bound itself to exercise its own judgment as to how to develop and maintain its own capacity to resist aggression and to help others. It is proposed to review in this chapter some of the ways in which member countries have been assisting their partners to achieve both economic and military strength. Mutual aid has taken varying forms, and it is not possible to enumerate or to evaluate them all. It can be said, however, that ever since the Treaty came into force, mutual aid has been a very important element in building up both the defensive and economic strength of the NATO countries.

THE STRATEGIC NEED FOR MUTUAL AID

When the magnitude of the task of defending the North Atlantic area against the
Note:
The figures for Gross National Product are based on estimates submitted by member countries and are subject to revision.

For the European countries, the figures have been converted into terms of US dollars, using official exchange rates. Recent OEEC studies indicate that this method exaggerates the difference between the European and the North American areas, the real purchasing power of European peoples being closer to that of the North Americans than is here implied.

Data showing Gross National Product on a truly comparable basis for all NATO countries are not yet available.

Soviet threat was assessed, it was immediately apparent that considerable efforts in self-help and mutual aid would be required in the military as well as in the economic sphere. At the root of the problem, there lay the need for building up armed forces in countries or areas which could by no means support the whole burden of that effort from their own limited resources. In the interest of all members of the Alliance, the Western European mainland with its northern and southern approaches had to be defended. The financial and physical resources of the countries in that area were however wholly inadequate for the task.

THE VARIOUS FORMS OF MUTUAL AID

One solution to the problem was to man and equip military units in the countries which had the resources and send them as expeditionary forces to Europe. In fact, the United Kingdom and the United States already had troops in Germany in 1949, as occupation forces. These were later considerably reinforced and re-grouped on a defensive posture.*

* See Chapter IV.
Another partial solution was to increase the economic potential of the Western European countries, through self-help and mutual aid, to the level at which an adequate joint defence could be supported. The reconstruction of the Western European economy from the destruction and dislocations left by the last war was already well under way through the individual and joint efforts of the European participants in the European Recovery Programme, with the help of Marshall Plan aid from the United States. This programme was purely one of economic reconstruction with no military implications; but many European member states had, by 1951, achieved a degree of recovery which permitted them to support a defence effort more nearly in keeping with the grim requirements of the times. They were however still far from being able to shoulder the whole burden: accordingly United States economic aid was continued, though on a diminishing scale and with the changed emphasis that is reflected in the new name of 'defence support aid'.

Meanwhile, the European members were increasing their own military forces. Their main difficulty was to procure the necessary weapons and equipment. This was, and still is, being overcome largely by important deliveries of military equipment, free of charge, by the North American members to their European partners, under the Canadian and United States military aid programmes. Some details of these programmes are given later in this chapter.

It has been seen in Chapter XI how the need for common infrastructure has developed, in pace with the build-up of combined allied forces under NATO's Supreme Commanders. The financing and implementation of agreed NATO infrastructure programmes are noteworthy applications of the concept of mutual aid and burden sharing.

Member countries have granted rights to their partners for construction and use of military facilities, in some cases as part of the NATO common infrastructure programme, in others on a bilateral basis. Many thousands of acres of land have been contributed by European members for facilities such as airfields, training areas, bombing and artillery ranges, barracks, naval base facilities, supply depots, etc., for common use or for the designated use of other members. Some of the ranges require an area of roughly 600 square miles each. Much of this land had to be diverted from agricultural or other productive use.

Other forms of mutual aid have appeared as the need arose, and some are still being developed. A few examples may be given to show their scope and purpose:
- loan of ships and aircraft by the United States and the United Kingdom to other NATO members;
- loan of training grounds;
- training of specialists in Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, especially for the air forces and for the operation of radar equipment. This sort of aid is invaluable, particularly to the smaller countries for whom the capital outlay and the overhead costs involved in the establishment of training schools would create major problems and would be wasteful of funds;
- provision of spare parts for military equipment;
- provision of detailed working drawings for the manufacture of military equipment;
- exchange of engineering data and industrial 'know-how'.

These examples are drawn from the daily activities of NATO and no central accounting has ever been attempted for services thus rendered. Mutual aid in the military field can be considered as one of the greatest achievements of the
Alliance. In terms of manpower for the military contingents placed under NATO command, and in land and other facilities made available for joint military use, the European members are contributing by far the greater share - while the North American members are contributing the greater part of the weapons, ammunition and other equipment necessary for the build-up of NATO forces.

THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION

The total money value of the United States and Canadian aid programmes for European NATO countries, in amounts voted from 1948 to April, 1954, is of the order of $30,000 million. More than half of this is for military equipment. The balance has been provided in the form of:

1. economic aid (goods, machinery, technical advice and financial support to a value of more than $11,500 million);
2. 'intermediate type aid' (financial contributions for specific projects in the defence budgets of certain member countries);
3. training of aircrews and other military personnel.

The scope and magnitude of the economic aid given to European NATO members under the Marshall Plan, and continued in reduced amounts as 'defence support aid' under later United States aid programmes, is indicated above. Its importance in helping to build the sound economic base on which NATO's effectiveness is founded was very great. But during the current phase of NATO's growth, it is the military aid which invites our particular attention.

CANADIAN AID

The Canadian mutual aid programme began in 1950, in conjunction with the decision of the Canadian Government to re-equip its land forces with American-type equipment. The British-type equipment with which their forces had hitherto been supplied, or which was being kept in reserve stock, was made available to NATO.

From the beginning, Canadian aid has been made available on the basis of multilateral offering to NATO countries. It is transferred to individual European recipients in accordance with Canadian acceptance of allocations recommended either by the Standing Group or by the NATO Secretariat. In this way, the early phases of the Canadian aid programme provided the basic infantry and artillery weapons, motor vehicles, other equipment and ammunition to supply three European ground divisions (one Belgian, one Dutch and one Italian). Much additional equipment, ammunition and explosives have been donated, and every European member nation except Iceland (which has no armed forces) has been the beneficiary of Canadian military assistance.

The later phases of the programme include more than 500 F 86 Sabre jet aircraft with spares, radio sets, early warning radar sets, minesweepers and a wide range of ammunition and explosives. Since Canada is manufacturing much of her equipment to American design, this ensures a degree of standardisation. The value of Canadian end-item aid (i.e. finished articles of military equipment - weapons, vehicles, ammunition, etc.) programmed to the end of March, 1954, was $630 million. An additional $220 million is budgeted for the financial year 1954-55.
In making up the programme, the Canadian authorities were mindful of the need for keeping in operation the production capacity for certain essential kinds of military equipment. In February, 1953, the Canadian Permanent Representative to the Council spoke of the 'vital importance, in the general NATO interest, of maintaining the production of certain types of equipment which can readily be produced in quantity in Canada but for which the demands alone of our armed services are not sufficient for economic operation'. He added: 'From the outset we have regarded as an important objective of our programme the means which it provides for creating and maintaining in Canada important production facilities that are needed by our North Atlantic partners as well as by ourselves'.

In addition to end-item aid, Canada has also conducted, as we have seen in Chapter IX, training programmes for NATO European pilots and other aircrew at a total cost of over $200 million up to the end of March, 1954. More than 2,500 men have completed their training, and nearly 1,000 others are receiving their instruction in Canada. About $60 million is budgeted for these programmes for the financial year 1954-55 and their continuance has been approved by Canada for the three subsequent years.

UNITED STATES AID

The United States economic aid to European countries has been mentioned in Chapter I, and the events which led to the passing of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act in 1949 by the United States Congress have been described in Chapter III.

In October, 1951, the United States Mutual Security Act was approved. It brought the economic and military aid legislation together in certain respects and, as a result:

1. the United States military and economic aid programmes became parts of a unified programme;
2. United States dollar assistance was increased for military purposes and reduced for economic purposes;
3. the 'counterpart' funds generated by economic aid – i.e. the special deposits in European currencies made by recipient governments to match the dollar value of the economic aid donated by the United States – were applied increasingly to military purposes, instead of exclusively to economic purposes, as previously.

United States aid to Europe, whether economic, military or 'intermediate', has been furnished on the basis of bilateral agreements negotiated between the United States and the individual recipient countries. The level and the nature of the military aid given to NATO member states is based on the military force goals agreed upon in the course of the Annual Review, the recommendations of the NATO military authorities and the ability of the recipient country to utilise the aid effectively.

By the beginning of April, 1954, the value of military equipment shipped or planned by the United States for delivery to its European partners had reached about $15,000 million. The end-items supplied to NATO countries include well over a million small arms, more than twenty thousand artillery pieces and mortars, thousands of tanks and aircraft, and tens of thousands of motor vehicles, to say nothing of ammunition and other equipment. These are impressive figures. In addition, contracts still outstanding cover items ranging from minesweepers to jet aircraft and radar equipment. The United States Administration is also
ECONOMIC AID – Value of shipments of food, fuel, industrial raw materials, fertilizers, machinery and equipment, etc., plus $ payments for industrial development projects, technical assistance, contributions to the European Payments Union, and other forms of economic and financial aid to European NATO countries; does not include Intermediate Type Aid.

MILITARY AID – Value of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment supplied to European countries; does not include Intermediate Type Aid or training programmes. Includes relatively small amounts for non-NATO countries in Europe, Near East and Africa.

considering helping to maintain the equipment it has supplied by furnishing such necessary spare parts as cannot, for technical or economic reasons, be manufactured in Europe.

An important feature of United States aid is the offshore procurement financed as part of the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme (MDAP-OSP). Under this scheme, a portion of the money provided for the MDAP is used to purchase military equipment in countries other than the United States, the equipment then being given to one of America’s allies (often the country of manufacture) for its military forces. This scheme is beginning to show significant results. By April, 1954, contracts placed by the United States in European NATO countries amounted to $1,727 million (not including $388 million of Special Military Support for France). The largest allocation is for ammunition ($852 million), with aircraft and related equipment ($366 million) and ships ($239 million) also accounting for considerable sums. Payments under these contracts reached about $280 million by April, 1954.

The concept of offshore procurement is proving to be a happy one, for a number of reasons:

1. it enlarges the European military production base, reduces the dependence on North American sources of supply, and fosters the
US MDAP OFF-SHORE PROCUREMENT

VALUE OF ORDERS PLACED IN EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES

AS AT 31 MARCH, 1954*

-Millions of Dollars-

by Country

- FRANCE
- UNITED KINGDOM
- ITALY
- BELGIUM
- NETHERLANDS
- OTHER COUNTRIES

by Type of Equipment

- AMMUNITION
- AIRCRAFT & EQUIPMENT
- SHIPS & EQUIPMENT
- ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
- COMBAT & TRANSPORT VEHICLES
- OTHER

* Does not include "Special Military Support"

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development and maintenance of modern military production techniques and special skills. In certain instances, it prevents existing European defence production capacity from deteriorating or going out of use;

2. supply lines are shortened, with consequent easing of logistical problems;

3. European unit costs are lower in some instances than United States costs, and packing and shipping charges are smaller; it is therefore possible for a given expenditure in dollars to procure more equipment;

4. the scheme lends general support to the economy of the European member nations by providing not only a means of earning dollars but also employment for many European workers;

5. it is easily dovetailed in with the NATO correlated production programmes for Europe and these two concepts are being developed along lines mutually beneficial and stimulating.

The United States has also provided technical military training for many European soldiers, sailors and airmen, largely to ensure the proper handling and maintenance of the United States supplied equipment.

Dollar payments under economic aid, intermediate type aid, NATO common infrastructure and MDAP-OSP contracts, together with the dollar expenditures of United States forces and other personnel stationed in Europe, have helped to mitigate the most intractable postwar economic problem – the dollar shortage of European countries. Indeed, the total dollar receipts of the European NATO countries from these sources in 1953 were such that they played a great part in enabling those countries to increase their gold and dollar reserves by nearly $2,000 million and to relax some of their restrictions on dollar purchases. It should be borne in mind, however, that this way of easing the dollar position of Europe cannot continue indefinitely. While some of the United States expenditures in Europe are of a recurring character, others are not – for example, capital outlays for military bases or NATO common infrastructure projects – and the MDAP offshore purchases now planned will gradually taper off.

With the possible exception of certain special or urgent cases, the need for United States economic (‘defence support’) aid to European member states should be much reduced in the future since, in any case, offshore procurement contracts and other United States military expenditures in Europe assure large dollar earnings for several years to come. It is also conceivable that in the long run the dependence of European NATO countries on military end-item aid may come to an end, unless, of course, changes in the international situation demand a revision of NATO military requirements. Since, even after April, 1954, military equipment to the value of more than $6,000 million remained to be delivered from aid programmes already put in motion, it is not to be expected that the magnitude of any future peacetime programmes will equal those of the past. This is not to say that mutual aid in NATO is likely to decline in importance, but merely that certain aspects of it which have achieved their immediate purpose will come to an end or alter their form.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OVER FIVE YEARS

The concept of mutual aid, and the philosophy behind it, have led to achieve-
ments of lasting importance not only in the defence field but in wider spheres of international co-operation. In the past, it was only after some months or even years of fighting together against a common foe that mutual aid and a measure of co-ordination amongst allied forces were attained. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, schemes of mutual aid have not only been planned, but have actually been put into operation and are functioning successfully in time of peace. It may be asserted without undue optimism that the results have been:

1. a continuous increase in the size and effectiveness of a balanced collective force for the defence of the North Atlantic area;
2. a reduction in the economic strains that the defence build-up imposes upon the member states;
3. the development of the practice of working together, allowing collective plans to be made and common problems to be discussed in a systematical and orderly manner and in an atmosphere free from the stresses of actual warfare.

In 1949 and 1950 experts forecast that the economies of the Western World would suffer catastrophic collapse under the burden of rearmament. What has in fact happened is that, while the total defence expenditure of NATO countries has tripled since 1949 – increasing from less than 20 to more than 60 thousand million dollars a year – the majority of member states have succeeded, in the same period, in maintaining or increasing their net national per capita income. At the same time, the level of employment has risen and has remained high in all countries except two, where the problem of over-population requires special remedies. It is in fact indisputable that all NATO member states are now in a far more robust condition, both economically and militarily, than they were in April, 1949, and that they have all achieved, through self-help and mutual aid, levels of economic and financial health which permit the continuance of substantial military contributions towards the strength of the Alliance.

PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF MUTUAL AID

An important aspect of the NATO policy of self-help and mutual aid is the constant search which is being made for the best and most economical use of the resources assigned to the defence of the North Atlantic area. The aim of building maximum defensive strength at the lowest possible cost fits well with the basic strategic concept of balanced, collective NATO forces. The simple consideration by NATO of common defence problems, done as a collective exercise in the Annual Review, in planning common infrastructure, and in countless other day-to-day activities, makes it possible to achieve substantial economies, an efficient distribution of efforts and to avoid, as far as possible, overlapping and duplication.

Economies result from the selection and use of standard training methods, the joint use of training grounds and other facilities, the selection of the most suitable types of weapons, the sharing of technical knowledge and the agreements reached on correlating defence production programmes. Furthermore the collective use of resources is the sole means of achieving a disposition of forces covering all NATO territories as effectively as possible, without a direct relationship being necessary between the territorial disposition of the forces and the cost of their training and equipment.

In these ways, the burden-sharing of defence takes place in NATO to an extent which is not generally realised. It is achieved not by any single magic formula,
but by the daily practice of each of the methods enumerated in this chapter – to recapitulate: the stationing of units from one member state on the territory of another; the training undertaken by the countries which are better equipped for this task; an effective sharing of infrastructure costs; defence support assistance from the United States to European countries, and assistance in the form of military equipment supplied from both the United States and Canada.

Is it possible to translate into financial terms the total economies thus realised and the increased effectiveness of the defence system achieved through NATO’s collective efforts? Yes, in the sense that each member country may well calculate what would be the cost of defence of its own territory or of protecting its sea communications, should it have to do so on a national basis and alone. The aggregate estimated costs of such unilateral systems of defence would be a great deal higher than that of the collective system which has been adopted. In any event, NATO countries would be utterly unable to make individually a financial defence effort sufficient to achieve, at best, more than an illusory protection. But above all, a purely national organization would have little defensive value for any of them. The range of modern weapons is so great that no single country, however large and powerful, can protect itself alone. General Eisenhower once said: ‘The struggle against the threat of dictatorial aggression has no geographical bounds; it is all one’.

It has been attempted, in this chapter, to analyse how the principles of self-help and mutual aid have been applied by NATO, in peacetime, over the last five years. If, despite all efforts to deter aggression, war were to come to the NATO countries, the whole emphasis of mutual aid would be radically changed. Then would the truly vital forms of self-help and mutual aid be called into play to save the freedom of the Atlantic Community. This would mean the maximum utilisation of national resources for the common cause, the sending of reinforcements to buttress the defences of one’s partners, the sharing of equipment and supplies – all with the single aim of repulsing the aggressor and restoring our countries to peace in the shortest possible time. The cost would not be counted then in dollars, sterling or francs, but in men and cities, in families and homes.

It is to avoid the grim realities of a third world war that the voluntary co-operation of the NATO countries should continue and should form a unity stronger and more enduring than that which any aggressively minded Power can impose by force on other nations. Here is mutual aid and self-help in the widest and most enlightened form: standing together and helping each other, first to rid the world of the fear of war, and then to build together a better future.
CHAPTER XIII

EMERGENCY PLANNING

Much of this survey has been devoted to the measures which have been and are being taken to build up the armed strength of the Alliance; but, as bitter experience has shown, modern war is not merely a matter for soldiers, sailors and airmen. The armed forces are, in fact, only the cutting edge of a mechanism which involves every single national activity. The skill of the Commanders, the valour of the troops, the excellence of their equipment will be of no avail if the home front cracks.

Prior to the First World War, there was no need for governments in time of peace to make extensive preparations for the stability of the home front. Since then, however, the total character of modern war, the dependence of armed forces on a continuous and high level of industrial production, the development of the submarine and mine, the advent of air power, and the dislocation caused by war to national economies, have brought the effects of war into the homes and working places of every single individual. Moreover, the dependence of nations at war on imported food, petrol and raw materials, many of which are often scarce and difficult to transport in wartime, makes it imperative for partners in any modern alliance to work together in the civilian field and thus to ensure the best possible distribution of these commodities amongst themselves, in order to feed their peoples and to maintain their industrial effort.

The members of the North Atlantic Alliance are pledged to 'maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'. * In view of what has been said earlier in this survey, it is clear that this pledge will not be fully redeemed unless plans and preparations are made in peacetime by all member nations and, where necessary, jointly by nations, for the organization and protection of the civil population and for the direction of civilian activities in time of war. If the transition from peace to war is mishandled or carried out without proper co-ordination among governments, civilians may go short of food, their confidence in their leaders will be shaken, armament production will be impeded, and dislocation of the economic system may give rise to social unrest. Chaos can be caused by attacks from the air, and the side whose home front fails to stand the strain is lost.

Accordingly, it is the duty of all member governments to make plans and preparations to overcome the problems which might arise in the civilian field in time of war, and to make certain that, in parallel with the military build-up, the home front is prepared for all eventualities.

It is obviously impossible to work out in advance a complete master plan for all the action which would have to be undertaken in the civilian field by NATO

* Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
as a whole, and by each individual member government, on the outbreak of war. Nevertheless, it is the duty of the Council to indicate to member governments the fields where action is both necessary and possible, and to make recommendations which are based on a firm and universally accepted concept of the purposes and techniques of preparing the civilian front.

In undertaking this work NATO provides a forum for the exchange of information and so enables countries with little experience of these problems to learn from those which have much. It can also judge whether each member government is doing all that it can, and if it is not doing so, stimulate it to do more. In addition, it ensures that separate national plans do not conflict with, but support, each other.

The measures that have been, and are being, taken by NATO, particularly in the fields of civil defence, refugees and evacuees, transport, both maritime and inland, and wartime commodity problems are summarised in the paragraphs that follow.

**CIVIL ORGANIZATION IN TIME OF WAR**

The last war proved that the existence of good civil defence arrangements can do a great deal to minimise the material damage of air attack and to sustain the morale, not only of the civilian populations, but also of their anxious relatives in the fighting line. Since then, the addition of the atom and hydrogen bombs to the terrifying and destructive power of the armouries of modern nations makes the provision of adequate protection against, and organization to deal with, air attack of even greater importance. Everything possible must be done to minimise the casualties and damage which can be created on an unprecedented scale by atomic bombardment due to blast, heat-flash, gamma radiation and residual radioactivity.

To meet these dangers, governments must take steps well in advance of an attack to provide shelters, to train mobile columns, fire fighters, rescue workers, decontamination squads, and to plan emergency medical services and feeding arrangements.

Many of us have vivid memories of the extent to which military operations in the last war were impeded, and indeed frustrated, by the unorganized movement of panic-stricken civilians fleeing from the enemy. Who can doubt that plans must be made in advance, in consultation with the military authorities, for the control of the movement of all civilian populations likely to find themselves in the areas of hostilities?

Fifth Column activities are another danger to be guarded against. In the event of Soviet aggression the danger of such activities would probably be even greater than in World War II. There are in every country important installations such as bridges, docks, munition factories and oil refineries which are vulnerable to sabotage. The most vital of these must clearly have special protection in time of war and the necessary arrangements for their protection must be made in advance. The problems of this nature which would face governments at the outbreak of war can be multiplied almost indefinitely.

One of the first acts of the Council after the move to Paris was to set up a Committee on Civil Organization in Time of War. The preliminary studies of this Committee led it to give priority to two problems: the defence of the civilian population and of their homes and work places from air attack; and the organization of refugees and evacuees. Accordingly, they set up a Civil Defence Committee and a Committee on Refugees and Evacuees, both composed of experts in their respective fields. In addition, a Special Civil Defence Committee was created to
provide a forum in which the experts of NATO member governments can meet those from the Federal Republic of Western Germany to exchange ideas on civil defence matters in which there is a common interest.*

The Civil Defence Committee has examined the following problems:
- air-raid warning systems;
- protection against the effects of blast, especially with regard to shelters;
- blackout and camouflage;
- protection against the effects of incendiary bombs;
- precautions to be taken to reduce personnel casualties and damage in industrial areas;
- protection against poison gas;
- the rescue of trapped persons and the treatment and removal of the injured;
- special problems created by the possible use of atomic and radioactive weapons, including the special effects of heat radiation, radioactivity and atomic blast.

The information which has been collected is being sifted and edited and will be issued to governments in the form of handbooks. Two civil defence experts have been engaged to work full time on these and analogous problems.

NATO's task in the civil defence field is to ensure that all governments are aware of the most modern techniques in defending their civilian populations against air attack; to underline those problems which can be best solved by mutual co-operation and arrangements between neighbouring countries; and to ensure that the civilian and military authorities work closely together. The Civil Defence Committee has found that in some countries planning is far advanced and significant practical steps have been taken; in others, that governments, beset by financial difficulties and handicapped by lack of technical and practical knowledge, have made very little headway in making the necessary preparations.

Some of the measures which should be taken, such as the construction of air-raid shelters, cost money. Most countries can ill afford this additional expenditure since money spent on such expensive projects must often be at the expense of the military build-up. On the other hand, there are many civil defence measures which can be taken at very small cost: for example the training of first-aid workers, fire fighters and home guards, the listing of emergency water supplies and so forth. All measures have this in common: they cannot be improvised at the last moment.

The Committee on Refugees and Evacuees, in close collaboration with the military authorities, has considered such questions as the establishment and organization of hospital or safety zones in accordance with the Geneva Convention; evacuation of certain categories of persons from the operational and combat zones; the temporary residence during wartime of refugees and evacuees in a foreign country; specialised services for the preparation and implementation of all aspects of evacuation plans; the control of mass movements of persons anxious to escape from threatened bombardment or the menace of enemy occupation. The Council will make recommendations for inter-governmental action where necessary.

In addition to making broad recommendations based on the conclusions of the Committee on Civil Defence and on those of the Committee on Refugees and Evacuees, the Committee on Civil Organization in Time of War has examined the

* On the 14th September 1954 a Medical Committee was set up to review medical manpower in each country and to recommend plans for the solution of civilian and military problems which may arise in wartime.
protection of vital industrial installations, the control of civilian travel in wartime and measures to deal with enemy shipping and aircraft in NATO harbours and airports at the outbreak of war. The aim of these studies is not to produce any hard and fast plans but to acquaint governments with the problems they may have to face and to suggest various methods by which they may be dealt with.

**TRANSPORTATION**

In war it is the actual fighting which most excites the imagination. The long line of communications and the intricate complications of supply often go unnoticed. Yet they are of primary importance: particularly when members of a coalition are separated by an ocean. As Sir Winston Churchill said in his book 'The River War': 'Victory is the beautiful, bright-coloured flower. Transport is the stem without which it could never have blossomed'. No matter how well strategy is planned, how brilliant the tactical moves, all is of no avail if supplies and materials in sufficient quantities do not arrive when and where they are wanted.

**The Planning Board for Ocean Shipping**

The North Atlantic Council turned their attention to these matters soon after they were established. In May 1950, they created the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping (PBOS) and gave it the task of working out plans to ensure the most efficient use of the available shipping resources in time of emergency. PBOS was the only civilian NATO agency to survive the Lisbon reorganization in its original form. Even after the Council moved to Paris the Planning Board has continued to operate from London and Washington. The Board, unlike other NATO agencies, is not served by an International Secretariat paid out of common funds. Its work is carried on chiefly by a small group of British and American civil servants who, with the co-operation of shipping experts from other member governments, prepare papers for the Planning Board's consideration.

The most important principle on which the Planning Board has agreed is that, in order to diminish the effects of a shortage of sea transport at the outbreak of war, the great bulk of ocean-going merchant ships under the flags of NATO countries would be pooled and, for allocation purposes, put at the disposal of an inter-allied body to be called the Defence Shipping Authority. This Authority will be responsible for the allocation of ocean-going shipping throughout the whole area controlled by and friendly towards the member governments of NATO, its allies and partners.

The Board has agreed on the general lines of the organization of the proposed Authority. It will consist of a Defence Shipping Council and a Defence Shipping Executive Board (DSEB). The main duty of the Defence Shipping Council will be to formulate general shipping policy in accordance with overall strategy. The Executive Board will administer the central pool and for the purpose of day-to-day operation will have two branches, one in Washington and one in London, each with subordinate committees.

The Board has agreed on the arrangements for the setting up of the two branches, and has decided that the initial steps to bring the branches into being should be taken early enough to ensure that the Executive Board is fully operative at the outbreak of war, or as soon as possible after it. To this end, steps have been taken for assembling the key personnel, including national shipping representatives, of member countries.

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In addition, governments have prepared for PBOS individual cards showing the characteristics of each of their ocean-going ships. This should enable the work of the allocation of merchant shipping to go forward without undue delay if it becomes necessary.

A rapid turn-round of ships can only be achieved if vessels can be loaded and unloaded speedily in ports which are free from congestion. To this end, in each country in Western Europe, 'Ship Destination Rooms' have been set up. The role of this Organization in an emergency would be to decide the destination ports for ships before the sailing of convoys, and the diversion of ships in convoy to other ports, if the original destination port became unable to receive them. It is also important to have, in wartime, day-to-day information on the arrival of ships, so that internal transport by rail, road or inland waterways, can be expeditiously and economically used.

