FACTS ABOUT
THE NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION
THE NATO AREA

NATO Member Countries

Other Countries
SPITZBERGEN (NORWAY)

ICELAND

UNITED KINGDOM

ITALY

Paris

PORTUGAL

USSR

Territories under Soviet control (and Albania)
FACTS ABOUT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
FACTS ABOUT THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
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**PREFACE BY MR. DIRK U. STIKKER, SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO, CHAIRMAN OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL**  
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This book, which is the outcome of a recommendation by my predecessor, Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, and which I now have the honour of prefacing, is neither a sequel to Lord Ismay's remarkable study \textit{NATO – the First Five Years}, nor a re-issue, under a new guise, of our reference book: \textit{Facts about NATO}.

It takes its place, one might say, between the two. It is not intended – as was the work of the first Secretary General of \textit{NATO} – to give a complete and detailed account of the history of our Organization. What was feasible in 1954 is no longer possible today. Too many years have gone by, too much work has been done for it still to be feasible to embark upon a detailed account of the Organization's activities without immediately exceeding the average size of a book and perhaps discouraging the reader. We have had to confine ourselves to a synopsis.

An up-to-date version of \textit{Facts about NATO}, on the other hand, would not have served our purpose. The didactic character of its lay-out made it primarily a reference book for lecturers. We hope that the present book will reach far wider sections of the public in member countries, for despite the respectable age that \textit{NATO} has attained, there are still vast numbers of people to whom it means little or nothing. We cannot hope that its ideals will be supported and its activities encouraged if the public is not first made aware of what it is, of what it defends, of the major role it plays in maintaining peace, the primary condition for freedom of speech and of action.

In our times, in our democracies, no policy can be successfully conducted and bear fruit without the support of the public. It is to the latter that this book is addressed, to provide information in the hope of winning in return that voluntary support without which there can be no effective action or lasting achievement.

\textit{Dirk U. Stikker}

\textit{Secretary General of NATO}
PART I
CHAPTER I

HISTORY OF THE ALLIANCE*

On 26 June, 1945, shortly after the collapse of Nazi Germany and a few weeks before the surrender of Japan, the representatives of fifty nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco. People the world over dared to hope that after one of the cruellest wars in history an era of peace had at last dawned.

True they had not forgotten that the League of Nations had also tried to build up a system of collective security and failed. But this time the situation was different: the United States and the other great Powers which had survived the trials were founder members of the new international organization and practically all the remaining strength and wealth of the world were at its service.

But peace was not finally assured. The Western countries found themselves faced with a new danger: the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union.

The defeat of the two great military and industrial powers, Germany and Japan, had left an immense vacuum to the east and west of the Soviet Union. Taking advantage of such exceptionally favourable circumstances, the Kremlin made full use of the combined strength of the Red Army and world Communism to conduct an imperialist policy which was soon to threaten peace and collective security.

Even in 1945 the most confirmed optimist could not claim that the international sky was unclouded. The British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, in his telegram of 12 May addressed to President Truman, expressed his anxiety in the following terms: "What will be the position in a year or two when the British and American armies have melted, and the French have not yet been formed on any major scale, and when Russia may choose to keep 200 or 300 divisions on active service?" and he added: "An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front (Russia). We do not know what is going on behind...". This, it may be noted, was the first occasion on which this subsequently familiar metaphor was used.

On the morrow of the German surrender, the Western democracies, true to their wartime pledges and to popular demand, began to demobilize. The United States and the United Kingdom quickly withdrew the bulk of their armed forces from Europe. They demobilized most of their troops, with the exception of occupation forces and

* This historical chapter is, for the most part, taken from Lord Ismay's book: NATO - The First Five Years.
units committed in other parts of the world. As for the nations of Europe, they addressed themselves to the complex tasks of reconstruction.

The armed strength of the Allied Forces in Europe at the time of the surrender of Germany was about five million men. One year later, following demobilization, their armed strength amounted to no more than 880,000 men. The following table, moreover, shows the exact strengths after demobilization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,100,000 men</td>
<td>391,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,321,000 &quot;</td>
<td>488,000 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>299,000 &quot;</td>
<td>0 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued to keep its armed forces on a wartime footing; in 1945 their strength amounted to more than four million men. It also kept its war industries going at full blast.

On the political side, the Western Powers went to the furthest limits of conciliation. They made every effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Government and to make the United Nations an effective instrument for peace. They met with nothing but obstruction.

At San Francisco in 1945, Poland was not represented at the conference table because the USSR and the Western Powers were unable to agree on the composition of a Polish provisional government.

At the London Conference of Foreign Ministers (September, 1945), Mr. Molotov blocked any discussion of the United Kingdom's proposals for the opening of an impartial enquiry into the situation in Rumania and Bulgaria.

It was only after making concessions on the Far East that the representatives of the Western Powers were able, in November 1945, to obtain Soviet agreement on a procedure for framing peace treaties with Italy, Finland and Germany's former satellites in the Balkans.

The Peace Conference opened in Paris on 29 July, 1946, and the peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania were not signed until 10 February, 1947.

In March, 1947, the Foreign Ministers met in Moscow to discuss the drafting of peace treaties with Germany and Austria. They were unable to agree on what Germany's fate should be.

A new Foreign Ministers' Conference was held in London in November, 1947, but it did no more than confirm the impossibility of agreement. Shortly afterwards, the Soviet representatives ceased to take part in the Allied Control Council in Berlin.

The Foreign Ministers met once more in Paris in May, 1949, to discuss anew the problem of Germany and Austria and, in 1951, their deputies spent 109 days at the Palais Rose Conference in Paris vainly trying to draw up an agenda for a new meeting at ministerial level.
For all practical purposes, the stalemate at the 1947 Moscow Conference put an end to the possibility of co-operation between the USSR and the Western democratic countries. The signing of the United Nations Charter on 26 June, 1945, had raised the hopes of the peoples of the Western countries. But the Soviet Union abused the right of veto at the Security Council.

In the case of Greece, to take an example, where incidents had taken place between her and certain neighbouring states – Albania and Bulgaria – a commission of enquiry was appointed in 1947 by the Security Council of the United Nations. Although the report prepared by this commission established the responsibility of both Albania and Bulgaria, all draft resolutions recommending United Nations action encountered the systematic veto of the Soviet Union.

Between then and December, 1960, the Soviet Union vetoed a decision taken by the Security Council on nearly one hundred different occasions.

SOVIET TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

Soviet territorial expansion had already begun during the war by the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, together with certain parts of Finland, Poland, Rumania, North-Eastern Germany and Eastern Czechoslovakia, a total of about 180,000 square miles of territory occupied by more than 23 million inhabitants. It was this that moved Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, who was at the time the Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, to state in the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948: "There is but one Great Power that emerged from the war having conquered other territories, and that Power is the USSR".

This territorial expansion continued after the defeat of Germany and was supplemented by a policy of control over the countries of Eastern Europe. The presence of the victorious Soviet armies in the heart of Europe, coupled with Communist infiltration into 'popular front' governments, effectively compelled Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to fall within the sphere of Soviet domination (an area of about 390,000 square miles and a population of over 90 million non-Russian inhabitants).

Here are the highlights of the 'conquest without war':

In Hungary, from the beginning of 1947, the Communist Party opened a violent campaign against the Smallholders Party, and as a result of its denunciations many arrests were made. The Nagy government had to resign on 29 May; new elections resulted in a majority for the Communist Party, which quickly formed a new government and formally dissolved the opposition parties on 21 November, 1947.

In Bulgaria, the operation was carried out along similar lines. Nicolas Petkov, leader of the Agrarian Party and the opposition, was accused of plotting a military coup d'état, sentenced to death on 16 August, 1947, and hanged on 23 September. On 26 August, the Peasant Party was dissolved as 'fascist' and on 22 November, the national administration was organized along Soviet lines. On 11 December 1947,
Dimitrov, former Secretary of the Comintern, assumed leadership and formed a predominantly Communist cabinet.

In Rumania, after elections which were regarded as invalid by the Anglo-Saxon countries, the members of the opposition were accused of plotting the overthrow of the democratic regime. The Peasant Party was dissolved on 10 October, 1947, and its leader, Dr. Maniu, was sentenced to life imprisonment on 29 October. Mrs. Anna Pauker, who had served in Moscow during the war as adviser to the Soviet Government on Rumanian affairs, succeeded Mr. Tataresco, and King Michael had to abdicate on 1 January, 1948.

In Poland, Mr. Mikolajczyk, head of the Peasant Party, was compelled to leave the country in November, 1947 in the face of constant threats to his life. His party had to relinquish its role as opposition and was finally dissolved on 21 November, 1947.

In Czechoslovakia, Soviet interference steadily increased. The Prague government, which had favoured participation in the Marshall Plan, was obliged to revise its views and reverse its decision after a hasty visit by Mr. Gottwald and Mr. Masaryk to Moscow in July, 1947.

In Slovakia, the Communists, by means of a campaign of denunciation, secured the arrest and trial of many members of the democratic party which held an absolute majority. At the end of 1947, Ambassador Zorin, Moscow's special envoy, engineered the resignation of President Benes (25 February, 1948). A Communist government was then formed.

On 10 March, 1948, Mr. Jan Masaryk, Foreign Minister in the Gottwald Government, was found dead on the pavement beneath the windows of his home...

In less than a year, Moscow had thus succeeded in gaining control over the governments in Budapest, Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw and Prague. The Communist parties ruled alone, or nearly alone, in each of these capitals, from which all opposition had been swept.

It only remained for the Kremlin to co-ordinate the activities of these governments on the international level and thus establish a bloc of satellite nations under Moscow's orders.

The Soviet Union also exerted heavy pressure, directly or indirectly, in various parts of the world:
- in Northern Iran, where the Soviet armies vainly sought a foothold after the war, in spite of the provisions of the Treaty of Teheran and the protests of the United Nations;
- in Turkey, where both government and people resisted all attempts at intimidation, territorial claims on Kars and Ardahan, and demands for the granting of bases in the Straits;
- in Greece, where the guerilla campaign which began in 1944 took on the aspect of real war in 1946, when the rebels received reinforcement from bases in neighbouring states;
HISTORY OF THE ALLIANCE

SOVIET EXPANSION DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Population (Thousands)</th>
<th>Area (sq Miles)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 FINNISH TERRITORY</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>17,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ESTONIA</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>18,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 LATVIA</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>26,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 LITHUANIA</td>
<td>2,957</td>
<td>21,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 EAST POLAND</td>
<td>11,800</td>
<td>69,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 RUTHENIA</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 BESSARABIA-NORTHERN BUKOVINIA</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>19,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 EAST PRUSSIA*</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Total</td>
<td>23,908</td>
<td>182,400</td>
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* Under Soviet administration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>Population (Thousands)</th>
<th>Area (sq Miles)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 EAST PRUSSIA**</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>8,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 POLAND</td>
<td>22,172</td>
<td>81,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 GERMAN TERRITORY**</td>
<td>6,239</td>
<td>2,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 SOVIET ZONE OF GERMANY</td>
<td>18,807</td>
<td>63,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 CZECHOSLOVAKIA</td>
<td>12,340</td>
<td>49,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 HUNGARY</td>
<td>9,750</td>
<td>32,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 RUMANIA</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>91,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 BULGARIA</td>
<td>7,150</td>
<td>42,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 ALBANIA</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>10,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Total</td>
<td>95,063</td>
<td>363,459</td>
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** Under Polish administration

TERREITORIES ANNEXED BY THE USSR OR UNDER SOVIET ADMINISTRATION (1940-1945)

TERREITORIES CONTROLLED BY THE USSR (1945-1948)
- in Asia, where the Soviet Union considerably extended its influence by occupying the greater part of Manchuria and Northern Korea in 1945. In addition, Communist agitation was intensified throughout the whole of South-East Asia;
- in Indochina, where France and the Associated States were engaged in extensive operations against a Communist-directed rebellion;
- in Malaya, where substantial British Forces were tied down by Communist-inspired guerillas;
- in Burma, where Communist parties fomented strikes and unrest;
- in the Philippines, where armed Hukbalahaps (Communists) engaged in constant guerilla warfare.

The Communist parties in Western Europe, on orders from Moscow, strengthened Soviet policy by propaganda and by a course of action which opposed any Western viewpoint which was out of line with Soviet aims. These local Communist parties could be considered the ‘fifth columns’ in the cold war.

The Communist parties did not confine their attempts at infiltration to governments and national and official organizations, but also extended them to private or international bodies.

From 1944 to 1947, acting in accordance with directives from Stalin, these Communist parties adopted a policy of comparative moderation, of participation in governments (in ten Western European countries), of a show of patriotism and even of denial of any dependence on the Soviet Union.

As the gulf widened between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, the Communist parties in the West allied themselves with the Opposition, and obeyed instructions from abroad. This trend was further reinforced by the setting up, in September, 1947, of the Cominform, the Communist answer to the Marshall Plan. The members of the Cominform were: the leaders of the Communist parties in the USSR, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, France, Italy, and later, the Netherlands.

At the end of 1947, directions for agitation and orders to strike supported a concerted and virulent campaign of opposition throughout the whole of Western Europe. The struggle continued with persistent attempts to infiltrate into all branches of activity in the Western countries, notably into the trade unions, in France and Italy in particular.

WESTERN REACTIONS

Faced with Soviet expansion, the free countries of Europe, gravely threatened, understandably recognized the need to seek the means of guaranteeing their freedom and security. It was natural that, sooner or later, they should turn towards the United States who alone was powerful enough to impress the USSR. The United States’ reaction was prompt and decisive.

On 12 March, 1947, President Truman told Congress: “It must be the policy of the
United States of America to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities, or by outside pressure". Following that statement, which became known as the "Truman Doctrine", the Congress of the United States authorised the appropriation of $400 million for aid to Greece and Turkey up to June, 1948. It was, indeed, on these countries that Soviet pressure had been brought hardest to bear. Congress also authorised the despatch to these countries of American civilian and military missions.

The 'Truman Doctrine' was designed to deal with the specific threat to Greece and Turkey. But the situation in Western Europe generally was no less alarming. In spite of the aid received by the free countries of Europe from the United States to relieve post-war shortages, the mechanism of European economy remained badly jammed and Western Europe would have found itself on the brink of economic collapse.

On 5 June, 1947, in a speech at Harvard University, the then Secretary of State of the United States, General George C. Marshall, initiated the idea of a Programme for European Recovery. He proposed that the United States should come to the help of Europe and suggested that the European countries should agree on their requirements and draw up a common programme agreed by a number, if not all, of the European nations. He added that this policy was "directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos."

This offer of economic assistance, which, in the next few years, contributed largely to the economic recovery of the Western countries, was also open to the Soviet Union and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. Stalin refused all American aid for the USSR and, despite initial interest on the part of both Czechoslovakia and Poland, forced satellite governments to do likewise. Finally, he set up the Cominform, whose allotted aim was to fight the Marshall Plan as "an instrument of American imperialism."

The world thus found itself split into two blocs. The nature and extent of Soviet intentions were henceforth clearly perceived. As regards the free countries of Europe, the only way they could begin to re-establish a balance of forces was to come together. A number of statesmen, particularly Sir Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister, and Mr. Louis St. Laurent, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, had already contemplated in 1946 the idea of a defensive alliance within the framework of the United Nations.

On 22 January, 1948, Mr. Ernest Bevin, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, suggested a formula for Western Union consisting of a network of bilateral agreements on the lines of the Dunkirk Treaty.

This Treaty had been signed on 4 March, 1947 by France and the United Kingdom. It was a "Treaty of alliance and mutual assistance" of 50 years' duration, according to which the two countries would unite in the event of any renewed attempt at aggression by Germany. Under its terms they were also bound, by means of continuing consultation on problems bearing on their economic relations, to take all measures necessary to increase their prosperity and economic stability and thus enable them to make a
more effective contribution to the economic and social aims of the United Nations. Although the idea was warmly welcomed it was felt that, as the Dunkirk Treaty had been aimed expressly against a renewed German aggression, it might be preferable to take the Rio Treaty as a model. This Treaty had been signed on 2 September, 1947, by the United States and the Latin American countries, with the exception of Nicaragua and Ecuador. It was essentially a collective, defensive alliance against any aggression and provided an example of 'regional grouping' within the framework of the United Nations Charter.

While these problems were under discussion, the Prague coup d'état, in February 1948, drew Czechoslovakia into the Soviet orbit and came as a sharp reminder to the Western Allies that common defensive action was needed.

FROM THE BRUSSELS TREATY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

On 4 March, 1948, representatives of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom met in Brussels to consider the terms of a treaty of mutual assistance. Their efforts soon met with success. The Brussels Treaty* was signed on 17 March, 1948 by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. These countries pledged themselves to build up a common defence system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties.

Article IV of the Brussels Treaty states that should any of the contracting Parties be the object of an "armed aggression in Europe", the other signatories to the Treaty would afford the attacked Party "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power". The Treaty, with a duration of 50 years, provided for the creation of a supreme body in Western Union, known as the Consultative Council, consisting of the five Foreign Ministers. Under it was a Western Defence Committee consisting of the Defence Ministers.

The Brussels Treaty was scarcely signed when the Russians started the blockade of West Berlin (June, 1948). It was to last for 323 days and was only countered by the organization of an air-lift by the Western Powers. The Berlin blockade hastened the setting up of Western defence.

On 30 April, 1948, the Defence Ministers and Chiefs-of-Staff of the five Brussels Treaty signatory Powers met in London to discuss their countries' military equipment needs, to see how far they could be met from their own production resources, and how much additional aid would have to be requested from the United States.

From July, 1948, onwards, United States and Canadian experts attended these meetings as observers.

In September, 1948, a military body was created within the Brussels Treaty known as

* For extracts from the Brussels Treaty, see page 194.
the Western Union Defence Organization. Field Marshal Montgomery was appointed Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee and set up his Headquarters at Fontainebleau, France.

Commanders-in-Chief were appointed: General de Lattre de Tassigny (France) for the Land Forces; Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb (United Kingdom) for the Air Forces; Vice Admiral Jaujard (France) for Naval Forces.

The creation of a defence organization by the free countries in Europe could not fail to awaken a response from the United States.

On 11 April, 1948, the United States Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall and the Under-Secretary, Mr. Robert M. Lovett, opened preliminary talks with Senators Arthur H. Vandenberg and Tom Connally on the problems of security in the North Atlantic area.

On 28 April, 1948, the idea of a single mutual defence system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty, was publicly put forward by Mr. St. Laurent in the Canadian House of Commons. It was warmly welcomed one week later by Mr. Ernest Bevin. But it was essential that the United States should be able, constitutionally, to join the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, in consultation with the State Department, Senator Vandenberg drew up a Resolution which recommended, in particular, "the association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" and its "contribution to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 (of the United Nations Charter) should any armed attack occur affecting its national security".

This Resolution, thanks to the timely initiative of Senators Vandenberg and Connally, was adopted on 11 June, 1948, by the United States Senate. The road was now clear.

Preliminary talks opened in Washington on 6 July 1948, between the State Department and the Ambassadors of Canada and of the Western Union Powers. They ended on 9 September, 1948 with a report to governments. This report having been favourably received by governments, the Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty was able, at the end of October, 1948, to announce complete identity of views on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic area.

