

I

1. In pursuance of their resolution of 16 December 1966, the Ministers had consultations about the future tasks facing the Alliance and examined the procedures for their solution. They had received reports submitted to them by Messrs. Watson, Schütz, Spaak, Kohler and Patijn. They expressed to these gentlemen their thanks for the great efforts undertaken by them and for their intelligent and thoughtful reports.

II

2. The Ministers of the 15 member countries, meeting in the Council of the Atlantic Alliance, express the conviction that the principles laid down in the Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949 will continue to determine their cooperation.

par le 6/11/66 (no)

*yes =
see resolution
16/12/66*

III

3. Five years ago the Cuban Missile Crisis led to a dangerous East-West confrontation.

The peaceful solution of this crisis marked a turning point in East-West relations.

Ever since, détente has dominated in East-West relations and tensions have been limited.

The members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as the members of the Warsaw Pact Organization have benefited from this development. This is the time for a new effort to strengthen and to extend it.

4. The member governments of the Atlantic Alliance are resolved to devote - individually as well as jointly - their activities and their energies to this purpose.

In pursuit of this purpose, the Ministers adopted an action programme the aim of which is to bring about another step towards further détente within the next years.

5. In adopting this plan the Ministers representing all 15 member governments were inspired by the following considerations:

- (a) Adjusting the Alliance and its rôle to an evolving environment is a continuing process.

[All members are convinced that the Alliance must continue.] Security for the members of NATO rests on two pillars: First, the maintenance of adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of the NATO countries if aggression should occur. Second, realistic measures to reduce tensions and the risk of conflict, including arms control and disarmament measures.

- (b) But defence is not enough. New opportunities are opening up for promoting a genuine relaxation of East-West-tension. This in turn presents a new challenge to our own Alliance.

For, in a changing world the Western Alliance has also been developing. It has never been a purely military organization. It has from the start been a group of like-

minded states with many common political purposes. During its lifetime, changing conditions have continuously required the adaptation of its activities and machinery. [The report of the Three Wise Men in 1956 marked a major stage in this process of expanding political consultation and cooperation.]

(c) The long-term aim of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. Such an order must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe which manifest themselves most clearly in the division of Germany, and provide adequate and reliable security to all of Europe.

(d) Easier movements and contacts between the countries of Europe and peaceful cooperation among them can contribute to this outcome. Yet, relaxing tensions is not the final goal but a step on the way towards a European settlement which in itself no longer gives rise to renewed tension.

6. The target of the Alliance's plan is:

(a) to develop [and to ^{no 1} negotiate] the outline of a European settlement serving to liquidate the cold war and offering a basis for overcoming the division of Germany;

(b) to promote and press for practical arms control measures and effective action to be taken in the field of disarmament, [in particular nuclear ₂ disarmament by the super powers];

no (c) [to consult as intensely as possible in conflicts and crises outside the NATO area;]

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in view of improving the defence of the south eastern flanks of the alliance area and in connection with new developments in force and in political relations directly affected by that plan

(d) to devote special attention to the Mediterranean area, which has become a new important theatre of East-West contacts - political and military - the nature of which is still undetermined;

(e) to preserve and strengthen the defence posture of the Alliance and the effective deterrent, which does not only protect the security and independence of member nations but is at the same time the indispensable pre-requisite of a realistic détente policy.

IV

allow these aims to be translated into action at the appropriate moment

7. In order to translate this programme into practical action, the Alliance should: *and by the most appropriate, bilateral or multilateral procedures, the Alliance should:*

(a) give further detailed study to the various measures proposed to extend the détente and to achieve a European settlement. The Atlantic Council should serve as a "clearing house" where analyses and discussions of new proposals might always be possible. There shall be constituted a special body, under the Council, to study on a continuing basis the substantive issues related to a general settlement in Europe, a European security system and procedural approaches to East-West negotiations.

(b) Problems of arms control and possible security arrangements should be examined with as much continuing care and attention as NATO devotes to force planning, strategy and nuclear questions. This could be accomplished by establishing, under the authority of the Council, a separate Permanent Arms Control and Disarmament Committee.

(c) With respect to political action outside the NATO area, responsibilities of the members of NATO will differ widely. It is not advisable for NATO as such to intervene in conflict situations outside its own area. But members of

4

existing framework

no machinery studies

no machinery 6

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the Alliance should improve the procedures for consultation with regard to developments outside the NATO area.

8. In an alliance of sovereign states there is no obligation to subordinate national policies to collective decision. But the actions of all the Allies will be more effective and more influential when, particularly in matters of close concern to them all, they act in accordance with a framework of policy which is so far as possible agreed by all.