PBOS is carrying out a statistical and general survey of the present, and possibly emergency, employment of European coasting and short sea shipping. It is also studying the emergency anchorage requirements for shipping of this kind.

Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport

The task of adequately supplying Western Europe is not finished when ships have been convoyed successfully across the Atlantic. The problem is then to transport their cargoes to the armed forces, to industry and to the civilian populations. To achieve this successfully roads must be in good repair, railway equipment must be sufficient and of the types required, port installations must be capable of handling the vast quantities of military equipment and civilian supplies which will be off-loaded, and emergency ports must be earmarked and prepared. All these need protection against sabotage and air attack.

In June 1952 a Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport (PBEIST) was set up by the Council to plan the co-ordination in time of crisis of the use of the roads, railways, canals and ports of Western Europe. This Board is obtaining information concerning the amount of inland surface transport which will be required to meet the military and civilian requirements in time of an emergency, and is comparing these requirements with the present availability of transport. Later, it will estimate the deficiencies which might affect the NATO defence effort and, where possible, will suggest means of minimising their effect.

The work which the Planning Board has accomplished can be divided into two parts: the first consists in collecting data on the present stage of the transport system in the NATO European area; the second consists in reviewing national transport organizations and in drafting the constitution of an agency to co-ordinate transport between various countries in time of war. To accomplish this work PBEIST has set up six working groups dealing with road transport, rail transport, inland water transport, ports and beaches, port emergency planning and the inland transport of bulk petroleum products. Within the framework of these groups, military sub-groups have been set up on a geographical basis (corresponding to the areas covered by the Northern, Southern and Central Commands) to study these questions of inland surface transport which, from the operational and often the regional standpoint, are of particular military significance.

The Planning Board directed its working groups to consider in the first place how, within the limitations of the transport system, it would be possible in the
early months of a war to meet the military requirements on the basis of the following assumptions:
- the volume, nature and destination of the commodities to be moved;
- the ports to be used for imports; and
- the estimated degree of damage to ports and inland transport networks.

The working groups were also asked to study a large number of technical matters, including the administration of transport arrangements, the maintenance, protection, repair of the inland transport system.

The inland surface transport in each country in Europe has inevitably developed in different fashions, technically and administratively, and was not planned to cope with the demands which might be made should military operations start in Western Europe. PBEIST and its working groups have therefore had to spend much time in finding out the facts, and in discussing what changes need to be made in the various national transport systems, and in the various modes of transport, to make them capable of standing up to the heavy demands of modern warfare.

In planning a stand-by organization PBEIST has worked on the assumption that, as the control of the various forms of transport in time of war is likely to vary from country to country, each member government of NATO must continue to exercise direct authority over its own transport system. In order, however, to ensure the maximum flexibility and the best use of the available transport resources, efficient co-ordination between national systems is essential. Even when movement takes place entirely within a single country, some measure of co-ordination is necessary in view of its indirect impact on international traffic and its consequences for the military authorities.

PBEIST has therefore endeavoured to draft arrangements which will effectively combine national control of the detailed short-term movement of transport with international long-term planning. In 1954, the Council approved the terms of reference of an Authority for the International Co-ordination of European Inland Surface Transport in the Central European areas. The Council will in due course receive from PBEIST proposals for the co-ordination of transport movements in the Northern and the Southern European areas.

WARTIME COMMODITY PROBLEMS

In June 1951 the Council Deputies, acting on the advice of the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping that there would be a serious deficiency in shipping tonnage in time of a crisis, asked the Financial and Economic Board (FEB) to report on:

1. the feasibility of a realistic examination of civilian seaborne import requirements for commodities, especially bulky commodities, in time of war, on a strict austerity basis; and

2. the nature and functions of any stand-by organization which might be established within NATO to provide the wartime shipping authorities with agreed programmes of civilian imports for NATO countries.

The FEB's report was considered by the Council in June, 1952. The Council accepted the Board's view that for the time being it was not feasible to attempt to establish the principles on which wartime import requirements should be calculated, since it would entail making assumptions, for which there were no accept-
able bases, about the general level of wartime economic activity in member countries and, in particular, about levels of consumption. Consequently, the Council decided that it would be premature to consider the form and functions of any wartime organization which was to draw up agreed programmes of civilian import requirements. They did, however, approve the FEB's conclusion that some progress could be made toward a useful estimate of wartime import requirements by collecting and studying statistics of total seaborne imports of important commodities in a typical year together with information concerning their origin.

To obtain this information the Council set up a Food and Agriculture Planning Committee, a Coal and Steel Planning Committee and an Industrial Raw Materials Planning Committee. The work of these Committees is co-ordinated by a Committee on Wartime Commodity Problems, which has also assumed responsibility for co-ordinating the work of the Petroleum Planning Committee set up by the Council Deputies in January 1952.

These Planning Committees have been instructed to study the difficulties which might arise in their particular commodity field during the first year of a war, and to recommend what measures can be usefully taken in advance to overcome, or at least to minimise them.

The Committees have already examined:
1. the peacetime readiness measures existing, or in preparation, in member countries;
2. the considerations which might have to be taken into account in estimating national requirements if war breaks out;
3. the probable sources of supply in wartime.

Questions discussed by the Committee include:
- legislation, draft governmental decrees and regulations;
- regional administrative organization within each country in times of crisis;
- staff requirements for preparing the measures in peacetime and operating them in wartime;
- availability of necessary statistics;
- prevention of hoarding and panic buying; price control;
- rationing of consumers and the preparation of the documents and machinery for rationing;
- plans for emergency feeding;
- examination of the controls and distribution procedures for scarce commodities;
- import priorities and methods of reducing demands on shipping to a minimum level;
- purchasing procedures;
- organization and control of traders in wartime;
- stockpiling and storage problems.

After having dealt with the domestic plans and preparations of each country, these Committees will go on to consider whether national measures can be made more effective in some spheres by setting up international machinery for the control and distribution of any particular group of commodities. Progress in this field will of course be limited by the fact that large quantities of the commodities under study by the Planning Committees are produced outside the NATO area.

All these Committees have made some progress in studying wartime requirements and availabilities. They have not so far attempted to draw up anything like wartime import programmes. They conduct their work on the basis of a series
of hypotheses. In making plans and preparations the assessment of the broad effect of the assumptions is more important in this field than the precise calculation of figures. The incidental value of the studies which the Committees have undertaken is that it brings together responsible experts from the various NATO capitals and provides training and educational material for the individuals and administrative machines likely to be called upon to deal with these problems if war should break out. The lessons learnt should then be applied in time of crises in the same way as lessons learnt by soldiers in the course of military manoeuvres and staff exercises.

By way of example let us now look at some of the work which has been done by the Planning Committees.

The Petroleum Planning Committee has estimated the military, and the minimum essential civilian, requirements for petroleum products necessary, in wartime, to maintain the economy of each country at full production. It has also estimated the likely availabilities of crude oil and refined products, and has examined the rationing plans which countries have ready to bring into force if the necessity arises.

The Coal and Steel Planning Committee has studied the vulnerable and distant sources of supply of coal and steel. It has asked the principal coal-producing NATO countries of Europe for information about the steps they are taking to maintain their labour force in war. The Committee is giving consideration to the availability in war of the raw materials necessary for steel production in Western Europe.

The Food and Agriculture Planning Committee has examined imports of the various countries over the past few years and has drawn attention to the supplies which are likely to be lost on the outbreak of war. It is also studying the effect of hypothetical cuts in seaborne imports. The Committee has considered the changes which might be necessary in the pattern of wartime agriculture and is enquiring into the supply of agricultural machinery, fuel fertilisers and other requisites essential to the maintenance of an increased production in an emergency.

The Industrial Raw Materials Planning Committee has so far concentrated on the problems which would arise from the loss of commodities from vulnerable sources, from the need to reduce the import of bulky commodities owing to a shortage of shipping, and from the scarcity of certain commodities owing to increased demands in war.

The Food and Agriculture and the Industrial Raw Materials Planning Committees are giving particular attention to stockpiling. They are studying such problems as what commodities should be stocked, the best size and form of the stockpile, the method of procurement, custody and storage, turnover and replacement. Serious financial problems arise, since countries are naturally reluctant to spend money on stockpiling and thus aggravate their balance of payments difficulties.

In addition to the subjects now being examined and dealt with by the North Atlantic Council's Committees on Emergency Planning, there are a host of others, perhaps no less important, which have yet to be taken up. They will be examined in order of priority with the minimum of delay. In this vital matter of assuring the security, supply and efficient administration of the home front in time of war, the Council are still upon the threshold of a task whose urgency and importance are second to none.
The development of NATO as a defensive alliance has tended to concentrate public attention on the military aspects of the Treaty. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that from the outset it was intended that it should be much more than a military pact. To quote the words spoken by Mr. Lester Pearson on the day the Treaty was signed: 'This Treaty, though born of fear and frustration, must however lead to positive social, economic and political achievements if it is to live'. It was with this in view that the partners agreed, by Article 2 of the Treaty, to four binding commitments, namely:

1. to strengthen their free institutions;
2. to bring about a better understanding of the principles on which those institutions are founded;
3. to promote conditions of stability and well-being;
4. to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and to encourage collaboration between any or all of them.

These four undertakings can be discharged by governments in any manner and by any means they think fit. They are a promise by governments to their peoples and to their partners to work together for a happier future. Article 2 was in fact regarded by many as a constitutional act which would, it was hoped, strengthen the unity of the North Atlantic Community.

The term 'Community' does not appear in the Treaty, but it was expressly used by Mr. Lester Pearson on the occasion of its signature. * It has since appeared in numerous Council documents and official communiqués. It conveys precisely the sort of relationship to which member states aspire; but it must not be confused with the idea of an Atlantic federal union. This has ardent advocates in some quarters but cannot yet be regarded as practical politics.

During the discussions which took place at the Council's first session in September, 1949, on the machinery to be set up to implement the Treaty, it was suggested that special agencies might be required in the future to carry out the provisions of Article 2. There was general agreement in principle, but not all governments were equally enthusiastic. Some were anxious to make Article 2 a reality at once; others tended to regard it as an ultimately desirable, though not immediately practicable, idea. As a result nothing definite was done, and it was not until two years later – at the Ottawa Conference in 1951 – that the Council gave serious consideration to the possibilities of closer co-operation in the Article 2 field.

* 'We, of this North Atlantic Community, the structure of which we now consolidate, must jealously guard the defensive and progressive nature of our League'.
THE PEARSON COMMITTEE

The upshot was the issue of a statement — sometimes known as the Ottawa Declaration — in the following terms: ‘The strengthening of the North Atlantic Organization in the past two years has developed in the minds of the peoples a strong sense of their common interests and ideals. There is a desire within the North Atlantic Community to meet specific needs in all fields where close collaboration will advance the welfare of the community’.*

The Council also set up a committee to consider ‘the further strengthening of that Community and especially the implementation of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty’. The Committee consisted of Ministers from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway — small or medium Powers of different backgrounds and interests, yet all deeply concerned in what General Eisenhower has called ‘the logic of larger groups and associations of nations’.** Mr. Lester Pearson was Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Charles Spofford, Chairman of the Council Deputies, was the only non-Ministerial member.

The Pearson Committee first reviewed the work of this kind which was already being done by member governments in other international bodies. It soon found that quite a lot had been, and was being done. The five Brussels Treaty Governments, for example, had contracted to ‘develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries’ and to ‘conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security’.

Subsequently, these same governments agreed on sundry codes and conventions to facilitate the movement of labour. They also reached reciprocal agreements relating to security benefits for workers moving from one Brussels Treaty country to another, the exchange of statistical and industrial information, health and medical benefits. Much of this work has been developed, and extended, to other countries by the Council of Europe, eleven of whose fifteen members also belong to NATO.

The Pearson Committee made an interim report to the Council at Rome in November, 1951, and a final report to the Council at Lisboa in February, 1952. It was not surprising that it had to say that little ground had been left untrodden either in the economic, social or cultural fields. On the other hand, it was able to point out that member governments were making progress within NATO in harmonising their policies on the following subjects:

- the collective examination of their capabilities in relation to the common defence programme undertaken by the Temporary Council Committee (TCC);
- the reorganization of NATO’s civilian agencies which would provide for ‘much closer co-ordination of the efforts of member governments’;
- the plans for close co-operation between the members of the projected European Defence Community.

To this last example might be added the co-operation of five members of NATO in the Coal and Steel Community which became operative in 1952.

The Pearson Committee had felt hampered by the absence of representatives of any of the larger Powers. It therefore advised dissolution and the transference of its tasks to the Council in permanent session. This was approved by the

* For full text of the Declaration, see Appendix V, page 201.
** Supreme Allied Commander, First Annual Report.

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Council at Lisbon. In its report the Committee recommended the following subjects for consideration by the Council:
- co-ordination and consultation on foreign policy;
- economic co-operation;
- the movement of labour;
- social and cultural co-operation;
- information activities.

**ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION**

Co-ordination and consultation on foreign policy was discussed in Chapter VI. Let us here have a look at the other recommendations of the Committee. First of all, economic co-operation. The reader will be aware that there is an organization, the OEEC, whose task is to promote peacetime economic co-operation between its eighteen European members and its two North American associate members. All members of NATO take part in the work of the OEEC, but all members of the OEEC are not members of NATO.

NATO’s special interest in the economic sphere is the impact of defence expenditures on the economic situation of the Atlantic countries. As we have seen, the establishment of a defence plan led the Council to consider its political and economic implications in the several countries, the difficulties limiting each country’s defence effort, and the means by which these could be overcome by national or international action. It has therefore been the duty of NATO to offer recommendations to governments about their economic policies – e.g. in the Annual Review which is part of its continuing work. It is also in accord with Article 2 that no country be compelled to bear a defence burden which would impose an intolerable economic or social strain.

There are thus certain economic problems connected with defence which are studied only in NATO. But, true to its policy of avoiding unnecessary duplication of work, NATO does not trespass on other international agencies. It leaves member countries to carry out any international implications of its economic recommendations through these organizations.

**LABOUR MOBILITY**

The problem of surplus manpower in member countries was recommended for close study by the Permanent Council both by the Pearson Committee and the TCC. The latter, in its report of December, 1951, pointed out that solutions must be found to both surpluses and shortages of manpower. It particularly stressed that the pressure of surplus manpower in Italy could be relieved only by a substantial increase of emigration. At Lisbon the Council confirmed this analysis and recommended that governments should facilitate labour mobility between their countries. Apart from Italy, other member countries with crucial over-population problems are Greece and the Netherlands.

Certain international organizations – e.g. the International Labour Organization and the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration – are specifically concerned with various aspects of manpower problems. NATO’s role, as will be seen, is very much more limited.

In September, 1952, the Council set up a Working Group on Labour Mobility.
This Group, in a report to the Council in November 1953, drew attention to two developments. First, the decision in August, 1953, by the United States Congress to admit, in addition to existing quotas, a total of 209,000 immigrants during the period ending the 31st December, 1956, of whom about half could come from NATO countries in Europe. This action followed a recommendation of President Eisenhower which stressed the United States interest in strengthening the Atlantic Community. Secondly, the adoption by the OEEC Council, also in 1953, of a code dealing with 'the employment of nationals of other member countries'. This introduces a measure of international control with the granting of work permits to foreigners. It applies between all the OEEC countries, except Portugal and Turkey.

Two conclusions may be drawn from NATO's study of the problems of labour mobility. First, progress is bound to be very slow because of the political, economic and social factors involved. Secondly, since other international agencies are dealing with it, NATO cannot, and should not, attempt to become an executive agency for labour mobility and emigration. Moreover, most of the overseas countries capable of receiving immigrants do not belong to NATO. The Council will continue, however, to remind their member governments of the dangers to the Atlantic Community, and to its defence effort, resulting from the existence of large surplus populations in more than one member country.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

The Pearson Committee believed that NATO's best contribution in the social and cultural sphere should be sought in furthering co-operation between the European countries and North America. It realised, however, that, in existing conditions, such work would be hampered by differences between social legislation and practice on opposite sides of the North Atlantic – obstacles due partly to the political systems of Canada and the United States, where responsibility for social legislation is divided between the federal governments and the provincial and state governments, respectively. In the social field, therefore, the extension of transatlantic co-operation seemed unlikely and, in fact, the Council have not found it possible to make any headway.

Cultural exchanges would seem to be less intractable and, in March, 1954, the Council appointed a consultant* to study the various forms of cultural co-operation between member countries (both on a bilateral and an international basis) and to suggest where NATO could fill gaps.

Although there are as yet no NATO-wide cultural projects, there are frequent cultural exchanges between individual member countries. To take one example, the Danish Society for the Atlantic Pact and Democracy, at the suggestion of a French professor, planned a summer course in 1954, under the auspices of Copenhagen University open to students from all NATO countries. The same Danish Society has also arranged an Atlantic Holiday Camp for young people employed in commerce. These are examples of the excellent initiatives that the NATO partners may take, on an official or private level. In the NATO budget, there are no funds for cultural activities: consequently future progress must primarily depend on the willingness of member governments to find the money required.

* Dr H. J. Reinink, Secretary General of the Netherlands Ministry of Education, Science and Arts.
A great international experiment like NATO must, to a large extent, depend for its success upon the support of the citizens of all the member countries: and they are unlikely to lend that support unless they understand the reasons for the exertions and sacrifices that are demanded of them. This has been recognised from the outset of the Alliance. At their meeting in May, 1950, the Council laid it down that one of their most important tasks was to promote public information on the Treaty's objectives and achievements – while leaving responsibility for national programmes to each member government. In 1951, the Council Deputies agreed a similar resolution, and called a conference in London of information officials of all member governments to study this subject. The Pearson Committee's report contained a further exhortation to increase public knowledge of NATO. The subject has since been raised in the Council on more than one occasion, while in every one of his reports to Ministers the Secretary General has stressed the immense importance to the Alliance of informed public opinion.

There is no doubt that a majority favourable to the Atlantic Alliance does exist among the citizens of the NATO countries. This was clearly demonstrated by the votes in the national parliaments on the Treaty's ratification; it is also evident from the approval accorded by parliaments to the annual defence budgets. Nevertheless, paradoxically enough, the ignorance of these same citizens about NATO is still very great. In 1953, a survey by the International Press Institute at Zurich revealed that 79 per cent of the people of the United States, 82 per cent of the British, 87 per cent of the Italians and 89 per cent of the French had no idea of what NATO or OTAN stood for! The article in which this information appeared had the appropriate title of 'NATO remains the Great Unknown'.

This depressing state of affairs must not be attributed either to lack of interest on the part of the Council, or to lack of effort on the part of the International Staff. So far as the first are concerned, there is a Committee on Information and Cultural Relations under the Chairmanship of Mr. Dana Wilgress, the Permanent Representative of Canada, which has under constant consideration various methods by which the aims and progress of NATO can be made more widely known in member countries. As to the International Staff, an indication of their contribution is given below.

The various projects originated by the Information Division are restricted by three conditions. The first is finance. The total operational budget of the Division amounts to a mere £34,000 a year. The second is security; time and again the release of an interesting story has had to be forbidden because it deals with a subject which is 'classified'. The third is that the Division's activities are limited to initiation, suggestion and co-ordination: the responsibility for implementation rests with governments who, naturally, are free to adopt, reject or adapt the suggestions as they think fit. Governments, of course, have their own difficulties about NATO information: not all are equally well staffed or equipped to distribute this information, which is generally only one of many other preoccupations; again, in some countries state information agencies can work only in restricted fields as laid down by law. Nevertheless a few NATO governments have already taken steps to overcome the obstacles which beset an international agency which has to distribute its material through national channels. Some for example have

* Another such conference was held in Paris, in February, 1953, and a third one is scheduled for the beginning 1955.
appointed officials to deal specifically with NATO information matters. Moreover, in the Council's Information and Cultural Relations Committee the fourteen representatives are gradually developing a 'NATO way' of handling and solving information problems.

Before mentioning some of the information projects approved by governments, a word may here be said about a subject on which there are widely divergent opinions: psychological warfare, or 'counter-propaganda'. On the one hand, there is a feeling in some quarters that member countries should examine in NATO the methods of combating the massive anti-NATO propaganda made by Communists and others hostile to the Alliance. On the other hand, it is argued that this is a matter which must remain the prerogative of each government. Between the two points of view a compromise has been reached whereby NATO can act as a forum for consultation about psychological warfare. Such consultation is, however, restricted to matters affecting member countries only: NATO, as an international organization, has never envisaged carrying on propaganda to the peoples of the Soviet Union or of the satellite countries.

Here are some of the Information Division's initiatives, which have yielded good results:

1. **Tours of Journalists**: From time to time, parties of journalists from all member countries are assembled in Paris where, for a couple of days, they are briefed in the manifold activities of NATO. They then proceed under NATO auspices and with a NATO conducting officer to various countries of the Alliance. Up to the 1st July, 1954, there have been nineteen parties (making a total of over 250 journalists), and every member country, except the United States, has been visited. The coverage on the radio, in the newspapers and periodical press which has resulted from these tours has been encouraging and the tours are being continued throughout 1954.

2. **Fifth Anniversary**: The greatest efforts were made to take advantage of the publicity possibilities of the Fifth Anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on the 4th April, 1949. The Secretary General took part in a number of broadcasts and television programmes (including a special camera interview which formed the nucleus around which commemoration television programmes were made in a number of member countries), and the Information Division cooperated with the radio, television, film and press authorities in all member countries. The press results alone were impressive: almost 10,000 column inches of newsprint in the fourteen countries.

3. **NATO Caravan of Peace**: This is a large mobile exhibition which tells the story of NATO in graphic and pictorial form. After touring Italy, Greece and Turkey (where it was visited by over three million people) it was brought to France, opening in Strasbourg in September 1953. Since then it has been shown in the principal French cities, including Paris, and at the beginning of May, 1954, welcomed at Rennes its millionth visitor - a plumber. Smaller mobile exhibitions are on tour in Greece and Turkey; in the autumn one will visit Portugal.

4. **Films**: Although finance must limit NATO's use of this effective but costly medium, some progress has been made, largely thanks to the help of United States information agencies in Europe. For example, NATO has sponsored, with American help, a film of co-operation under the Treaty. This traces the Council’s work,
with particular emphasis on infrastructure. In the same way, a series of 14 films, under the general title 'The Atlantic Community – Know Your Allies' – one film on each member country – is being made for the use of educational groups and of the armed forces. NATO has also provided funds to make a revised version of the film ‘Alliance for Peace’, originally issued by SHAPE in 1951. This film, which will eventually be available in the languages of all member countries, shows why the Treaty had to be signed, describes the international command structure and NATO’s present military strength. Finally, late in 1953, a short documentary film featuring the Secretary General was made for troop information purposes.

5. NATO Letter and Handbook: Since the end of 1953 the Information Division has produced a monthly NATO Letter giving, in condensed form, news of current interest relating to NATO. It is intended primarily for journalists not living in Paris, for government authorities and other persons interested in following the activities of NATO. Mention should also be made of the NATO Handbook – the official ‘guide-book’ of the Organization – of which well over 100,000 copies a year are distributed, and of a simple picture-book called ‘Atlantic Alliance’. Some 250,000 copies of the latter, aimed at the schools and armed forces, have been published in all languages of the member countries. It was the first popular publication attempted by NATO and the response has been very encouraging.

6. Briefings and Talks: The Secretary General and senior members of the International Staff have given talks and briefings in all countries of the Alliance. By July, 1954, the Secretary General had made well over 100 speeches, broadcasts and television interviews, in addition to regular press conferences at Headquarters and during his visits to member countries.* Moreover, he and members of the Staff have given briefings to the United States National Defence College, the British War College, the French Ecole de Guerre, the Canadian War College and the NATO Defence College, as well as to several groups of parliamentarians and to various pro-NATO organizations.

TROOP INFORMATION AND MILITARY COMMUNITY RELATIONS

This brief review of some of the information work done at Headquarters would be incomplete without a mention of two closely related subjects which are of special interest to the Alliance. The first is the instruction of Allied officers and men in the purpose and work of NATO. The second is the promotion of good relations between Allied troops (and their families) and the populations of the member countries where they are stationed.

The Council have more than once debated these matters; and in October, 1953, about 70 experts from member countries and international commands met at the Palais de Chaillot to review the problems together.

With regard to troop information, the scores of pamphlets, photographs and other publications exhibited at the conference showed the wide range of work already being done by governments to educate their troops. Delegates were able to agree on a number of ways of improving programmes and instruction methods and they recommended that the NATO Information Division, in addition to its production, should serve as the centre for an exchange of troop information

* See Chapter VI.

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material between governments. This has been done; and it has resulted in a marked increase both in the volume of troop information exchanged between countries and in the space given to NATO in national publications for the armed forces.

One of the lessons of the last war was that the need for good relations between visiting troops and the people of the host country was of the first importance. The same is even more true today when thousands of Allied troops are stationed in other Allied countries in time of peace. This may cause some antagonism and misunderstanding, attributable on the part of the soldiers to the bewilderment of young men who find themselves living in countries with whose customs and language they are unfamiliar and, on the part of the civilian population, to ignorance of the reasons for the presence of foreign soldiery and to a feeling that they are responsible for all ills: the rise in the cost of rent, food and amusements and so forth. Careful teaching of visiting troops about the country in which they are stationed, and explanation to the local people of why they are there, can do much to change suspicion into tolerance and even friendship. In these days when the soldier is a citizen in uniform, the value of such understanding is immense not only at the time, but after the troops go home. Then every soldier can, by contributing to the understanding and sympathy of his compatriots for the ways of life of their Allies, effectively continue in his daily life to work for the good of the Atlantic Community.

Clearly, military community relations concern principally the host government and that of the visiting forces. But all governments can learn from one another’s experiences in matters such as language teaching, recreational activities, and orientation courses, to mention a few typical examples. The 1953 Conference was thus able to review the work being done by governments, international commands and voluntary societies and to make practical recommendations to the Council. So successful was this gathering that delegates were unanimous in proposing that a similar meeting should be held in the near future. The Council have decided that the next conference will meet early in 1955.

**NATO AND PARLIAMENTARIANS**

Another idea of interest to NATO is how to effect a closer relationship between the Organization and members of national legislatures. During the last two years, parties of parliamentarians from Denmark, France, Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom have visited the Palais de Chaillot and been fully informed of the problems and progress of NATO. Many parliamentary groups have also visited SHAPE.

Norway has always been particularly anxious to establish direct exchanges of views between parliamentarians and NATO. The Norwegian Foreign Minister, Dr. Lange, raised the matter as far back as the Ottawa session of the Council in 1951. In July, 1953, a parliamentary group from the Norwegian Storting visited NATO in Paris. In the following September the question of a closer association between parliamentarians and NATO was discussed at length at the privately sponsored Copenhagen Conference.