The text of the Treaty was published on 18 March, 1949. Even before that, on 15 March, 1949 the Brussels Treaty signatory Powers, Canada and the United States, officially invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal to accede to the Treaty.

On 4 April, 1949, in spite of the pressure brought to bear by the Soviet Union on the Parties to the Treaty (notably a memorandum addressed to the twelve original signatories alleging the hostile nature of their action), the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium (Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak), Canada (Mr. Lester Pearson), Denmark (Mr. Gustav Rasmussen), France (Mr.
Robert Schuman), Iceland (Mr. Bjarni Benediktsson), Italy (Count Carlo Sforza), Luxembourg (Mr. Joseph Bech), Netherlands (Dr. Dirk U. Stikker), Norway (Mr. Halvard M. Lange), Portugal (Dr. José Caeiro de Matta), United Kingdom (Mr. Ernest Bevin) and United States (Mr. Dean Acheson).* 

The Parliaments of the member countries ratified the Treaty within five months thereafter. 

Subsequently, three other countries joined the twelve original signatories. Greece and Turkey were invited to join the Alliance in September, 1951; they formally acceded to the Treaty on 18 February, 1952.** 

The Federal Republic of Germany was invited to accede to the Treaty following the signature of the Paris Agreements in October, 1954, and officially became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 9 May, 1955.***

* See Appendix 4, page 198, for the text of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
** See Appendix 5, page 201, for the Protocol of Accession of Greece and Turkey. 
*** See Appendix 6, page 203, for Documents relating to the accession to the Treaty of the Federal Republic of Germany.
### Population and Area of NATO Countries
*(excluding the Saar)*

**1959**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (Thousands)</th>
<th>Area (Sq. miles)</th>
<th>Area (Sq. km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9,104</td>
<td>11,779</td>
<td>30,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>17,442</td>
<td>3,851,116</td>
<td>9,974,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4,547</td>
<td>16,619</td>
<td>43,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>45,071</td>
<td>212,822</td>
<td>551,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (West Berlin excl.)</td>
<td>51,754</td>
<td>95,737</td>
<td>247,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>8,650</td>
<td>51,182</td>
<td>132,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>39,768</td>
<td>103,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>49,062</td>
<td>116,304</td>
<td>301,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>2,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>11,346</td>
<td>12,529</td>
<td>32,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3,556</td>
<td>125,065</td>
<td>323,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>9,052</td>
<td>35,599</td>
<td>92,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>26,645</td>
<td>301,381</td>
<td>780,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>52,157</td>
<td>94,215</td>
<td>244,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>177,103</td>
<td>3,615,213</td>
<td>9,363,387</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total NATO Europe             | 271,440                | 1,113,998        | 2,885,250     |
| NATO North America            | 194,545                | 7,466,329        | 19,337,762    |
| Total NATO                    | 465,985                | 8,580,327        | 22,223,012    |
| World Total                   | 2,905,000              | 52,263,790       | 135,363,000   |

*Source: United Nations and OECD.*
CHAPTER 2

ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY

The North Atlantic Treaty is essentially a framework for very broad co-operation between its signatories. It is not only a military alliance formed to prevent aggression - or to repel it should the need arise; it also provides for joint permanent action in the political, economic and social fields.

The signatory countries undertake, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, to preserve peace and international security and to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They also undertake to eliminate any incompatibilities in their international economic policies and to encourage economic co-operation between their countries.

The Treaty thus has a dual aspect: it proclaims the importance of economic and social progress and, at the same time, reaffirms a security policy based on the inherent right of collective self-defence.

The Treaty is not a regional agreement as defined in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Its implementation would in no way constitute 'enforcement action' or sanction within the meaning of Article 53. The Treaty is an agreement between certain countries for their collective self-defence as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Treaty consists of a preamble and fourteen articles.

The preamble outlines the main features of the Treaty. It is a treaty of alliance, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, for the defence of a way of life, not only by means of essential military measures but also by co-operation in political, economic, social and cultural fields.

Article 1 defines the basic principles to be followed by member countries in conducting their international relations in order to avoid endangering peace and world security. Article 1 expressly refers to the Charter of the United Nations.

This Article is, in fact, an almost literal reproduction of paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, which lay down the principles to be followed by members of the United Nations Organization in the conduct of their international relations. Most of the signatory countries (being members of the United Nations Organization) were thus already bound, in a legal sense, by the provisions of this Article.
Article 2 defines the aims to be followed by member countries in their international relations and their resulting obligations.
This Article is inspired by Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations, which defines the aims of the U.N.: preservation of peace, development of friendly relations among nations, achievement of international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic and social character.
The obligations accepted by the signatories are as much external (to bring about a better understanding of the principles upon which Western civilization is founded) as internal (to eliminate disputes or conflicts within the Community, in the economic and social fields).
The provisions of this Article clearly underline the dual aspect of the Alliance, which is not solely military and defensive but is also designed to ensure the preservation of a way of life which is dynamic, free and prosperous in contrast to the totalitarian character of Communism.

Article 3 deals with the means of maintaining and increasing the individual and collective capacity of NATO member countries to resist an armed attack.
Member countries of NATO are therefore under an obligation to develop their individual capacities to resist and to act jointly through the medium of mutual assistance.
This joint action may be achieved by a gradual integration of armed forces and a co-ordination of instruction and training (essential function of the Supreme Headquarters). Mutual aid may also be given in kind. The military assistance provided by the United States of America, for example, may take the form of end-items or of 'offshore' procurement.*

Article 4 deals with a threat to one of the member countries of NATO.
The only obligation expressed in this Article is for signatory countries to consult together if the territorial integrity or political independence of one of them is endangered. Such consultation may be requested by a country other than the one threatened.**
As explained in Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the preservation of peace and international security is in no way affected. If, in the event of a threat, consultation by member countries of NATO leads to enforcement action being decided, the only competent body to authorise such action would be the Security Council (or, in the case of default, the General Assembly of the United Nations).

Article 5 is one of the most important articles of the Treaty and contains one of the

* A system whereby the United States buys equipment in various European countries with funds from its Mutual Defence Assistance Programme and gives it to one of the Allied countries for equipping its armed forces.
** In practice, this consultation would take place during the North Atlantic Council meetings, which can be held in Paris at an hour's notice.
essential provisions of the Treaty: "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...".

This undertaking is exceptionally important because the resulting solidarity creates a coalition which will discourage aggression.

Having stated this principle, the Article goes on to define the obligations of countries in the event of armed attack. These obligations consist of taking at once, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action, including the use of armed force, as is deemed necessary by each Party.

Each country is thus free to take whatever action it may deem necessary. All armed attacks need not, in fact, be considered as general offensives calling for a declaration of war. Furthermore, all Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty would not necessarily provide the same type of assistance.

It is equally important to foresee, in time of peace, the forms which an armed attack might take (and where and on what scale it might be made) and to plan counter-measures. Any self-defence, if it is to be successful, must come into play at once.

Joint action is justified by the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence, individual or collective, as provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The right of self-defence is an inherent right, the exercise of which in no way affects the primary competence of the Security Council in matters relating to the maintenance and restoration of peace. The final provisions of Article 5 stipulate that the measures so taken shall be reported to the Security Council and shall be terminated when that body has taken the necessary measures.

Article 6 defines the area in which the provisions of Article 5 are applicable. The Article was amended after the accession of Greece and Turkey to the Treaty.*

As far as the definition of the area is concerned, it should be emphasized once more that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not established to defend a geographically homogeneous territory but was established primarily to defend a way of life. The regional character of the Treaty is due more to the common interest of the Parties in maintaining peace and security in a certain area than to the fact that they possess territories in that area.

Moreover, the definition of the area for the military application of the Treaty in no way implies that political events which occur outside this area cannot be discussed by the Council, for it is the international situation as a whole which is likely to affect the maintenance of peace and security in the area in question and it is on this situation that the Council should, and indeed does normally focus its attention.

Article 7 states the compatibility of the Treaty with the Charter of the United Nations. In Article 8 the Parties confirm the compatibility of the Treaty with their other inter-

* For the new definition of the NATO area see the Protocol on the accession to the Treaty of Greece and Turkey in Appendix 5, page 201.
national engagements, and also undertake, in the future, not to enter into any international engagements in conflict with the Treaty.

Article 9 provides for the creation of bodies to implement the provisions of the Treaty. It is these bodies which constitute the ‘Organization’ as such within the strict meaning of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Article 10 stipulates that the Parties may, by unanimous decision, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty to accede to it. This Article of accession has been applied to Greece and Turkey (1951) and to the Federal Republic of Germany (1955).

Article 11 deals with the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty.

Articles 12 and 13 deal with the possibilities of revision and denunciation of the Treaty. After ten years the Parties may agree to review the Treaty (Article 12). After it has been in force for twenty years any Party may denounce it (Article 13).

Although duration is not mentioned in the Treaty, the feeling is that it should remain in force as long as it is considered useful.

Lastly, Article 14 deals with the deposit of the Treaty.

To this analytical study of the text of the Treaty must be added the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has no supranational character; all decisions are taken unanimously by national representatives. It must not be thought, however, that the rule of unanimity is the same thing as the right of veto. It is true that the rule of unanimity can result in a veto in practice; but it is based on concepts in conflict with those of the right of veto. The right of veto is essentially negative. It gives a Power the undisputed right to oppose a decision without even justifying its reasons. The rule of unanimity, on the contrary, is a pressing invitation to conciliate. It is based on the desire to ensure united action to achieve the common goal. Thus, in NATO there has never been a question of veto. Co-operation within the Organization has developed in such a way that the expression remains unknown there. Agreements are ultimately worked out thanks to the practice of sustained consultation.
The history of the Atlantic Alliance can reasonably be divided into two main periods. During the first phase – from 1949 to 1955 – the partners in the Alliance were setting up and perfecting a collective structure designed to meet the collective commitments to which they had subscribed under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, commitments which called for immediate and continuous action. The organization of common defence was found to be a multifarious task, with political, economic and financial aspects as well as military. This period was marked by a widening of the circle of Atlantic allies: the twelve original signatories of 1949 were joined by three new members – Greece, Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany. Not only was the territorial expanse enlarged by the accession of Greece and Turkey, but the adherence of West Germany solved the gravest political problem posed in the organization of Western defence.

During the second phase – from 1955 to the end of 1961 – the Soviet threat, formerly confined to Europe and essentially military in character, took on more varied aspects and was extended to every quarter of the globe. Attempts at political negotiation between the USSR and the West, practically non-existent after 1949, were renewed from time to time. The essentially political role which thus fell to the Alliance forced it to undergo a degree of adaptation. While continuing to perfect its defence arrangements (under the changing conditions imposed by considerable progress in new weapons such as nuclear arms and guided missiles) it had to confront the political thrusts of Soviet policy with the concerted and agreed attitudes of the member countries. In order to ensure the necessary unity of outlook and action, the Western Powers were led to practise a very much closer co-operation in foreign policy. This widening of the field of co-operation between the partners of the Alliance constitutes, along with the modernisation of defence equipment, a vital aspect of NATO’s work over the past few years.

PUTTING THE TREATY TO WORK

Far from leading to increased tension between the East and the West, the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April, 1949, was immediately followed by a slight easing of the situation. In May, 1949, the USSR raised the blockade of Berlin.
On 23 May, 1949, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR met in Paris and succeeded in achieving limited though positive results on practical problems concerning Germany and Berlin (communications and relationships between countries), as well as on the question of a treaty with Austria. Moreover, the cessation in October 1949 of Soviet assistance to the Communist insurrection in Greece, brought peace to that country. The reinforcement of Western solidarity effectively prevented, at least for the time being, further Soviet military aggression in Europe.

The Treaty having come into force on 24 August, 1949, after all the ratifications had been deposited, the Governments of member countries were faced with two tasks: that of setting up the various bodies necessary for the implementation of the Treaty and working out a common defence policy.

At its first meeting in Washington on 17 and 19 September, 1949, the North Atlantic Council began the establishment of the various NATO bodies.

In particular, it decided that the North Atlantic Council, the principal authority in the Alliance and composed of the Foreign Ministers of member countries, would meet in ordinary session annually and could, at any time, at the request of any of its members invoking Article 4 or Article 5 of the Treaty, convene in extraordinary session. Each year the Foreign Minister of a member country was to be President of the Council, the Presidency rotating annually according to the English alphabetical order.

In accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, the Council created a Defence Committee composed of the Defence Ministers of member countries, charged with drawing up co-ordinated defence plans for the North Atlantic area. It was agreed that this Defence Committee would meet at least once a year.

The military structure of the Alliance was begun by setting up a number of permanent bodies, first and foremost the Military Committee. It consists of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the member countries and its function is to give the Council advice on general questions of a military nature and to provide guidance to its executive agency, the Standing Group. The latter consists of representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, who are responsible for strategic guidance in areas in which Allied NATO Forces operate. Five Regional Planning Groups were also set up* to develop plans for the defence of each of the areas covered by the Treaty.

At the same session, the Council recognised that questions of military production and supply and the economic and financial repercussions of the defence effort would have

* The Northern European Regional Planning Group (Denmark, Norway and the United Kingdom).
The Western European Regional Planning Group (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom).
The Southern European-Western Mediterranean Regional Planning Group (France, Italy and the United Kingdom).
The Canadian-United States Regional Planning Group.
The North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group (all member countries except Italy and Luxembourg).
to be studied in detail. At a second session, held in Washington on 18 November, 1949, the Council decided to set up two further bodies; a Defence Financial and Economic Committee and a Military Production and Supply Board.

The Defence Financial and Economic Committee, composed of the Finance Ministers of the member countries, was to develop, in co-operation with the Military Committee and the Standing Group, overall financial and economic guides to the defence programmes and to fix the limits of these programmes and of military production in the light of the available economic and financial resources. It was also to appraise the financial and economic impact on member countries of major individual defence projects formulated by the Military Production and Supply Board or the Military Committee, to recommend financial arrangements for executing military defence plans, and particularly to make recommendations on the interchange among Treaty countries of military equipment. Finally, it was to study ways of meeting the foreign exchange costs of imports of materials and equipment from non-member countries required under the defence programmes.

The Military Production and Supply Board was to report to the Defence Committee. Its function was to promote co-ordinated production, standardisation and technical research in the field of armaments.

THE COUNCIL DEPUTIES

The control and supervision of the civilian and military agencies of the Alliance could no longer be effectively undertaken by the Council in the course of its infrequent meetings. At its meeting of 15 to 18 May, 1950, the Council therefore decided to create a civilian body responsible for regular political exchanges between member governments, for the execution of their directives and for the co-ordination of all the activities of the Organization: these tasks were entrusted to the Council Deputies. This body, on which each government was represented by a Deputy to its Foreign Minister, was to meet in continuous session in London.

The Council Deputies had not only to co-ordinate the work of NATO agencies, but also to study the relationship between the various defence plans, to suggest to governments the measures needed to co-ordinate these plans, to hold political discussions, to examine what action could be taken under Article 2 of the Treaty and to encourage the efforts made to bring the Alliance to the attention of the public in member countries. Having thus formed a framework which enabled the Council to control both the civil and military activities of the Organization, the Foreign Ministers also specified that the problem of adequate military forces and the necessary financial costs should be examined as one, rather than as separate problems. They noted that the combined resources of the members of the Alliance were sufficient to ensure the progressive and speedy development of adequate military defence without impairing the social and economic progress of these countries. And they urged the member governments to
concentrate on the creation of balanced collective forces in the progressive build-up of the defence of the North Atlantic area.

Soon after this Council session in London, there occurred an event which was to have a profound influence on the evolution of NATO: the Communist attack upon Southern Korea, which shocked the free world into a sharpened awareness of the threat confronting it. The Security Council denounced North Korea as the aggressor and decided on economic and military sanctions. All member countries of the United Nations Organization were requested to go to the rescue of the South Korean Republic. The solidarity of the free world shown in the Far East on this occasion could be shown elsewhere in the event of further aggression. When the North Atlantic Council met again on 15 September, 1950, its discussions concentrated on one problem: how to defend the NATO area against an aggression similar to that in Korea. It was agreed unanimously that a "forward strategy" must be adopted in Europe; that is to say, that any aggression must be resisted as far to the East as possible in order to ensure the defence of all the European countries of the Alliance. But to carry out this strategy, far greater resources were required than those available to NATO at that time (approximately fourteen divisions on the continent of Europe, as against some 210 Soviet divisions). The military strength of the Alliance would therefore have to be built up and the existing defence plans revised as a matter of urgency. It was also necessary to create an integrated force under a centralised command, adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe. The Council therefore requested the Defence Committee to recommend measures necessary to bring this force, which was to be placed under a supreme commander to be appointed by NATO, into being at the earliest possible time. The Standing Group was to assume the strategic direction.

The Council, having adjourned this session until 26th September, 1950, to enable Ministers to consult their governments, decided, on reconvening, to make a detailed study of the problem of the possibility of Germany contributing to the defence of Western Europe. The "forward strategy" adopted by NATO necessitated the defence of Europe on German soil, and this would be impossible without the military and political participation of the Federal Republic of Germany. However, such participation presented difficulties of principle for certain member countries, and for France in particular, and it was only towards the end of 1950 that any progress was made. The Council, meeting again on 18 December, 1950, in Brussels, recognised that German participation would strengthen the defence of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and took the first steps to ensure this participation. In particular, it invited the governments of the three occupying powers, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to explore, in co-operation with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, ways of giving effect to the principle of German participation in common defence.
At Brussels, the Council also took important decisions on military matters. First of all, it decided that an integrated force should be constituted under the supreme command of an American officer and requested President Truman to designate General Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The President agreed, and the Council then made the appointment. It was decided that, acting from headquarters to be established in Europe early in 1951, he would have the authority to train the national units assigned to his command and to organize them into an effective integrated force. The new Supreme Commander was to be supported by an international staff drawn from the nations contributing to the force.

At this same session, the Council approved a Defence Committee recommendation to establish a Defence Production Board with wider powers than those of the Military Production and Supply Board which it replaced. This new Board was given the task of increasing production and facilitating the joint use of the industrial installations of the member countries.

The Council and the Defence Committee, at a joint meeting in Brussels, also agreed to appoint, as soon as possible, a single Supreme Commander for the North Atlantic Ocean. It was decided that he would be American and that his deputy would be English.

In May, 1951, the Council Deputies in London announced important measures taken to develop the structure of NATO. In the first place, the North Atlantic Council became the sole Ministerial body of NATO, the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic Board having been abolished. A Financial and Economic Board was set up in Paris, alongside the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) which was to provide it with assistance and information. The task of this Finance and Economic Board was to give opinions on all the economic and financial aspects of the defence programme and to give advice on these same questions to the other NATO agencies under the control of the Council Deputies. It could therefore approach not only the Council itself, but, in certain specific cases, the member governments direct.

This re-organization resulted in a considerable change in the duties of the Council. Governments could be represented by their Foreign Ministers, or their Defence Ministers, or both, or by other ministers concerned and in particular their Finance Ministers or Ministers for Economic Affairs. Heads of Government could also attend meetings of the Council. The status of the Deputies was therefore reinforced: instead of being the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers only, they now represented all Ministers in their government concerned with NATO matters. The Council Deputies thus became the permanent working organization of the North Atlantic Council. An International Staff, paid from a budget to which all member states contributed, was set up under the direction of the Deputies’ Chairman, Mr. Charles M. Spofford (USA). During the year 1951, much work was done by the Council Deputies and their subsidiary agencies. For instance, on 19 June, 1951, an “Agreement between the Parties
to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces" was signed, which determined the legal status of the officers and soldiers of one member country called to serve under NATO command in another member country. A similar agreement relating to the civilian side of NATO was signed in September, 1951: this was the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff. The Deputies also settled another important question, that of how international military headquarters would be jointly financed by member countries. In August, 1951, a cost-sharing formula was agreed for financing SHAPE and its subordinate headquarters.

Though the efforts made since the formation of the Alliance had minimized the danger of aggression in Europe, tension still disturbed the relationships between the East and the West, war continued in Korea and Indo-China, and in the United Nations there was complete deadlock on disarmament and the control of atomic energy. The NATO countries had therefore to continue their defence preparations, but the intense and prolonged effort required created economic and financial problems which were to an increasing degree to occupy the attention of the Alliance.

THE TEMPORARY COUNCIL COMMITTEE

The Defence Ministers and the Ministers of Finance or Ministers for Economic Affairs joined the Foreign Ministers at the Council meeting held in Ottawa from 15 to 20 September, 1951. The military requirements of the Alliance as assessed by the Military Committee called for financial contributions far greater than those which the member states considered they were able to make. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the defence effort was threatened by a series of adverse factors: rising prices, the danger of inflation, imbalance of payments, difficulties regarding the distribution of raw materials. In order to solve these problems, the Ministers set up a Temporary Council Committee (TCC) to reconcile, on the one hand, requirements of collective security and, on the other hand, the political and economic capabilities of the member countries. In short, the TCC had to decide whether the military authorities were asking too much or whether the governments were offering too little. To this end, it was empowered to ask for information, advice and assistance from all member governments and from all the military and civilian agencies of NATO.

At this Ottawa meeting the Council formally recommended to member governments that the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey should be invited to accede to the Treaty. It also decided to examine the possibility of extending NATO's activities in the non-military field and established a Ministerial Committee composed of representatives from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway to consider the best means of strengthening the Atlantic Community and of implementing Article 2 of the Treaty.

The Council also received a report from the occupying powers on progress made in the
negotiations undertaken to establish a new basis for relations with the Federal Republic of Germany and was informed of the statement made in Washington by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States welcoming the plan for a European Defence Community to include Germany. Finally, it noted that the Council Deputies had been able to agree on a cost-sharing formula for financing the Second Slice of the NATO Infrastructure programme.

The Temporary Council Committee started its work immediately after the Ottawa Meeting. Consisting of representatives of the twelve member countries, it was under the chairmanship of Mr. Averell Harriman (United States), and decided to delegate its detailed work to an Executive Board of three: Mr. Averell Harriman (United States), Mr. Jean Monnet (France) and Sir Edwin Plowden (United Kingdom). These three outstanding figures were known to the press and the public as the 'Three Wise Men'.

The Council met again in Rome from 24 to 28 November, 1951, to receive progress reports on the work initiated at Ottawa. For the first time it heard a statement by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe on progress made with military strategy. It decided that the NATO agencies should study without delay the problem of the relationship which should obtain between NATO and the European Defence Community. On examining an interim report by the Atlantic Community Committee, the Council gave instructions that certain proposals made by this Committee, particularly those concerning displacement of manpower, be examined in detail and continuously.

The report submitted by the Temporary Council Committee on 18 December, 1951, was in the nature of a first comprehensive review of the military capacity of the member countries under peacetime conditions. It gave the maximum level of the forces which could be built up within the framework of Atlantic defence. It also set out the measures to be taken for future build-up. It was based on an essential principle: the contributions to common defence should be equitably distributed among the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Economic and social stability was vital to the defence effort, which, in turn, entailed an expansion of production by concerted action. The report specified that the primary condition for the implementation of the defence programme without any loss of economic power was a satisfactory level of general economic expansion. It also proposed ways of relieving the balance of payments difficulties and of reinforcing the social structure, and laid special emphasis on offshore purchases, on United States participation in common infrastructure and on other North American military expenditures in Europe.

The Temporary Council Committee also recommended that a procedure similar to that it had followed be a regular feature of NATO's work so as to ensure a continuous appraisal of defence programmes in the light of actual economic and political developments. This was the origin of one of the most novel activities of NATO: the Annual Review.*

* See Chapter 9, page 93.
THE LISBON DECISIONS

At the important meeting held by the Council in Lisbon from 20 to 25 February, 1952, the Ministers were asked to examine the Temporary Council Committee's detailed analysis of the defence programmes of each member country. They then adopted the military targets suggested in the report: firm goals for 1952, provisional estimates for 1953 and 1954. Thus, they undertook to contribute a total of 50 divisions, 4,000 aircraft and strong naval forces by the end of 1952. After having reviewed the aims of the Alliance and again stressed the strictly defensive character of its military effort, the Council made clear that NATO's aim was not only to protect its members but also to ensure lasting progress which would lead to a more closely knit Atlantic Community.

It also examined the problem of German participation in Western defence and approved the plans which were then being negotiated in Paris for setting up a European Defence Community. It recommended that the member countries of NATO sign a protocol to the Treaty on the guarantees to be given to member countries of the European Defence Community. This protocol was to be signed in May 1952, at the same time as the EDC Treaty.

The Council noted the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty; and it adopted a report by the Atlantic Community Committee stressing the importance of economic co-operation, advocating expansion and liberalisation of trade, and calling for a closer collaboration with other international bodies, in particular OEEC.

Lastly, the Council, acting upon a report by the Council Deputies and recommendations by the Temporary Council Committee, drastically re-organized the civilian agencies of the Alliance. It decided to transform the North Atlantic Council into a permanent body with headquarters in Paris. The Council, however, continued to be a council of governments, represented by Ministers for Foreign Affairs and/or Ministers of Defence and/or other competent Ministers, especially those responsible for financial and economic affairs, as required by the agenda of each meeting. When appropriate, member countries could be represented by Heads of Government. To enable the Council to function in permanent session with effective powers of decision, each government agreed to appoint a permanent representative who would take part in the Council's work when Ministers were not present. Each Permanent Representative would head a national delegation of advisers and experts.

The chairmanship of the Permanent Council was to be assumed by a permanent vice-chairman who would also serve as Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He would not be a member of any national delegation and would be responsible for organizing the work of the Council and directing the activities of the International Staff/Secretariat whose task would be to prepare matters for Council action and to implement Council decisions. The Council was to assume responsibility
Liaison between the Council and the Military Agencies was to be strengthened. The duties of the Standing Group and of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe were increased, particularly with respect to priorities to be given for the equipping of forces and plans to be prepared for their logistic support.

Moreover, two new commands were established: the Atlantic Command (set up on 30 January, 1952) whose Headquarters was installed at Norfolk (United States), and the Naval Command and the Maritime Air Command for the English Channel and the Southern North Sea area (set up in February, 1952). The two latter Commanders-in-Chief were made responsible to a ‘Channel Committee’ composed of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Admiral Lynde D. McCormick (United States) was appointed Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) on 10 April, 1952. His staff was drawn from the navies, armies and air forces of eight countries (Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States). Like the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, he was directly responsible to the Standing Group. His peacetime duties were to develop defence plans for the Atlantic Ocean area, organize combined training exercises in the same area and make recommendations to the Standing Group and to national authorities on strategic requirements in his area. His primary task in wartime would be to ensure security in the Atlantic Ocean by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to an enemy. He was also to be responsible for islands, such as Iceland and the Azores, situated in the Atlantic Ocean. His responsibilities being almost entirely operational, he had no forces permanently attached to his Command in peacetime. However, for training purposes and in the event of war, forces were to be earmarked by the countries involved; the naval element was to be predominant, but some ground and land-based air forces were also to be allocated to him.

The peacetime task of the Channel Committee and of the Channel Command directly under it, was to prepare plans for the control and defence of their area and to coordinate these with other NATO and national plans. In wartime they were to control the Channel and the North Sea and deny them to the enemy, to keep sea routes of communication open and to support operations of other Commands. In the event of hostilities, they were to have forces placed entirely at their disposal and to co-operate with the forces remaining at the disposal of the coastal area Commanders acting under their respective national authorities.

FROM THE LISBON MEETING TO THE PARIS AGREEMENTS

After the decisions taken in Lisbon, the Alliance devoted its efforts to setting up its new institutions: on 12 March, 1952, Lord Ismay, Secretary of State for Common-
wealth Relations in the United Kingdom Government, was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Council and Secretary General of NATO. The International Staff of the Organization was installed in Paris where it was joined by all the Permanent Representatives of the member countries and their national delegations.

The Permanent Council held its first meeting on 28 April, 1952, and immediately appointed General Matthew B. Ridgway to the post of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to replace General Eisenhower who had asked to be released in order to enter United States politics.

The Council also decided to continue the study carried out in the Autumn of 1951 by the Temporary Council Committee, namely to prepare an annual review of the defence effort undertaken by member countries.

The Council, moreover, decided to strengthen its relations with the military commands of the Alliance and, with this purpose in mind, attended a number of international manoeuvres in the NATO area.

At the Ministerial meeting held in Paris from 15 to 18 December, 1952, the Secretary General submitted his first report on the progress of work in NATO. On adopting this report, the Council voted a resolution on the application of Article 2 of the Treaty. This Resolution stressed the need for further detailed economic study not only to ensure the defence of the NATO member countries, but also to promote social progress and the ideals of freedom. The member governments were invited to strengthen their political and economic capacities by finding solutions to the problems of the balance of payments, increased production, internal financial stability and manpower.

The Military Committee at this time, reported also on the progress made in connection with the effective power of the NATO forces and co-operation between units.

Moreover, for the first time, the Council voted a resolution on international affairs outside the NATO area. It considered that, as the resistance of the free countries in South East Asia was in harmony with the aims and the ideals of the Atlantic Community, the campaign which the forces of the French Union were waging in Indo-China deserved the support of the NATO governments.

At a Ministerial meeting held from 23 to 25 April, 1953, the Council adopted short-term and long-term goals for the NATO forces and agreed to a cost-sharing formula for infrastructure expenditures applicable for a period of three years (amounting to £ 250 million). It also worked out a method for preparing co-ordinated production programmes with the help of the United States 'offshore' orders.

At a further meeting held from 14 to 16 December, 1953, the Council concentrated on the preparation of long-term defence plans and on improving the quality of the NATO forces. It also emphasised the importance of co-ordinating the national civil defence plans and plans for the allocation and control of supplies and transport in wartime.

The main task in 1954 was to settle the question of German participation in Western
defence. The formula approved at the Lisbon conference, that of the European Defence Community, became invalid when the French National Assembly refused, on 29 August, 1954, to ratify the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community. After a period of intense diplomatic activity an alternative solution was found. At the suggestion of the British Government a first conference, held in London from 28 September to 3 October, 1954, brought together the Foreign Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty powers and of Germany, Italy, the United States and Canada. The decisions taken there were approved at a further meeting held in Paris from 20 to 22 October, 1954, and the Paris Agreements were signed on 23 October, 1954.* Under these Agreements, France, the United Kingdom and the United States terminated the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany and recognised it as a sovereign State. The Federal Republic undertook to authorise the maintenance on its territory of foreign forces of at least the same strength obtaining at the date of entry into force of the Agreements.

The Federal Republic and Italy joined the Western European Union (WEU) which was set up by the Paris Agreements. The closest co-operation was envisaged between WEU and NATO in both civilian and military affairs.

Finally, the German Federal Republic was invited to enter NATO and thereby contribute to Western Defence by means of a national army integrated into the forces of the Alliance. Under the Paris Agreements, machinery was also set up to limit the number of forces and formations liable to be created within the framework of the Western European Union, as well as armaments.

At the London and Paris meetings, the United Kingdom gave a pledge to continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces assigned to SACEUR. The undertaking was subject to certain reservations in case of an acute overseas emergency, or if the financial burden proved too heavy, in which case the United Kingdom would invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions under which the forces in Europe were maintained.

It was also decided to establish a unified military formation by assigning to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe all forces, with some exceptions, of member countries stationed within the area of his command.

At the London Conference the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, had promised his colleagues that he would recommend to the President of the United States that American forces be maintained on the European Continent. President Eisenhower acted upon this recommendation on 5 March, 1955, when he gave a public undertaking that these forces would be maintained for as long as necessary.

The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty became effective on 5 May.

* See Appendix 10, page 232, for Documents relating to the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany.
On the 14th of the same month, by way of reply, the USSR concluded the Warsaw Pact with its European satellites.

THE FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE

On 7 June, 1955, the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom sent the Soviet Government a joint Note inviting the USSR to attend a four-power conference to be held in Geneva from 18 to 21 July. On 14 June the Soviet government accepted this invitation. On 16 July, a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council was held in Paris to enable the NATO Allies to exchange views before this conference. The latter, known as the Four-Power or 'Summit' Conference, ended on 21 July without any agreement having been reached. However, the Heads of Government instructed their Foreign Ministers to continue to study the outstanding problems and to suggest effective means of solving them. The Foreign Ministers met on 27 October. Just before, on 25 October, the Council again held a Ministerial Meeting to discuss which proposals the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and the United Kingdom were to submit to the second Geneva conference. The Geneva Meeting lasted until 11 November without any results.

Throughout this conference, as during the first, the governments of all NATO member countries continued to be kept informed and consulted through the medium of the North Atlantic Council.

In December 1955, the Ministers, at a Ministerial Meeting, first noted the negative result of the Geneva meetings. They reiterated that the reunification of Germany was still an essential condition for establishing a lasting peace. Finally, they took a major decision regarding defence planning. All the member countries had stressed their clear intention of seeing the Atlantic forces equipped with the most modern weapons, with a view to the continual adjustment of defence strategy to developments in weapons and technique. The Council therefore adopted procedures designed to give new impetus and direction to the defence planning of the Alliance.

The Council noted with satisfaction the substantial progress that could be achieved in this respect as a result of the valuable assistance of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada.

The Council also devoted major attention to improving the arrangements for air defence and the warning system in Europe. It approved recommendations on the re-organization and closer co-ordination of air defence in the NATO European countries so as to integrate further NATO activities in this vital field. Finally, it received a report on a new type of communications system for air defence and warning. The United States offered to finance a pilot project for this new system.

At its meetings in 1956, the Council examined the implications for NATO of Soviet policy in Europe and elsewhere, and agreed on the need to face up to any threat likely
to endanger the security and freedom of the Atlantic Community. The brutal suppres­sion of the heroic Hungarian people's rebellion by the Soviets and their attempt to penetrate the Middle East were primary causes of the renewed deterioration of in­ternational relations, and the end of 1956 saw a return to the cold war.

Meanwhile, in May, 1956, the Foreign Ministers had pointed out that the Atlantic powers possessed in the North Atlantic Council an instrument of unity and a forum for consultation regarding all policies of general interest. To enable the Council better to perform these tasks, they decided to appoint a committee of three Foreign Ministers – Dr. Gaetano Martino of Italy, Mr. Halvard Lange of Norway, and Mr. Lester B. Pearson of Canada – to advise the Council on how to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic community.

THE COMMITTEE OF THREE

The Committee's mandate was first of all inspired by a desire to implement Article 2 of the Treaty. The course of events in the following months, notably in the Middle East and Hungary, led the Atlantic Allies to attach special significance to another aspect of the task of the Committee of Three, namely the ways and means of improving political consultation.

At the Ministerial Meeting in December 1956, the Council approved the recommenda­tions included in the Report of the Committee of Three, and consequently sanctioned wider and more intimate consultation among member states on political matters.*

Among the measures to promote unity proposed by the Committee of Three and approved by the Council, the following are particularly noteworthy:

1. Member governments are to inform the North Atlantic Council of any develop­ment which significantly affects the Alliance in order to have effective political consultation about the action to be taken.

2. At every spring Ministerial Meeting the fifteen Foreign Ministers will make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance, based on a political annual review prepared by the Secretary General.

3. Article 1 of the Treaty provides that the members shall settle disputes by peaceful means. For the first time, it is agreed that member states should submit any such disputes which are not capable of direct settlement to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency. The Secretary General is empowered, with the consent of the parties, to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation or arbitration to settle such disputes. In this connection he may choose three permanent representatives to assist him.

* For the Report of the Committee of Three see Appendix 11, page 260.
At its December 1956 meeting the Council also approved a directive for future military plans based on an assessment of the continued rise in Soviet capabilities and the various types of new weapons available for NATO defence. It reaffirmed, moreover, that the concept of forward defence in NATO strategy should be maintained.

It was at this Ministerial Meeting of December 1956, that Lord Ismay announced his desire to retire in the spring of 1957 as Secretary General and that the Council appointed Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium, to succeed him. Mr. Spaak took office on 15 May, 1957.

In November 1956, General Lauris Norstad (United States) succeeded General Gruenther as Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in Europe.

QUESTIONS OF DEFENCE AND OF DISARMAMENT

In accordance with a recommendation of the Committee of Three that the Council should, from time to time, hold Ministerial sessions elsewhere than Paris, the Foreign Ministers of the NATO countries met in Bonn (Federal Republic of Germany) on 2 and 3 May, 1957.

NATO's defence policy was one of the main subjects discussed at this meeting. The Soviet leaders had launched a campaign aimed at inducing public opinion in various member countries to oppose the modernisation of Western defence forces. The Council agreed that one of the objects of this campaign was to ensure for Soviet forces a monopoly of nuclear weapons on the European continent and that in the face of this threat, the Atlantic Alliance must be in a position to meet any attack which might be launched against it. No power had the right to deny to the Alliance the possession of the modern arms needed for its defence, it stated.

The Ministers also decided to intensify their efforts in favour of German reunification by means of free elections.

During the spring and summer of 1957, the question of disarmament was also frequently discussed by the Council.

Four NATO countries – Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States – participated in the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee talks in London with the USSR during the spring and summer of 1957. The meetings brought out the continual opposition between the Soviet and Western viewpoints on disarmament, and as these negotiations were of major interest to all members of the Alliance, the four Western governments represented on the Sub-Committee made it a habit to consult their NATO partners about their proposals and to keep them informed of the progress of the London talks. Mr. Harold Stassen and Mr. Jules Moch, the representatives of the United States and France respectively, reported to the Council on two occasions, and other reports and consultations were frequent.

In this all-important field, consultation within the framework of NATO achieved positive results: in the light of the advice given by the military authorities of the Alliance, very complete discussions took place which made it possible for the members
THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE FROM 1949 TO 1962

of NATO to arrive at a common position. The proposals put forward by the four Western powers in London on 29 August, 1957 thus reflected a viewpoint common to all the partners of the Alliance.

The Western proposals comprised the following measures, to be carried out under international control: reduction of all types of armaments and military forces; cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes; reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons; suspension of nuclear weapon tests; and adoption of protective measures against the risk of surprise attack.