The International Staff have been delighted to receive these parliamentary groups and look forward to further visits. Should these national groups in course of time develop contacts between themselves and wish occasionally to hold a combined meeting, the International Staff would place all facilities at their disposal.
Official action is not of course the only way of making NATO known and understood. Private initiative may also do a great deal, and an encouraging feature is the growth in member states of voluntary associations in support of NATO. The rate of growth of such societies varies from one country to another. In the Scandinavian countries, for example, and in the Netherlands, pro-Atlantic groups are thriving; the same is true for Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The movement towards an association of pro-NATO societies was initiated by the British Society for International Understanding which as a first step organized in September, 1952, an Atlantic Community Study Conference at Oxford. As a result of this meeting an international Atlantic Committee was set up. It sponsored the Conference on the 'Defence of the Free World' which was arranged in Paris in June, 1953, by the Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère and organized, in co-operation with the Danish Society for the Atlantic Pact and Democracy, the Second International Study Conference on the Atlantic Community held at Copenhagen in the following September. More recently, on the 18th June, 1954, the constitution of an Atlantic Treaty Association was signed at a meeting of national Atlantic organizations held at The Hague.

Voluntary societies can help greatly in enlightening the general public about NATO and in developing a sense of community between the peoples of the fourteen Treaty countries. The Council's policy is to give such societies all possible support, without however attempting to run them or finance them. The value of such spontaneous enterprises would be diminished if they became too closely linked with either NATO or member governments.

RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

NATO, as we have seen, is in close touch with other international organizations. Among these are the Organization for European Economic Co-operation in Paris, the Council of Europe at Strasbourg, the International Labour Organization, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration – all at Geneva – and, of course, the Brussels Treaty Organization in London.

In the non-governmental field the International Staff have established valuable contacts with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. In November, 1952, in May, 1953, and in March, 1954, the leaders of this important body visited the Palais de Chaillot for informal conferences with the International Staff. Continuous liaison has thus been maintained between the two Secretariats, as well as regular exchange of information. A similar meeting was held in 1952 with the Federation of Christian Trade Unions.

THE FUTURE

The aspects of NATO's work sketched in this chapter demand the most patient and careful tending. Article 2 empowers the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty to find means of creating more effective economic and cultural ties with one another. NATO's modest efforts in the information field have been stressed because to a certain extent information must precede action and the people of the
fourteen countries will be prepared to support further co-operation under the Treaty only when they are convinced that, as co-operation has increased their security, so it can increase their well-being. Only modest beginnings have been made towards the development of an Atlantic Community; much remains to be done and Article 2 points to the direction which should be followed. There is undoubtedly a tendency to regard the implementation of that Article as entirely distinct from the defence build-up, and consequently of lesser immediate importance. Yet Article 2 contains the fundamental goals of the Treaty – the attainment by the fourteen countries of ‘conditions of stability and well-being’ and the ‘strengthening of their free institutions’. The military effort, urgent as that is, represents one of the means, but not all, to achieve that end. Should the risk of aggression become less pressing than it is today, it may be discovered that Article 2 is the real battlefield: if, by building up positions of strength we are able to avoid a third world war, then the contest between the free countries and the Communist totalitarian countries may be won by those who have been the most successful in solving their economic and social problems.

Can NATO then continue to concentrate almost exclusively on defence? Council communiqués and government statements have stressed that NATO should be used increasingly as an instrument of co-operation outside the military sphere, and that the provisions of the Treaty for ‘self-help and mutual aid’ should be applied not only to the military build-up but also to the peacetime problems of the Atlantic Community.

We touch here on one of the profound reasons why so many of the peoples of the member countries show moderate interest in NATO. They are ready to accept the Atlantic Alliance as a form of insurance policy against armed attack but they are not yet prepared to recognise it as a means of achieving progress in more fruitful fields of human endeavour. It is up to the Council to correct this error, by their common decisions and by their deeds. The work will be slow, uphill and often frustrating. But it is worth any effort to give our nations – and particularly younger generations – the feeling that the sacrifices they are making for their security will not, in any case, have been in vain. Whatever may be our future relations with the Soviet world, NATO should help to build up a healthy Atlantic Community offering conditions of greater wellbeing and happiness to all its citizens.


**APPENDIX I**

**CHRONICLE**

**1945**

**June 26**

The United Nations Charter is signed at San Francisco.

**1947**

**March 4**

France and the United Kingdom sign a 50-year Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance at Dunkirk.

**March 12**

President Truman delivers his message to Congress urging the United States of America 'to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure' (Truman Doctrine) and requesting the appropriation of direct financial aid to Greece and Turkey.

**June 5**

General of the Army George C. Marshall, United States Secretary of State, speaking at Harvard, announces a plan for the economic rehabilitation of Europe. This speech initiated the action which led to the European Recovery Programme.

**1948**

**January 22**

Mr. Ernest Bevin, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the House of Commons, proposes a form of Western Union.

**February 22**

The Communist Party in Czechoslovakia gains control of the government in Prague through a coup d'état.

**March 17**

The Brussels Treaty - a 50-year treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence - is signed by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

**April 11**

Secretary of State Marshall and Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett begin exploratory conversations with Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and Senator Tom Connally on security problems of the North Atlantic area.

**April 16**

The Convention for European Co-operation is signed by the Foreign Ministers of sixteen European countries and by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Western Zones of Occupation in Germany. The OEEC was set up under Article 1 of the Convention.

**June 11**

The United States Senate adopts Resolution 239, known as the 'Vandenberg Resolution'.

**July 6**

Mr. Lovett and the Ambassadors in Washington of the Brussels Treaty Powers and of Canada begin discussions about North Atlantic defence.

**September 27-28**

The Defence Ministers of the Brussels Treaty Powers decide to create a Western Union Defence Organization.

**October 25-26**

The Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers announce 'complete agreement on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic and on the next steps to be taken in this direction'.

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1948

1949
March 15 The negotiating Powers invite Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty.
March 18 The text of the North Atlantic Treaty is published.
March 31 The Soviet Government presents a memorandum to the twelve prospective signatories claiming that the Treaty is contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers.
April 2 The twelve governments repudiate the Soviet assertions in a common note.
April 4 The North Atlantic Treaty is signed in Washington by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and United States.
April 8 Texts published of requests by the Brussels Treaty Powers, Denmark, Italy and Norway for United States military and financial assistance.
August 24 The North Atlantic Treaty enters into effect upon the deposit in Washington of the final instruments of ratifications.
September 17 North Atlantic Council, first session, Washington (Chairman: Mr. Dean Acheson, United States).
October 6 Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 is signed by President Truman.
November 18 North Atlantic Council, second session, Washington (Chairman: Mr. Acheson).

1950
January 6 North Atlantic Council, third session, Washington (Chairman: Mr. Acheson).
January 27 President Truman approves the plan for the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area, thus releasing $900,000,000 of military aid funds.
May 9 The French Government proposes the creation of a single authority to control the production of steel and coal in France and Germany, open for membership to other countries (Schuman Plan).
May 15-18 North Atlantic Council, fourth session, London (Chairman: Mr. Acheson).
June 25 North Korean forces attack the Republic of South Korea.
August 1 Announcement is made in Ankara that the Turkish Government has decided to make formal application for Turkey's adhesion to the North Atlantic Treaty.

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1950

September 15-18  North Atlantic Council, fifth session, New York (Chairman: Mr. Acheson).

September 26  North Atlantic Council, fifth session, New York (continued).

October 2  Turkey accepts Council invitation to be associated with the military agencies of NATO in Mediterranean defence planning.

October 5  Greece accepts Council invitation to be associated with Mediterranean defence planning.

October 24  French Prime Minister, M. René Pleven, outlines to the National Assembly his plan for a European unified army, including German contingents, within the framework of NATO (Pleven Plan).

October 28-31  The NATO Defence Committee discusses the methods by which Germany might participate in the defence of Western Europe, and refers the political and military aspects of the problem to the Council Deputies and Military Committee respectively for further study.

December 18-19  North Atlantic Council, sixth session, Brussels (Chairman: M. Paul van Zeeland, Belgium).

December 19  The Council appoints General Dwight D. Eisenhower (United States) Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

December 19  The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, acting on the invitation of the North Atlantic Council at their sixth session, authorise the Allied High Commissioners in Western Germany to open discussions with the Federal Republic on a possible German contribution to the defence of Western Europe (Petersberg negotiations).

December 20  The Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers decide to merge the military organization of the Western Union into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

1951

January 24  The French Government announces it will convene a Conference to discuss the European Army Plan.

February 15  Conference on the setting up of a European Army opens in Paris.


April 18  Representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany sign a joint declaration formally setting up the European Coal and Steel Community.

May 3  The Council Deputies announce important changes in the top structure of NATO, namely the incorporation by the North Atlantic Council of the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee. The Council thus become the sole Ministerial body of the Organization.
1951

June 19 An agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Status of their Forces (Military Status Agreement) is signed in London by the Council Deputies on behalf of their governments.

July 8 The Petersberg negotiations are suspended.

July 24 The Paris Conference approves an interim report to governments, recommending the creation of a European Army. General Eisenhower agrees to co-operate in working out the military problems.

September 15-20 North Atlantic Council, seventh session, Ottawa (Chairman: M. van Zeeland).

September 20 Agreement signed in Ottawa on the Status of NATO, National Representatives and International Staff (Civilian Status Agreement).

October 9-11 Temporary Council Committee (TCC), first session, Paris. Executive Bureau (Three Wise Men) established.

October 17-22 Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey is signed in London by the Council Deputies acting on behalf of their governments.

November 19 Inauguration of the NATO Defence College, Paris.

November 24-28 North Atlantic Council, eighth session, Rome (Chairman: Mr. L. B. Pearson, Canada).

1952


February 18 Greece and Turkey accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.

February 20-25 North Atlantic Council, ninth session, Lisbon (Chairman: Mr. Pearson).

February 21 The Council decide to establish a Channel Command and appoint Admiral Sir Arthur John Power Commander-in-Chief.

March 12 Announcement is made of the appointment of Lord Ismay, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, as Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, and Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

April 4 Third anniversary of the signing of the Treaty. Lord Ismay takes office and the North Atlantic Council assume responsibility for the tasks hitherto performed by the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board and the Economic and Financial Board, the international staffs serving those agencies being amalgamated into one organization with headquarters in Paris.

April 10 Activation of Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

April 16 NATO opens its provisional Headquarters at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris.
The North Atlantic Council, now in permanent session, hold their first meeting in Paris. Appoint General Matthew B. Ridgway (United States) Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to succeed General Eisenhower.

The Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the German Federal Republic sign in Paris the Treaty setting up the European Defence Community. Representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty governments sign a Protocol to the Treaty on Guarantees given by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to the members of the European Defence Community.

North Atlantic Council meet in Ministerial session in Paris (Chairman: Mr. Ole Bjørn Kraft, Denmark).

A Treaty of 'friendship and collaboration' is signed in Ankara between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

North Atlantic Council meet in Ministerial session in Paris (Chairman: Lord Ismay).

The North Atlantic Council in Paris appoint General Alfred M. Gruenther (United States) to succeed General Ridgway as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Lord Ismay attends the Bermuda Conference (France, the United Kingdom, the United States) as observer for NATO.

The North Atlantic Council meet in Ministerial session in Paris (Chairman: M. Georges Bidault, France).

The North Atlantic Council appoint Admiral Jerauld Wright (United States) to succeed Admiral McCormick as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.

North Atlantic Council meet in Ministerial session in Paris (Chairman: M. Bidault, France).

Opening of the Geneva Conference, convened by France, the United Kingdom, the USSR and the United States for the purpose of reaching a settlement of the Korean problem and of considering the question of the re-establishment of peace in Indo-China.

In their reply to a Soviet note of March 31, France, the United Kingdom and the United States reject the USSR's bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Meeting, at The Hague, of the Constituent Conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association, sponsored by the International Atlantic Committee (representing pro-NATO voluntary organizations). The constitution of the Association is agreed upon.

M. Pierre Mendès France, French Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, becomes Chairman of the North Atlantic Council.
EXTRACTS FROM THE BRUSSELS TREATY
Brussels, 17th March 1948

The titular heads of the participating states:

Resolved to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations; To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage; To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united; To cooperate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery; To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression; To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression; To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;

Have appointed... their plenipotentiaries... who... have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Consultative Council referred to in Article VII as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organizations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organizations.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialised agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest,
relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialised agencies. They will endeavour to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

**Article III**

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

**Article IV**

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

**Article V**

All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

**Article VI**

The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any of the other High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

**Article VII**

For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will create a Consultative Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be
immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult
with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever
area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the
steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with
regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.

    . . . . . . . . . . . . .

    Article X

The present Treaty... shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last
instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years...
APPENDIX III

THE VANDENBERG RESOLUTION

Senate Resolution 239, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 11th June 1948

Whereas peace with justice and the defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international co-operation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of The Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

1. Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

2. Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

3. Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

4. Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

5. Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

6. If necessary, after adequate effort towards strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under Article 109 or by the General Assembly.
The Council established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty held its first session in Washington on September 17, 1949. Representatives of the Parties to the Treaty attending this first session were: For Belgium, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Paul van Zeeland; for Canada, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Lester B. Pearson; for Denmark, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gustav Rasmussen; for France, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Robert Schuman; for Iceland, the Minister to the United States, Mr. Thor Thors; for Italy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Sforza; for Luxembourg, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Josef Bech; for the Netherlands, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Dirk U. Stikker; for Norway, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Halvard M. Lange; for Portugal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. José Caeiro da Matta; for the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin; for the United States, the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson.

The task of the Council is to assist the Parties in implementing the Treaty and particularly in attaining its basic objective. That objective is to assist, in accordance with the Charter, in achieving the primary purpose of the United Nations – the maintenance of international peace and security. The Treaty is designed to do so by making clear the determination of the Parties collectively to preserve their common heritage of freedom and to defend themselves against aggression while emphasising at the same time their desire to live in peace with all governments and all peoples.

It is in this spirit that the Foreign Ministers of the Parties have met in Washington and have taken steps to implement the Treaty. The meetings of the Council showed that all Parties are united in their resolve to integrate their efforts for the promotion of lasting peace, the preservation of their common heritage and the strengthening of their common defence.

The main purpose of the Council during this first session was to provide for its own future operation and, in accordance with Article 9, to establish a Defence Committee and such other subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary to assist the Council in considering matters concerning the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Organization

The Council is the principal body in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In accordance with the Treaty, the Council is charged with the responsibility of considering all matters concerning the implementation of the provisions of the
Treaty. Such subsidiary bodies as are set up under Article 9 of the Treaty are subordinate to the Council.

The organization established under the North Atlantic Treaty should be operated with as much flexibility as possible and be subject to review from time to time. The establishment of this machinery does not preclude the use of other means for consultation and co-operation between any or all of the Parties on matters relating to the Treaty.

Council

As regards its own organization, the Council agreed as follows:

As decided on April 2, the Council will normally be composed of Foreign Ministers. Should the latter be unable to attend, their places shall be taken by plenipotentiary representatives designated by the Parties. To enable the Council to meet promptly at any time the diplomatic representatives in Washington of the Parties shall be empowered to act as their Governments' representatives whenever necessary.

Terms of Reference

The North Atlantic Treaty shall constitute the terms of reference of the Council.

Time and Frequency of Sessions

The Council shall be convened by the Chairman and shall meet in ordinary session annually and at such other times as may be deemed desirable by the majority of the Parties. Extraordinary sessions under Articles 4 and 5 of the Treaty may be called at the request of any Party invoking one of these Articles.

Location of the Council Sessions

The location of each session of the Council shall be determined by the Chairman after consultation with the other members of the Council. For general convenience the ordinary annual session should normally be held at about the same time and in the same general geographical area as the annual session of the General Assembly. Other ordinary sessions should whenever practicable be held at some convenient location in Europe.

Chairmanship

Chairmanship shall be held in turn by the Parties according to the alphabetical order in the English language beginning with the United States. Each Party shall hold office from the beginning of the one ordinary annual session until the appointment of the new Chairman at the following ordinary annual session. If any Party does not wish to accept the Chairmanship, it shall pass to the next Party in alphabetical order.

Languages

English and French shall be the official languages for the entire North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Permanent Co-ordination

Additional political bodies shall not be established unless and until experience has demonstrated their need. However, the existing informal arrangement for consultation between representatives in Washington of the Parties shall be maintained.

Defence Committee

The Council established a Defence Committee.

The Council reaffirmed that ensuring the security of the North Atlantic area is a primary objective of the North Atlantic Treaty and is vital to the security of each of the Parties. It is therefore of paramount importance that the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help, and mutual aid, maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. The Defence Committee should therefore immediately take the requisite steps to have drawn up unified defence plans for the North Atlantic area.

As regards the organization of the Defence Committee, the Council agreed as follows:

The Defence Committee will be composed of one representative from each Party. These representatives will normally be Defence Ministers. In any case where this is not possible, another representative may be designated.

Terms of Reference

The Defence Committee shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5 in accordance with general policy guidance given by the Council.

Time and Frequency of Sessions

The Defence Committee shall be convened by the Chairman and shall meet in ordinary session annually and at such other times as it may be requested to meet by the Council or as may be deemed desirable by the majority of the members of the Defence Committee.

Location

The location of each session of the Defence Committee shall be determined by the Chairman in consultation with the members of the Committee.

Chairmanship

Chairmanship shall be held in turn by the Parties according to the alphabetical order in the English language beginning with the United States. Each Party shall hold the office from the beginning of one ordinary annual session until the appointment of the new Chairman at the following ordinary annual session. If any Party does not wish to accept the Chairmanship, it shall pass to the next Party in alphabetical order.

The Council suggested to the Defence Committee the general outline of those subsidiary military bodies which it considered appropriate for the task of aiding the Defence Committee in recommending measures for the implementation of
Articles 3 and 5 of the Treaty. The Defence Committee was invited, among other things, to consider the question of these subsidiary bodies in detail and to elaborate on the general provisions suggested by the Council for each body.

The Council suggested in general terms that the military organization should include the following:

*Military Committee*

The Defence Committee should establish a Military Committee composed of one military representative from each Party. These representatives should be Chiefs-of-Staff or their representatives. (Iceland, having no military establishment, may, if it so desires, be represented by a civilian official.)

*Terms of Reference*

The Military Committee should:
- provide general policy guidance of a military nature to its Standing Group;
- advise the Defence Committee and other agencies on military matters as appropriate;
- recommend to the Defence Committee military measures for the unified defence of the North Atlantic area.

*Location*

The Military Committee should normally meet in Washington.

*Standing group*

In order to facilitate the rapid and efficient conduct of the work of the Military Committee, there should be set up a sub-committee of that body to be known as the 'Standing Group'. The Standing Group should be composed of one representative each of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

*Terms of Reference*

The Standing Group, in accordance with general policy guidance provided by the Military Committee, should provide such specific policy guidance and information of a military nature to the Regional Planning Groups and any other bodies of the organization as is necessary for their work.

To achieve the unified defence of the North Atlantic area, the Standing Group should co-ordinate and integrate the defence plans originating in the Regional Planning Groups, and should make appropriate recommendations thereon to the Military Committee.

The Standing Group should recommend to the Military Committee those matters on which the Standing Group should be authorised to take action in the name of the Military Committee within the framework of approved policy.

It is recognised that it is the responsibility of individual governments to provide for the implementation of plans to which they have agreed. It is further recognised that it is the primary responsibility of the Regional Planning Groups to prepare plans for the defence of their respective regions. Subject to these
principles, it is understood that before the Standing Group makes recommendations on any plan or course of action involving use of forces, facilities, or resources of a Party not represented on the Standing Group, going beyond or differing from arrangements previously agreed by the Party concerned, the Party should have the right to participate in the Standing Group in the work of formulating such recommendations. It is also understood that when communicating their regional plans to the Standing Group, the Regional Planning Groups should be entitled to have their plans presented and explained by any one of their members and not necessarily by a member of the Standing Group.

Time and Frequency of Sessions
The Standing Group should be so organized as to function continuously.

Location
The permanent site of the Standing Group should be in Washington.

Permanent Representation
In order to maintain close contact with the Standing Group, a Party not represented thereon may appoint a special representative to provide permanent liaison with the Standing Group.

Regional Planning Groups
In order to ensure speedy and efficient planning of the unified defence of the whole North Atlantic area there should be established Regional Planning Groups on a geographical basis. It should be provided that:

1. Before any Regional Planning Group makes any recommendations affecting the defence of the territory or involving the use of forces, facilities, or resources of any Party not a member of that Group, that Party should have the right to participate in the Group in the work of formulating such recommendations.

2. Any Group which considers that a Party not a member of the Group can contribute to the defence planning of that Group's region, can call upon that Party to join in the planning as appropriate.

Composition

Northern European Regional Planning Group
Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom.
The United States has been requested and has agreed to participate actively in the defence planning as appropriate.
Other Parties may participate under the provisions listed above.

Western European Regional Planning Group
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
Canada and the United States have been requested and have agreed to parti-
cipate actively in the defence planning as appropriate. Other Parties may, and particularly Denmark and Italy will, participate under the provisions listed above.

**Southern European-Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group**

France, Italy and the United Kingdom.

The United States has been requested and has agreed to participate actively in the defence planning as appropriate.

Other Parties may participate under the provisions listed above.

It is recognised that there are problems which are clearly common to the defence of the areas covered by the three European regional groups. It is therefore important that arrangements be made by the Defence Committee with a view to ensuring full co-operation between two, or if the need arises, all three groups.

**Canadian-United States Regional Planning Group**

Canada and the United States.

Other Parties may participate under the provisions listed above.

**North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group**

Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The responsibilities for planning the defences in the North Atlantic Ocean cannot be shared equally by all members of the Group. On the other hand, these responsibilities can to some extent be divided along functional lines and allocated to those Parties who are best able to perform the respective defence functions. Therefore, the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group, when it meets, should establish a series of planning sub-groups related to specific functions of defence. The Group should determine on which sub-group or sub-groups each Party should sit, and the arrangements necessary to ensure co-ordination between these sub-groups in the interest of speedy and effective planning.

**Terms of Reference**

Each Regional Planning Group should:

- develop and recommend to the Military Committee through the Standing Group plans for the defence of the region; co-operate with the other Regional Planning Groups with a view to eliminating conflict in, and ensuring harmony among, the various regional plans.

**Location**

The Defence Committee should consider the question of the location of the Regional Planning Groups.

The Council recognises that the question of military production and supply is an integral part of the whole problem of the defence of the North Atlantic area. Consequently, there shall be established as soon as possible appropriate machinery to consider these matters. The details of organization of this machinery,
terms of reference, etc. shall be studied forthwith by a working group which shall submit recommendations to the Defence Committee or to the Council.

The Council recognises the importance of economic and financial factors in the development and implementation of military plans for the defence of the North Atlantic area. Consequently, there shall be established as soon as possible appropriate machinery to consider these matters. The details of organization of this machinery, terms of reference, etc. shall be studied forthwith by a working group which shall submit recommendations to the Council.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Second Session, November 18, 1949, Washington

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The North Atlantic Council convened today in Washington in its second session. The Council considered and approved a report of the Working Group on the establishment of a ‘Defence Financial and Economic Committee’ under the North Atlantic Treaty as follows:

Defence Financial and Economic Committee

In accordance with the decision of the North Atlantic Council on September 17, 1949, and in further implementation of Article 9 of the Treaty, there is hereby established a Defence Financial and Economic Committee. It shall be responsible for advising the Council on the financial and economic aspects of measures for the defence of the North Atlantic area.

The following general provisions shall govern the operation of the Defence Financial and Economic Committee:

1. The Defence Financial and Economic Committee shall be composed of a representative at a Ministerial or similarly high level of responsibility from each signatory country. It shall report directly to the North Atlantic Council. It shall consult with the Defence Committee as appropriate.

2. The Committee and any subordinate bodies which it may set up shall establish and maintain close working relations with the North Atlantic military organization, and particularly the Military Production and Supply Board.

The Committee or its subordinate bodies shall provide them with guidance on all relevant economic and financial factors; shall obtain from them information on those requirements of defence programmes which are relevant to the consideration of economic and financial questions; and shall provide them with guidance on financial and economic arrangements to meet the requirements of defence programmes.

3. The Defence Financial and Economic Committee is in particular responsible to the North Atlantic Council for the performance of the following functions, having regard for the principle of self-help
and mutual aid in the field of military production and supply, and for the primary importance of economic recovery and continued economic stability:

(a) To develop in co-operation with the Military Committee (including the Standing Group) and the Military Production and Supply Board overall financial and economic guides to and limits of future defence programmes, including military production programmes, which North Atlantic Treaty countries as a group and individually should undertake within available financial and economic resources.

(b) To appraise the financial and economic impact on member countries of major individual defence projects formulated by the Military Production and Supply Board or the Military Committee (including the Standing Group), including consideration of financing problems and availability of raw materials, capital equipment, and manpower, and, on the basis of such review, make recommendations as to action on such projects.

(c) To recommend financial arrangements for executing military defence plans, and particularly financial arrangements for the interchange among North Atlantic Treaty countries of military equipment, surplus stocks, or materials and equipment to be used in producing military equipment.

(d) To measure and to recommend steps to meet the foreign exchange costs of imports of materials and equipment from non-member countries required by defence programmes under the North Atlantic Treaty.

(e) To consider, as may be found desirable and appropriate, plans for the mobilisation of economic and financial resources in time of emergency.

4. The Committee may delegate to any Regional Defence Financial and Economic Committee which may be established by the governments of a Region any of its functions which, in its judgment, can be better performed by regional committees. Actions of regional committees under such delegations shall be under the general guidance of, and in accordance with the general policies laid down by the North Atlantic Committee, and shall be subject to its co-ordination and review.

5. The Committee shall provide itself with such subordinate bodies and staff assistance as may be necessary to carry out its functions. In particular, there shall be a permanent working staff in London, composed of qualified personnel representing interested countries to carry on the day-to-day work of the Committee and to which the Committee may delegate such of its functions as it deems appropriate. The Committee shall have a Secretary, with suitable assistance, to perform the secretarial and administrative functions.

6. The Committee shall meet at such times and places as shall be required. Its secretariat and working staff shall be located in London. The Committee shall decide its own rules of procedure. Chairmanship shall be held in turn by the Parties according to the alphabetical order in the English language beginning with the United States. Each Party shall hold the office for one year. If any Party does not
wish to accept the Chairmanship, it shall pass to the next party in alphabetical order.

The Council took note of and approved the action of the Defence Committee in establishing a ‘Military Production and Supply Board’. The Military Production and Supply Board has already met in London in its first session and has initiated a work programme which was summarised in a communiqué issued in London on November 2.

The directive issued by the Defence Committee in establishing the Military Production and Supply Board, and approved by the Council, is as follows:

**North Atlantic Defence Committee Directive to the Military Production and Supply Board**

In accordance with the decision of the North Atlantic Council on September 17, 1949, and in furtherance of Article 9 of the Treaty, there is hereby established a Military Production and Supply Board.

The following general provisions shall govern the operation of the North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board:

1. The North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board shall be composed of a representative at the sub-ministerial level from each signatory country. It shall report directly to the Defence Committee.

2. The Board shall establish and maintain close working relations with the appropriate military bodies set up under the Defence Committee. It shall look to them for information on military requirements and work with them to insure that, insofar as feasible, the military production and procurement programme supports defence plans effectively. The Board shall also work in close co-ordination with the military bodies on the promotion of standardisation of parts and end products of military equipment, and provide them with technical advice on the production and development of new or improved weapons. To facilitate the fullest co-operation and exchange of information between them on matters of joint interest, the Board shall establish and direct a suitably representative liaison group on a working level in Washington to work with the Standing Group.