These proposals were rejected by the USSR, though they were later approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, in November 1957, by a considerable majority. Subsequently the General Assembly set up a new disarmament commission which the USSR announced it would boycott.

This boycott increased the gravity of the international situation during the summer of 1957. The Soviet policy of penetration was meeting with success in the Middle East, and particularly in Syria, where the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Furthermore, the launching of the first Sputnik enabled the USSR to wage a vast propaganda offensive which, by claiming for the Soviet Union technical superiority over the rest of the world, implied its military superiority, particularly in the field of long-range missiles.

In autumn 1957, the countries of the Alliance met the Soviet challenge with a decision to re-inforce their unity. In October 1957, President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan of the United Kingdom met in Washington to consider action to be taken to combat the new aspects of the Soviet threat. The Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Spaak, was invited to join them for part of these talks, at the close of which the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom issued a declaration of common purpose which underlined, in particular, the fact that the countries of the free world were interdependent and must increase their co-operation, pool their resources and share the tasks in the fields essential to their security and well-being.

In order to mark with particular solemnity the unity of the Alliance, it was decided, following the talks in Washington, that the North Atlantic Council would meet for the first time at the level of Heads of Government in December 1957.

THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING

The Heads of Government met in Paris from 16 to 19 December, 1957. In a solemn declaration,* the Council re-dedicated itself to the principles and purposes of the Alliance, and reaffirmed the common position of its members regarding the maintenance of peace and security.

In the field of defence, the Council stressed that NATO must possess the most effective

* For the texts of the Declaration and Communiqué of the December 1957 Ministerial Meeting, see Appendix 12, page 279.
military defensive strength, taking into account recent developments in weapons and techniques. To this end, it was necessary to establish stocks of nuclear warheads readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council also decided that intermediate-range ballistic missiles should be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The deployment of these stocks as well as arrangements for their use were to be decided in agreement with the countries directly concerned.

Recognising the growing interdependence of the nations of the free world, the Council recommended closer co-ordination in the organization of forces to enable each NATO country to make the most effective contribution to the requirements of the Alliance. It also pointed out that better use of the Alliance’s resources and greater efficiency for its forces would be obtained through as high a degree of standardization and integration as possible.

In the political field, the Heads of Government recognised the need for fuller consultation and for a broad co-ordination of policies. They reaffirmed their unity regarding the problem of German reunification and of the security and freedom of Berlin. In the field of disarmament, they emphasised the need for adequate international control and agreed to establish a technical group to advise on problems of arms control arising out of new technical developments. They stated their willingness to promote any negotiations with the USSR which would lead to the controlled reduction of armaments within the limits imposed by security. They proclaimed that they were prepared to examine any proposal, from whatever source, for general or partial disarmament.

In the course of this same Ministerial Meeting, moreover, the foundations were laid for co-operation in the field of scientific and technical matters. Recognising that progress in this field depended on vigorous action within each member country and also in the co-operation of teachers and scientists, the Heads of Government stressed their desire to increase the effectiveness of national efforts by pooling scientific facilities and information and by sharing out the tasks. They therefore decided to establish immediately a science committee on which all NATO countries would be represented by experts who could speak authoritatively on scientific policy. They also recommended the appointment of an outstanding scientist as Science Adviser to the Secretary General of NATO.

The Heads of Government reaffirmed the need for closer economic association between the countries within the Atlantic Community and in the free world as a whole. They decided that the North Atlantic Council should, from time to time, in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty and without duplicating the work of other agencies, review economic trends, assess economic progress and make suggestions for improvements.

Before the Heads of Government Meeting began in Paris, the Soviet Union launched a diplomatic offensive which continued long after the Ministerial session. It took the
form of an avalanche of letters to the various member governments; most of them were signed by Mr. Bulganin, at that time Soviet Prime Minister. These messages raised a number of issues such as the calling of a summit meeting, the suspension of nuclear tests, the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, the institution of a de-nuclearised zone in Europe, the installation of launching ramps for missiles, the signing of a non-aggression pact, etc. The messages were clearly aimed at creating dissension, which could then be exploited with a view to persuading the countries of the Alliance to negotiate separately with the Soviet Union.

The NATO partners found in political consultation the answer to this attack. By agreeing to discuss within the Council both the contents of the Soviet letters and the draft replies prepared by each of the governments, the members of NATO were able to achieve a remarkable degree of harmony in their views. As regards Soviet proposals for a summit meeting, studies were carried out by the Council on procedural questions and a possible agenda, in order to agree on a common Western position.

In accordance with the decisions taken on defence questions in December 1957, by the Heads of Government, the Defence Ministers of the Alliance met in Paris from 15 to 17 April, 1958.

They agreed on measures aimed at achieving greater co-ordination and widening co-operation among member countries in the fields of defence research, the development of production and the organization of forces. They also confirmed their support of the basic NATO defensive strategy, which continued to be founded on the concept of a strong deterrent, comprising the Shield with its conventional and nuclear elements, and the nuclear retaliatory forces.

POLITICAL CO-OPERATION AND EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS

The Council held its spring Ministerial Meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen from 5 to 7 May, 1958. Its discussions centred chiefly on political and economic co-operation within the Alliance.

A political report prepared by the Secretary General figured on the agenda for the first time, in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Three. This document emphasised the very real progress made by the Alliance in the field of political co-operation.

Regarding a possible summit conference, the Council adopted a positive attitude, with the proviso that such a meeting should offer prospects of reaching settlements on important questions; it should, in other words, be properly prepared and take place in a favourable atmosphere. The Foreign Ministers emphasised that the questions of German reunification and controlled disarmament should be discussed.

With regard to the latter point, the Council demonstrated its willingness to negotiate by proposing partial measures which could serve as test cases and might later be applied on a wider scale. It pointed out that agreement on measures which might, for
example, prevent surprise attacks or detect nuclear explosions would go far towards demonstrating the possibility of agreement on disarmament.

Negotiations for a summit conference continued during the summer of 1958, but the USSR, when it failed to obtain agreement to a conference on its own terms, appeared to lose interest in a summit meeting.

The North Atlantic Council, however, continued to be the forum for Western consultation on matters involving relations with the Soviet Union, including the suspension of nuclear weapons tests and the prevention of surprise attacks.

The Secretary General of NATO played an active role during this period in efforts to settle disputes between member countries such as those concerning fishing rights off Iceland, and the future of Cyprus.

Towards the end of 1958 it was the question of Germany's future, and that of Berlin in particular, which dominated the scene. On 10 November, 1958, Mr. Khrushchev declared that the USSR wished to terminate the present status of Berlin and on 27 November, 1958, the Soviet Government confirmed this intention. It announced that it proposed to transfer to the Pankow Authorities, within six months, all the powers it exercised in East Berlin by virtue of the 1945 agreements, as well as the control of communications between Western Germany and Berlin.

The North Atlantic Council held its regular Ministerial session in Paris from 16 to 18 December, 1958. It gave special attention to the question of Berlin and associated itself fully with the views previously expressed on the subject by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. It stressed in particular that the NATO countries could not approve a solution of the Berlin question which would jeopardize the right of the three Western Powers to remain there as long as their responsibilities so required, and which would not assure freedom of access and communication between Berlin and the free world. It emphasized that the Soviet Union would be responsible for any action which would have the effect of hampering free access and communication. The Council stated that the question of Berlin could only be settled in the context of an agreement with the USSR on Germany as a whole. It recalled that the Western powers had always been and still were ready to discuss this problem, as well as those of European security and disarmament.

The Council also examined a report submitted by the Secretary General of NATO on political co-operation in the Alliance. The Ministers agreed that the existing machinery of NATO was well suited to the needs of the Alliance, but that political consultation could be improved by more systematic study of long-term political questions.

The Council reaffirmed the importance it attached to the measures taken both individually and collectively by member countries to stimulate economic activity and to ensure continued expansion without inflation.

Examining the military situation of the Alliance, the Council emphasized the vital need, in view of the continuing increase in Soviet armaments, to sustain member
countries’ efforts to improve the Alliance’s defensive power. It reaffirmed NATO’s defensive strategy as continuing to be based on the existence of effective Shield forces and on the firm will to use nuclear retaliatory forces to repel aggression.

The Ministers approved the conclusions of the report on the 1958 Annual Review, noting that plans agreed in December 1957, by the Heads of Governments were being actively implemented. They suggested measures for accelerating their realisation.

The Council decided to hold its next Ministerial Meeting in Washington in order to celebrate, on 4 April, 1959, the Tenth Anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

This session was of particular importance on account of the sudden changes in East-West relations which occurred early in 1959. Apparently the Soviet government had become aware of the appalling risks of a nuclear conflict and also thought a détente could offer advantages for the extension of its influence throughout the world. It had therefore suggested that East-West relations be based on ‘peaceful co-existence’. Mr. Khrushchev himself, in his speech of 10th October, 1959 at Novosibirsk, had defined this as: “the continuation of the struggle between the two social systems, but by peaceful means”.

The Western powers examined the prospects of genuine agreement which the ‘dé­­tente’ might offer.

In February 1959, personal contact was again made between the Soviet and Western leaders when Mr. Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, visited Moscow. In August, Mr. Nixon, the United States Vice-President, also went there. In February 1960, Mr. Gronchi, President of Italy, made an official visit to the USSR. Mr. Khrushchev, on his side, accepted the invitation of the United States Government in September 1959 and that of the French Government in March 1960, to visit their respective countries. Meanwhile, the French, United Kingdom and United States Governments were reaching agreement with the Soviet Government on the principle of a conference of the four Foreign Ministers to deal primarily with the German question.

The re-opening of negotiations on a question which affected the basic interests of the Alliance called for detailed consultation between the member countries to ensure that they were all in agreement on the positions to be defended by the three Western Powers.

The Ministerial Meeting in Washington afforded the opportunity for such consultation, and the Council made a point of recalling that the unity of action and policy rendered possible by the Alliance was the best guarantee of success in negotiations with the Soviet Government and the finding of genuine solutions to the problems which divided the East and the West.

Consultation continued within the Permanent Council. Both before and during the first and then the second Geneva Conference, close liaison was maintained between the negotiating powers and the other Allies. After each of these conferences, one of the Ministers who had taken part – first Mr. Couve de Murville, and later Mr. Selwyn
Lloyd – came to report to the Council. Moreover, there were regular and frequent reports during the sessions. These negotiations had revealed that the Western and Soviet positions concerning Germany were still irreconcilable. However, the discussions between President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev shortly afterwards at Camp David opened the door to further negotiation, undertaken this time at the level of Heads of Government. The ‘summit conference’, now appearing on the horizon, was to take first place in the Council’s work for some time.

The Ministerial Meeting, held from 15 to 22 December, opening with the inauguration of the new NATO Headquarters, was largely devoted to the forthcoming negotiations between the East and the West. The Ministers initiated a procedure for consultation and the exchange of information with a view to continuing the preparation for the summit conference.

Whilst continuing to prepare this conference, the Permanent Council was kept constantly informed of developments in the disarmament negotiations, re-opened in Geneva since 15 March, 1960, within the framework of the Ten-Power Committee.*

**FAILURE OF THE SUMMIT MEETING**

On 2 May, when the Ministerial Meeting opened in Istanbul – it was to end on 4 May – the Summit Conference was very near. The Council was able to note that all member countries were in agreement with “the common positions of the United States, France and the United Kingdom as worked out in consultation with their allies”.

The Council re-stated the Western position on Germany – reunification on the basis of self-determination – and Berlin; it declared itself in favour of “general and complete disarmament, to be achieved by stages under effective international control”; it denounced the efforts of Soviet propaganda to discredit the Federal Republic of Germany and certain other NATO countries as “inconsistent with a real improvement of international relations” since “détente, like peace, is indivisible”.

When it met in Paris on 16 May, 1960, the summit conference was at once deliberately broken up by Mr. Khrushchev.

On 19 May, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States reported to the Permanent Council on what had occurred. The ensuing discussion showed that member countries were in agreement with the positions taken by the three Heads of State and Government.

A few weeks later, on 27 June, the Communist bloc countries suddenly left the Geneva Disarmament Conference, claiming that the disarmament talks could only be usefully continued within a wider framework. The only surprising factor in the cessation of the talks was its suddenness. It was, in fact, a logical step in the hardening

* Participants included five Western countries: Canada, France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States; five Eastern countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, USSR.
of Soviet policy noted since the abortive conference of 16 May. Moreover, it was the forerunner of a spectacular initiative by Mr. Khrushchev who personally attended the General Assembly of the United Nations at New York in September and succeeded in inflaming the debates by his vehement interventions and extravagant behaviour.

In November, a secret meeting took place in Moscow which was attended by representatives of the 81 Communist Parties in the world. This conference ended with the publication of a voluminous document from which it was clear – so far as international politics was concerned – that Mr. Khrushchev’s views on peaceful co-existence had finally been approved unanimously by the delegates.

From 16 to 18 December, the North Atlantic Council held its Ministerial Meeting in Paris. As announced by the Secretary General, it was a transition meeting, for the new United States Administration was not yet in power.

The Ministers made a broad study of the international situation from the political, military and economic angles. They also examined the question of long-term planning on the basis of a progress report from the Secretary General and suggestions put forward by governments.

Furthermore, the Council re-emphasized its determination to work for a lasting improvement in international relations, in which freedom, national independence and law would be respected. It also expressed the hope for an early resumption of negotiations with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament by stages under effective international control.

In the face of renewed harassing tactics by the Soviet bloc against Berlin, the Council confirmed its declaration of 16 December, 1958, and its determination to protect the freedom of the people of West Berlin.

In the military sector, the Ministers considered that the Alliance should be able to respond to any attack with whatever force might be appropriate. In this connection, it considered a proper balance between nuclear and conventional strength to be imperative. Moreover, it noted with great interest a suggestion by the United States that a multilateral medium-range ballistic missile force be set up.

In connection with the development and production of military equipment, the Council urged all parties concerned to continue and, if possible, to intensify their cooperation.

In the political field the Ministers reaffirmed their determination to pursue within the Alliance comprehensive political consultation designed to achieve the closest possible co-ordination of their views and unity of action.

Finally, in the economic field, the Ministers emphasized the importance they attached to the economic development of the less-favoured countries of the Alliance and expressed the Atlantic countries’ recognition of their special responsibility in the field of aid to under-developed countries.

In view of the development of the Communist economic offensive, the Ministers instructed the Permanent Representatives to follow up previous studies and to concert the necessary defensive measures.
On 1 February 1961, the Secretary General, Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, informed the Council of his decision to resume political life in his own country. The Council, accepting his resignation, expressed its gratitude to him for the work he had accomplished in the many fields of the Alliance, as well as for the impulse his dynamism had given to the Organization. Mr. Spaak left office on 5 March; on 18 April the Council offered the post of Secretary General to Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, the Netherlands' Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council. Mr. Stikker took office on 21 April.

THE OSLO SESSION

The Council met in Ministerial session from 8 to 10 May in Oslo. The Council expressed its regret over the lack of progress towards German reunification, and reaffirmed its conviction that a peaceful and just solution of the German problem, including that of Berlin, was to be found only on the basis of self-determination. With particular regard to Berlin, the Ministers reiterated their determination, expressed in the Declaration of 16 December, 1958, to maintain the freedom of West Berlin and its people. Reference was also made to the fact that the United States had initiated consultations with the Soviet Union in order to arrive at a mutually acceptable procedure for the resumption of disarmament negotiations. The Council agreed that the position of those members participating in the disarmament discussions should be developed in close consultation with the NATO Council.

With regard to the Geneva negotiations on the suspension of nuclear tests, the Council noted with approval that the United States and the United Kingdom had tabled a comprehensive draft treaty offering a basis for agreement. They regretted that new difficulties had been raised by the Soviets' negative attitude. Particular attention was devoted also to the problems of aiding the world's less-developed areas, and the Ministers noted with satisfaction the large volume of such aid being granted by the Free World – aid dwarfing that granted by the Sino-Soviet bloc. The Council reaffirmed its determination to increase these efforts.

The Ministers also discussed the problems of long-term planning within the Alliance in the non-military sphere on the basis of a report presented by the Council in Permanent Session, dealing with the future development and role of the Alliance in the political, economic, civil emergency planning and other fields. Guidelines were set for the Permanent Council to strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance.

The Ministers also invited the Council in Permanent Session to continue, in close cooperation with the military authorities, its studies of all aspects of the military posture of the Alliance with a view to improving its deterrent and defensive strength. They requested the Council to submit these studies when ready and to report to the December Ministerial Meeting.

In a further action, the Ministers gave special attention to the economic problems affecting Greece and Turkey, and considered ways and means of assisting the efforts
made by these countries to speed up their development programmes and to raise the standards of living of their peoples.

On 2 and 3 June 1961, Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev met in Vienna to establish a personal contact and exchange views. This meeting, which was not expected to have immediate results, brought out the divergent views separating the East and the West, particularly on the subject of Berlin. A few weeks later, during the night of 13 August, the 'Vopos' of the Pankow Regime barricaded the Eastern sector of Berlin and, despite the protests of the three Allied Powers, commenced the building of the Berlin Wall.

On 31 August the USSR resumed nuclear testing on an unprecedented scale. The tests appeared to be completed on 30 October with the explosion of a 50 megaton bomb. Meanwhile, on 17 October, the xxii Soviet Communist Party Congress had opened in Moscow. As far as internal matters are concerned, the Congress was notable for the rebirth of de-Stalinisation; regarding external problems, there was a slight change in Mr. Khrushchev's attitude toward Berlin in the sense that he withdrew the year-end ultimatum for the signing of a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Nevertheless, the Soviet position remained unchanged regarding the basis of the problem. The Allies, however, continued to think that a peaceful solution to the problem might be negotiated if such a negotiation could be carried out under reasonable conditions. This problem was the object of detailed study in the weeks preceding the next Ministerial Meeting which took place in Paris on 13, 14 and 15 December.

**THE FINAL SESSION OF 1961**

In the communiqué which was issued after the session, the Ministers deplored the Soviet Government's continued refusal to accept effective international controls for disarmament. They also expressed regret over the Soviets' refusal to hold serious discussions and their obstruction, for over three years, of the Nuclear Test Ban talks while at the same time they were secretly preparing for the longest series of tests ever held, topped by the most powerful explosion yet set off.

Regarding Berlin, the Ministers expressed their sympathy for all the families which were divided by the building of the Wall and their loss of opportunity to seek freedom in the West. They voiced their admiration for the courage shown by the freedom-loving population of Berlin. The Ministers once again reaffirmed their conviction that a just and peaceful solution to the German problem, including that of Berlin, must be based on the principle of self-determination, and their determination to protect the freedom of West Berlin and to assure the population a prosperous and free life. The communiqué specifically reported: "The Council heard statements on Berlin by the Foreign Ministers of the countries most directly concerned, and was informed of the intention to resume diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union... in the hope that these contacts might serve to determine whether a basis for negotiation could be
found. Their colleagues approved the resumption of diplomatic contacts and expressed the hope that a negotiated settlement could be achieved”.
In the military field, the Ministers noted the improvements made by member countries in their force contributions, particularly in response to the aggravation of the military threat arising from the deterioration of the Berlin situation. These improvements were shown, they said, by the reinforcement of units as well as by their degree of readiness. Moreover, a mobile task force had been created and there had been advances in cooperative programmes for defence research and production, as well as in communications and infrastructure.
They also noted the progress made by the Council in its study of the long-term problems of improving the deterrent and defensive strength of the Alliance; it asked the Permanent Council to continue its study of these urgent questions.
In considering Civil Emergency Planning, particularly the protection of civilian populations, the Council recognized that such measures represent an essential element in the NATO countries’ defence effort.
In the economic field the Council noted that a mission of high-ranking personalities had been set up in conformity with a decision taken at the last Ministerial Meeting to study ways and means of assisting Greek and Turkish efforts to speed up their development programmes and improve their peoples’ living standards.
CHAPTER 4

THE STRUCTURE OF NATO

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority in NATO. It is composed of representatives of the member countries. These being sovereign states, equal in status, all decisions of the Council are taken unanimously.

The Council may meet at the level either of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives. At Ministerial meetings of the Council, the members of the Alliance are represented by one – or several – of their Ministers (for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Economic Affairs, etc.) according to the agenda of the meeting. They may also be represented by Heads of Government.*

Permanent Representatives of the member countries, who hold the rank of Ambassador, meet between Ministerial sessions, thus ensuring the continuous functioning of the Council with effective powers of decision.

The Council meets at Ministerial level approximately two or three times a year, and once or twice a week at the level of Permanent Representatives. The latter can be called together at short notice and at any time. In the course of the last ten years, the Council has held more than 700 meetings. Whatever the level at which the Council meets, its chairman is the Secretary General of NATO.

Each year the Foreign Minister of a member state is President of the Council. The Presidency rotates annually according to the alphabetical order of the NATO countries.

THE CIVILIAN SIDE

COUNCIL COMMITTEES

The Council has established a number of committees and working groups. They examine the problems submitted to them by the Council and make recommendations.

THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT

Secretary General

The Secretary General is Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and is responsible for the direction of the International Staff/Secretariat.

* In December 1957, the Council met for the first time at the level of Heads of Government.
A Deputy Secretary General assists the Secretary General in the exercise of his functions, and replaces him in his absence.

**The Division of Political Affairs**
This Division is directed by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, and has the following responsibilities:

a. Preparation of the political discussions of the Council, and of the discussions of the Committee of Political Advisers.

b. Preparation of notes and reports on political subjects for the Secretary General and for the Council.

c. Political liaison with the delegations of member countries.

d. Liaison with other international organizations, both intergovernmental and non-governmental.

The Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs is Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers (established in 1957, following the recommendations of the Committee of Three) and of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations.

**The Information Service**
The Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs is also responsible for the Information Service.

In co-operation with national information authorities, the Information Service has the task of informing public opinion about the aims and achievements of the Atlantic Alliance. Through periodicals, films, radio and television programmes, publications and exhibitions, the Information Service seeks to improve public understanding among the member countries and to encourage a feeling of unity and community of interests.

**The Press Service**
The Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs is also responsible for the Press Service, which ensures daily contact with the press and includes the Documentation and Library Section. In dealings with the press, the Head of the Service is considered the official spokesman for NATO.

**The Division of Economics and Finance**
The Division is directed by the Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance, and is responsible for:

a. The study of economic matters of concern to the Alliance, especially any with political effect on defence problems, or any likely to influence the well-being of the Atlantic Community, and in this connection the constant scrutiny of the economic positions of the member countries in regard to the defence effort.

b. The study of the overall financial aspects of defence by country, within the framework of the plans laid down by the military authorities, and the national defence
THE CIVIL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF NATO
budgets; and the analysis and estimate of the cost by services of the defence programmes (Annual Review).
c. Lastly, the organization and direction of the statistical studies required to assess the NATO defence effort.

The Division of Production, Logistics and Infrastructure
This Division is directed by the Assistant Secretary General for Production, Logistics and Infrastructure, and has the following responsibilities:
a. The promotion, within the field of armaments, of the most efficient use of the resources of the Alliance for equipment of its forces. This task especially involves:
   i. The study of problems of improvement, standardization and supply within the framework of the Alliance's defence plans.
   ii. Organizing the exchange of technical information concerning research, improvement and production.
This work is mainly carried out under the control of the Armaments Committee.
   iii. Participation in the Annual Review.
b. To assure technical and financial supervision of the infrastructure programme.
   This supervision is exercised by the Infrastructure Committee and the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee.

The Division of Scientific Affairs
The tasks of the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs are:
a. To advise the Secretary General on scientific matters of interest to NATO.
b. To preside over the Science Committee.
c. Between meetings of the Science Committee, to make the necessary preparations for future meetings and to implement their decisions.
d. To direct the activities of the Working Groups created by the Science Committee.
e. To ensure liaison in the scientific field with the military and civil authorities of NATO, as well as with such authorities in member countries as are responsible for the implementation of scientific directives, and also with other international organizations having scientific affiliations.

The Office of the Executive Secretary
The Executive Secretary acts as Secretary to the Council and ensures co-ordination of the activities of the NATO Committees.
The office of the Executive Secretary provides the necessary secretariat for these Committees and also attends to the production of the various records, reports and other documents vital to their work.
The Civil Emergency Planning Office comes under the supervision of the Executive Secretary.
PRINCIPAL COMMITTEES OF THE COUNCIL

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

- Committee of Political Advisers
- Committee of Economic Advisers
- Annual Review Committee
- Arms Committee
- Science Committee
- Infrastructure Committee
- NATO Pipeline Committee
- Committee on Information and Cultural Relations
- Civilian Budget Committee
- Military Budget Committee
- Committee of European Airspace Co-ordination
- Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee
- Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee

- Civil Communications Planning Committee
- Civil Defence Committee
- Planning Board for Ocean Shipping
- Civil Emergency Co-ordinating Committee
- Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport
- Medical Committee
- Petroleum Planning Committee
- Industrial Planning Committee
- Food and Agriculture Planning Committee
- Manpower Planning Committee
- Civil Aviation Committee
The Civil Emergency Planning Office
This office is directed by the Senior Civil Defence Adviser, who is responsible for the general co-ordination of all activities undertaken within the framework of civil emergency planning in time of war. He also provides technical assistance and advice on all matters concerned with civil defence and assists national civil defence services.

The Personnel and Administration Service
This Service is directly under the Secretary General. The Head of Personnel and Administration is responsible for the general administration of the International Staff, as well as for the preparation of the budget.

The Service of the Financial Controller
This independent Service is headed by the Financial Controller, who is appointed by the Council and is responsible for the control of expenditures within the framework of the budget.

OTHER CIVIL AGENCIES OF NATO
Within the last few years, the Council has created a number of subsidiary agencies, each responsible for certain specific tasks.

Central Europe Operating Agency
This Agency, created by the Council in 1957, is responsible for the operation of the network of pipelines, the construction of which was decided upon in 1952 in response to the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. These pipelines ensure the supply of fuel to NATO's land and air forces in Central Europe. The Agency has its headquarters near Versailles in France.

NATO Maintenance Supply Services Agency
This Agency was created by the Council in 1958 in order to provide a common system for the supply of spare parts for the forces of NATO countries. A NATO Supply Centre has recently been set up at Chateauroux in France to assist the Agency and NATO member countries in carrying out their supply commitments, by providing the maximum assistance in this field at the lowest possible cost.

Hawk Agency
This Agency, created in June 1959, groups the five countries which are concerned with the European production of the Hawk engine, (Belgium, France, Western Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). This supersonic ground-air engine was developed in the United States, who provided the necessary technical assistance for its manufacture in Europe. Five companies – one from each country – formed an international consortium, SETEL (Société Euro-
péenne de Téléguidage), which, on behalf of the five governments, is responsible for the control of production. Each participating company makes various parts of the engine.

THE MILITARY SIDE

The higher military organization of NATO comprises the Military Committee, its executive agency – the Standing Group – the Commands and a Regional Planning Group.

THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

The Military Committee is the senior military authority in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is composed of a Chief-of-Staff of each member country. Iceland, however, having no military forces, may be represented by a civilian. The chairmanship of the Military Committee rotates annually in the alphabetical order of countries.

At the level of Chiefs-of-Staff the Military Committee meets regularly – at least twice a year – and whenever else it may be found necessary. It is responsible for making recommendations and supplying guidance on military questions to subordinate authorities.

In order to enable the Military Committee to function in permanent session with effective powers of decision, each Chief-of-Staff appoints a Permanent Military Representative. Between meetings of the Chiefs-of-Staff, their Permanent Military Representatives deal with and settle questions which come within the province of the Military Committee, except those which, by their nature and scope, require the approval of the Chiefs-of-Staff.

THE STANDING GROUP

The Standing Group is composed of representatives of the Chiefs-of-Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is the executive agent of the Military Committee. The Chairmanship of the Standing Group rotates among the three countries every three months. The members of the Standing Group are at the same time the representatives of their Chiefs-of-Staff in the Military Committee in Permanent Session.

The Standing Group is the superior body responsible for the highest strategic guidance in areas in which Allied NATO forces operate. As such, it is the body to which the NATO Commanders are responsible. On certain subjects it draws its authority from the Military Committee.

To ensure the integrated defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area, the Standing Group has the task of co-ordinating defence plans originating in NATO Commands and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group, and of making appropriate recommendations thereon to the Military Committee and ultimately to the Council. The Standing Group is represented on the North Atlantic Council in Paris by a
THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF Nato

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

MILITARY COMMITTEE

STANDING GROUP
Washington U.S.

STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE
Paris

NATO DEFENCE COLLEGE (Paris)
MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (London)
COMMUNICATIONS AGENCIES IN EUROPE (Paris-London)
ADVISORY GROUP FOR AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (Paris)

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE
Paris France

ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC
Norfolk U.S.

CHANNEL COMMITTEE
London U.K.

ALLIED COMMAND CHANNEL
Portsmouth/Northwood U.K.

CANADA-U.S. REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP
Washington U.S.

* In Washington D.C., U.S., when in Permanent Session
general officer assisted by an Allied staff composed of officers drawn in rotation from all member nations, thus ensuring close co-operation between the NATO civilian and military authorities.

It is through this Standing Group Representative (SGREP) that the military advice, recommendations and decisions of the NATO military authorities are communicated to the Council or submitted to it for approval. Conversely, the Standing Group is kept regularly informed of the work and decisions of the Council.

The Standing Group has also the following NATO military agencies under its authority: the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) in London, the Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD) and the NATO Defence College, located in Paris. Also directly subordinate to the Standing Group are: the European Military Communications Co-ordinating Committee (EMCCC), the European Long Lines Agency (ELLA), the European Radio Frequencies Agency (ERFA) and the European Naval Communications Agency (ENCA).

COMMANDS
The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is divided, to take account of geographical as well as political factors, among three Commands and a Regional Planning Group. The authority exercised by these different Commands varies in form and is conditioned by these factors and by the situation in peacetime or in wartime.

The forces of member countries include forces assigned in peacetime to NATO Commands, forces earmarked for these Commands and forces remaining under national command. The NATO Commanders are responsible for the development of defence plans for their respective areas, for the determination of force requirements and for the deployment and exercise of the forces under their Command. All their reports and recommendations regarding forces and their logistic support are referred to the Standing Group.

The organization of these Commands is flexible enough and the liaison between them close enough to allow for mutual support in the event of war, and the rapid shifting of the necessary land, sea and air forces to meet any situation likely to confront the North Atlantic Community.

THE EUROPEAN COMMAND
This Command covers the land area extending from the North Cape to North Africa and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey, excluding United Kingdom and Algeria, the defence of which does not fall under the responsibility of any one major NATO Command, and Portugal, which falls under the Atlantic Ocean Command.

This area is under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, abbreviated as SACEUR, whose headquarters, between Paris and Versailles, are known as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.*

* Abbreviated as SHAPE.
The present Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is General Lauris Norstad (United States Air Force).*

SACEUR is responsible, under the general direction of the Standing Group, for the defence of the Allied countries situated in the area under his Command against any attack, and he would, in time of war, control all land, sea and air operations in this area. Internal defence (including that of Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily) and defence of coastal waters remain the responsibility of the national authorities concerned, but the Supreme Commander would have full authority to carry out such operations as he considered necessary for the defence of any part of the area under his Command.

SACEUR's peacetime functions are defined as:

a. organizing, training and equipping the North Atlantic forces assigned and earmarked to his Command so as to ensure that they are knit together into one unified force;
b. preparing and finalising defence plans;
c. making recommendations to the Standing Group about such matters as the instruction, training and support of his forces, and indeed on any military questions which affect his ability to carry out his responsibilities in peace or war.

Although the Supreme Commander receives his directions from the Standing Group, he nevertheless has the right of direct access to the Chiefs-of-Staff of any of the Powers and, in certain circumstances, to Defence Ministers and Heads of Government. In addition, all the North Atlantic countries, with the exception of Iceland, maintain National Military Representatives (NMR) at SHAPE, who are responsible for liaison with their Chiefs-of-Staff.

The special responsibility of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is to further the organization, equipment, training and mobilization of national forces allocated to the Supreme Commander. SACEUR also has a Naval Deputy and an Air Deputy.

COMMANDS SUBORDINATE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

There are four subordinate Commands directly responsible to SACEUR:

a. The Northern Europe Command**

The Commander-in-Chief Northern Europe has under him a Commander Allied Naval Forces Northern Europe, a Commander Allied Land Forces Norway, a Commander Allied Land Forces Denmark and a Commander Allied Air Forces Northern Europe.

b. The Central Europe Command

The Commander-in-Chief Central Europe has under him a Commander Allied

* General Norstad's predecessors were Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower (1950-1952), Matthew B. Ridgway (1952-1953) and Alfred M. Grunther (1953-1956), all three of the United States Army.
** As a result of the creation, on 8 December, 1961, of an Allied Command, Baltic Approaches, and the appointment of a Commander, subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, Northern Europe, the Northern Europe Command is being re-organized.
Land Forces Central Europe, a Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe, and a Commander Allied Naval Forces Central Europe.

c. The Southern Europe Command
The Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe has under him a Commander of Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe, two Commanders Allied Land Forces, one for Southern Europe and one for South-Eastern Europe, and a Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe.

d. The Mediterranean Command
The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has under him the Commanders of the Gibraltar-Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, South-Eastern Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean and North-Eastern Mediterranean areas.

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN COMMAND
This Command extends from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa, including Portugal, except for the Channel and the British Isles.
The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic* is Admiral R. L. Dennison**, who, like the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, receives his directions from the Standing Group.
SACLANT's peacetime responsibilities are defined as:
a. preparing and finalising defence plans;
b. conducting joint and combined training exercises;
c. laying down training standards and determining the establishment of units;
d. supplying the NATO authorities with information on his strategic requirements.

The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic would be to ensure security in the whole Atlantic Area by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to an enemy. SACLANT has responsibility for islands in this area, such as Iceland and the Azores.
His authority in the event of war covers, in particular:
– The determination of the composition and deployment of forces.
– Overall direction of operations.
– Assignment of forces.
SACLANT's responsibilities are almost entirely operational. Unlike SACEUR, he has no forces permanently attached to his Command in peacetime. However, for training purposes and in the event of war, forces earmarked by the nations involved are assigned to his direction. Although these forces are predominantly naval, they also include ground and land-based air forces.

* Abbreviated as SACLANT.
** His predecessors were Admiral Lynde D. McCormick (1952-1954) and Admiral Jerauld Wright (1954-1960), both of the United States Navy.
Like SACEUR, SACLANT has the right of direct access to the Chiefs-of-Staff and, as occasion demands, to the appropriate Defence Ministers and Heads of Government.

**COMMANDS SUBORDINATE TO THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC:**


b. *The Eastern Atlantic Command*, whose Commander-in-Chief has under him a Commander Submarine Force Eastern Atlantic, a Commander Northern Sub-Area, a Commander Central Sub-Area, and a Commander Bay of Biscay Sub-Area. The Commander Maritime Air Eastern Atlantic Area is responsible for maritime air and has under him a Commander Maritime Air Northern Sub-Area and a Commander Maritime Air Central Sub-Area.

c. *The Striking Fleet Atlantic Command*.

**THE CHANNEL COMMITTEE AND CHANNEL COMMAND**

The Channel Committee consists of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff (or their representatives) of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Directly under the Channel Committee is the Allied Command Channel, covering the English Channel and southern North Sea.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief is Admiral Sir Alexander Bingley (UK). His Maritime Air Adviser is also the Commander Allied Maritime Air Force Channel, Air Marshall Sir Edward Chilton (UK).

**CANADA-UNITED STATES REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP**

This Planning Group, which covers the North American area, develops and recommends to the Military Committee, through the Standing Group, plans for the defence of the Canada-United States region. It meets alternately in Washington and Ottawa.

**OTHER NATO MILITARY AGENCIES**

**NATO DEFENCE COLLEGE**

The NATO Defence College, which was set up following a suggestion by General Eisenhower, was inaugurated on November 19, 1951, for the training of officers who will be needed to serve in key capacities in NATO organizations. It is housed in the Ecole Militaire in Paris. The Commandant of the NATO Defence College is at present General Umberto de Martino (Italy). The classes consist of approximately fifty students per term, most of whom are officers and civilian officials from the NATO countries. The study course is for approximately 23 weeks. 21 classes, comprising a total of more than 1,000 officers, have now completed their studies at the College.
Military Agency for Standardization
This body was set up in London early in 1951 as a subsidiary agency of the Standing Group, from which it receives guidance and direction. It is composed of representatives of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, but the other NATO Powers also have accredited representatives. Its purpose is to facilitate military standardization, both procedural and material, among member nations, and to promulgate standardization agreements. With regard to defence equipment, the agency makes use of the work of international technical expert groups. Liaison is provided by the Production, Logistics and Infrastructure Division of the International Staff.

Communications Agencies in Europe
Established in Paris, August, 1951:
- The European Military Communications Co-ordination Committee (EMCCC) and the European Naval Communications Agency (ENCA). Both deal with signals matters pertaining to the defence of Western Europe and the associated NATO area.
- The European Long Line Agency (ELLA). ELLA studies all matters relating to the use of naval telecommunication facilities by the armed forces in Europe.

Established in London:
- The European Radio Frequencies Agency (ERFA). ERFA collects all available information on radio frequencies and prepares plans for allocation and assignment of frequencies.

Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD)
This Group, created in January 1952 and set up in Paris, advises on the most efficient use, in the common interest, of the research facilities, the installations and the personnel of the NATO countries.
### CHAIRMEN OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
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<tr>
<td>1949-1950</td>
<td>Mr. Dean G. Acheson</td>
<td>(United States)</td>
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<td>1950-1951</td>
<td>M. Paul van Zeeland</td>
<td>(Belgium)</td>
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<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>Mr. Lester B. Pearson</td>
<td>(Canada)</td>
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<td>1952-1953</td>
<td>Mr. Ole Bjørn Kraft</td>
<td>(Denmark)</td>
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<td>1953-1954</td>
<td>M. Georges Bidault</td>
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<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>M. Pierre Mendès-France</td>
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<td>1955-1956</td>
<td>M. Stephanos Stephanopoulos</td>
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<td>1956</td>
<td>M. Gaetano Martino</td>
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<td>1956</td>
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<td>1957-1958</td>
<td>M. Giuseppe Pella</td>
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### PRESIDENTS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL*

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<tr>
<th>Years</th>
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* In accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Three, it was decided that each year a Foreign Minister of one of the member countries would become President of the North Atlantic Council, and that the Secretary General would be Chairman at all working sessions of the Council.
CHAPTER 5

NATO FINANCES AND CONTROL OF EXPENDITURES

As the defence structure binding together countries of the Atlantic pact, NATO not only constitutes the General Staff of a coalition but also has the means to make the member countries' collaboration effective in a variety of fields, political, economic, scientific, as well as military. Nor does it neglect the psychological aspect which provides the foundation on which NATO must unite not only governments, but peoples.

The accomplishment of these tasks calls for large-scale administrative machinery capable of preparing and implementing the measures adopted by the Council, for which the International Secretariat employs a staff of several hundred people. It deals with the resources, tangible and intangible, pooled by the participating countries for the implementation of the tasks they have agreed to undertake. Particularly important are the so-called infrastructure works, i.e. airfields, pipelines, communications, facilities, etc.

In addition to the International Staff there are the military headquarters and particularly SHAPE, (headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command in Europe) and its subordinate headquarters which are located in the member countries. Finally, there are a number of specialised agencies working in various fields.

All the operating expenditures for the International Staff, the Headquarters and the agencies are paid for by means of contributions requested from member countries.

OPERATING EXPENDITURES

These expenditures are covered by budgets adopted by the Council on the basis of a report by a Budget Committee consisting of representatives of the various countries. There are two Budget Committees; one examines the requests for funds made by the various departments of the International Staff; the other examines the budget estimates of SHAPE, the subordinate headquarters and related organizations and the budget estimates of the independent commands, Channel Command and SACLANT.

The financial departments come under the authority of a Financial Controller. It is his business to obtain the contributions due from member countries which are payable in
three stages throughout the year, and which in principal are equivalent to the funds voted. Each nation's share is worked out on the basis of a cost-sharing formula. The expenditures are undertaken by the various departments under the supervision of the Financial Controller who is responsible for ensuring compliance with the budgetary regulations and the provisions of the financial rules and procedures drawn up by the Council. It is also the Financial Controller who checks the invoices sent in to him and ensures their payment.

There is a Financial Controller for the International Staff and one for each of the independent commands. In the subordinate headquarters the Financial Controllers at the head of the finance departments are responsible to the SHAPE Financial Controller. The annual accounts drawn up by the Financial Controller, with a single account for SHAPE and the subordinate headquarters, are submitted for audit to a Board of Auditors which plays the same part as the audit offices or similar bodies in the various countries. The Board of Auditors is completely independent of NATO administration; its members are selected from among senior civil servants in the financial control organizations of the various countries and are placed at the disposal of NATO, though their emoluments are paid by their home country.

The Board of Auditors reports are examined in the presence of the Financial Controllers concerned by the Budget Committees which forward them to the Council with their view on the comments contained therein.

It may thus be seen that the financial organization of NATO follows the same lines as that in modern countries, and the management of the funds paid to NATO is protected by the same guarantees and subjected to the same auditing processes. The number of different currencies in which payments are made, particularly in the headquarters, has entailed certain difficulties which have led to the adoption of an accounting currency with a view to reaching general results in the case of SHAPE, and this has proved entirely satisfactory.

**INFRASTRUCTURE EXPENDITURES**

When Infrastructure works are carried out on their territory, the NATO countries incur expenditures which are financed jointly by all the members of the Alliance. This common funding is based on a cost-sharing formula which is approved by all countries. Settlement of the net sums due is made directly by countries among themselves on the basis of a periodical financial report prepared by the International Staff. These sums are calculated in the following way: Infrastructure works are always the subject of expenditure estimates spread over several periods. However, the actual expenditures are generally either lower or higher than the estimates. Consequently, for a given period the estimated expenditures are increased or decreased by the differences between the estimate and the actual cost.

No project is eligible for common funding unless the work has been authorised beforehand by the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee which estimates
the cost entailed. Throughout the work, the host country – that is the country in which the work is being done – sends in reports to the International Staff on the expenditures incurred.

The screening of expenditures for which host countries claim the benefit of common funding is carried out by the International Board of Auditors for Infrastructure Accounts. The members of this Board are senior civil servants with experience in screening public works and finances. They are appointed and paid by their respective countries and nominated by the Council. They are assisted by other officials who are also experienced in checking accounts in their own countries. These officials are members of the International Staff, that is they are appointed and paid by the NATO Secretariat.

The main task of this Board is to examine after the event the Infrastructure expenditures for which host countries request repayment from common funds, and to ensure that the expenditures were in fact incurred for works expressly authorised and not exceeding the standards fixed by SHAPE, and that they comply with the decisions of the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee or the other interested committees. In this way, all member countries are assured that an independent control agency will check the accounts for the host countries with respect to their requests for repayment from common funds, and for the contributing countries with respect to the expenditures incurred under common funds to which they contribute.

The Board fulfils its task by examining the statements of Infrastructure expenditures kept by the member countries and by inspecting the sites where installations are being constructed. The extent of such screening varies according to the nature of the check undertaken beforehand by the national controlling bodies for the national administrations. Any comments the Board may have to make on the liability of a given expenditure for common funding are sent first to the host country concerned. If the Board’s comments give rise to discussion, the question can be submitted by the Board to the Council or to the Infrastructure Committees for a decision. The Board reports yearly to the Council on its main activities and findings.
PART II
CHAPTER 6

POLITICAL CONSULTATION

There is a widespread view that the North Atlantic Treaty sealed an exclusively military alliance and that the Organization set up to implement it consequently was also uniquely military. Even in 1949 this was not the case, and NATO's subsequent development has witnessed continuing emphasis on more and more widespread aspects of the non-military features of the Treaty.

It is true that in 1949 and the years immediately thereafter the threat facing the free world and in particular Western Europe was mainly military. The Atlantic Council, therefore, naturally concentrated its attention during the first five years of its existence on developing and implementing co-ordinated defence plans.

The results, however, made NATO to a certain extent a victim of its own success, for the Soviets soon realised that open aggression in Europe would entail serious consequences for them. For that reason, while continuing to maintain their armed forces along the Iron Curtain boundaries, the Soviets changed the focus and manner of their threat: they set out to attain by other means the objective which they could no longer hope to achieve by military pressure alone. The Soviet objective remained constant—the communisation of the West. But their new course of action became one of harassment designed to deaden the West's will as well as its capacity to resist. Soviet policy was therefore directed to fighting the West on far broader fronts that encompassed virtually every field of human activity and extended geographically over the whole world. The threat was particularly aimed against Asia, Africa and parts of the American continent. This vast, many-pronged offensive was developed by taking advantage of all possible circumstances and opportunities.

In the military field, the Soviets tried first through a world-wide propaganda campaign to induce the West to relinquish voluntarily its superiority in nuclear weapons; the fact that such superiority did much to balance the Western inferiority in the field of conventional weapons was ignored in the Communist claims that nuclear weapons should be abandoned in the cause of peace. They also conducted a campaign against 'bases in foreign countries' and against the 'stationing abroad of foreign troops'—in other words, against the presence of British, Canadian and American troops in Europe. The Soviets too opened a campaign to intimidate certain countries into refusing to allow establishment of missile launching ramps on their territory, such ramps having
become an integral part of the Western defence system. They proposed plans for the de-nuclearisation of certain areas of Europe, the effect of which would have been to neutralise these areas and render them defenceless. Meanwhile, the Communists helped to arm or incited other countries to arm potential NATO enemies.

At the same time, in the political field, the Soviets continued to paralyse the United Nations through calculated abuse of the veto in the Security Council. They sought to divide the NATO countries by taking advantage of incidents (such as the Suez affair), on occasion provoking them (as in the case of the Turkish-Syrian crisis), and by bringing to a standstill, first in London, then in Geneva, the work of the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee and Committee. They further refused to discuss the problem of the reunification of Germany, despite their acceptance at Geneva, in 1955, of a solution based on free elections. They did their utmost to torpedo the 1957 NATO Heads of Government Conference with a pressure campaign on Western public opinion. Even more recently came the abortive Paris Summit Conference (1959), Mr. Khrushchev’s outbursts at the United Nations General Assembly (late 1959), Soviet influence in Cuba (early 1961), and the series of crises over Berlin.

In the field of economics, the Soviets offered developing countries their assertedly disinterested assistance and encouraged and supported the desire for independence of countries in the process of de-colonisation. Their aim was to deprive the West of its sources of raw materials and its markets and to disrupt its traditional trade patterns. Their goal, in short, was to impoverish the West, and to weaken it to the point where it would be forced to come to terms. In the same vein, the Communists have bitterly opposed all efforts to unify Europe, attacking the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, Euratom and the Free Trade Area, thus trying to block all moves to strengthen Europe politically and economically.

This account of some of the facts in the struggle between East and West is far from complete. It does, however, indicate that the contest has assumed proportions far exceeding those of a localised military threat in Europe.

A NEW RESPONSE TO A NEW DANGER

The change in Soviet tactics did not, of course, come about in a day; nor was NATO’s reaction immediate, though the members of the Alliance quickly realized that the policy and practices of the early ‘fifties were no longer the best to meet the new situation. It soon became apparent that just as the earlier danger had been met by a collective response, so must the new danger be met by a new form of joint action. The obvious answer was a closer co-operation between NATO members, in particular in the political field where it was essential to achieve unity of views and action. Attainment of this aim was a gradual process, complicated especially in the political field by the very nature of the Alliance and its structure. In the first place, NATO
continues to be an international, not a supranational organization. It is composed of sovereign nations which have relinquished none of their independence in respect of foreign policy. No decision can be taken in the Council unless it is unanimous; in other words, through common consent. And while there is no essential barrier to common consent, it is not always swiftly achieved, first because of the individual political traditions of the countries involved, and secondly because of their inherent differences.

Nations react to a large extent in the light of their immediate or future interests; but the force of their past also exerts strong pressures. Inevitably, an alliance of fifteen nations whose respective histories reflect many divergencies must sooner or later be faced with problems which provoke differences of opinion. And while the NATO members have equal rights and each one has one vote at the Council table, they do vary in respect of size, populations and territory. The larger countries face worldwide responsibilities which do not exist for some of the smaller countries.

The efforts towards a closer political co-operation are directed towards keeping the other member governments better informed, and towards increased mutual consultation in order to arrive at a better co-ordination of foreign policies.

The definitions of these two aims should be clear. Keeping the other member governments informed consists of a regular exchange of information on events of interest to the Alliance as a whole, and notifying each other of decisions before they are made public. In practice, naturally, such exchange of information between allies is more a gesture of courtesy than the result of a specific system of co-operation. It was, however, a first step, encouraging no doubt, but with a long road to travel before perfection was reached.

Regarding consultation, the term itself is open to various interpretations. A distinction should be made between two kinds of consultation: on the one hand there is the mere formality of a government's consulting its partners once a decision has been taken, with no intention of considering the views of those it consults. This, in itself, goes only little further than the act of exchanging information.

The second form of consultation consists of intergovernmental exchange of views prior to any decision, i.e. during the policy-making stage. Clearly this second method is the more substantial, and the more likely to produce results opening the way to truly co-ordinated policies. It is towards this type of consultation that the NATO countries are directing their efforts, efforts aimed at working out new procedures for developing national policies without discarding the framework of national sovereignty.

POLITICAL CONSULTATION

The need for systematic political consultation was particularly evident in the years following 1955, though it would be wrong to imagine that political consultation in
NATO did not exist before then. On the contrary, as a systematic exercise it began when the Council Deputies first met in May 1950. One of their tasks was to exchange views on political problems of common interest within the scope of the Treaty, for example problems relating to the way Germany might best contribute to the defence of the West, the question of Greek and Turkish association with NATO, and numerous other questions. They also exchanged views and information on the policies of the Communist Bloc countries.

The North Atlantic Council which began to meet in permanent session in April 1952 enlarged and extended the field of political consultation in the light of recommendations drawn up by the Atlantic Community Committee which had submitted its final report to the Lisbon Conference. Its powers in this field were still further increased by the approval, in April 1954, of a resolution urging members to submit to the Council all political information likely to be of interest to other members. It was during this period (actually starting in 1953) that the Council discussed the replies drafted by the three Western occupying powers in Germany in answer to various notes from the Soviet Union. It also took part in considerations on replies to the Soviet note of 13 November, 1954, in negotiation of the Paris and London agreements approved in October 1954, and the preparatory work for the Geneva Summit Conference during the summer of 1955 as well as the Foreign Ministers’ Conference which followed in the autumn of the same year.

THE COMMITTEE OF THREE

Political events within the NATO framework and the growing conviction that the organization should become more closely knit led to the establishment, at the Ministerial session of May 1956, of the Committee on Non-Military Co-operation. This Committee – more frequently referred to as the ‘Committee of Three’ or the ‘Three Wise Men’ – was instructed “to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community”. It was this Committee’s report and recommendations, approved by the Council on 13 December, 1956, shortly after the Suez crisis, that highlighted for the first time the vital importance of NATO political consultation and did much to spur its development. In summary form, the main points of its conclusions and recommendations were:

* See page 260 for full text of the report.
on to emphasize that NATO could only fulfil its deterrent task under certain conditions and in particular if there were close political and economic relations between its members. “An Alliance in which the members ignore each other’s interests or engage in political or economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other cannot be effective either for deterrence or defence.” In this way they made clear their conviction that the two aspects of security – civil and military – cannot be considered separately; NATO must “do enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong and enduring”. And the Committee specifically recommended expanded co-operation and consultation, particularly in the political field, “in the early stages of policy formation and before national positions become fixed”, noting that “at best it will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance”, at least, “it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others”.

The Committee foresaw difficulties and problems in applying these principles once they were agreed. They nevertheless thought it worthwhile to set down a number of suggestions to serve as guidelines for future development. They are:

a. members should inform the Council of any development significantly affecting the Alliance. They should do this not as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation;

b. both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character;

c. a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible;

d. in developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council;

e. where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more important that when an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the Council’s discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national action or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

These were the general guidelines. With regard to practices for strengthening procedure the Committee drew up a number of more specific recommendations, including the following:

a. to strengthen the process of consultation, the Foreign Ministers, at each Spring meeting, should make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance. To
prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit an annual report analysing the major political problems of the Alliance, reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems and indicating the problems which may require future consultation;
b. to assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation, a Committee of Political Advisers should be constituted under the Council. Its membership would consist of representatives from each Delegation and it would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff;
c. any dispute which has not proved capable of direct settlement should be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency, except for disputes firstly of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and secondly disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialised economic organization. The Secretary General should be empowered to offer his good offices informally at any time to the countries in dispute and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.

POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN PRACTICE

It is on the basis of these recommendations approved by the Council that political consultation in NATO has since developed. The main forum is the North Atlantic Council where, under the chairmanship of the Secretary General, the Permanent Representatives of member countries are free to discuss immediate or long-term political problems which they themselves, their Governments or the Secretary General consider worth raising.
These meetings of the Council take place in an atmosphere in which there is little formality. Discussion is frank and direct. The Secretary General plays an important part in these exchanges of view, not only because he is Chairman but also because he represents the conscience of the Alliance, as it were, and acts as its spokesman.
Because of the multiplicity of its tasks, the Council cannot devote all its time to political consultation and is assisted by the Committee of Political Advisers. The latter was set up in January 1957, in implementation of the recommendation by the Committee of Three. Its chairman is the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and it consists of close collaborators of the Permanent Representatives. As a rule it meets once a week for informal discussions on events of interest to NATO irrespective of whether they occur within the area directly covered by the Treaty or not. It prepares studies for discussion by the Council on political problems and submits to the Council reports on subjects to be debated. It keeps abreast of political trends and developments in countries of vital interest to NATO. Lastly, it forwards to the Council basic documents usually drawn up, at its own request, by groups of experts.
These experts, unlike the members of the Committee of Political Advisers, are only brought in for certain specific tasks. Most of them are national experts who come to Paris only when specifically requested. In this way, the Council is provided with detailed analyses and authoritative documentation on particular aspects of the international situation. These meetings of experts have proved to be very profitable, not least for the experts themselves who have benefitted greatly from the discussions. Political consultation in NATO thus takes place at three levels: that of the Permanent Representatives, that of the members of the Committee of Political Advisers, and that of the Experts. These activities, however, complement each other and are further assisted by the International Staff, in particular by its Political Affairs Division. Most of the discussions deal with problems on which working papers and reports have been previously drawn up by the latter on the basis of information supplied by delegations or drawn from replies to questionnaires which it has drafted on specific topics.

These, briefly, are the lines along which the process of consultation has developed; virtually all current international problems have been discussed. Political consultation in NATO has come into play in a number of cases of disputes between member countries, particularly in the Cyprus affair and the question of the Icelandic fisheries. Whether initiated by the Secretary General or by interested parties, it has clarified points of view and consequently often brought members closer together. It would be an exaggeration to say that NATO’s efforts have made it possible to reach a solution on the question of the Icelandic fisheries. It could be said though, that discussion in NATO did to an extent pave the way to an amicable settlement of the problem. The final settlement of the Cyprus affair was certainly the result of direct political consultation between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey; but it is none the less true that a solution might never have been found if the way to agreement had not previously been prepared by consultation in NATO.

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

However valuable the settlement of disputes between NATO members may be for the Alliance, it is nevertheless basically in the field of current political problems such as disarmament that political consultation has shown its true importance. The problem of disarmament is of vital interest to all members of the Atlantic Alliance, and the Council has been continually consulted on it and has been following its development for many years. When the Ten-Power Disarmament Committee held its first meeting on 15 March 1960, the plan submitted by the Western delegations providing for disarmament in three stages with appropriate controls had received prior approval of all NATO countries. Nor was this a purely formal approval. On the contrary, the plan and all its implications had been studied over a long period. In fact, during the final months of 1959 and the first months of 1960, questions on it arose at every Council meeting, and on numerous occasions during the Conference the Council received
written and verbal reports from representatives of the countries engaged in the preparation and drafting of the Western proposals. The Council in this way took an active part in their preparation both before and during the meetings.

The Council also spent much time discussing the problem of Berlin and particularly Mr. Khrushchev’s threat to modify unilaterally the city’s status. Here, too, consultation in NATO has been extremely fruitful and the common front created by the Western Powers in the face of this problem was reflected not only in the statement by the Foreign Ministers of 16 December, 1958, but also in the replies which the West has made to the various notes and moves of the Soviet Union since then.