3. The Board shall maintain close working relations with the finance and economic machinery to be established by the Council, and look to it for guidance on all relevant economic and financial factors.

4. The North Atlantic Military Production and Supply Board is responsible to the Defence Committee for the performance of the following functions, having regard for the principle of self-help and mutual aid in the field of military production and supply.
   (a) The review of the military supply situation on the basis of data to be secured from the appropriate military bodies on military material requirements and on the current availability of military material to meet such requirements.
   (b) The recommendation to the Defence Committee of ways and means of increasing available supplies where they fall short of requirements, either from production, surplus equipment or equipment economically capable of rehabilitation. In preparing
such recommendations, account shall be taken of strategic factors, of physical capabilities of individual countries to produce military material, of the importance of securing maximum efficiency and integration of production, and of the guidance furnished by the finance and economic machinery with respect to financial and economic considerations.

(c) The promotion of more efficient methods of producing military equipment and of the standardisation of parts and end products of military equipment, including conservation in the use of strategic and critical materials, and including advice to the appropriate military bodies on the production problems involved in proposed new weapons or modifications in existing weapons.

5. The Board may delegate to any Regional Supply Board which may be established by the governments of a Region any of its functions which in its judgment, can be better performed by regional boards. Actions of regional boards under such delegations shall be under the general guidance of and in accordance with the general policies laid down by the North Atlantic Board, and shall be subject to its coordination and review.

6. The Board shall provide itself with such subordinate bodies and staff assistance as may be necessary to carry out its functions. In particular, there shall be, in addition to the liaison group in Washington, referred to in paragraph 2, a permanent working staff in London, composed of qualified personnel representing interested countries, to carry on the day-to-day work of the Board. The Board shall have a Secretary, with suitable assistance, to perform secretarial and administrative functions.

7. The Board shall meet at such times and places as may be required. Its secretariat and working staff shall be located in London. The Board shall decide its own rules of procedure. Chairmanship shall be held in turn by the parties according to the alphabetical order in the English language beginning with the United States. Each Party shall hold the office for one year. If any party does not wish to accept the Chairmanship, it is passed to the next Party in alphabetical order.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Third Session, January 6, 1950, Washington

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The North Atlantic Council met today in Washington in its third session. The United States was represented by the Secretary of State Acheson, who is Chairman for the first year of the Council's operation. Representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty signatories were: For Belgium, Ambassador Silvercruys; for Canada, Ambassador Wrong; for Denmark, Ambassador de Kauffman; for France, Ambassador Bonnet; for Iceland, Minister Thors; for Italy, Ambassador Tarchiani; for Luxembourg, Minister Le Gallais; for the Netherlands, Ambassador
van Kleffens; for Norway, Ambassador Morgenstierne; for Portugal, Ambassador Pereira; for the United Kingdom, Ambassador Franks.

The Council considered and approved recommendations agreed by the Defence Committee in Paris on December first for the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area. These recommendations embody the principles of self-help and mutual aid and will provide the basis for the common defence of the Parties.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL


FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

At the fourth session of the Atlantic Council in London the Foreign Ministers of the 12 nations of the North Atlantic Treaty considered the principles on which their association is founded and the objectives toward which they are working.

They reaffirmed the adherence of their governments to the principles which inspire the United Nations Charter and their conviction that common action under the Treaty is an integral part of the effort which all free nations are making to secure conditions of world peace and human welfare.

They are determined that freedom, which is the common basis of their institutions, shall be defended against every threat of aggression or subversion, direct or indirect. Freedom means the independence of nations, the respect for spiritual values, and the dignity of man. Only a free society can guarantee to the individual, the benefits of economic and social betterment.

They are resolved to secure the economic progress and prosperity of the peoples of their countries and to promote the economic and social development of other peoples of the free world through close co-operation with each other and with other nations. To the immense resources of the free world, and its industrial and scientific development, the peoples of the North Atlantic Community bring the spiritual strength which comes from freedom.

Conscious of the strength and of the will to peace of their countries, the Ministers remain ready to seize any opportunity for achieving a genuine and lasting settlement of international problems: but for so long as some nations are not willing to co-operate on a basis of equality and mutual respect, they believe that the maintenance of peace and the defence of freedom require the organization of adequate military defence.

The nations of the Atlantic Council are accordingly resolved, by their united efforts, to build up a system of defence equipped with modern weapons and capable of withstanding any external threat directed against any of them.

The Council throughout its deliberations recognised that only through coordinated planning and joint effort could these objectives be achieved.

To this end the Council took the following decisions to improve the functioning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to guide its future work.

1. They decided to establish, by the appointment of Deputies, mechanism to permit the Council fully to discharge its role as the principal and directing body of the North Atlantic Treaty. The full text of the Council resolution on this subject is attached.

2. The Council in this connection agreed on principles which should
guide the work of the Deputies and of the other organizations of the North Atlantic Treaty.

3. The Council, having considered the reports of the Defence Committee, and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee, issued directives to guide them in their future work. These directives emphasise that the problem of adequate military forces and the necessary financial costs should be examined as one and not as separate problems.

In formulating their directives the Council proceeded on the basis that the combined resources of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty are sufficient, if properly co-ordinated and applied, to ensure the progressive and speedy development of adequate military defence without impairing the social and economic progress of these countries.

4. The Council recognising the indispensability of self-help and mutual aid among the Treaty Powers in making progress towards an integrated defence, and convinced that further mutual assistance is essential to rapid progress towards the strength required for the common security of the North Atlantic area, recommended that each Party make its full contribution through mutual assistance in all practicable forms.

5. The Council unanimously agreed that if adequate military defence of the member countries is to be achieved it must be along the lines of the most economical and effective utilisation of the forces and material at the disposal of the North Atlantic countries. They accordingly urged their governments to concentrate on the creation of balanced collective forces in the progressive build-up of the defence of the North Atlantic area, taking at the same time fully into consideration the requirements for national forces which arise out of commitments external to the North Atlantic area.

6. In furtherance of Article 9 of the Treaty the Council established a North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping to be composed of representatives of the participating countries concerned. This Board will report directly to the Council and will work in close cooperation with other bodies of the Treaty Organization in all matters relating to the factor of merchant shipping in defence planning.

The Ministers believe that the decisions they have taken here in London represent a marked advance towards the practical realisation of the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Resolution

The North Atlantic Council established in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty has so far only met twice at the Ministerial level and on two other occasions when members of the Council have been represented by their governments’ diplomatic representatives in Washington.

But under Article 9 the Council is the principal body of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is therefore the paramount duty of the Council to put itself in a position to exercise its full role as the central and most important of the various organs of the Treaty by taking the most effective steps to keep itself informed of all matters which fall within its competence, by taking the necessary decisions and by ensuring the execution of such decisions.

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A year's experience has shown that on the political side the meetings of the Council have been too infrequent to permit a sufficient exchange of views on matters of common interest within the scope of the Treaty. On the military side the strategic concept of the Treaty has been adopted and a defence plan drawn up, and the corresponding estimate of the necessary forces is being established. The next step is to put these plans into effect by taking further measures in the direction of common defence, the division of financial responsibilities and the adaptation and development of the necessary forces.

In view of this situation, the Council will in particular undertake the following tasks:

(a) study the inter-relationship of the various programmes to support the plans for the defence of the North Atlantic area and ensure coordination of the work of the Defence Committee, the Defence Financial and Economic Committee, and all other bodies established under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

(b) recommend to governments the steps necessary to ensure that effect is given to the co-ordinated plans prepared for the defence of the North Atlantic area;

(c) exchange views on political matters of common interest within the scope of the Treaty;

(d) promote and co-ordinate public information in furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty while leaving responsibility for national programmes to each country;

(e) consider what further action should be taken under Article 2 of the Treaty, taking into account the work of existing agencies in this field.

To enable the Council effectively to carry out its responsibilities and to exercise them continuously, each government will appoint a Deputy to its Council representative. Each Deputy will be in a position to give whatever time may be necessary to ensure that the responsibilities of the Council are carried out effectively.

In the intervals between meetings of Ministers, the Deputies duly authorised by their respective governments, will be responsible, on behalf of and in the name of the Council, for carrying out its policies and for formulating issues requiring decisions by the member governments.

To assist the Council in fulfilling its responsibilities the Deputies, on behalf of their governments, shall select a Permanent Chairman from among their membership. With the advice of the Chairman, the Deputies shall establish a suitable full-time organization composed of highly qualified persons contributed by member governments. The Chairman, in addition to presiding at meetings of the Deputies, shall be responsible for directing the organization and its work.

Member governments will appoint their Deputies with the least possible delay in order that a Chairman may be selected, the organization established, and progress be made on the urgent problems before the Council. The Deputies, assisted by the Chairman and the organization to be created, should begin functioning in the very near future in order that tangible results may be achieved before the next meeting of the Ministers when the progress made will be reviewed. Without minimising the importance of any of the points listed above, first priority in the work of the organization should be given to points (a) and (b).

The Deputies will have their headquarters in London.
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Fifth Session, September 16-18, 1950, New York

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The North Atlantic Council has devoted its three-day meeting to a thorough discussion of the major questions presented by the urgent need to strengthen collective defence. The Council was determined to proceed with the necessary measures to this end. The discussions dealt with matters of far-reaching importance and related principally to the creation, in the shortest possible time, of an integrated military force adequate for the defence of freedom in Europe, and to the related questions of the character of participation in the force, its military organization and matters of supply, finance and raw materials. The proposal for such a force supported by appropriate supply and financial arrangements, based on collective effort, was warmly welcomed and it was decided that the Ministers should promptly consult their governments as to the way in which such a plan could be put into effect. Many of the problems involve considerations of a character which make such consultations necessary so as to enable definite decisions to be taken promptly.

To permit these consultations to take place, the Council has recessed subject to call by the Chairman during the next two weeks.

Fifth Session (resumed), September 26, 1950, New York

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The North Atlantic Council reconvened today to resume discussions. The Council has been in recess since Monday, September 18. During the interval of this recess the Foreign Ministers have been in consultation with their governments.

The Council agreed upon the establishment at the earliest possible date of an integrated force under centralised command, which shall be adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe.

The concept of the integrated force approved by the Council is based upon the following principles:

1. The force will be organized under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and will be subject to political and strategic guidance exercised by the appropriate agencies of that organization.

2. The force will be under a Supreme Commander who will have sufficient delegated authority to ensure that national units allocated to his command are organized and trained into an effective integrated force in time of peace as well as in the event of war.

3. The Supreme Commander will be supported by an international staff representing all nations contributing to the force.

4. Pending the appointment of a Supreme Commander there is to be appointed a Chief-of-Staff who will have responsibility for training and organization.

5. The Standing Group of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be responsible for higher strategic direction of the integrated force.
The finalisation by the Council of the arrangements for the integrated force must await the recommendations of the Defence Committee on the following points:

The Council has requested the Defence Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to work out the organization of the integrated force and to recommend the steps necessary to bring this force into being at the earliest possible time. The Council has also requested the Defence Committee to consider changes and simplifications required in the military structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and related military organizations and to consider how best to ensure the necessary close working relationship between the Standing Group and the member governments not represented on it.

The Council agreed that in order to bring the integrated force into effective being all available manpower and productive resources should be fully utilised for the defence of Western Europe. To this end the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will consider the precise character and composition of the forces to be allocated to the integrated force by member governments. Decisions regarding the allocation of such forces will be sought from member governments at an early date.

The utilisation of German manpower and resources was discussed in the light of views recently expressed by democratic leaders in Germany and elsewhere. The Council was in agreement that Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defence of Western Europe, and noting that the Occupying Powers were studying the matter, requested the Defence Committee to make recommendations at the earliest possible date as to the methods by which Germany could most usefully make its contribution.

In accordance with the policy of annual rotation of the Chairmanship the Foreign Minister of Belgium, The Honourable Paul Van Zeeland, has assumed the Chairmanship of the Council for the coming year.

In adjourning their meeting the Ministers reaffirmed the unity of the free peoples which they represent in their common determination to preserve the peace, the security and the freedom of the Atlantic community.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Sixth Session, December 18-19, 1950, Brussels

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The North Atlantic Council acting on recommendations of the Defence Committee today completed the arrangements initiated in September last for the establishment in Europe of an integrated force under centralised control and command. This force is to be composed of contingents contributed by the participating governments.

The Council yesterday unanimously decided to ask the President of the United States to make available General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Commander. Following receipt this morning of a message from the President of the United States that he had made General Eisenhower available, the Council appointed him. He will assume his command and establish his headquarters in Europe early in the New Year. He will have the authority to train the national units assigned to his command and to organize them into an effective integrated defence force. He will be supported by an international staff drawn from the nations contributing to the force.
The Council, desiring to simplify the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in order to make it more effective, asked the Council Deputies to initiate appropriate action. In this connection the Defence Committee, meeting separately on 18th December, had already taken action to establish a Defence Production Board with greater powers than those of the Military Production and Supply Board which it supersedes. The new Board is charged with expanding and accelerating production and with furthering the mutual use of the industrial capacities of the member nations.

The Council also reached unanimous agreement regarding the part which Germany might assume in the common defence. The German participation would strengthen the defence of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Council invited the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to explore this matter with the Government of the German Federal Republic.

The decisions taken and the measures contemplated have the sole purpose of maintaining and consolidating peace. The North Atlantic nations are determined to pursue this policy until peace is secure.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Seventh Session, September 15-20, 1951, Ottawa

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The North Atlantic Council has concluded its seventh session, in which for the first time the member governments were represented by Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and Economic or Finance Ministers. The new composition of the Council reflects the wide fields in which co-ordination is being steadily developed.

In an exchange of views on the world situation, note was taken of the growing confidence and strength of the Atlantic Community in a world of continuing tension. The Council was informed by the Occupying Powers of the progress of discussions directed toward the establishment of a new relationship with the German Federal Republic. It was also informed of the statement made by the three Foreign Ministers after their meeting in Washington in which they welcomed the plan for a European Defence Community of which Germany would form part.

The Council, considering that the security of the North Atlantic area would be enhanced by the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, agreed to recommend to the member governments that, subject to the approval of national parliaments under their respective legislative procedures, an invitation should be addressed as soon as possible to the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to accede to the Treaty.

The Council considered the reports submitted by the military and civilian agencies of the Treaty Organization:

(a) The Standing Group reported on the establishment and development of the integrated force under General Eisenhower and progress on other military matters.

(b) The Defence Production Board reported on the problems relating
to the further development of production and recommended means of dealing with these problems.

(c) The Financial and Economic Board presented a report analysing the economic and financial impact of the NATO defence effort with special reference to the equitable sharing of the burden.

(d) The Council Deputies, the permanent working body of The Treaty Organization, reported on their activities in political, organization, and administrative matters and in developing closer co-ordination between the Treaty agencies.

(e) The Chairman of the Council Deputies summarised the major issues before the Organization and suggested action to meet them.

As a result of the study of these reports, the Council issued guidance and directives to the respective agencies concerning their future work.

All member governments recognise as their joint aim the building up of defence forces to a sufficient level of strength, and the no less important objective of a sound and stable economy necessary to support that effort. The reports of the Defence Production Board and of the Financial and Economic Board, and the discussion thereon, have indicated a number of difficulties in the production and economic fields. The member countries recognise the need to surmount such difficulties in order to assure the continued progress of their efforts to strengthen the free world. The Council has noted the danger of inflation, the burdens which increased defence efforts place on the balance of payments, and the obstacles to an adequate defence arising from price and allocation pressures on raw material supplies. The Ministers recognised that the common effort requires a common attack upon these problems, and agreed to take such action severally and jointly as they deem appropriate to find solutions to them.

Accordingly a temporary committee of the Council was established to survey urgently the requirements of external security, and particularly of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defence of Western Europe, and the realistic political-economic capabilities of the member countries, with a view to determining possible courses of action for their reconciliation so as to achieve the most effective use of the resources of the member countries.

The Council received reports from the member governments on the status of the defence effort in their countries and referred them to the military agencies and appropriate commands for study and recommendations to improve the early effectiveness and availability of forces.

The Council noted that agreement has been reached on the financing of an 'infrastructure' programme of airfields, communications, and certain installations for the support of forces. These projects will continue without delay.

The Council has issued a separate statement making clear the importance which the member governments attach to the development of the Atlantic community, not only to safeguard their freedom and common heritage on an equal footing but also to strengthen their free institutions and to advance the well-being of their peoples. The statement announced the establishment of a ministerial committee to study and recommend lines of future action toward these objectives.

The Council resolved that, in order to develop more effective unity of action, and in accordance with its duties as the institution for forming the policy and directing the operations of the Treaty Organization, its meetings would be held more frequently and at more regular intervals. In order to continue progress on the problems discussed at the Seventh Session, it was agreed that the question of
the date of the next meeting of the Council, which will be held in Rome, would be referred to the Council Deputies for decision.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Eighth Session, November 24-28, 1951, Rome

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The North Atlantic Council has today concluded its eighth session in Rome. It was a regular meeting of the Council held in accordance with the policy announced at Ottawa of holding frequent meetings to exchange views and to develop more effective unity of action on a continuing basis. The meeting was the first held under the Chairmanship of the Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Minister for External Affairs, and was attended by twenty-eight ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Defence.

Pending parliamentary approval of the decision to invite Greece and Turkey to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty, representatives of those two countries attended the plenary meetings of the Council as observers.

The Council considered progress reports from its military and civilian agencies. It instructed the pertinent agencies to put into action certain recommendations of the reports and to continue their work on others with a view to reporting further at the next session of the Council.

The Chairman and one Vice-Chairman of the Temporary Council Committee informed the Council of the progress of the Committee’s work directed towards the reconciliation of military requirements with political-economic capabilities. They stated that the Committee’s final report and recommendations would be presented early in December for the consideration of member governments and the Council at its next session.

The Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs-of-Staff of member countries, met in Rome before the Council Meeting. The Council considered the reports of the Military Committee, including one on the readiness and effectiveness of NATO forces. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and his Chief-of-Staff made oral statements. The Council exchanged views and took decisions on various military matters dealt with in these reports.

The North Atlantic Council received statements with respect to the status of negotiations for the establishment of a European Defence Community, and the status of negotiations with the German Federal Republic concerning the contractual arrangements to replace the occupation statute.

The Council adopted a resolution expressing its hope that the Paris Conference would conclude its activities at the earliest possible moment so that a definitive report could be made to the Council for consideration at its next meeting.

The resolution requested the appropriate North Atlantic Treaty agencies in the meantime to give early attention to the problem of correlating the obligations and relationships of the European Defence Community with those of the North Atlantic Treaty so that discussions with the Paris Conference on this question may be held and concluded as soon as possible.

The Council approved an interim report submitted by the Committee on the North Atlantic Community (consisting of representatives of Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway).
The report stressed the importance of further developing the habit of consultation on matters of common concern. The Council directed that fuller study be given to a number of proposals relating to economic, social and cultural matters and to the co-ordination of the activities of NATO civilian agencies with those of other international organizations. In this connection the Council recommended that particular consideration be given to facilitating the movement of labour from member countries with excess manpower to others where it could be effectively utilised.

The Council directed the Committee to continue its work.

The Council agreed that its next meeting should be held in Lisbon on February 2nd, 1952.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Ninth Session, February 20-25, 1952, Lisbon

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The ninth session of the North Atlantic Council was held in Lisbon from February 20th to February 25th 1952, under the Chairmanship of the Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs.

On February 18th, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey acceded to the Treaty, and representatives of their respective governments attended throughout the session. In all, thirty-five Ministers of fourteen countries took part in the discussions of the Council.

The Council made further progress in dealing with current and long-range problems of the Atlantic Community. The decisions taken and the agreements reached by the Council are the practical result of projects initiated at earlier sessions and reflect the continuing work of the Treaty agencies. They represent the united efforts of member governments to safeguard the peace, stability and well-being of the North Atlantic Community through the strengthening of their collective defence.

The Council took note of a report of the Paris Conference on the European Defence Community and a report by the Occupying Powers on the proposed contractual arrangements with the German Federal Republic. The Council found that the principles underlying the Treaty to establish the European Defence Community conformed to the interests of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. It also agreed on the principles which should govern the relationship between the proposed Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The North Atlantic Council agreed to propose to its members and to the European Defence Community reciprocal security undertakings between the members of the two organizations. Such undertakings would require ratification in accordance with the constitutional processes of the states involved. All these decisions are inspired by the conviction that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defence Community have a common objective, to strengthen the defence of the Atlantic area, and that the development of the European Defence Community should be carried forward in this spirit. Therefore, the Council considered that the obligations and relationships between the Communities should be based on the concept of two closely related organizations, one working,
so far as this objective is concerned, within the framework of, and reinforcing the other.

The Council took detailed and comprehensive action based on the recommendations of the Temporary Council Committee. The decisions taken by the Council provided for the earliest building-up of balanced collective forces to meet the requirements of external security within the capabilities of member countries. Agreement was reached on the specific defensive strength to be built this year, and on a definite programme of measures to be taken this year to increase defensive strength in following years. A number of important steps were agreed to be taken by the Treaty Organization and by member governments to accomplish this building-up with a more efficient use of resources. Policies designed to maintain and strengthen the economies and social stability of member countries were agreed and recommended to governments.

Agreement was reached on the financing of a further portion of the infrastructure programme, for airfields, communications and headquarters.

The terms of reference of the Standing Group and of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers in Europe, were revised to reflect added responsibilities, notably for equipment priorities and planning for the logistical support of the military forces.

The Council agreed that the ground and air forces of Greece and Turkey assigned to NATO will operate under the overall command of SACEUR through Commander-in-Chief, Southern Europe. The naval forces of Greece and Turkey will remain for the present under their national Chiefs-of-Staff, operating in close co-ordination with all other naval forces in the Mediterranean. The Standing Group was directed to continue its study of command of naval forces in the Mediterranean area and their co-ordination with land and air forces and to submit a definitive report to the Council at its next meeting.

The Council also took action to adapt the Treaty Organization to the needs arising from the development of its activities from the planning to the operational stage. The North Atlantic Council, while continuing to hold periodic Ministerial Meetings, will henceforth function in permanent session through the appointment of Permanent Representatives. The Council decided to appoint a Secretary General, who will head a unified international secretariat designed to assist the Council in the fulfilment of its increasing responsibilities. All civilian activities of the Organization will be concentrated in the geographical area where are situated other international agencies whose work is closely related to that of the Treaty Organization and with which close administrative connection is essential to efficiency. These are presently situated in the vicinity of Paris. When these changes become effective, the Council will assume the functions hitherto performed by the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board, and the Financial and Economic Board.

The Council adopted a report of the Atlantic Community Committee, established at its Ottawa Meeting. This report emphasised the importance of economic co-operation, the expansion and liberalisation of trade, and the possibility of working out closer co-operative arrangements with other bodies, particularly the OEEC. In approving the analysis of the problem of the movement of labour between member countries in the report of the Atlantic Community Committee, the Council acknowledged the importance of this problem and endorsed the resolution of the Temporary Council Committee on this subject. It was agreed that the permanent North Atlantic Treaty Organization should keep this problem under continuous review, and make recommendations for the elimination, by the
most effective utilisation of manpower resources, of general or specific manpower shortages which hinder defence production. As co-operation in the field covered by the Five Power Atlantic Community Committee is of direct and common concern to each member of the Council, it was decided that the future work in this sphere should be transferred to the Council.

The Council issued a Declaration reaffirming the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the promotion of peace through defensive strength and enduring progress.

MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

December 15-17, 1952, Paris

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council ended in Paris today. The Chairman was Mr. Ole Bjorn Kraft, Foreign Minister of Denmark. It was attended by thirty-two Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Economics and Defence.

The Council received a progress report by the Secretary General, which outlined the structure of the International Secretariat. It described the work accomplished in the last eight months by the Council, meeting regularly through the Permanent Representatives, and the development of close working relations between NATO's civilian and military authorities. It also dealt with the constructive work of the Council's Committee on Civil Defence, and of those concerned with non-military aspects of the Treaty covered by Article 2, such as over-population and social, cultural and informational matters.

After taking note of Lord Ismay's report, the Council adopted a resolution (the text of which is issued with this communiqué) periodically to review the Organization's work under Article 2 of the Treaty.

In parallel with the Secretary General's report, the Council considered a progress report prepared by the Military Committee. This report showed a great advance in the training and effectiveness of the various national forces assigned to the Supreme Commanders. Combined land, air and sea manoeuvres had shown a marked improvement in co-operation between units as well as at the staff level. The report also showed a substantial advance in the standardisation of international military procedures, notably in signals.

The Council approved proposals from the Military Committee for the establishment of a Mediterranean Command, so completing the European Command structure for the defence of the North Atlantic area. Admiral Lord Mountbatten has been appointed.

The Council considered the Strategic Guidance submitted to them by the Military Committee, which took account of the accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO. In approving it the Council reaffirmed their determination to defend all the territories and peoples of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

The Council also had the benefit of statements from the Supreme Allied Command Europe, and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. General Ridgway paid tribute to the high quality of the forces under his Command but emphasised that only by a continuing increase in the forces assigned to him would he be able
to carry out his responsibilities. Consequently, there could be no relaxation; on the contrary, every effort must be made to increase NATO armed strength as rapidly as possible. Admiral McCormick spoke in similar vein.

Against this background the Council then considered the first report on the Annual Review for 1952. They noted with satisfaction that the increase in forces agreed to at Lisbon had been substantially achieved by the end of 1952, and that it was planned to make further individual and collective efforts in 1953 to increase, improve and strengthen the forces now in being. At the same time they recognised that strong defence requires a healthy economy.

For the future, the Council directed that more emphasis should be given to increasing the effectiveness of the forces of the Alliance and the units necessary for their support rather than to the provision of greater numbers, to the extent that resources were not available for both tasks. The Council noted the progress being made in the co-ordination of production of defence equipment and directed that further study be given to this and to further standardisation in this field. The Council also welcomed the assistance given to European production by United States offshore procurement contracts.

Agreement was reached on the financing of a further portion of the infrastructure programme for airfields, communications and jet fuel supplies, to the amount of approximately £ 80 million.

During the past eight months, the Council have regularly exchanged views and information on political problems affecting their common interests. At this meeting the Council paid particular attention to the struggle in Indo-China, to the European Defence Community Treaty, and to the situation in Eastern Germany. They noted in particular that, despite the Soviet Union’s repeated declarations favouring a German peace treaty and German unification, no reply had been received to the proposals of the United Kingdom, France and the United States sent three months ago. The Council also received a progress report upon the work of the Interim Commission of the European Defence Community. The Council adopted resolutions (the texts of which have already been released) on Indo-China and the European Defence Community.

It was agreed that the next Ministerial Meeting of the Council should be held as early as possible in the spring of 1953, when its first task will be to consider the final report on the Annual Review for 1952.

In the course of the present Meeting, the Council considered the present situation of the Atlantic Community and its prospects for the future. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, fourteen sovereign states have developed a degree of voluntary co-operation without precedent in history. By combining their resources and their knowledge, by sharing the material burden of defence, by the constant practice of mutual consultation and mutual assistance, member states have already increased their common strength, understanding and unity.

Member governments are more than ever convinced that the course they have chosen is the best way of protecting their free society from direct or indirect Communist attempts to overwhelm it. Such improvement as has taken place in the general international situation can be attributed to the efforts which member governments have made in increasing their collective strength since the foundation of the Alliance. If there were any relaxation in these efforts, there would be a corresponding increase in the dangers to which they are exposed. The increasingly successful co-operation of the fourteen member governments is a clear proof that the avowed intentions of the Soviet Government to sow dissension in the free world will not succeed.
The Council reaffirmed the purpose of their Alliance as being for defence, for peace, and for security, and their resolve to extend the scope of their joint action, and collectively to preserve their common heritage of freedom. The Council welcomed the sense of unity which is steadily growing among the peoples of the Atlantic Community.

RESOLUTIONS

1. Implementation of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty

The North Atlantic Council

CONVINCED of the necessity of a continuing review and of an adequate solution of economic problems which face member states, not only to provide the defence effort with a firm foundation but also to promote social progress and the ideals of freedom which are the bases of the North Atlantic Community; and

HAVING IN MIND Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the work already initiated within the Organization to give effect to the report of the Committee on the North Atlantic Community, approved by the Council at its Lisbon session and particularly as far as over-population problems are concerned;

AGREES that member governments should seek by individual and collective measures to strengthen their political and economic capacities by finding solutions to their problems such as balance of payments, increase of output, internal financial stability and manpower; and that the results of their endeavours should be examined periodically by the Council.

2. Indo-China

The North Atlantic Council

RECOGNISES that resistance to direct or indirect aggression in any part of the world is an essential contribution to the common security of the free world;

HAVING BEEN informed at its meeting in Paris on the 16th December of the latest developments in the military and political situation in Indo-China;

EXPRESSES its wholehearted admiration for the valiant and long continued struggle by the French forces and the armies of the Associated States against Communist aggression; and

ACKNOWLEDGES that the resistance of the free nations in South-East Asia as in Korea is in fullest harmony with the aims and ideals of the Atlantic Community;

AND THEREFORE AGREES that the campaign waged by the French Union forces in Indo-China deserves continuing support from the NATO governments.
The North Atlantic Council

**RECALLING** the decisions taken by the Council at Brussels and at Lisbon regarding German participation in Western defence, and the resolution of the 26th May 1952 by which the Council noted that the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community fulfilled the conditions embodied in the Brussels and Lisbon decisions;

**TAKING NOTE** that this Treaty was signed on the 27th May 1952;

**TAKING NOTE** of the progress made towards European integration, in particular in the economic field by the creation of the Coal and Steel Community which is already functioning;

**HAVING NOW HEARD** the report on the activities of the Interim Committee of the Conference for the Organization of the European Defence Community submitted by the Chairman of this committee;

**REITERATES** that the defence of Europe, including Western Germany, calls for the early establishment of the European Defence Community;

**REAFFIRMS** the importance of the reciprocal guarantees exchanged between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the members of the European Defence Community;

**STRESSES** the paramount importance which the Atlantic Community attaches to the rapid entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community and consequently to its ratification by all the signatories, as well as to the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on guarantees given by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to members of the European Defence Community.

**MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL**

April 23-25, 1953, Paris

**FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ**

The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Paris in Ministerial session with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Economics and Finance present, and under the Chairmanship of Lord Ismay, completed their work today.

The Council agreed on short and long-term programmes for NATO. They established a firm military programme for 1953 and a provisional programme for 1954. In addition to the forces which Greece and Turkey are contributing, there will be a notable increase in the size of the forces assigned to NATO Supreme
Commanders and a considerable improvement in their effectiveness. Training is being greatly improved at all levels. The series of large-scale manoeuvres held during the last year has appreciably raised the standard of co-operation of the forces of the member countries; units are being better equipped and the organization of support forces is developing. The NATO military authorities consider that the attainment of the force goals in 1953, and the combined influence of these various factors, will add materially to the defensive strength of NATO during 1953.

Agreement was reached not only on the common financing of the second part (£ 67,000,000) to the Fourth Slice of the infrastructure programmes (the first part to the amount of about £ 80,000,000 having been settled at a Ministerial Meeting in December), but also on a cost-sharing formula which would cover future programmes to be submitted by the Supreme Commanders for the three-year period beginning in 1954, involving expenditure of up to £ 250,000,000, subject to the approval of parliaments. These programmes will include a wide range of projects such as airfields, telecommunications, naval bases and port facilities, pipelines and radar installations. The military authorities of NATO now have a financial planning figure to which they can work for over three years. In addition, an improved system is ready to be put into operation to ensure closer financial supervision over the expenditure of common infrastructure funds.

The Council gave close attention to various economic and financial factors affecting the rate of expansion of the defence efforts. It was agreed that the development of sound national economies and the increase of military forces should be pursued concurrently; in certain fields the establishment of long-term joint military production programmes appeared to be the least costly and the most efficient solution.

It was on these lines that the member governments and the International Staff developed a method for preparing correlated production programmes. The object of this is both to ensure that the defence production undertaken by European countries within their own budgets is on the most economic lines and to make defence production in Europe more effective. The participation of the United States, through offshore procurement, adds to the contribution of the European countries and plays a very important part in these achievements. The additional fighter aircraft production programme, which has recently been announced, is a first important result of this. It will facilitate the expansion of the aircraft industries in five European countries while at the same time strengthening the air defence capacity of the Alliance. Other programmes are being considered. NATO is also studying the means of developing production in Europe of spare parts for the maintenance of equipment of American and Canadian origin.

The Secretary General's Progress Report to the Council stressed the close collaboration between the civilian and military agencies of NATO, and outlined the current work of the International Staff. It emphasised the importance of developing a better public understanding of the aims and achievements of NATO, a matter to which governments should give their constant attention. The Report described the progress made in the many and varied technical studies by Committees of the Council in a number of widely different fields, such as civil defence and other aspects of civil organization in time of war.

In the course of discussion on the Report, the Council re-emphasised their interest in the NATO countries' co-operation in the economic, cultural and social fields. They noted with satisfaction the initiative taken by the President of the United States of America, recently announced, with a view to fostering the solution of over-population problems in certain countries.
The Council continued their regular practice of exchanging views on political matters of common concern. In reviewing the international situation they were in full agreement. This agreement included their estimate of the recent Soviet moves and gestures. To the extent that these moves and gestures are proved by events to be genuine efforts to reduce international tension, they will be welcomed by member governments, whose policy has always been to seek every opportunity for world peace.

Nevertheless, the Council found that there had not yet in fact been any change in the fundamental threat to the security of free peoples. The most striking evidence of this continuing threat is the huge and constantly strengthened military force maintained by those nations whose policies have been responsible for the present tension, and who are still promoting aggressive war in several parts of the world. The most recent example is the extension of hostilities in Laos. This serious development has increased the burden of France in the struggle against aggression and has given rise to deep concern on the part of other member governments.

The Council therefore reaffirmed the policy of collective defence which has proved fully justified, and which has been responsible for the growing confidence of the free world in the future. The Council felt that there was every prospect that this policy, continued with firmness and patience, will create a basis for a just settlement of unresolved international problems.

The Council considered it essential that member governments should continue to develop the free Atlantic Community which should include a European Defence Community to be established as soon as possible in an ever more closely united Europe.

The Council reaffirmed their fundamental desire to build for peace. They looked forward to the day when a greater share of the resources of their countries would be devoted to national and international reconstruction and development. Convinced that in unity lies their greatest strength, they are resolved to broaden cooperation in every field, economic, political and social, as well as military, and so to make the Atlantic Community a lasting reality.

MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
December 14-16, 1953, Paris

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Paris in Ministerial session under the Chairmanship of the French Foreign Minister, M. Georges Bidault, completed its work today.

The Council examined the international situation and views were exchanged on matters of common concern, including Soviet policy. The Council concluded that there had been no evidence of any change in ultimate Soviet objectives and that it remained a principal Soviet aim to bring about the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance. While the Soviet Government had yet to show that it genuinely desired to reach agreement on any of the outstanding points of difference throughout the world, the policy of NATO is to seek solutions to problems by peaceful
means. The Council therefore welcomed the steps taken by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in their recent exchanges of notes with the Soviet Government to bring about an early meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Berlin. The Council also warmly endorsed the initiative taken by the President of the United States in placing before the United Nations proposals for developing and expediting the peaceful use of atomic energy and bringing together the Powers principally involved in order to seek a solution to the problem of atomic armaments.

The Council reaffirmed its conviction that peace and security must be the paramount aim of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It recognised that the increasing strength and unity of the North Atlantic Powers, which must be steadily reinforced, had proved to be decisive factors in maintaining peace and preventing aggression. Nevertheless, the threat to the Western world remains and member countries must be ready to face a continuance of this threat over a long period. The Atlantic Community must therefore be prepared to keep in being over a period of years forces and weapons which will be a major factor in deterring aggression and in contributing to the effective security of the NATO area, and which member countries can afford while at the same time maintaining and strengthening their economic and social structures. Improvements must continually be sought in the quality of NATO forces and to ensure that they have equipment which is always up-to-date so that, in the event of attack, they can act as a shield behind which the full strength of the member countries can be rapidly mobilised.

Within the continuously developing framework of the Atlantic Community the institution of the European Defence Community including a German contribution, remains an essential objective for the reinforcement of the defensive strength of the Alliance.

The Council considered the Report on the Annual Review for 1953 which records the progress in the NATO defence effort, particularly during the past year. At its meeting in December 1952, the Council laid emphasis on the development of the effectiveness of the forces. In this respect notable progress has been made. Large quantities of new equipment have been provided to the forces. This has enabled, in particular, many new support units to be built up. The goals established for the current year have been completely met for the land forces and to a substantial extent for the naval and air forces.

On the basis of recommendations made in the Report, the Council adopted firm force goals for 1954, provisional goals for 1955, and planning goals for 1956. The force goals agreed upon for 1954 envisage some increase in the numerical strength of existing NATO forces and a very substantial improvement in their quality and effectiveness.

It was agreed that special attention should be given to the continuing provision of modern weapons of the latest types to support the NATO defence system.

The Council noted with satisfaction the intention of the President of the United States of America to ask Congress for authority to provide information on nuclear weapons to NATO Commanders for purposes of NATO military planning.

The Council recognised that a long-term defence system as now envisaged raises important military and financial problems. With respect to the military problems the Council invited the Military Committee to continue its re-assessment of the most effective pattern of military forces, for this long term, both active and reserve, due regard being paid to the results of studies of the effect of new weapons. The Council will be kept informed of the progress of this work and
a report will be submitted to it in due course. The Council will also keep under review the very considerable financial effort still required to continue the present build-up, to maintain NATO forces at an adequate level of readiness and to replace obsolescent weapons.

The Council heard statements by Admiral Sir John Edelsten, Commander-in-Chief Channel, Admiral L. D. McCormick, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, on the work achieved in their Commands, and took note of a progress report by the Military Committee.

In the course of its review the Council considered the Secretary General's Report and welcomed the progress recorded since the last Ministerial Meeting in April. It emphasised the importance of the work being done to co-ordinate national planning in such matters as civil defence, the wartime control and distribution of commodities and of shipping and other means of transport. Agreement was expressed with Lord Ismay's view that the preparations by member governments in these fields should parallel the progress already achieved in the military field. The Council took note that the problems of manpower had been kept under review and that several recommendations to governments had been approved. Progress which had been achieved this year in preparing correlated production programmes was welcomed. These programmes cover production, for several years ahead, of important ranges of military equipment. The Council expressed satisfaction with the Secretary General's Report on the implementation of the common infrastructure programmes. Besides a large number of projects now under construction, no less than 120 airfields and a large network of signals communications facilities are in use by NATO forces.

Ministers took the opportunity to meet together in restricted session and discussed informally matters of interest to all the member governments. They intend at future meetings to continue this procedure, which developed naturally from the sense of unity in the Alliance. They are continually mindful of the political links which bind them in an Alliance which is not solely military in character.

MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
April 23, 1954, Paris
FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

At a Ministerial Meeting held in Paris today, five years after the Treaty was signed, the North Atlantic Council reviewed the progress made by the Organization, examined the present international situation, and exchanged views on problems of common interest. The meeting was attended by the Foreign Ministers of the member governments under the Chairmanship of M. Bidault.

The Vice-Chairman and Secretary General, Lord Ismay, reported on the work of the Organization. His survey emphasised the effective working relationship developing within the Alliance, a relationship which goes beyond the formal obligations assumed by its members. The Foreign Ministers took this opportunity to reaffirm their association in the Atlantic Alliance as fundamental to the policies of their respective governments. Recalling the defensive and peaceful aims of the
Treaty, they expressed their resolve to maintain and develop the Alliance not only as the firm basis for the collective defence of their peoples, but also as an enduring association for common action and co-operation between the member states in every field.

After discussing international developments since its last meeting, the Council found no evidence that the ultimate aims of the Soviet Union had altered, and noted that the military strength of the Soviet Union and its satellites continues to increase. The Council therefore once more agreed upon the need for continuing efforts, vigilance and unity.

The Council—reaffirming its long-established position that the institution of the European Defence Community is in the essential interest of the Alliance—welcomed the ratification of the EDC Treaty by a number of the signatories since the last Ministerial Meeting, which brings closer the entry into force of the Treaty. The Council also expressed its gratification at the far-reaching steps taken by the Governments of the United Kingdom and United States towards co-operation with the European Defence Community, thus ensuring their lasting and close association with the defence of the continent of Europe.

With regard to the recent declaration by the Soviet Government on the status of their zone of occupation in Germany, the Council noted with approval that member governments of the Organization had no intention of recognising the sovereignty of the so-called German Democratic Republic or of treating the German authorities there as a government. It decided that the Permanent Representatives should draw up a resolution on this subject.

The Council, with a view to developing further the habit of political consultation in the Council, adopted a resolution on that subject, the text of which has been published separately.

The Council paid tribute to the gallantry of the French Union forces fighting in Indo-China. It expressed the hope that the Geneva Conference will have positive results.
The peoples of the North Atlantic Community are united under the North Atlantic Treaty to preserve their freedom and to develop their common heritage of democracy, liberty and the rule of law. During the past two years, since the Treaty came into being, North Atlantic countries have joined in collective efforts for their defence. They will continue to work together closely to consolidate the North Atlantic Community. All obstacles which hinder such co-operation on an equal footing should be removed.

The persistent attempts which have been made and are being made to divide the peoples of the North Atlantic Community will fail. Those who make these attempts do not understand the nature or the strength of the close ties between the free peoples of the North Atlantic Community. The preservation of peace is the very essence of that Community, and free discussion as to how this can best be done is a source of continuing strength.

It was the threatening international situation that brought twelve nations of the North Atlantic Community formally together under the North Atlantic Treaty to create sufficient strength to preserve their freedom and liberty. A series of so-called peace offers as vague in language as they are obscure in content are made from time to time. The peoples of the North Atlantic Community will test these offers by the deeds that follow them. They will never reject any genuine move for peace, but will not be deflected from building up their defensive strength by mere empty words about peace.

The strengthening of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the past two years has developed in the minds of the peoples a strong sense of their common interests and ideals. There is a desire within the North Atlantic Community to meet specific needs in all fields where close collaboration will advance the welfare of the Community.

One basis for the further development of the North Atlantic Community is Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states:

'The Parties will contribute towards the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.'

A clear sense of the direction in which the Community is developing should make it easier to take practical steps towards that end.

The Council has therefore decided to set up a Ministerial Committee composed of representatives from Belgium, Canada, Italy, Netherlands and Norway, to consider the further strengthening of the North Atlantic Community and especially the implementation of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Committee, assisted by the Council Deputies, will, in particular consider and make recommendations to the Council on the following matters:
(a) Co-ordination and frequent consultation on foreign policy, having particular regard to steps designed to promote peace;
(b) Closer economic, financial and social co-operation, designed to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being, both during and after the present period of the defence effort, within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or through other Agencies;
(c) Collaboration in the fields of culture and public information.

In these and other ways the Council will build up the inner strength of the North Atlantic Community, without duplicating the work of other international organizations which promote the same objectives.

The Council endorses the recent declaration of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation which called on all sections of the European community to increase production and play their part in the collective effort for peace and well-being.

In developing the North Atlantic Community, the Council will act in conformity with and seek to strengthen the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It is only by the work and by the enlightened understanding of the free peoples everywhere that the cause of freedom and democracy will be upheld against any challenge.

2.

LISBON, 25TH FEBRUARY, 1952

In the course of their discussions in Lisbon the members of the North Atlantic Council reviewed the aims of their association.

They wish once more to emphasise that this association was forged as a shield against aggression. Its first aim is peace, and the armed strength which is being built up by the united efforts of the member nations will be used only for the defence of their countries and the security of their peoples.

The plan for the build-up of defence forces for the North Atlantic Treaty area laid down by the TCC has been adopted at the present session of the Council in the belief that defensive strength will prove the best deterrent to aggression.

The Council has learnt with approval of the main provisions of the plan worked out between five of its members and the German Federal Republic for a European Defence Community. The establishment of this Community will help to promote the closer association of the Western European countries and to strengthen the defence of the North Atlantic area. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, respecting the principles on which the Community is founded, will support and co-operate with its institutions. The arrangements to govern the relationship between the two Organizations which have been approved at Lisbon will ensure that in pursuit of the common objective, the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area, the EDC will reinforce and work within the framework of NATO.

The partnership between the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty exists not for defence alone but for enduring progress. The members of the Council look forward to the time when the main energies of their association can be less concentrated on defence and more fully devoted to co-operation in other fields, for the well-being of their peoples and the advance of human progress. Then, as now, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will have to play its part, and to this end it has been agreed in Lisbon to strengthen its structure so that it may become a still more effective association of like-minded nations determined to maintain in
peace the unity of purpose and effort achieved in the face of present dangers, and to express itself by continuous collaboration on common problems.

The understanding and sense of fellowship which the members wish to see develop between their countries cannot be achieved by governmental action alone. All citizens can play their part in the work of uniting the peoples in one Atlantic Community which will afford, in ever increasing measure, the benefits of peace, freedom and prosperity.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY REGARDING
THE STATUS OF THEIR FORCES

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4th April, 1949,

CONSIDERING that the forces of one Party may be sent, by arrangement, to serve in the territory of another Party;

BEARING in mind that the decision to send them and the conditions under which they will be sent, in so far as such conditions are not laid down by the present Agreement, will continue to be the subject of separate arrangements between the Parties concerned;

DESIRING, however, to define the status of such forces while in the territory of another Party;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. In this Agreement the expression—

(a) ‘force’ means the personnel belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of one Contracting Party when in the territory of another Contracting Party in the North Atlantic Treaty area in connexion with their official duties, provided that the two Contracting Parties concerned may agree that certain individuals, units or formations shall not be regarded as constituting or included in a ‘force’ for the purposes of the present Agreement;

(b) ‘civilian component’ means the civilian personnel accompanying a force of a Contracting Party who are in the employ of an armed service of that Contracting Party, and who are not stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in, the State in which the force is located;

(c) ‘dependent’ means the spouse of a member of a force or of a civilian component, or a child of such member depending on him or her for support;

(d) ‘sending State’ means the Contracting Party to which the force belongs;

(e) ‘receiving State’ means the Contracting Party in the territory of which the force or civilian component is located, whether it be stationed there or passing in transit;

(f) ‘military authorities of the sending State’ means those authorities of a sending State who are empowered by its law to enforce the military law of that State with respect to members of its forces or civilian components;

(g) ‘North Atlantic Council’ means the Council established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty or any of its subsidiary bodies authorised to act on its behalf.

2. This Agreement shall apply to the authorities of political sub-divisions of the Contracting Parties, within their territories to which the Agreement applies or extends in accordance with Article XX, as it applies to the central authorities of those Contracting Parties, provided, however, that property owned by political
sub-divisions shall not be considered to be property owned by a Contracting Party within the meaning of Article VIII.

 ARTICLE II

It is the duty of a force and its civilian component and the members, thereof as well as their dependents to respect the law of the receiving State, and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the present Agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the receiving State. It is also the duty of the sending State to take necessary measures to that end.

 ARTICLE III

1. On the conditions specified in paragraph 2 of this Article and subject to compliance with the formalities established by the receiving State relating to entry and departure of a force or the members thereof, such members shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection on entering or leaving the territory of a receiving State. They shall also be exempt from the regulations of the receiving State on the registration and control of aliens, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right to permanent residence or domicile in the territories of the receiving State.

2. The following documents only will be required in respect of members of a force. They must be presented on demand:

(a) personal identity card issued by the sending State showing names, date of birth, rank and number (if any), service, and photograph;

(b) individual or collective movement order, in the language of the sending State and in the English and French languages, issued by an appropriate agency of the sending State or of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and certifying to the status of the individual or group as a member or members of a force and to the movement ordered. The receiving State may require a movement order to be countersigned by its appropriate representative.

3. Members of a civilian component and dependents shall be so described in their passports.

4. If a member of a force or of a civilian component leaves the employ of the sending State and is not repatriated, the authorities of the sending State shall immediately inform the authorities of the receiving State, giving such particulars as may be required. The authorities of the sending State shall similarly inform the authorities of the receiving State of any member who has absented himself for more than twenty-one days.

5. If the receiving State has requested the removal from its territory of a member of a force or civilian component or has made an expulsion order against an ex-member of a force or of a civilian component or against a dependent of a member or ex-member, the authorities of the sending State shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned within their own territory or otherwise disposing of him outside the receiving State. This paragraph shall apply only to persons who are not nationals of the receiving State and have entered the receiving State as members of a force or civilian component or for the purpose of becoming such members, and to the dependents of such persons.
**ARTICLE IV**

The receiving State shall either

(a) accept as valid, without a driving test or fee, the driving permit or licence or military driving permit issued by the sending State or a sub-division thereof to a member of a force or of a civilian component; or

(b) issue its own driving permit or licence to any member of a force or civilian component who holds a driving permit or licence or military driving permit issued by the sending State or a sub-division thereof, provided that no driving test shall be required.

**ARTICLE V**

1. Members of a force shall normally wear uniform. Subject to any arrangement to the contrary between the authorities of the sending and receiving States, the wearing of civilian dress shall be on the same conditions as for members of the forces of the receiving State. Regularly constituted units or formations of a force shall be in uniform when crossing a frontier.

2. Service vehicles of a force or civilian component shall carry, in addition to their registration number, a distinctive nationality mark.

**ARTICLE VI**

Members of a force may possess and carry arms, on condition that they are authorised to do so by their orders. The authorities of the sending State shall give sympathetic consideration to requests from the receiving State concerning this matter.

**ARTICLE VII**

1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,

(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State;

(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences committed within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of that State.

2.-(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State.

(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of that State, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending State.

(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a security offence against a State shall include
(i) treason against the State;
(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of that State, or secrets relating to the national defence of that State.

3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:

(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation to
(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent;
(ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.

(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.

(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.

4. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall not imply any right for the military authorities of the sending State to exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in the receiving State, unless they are members of the force of the sending State.

5.-(a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their dependents in the territory of the receiving State and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.

(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall notify promptly the military authorities of the sending State of the arrest of any member of a force or civilian component or a dependent.

(c) The custody of an accused member of a force or civilian component over whom the receiving State is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the sending State, remain with that State until he is charged by the receiving State.

6.-(a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offence. The handing over of such objects may, however, be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them.

(b) The authorities of the Contracting Parties shall notify one another of the disposition of all cases in which there are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.

7.-(a) A death sentence shall not be carried out in the receiving State by the authorities of the sending State if the legislation of the receiving State does not provide for such punishment in a similar case.

(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the sending State for assistance in carrying out a sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the authorities of the sending State.
8. Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offence within the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party. However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the sending State from trying a member of its force for any violation of rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an offence for which he was tried by the authorities of another Contracting Party.

9. Whenever a member of a force or civilian component of a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled—

(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to have free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at his trial.

10. (a) Regularly constituted military units or formations of a force shall have the right to police any camps, establishments or other premises which they occupy as the result of an agreement with the receiving State. The military police of the force may take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security on such premises.

(b) Outside these premises, such military police shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the authorities of the receiving State and in liaison with those authorities, and in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among the members of the force.

11. Each Contracting Party shall seek such legislation as it deems necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within its territory of installations, equipment, property, records and official information of other Contracting Parties, and the punishment of persons who may contravene laws enacted for that purpose.

**Article VIII**

1. Each Contracting Party waives all its claims against any other Contracting Party for damage to any property owned by it and used by its land, sea or air armed services, if such damage—

(i) was caused by a member or an employee of the armed services of the other Contracting Party in the execution of his duties in connexion with the operation of the North Atlantic Treaty; or

(ii) arose from the use of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft owned by the other
Contracting Party and used by its armed services, provided either that the vehicle, vessel or aircraft causing the damage was being used in connexion with the operation of the North Atlantic Treaty, or that the damage was caused to property being so used.

Claims for maritime salvage by one Contracting Party against any other Contracting Party shall be waived, provided that the vessel or cargo salved was owned by a Contracting Party and being used by its armed services in connexion with the operation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. -(a) In the case of damage caused or arising as stated in paragraph 1 to other property owned by a Contracting Party and located in its territory, the issue of the liability of any other Contracting Party shall be determined and the amount of damage shall be assessed, unless the Contracting Parties concerned agree otherwise, by a sole arbitrator selected in accordance with sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph. The arbitrator shall also decide any counter-claims arising out of the same incident.

(b) The arbitrator referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above shall be selected by agreement between the Contracting Parties concerned from amongst the nationals of the receiving State who hold or have held high judicial office. If the Contracting Parties concerned are unable, within two months, to agree upon the arbitrator, either may request the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies to select a person with the aforesaid qualifications.

(c) Any decision taken by the arbitrator shall be binding and conclusive upon the Contracting Parties.

(d) The amount of any compensation awarded by the arbitrator shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 (e) (i), (ii) and (iii) of this Article.

(e) The compensation of the arbitrator shall be fixed by agreement between the Contracting Parties concerned and shall, together with the necessary expenses incidental to the performance of his duties, be defrayed in equal proportions by them.

(f) Nevertheless, each Contracting Party waives its claim in any such case where the damage is less than:

Belgium: B.fr. 70,000.
Canada: $ 1,460.
Denmark: Kr. 9,670.
France: F.fr. 490,000.
Iceland: Kr. 22,800.
Italy: Li. 850,000.

Luxembourg: L.fr. 70,000.
Netherlands: Fl. 3,320.
Norway: Kr. 10,000.
Portugal: Es. 40,250.
United Kingdom: £ 500.
United States: $ 1,400.

Any other Contracting Party whose property has been damaged in the same incident shall also waive its claim up to the above amount. In the case of considerable variation in the rates of exchange between these currencies the Contracting Parties shall agree on the appropriate adjustments of these amounts.

3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article the expression 'owned by a Contracting Party' in the case of a vessel includes a vessel on bare boat charter to that Contracting Party or requisitioned by it on bare boat terms or seized by it in prize (except to the extent that the risk of loss or liability is borne by some person other than such Contracting Party).