Throughout 1958 and 1959 the Council frequently discussed the various aspects of East-West relations. The intensive correspondence which took place with the Soviet Government on the possibility of holding a summit conference in 1958 was the subject of almost uninterrupted consultation in NATO. During the 1959 Geneva Conference, the Council was continually kept informed of the developments of the situation. When, finally, after the Paris and Rambouillet Conferences (19 to 21 December, 1959) the three Western Powers invited Mr. Krushchev to take part in a Summit Conference in Paris, the Council requested—and the Three Powers agreed—that all countries of the Alliance be given the right not only to be fully consulted, but also to participate in preparing the Western positions and proposals to be submitted to the Conference. The December 1959 Meeting of the Council provided an opportunity for taking decisions which enabled all NATO countries to participate actively in the preparation of the Summit Conference, the date of which had by then been fixed.

Up to the time the Conference actually opened (only to close almost immediately) the Council continued to examine the proposals which the negotiating powers were to submit. The same procedure was followed in 1961 during the tense situation created by the Soviet demands regarding Berlin.

Thus the important problems of disarmament and the preparation of East-West negotiations, as well as numerous others, benefitted from genuine consultation between all member countries of the Alliance, great and small alike.

Such then is the overall picture of political consultation as it is developing in NATO. This study, however, would be incomplete without a brief reference to the activity of institutions such as the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference which seeks to make known the ideals of NATO and the Atlantic Community. This Conference, although completely independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, constitutes a link between the Alliance and parliamentarians of member countries. It holds an annual autumn meeting as a result of which NATO’s activities have gained a wider public hearing in member countries. Further, parliamentarians informed on NATO problems are in a better position to support and influence the Governments who bear the responsibility of directing the Alliance and ensuring full use of its potentialities.

As to these potentialities, it would be a serious error to imagine that they are directed
solely at settling the East-West dispute. The NATO countries did not join forces solely to defend themselves against a common danger, even if that danger was the initial incentive. Other problems called for co-operation and the fruits of this co-operation have shown it to be increasingly desirable. In other words, the Alliance has a life and a purpose of its own, whatever the future development of East-West relations.
Since World War II, the USSR has expended vast resources in improving its military forces. Its Army has been completely re-equipped with all types of modern weapons, such as tanks and field artillery, and with motor transportation—all developed after World War II. Additionally, the USSR has provided quantities of late model material, aircraft and technical assistance to other countries of the Communist Bloc, including the Soviet Zone of Germany and the other Eastern European Satellites.

Plans to reduce the armed forces by over a million men have been repeated in Soviet propaganda as evidence of Soviet support of worldwide disarmament. The need to increase manpower available for industry and agriculture however has some bearing on their plans for reduction of military personnel. While there is no doubt that some reductions in military personnel strength took place, the trend appears to have been reversed. Moreover, the Soviet ground forces and tactical air forces are in process of reorganization and modernization to increase striking power by adding to their tactical nuclear capability. Because of the modernization of weapon systems and equipment in general, the firepower of these forces will increase despite any reduction in personnel which may have taken place.

This trend was reflected in Mr. Khrushchev's address to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January, 1960, in which he announced that, although sizeable reductions would be made in the Soviet armed forces over the ensuing two years, there would be even greater numbers of, and emphasis upon, tactical as well as strategic nuclear weapons in the Soviet armed forces.

In December 1960, it was claimed that direct spending in 1961 for defence purposes would be decreased by a little over one per cent as compared with 1960. However, this is more than compensated for by an increase of fifteen per cent in the 1961 expenditure on scientific progress over that of 1960. Most of this is devoted to military research. The Soviet ground forces and tactical air forces are now being reorganized and modernized. A reduction in the number of men assigned to the ground forces is taking place but this reduction in numbers is accompanied by modernization. Mechanization, already completed in the Soviet ground forces stationed in the Soviet Zone of Germany, is being extended to an increasing number of divisions. This mechanization,
together with the entry into service of even more numerous means of launching
tactical nuclear weapons, is an indication of the progress made towards increased
firepower and mobility. In summary, it must be emphasized that, notwithstanding any
present or future reduction in strength, these forces remain sufficiently strong both in
numbers and in firepower to constitute a very effective tool for the conduct of all types
of military operations.
More than 50 Satellite divisions, reportedly of medium combat efficiency, are available
to assist in obtaining Soviet Bloc objectives.
Approximately 18,000 aircraft are reported to be in the possession of the USSR, the
majority of them combat aircraft.
The Soviet strategic striking force is now equipped with long-range bomber aircraft in
combination with a growing number of ICBMS and MRBMS. The long-range force
already constitutes a considerable threat to the bases and populations of territories
lying far from the USSR, and the numbers of missiles can be expected to increase
considerably during the coming years. The medium-range systems consist of medium
bombers and of mid-range ballistic missiles in the under-1000 n.m. class. An attack by
such Soviet MRBMS represents a growing menace to Europe.
The numbers of tactical aircraft are being reduced as newer missile systems are
developed and as newer and better performing aircraft are introduced, but, even with
smaller numbers of aircraft, the tactical air forces give the Soviets a major manned-
aircraft capability.
In the air defence field, it is known that ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles have been
incorporated in the Soviet forces, and that formidable missile air defences are being
developed around the key centres of the Soviet Union to reduce their vulnerability to
air attack.
The Soviet Navy appears to have completed its expansion programme and to be de-
voting its major efforts to modernization, re-equipment and replacement. It is the
second largest navy in the world. The Soviets have the capability of providing a
strong defence of the USSR from seaborne attack. The Soviet Navy also has a growing
capability of utilizing submarines to launch missile attacks against targets located in
coastal areas of all NATO countries. The Soviets have about 400 submarines of all
types and various ranges, and the present trend is toward modernization, with the
total submarine strength maintained or slightly reduced.

COMMON DEFENCE EFFORT

To build up the military strength of the Alliance in the face of the Soviet threat by co-
ordinating the defence effort of member countries, to maintain the apparatus thus set
up by improving it and adapting it to changing conditions, to find the resources
needed to supply the NATO forces with the most up-to-date equipment and facilities,
such were, – and indeed still are – the problems confronting the Alliance. They could
THE SOVIET THREAT AND THE COMMON DEFENCE EFFORT

never have been resolved without the close co-operation achieved between member countries from the outset, and increasingly developed recently.
From a military point of view, it was necessary to build up and equip the existing forces, which were far from adequate at the time of the Korean war, so as to be in a position to counter any Soviet aggression. It was also essential to set up a unified command and international headquarters consisting of representatives from all the member countries of the Alliance; to work out a common strategy and adapt it in the light of changing requirements; to carry out joint training exercises designed to inculcate in the forces of the various countries the habit of close collaboration; finally, to give officers practical experience of international co-operation.
In addition to these purely military technical problems, there were those involving the financing of the defence effort. While it was essential to increase very considerably military expenditure – from 1949 to 1953 it almost trebled for the Alliance as a whole – it was equally vital to ensure that the increased financial effort did not interfere with the economic development of the members. Moreover, despite the sacrifices accepted in the interest of defence, many countries would have been unable to achieve the goals assigned to them if other wealthier partners, more advanced industrially, had not given them assistance which in many cases was considerable. In the case of European countries, mutual aid, in its various forms, undoubtedly constituted a vital contribution.

Since NATO member countries retain full sovereignty, a procedure had to be found for reconciling the requirements of the allied military authorities with the national programmes to make possible co-ordination of the common defence effort and to fix the military goals to be achieved in the light of the countries’ economic and financial capacity. This procedure, known as the Annual Review, has made it easier to find the solutions to problems which are frequently very complex. This has been achieved mainly as the result of the very close collaboration which has developed between the military authorities of the Alliance, the International Secretariat and the national authorities.

The ever-increasing complexity of armaments and the growing expenditure entailed in their renewal have inevitably led to close co-operation between the various countries which, with one or two exceptions, had insufficient resources to achieve anything on their own. Despite certain initial qualms about the principle of joint production, the need, from an economic point of view, to expand the bases of production as much as possible gradually made it feasible to lift any reserves. A fruitful association was thus initiated between the countries and is in a continual state of development. The achievements of the last few years in this field are rich in promise for the future.
But it is probably infrastructure which is the best example of the trustful collaboration which has been established between member countries in the field of defence. The construction and planning of more than 200 airfields, the improvement of refuelling
arrangements for aircraft by means of a pipeline system which, when it is completed, will cover over 9,000 kilometres, the linking of airfields and general headquarters by a complex system of communications, are some of the infrastructure programme undertakings, all of them calling for considerable investment. The question then arose as to how the expenditure should be divided between, on the one hand, the countries on whose land the facilities are to be built and, on the other, the user countries. Finding a formula inevitably presented considerable difficulties but numerous obstacles were overcome by adopting the principle of common financing for the infrastructure programmes and by working out a cost-sharing formula. The implementation of the infrastructure programme is now a complete success.

Finally, as NATO’s responsibilities increased and as they grew in complexity, it became necessary to introduce a certain amount of decentralisation and to entrust to specialised agencies the study, development and control of a number of activities. Since they were set up, these agencies have continued to develop and have already enabled impressive results to be achieved in various fields.

This brief outline reveals the various headings under which the problem of defence co-operation should be considered in the following chapters: armed forces, economic problems and the financing of the defence effort and infrastructure.
In 1949, the twelve members of NATO (Germany, Greece and Turkey joined later) had only a small number of divisions (less than 20), and their reserves of trained manpower were inadequately equipped and therefore ineffective.

In Western Europe, there were fewer than 1,000 operational aircraft available and many of these were obsolete aircraft from World War II. Airfields (less than 20 in all) were not all equipped to handle jet aircraft and were situated in vulnerable forward areas.

The greatest concentration of NATO air and ground strength was located in Western Germany, where it was deployed not for defence against attack but rather to carry out occupation and police duties. Supply lines ran from north to south instead of from west to east.

The naval position was no better. Many warships had been scrapped, put in reserve, or converted for use in civilian transport.

Faced with the Soviet threat, the West would have been incapable of putting up serious resistance and the total fighting force was not yet strong enough to deter aggressive attempts.

THE INCREASE IN ARMED STRENGTH

The Western Union, which had been established within the framework of the Brussels Treaty, had set up Allied Headquarters headed by Field-Marshal Montgomery and with a staff drawn from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. This Headquarters formed a planning group and had no active forces.

War broke out in Korea in June 1950, and when the North Atlantic Council met in New York on 15 September 1950, its discussions were mainly centred on the problem of the defence of the NATO area against a would-be aggressor. The Council agreed unanimously that European countries could be adequately defended only by resisting aggression as far to the east as possible. Such a strategy called for forces far superior to those already in existence, and the Council therefore decided that member countries should take urgent measures to increase their military strength. It would be necessary to create, under a centralized command, an integrated force capable of
deterring aggression and ensuring the defence of Western Europe. It was decided that
this force should be placed under a Supreme Commander appointed by NATO.
Although strategic plans are drawn up by the Military Committee (the supreme
military authority in NATO, created in 1949), the Standing Group assumes the higher
strategic direction of the NATO forces.
NATO forces are of three distinct types:
1. **Forces assigned to NATO** – those having already been placed under NATO opera-
tional command. For the time being, forces have been assigned only to the
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR). They include some elements of
the Allied air forces on the Continent, such as tactical air forces (the strategic air
forces remain under national control). It was decided that SACEUR would be
responsible for the training in peacetime, and military operations in wartime, of the
forces assigned to his Command, but that they would remain under national
control for administration and discipline. Logistical support also remains a national
responsibility.
2. **Forces earmarked for NATO** – member countries have agreed to place them at the
disposal of the Commanders in the event of mobilization or war.
3. **Forces remaining under national command** – they must ensure the defence of
national territories, as well as carry out security and garrison duties. If any member
country has forces stationed outside the NATO area, they also remain under
national control.
The defence policy of the Alliance is to avert war by making plain to the potential
aggressor that war will not pay. This policy was approved by the North Atlantic
Council in January 1950, and is still being pursued. Methods for its implementa-
tion have undergone changes over the years, and so have plans for dealing with aggression
should NATO fail in its primary aim of preserving peace. But NATO’s basic defence con-
cept has remained the same – the concept of the deterrent.

In April 1950, plans concentrated on holding the enemy as far to the east as possible;
they led to the adoption of a strategy by which NATO peoples and territories would be
protected against invasion, and no major withdrawals would be acceptable. This
concept of forward defence is still the cornerstone of NATO’s military planning.

A strategic reappraisal made at the end of 1956, based on the contribution of the
15 member countries of NATO and the gradual introduction, for the use of forces on
both sides of the Iron Curtain, of a large variety of nuclear weapons, led the North
Atlantic Council to give new directives to the military authorities. The latter were
requested to study the military capabilities of the Alliance in the light of a continuing
threat over a long period and of a levelling-off of defence expenditures.
Their new studies were to take into account not only a German contribution to the
common effort but also the use of new weapons, since both these factors would
influence the composition of the Allied Forces.
The Allied Forces should be able not only to put into operation an adequate defence system, but in the event of aggression to retaliate immediately with devastating results. General Norstad has described NATO's strategic concept as that of the "Retaliatory Forces and Shield Forces" accompanied by "the Alliance's unmistakable determination to use these forces as needed".

The 'Retaliatory Forces' enable the Alliance to retaliate instantaneously upon being attacked. NATO has this power and the Soviet Bloc knows it; this is a major element in deterring aggression. However dangerous Soviet air forces and missile capabilities may be, the forces of the NATO countries are adequately well-equipped with aircraft and other means of delivery of the most up-to-date weapons to defeat the aggressor. The powerful elements of the Retaliatory Forces consist of the United States Air Command, the United Kingdom's Bomber Command and Allied Naval Forces with their nuclear capabilities. Such forces, equipped to deliver long-range and devastating nuclear attacks, make the cost of deliberate all-out war too great for any would-be aggressor. In the past, the effectiveness of their deterrent capabilities has been singularly evident and from a technical standpoint there is no reason why it should not continue in the foreseeable future.

This effectiveness makes it improbable – if not impossible – for the Soviets to face up to the costly decision of deliberately provoking general war. However, the danger of local aggression or incursion either by accident, error or design still remains. The Shield Forces, designed to cope with such developments, are thus an indispensable part of the total defence. They consist of ground, air and naval elements of NATO nations deployed in the forward areas and strongly supported by the most modern weapons. As General Norstad has pointed out, the Shield Forces perform a three-fold function in supporting the broad objectives of NATO's deterrent strategy. First, by their ability to delay any lesser hostile action they would create a break in the continuity of such action. Secondly, during that break they would compel the aggressor to make a conscious decision – to go to war or not to go to war. Finally, they would require that decision to be made, not only in consideration of the Shield Forces in immediate opposition, but in consideration of the full effect and power of all forces and factors that make up the deterrent, including the heavy strategic forces. By their very presence on NATO territory the Shield Forces demonstrate to a potential aggressor that he cannot hope to benefit from an attack against any member country.

An intangible but nonetheless very real third element should be added to the above – that of the unmistakable intention of the Allies to use either or both of these forces as needed.

NATO must be prepared to organize concurrently two distinct but complementary actions:
1. A nuclear counter-offensive launched by the Retaliatory Forces (described above) supported by the land, air and naval forces under NATO Command. This would entail the use of all long-range weapons: bombs, guided and ballistic missiles, rockets, and such other new weapons as might be used by either side.

2. The forward defence of the NATO land and sea areas. This would mean the defence of the Allied territory (and not what has been called peripheral defence: an almost immediate withdrawal, accompanied by small, local operations and long drawn-out liberation).

The Shield Forces must be able not only to resist, counter-attack and hold back the enemy forces until the Allied nuclear reprisals have taken effect, but also to protect the bases from which the retaliatory forces would operate. The strength of the air attacks launched by the NATO forces would be seriously impaired if those bases were lost. NATO will need this shield as long as the Soviet threat remains. It is not yet strong enough however: there are still marked weaknesses in the air defence system and ground forces are not yet numerous enough. There can be no question of reducing them, all the more so as in peacetime they are indispensable as a means of preventing local incidents from degenerating into a world war. A would-be aggressor could be tempted to test Allied defences before launching an all-out attack, and only immediate and effective counter-measures could discourage him.

Close co-ordination and co-operation between the Retaliatory Forces and the Shield Forces are essential, and are provided by NATO. A good example of this is the support which tactical air forces can give to long-range bombers coming from distant bases. In addition to the destruction of enemy targets and the interception of enemy aircraft, tactical air forces could also act as cover escort to strategic bombers heading for Soviet objectives.

As regards naval operations, the basic strategy is the same as during World War II: to gain and preserve control of the vital sea areas, to protect lines of communications, and to support the air and land operations of Allied Command Europe. As to the protection of lines of communications, action would be taken on a far larger scale than during World War II: whereas Germany then had only 60 submarines, the Soviets now have about 400, some of which are of the most modern type.

RESULTS OF THE DEFENCE EFFORT

The increase of NATO's armed strength cannot be measured solely in terms of numbers because, owing to the varied nature of the effort and the large geographical area involved, progress has been faster in some directions than in others. (For instance, fighting units have been organized more quickly than the logistical support they would need to take part in sustained operations.) The figures for divisions, ships and aircraft are only approximate, as the strength of a division may vary from 10,000 to 20,000 men, of whom probably only half would actually come to grips with the enemy in
wartime, the other half being there to ensure that troops or tanks can be brought up to the front line and supplied with ammunition, food, etc.

In wartime the numerical strength of NATO's forces would be four or five times greater than in 1950.

The essential achievement is the progress made in the common planning for NATO forces, as well as in their firepower and their combat value.

Part of this progress has been obtained through a number of large-scale exercises carried out over the last few years. Firearms and other equipment available to NATO assigned forces have been increased and modernised, mostly with the military aid of the United States MAAG. For the nuclear deterrent, the United States have delivered rockets and missiles capable of utilizing atomic warheads not only to NATO forces in Europe, but also to other allied armed forces, and this process is still going on.

Allied Command Europe (ACE)

At its meeting in Brussels in December 1950, the North Atlantic Council requested President Truman to nominate General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. The President agreed and in April 1951, General Eisenhower set up his headquarters, SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe), in Paris. Field-Marshal Montgomery was appointed Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, and General Gruenther, who was himself later to become Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, was appointed Chief-of-Staff to General Eisenhower. Headquarters were established at Rocquencourt, near Paris, on a site donated by the President of the French Republic, and manned by officers drawn from all the member countries.

Thus, for the first time in the history of international relations, an integrated command consisting of representatives from all the member countries of the Alliance was created during a period of peace.

The mission of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe is to ensure the security of Western Europe by unifying allied defensive measures, strengthening allied military forces in peacetime and planning for their most advantageous use in time of war. He reports to the Standing Group but is authorized to deal directly with national governments.

In 1951, the United States agreed to place its units in Germany under SACEUR's command. France, the United Kingdom and the other member countries followed suit. When General Eisenhower departed in May 1952, and was succeeded by General Matthew B. Ridgway, the command structure had been considerably improved, the forces of Greece and Turkey (who had acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty in February 1952) had been incorporated in Allied Command Europe, the strategic concept had been further developed, and the effectiveness of the armed forces had increased.