4. Each Contracting Party waives all its claims against any other Contracting Party for injury or death suffered by any member of its armed services while such member was engaged in the performance of his official duties.

5. Claims (other than contractual claims and those to which paragraphs 6 or 7
of this Article apply) arising out of acts or omissions of members of a force or civilian component done in the performance of official duty, or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which a force or civilian component is legally responsible, and causing damage in the territory of the receiving State to third parties, other than any of the Contracting Parties, shall be dealt with by the receiving State in accordance with the following provisions:—

(a) Claims shall be filed, considered and settled or adjudicated in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State with respect to claims arising from the activities of its own armed forces.

(b) The receiving State may settle any such claims, and payment of the amount agreed upon or determined by adjudication shall be made by the receiving State in its currency.

(c) Such payment, whether made pursuant to a settlement or to adjudication of the case by a competent tribunal of the receiving State, or the final adjudication by such a tribunal denying payment, shall be binding and conclusive upon the Contracting Parties.

(d) Every claim paid by the receiving State shall be communicated to the sending States concerned together with full particulars and a proposed distribution in conformity with sub-paragraphs (e) (i), (ii) and (iii) below. In default of a reply within two months, the proposed distribution shall be regarded as accepted.

(e) The cost incurred in satisfying claims pursuant to the preceding sub-paragraphs and paragraph 2 of this Article shall be distributed between the Contracting Parties, as follows:—

(i) Where one sending State alone is responsible, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed in the proportion of 25 per cent. chargeable to the receiving State and 75 per cent. chargeable to the sending State.

(ii) Where more than one State is responsible for the damage, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed equally among them; however, if the receiving State is not one of the States responsible, its contribution shall be half that of each of the sending States.

(iii) Where the damage was caused by the armed services of the Contracting Parties and it is not possible to attribute it specifically to one or more of those armed services, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed equally among the Contracting Parties concerned; however, if the receiving State is not one of the States by whose armed services the damage was caused, its contribution shall be half that of each of the sending States concerned.

(iv) Every half-year, a statement of the sums paid by the receiving State in the course of the half-yearly period in respect of every case regarding which the proposed distribution on a percentage basis has been accepted, shall be sent to the sending States concerned, together with a request for reimbursement. Such reimbursement shall be made within the shortest possible time, in the currency of the receiving State.

(f) In cases where the application of the provisions of sub-paragraphs (b) and (e) of this paragraph would cause a Contracting Party serious hardship, it may request the North Atlantic Council to arrange a settlement of a different nature.

(g) A member of a force or civilian component shall not be subject to any proceedings for the enforcement of any judgment given against him in the
(h) Except in so far as sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph applies to claims covered by paragraph 2 of this Article, the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any claim arising out of or in connexion with the navigation or operation of a ship or the loading, carriage, or discharge of a cargo, other than claims for death or personal injury to which paragraph 4 of this Article does not apply.

6. Claims against members of a force or civilian component arising out of tortious acts or omissions in the receiving State not done in the performance of official duty shall be dealt with in the following manner:

(a) The authorities of the receiving State shall consider the claim and assess compensation to the claimant in a fair and just manner, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the injured person, and shall prepare a report on the matter.

(b) The report shall be delivered to the authorities of the sending State, who shall then decide without delay whether they will offer an *ex gratia* payment, and if so, of what amount.

(c) If an offer of *ex gratia* payment is made, and accepted by the claimant in full satisfaction of his claim, the authorities of the sending State shall make the payment themselves and inform the authorities of the receiving State of their decision and of the sum paid.

(d) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving State to entertain an action against a member of a force or of a civilian component unless and until there has been payment in full satisfaction of the claim.

7. Claims arising out of the unauthorised use of any vehicle of the armed services of a sending State shall be dealt with in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article, except in so far as the force or civilian component is legally responsible.

8. If a dispute arises as to whether a tortious act or omission of a member of a force or civilian component was done in the performance of official duty or as to whether the use of any vehicle of the armed services of a sending State was unauthorised, the question shall be submitted to an arbitrator appointed in accordance with paragraph 2 (b) of this Article, whose decision on this point shall be final and conclusive.

9. The sending State shall not claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving State for members of a force or civilian component in respect of the civil jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving State except to the extent provided in paragraph 5 (g) of this Article.

10. The authorities of the sending State and of the receiving State shall cooperate in the procurement of evidence for a fair hearing and disposal of claims in regard to which the Contracting Parties are concerned.

**Article IX**

1. Members of a force or of a civilian component and their dependents may purchase locally goods necessary for their own consumption, and such services as they need, under the same conditions as the nationals of the receiving State.

2. Goods which are required from local sources for the subsistence of a force or civilian component shall normally be purchased through the authorities which
purchase such goods for the armed services of the receiving State. In order to avoid such purchases having any adverse effect on the economy of the receiving State, the competent authorities of that State shall indicate, when necessary, any articles the purchase of which should be restricted or forbidden.

3. Subject to agreements already in force or which may hereafter be made between the authorised representatives of the sending and receiving States, the authorities of the receiving State shall assume sole responsibility for making suitable arrangements to make available to a force or a civilian component the buildings and grounds which it requires, as well as facilities and services connected therewith. These agreements and arrangements shall be, as far as possible, in accordance with the regulations governing the accommodation and billeting of similar personnel of the receiving State. In the absence of a specific contract to the contrary, the laws of the receiving State shall determine the rights and obligations arising out of the occupation or use of the buildings, grounds, facilities or services.

4. Local civilian labour requirements of a force or civilian component shall be satisfied in the same way as the comparable requirements of the receiving State and with the assistance of the authorities of the receiving State through the employment exchanges. The conditions of employment and work, in particular wages, supplementary payments and conditions for the protection of workers, shall be those laid down by the legislation of the receiving State. Such civilian workers employed by a force or civilian component shall not be regarded for any purpose as being members of that force or civilian component.

5. When a force or a civilian component has at the place where it is stationed inadequate medical or dental facilities, its members and their dependents may receive medical and dental care, including hospitalisation, under the same conditions as comparable personnel of the receiving State.

6. The receiving State shall give the most favourable consideration to requests for the grant to members of a force or of a civilian component of travelling facilities and concessions with regard to fares. These facilities and concessions will be the subject of special arrangements to be made between the Governments concerned.

7. Subject to any general or particular financial arrangements between the Contracting Parties, payment in local currency for goods, accommodation and services furnished under paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and, if necessary, 5 and 6, of this Article shall be made promptly by the authorities of the force.

8. Neither a force, nor a civilian component, nor the members thereof, nor their dependents, shall by reason of this Article enjoy any exemption from taxes or duties relating to purchases and services chargeable under the fiscal regulations of the receiving State.

ARTICLE X

1. Where the legal incidence of any form of taxation in the receiving State depends upon residence or domicile, periods during which a member of a force or civilian component is in the territory of that State by reason solely of his being a member of such force or civilian component shall not be considered as periods of residence therein, or as creating a change of residence or domicile, for the purposes of such taxation. Members of a force or civilian component shall be exempt from taxation in the receiving State on the salary and emoluments paid to them as such members by the sending State or on any tangible movable property the presence of which in the receiving State is due solely to their temporary presence there.

2. Nothing in this Article shall prevent taxation of a member of a force or civilian
component with respect to any profitable enterprise, other than his employment as such member, in which he may engage in the receiving State, and, except as regards his salary and emoluments and the tangible movable property referred to in paragraph 1, nothing in this Article shall prevent taxation to which, even if regarded as having his residence or domicile outside the territory of the receiving State, such a member is liable under the law of that State.

3. Nothing in this Article shall apply to ‘duty’ as defined in paragraph 12 of Article XI.

4. For the purposes of this Article the term ‘member of a force’ shall not include any person who is a national of the receiving State.

**Article XI**

1. Save as provided expressly to the contrary in this Agreement, members of a force and of a civilian component as well as their dependents shall be subject to the laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities of the receiving State. In particular the customs authorities of the receiving State shall have the right, under the general conditions laid down by the laws and regulations of the receiving State, to search members of a force or civilian component and their dependents and to examine their luggage and vehicles, and to seize articles pursuant to such laws and regulations.

2.-(a) The temporary importation and the re-exportation of service vehicles of a force or civilian component under their own power shall be authorised free of duty on presentation of a triptyque in the form shown in the Appendix to this Agreement.

(b) The temporary importation of such vehicles not under their own power shall be governed by paragraph 4 of this Article and the re-exportation thereof by paragraph 8.

(c) Service vehicles of a force or civilian component shall be exempt from any tax payable in respect of the use of vehicles on the roads.

3. Official documents under official seal shall not be subject to customs inspection. Couriers, whatever their status, carrying these documents must be in possession of an individual movement order, issued in accordance with paragraph 2 (b) of Article III. This movement order shall show the number of despatches carried and certify that they contain only official documents.

4. A force may import free of duty the equipment for the force and reasonable quantities of provisions, supplies and other goods for the exclusive use of the force and, in cases where such use is permitted by the receiving State, its civilian component and dependents. This duty-free importation shall be subject to the deposit, at the customs office for the place of entry, together with such customs documents as shall be agreed, of a certificate in a form agreed between the receiving State and the sending State signed by a person authorised by the sending State for that purpose. The designation of the person authorised to sign the certificates as well as specimens of the signatures and stamps to be used, shall be sent to the customs administration of the receiving State.

5. A member of a force or civilian component may, at the time of his first arrival to take up service in the receiving State or at the time of the first arrival of any dependent to join him, import his personal effects and furniture free of duty for the term of such service.

6. Members of a force or civilian component may import temporarily free of
duty their private motor vehicles for the personal use of themselves and their dependents. There is no obligation under this Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use of roads by private vehicles.

7. Imports made by the authorities of a force other than for the exclusive use of that force and its civilian component, and imports, other than those dealt with in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article, effected by members of a force or civilian component are not, by reason of this Article, entitled to any exemption from duty or other conditions.

8. Goods which have been imported duty-free under paragraphs 2 (b), 4, 5 or 6 above—
   (a) may be re-exported freely, provided that, in the case of goods imported under paragraph 4, a certificate, issued in accordance with that paragraph, is presented, to the customs office; the customs authorities, however, may verify that goods re-exported are as described in the certificate, if any, and have in fact been imported under the conditions of paragraphs 2 (b), 4, 5 or 6 as the case may be;
   (b) shall not normally be disposed of in the receiving State by way of either sale or gift: however, in particular cases such disposal may be authorised on conditions imposed by the authorities concerned of the receiving State (for instance, on payment of duty and tax and compliance with the requirements of the controls of trade and exchange).

9. Goods purchased in the receiving State shall be exported therefrom only in accordance with the regulations in force in the receiving State.

10. Special arrangements for crossing frontiers shall be granted by the customs authorities to regularly constituted units or formations, provided that the customs authorities concerned have been duly notified in advance.

11. Special arrangements shall be made by the receiving State so that fuel, oil and lubricants for use in service vehicles, aircraft and vessels of a force or civilian component, may be delivered free of all duties and taxes.

12. In paragraphs 1–10 of this Article—
   ‘duty’ means customs duties and all other duties and taxes payable on importation or exportation, as the case may be, except dues and taxes which are no more than charges for services rendered;
   ‘importation’ includes withdrawal from customs warehouses or continuous customs custody, provided that the goods concerned have not been grown, produced or manufactured in the receiving State.

13. The provisions of this Article shall apply to the goods concerned not only when they are imported into or exported from the receiving State but also when they are in transit through the territory of a Contracting Party, and for this purpose the expression ‘receiving State’ in this Article shall be regarded as including any Contracting Party through whose territory the goods are passing in transit.

**Article XII**

1. The customs or fiscal authorities of the receiving State may, as a condition of the grant of any customs or fiscal exemption or concession provided for in this Agreement, require such conditions to be observed as they may deem necessary to prevent abuse.

2. These authorities may refuse any exemption provided for by this Agreement in respect of the importation into the receiving State of articles grown, produced
or manufactured in that State which have been exported therefrom without payment of, or upon repayment of, taxes or duties which would have been chargeable but for such exportation. Goods removed from a customs warehouse shall be deemed to be imported if they were regarded as having been exported by reason of being deposited in the warehouse.

**Article XIII**

1. In order to prevent offences against customs and fiscal laws regulations, the authorities of the receiving and of the sending States shall assist each other in the conduct of enquiries and the collection of evidence.

2. The authorities of a force shall render all assistance within their power to ensure that articles liable to seizure by, or on behalf of, the customs or fiscal authorities of the receiving State are handed to those authorities.

3. The authorities of a force shall render all assistance within their power to ensure the payment of duties, taxes and penalties payable by members of the force of civilian component or their dependents.

4. Service vehicles and articles belonging to a force or to its civilian component, and not to a member of such force or civilian component, seized by the authorities of the receiving State in connexion with an offence against its customs or fiscal laws or regulations shall be handed over to the appropriate authorities of the force concerned.

**Article XIV**

1. A force, a civilian component and the members thereof, as well as their dependents, shall remain subject to the foreign exchange regulations of the sending State and shall also be subject to the regulations of the receiving State.

2. The foreign exchange authorities of the sending and the receiving States may issue special regulations applicable to a force or civilian component or the members thereof as well as to their dependents.

**Article XV**

1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article, this Agreement shall remain in force in the event of hostilities to which the North Atlantic Treaty applies, except that the provisions for settling claims in paragraphs 2 and 5 of Article VIII shall not apply to war damage, and that the provisions of the Agreement, and, in particular of Articles III and VII, shall immediately be reviewed by the Contracting Parties concerned, who may agree to such modifications as they may consider desirable regarding the application of the Agreement between them.

2. In the event of such hostilities, each of the Contracting Parties shall have the right, by giving 60 days' notice to the other Contracting Parties, to suspend the application of any of the provisions of this Agreement so far as it is concerned. If this right is exercised, the Contracting Parties shall immediately consult with a view to agreeing on suitable provisions to replace the provisions suspended.

**Article XVI**

All differences between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be settled by negotiation between them.
without recourse to any outside jurisdiction. Except where express provision is made to the contrary in this Agreement, differences which cannot be settled by direct negotiation shall be referred to the North Atlantic Council.

**Article XVII**

Any Contracting Party may at any time request the revision of any Article of this Agreement. The request shall be addressed to the North Atlantic Council.

**Article XVIII**

1. The present Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify each signatory State of the date of deposit thereof.

2. Thirty days after four signatory States have deposited their instruments of ratification the present Agreement shall come into force between them. It shall come into force for each other signatory State thirty days after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

3. After it has come into force, the present Agreement shall, subject to the approval of the North Atlantic Council and to such conditions as it may decide, be open to accession on behalf of any State which accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify each signatory and acceding State of the date of deposit thereof. In respect of any State on behalf of which an instrument of accession is deposited, the present Agreement shall come into force thirty days after the date of the deposit of such instrument.

**Article XIX**

1. The present Agreement may be denounced by any Contracting Party after the expiration of a period of four years from the date on which the Agreement comes into force.

2. The denunciation of the Agreement by any Contracting Party shall be effected by a written notification addressed by that Contracting Party to the Government of the United States of America which shall notify all the other Contracting Parties of each such notification and the date of receipt thereof.

3. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the receipt of the notification by the Government of the United States of America. After the expiration of this period of one year, the Agreement shall cease to be in force as regards the Contracting Party which denounces it, but shall continue in force for the remaining Contracting Parties.

**Article XX**

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the present Agreement shall apply only to the metropolitan territory of a Contracting Party.

2. Any State may, however, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession or at any time thereafter, declare by notification given to
the Government of the United States of America that the present Agreement shall extend (subject, if the State making the declaration considers it to be necessary, to the conclusion of a special agreement between that State and each of the sending States concerned), to all or any of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible in the North Atlantic Treaty area. The present Agreement shall then extend to the territory or territories named therein thirty days after the receipt by the Government of the United States of America of the notification, or thirty days after the conclusion of the special agreements if required, or when it has come into force under Article XVIII, whichever is the later.

3. A State which has made a declaration under paragraph 2 of this Article extending the present Agreement to any territory for whose international relations it is responsible may denounce the Agreement separately in respect of that territory in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX.

IN WITNESS whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in London this nineteenth day of June, 1951, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory and acceding States.
PROTOCOL ON THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS SET UP PURSUANT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4th April, 1949,

Considering that international military Headquarters may be established in their territories, by separate arrangement, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and Desiring to define the status of such Headquarters and of the personnel thereof within the North Atlantic Treaty area;

Have agreed to the present Protocol to the Agreement signed in London on 19th June, 1951, regarding the Status of their Forces:

ARTICLE 1

In the present Protocol the expression
(a) ‘the Agreement’ means the Agreement signed in London on 19th June, 1951, by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces;
(b) ‘Supreme Headquarters’ means Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and any equivalent international military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty;
(c) ‘Allied Headquarters’ means any Supreme Headquarters and any international military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty which is immediately subordinate to a Supreme Headquarters;
(d) ‘North Atlantic Council’ means the Council established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty or any of its subsidiary bodies authorised to act on its behalf.

ARTICLE 2

Subject to the following provisions of this Protocol, the Agreement shall apply to Allied Headquarters in the territory of a Party to the present Protocol in the North Atlantic Treaty area, and to the military and civilian personnel of such Headquarters and their dependents included in the definitions in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Protocol, when such personnel are present in any such territory in connection with their official duties or, in the case of dependents, the official duties of their spouse or parent.

ARTICLE 3

1. For the purpose of applying the Agreement to an Allied Headquarters the expressions ‘force’, ‘civilian component’ and ‘dependent’, wherever they occur in the Agreement, shall have the meanings set out below:

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(a) 'force' means the personnel attached to the Allied Headquarters who belong to the land, sea or air armed services of any Party to the North Atlantic Treaty;

(b) 'civilian component' means civilian personnel who are not stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to the Treaty, nor nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in the receiving State, and who are (i) attached to the Allied Headquarters and in the employ of an armed service of a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty or (ii) in such categories of civilian personnel in the employ of the Allied Headquarters as the North Atlantic Council shall decide;

(c) 'dependent' means the spouse of a member of a force or civilian component, as defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, or a child of such member depending on him or her for support.

2. An Allied Headquarters shall be considered to be a force for the purposes of Article II, paragraph 2 of Article V, paragraph 10 of Article VII, paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 of Article IX, and Article XIII, of the Agreement.

**Article 4**

The rights and obligations which the Agreement gives to or imposes upon the sending State or its authorities in respect of its forces or their civilian components or dependents shall, in respect of an Allied Headquarters and its personnel and their dependents to whom the Agreement applies in accordance with Article 2 of the present Protocol, be vested in or attach to the appropriate Supreme Headquarters and the authorities responsible under it, except that

(a) the right which is given by Article VII of the Agreement to the military authorities of the sending State to exercise criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction shall be vested in the military authorities of the State, if any, to whose military law the person concerned is subject;

(b) the obligations imposed upon the sending State or its authorities by Article II, paragraph 4 of Article III, paragraphs 5 (a) and 6 (a) of Article VII, paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article VIII, and Article XIII, of the Agreement, shall attach both to the Allied Headquarters and to any State whose armed service, or any member or employee of whose armed service, or the dependent of such member or employee, is concerned;

(c) for the purposes of paragraphs 2 (a) and 5 of Article III, and Article XIV, of the Agreement, the sending State shall be, in the case of members of a force and their dependents, the State to whose armed service the member belongs, or, in the case of members of a civilian component and their dependents, the State, if any, by whose armed service the member is employed;

(d) the obligations imposed on the sending State by virtue of paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article VIII of the Agreement shall attach to the State to whose armed service the person belongs whose act or omission has given rise to the claim or, in the case of a member of a civilian component, to the State by whose armed service he is employed or, if there is no such State, to the Allied Headquarters of which the person concerned is a member.

Both the State, if any, to which obligations attach under this paragraph and the Allied Headquarters concerned shall have the rights of the sending State in connection with the appointment of an arbitrator under paragraph 8 of Article VIII.
Article 5

Every member of an Allied Headquarters shall have a personal identity card issued by the Headquarters showing names, date and place of birth, nationality, rank or grade, number (if any), photograph and period of validity. This card must be presented on demand.

Article 6

1. The obligations to waive claims imposed on the Contracting Parties by Article VIII of the Agreement shall attach both to the Allied Headquarters and to any Party to this Protocol concerned.
2. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article VIII of the Agreement,
   (a) property owned by an Allied Headquarters or by a Party to this Protocol and used by an Allied Headquarters shall be deemed to be property owned by a Contracting Party and used by its armed services;
   (b) damage caused by a member of a force or civilian component as defined in paragraph 1 of Article III of this Protocol or by any other employee of an Allied Headquarters shall be deemed to be damage caused by a member or employee of the armed services of a Contracting Party;
   (c) the definition of the expression ‘owned by a Contracting Party’ in paragraph 3 of Article VIII shall apply in respect of an Allied Headquarters.
3. The claims to which paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Agreement applies shall include claims (other than contractual claims and claims to which paragraphs 6 or 7 of that Article apply) arising out of acts or omissions of any employees of an Allied Headquarters, or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which an Allied Headquarters is legally responsible, and causing damage in the territory of a receiving State to third parties, other than any of the Parties to this Protocol.

Article 7

1. The exemption from taxation accorded under Article X of the Agreement to members of a force or civilian component in respect of their salaries and emoluments shall apply, as regards personnel of an Allied Headquarters within the definitions in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) (i) of Article 3 of this Protocol, to salaries and emoluments paid to them as such personnel by the armed service to which they belong or by which they are employed, except that this paragraph shall not exempt any such member or employee from taxation imposed by a State of which he is a national.
2. Employees of an Allied Headquarters of categories agreed by the North Atlantic Council, shall be exempted from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the Allied Headquarters in their capacity as such employees. Any Party to the present Protocol may, however, conclude an arrangement with the Allied Headquarters whereby such Party will employ and assign to the Allied Headquarters all of its nationals (except, if such Party so desires, any not ordinarily resident within its territory) who are to serve on the staff of the Allied Headquarters and pay the salaries and emoluments of such persons from its own funds, at a scale fixed by it. The salaries and emoluments so paid may be taxed by the Party concerned but shall be exempted from taxation by any other Party. If such an arrangement is entered into by any Party to the present Protocol and is sub-
sequently modified or terminated, Parties to the present Protocol shall no longer be bound under the first sentence of this paragraph to exempt from taxation the salaries and emoluments paid to their nationals.

**Article 8**

1. For the purpose of facilitating the establishment, construction, maintenance and operation of Allied Headquarters, these Headquarters shall be relieved, so far as practicable, from duties and taxes, affecting expenditures by them in the interest of common defense and for their official and exclusive benefit, and each Party to the present Protocol shall enter into negotiations with any Allied Headquarters operating in its territory for the purpose of concluding an agreement to give effect to this provision.

2. An Allied Headquarters shall have the rights granted to a force under Article XI of the Agreement subject to the same conditions.

3. The provisions in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article XI of the Agreement shall not apply to nationals of the receiving States, unless such nationals belong to the armed services of a Party to this Protocol other than the receiving State.

4. The expression 'duties and taxes' in this Article does not include charges for services rendered.

**Article 9**

Except in so far as the North Atlantic Council may decide otherwise,

(a) any assets acquired from the international funds of an Allied Headquarters under its capital budget and no longer required by the Headquarters shall be disposed of under arrangements approved by the North Atlantic Council and the proceeds shall be distributed among or credited to the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in the proportions in which they have contributed to the capital costs of the Headquarters. The receiving State shall have the prior right to acquire any immovable property so disposed of in its territory, provided that it offers terms no less favourable than those offered by any third party;

(b) any land, buildings or fixed installations provided for the use of an Allied Headquarters by the receiving State without charge to the Headquarters (other than a nominal charge) and no longer required by the Headquarters shall be handed back to the receiving State, and any increase or loss in the value of the property provided by the receiving State resulting from its use by the Headquarters shall be determined by the North Atlantic Council (taking into consideration any applicable law of the receiving State) and distributed among or credited or debited to the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in the proportions in which they have contributed to the capital costs of the Headquarters.

**Article 10**

Each Supreme Headquarters shall possess juridical personality; it shall have the capacity to conclude contracts and to acquire and dispose of property. The receiving State may, however, make the exercise of such capacity subject to special
arrangements between it and the Supreme Headquarters or any subordinate Allied Headquarters acting on behalf of the Supreme Headquarters.

**Article 11**

1. Subject to the provisions of Article VIII of the Agreement, a Supreme Headquarters may engage in legal proceedings as claimant or defendant. However, the receiving State and the Supreme Headquarters or any subordinate Allied Headquarters authorised by it may agree that the receiving State shall act on behalf of the Supreme Headquarters in any legal proceedings to which that Headquarters is a party before the courts of the receiving State.

2. No measure of execution or measure directed to the seizure or attachment of its property or funds shall be taken against any Allied Headquarters, except for the purposes of paragraph 6 (a) of Article VII and Article XIII of the Agreement.

**Article 12**

1. To enable it to operate its international budget, an Allied Headquarters may hold currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency.

2. The Parties to the present Protocol shall, at the request of an Allied Headquarters, facilitate transfers of the funds of such Headquarters from one country to another and the conversion of any currency held by an Allies Headquarters into any other currency, when necessary to meet the requirements of any Allied Headquarters.

**Article 13**

The archives and other official documents of an Allied Headquarters kept in premises used by those Headquarters or in the possession of any properly authorised member of the Headquarters shall be inviolable, unless the Headquarters has waived this immunity. The Headquarters shall, at the request of the receiving State and in the presence of a representative of that State, verify the nature of any documents to confirm that they are entitled to immunity under this Article.

**Article 14**

1. The whole or any part of the present Protocol or of the Agreement may be applied, by decision of the North Atlantic Council, to any international military Headquarters or organisation (not included in the definitions in paragraphs (b) and (c) of Article 1 of this Protocol) which is established pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. When the European Defence Community comes into being, the present Protocol may be applied to the personnel of the European Defence Forces attached to an Allied Headquarters and their dependents at such time and in such manner as may be determined by the North Atlantic Council.

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**Article 15**

All differences between the Parties to the present Protocol or between any such Parties and any Allied Headquarters relating to the interpretation or application of the Protocol shall be settled by negotiation between the parties in dispute without recourse to any outside jurisdiction. Except where express provision is made to the contrary in the present Protocol or in the Agreement, differences which cannot be settled by direct negotiation shall be referred to the North Atlantic Council.

**Article 16**

1. Articles XV and XVII to XX of the Agreement shall apply as regards the present Protocol as if they were an integral part thereof, but so that the Protocol may be reviewed, suspended, ratified, acceded to, denounced or extended in accordance with those provisions independently from the Agreement.

2. The present Protocol may be supplemented by bilateral agreement between the receiving State and a Supreme Headquarters, and the authorities of a receiving State and a Supreme Headquarters may agree to give effect, by administrative means in advance of ratification, to any provisions of this Protocol or of the Agreement as applied by it.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

Done in Paris this 28th day of August 1952, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory and acceding States.
AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF

The States signatory to the present Agreement,

Considering that for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their purposes it is necessary that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its international staff and the representatives of Member States attending meetings thereof should have the status set out hereunder,

Have agreed as follows:

Part I. - General

Article 1

In the present Agreement,

(a) 'the Organization' means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization consisting of the Council and its subsidiary bodies;
(b) 'the Council' means the Council established under Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Council Deputies;
(c) 'subsidiary bodies' means any organ, committee or service established by the Council or under its authority, except those to which, in accordance with Article 2, this Agreement does not apply;
(d) 'Chairman of the Council Deputies' includes, in his absence, the Vice-Chairman acting for him.

Article 2

The present Agreement shall not apply to any military headquarters established in pursuance of the North Atlantic Treaty nor, unless the Council decides otherwise, to any other military bodies.

Article 3

The Organization and Member States shall co-operate at all times to facilitate the proper administration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations and prevent the occurrence of any abuse in connexion with the immunities and privileges set out in the present Agreement. If any Member State considers that there has been an abuse of any immunity or privilege conferred by this Agreement, consultations shall be held between that State and the Organization, or between the States concerned, to determine whether any such abuse has occurred, and, if so, to attempt to ensure that no repetition occurs. Notwithstanding the foregoing or any other provisions of this Agreement, a Member State which considers that any person has abused his privilege of residence or any other privilege or immunity granted to him under this Agreement may require him to leave its territory.
Part II. – The Organization

Article 4

The Organization shall possess juridical personality; it shall have the capacity to conclude contracts, to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property and to institute legal proceedings.

Article 5

The Organization, its property and assets, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case the Chairman of the Council Deputies, acting on behalf of the Organization, may expressly authorise the waiver of this immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution or detention of property.

Article 6

The premises of the Organization shall be inviolable. Its property and assets, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any other form of interference.

Article 7

The archives of the Organization and all documents belonging to it or held by it shall be inviolable, wherever located.

Article 8

1. Without being restricted by financial controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind,

(a) the Organization may hold currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency;

(b) the Organization may freely transfer its funds from one country to another or within any country and convert any currency held by it into any other currency at the most favourable official rate of exchange for a sale or purchase as the case may be.

2. In exercising its rights under paragraph 1 above, the Organization shall pay due regard to any representations made by any Member State and shall give effect to such representations in so far as it is practicable to do so.

Article 9

The Organization, its assets, income and other property shall be exempt:

(a) from all direct taxes; the Organization will not, however, claim exemption
from rates, taxes or dues which are no more than charges for public utility services;

(b) from all customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports in respect of articles imported or exported by the Organization for its official use; articles imported under such exemption shall not be disposed of, by way either of sale or gift, in the country into which they are imported except under conditions approved by the Government of that country;

(c) from all customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports in respect of its publications.

**Article 10**

While the Organization will not as a general rule claim exemption from excise duties and from taxes on the sale of movable and immovable property which form part of the price to be paid, nevertheless, when the Organization is making important purchases for official use of property on which such duties and taxes have been charged or are chargeable, Member States will whenever possible make the appropriate administrative arrangements for the remission or return of the amount of duty or tax.

**Article 11**

1. No censorship shall be applied to the official correspondence and other official communications of the Organization.

2. The Organization shall have the right to use codes and to despatch and receive correspondence by courier or in sealed bags, which shall have the same immunities and privileges as diplomatic couriers and bags.

3. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to preclude the adoption of appropriate security precautions to be determined by agreement between a Member State and the Council acting on behalf of the Organization.

**Part .III. – Representatives of Member States**

**Article 12**

Every person designated by a Member State as its principal permanent representative to the Organization in the territory of another Member State, and such members of his official staff resident in that territory as may be agreed between the State which has designated them and the Organization and between the Organization and the State in which they will be resident, shall enjoy the immunities and privileges accorded to diplomatic representatives and their official staff of comparable rank.

**Article 13**

1. Any representative of a Member State to the Council or any of its subsidiary bodies who is not covered by Article 12 shall, while present in the territory of another Member State for the discharge of his duties, enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
(a) the same immunity from personal arrest or detention as that accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;
(b) in respect of words spoken or written and of acts done by him in his official capacity, immunity from legal process;
(c) inviolability for all papers and documents;
(d) the right to use codes and to receive and send papers or correspondence by courier or in sealed bags;
(e) the same exemption in respect of himself and his spouse from immigration restrictions, aliens registration and national service obligations as that accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;
(f) the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;
(g) the same immunities and facilities in respect of his personal baggage as are accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;
(h) the right to import free of duty his furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up his post in the country in question, and, on the termination of his functions in that country, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty, subject in either case to such conditions as the Government of the country in which the right is being exercised may deem necessary;
(i) the right to import temporarily free of duty his private motor vehicle for his own personal use and subsequently to re-export such vehicle free of duty, subject in either case to such conditions as the Government of the country concerned may deem necessary.

2. Where the legal incidence of any form of taxation depends upon residence, a period during which a representative to whom this Article applies is present in the territory of another Member State for the discharge of his duties shall not be considered as a period of residence. In particular, he shall be exempt from taxation on his official salary and emoluments during such periods of duty.

3. In this Article ‘representative’ shall be deemed to include all representatives, advisers and technical experts of delegations. Each Member State shall communicate to the other Member States concerned, if they so request, the names of its representatives to whom this Article applies and the probable duration of their stay in the territories of such other Member States.

**Article 14**

Official clerical staff accompanying a representative of a Member State who are not covered by Articles 12 or 13 shall, while present in the territory of another Member State for the discharge of their duties, be accorded the privileges and immunities set out in paragraph 1 (b), (c), (e), (f), (h) and (i) and paragraph 2 of Article 13.

**Article 15**

Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of Member States and their staffs not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty. Consequently, a Member State not only has the right, but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its representatives and members of
their staffs in any case where, in its opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the purposes for which the immunity is accorded.

**Article 16**

The provisions of Articles 12 to 14 above shall not require any State to grant any the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national or to any person as its representative or as a member of the staff of such representative.

**Part IV. – International Staff and Experts on Missions for the Organization**

**Article 17**

The categories of officials of the Organization to which Articles 18 to 20 apply shall be agreed between the Chairman of the Council Deputies and each of the Member States concerned. The Chairman of the Council Deputies shall communicate to the Member States the names of the officials included in these categories.

**Article 18**

Officials of the Organization agreed upon under Article 17 shall:

(a) be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and of acts done by them in their official capacity and within the limits of their authority;

(b) be granted, together with their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with and dependent on them, the same immunities from immigration restrictions and aliens' registration as is accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;

(c) be accorded the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;

(d) be given, together with their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with and dependent on them, the same repatriation facilities in time of international crisis as are accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;

(e) have the right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their post in the country in question, and, on the termination of their functions in that country, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty, subject in either case to such conditions as the Government of the country in which the right is being exercised may deem necessary;

(f) have the right to import temporarily free of duty their private motor vehicles for their own personal use and subsequently to re-export such vehicles free of duty, subject in either case to such conditions as the Government of the country concerned may deem necessary.
Article 19

Officials of the Organization agreed under Article 17 shall be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the Organization in their capacity as such officials. Any Member State may, however, conclude an arrangement with the Council acting on behalf of the Organization whereby such Member State will employ and assign to the Organization all of its nationals (except, if such Member State so desires, any not ordinarily resident within its territory) who are to serve on the international staff of the Organization and pay the salaries and emoluments of such persons from its own funds at a scale fixed by it. The salaries and emoluments so paid may be taxed by such Member State but shall be exempt from taxation by any other Member State. If such an arrangement is entered into by any Member State and is subsequently modified or terminated, Member States shall no longer be bound under the first sentence of this Article to exempt from taxation the salaries and emoluments paid to their nationals.

Article 20

In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in Articles 18 and 19, the Executive Secretary of the Organization, the Co-ordinator of North Atlantic Defence Production, and such other permanent officials of similar rank as may be agreed the Chairman of the Council Deputies and the Governments of Member States, shall be accorded the privileges and immunities normally accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank.

Article 21

1. Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Articles 18 to 20) employed on missions on behalf of the Organization shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities so far as is necessary for the effective exercise of their functions while present in the territory of a Member State for the discharge of their duties:
   (a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage;
   (b) in respect of words spoken or written or acts done by them in the performance of their official functions for the Organization, immunity from legal process;
   (c) the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions and in respect of their personal baggage as are accorded to officials of foreign Governments on temporary official missions;
   (d) inviolability for all papers and documents relating to the work on which they are engaged for the Organization.

2. The Chairman of the Council Deputies shall communicate to the Member States concerned the names of any experts to whom this Article applies.

Article 22

Privileges and immunities are granted to officials and experts in the interests of...
the Organization and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Chairman of the Council Deputies shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official or expert in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the Organization.

**Article 23**

The provisions of Articles 18, 20 and 21, above shall not require any State to grant any of the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national, except:

(a) immunity from legal process in respect of words spoken or written or acts done by him in the performance of his official functions for the Organization;

(b) inviolability for all papers and documents relating to the work on which he is engaged for the Organization;

(c) facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions so far as necessary for the effective exercise of his functions.

**Part V. – Settlement of Disputes**

**Article 24**

The Council shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of:

(a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private character to which the Organization is a party;

(b) disputes involving any official or expert of the Organization to whom Part IV of this Agreement applies who by reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived in accordance with the provisions of Article 22.

**Part VI. – Supplementary Agreements**

**Article 25**

The Council acting on behalf of the Organization may conclude with any Member State or States supplementary agreements modifying the provisions of the present Agreement, so far as that State or those States are concerned.

**Part VII. – Final Provisions**

**Article 26**

1. The present Agreement shall be open for signature by Member States of the Organization and shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all signatory States of each such deposit.
2. As soon as six signatory States have deposited their instruments of ratification, the present Agreement shall come into force in respect of those States. It shall come into force in respect of each other signatory State, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE 27

The present Agreement may be denounced by any Contracting State by giving written notification of denunciation to the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all signatory States of each such notification. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the receipt of the notification by the Government of the United States of America.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement.

DONE in Ottawa this twentieth day of September, 1951, in French and in English, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which will transmit a certified copy to each of the signatory States.
SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDICES
NOTE: The documents printed in the Supplementary Appendices are concerned with the London and Paris Conferences of October, 1954. They fall, therefore, outside the period of NATO’s history dealt with in the survey. Their inclusion—at the last minute—was decided because of their exceptional importance to the future of the Atlantic Alliance.

The Nine-Power Conference which ended in London on the 3rd October, 1954, elaborated agreements to reinforce the defence of the West and provide for a German contribution following the rejection by the French Assembly of the EDC Treaty. At their meetings in Paris (October 20th—22nd), the Ministers put the finishing touches to the work they had begun in London, and on the 23rd October they signed agreements giving the Federal Republic her sovereignty, extending the Brussels Treaty to Italy and Germany, setting up the new Western European Organization, and allowing for the accession of the Federal Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty.

These agreements, when ratified and applied, will massively reinforce European and Atlantic unity. In conjunction with the Franco-German agreement on the Saar, and the Italo-Yugoslav agreement on Trieste, they constitute the most significant contribution to the maintenance of peace in the West since the signature on the 4th April, 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty itself.

SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX I

FINAL ACT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE
(3rd October, 1954)

The Conference of the Nine Powers, Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States met in London from Tuesday the 28th September, to Sunday the 3rd October, 1954. It dealt with the most important issues facing the Western world, security and European integration within the framework of a developing Atlantic community dedicated to peace and freedom. In this connexion the Conference considered how to assure the full association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West and the German defence contribution.

Belgium was represented by M.P.H. Spaak, Canada by Mr. L.B. Pearson, France by M.P. Mendès-France, Germany by Dr. K. Adenauer, Italy by Professor G. Martino, Luxembourg by M. J. Bech, the Netherlands by Dr. J. W. Beyen, the United Kingdom by Mr. A. Eden, and the United States by Mr. J. F. Dulles.

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All the decisions of the Conference formed part of one general settlement which is, directly or indirectly, of concern to all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Powers, and which will therefore be submitted to the North Atlantic Council for information or decision.

I. GERMANY

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States declare that their policy is to end the Occupation régime in the Federal Republic as soon as possible, to revoke the Occupation Statute and to abolish the Allied High Commission. The Three Governments will continue to discharge certain responsibilities in Germany arising out of the international situation.

It is intended to conclude, and to bring into force as soon as the necessary parliamentary procedures have been completed, the appropriate instruments for these purposes. General agreement has already been reached on the content of these instruments, and representatives of the Four Governments will meet in the very near future to complete the final texts. The agreed arrangements may be put into effect either before or simultaneously with the arrangements for the German defence contribution.

As these arrangements will take a little time to complete, the three Governments have in the meantime issued the following Declaration of Intent:

'Recognising that this great country can no longer be deprived of the rights properly belonging to a free and democratic people; and
Desiring to associate the Federal Republic of Germany on a footing of equality with their efforts for peace and security;
The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America desire to end the Occupation régime as soon as possible.

The fulfilment of this policy calls for the settlement of problems of detail in order to liquidate the past and to prepare for the future, and requires the completion of appropriate Parliamentary procedures.

In the meantime, the three Governments are instructing their High Commissioners to act forthwith in accordance with the spirit of the above policy. In particular, the High Commissioners will not use the powers which are to be relinquished unless in agreement with the Federal Government, except in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation and in cases where the Federal Government has not been able for legal reasons to take the action or assume the obligations contemplated in the agreed arrangement.

II. BRUSSELS TREATY

The Brussels Treaty will be strengthened and extended to make it a more effective focus of European integration.

For this purpose the following arrangements have been agreed upon:
(a) The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy will be invited to accede to the Treaty, suitably modified to emphasise the objective of European unity, and they have declared themselves ready to do so. The system of mutual automatic assistance in case of attack will thus be extended to the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy.
(b) The structure of the Brussels Treaty will be reinforced. In particular the
Consultative Council provided in the Treaty will become a Council with powers of decision.

(c) The activities of the Brussels Treaty Organization will be extended to include further important tasks as follows:

The size and general characteristics of the German defence contribution will conform to the contribution fixed for EDC.

The maximum defence contribution to NATO of all members of the Brussels Treaty Organization will be determined by a special agreement fixing levels which can only be increased by unanimous consent.

The strength and armaments of the internal defence forces and the police on the Continent of the countries members of the Brussels Treaty Organization will be fixed by agreements within that Organization, having regard to their proper functions and to existing levels and needs.

The Brussels Treaty Powers agree to set up, as part of the Brussels Treaty Organization, an Agency for the control of armaments on the Continent of Europe of the continental members of the Brussels Treaty Organization. The detailed provisions are as follows:

1. The functions of the Agency shall be:
   (a) to ensure that the prohibition of the manufacture of certain types of armaments as agreed between the Brussels Powers is being observed;
   (b) to control the level of stocks held by each country on the Continent of the types of armaments mentioned in the following paragraph. This control shall extend to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.

2. The types of armaments to be controlled under 1 (b) above shall be:
   (a) weapons in categories I, II, and III listed in Annex II to Article 107 of the EDC Treaty;
   (b) weapons in the other categories listed in Annex II to Article 107 of the EDC Treaty;
   (c) a list of major weapons taken from Annex I to the same Article, to be established hereafter by an expert working group. Measures will be taken to exclude from control materials and products in the above lists for civil use.*

3. As regards the weapons referred to under paragraph 2 (a) above, when the countries which have not given up the right to produce them have passed the experimental stage and start effective production, the level of stocks that they will be allowed to hold on the Continent shall be decided by the Brussels Treaty Council by a majority vote.

4. The continental members of the Brussels Treaty Organization agree not to build up stocks nor to produce the armaments mentioned in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) beyond the limits required (a) for the equipment of their forces, taking into account any imports including external aid, and (b) for export.

5. The requirements for their NATO forces shall be established on the basis of the results of the Annual Review and the recommendations of the NATO military authorities.

6. For forces remaining under national control, the level of stocks must

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* Weapons in categories I, II and III listed in Annex II to Article 107 of the EDC Treaty are atomic weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons. Weapons in other categories listed in this annex are long-range missiles, guided missiles, and influence mines; naval vessels other than minor defensive craft; and military aircraft. Annex I to Article 107 of the EDC Treaty divides conventional and unconventional armaments into a number of categories.
correspond to the size and mission of those forces. That level shall be notified to the Agency.

7. All imports or exports of the controlled arms will be notified to the Agency.

8. The Agency will operate through the collation and examination of statistical and budgetary data. It will undertake test checks and will make such visits and inspections as may be required to fulfil its functions as defined in paragraph 1 above.

9. The basic rules of procedure for the Agency shall be laid down in a Protocol to the Brussels Treaty.

10. If the Agency finds that the prohibitions are not being observed, or that the appropriate level of stocks is being exceeded, it will so inform the Brussels Council.

11. The Agency will report and be responsible to the Brussels Council which will take its decisions by a majority vote on questions submitted by the Agency.

12. The Brussels Council will make an Annual Report on its activities concerning the control of armaments to the Delegates of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

13. The Governments of the United States and Canada will notify the Brussels Treaty Organization of the military aid to be distributed to the continental members of that Organization. The Organization may make written observations.

14. The Brussels Council will establish a Working Group in order to study the draft directive presented by the French Government and any other papers which may be submitted on the subject of armaments production and standardisation.

15. The Brussels Treaty Powers have taken note of the following Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and record their agreement with it:

'The Federal Chancellor declares:

that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons, as detailed in paragraphs I, II and III of the attached list*;

that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraphs IV, V and VI of the attached list. Any amendment to or cancellation of the substance of paragraphs IV, V and VI can, on the request of the Federal Republic, be carried out by a resolution of the Brussels Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority, if in accordance with the

* List appended to the Declaration by the Federal Chancellor: This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs I to VI and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

1. Atomic Weapons (Text as in paragraph I of Annex II to Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty, page 253.)

2. Chemical Weapons (Text as in paragraph II of Annex II to Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty, page 253.)

3. Biological Weapons (Text as in paragraph III of Annex II to Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty, page 253.)

4. Long-Range Missiles, Guided Missiles, and Influence Mines (Text as in paragraph IV of Annex III to Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty, page 254.)

5. Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes (Text as in paragraph V of Annex III to Protocol No. III to the Brussels Treaty, page 254.)

6. Bomber Aircraft for Strategic Purposes
needs of the armed forces a request is made by the competent Supreme Commander of NATO;
that the Federal Republic agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organization to ensure that these undertakings are observed.'

The closest possible co-operation with NATO shall be established in all fields.

III. UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM
AND CANADIAN ASSURANCES

The United States Secretary of State set forth the willingness of the United States to continue its support for European unity, in accordance with the following statement:

'If, using the Brussels Treaty as a nucleus, it is possible to find in this new pattern a continuing hope of unity among the countries of Europe that are represented here, and if the hopes that were tied into the European Defence Community Treaty can reasonably be transferred into the arrangements which will be the outgrowth of this meeting, then I would certainly be disposed to recommend to the President that he should renew the assurance offered last spring in connection with the European Defence Community Treaty to the effect that the United States will continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area while a threat to the area exists and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defence of this area.'

The United Kingdom confirmed its active participation in the Brussels Treaty Organization and gave the following assurance about the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe:

'The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces now assigned to SACEUR, four divisions and the Tactical Air Force, or whatever SACEUR regards as equivalent fighting capacity. The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw those forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers, who should take their decision in the knowledge of SACEUR's views.

This undertaking would be subject to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency might oblige Her Majesty's Government to omit this procedure.

If the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too heavy a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom will invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the formations are maintained.'

Canada reaffirmed in the following statement its resolve to discharge the continuing obligations arising out of its membership in NATO and its support of the objective of European unity:

'As far as we are concerned, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for
the development of closer co-operation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. While we emphasise, then, our belief in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we welcome the proposed extension of the Brussels Treaty. We shall look forward to a growing relationship, within the framework of NATO, with the new Brussels Treaty Organization, composed of countries with whom we are already bound by such close ties.'

IV. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The Powers present at the Conference which are members of NATO agreed to recommend at the next ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council that the Federal Republic of Germany should forthwith be invited to become a member.

They further agreed to recommend to NATO that its machinery be reinforced in the following respects:

(a) All forces of NATO countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the exception of those which NATO has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command.

(b) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with NATO strategy.

(c) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned.

(d) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his consent, subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.

(e) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.

(f) Arrangements shall be made for the closer co-ordination of logistics by SACEUR.

(g) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments and equipment, logistics, and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.

The Conference recorded the view of all the Governments represented that the North Atlantic Treaty should be regarded as of indefinite duration.

V. DECLARATION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY AND JOINT DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF FRANCE, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES

The following declarations were recorded at the Conference by the German Federal Chancellor and by the Foreign Ministers of France, United Kingdom and United States

DECLARATION BY THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.

Upon her accession to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany declares that she will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the two Treaties. In particular the Federal Republic of Germany undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States.

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND FRANCE

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic.

Being resolved to devote their efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in particular with the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter

(i) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
(ii) to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations take preventive or enforcement action;
(iv) to ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Having regard to the purely defensive character of the Atlantic Alliance which is manifest in the North Atlantic Treaty, wherein they reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and undertake to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the Charter and to refrain, in accordance with those principles, from the threat or use of force in their international relations.

Take note that the Federal Republic of Germany has by a Declaration dated the Third of October, Nineteen hundred and Fifty Four accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States:

DECLARE THAT

1. They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.
2. In their relations with the Federal Republic they will follow the principles set out in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.
3. A peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between

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Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.

4. The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.

5. The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.

6. They will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic Alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three Governments, for their part, will consider the offending Government as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic Treaty and its Protocols. They will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty with a view to taking other measures which may be appropriate.

7. They will invite the association of other member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with this Declaration.

VI. FUTURE PROCEDURE

The Conference agreed that representatives of the Governments concerned should work out urgently the texts of detailed agreements to give effect to the principles laid down above. These will be submitted, where appropriate, to the North Atlantic Council, and to the four Governments directly concerned with the future status of the Federal Republic. The Conference hoped that it would be possible to hold a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the Twenty-second of October to decide on the arrangements affecting NATO. This will be preceded by meetings of the four Foreign Ministers on the question of German sovereignty and of the nine Foreign Ministers.

These agreements and arrangements constitute a notable contribution to world peace. A Western Europe is now emerging which, resting on the close association of the United Kingdom with the Continent and on the growing friendship between the participating countries, will reinforce the Atlantic community. The system elaborated by the Conference will further the development of European unity and integration.

ANNEX I TO THE FINAL ACT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE

DRAFT DECLARATION INVITING THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND ITALY TO ACCEDE TO THE BRUSSELS TREATY

The Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, parties to the Brussels Treaty of 17th March, 1948, for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for legitimate collective self-defence;
Aware that the principles underlying the association created by the Brussels Treaty are also recognised and applied by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy;

Noting with satisfaction that their devotion to peace and their allegiance to democratic institutions constitute common bonds between the countries of Western Europe;

Convinced that an association with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would represent a new and substantial advance in the direction already indicated by the Treaty;

DECIDE

In application of Article IX of the Treaty, to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty, as revised and completed by the Protocol and (list of agreements and documents) * of

DRAFT PROTOCOL TO THE BRUSSELS TREATY

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-defence, signed at Brussels on March 17th, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, on the one hand,

and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand,

inspired by a common will to strengthen peace and security,

desirous to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe,

convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the Treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims:

Have appointed, &c. ........

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the Treaty, as revised and completed by the present Protocol and the (list of agreements and documents.) *

ARTICLE II

(a) The sub-paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty ‘to take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression’ shall be modified to read:

‘to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe.’

(b) the following new article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IV:

‘IV. In execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

* These agreements and documents will be specified in the final text.

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The present Article IV of the Treaty and the succeeding articles shall be re-numbered accordingly.

(c) Article VIII, formerly Article VII, of the Treaty, shall read:

'For the purpose of consulting together on all questions dealt with in the present Treaty and its Protocol and the agreements and other documents set out in Article I above and of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between member States and with other European organizations, the High Contracting Parties will create a Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.'

**ARTICLE III**

The present Protocol and the agreements set out in Article I above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government. They shall enter into force upon the date of deposit of the last instrument of ratification.

**ANNEX III* TO THE FINAL ACT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE**

CONFERENCE PAPER ON 'A GERMAN DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION AND ARRANGEMENTS TO APPLY TO SACEUR'S FORCES ON THE CONTINENT'

The nine Governments represented at the London Conference agree to instruct representatives to draw up in Paris, in concert with the military and civilian agencies of NATO through the Secretary General, detailed proposals, for approval by the North Atlantic Council, for a German defence contribution and arrangements to be applied to SACEUR's forces on the Continent. These detailed proposals shall be based on the following principles agreed between the nine Governments:

1. (a) The seven Brussels Treaty Powers will conclude a special agreement setting out the forces each of them will place under SACEUR on the Continent.

(b) The German contribution shall conform in size and general characteristics to the contribution fixed for the EDC brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make it suitable for NATO.

(c) The terms of this special agreement will be agreed with the other NATO countries.

(d) If any time the NATO Annual Review recommends an increase above the figures in the Brussels Special Agreement such increase will require the unanimous approval of the Brussels Powers expressed in the Brussels Council or in NATO.

* Annex II to the Final Act of the London Conference consisted of statements by Mr. Dulles, Mr. Eden and Mr. Pearson at the Fourth Plenary Meeting on the 29th September, 1954.
(e) The Brussels Powers will ask that arrangements be made for SACEUR to designate a high-ranking officer who will be instructed to transmit regularly to the Brussels Treaty Organization information acquired as indicated in 3 (f) below in order to permit that Organization to establish that the figures agreed among the Brussels Powers are being observed.

2. All forces of NATO countries stationed on the Continent of Europe shall be placed under the authority of SACEUR, with the exception of the forces which NATO has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command. The strength and armaments on the Continent of the internal defence forces and of the police belonging to the members of the Brussels Treaty Organization shall be fixed by agreements made within this Organization, taking into account the task for which they are intended and on the basis of existing levels and needs.

3. **Arrangements to Apply to Saceur’s Forces**
   
   (a) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be deployed in accordance with NATO strategy.
   
   (b) The location of such forces shall be determined by SACEUR after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned.
   
   (c) Such forces shall not be redeployed on the Continent nor used operationally on the Continent without his consent subject to appropriate political guidance from the North Atlantic Council.
   
   (d) Forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent shall be integrated as far as possible consistent with military efficiency.
   
   (e) Arrangements shall be made for the closer coordination of logistics by SACEUR.
   
   (f) The level and effectiveness of forces placed under SACEUR on the Continent and the armaments, equipment, logistics and reserve formations of those forces on the Continent shall be inspected by SACEUR.
DECLARATION INVITING THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND ITALY TO ACCEDE TO THE BRUSSELS TREATY

The Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Parties to the Brussels Treaty of March the 17th, 1948, for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for legitimate collective self-defence;

Aware that the principles underlying the association created by the Brussels Treaty are also recognised and applied by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy;

Noting with satisfaction that their devotion to peace and their allegiance to democratic institutions constitute common bonds between the countries of Western Europe;

Convinced that an association with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would represent a new and substantial advance in the direction already indicated by the Treaty;

DECIDE,

in application of Article IX of the Treaty, to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to this Treaty, as modified and completed in accordance with the decisions of the Conference held in London from September the 28th to October the 3rd 1954, which are recorded in its Final Act.

PROTOCOL MODIFYING AND COMPLETING THE BRUSSELS TREATY

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on March the 17th, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, on the one hand,

and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand,

Inspired by a common will to strengthen peace and security;

Desirous to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe;

Convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the Treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims;
Having taken into consideration the decisions of the London Conference as set out in the Final Act of October the 3rd, 1954 and its Annexes;
Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
Who, having exhibited their full powers found in good and due form,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

**ARTICLE I**

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the Treaty as modified and completed by the present Protocol.

The High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol consider the Protocol on Forces of Western European Union (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. II), the Protocol on the Control of Armaments and its Annexes (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. III), and the Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. IV) to be an integral part of the present Protocol.

**ARTICLE II**

The sub-paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty: ‘to take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression’ shall be modified to read: ‘to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe’.

The opening words of the 2nd paragraph of Article I shall read: ‘The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VIII . . .’.

**ARTICLE III**

The following new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IV: ‘In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

Articles IV, V, VI and VII of the Treaty will become respectively Articles V, VI, VII and VIII.

**ARTICLE IV**

Article VIII of the Treaty (formerly Article VII) shall be modified to read as follows:
‘1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organizations, the High
Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.

2. This Council shall be known as the 'Council of Western European Union'; it shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary: in particular it shall establish immediately an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in Protocol No. IV.

3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments'.

**Article V**

A new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IX: 'The Council of Western European Union shall make an Annual Report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe'.

The Articles VIII, IX and X of the Treaty shall become respectively Articles X, XI and XII.

**Article VI**

The present Protocol and the other Protocols listed in Article I above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

They shall enter into force when all instruments of ratification of the present Protocol have been deposited with the Belgian Government and the instrument of accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

The Belgian Government shall inform the governments of the other High Contracting Parties and the Government of the United States of America of the deposit of each instrument of ratification.

In Witness whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris this twenty-third day of October 1954 in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.
PROTOCOL NO. II ON FORCES OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Having consulted the North Atlantic Council,

Have appointed . . . . .,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

ARTICLE 1

1. The land and air forces which each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall place under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime on the mainland of Europe shall not exceed in total strength and number of formations:

(a) for Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the maxima laid down for peacetime in the Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty on the Establishment of a European Defence Community signed at Paris, on 27th May, 1952; and

(b) for the United Kingdom, four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force;

(c) for Luxembourg, one regimental combat team.

2. The number of formations mentioned in paragraph 1 may be brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make them suitable for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, provided that the equivalent fighting capacity and total strengths are not exceeded.

3. The statement of these maxima does not commit any of the High Contracting Parties to build up or maintain forces at these levels, but maintains their right to do so if required.

ARTICLE 2

As regards naval forces, the contribution to NATO Commands of each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be determined each year in the course of the Annual Review (which takes into account the recommendations of the NATO military authorities). The naval forces of the Federal Republic of Germany shall consist of the vessels and formations necessary for the defensive missions assigned to it by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization within the limits laid down in the Special Agreement mentioned in Article 1, or equivalent fighting capacity.

ARTICLE 3

If at any time during the Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits specified
in Articles 1 and 2, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended
increases shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the High Contracting
Parties to the present Protocol expressed either in the Council of Western
European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ARTICLE 4

In order that it may establish that the limits specified in Articles 1 and 2 are
being observed, the Council of Western European Union will regularly receive
information acquired as a result of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe. Such information will be transmitted by a high-ranking
officer designated for the purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

ARTICLE 5

The strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the
mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall
be fixed by agreements within the Organization of Western European Union,
having regard to their proper functions and needs and to their existing levels.

ARTICLE 6

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany,
the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, that is to say four divisions and the
Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. She undertakes not
to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the High Contract-
ing Parties who should take their decision in the knowledge of the views of the
Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This undertaking shall not, however, bind
her in the event of an acute overseas emergency. If the maintenance of the United
Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too great a strain
on the external finances of the United Kingdom, she will, through Her Govern-
ment in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, invite the
North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the United
Kingdom formations are maintained.

IN WITNESS whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the
present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol
Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at Paris this twenty-third day of October, 1954, in two texts, in the
English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single
copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government
and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each
of the other Signatories.
PROTOCOL NO. III ON THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, the President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, have appointed . . .

Have agreed as follows:

Part I - Armaments not to be manufactured

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, take note of and record their agreement with the Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (made in London on 3rd October, 1954, and annexed hereto as Annex I) in which the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are defined in Annex II. These armaments shall be more closely defined and the definitions brought up to date by the Council of Western European Union.

Article 2

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, also take note of and record their agreement with the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in the same Declaration that certain further types of armaments will not be manufactured in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, except that if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a recommendation for an amendment to, or cancellation of, the content of the list of these armaments is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany submits a request accordingly, such an amendment or cancellation may be made by a resolution of the Council of Western European Union passed by a two-thirds majority. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are listed in Annex III.

Part II - Armaments to be controlled

Article 3

When the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties who have not
given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the High Contracting Parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of Western European Union.

**Article 4**

Without prejudice to the foregoing Articles, the types of armaments listed in Annex IV will be controlled to the extent and in the manner laid down in Protocol No. IV.

**Article 5**

The Council of Western European Union may vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision.

In Witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris on the twenty-third day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

**ANNEX I**

The Federal Chancellor declares:

that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons, as detailed in paragraphs I, II and III of the attached list (**);

that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraphs IV, V and VI of the attached list (\(^2\)). Any amendment to or cancellation of the substance of paragraphs IV, V and VI can, on the request of the Federal Republic, be carried out by a resolution of the Brussels Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority, if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a request is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

that the Federal Republic agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organization to ensure that these undertakings are observed.

**ANNEX II**

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs I to III and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installa-

\(^1\) Reproduced in Annex II.
\(^2\) Reproduced in Annex III.
tions, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

I. **Atomic Weapons**

(a) An atomic weapon is defined as any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilise, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning.

(b) Furthermore, any part, device, assembly or material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, any weapon as set forth under paragraph (a), shall be deemed to be an atomic weapon.

(c) Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, Uranium 233, Uranium 235 (including Uranium 235 contained in Uranium enriched to over 2.1 per cent by weight of Uranium 235) and any other material capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear fission or fusion or other nuclear reaction of the material. The foregoing materials shall be considered to be nuclear fuel regardless of the chemical or physical form in which they exist.

II. **Chemical Weapons**

(a) A chemical weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralysant, growth-regulating, anti-lubricating or catalysing properties of any chemical substance.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (c), chemical substances, having such properties and capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in paragraph (a), shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(c) Such apparatus and such quantities of the chemical substances as are referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from this definition.

III. **Biological Weapons**

(a) A biological weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, harmful insects or other living or dead organisms, or their toxic products.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (c), insects, organisms and their toxic products of such nature and in such amounts as to make them capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in (a) shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(c) Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the insects, organisms and their toxic products as are referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from the definition of biological weapons.
ANNEX III

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs IV to VI and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

IV. Long-range Missiles, Guided Missiles and Influence Mines

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), long-range missiles and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the speed or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (d), influence mines are defined as naval mines which can be exploded automatically by influences which emanate solely from external sources, including influence mines developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof.

(c) Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or with the weapons referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

(d) Proximity fuses, and short-range guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence with the following maximum characteristics are regarded as excluded from this definition:
   - Length, 2 metres;
   - Diameter, 30 centimetres;
   - Speed, 660 metres per second;
   - Ground range, 32 kilometres;
   - Weight of war-head, 22.5 kilogrammes.

V. Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes

Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes are:
(a) Warships of more than 3,000 tons displacement;
(b) Submarines of more than 350 tons displacement;
(c) All warships which are driven by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or by gas turbines or by jet engines.

VI. Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes

ANNEX IV

List of Types of Armaments to be controlled

1. (a) Atomic
   (b) biological, and
   (c) chemical weapons.

In accordance with definitions to be approved by the Council of Western European Union as indicated in Article I of the present Protocol.
2. All guns, howitzers and mortars of any types and of any rôles of more than 90 mm. calibre including the following component for these weapons, viz., the elevating mass.

3. All guided missiles.
   Definition: Guided missiles are such that the speed or direction or motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile; these include V-type weapons developed in the recent war and modifications thereto. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

4. Other self-propelled missiles of a weight exceeding 15 kilogrammes in working order.

5. Mines of all types except anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

6. Tanks, including the following component parts for these tanks, viz.:
   (a) the elevating mass;
   (b) turret castings and/or plate assembly.

7. Other armoured fighting vehicles of an overall weight of more than 10 metric tons.

8. (a) Warships over 1,500 tons displacement;
   (b) submarines;
   (c) all warships powered by means other than steam, diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines;
   (d) small craft capable of a speed of over 30 knots, equipped with offensive armament.

9. Aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kilogrammes.

10. Ammunition for the weapons described in paragraph 2 above.

11. (a) Complete military aircraft other than:
   (i) all training aircraft except operational types used for training purposes;
   (ii) military transport and communication aircraft;
   (iii) helicopters;
   (b) air frames, specifically and exclusively designed for military aircraft except those at (i), (ii) and (iii) above;
   (c) jet engines, turbo-propeller engines and rocket motors, when these are the principal motive power.

PROTOCOL NO. IV ON THE AGENCY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Having agreed in accordance with Article IV of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Having appointed .......

Have agreed as follows:

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Part I — Constitution

Article 1

The Agency for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as 'the Agency') shall be responsible to the Council of Western European Union (hereinafter referred to as 'the Council'). It shall consist of a Director assisted by a Deputy Director, and supported by a staff drawn equitably from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, Members of Western European Union.

Article 2

The Director and his staff, including any officials who may be put at the disposal of the Agency by States Members, shall be subject to the general administrative control of the Secretary General of Western European Union.

Article 3

The Director shall be appointed by unanimous decision of the Council for a period of five years and shall not be eligible for re-appointment. He shall be responsible for the selection of his staff in accordance with the principle mentioned in Article 1 and in consultation with the individual States Members concerned. Before filling the posts of Deputy Director and of the Heads of Departments of the Agency, the Director shall obtain from the Council approval of the persons to be appointed.

Article 4

1. The Director shall submit to the Council, through the Secretary General, a plan for the organization of the Agency. The organization should provide for departments dealing respectively with:
   (a) the examination of statistical and budgetary information to be obtained from the members of Western European Union and from the appropriate NATO authorities;
   (b) inspections, test checks and visits;
   (c) administration.
2. The organization may be modified by decision of the Council.

Article 5

The costs of maintaining the Agency shall appear in the budget of Western European Union. The Director shall submit, through the Secretary General, to the Council an annual estimate of these costs.

Article 6

Officials of the Agency shall be bound by the full NATO code of security. They shall in no circumstances reveal information obtained in connexion with the
execution of their official tasks except and only in the performance of their duties towards the Agency.

Part II – Functions

Article 7

1. The tasks of the Agency shall be:
   (a) to satisfy itself that the undertakings set out in Protocol No. III not to manufacture certain types of armaments mentioned in Annexes II and III to that Protocol are being observed;
   (b) to control, in accordance with Part III of the present Protocol, the level of stocks of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III held by each member of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe. This control shall extend to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.

2. For the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Agency shall:
   (a) scrutinise statistical and budgetary information supplied by members of Western European Union and by the NATO authorities;
   (b) undertake on the mainland of Europe test checks, visits and inspections at production plants, depots and forces (other than depots or forces under NATO authority);
   (c) report to the Council.

Article 8

With respect to forces and depots under NATO authority, test checks, visits and inspections shall be undertaken by the appropriate authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the case of the forces and depots under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Agency shall receive notification of the information supplied to the Council through the medium of the high-ranking officer to be designated by him.

Article 9

The operations of the Agency shall be confined to the mainland of Europe.

Article 10

The Agency shall direct its attention to the production of end-items and components listed in Annexes II, III and IV of Protocol No. III, and not to processes. It shall ensure that materials and products destined for civilian use are excluded from its operations.

Article 11

Inspections by the Agency shall not be of a routine character, but shall be in the nature of tests carried out at irregular intervals. Such inspections shall be con-
ducted in a spirit of harmony and co-operation. The Director shall propose to the Council detailed regulations for the conduct of the inspections providing, *inter alia*, for due process of law in respect of private interests.

**Article 12**

For their test checks, visits and inspections the members of the Agency shall be accorded free access on demand to plants and depots, and the relevant accounts and documents shall be made available to them. The Agency and national authorities shall co-operate in such checks and inspections, and in particular national authorities may, at their own request, take part in them.

**Part III – Levels of Stocks of Armaments**

**Article 13**

1. Each member of Western European Union shall, in respect of its forces under NATO authority stationed on the mainland of Europe, furnish annually to the Agency statements of:
   (a) the total quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III required in relation to its forces;
   (b) the quantities of such armaments currently held at the beginning of the control years;
   (c) the programmes for attaining the total quantities mentioned in (a) by:
      (i) manufacture in its own territory;
      (ii) purchase from another country;
      (iii) end-item aid from another country.
   2. Such statements shall also be furnished by each member of Western European Union in respect of its internal defence and police forces and its other forces under national control stationed on the mainland of Europe including a statement of stocks held there for its forces stationed overseas.
   3. The statements shall be correlated with the relevant submissions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

**Article 14**

As regards the forces under NATO authority, the Agency shall verify in consultation with the appropriate NATO authorities that the total quantities stated under Article 13 are consistent with the quantities recognised as required by the units of the members concerned under NATO authority, and with the conclusions and data recorded in the documents approved by the North Atlantic Council in connection with the NATO Annual Review.

**Article 15**

As regards internal defence and police forces, the total quantities of their arm-
ments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified by the members, provided that they remain within the limits laid down in the further agreements to be concluded by the members of Western European Union on the strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe.

**Article 16**

As regards other forces remaining under national control, the total quantities of their armaments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified to the Agency by the members.

**Article 17**

The figures furnished by members for the total quantities of armaments under Articles 15 and 16 shall correspond to the size and mission of the forces concerned.

**Article 18**

The provisions of Articles 14 and 17 shall not apply to the High Contracting Parties and to the categories of weapons covered in Article 3 of Protocol No. III. Stocks of the weapons in question shall be determined in conformity with the procedure laid down in that Article and shall be notified to the Agency by the Council of the Western European Union.

**Article 19**

The figures obtained by the Agency under Articles 14, 15, 16 and 18 shall be reported to the Council as appropriate levels for the current control year for the members of Western European Union. Any discrepancies between the figures stated under Article 13, paragraph 1, and the quantities recognised under Article 14 will also be reported.

**Article 20**

1. The Agency shall immediately report to the Council if inspection, or information from other sources, reveals:
   
   (a) the manufacture of armaments of a type which the member concerned has undertaken not to manufacture;
   
   (b) the existence of stocks of armaments in excess of the figures and quantities ascertained in accordance with Articles 19 and 22.

2. If the Council is satisfied that the infraction reported by the Agency is not of major importance and can be remedied by prompt local action, it will so inform the Agency and the member concerned, who will take the necessary steps.

3. In the case of other infractions, the Council will invite the member concerned to provide the necessary explanation within a period to be determined by the
Council; if this explanation is considered unsatisfactory, the Council will take the measures which it deems necessary in accordance with a procedure to be determined.

4. Decisions of the Council under this Article will be taken by majority vote.

**Article 21**

Each member shall notify to the Agency the names and locations of the depots on the mainland of Europe containing armaments subject to control and of the plants on the mainland of Europe manufacturing such armaments, or, even though not in operation, specifically intended for the manufacture of such armaments.

**Article 22**

Each member of Western European Union shall keep the Agency informed of the quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III, which are to be exported from its territory on the mainland of Europe. The Agency shall be entitled to satisfy itself that the armaments concerned are in fact exported. If the level of stocks of any item subject to control appears abnormal, the Agency shall further be entitled to enquire into the orders for export.

**Article 23**

The Council shall transmit to the Agency information received from the Governments of the United States of America and Canada respecting military aid to be furnished to the forces on the mainland of Europe of members of Western European Union.

IN WITNESS whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at Paris this twenty-third day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.
The North Atlantic Council:

1. Recognizing the necessity of strengthening the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of reinforcing the machinery for the collective defence of Europe, and desirous of specifying the conditions governing joint examination of the defence effort of member countries,

2. Recalls that:
   (a) the resources which member nations intend to devote to their defence effort as well as the level, composition and quality of the forces which the member nations are contributing to the defence of the North Atlantic area are each year subject to collective examination in the NATO Annual Review for the purpose of reaching agreement on force goals, taking into account expected mutual aid;
   (b) the defence expenditures incurred by the member nations and the extent to which the recommendations emerging from the Annual Review have been carried out are the subject of periodical review during the year.

3. Agrees with the terms of the Agreement on Forces of Western European Union; and that with respect to the forces which the members of Western European Union will place under NATO Command on the mainland of Europe and for which maximum figures have been established in that Agreement, if at any time during the NATO Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits established in this Agreement, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to unanimous approval by the members of Western European Union, expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. Decides that all forces of member nations stationed in the area of the Allied Command Europe shall be placed under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe or other appropriate NATO Command and under the direction of the NATO military authorities with the exception of those forces intended for the defence of overseas territories and other forces which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command.

5. Invites member nations to make an initial report for consideration and recognition by the Council on those forces which they plan to maintain within the area of Allied Command Europe for the common defence, but not to place under
the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, taking into account the provisions of relevant NATO directives bearing on that subject; the initial report will include a broad statement of the reason for which the above forces are not so placed. Thereafter, if any changes are proposed, the North Atlantic Council action on the NATO Annual Review will constitute recognition as to the suitability and size of forces to be placed under the authority of the appropriate NATO Command and those to be retained under national command.

6. Notes that the agreements concluded within the framework of the Organization of Western European Union on the internal defence and police forces which the members of that Organization will maintain on the mainland shall be notified to the North Atlantic Council.

7. Agrees, in the interest of most effective collective defence, that in respect of combat forces in the area of Allied Command Europe and under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe;
   (a) all deployments shall be in accordance with NATO strategy;
   (b) the location of forces in accordance with NATO operational plans shall be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned;
   (c) forces under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and within the area of Allied Command Europe shall not be redeployed or used operationally within that area without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, subject to political guidance furnished by the North Atlantic Council, when appropriate, through normal channels.

8. Decides that:
   (a) integration of forces at Army Group and Tactical Air Force level shall be maintained;
   (b) in view of the powerful combat support units and logistic support organization at Army level, integration at that level and associated Air Force level will be the rule, wherever formations of several nationalities are operating in the same area and on a common task, provided there are no overriding objections from the point of view of military effectiveness;
   (c) wherever military efficiency permits, in light of the size, location and logistic support of forces, integration at lower levels, both in the land and air forces, shall be achieved to the maximum extent possible;
   (d) proposals to the North Atlantic Council, indicating any increases in commonly financed items of expenditure, such as infrastructure which might be entailed by the adoption of such measures, should be submitted by the NATO military authorities.

9. Agrees that, in order to improve the capability of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to discharge his responsibilities in the defence of Allied Command Europe, his responsibilities and powers for the logistic support of the forces placed under his authority shall be extended.

10. Considers that these increased responsibilities and powers should include authority:
(a) to establish, in consultation with the national authorities concerned, requirements for the provision of logistic resources*;
(b) to determine, in agreement with the national authorities concerned, their geographic distribution;
(c) to establish, in consultation with these authorities, logistic priorities for the raising, equipping and maintenance of units;
(d) to direct the utilisation, for meeting his requirements, of those portions of the logistic support systems made available to him by the appropriate authorities;
(e) to co-ordinate and supervise the use, for logistical purposes, of NATO common infrastructure facilities and of those national facilities made available to him by the national authorities.

11. **Agrees** that in order to ensure that adequate information is obtained and made available to the appropriate authorities about the forces placed under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe including reserve formations and their logistic support within the area of Allied Command Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe shall be granted increased authority to call for reports regarding the level and effectiveness of such forces and their armaments, equipment and supplies as well as the organization and location of their logistic arrangements. He shall also make field inspections within that area as necessary.

12. **Invites** nations to submit to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe such reports to this end as he may call for from time to time; and to assist inspection within the area of Allied Command Europe by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of these forces and their logistic support arrangements as necessary.

13. **Confirms** that the powers exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime extend not only to the organization into an effective integrated force of the forces placed under him but also to their training; that in this field, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe has direct control over the higher training of all national forces assigned to his command in peacetime; and that he should receive facilities from member nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces within the area of Allied Command Europe earmarked for that Command.

14. **Directs** the NATO military authorities to arrange for the designation by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of a high-ranking officer of his Command who will be authorised to transmit regularly to the Council of Western European Union information relating to the forces of the members of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe acquired as a result of the reports and inspections mentioned in paragraphs 11 and 12 in order to enable that Council to establish that the limits laid down in the special agreement mentioned in paragraph 3 above are being observed.

15. **Agrees** that the expression 'the area of Allied Command Europe' as used throughout this resolution shall not include North Africa; and that this Resolution does not alter the present status of the United Kingdom and United States forces in the Mediterranean.

* By logistic resources should be understood all the materiel, supplies, installations and parts thereof necessary for the prolonged conduct of combat operations.
16. Directs the NATO Military Committee to initiate the necessary changes in the directives to give effect to the above policies and objectives of the North Atlantic Council.

RESOLUTION OF ASSOCIATION BY OTHER PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
(22nd October, 1954)

The North Atlantic Council:

Welcoming the declaration made in London by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 3rd October, 1954 (see London Final Act, V), and the related declaration made on the same occasion by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic (see London Final Act, V).

Notes with satisfaction that the representatives of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have, on behalf of their Governments, today associated themselves with the aforesaid declaration of the Three Powers.

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to that Treaty, and

Having noted that the Federal Republic of Germany has, by a declaration dated 3rd October, 1954, accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken upon its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of that Treaty, and

Having further noted that all member governments have associated themselves with the declaration also made on 3rd October, 1954, by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic in connection with the aforesaid declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Agree as follows:

Article I

Upon the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall on behalf of all the Parties communicate to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter the Federal Republic of Germany shall become a
Party to that Treaty on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

The present Protocol shall enter into force, when (a) each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified to the Government of the United States of America its acceptance thereof, (b) all instruments of ratification of the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty have been deposited with the Belgian Government, and (c) all instruments of ratification or approval of the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government of the United States of America shall inform the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each notification of acceptance of the present Protocol and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In Witness whereof, the undersigned Representatives, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed the present Protocol.

Signed at Paris the 23rd day of October, 1954

For Belgium: P. H. Spaak
For Canada: L. B. Pearson
For Denmark: H. C. Hansen
For France: Menides-France
For Greece: Stephanopoulos
For Iceland: Kristinn Gudmundsson
For Italy: G. Martino
For Luxembourg: J. W. Bech
For Netherlands: J. W. Beyen
For Norway: Halvard Lange

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RESOLUTION ON RESULTS OF THE FOUR AND NINE POWER MEETINGS

(Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 22nd October 1954)

The North Atlantic Council:

RECOGNISING that all the arrangements arising out of the London Conference form part of one general settlement which is directly or indirectly of concern to all the NATO Powers and has therefore been submitted to the Council for information or decision;

HAVE LEARNT with satisfaction of the arrangements agreed between the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and of the Federal Republic of Germany for the termination of the occupation régime in the Federal Republic as set forth in the Protocol communicated to the Council;

WELCOME the decision of the Brussels Treaty Powers to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty as modified and completed by the Protocols and other documents communicated to the Council, and hereby record their agreement with the provisions of those Protocols and documents insofar as they concern action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;

WELCOME the extension of the Brussels Treaty as an important step toward the achievement of European unity; and express confidence that there will be the closest co-operation between the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which remains the foundation of the security and progress of the Atlantic Community.

TAKE NOTE with satisfaction of the statements made on 29th September 1954 in London by the United States Secretary of State and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, and of the declaration by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom concerning the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe;

Finally,

RECORD their deep satisfaction at the happy conclusion of all the above arrangements which together constitute a decisive step in fortifying the North Atlantic Alliance and uniting the Free World.
MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 22ND OCTOBER, 1954

FINAL COMMUNEQUE

The North Atlantic Council held a Ministerial Session in Paris today under the Chairmanship of Mr. Stephanos Stephanopoulos, Foreign Minister of Greece. This Meeting, which was attended by Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers of member countries, dealt with issues of vital importance for the security of the free world, and for the promotion of greater European unity, within the framework of a developing Atlantic Community. In particular, the meeting was called to approve arrangements designed to bring about the full association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West, and a German defence contribution. On the invitation of the Council, Dr. Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, attended the meeting as an observer.

The Council noted that all the agreements reached at the London Conference and at the subsequent meetings of the Four and Nine-Power Conferences form part of one general settlement which is directly or indirectly of concern to all the North Atlantic Treaty Powers and which was accordingly submitted to the Council. The Council welcomed this settlement.

The Council was informed of the agreement reached between the Foreign Ministers of France, the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in regard to ending the occupation regime in the Federal Republic.

The Council was informed of the agreement reached on the text of four protocols strengthening and extending the scope of the Brussels Treaty Organization - now Western European Union - expanded to provide for the participation of Italy and of the German Federal Republic, and on the text of accompanying documents. The Council welcomed this agreement and agreed with the provisions of the Protocols to the Brussels Treaty insofar as they involve action by the North Atlantic Council or other NATO authorities.

The Council welcomed the declaration made in London by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 3rd October, 1954, and the related declaration made on the same occasion by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. It noted with satisfaction that the representatives of the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have today associated themselves with the declaration of the Three Powers.

The Council approved a resolution to reinforce the existing machinery for the collective defence of Europe, chiefly by strengthening the powers of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

The Council approved a Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty inviting the
Federal Republic of Germany to join NATO. The Protocol will be signed to­
morrow by the fourteen Foreign Ministers, and will enter into force when each of
the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the
United States of America of its acceptance, and when all instruments of ratific­
ation of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty have been
deposited with the Belgian Government, and when all instruments of ratification
or approval of the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal
Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany.

The Council heard a statement by the Foreign Minister of Italy on the
recent agreements reached on the Trieste problem. The value of these agreements
from the Atlantic and European point of view was emphasized.

The Council agreed to hold its next Ministerial Meeting on or about 15th
December next.

The Council reaffirmed that the North Atlantic Treaty remains a basic
element in the foreign policies of all member governments. It agreed that there
must be the closest possible co-operation between Western European Union and
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in all fields and that any duplication of
the work of existing agencies of NATO will be avoided. The Council reaffirmed its
unity of purpose in the pursuit of peace and progress. The present conference and
the agreements reached represent a new and decisive step in the development of
the Atlantic Community.

The text of the agreements and documents will be issued separately to­
morrow, Saturday, October 23, after the signing ceremony.
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Président d'honneur : M. Gaston Thorn (Luxembourg)

Président : M. Joseph Luns (Pays-Bas) - Secrétaire Général de l'OTAN

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1er mars 1972