To control the vast area covered by the Allied Command in Europe, subordinate
Commands were established: first in the Centre, then in the North, later in the South and in the Mediterranean. These are:

a. the **Northern Europe Command**, established in June 1951; it consists of two subordinate Land Commands (one for Norway and one for Denmark) and of an Air and a Naval Command.

b. the **Central Europe Command**, established in April 1951; it has two Groups (Central and Northern Europe) and two Allied tactical air forces which provide air support for the armies, and naval forces.

c. The **Southern Europe Command**, established in June 1951, which controls two Land Commands (Southern Europe and South-Eastern Europe) and has tactical air forces as well as naval forces.

d. the **Mediterranean Command**, established in December 1952, which controls naval forces in the Mediterranean. Six areas have been placed under national control; their national Commanders are at the same time subordinate Allied Commanders.

On 11 July, 1953, General Alfred M. Gruenther succeeded General Ridgway as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. During General Gruenther's period of command, relationships between Commands and member countries developed greatly, and a new strategy was drawn up which incorporated plans for the use of new weapons and techniques, the co-ordination of air defence and early warning systems, the use of the Federal German forces (the Federal Republic had joined the Alliance in May 1955) when available, and the Forward Scatter Communications System*. When General Gruenther left SHAPE, NATO's military strength was four or five times greater than in 1950, plans had been made to defeat aggression, and Commanders knew what to do should a sudden attack develop.

As far back as 1954, the North Atlantic Council had emphasized the determination of member governments to equip their forces with the most modern weapons. SACEUR was requested to base his planning on this fundamental principle. In December 1955, the North Atlantic Council also took measures to re-organize and co-ordinate more closely air defence and the early warning system in the NATO European countries. It authorized SACEUR to co-ordinate systems in four air defence regions: Northern Europe, Central Europe, Southern Europe and the United Kingdom.

In July 1956, the Council approved the establishment of a new communications system incorporating such new techniques as Forward Scatter. These served the needs of Allied Command Europe by extending the power of transmission. Forward Scatter ensures freedom from jamming and is independent of civilian facilities.

On 20 November, 1956, General Lauris Norstad, who had been SACEUR's Air Deputy, was appointed Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. During his command, he has continued the efforts of his predecessors to modernize the forces.

* 'Forward Scatter' is a communications system which makes use of reflections from layers in the upper air to cover greater distances.
In conformity with a political directive given by the North Atlantic Council in December 1956, concerning Allied Command Europe as well as Allied Command Atlantic and Channel Command, a study was undertaken entailing a reappraisal of the forces needed for the defence of the NATO area. This Minimum Force Study 1958/63 gives detailed information about each NATO country’s contribution (number and type of units) for the so-called ‘Shield and Strike Forces’. As a result, the countries were furnished with long-range goals for maintaining the full effectiveness of their forces and for equipping them with the more modern weapons necessary to fulfilling their tasks. Arrangements have also been made for periodic reviews of these goals. During 1960 further measures were taken to improve air defence, leading to a system of unified air defence.

The Atlantic Command
In the Spring of 1952 another Supreme Command was created, the Atlantic Command, placed under a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Like SACEUR, SACLANT is directly responsible to the Standing Group, and his task is to develop defence plans in the North Atlantic area. He also organizes and conducts combined training exercises. In wartime, his main duty would be to assure that the lines of communications of the Atlantic Ocean are maintained intact, to use atomic power against enemy naval bases and airfields and to support operations carried out by SACEUR.

Unlike SACEUR, SACLANT does not have forces permanently assigned to him in peacetime and Atlantic maritime powers of NATO maintain national control of their naval and maritime air forces. As a separate NATO naval force would have imposed too great a financial burden, it was decided by the countries concerned that their naval forces would, in wartime, be allocated to SACLANT for the common cause in order to gain and preserve control of the Atlantic Ocean. Eight countries have therefore earmarked naval, ground and air forces for SACLANT. In peacetime, they are put at SACLANT’s disposal at regular intervals for combined manoeuvres.

The first Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic was the late Admiral Lynde D. McCormick (United States), who was succeeded on 12 April, 1954, by Admiral Jerauld Wright (United States) and on 22 December, 1959, by Admiral Robert L. Dennison (United States). SACLANT Headquarters were set up at Norfolk, Virginia, and the staff was drawn from officers of those NATO countries most directly concerned in operations in the Atlantic area.

The Channel Command
In the Spring of 1952, a Channel Command was set up to control the Channel and the southern waters of the North Sea. This Command was placed under the Channel Committee, which consists of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This Committee, acting as agent of the Standing Group, was to deal with all naval problems relating to the vital Channel area.
Like SACLANT, and for the same reasons, the Channel Command does not have assigned, but only earmarked, forces. The staff of the Channel Command consists mainly of members of the Royal Navy and the R.A.F. Coastal Command. Some staff officers from Belgium, France and the Netherlands, as well as liaison officers, have also been appointed.

**The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group**

A Canada-United States Regional Planning Group has existed ever since the signing of the Ogdensburg Agreement in 1940 by Canada and the United States. It was a consultative body, which, after having functioned successfully during World War II, was asked in 1949 to put forward, within the framework of overall NATO strategy, defence plans for the Canada-United States area. It is mainly concerned with questions of defence against air attack in the Arctic regions and with the establishment of a vast radar network stretching from Alaska to Newfoundland. The Arctic defence operation is a joint Canada-United States effort, and the stations may be manned by Canadian or United States staff, or by combined Canadian/US personnel. The Canada-United States Regional Planning Group has no assigned forces and is not a command in the real sense of the word. Its primary task is to work out a common strategy for the North American area.

**THE TRAINING OF THE ARMED FORCES**

To increase the effectiveness and combat value of the NATO armed forces and to further the spirit of co-operation amongst the different nationalities, international exercises are organized periodically by the Supreme Allied Commanders Europe and Atlantic or by the Commander-in-Chief Channel in conjunction with member governments. They are planned a long time in advance in order to: a. prevent exercises from overlapping; b. ensure that the necessary forces will be available; and c. give member governments an opportunity to co-ordinate national exercises with NATO exercises. They fall into two main categories: those in which no forces take part which are called Command Post Exercises, and those in which actual forces participate.

**Command Post Exercises**

The aims of a Command Post Exercise (military abbreviation CPX) are: a. to confront commanders and staff officers with wartime problems; b. to test and evaluate plans and executive bodies; c. to study tactical and other questions. The object of CPX is to define, examine and solve military problems in all spheres of defence.

It may consist of a series of group discussions in which the ‘Exercise Director’ describes the problems chosen for study and the different commanders and their staffs present their views; or a staff exercise undertaken at any or all levels in which the tactics and procedures are followed without the use of actual troops.
Live Exercises
Live Exercises (those in which forces take part) are carried out either in a limited area in which case they are organized by Supreme or Subordinate Commanders or on a NATO-wide scale when they are jointly conducted by the Supreme Allied Commanders and the Commander-in-Chief Channel.
There are different types of exercises each of which is given a specific name, and the number of forces participating varies considerably. The general purpose is to increase co-operation between the forces of various member countries and to test plans or study tactical and strategical problems.

International manoeuvres have increased in scale with increases in the strength of forces assigned to NATO Commands. In 1954, in Exercise Battle Royal, the first really large-scale manoeuvre took place in Allied Command Europe. Two years later, in June 1956, there was held in Southern Europe and the Mediterranean the first large-scale exercise involving the air defence of NATO territory. In September 1956, Whipsaw was held throughout Allied Command Europe from Norway to Turkey. Units of all NATO air forces took part, and the air defence systems of Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were tested. This was the first time that SHAPE had been able to co-ordinate national defensive air operations on such a large scale.
In more recent years large-scale exercises have continued to be held to develop the fighting power of the various forces earmarked for, or assigned to NATO, and to practice co-ordination of the operations of land, air and naval forces and commands. Sidestep, held in 1959, was the first NATO-wide CPX Naval Control of Shipping Exercise, with the emphasis in Allied Command Europe placed on logistics; and in 1960 NATO-wide live exercises were held covering selected land, sea and air problems. The North Atlantic Council have expressed great interest in the conduct of NATO exercises, and in addition to receiving reports on all major and other selected exercises, members have often personally attended them.

NATO Defence College
When General Dwight D. Eisenhower took command of the Allied Forces, Europe, early in 1951, he was faced with a task unprecedented in history: that of organizing the collective defence in peacetime of a group of countries spread over a vast area. It was a new problem, calling for new answers – and these on an unaccustomed scale. He had to find men capable of adjusting to these special conditions as well as men with the ability to recognize the variety of military, political, economic and social problems involved, and who would assume the responsibility required by their decisions. In short, the task was to train the nucleus of civilians and service men who might be needed by NATO in the pursuit of its objectives.
To better resolve this problem, General Eisenhower took the initiative of transferring to the international field an idea which, in the national field, had already inspired the
creation of the National War College in Washington, the Imperial Defence College in London and the 'Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale' in Paris. The NATO Defence College was thus born and was solemnly inaugurated in a wing of the 'École Militaire' in Paris, on 19 November 1951. The Defence College was placed under the direction of NATO's Military Committee, which exercises its executive control through the medium of its Standing Group.

The Commandant of the College was immediately faced with a special problem, that of training people rapidly, but at the same time very thoroughly. This meant that the programme had to be intensive and the attendance select. The selection of 'students' for the course was left to the member countries themselves, in accordance with criteria fixed by the Standing Group. Candidates for each of the two courses every year are chosen according to an agreed allocation for each member nation.

The members of the course are, in principle, officers holding the rank of at least Lieutenant-Colonel, or civil servants of equivalent grade. In the beginning, the civil servants were drawn from the Foreign Ministries, but things have now evolved in such a way that officials from the Ministries of Defence, Finance and Economic Affairs, as well as from scientific bodies, are attending. This provides a timely increase in the influence of the Defence College in the outside world, while the members' varied training and experience also enriches the College. Classes are usually limited to 54 members to give best results.

The curriculum is divided into three parts: the first deals with the 'Basic Facts about NATO', the second with 'External Developments Affecting NATO', (in practice a study of the Soviet Bloc and the uncommitted countries), and the third, 'The future of NATO'. This cycle is broken up by two or three study tours which take members of the course to most of the European NATO countries. These tours are of exceptional interest. Members have the opportunity to listen to addresses by Foreign and Defence Ministers and national chiefs of staff, as well as to make contact with industry. Participants also have the opportunity to do research on problems of particular interest to them, whether cultural, social or economic.

Members must be able to speak one of the official NATO languages, but they attend classes every morning in the language which they know least well.

Command and Organization
The College, established on a military pattern, has at its head a Commandant who holds a rank of Lieutenant-General, or above.* He normally serves for two years.

* The Commandants of the NATO Defence College have been in turn: Admiral Lemonnier (France), from November 1951 to November 1953; Lieutenant General Darvall (UK), from November 1953 to November 1955; Lieutenant General Byers (USA), from November 1955 to July 1957; Lieutenant General de Renzi (Italy), from July 1957 to January 1958; Major General Estcourt (UK), ad interim, from January 1958 to May 1958; Lieutenant General Ariburun (Turkey), from May 1958 to September 1959; Lieutenant General Harteon (Belgium), from September 1959 to August 1960. The present Commandant of the NATO Defence College is Lieutenant General Umberto de Martino (Italy).
The Commandant is assisted by a faculty of three military deputies, one civilian deputy and twelve faculty advisers, all chosen because of their particular capabilities as well as their knowledge of men. Their problem is less that of teaching, in the precise meaning of the word, than of getting men from different Alliance countries* to know one another, in order first to understand one another, then to esteem one another, and finally, in a spirit of comprehension and friendship, to address themselves to their common task.

This is the essential aim of the methods adopted. At the outset, the members are divided into nine committees with a faculty adviser assigned to each committee. The composition of the committee is frequently modified during the course, so that it is rare, at the end, for a member not to have worked with all his colleagues. The mornings are generally devoted to lectures, which deal successively with a variety of subjects in the political, economic, scientific and social fields. These lectures are given in one or other of the official NATO languages, by eminent persons or highly-qualified experts from the countries of the Alliance. They are always followed by a discussion. The afternoons are reserved for work in the committees under the chairmanship of the faculty advisers.

This working formula and the friendly atmosphere prevailing have made the College into a unique instrument of Atlantic co-operation. Over a thousand members have already passed through the College and there is no doubt that the NATO spirit inspired by their stay at the College has been happily reflected in the work on which they later engage. Moreover, from the human point of view, their stay at the College has led to the formation of many durable friendships which are later strengthened by the ‘old student’ meetings held every year at the NATO Defence College.

* Of the 15 NATO countries, Iceland and Luxembourg have so far not sent any members to the College.
CHAPTER 9

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF THE ALLIANCE

As NATO is an international, not a supranational, organization, its member countries retain full sovereignty. They themselves decide the amount to be devoted to their defence effort, and the form which the latter will assume, taking into account, as far as possible, the views expressed by their partners in the Alliance. The Alliance therefore needs a procedure for the co-ordination of military plans and defence expenditures. This procedure rests on the detailed and comparative analysis of the economic and financial capabilities of member countries and of military requirements. The analysis is carried out annually in NATO, and is known as the Annual Review.

Late in 1951 a Temporary Committee of the Council (TCC) set up an Executive Board composed of three experts to carry out this analysis. Their task was to reconcile the military requirements of NATO with the realistic political and economic capabilities of the member countries. Their report, which was examined at the Ministerial Council at Lisbon in February 1952, reaffirmed the principle, fundamental to the Atlantic Treaty, that defence must rest on a sound economic and social basis and that no country should be expected to shoulder a defence burden beyond its capability.

THE ANNUAL REVIEW

The precedent set by the work of the Temporary Council Committee led to the establishment of the procedure which, under the name of ‘Annual Review’, has become an essential part of NATO’s work. The Annual Review is an entirely new experiment. Never before, either in peace or in war, have member governments of an alliance consented to exchange detailed and confidential information on their military, economic and financial programmes, and to expose the latter to close scrutiny and criticism by their partners. The Annual Review fixes force goals which take into account the overall defence needs of the Alliance, as defined by the NATO military authorities on one hand, and on the other the economic and financial capabilities of member countries. These goals are
the basis for recommendations by the NATO military authorities for the improvement of national forces.

These recommendations are adjusted in the light of assessments made of the total available resources, following discussions between the NATO International Staff and the competent military authorities.

As any national defence programme is by its very nature a relatively long-term undertaking, any planning in connection with the collective NATO programme must extend over a comparable period. At the same time, no democratic government can definitely commit itself to a programme extending over a longer period of time than that for which it has legislative authority. Although, therefore, an Annual Review covers a period of at least three years, governments are asked only for firm commitments, as regards force goals, for the following year, and for 'the present state of thinking' about plans for later years. As the 'firm goals' relate to the year following the Annual Review, the 'provisional goals' refer to the second year and the 'planning goals' to the third year.

**GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AT CONSTANT PRICES 1949-1960**

(Indice 1953 = 100)

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Each Annual Review starts with an assessment of accomplishments in reaching the 'firm goals' for that year. The 'provisional goals' of the previous Review are designed in the light of experience and changing circumstances to become the 'firm goals' proposed in the current Review of the following year. The 'planning goals' are designed to become 'provisional goals', and planning is then projected one year further ahead. In this way, the Annual Review has become a continuous process, and goals set for the second and third years in each Review provide a direction and order of magnitude on which national and NATO military and civilian planning can be based.

The Annual Review process, which extends over practically the whole year, includes the following separate stages:

a. general assumptions for the conduct of the Review; these are established by the Council each year and are based on an assessment of the military risk, on the one hand, and of the general economic and political position of NATO countries, on the other hand;

b. a detailed questionnaire to governments, designed to elicit information on national military programmes, budgets, production schedules and economic position;

c. military recommendations issued by Supreme Commanders to member countries for improvements in existing forces and discussion of these recommendations by representatives of Supreme Commanders, national authorities and members of the NATO International Staff, the particular task of the latter being to study, with national experts, the impact of military directives on economic and financial planning, and on the production of armaments;

d. analysis of national replies, carried out in the first instance separately by NATO military authorities, national delegations and civilians on the International Staff in order to establish a comparison between national defence programmes and NATO requirements, and to bring out the major problems facing each country;

e. recommendations by the NATO military authorities and the International Staff for adjustments in national plans, in the light of the above analysis, designed to ensure that they are collectively balanced on the entire NATO front;

f. multilateral discussion of each country's defence effort in order to examine the nature of this effort and to obtain an agreement from member countries which takes into account both the overall goals of the Alliance and national capabilities;

g. preparation of a final report to be forwarded to governments, setting force goals for each country and summarizing the main problems to be solved by the Alliance in the forthcoming period;

h. discussion and approval by the North Atlantic Council, in Ministerial session, of this final report.

In order to enable each member country to appreciate the defence efforts of its partners and to recommend for necessary modifications, it has been necessary to develop a system for the presentation of information on a country-wide basis.
Countries are asked in the questionnaires to describe their defence efforts along the following lines: the actual programme in military terms of the forces they propose to raise; the material which is expected to be available, and steps being taken to fill any deficiencies; the financial aspects of their plans and their relation to the economic capabilities of the country.

The replies to the questionnaires are examined by all national Delegations to NATO, the Standing Group, the Supreme Commanders and the appropriate sections of the International Staff. At the same time, the latter make an appraisal of the economic and financial position of each country, on the basis of general data collected by other international organizations (in particular by the OECD) and of the specific information concerning defence outlays, as provided by each member country. After having thus determined how far the military plans of the Alliance are compatible with countries' own military plans, and with their economic and financial capabilities, the International Staff then forms conclusions on the ability of each country to carry out the proposed defence programme. These conclusions are set out as recommendations addressed to each country, suggesting modifications to be made to their economic and financial planning so that the military goals of the Alliance may be attained.

INVESTMENT AT CONSTANT PRICES 1949-1960
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Source: OECD (Statistical Bulletin, January 1961)
It is the open, multilateral discussion in the course of the Annual Review which enables all members of the Alliance to assess whether the defence burden is being equitably shared or whether it is imposing a special strain on the economy of any country.

The essential element of the Annual Review is the reconciliation between the number of improvements or changes in national plans considered desirable by NATO military authorities and an assessment of the capability of the member countries to implement these various recommendations.

This reconciliation is prepared, and then finalised, in the Annual Review Committee in a multilateral discussion of those changes which can be suggested to governments in the final report.

This report comprises two series of documents: 1. an overall report analysing the major problems affecting the collective defence effort and summarising the conclusions reached in the course of the examinations; 2. detailed country by country studies covering their defence effort, their economic situation, the military problems facing them and recommendations for the improvement of their defence effort. This final report of the International Staff is complemented by a report from the NATO military authorities on the state of defence of the Alliance as revealed by the Annual Review. These documents serve as a basis for discussion by the Council at Ministerial level and for a decision on the implementation of the recommendations contained therein. The Annual Review is one of the most important tasks performed by NATO, since it is one of the main instruments for co-ordinating the defence effort of the Alliance. It is a means not only of identifying weaknesses, but also of estimating the cost and economic and financial impact of proposed remedies. It is through the Annual Review that agreement can be reached within the Alliance on what is both desirable and practicable.

It is also through the Annual Review that all member governments are learning to appreciate the difficulties facing their partners in the Alliance, and are acquiring the habit of working together on an intimate basis in order to solve complex problems.

Lastly, the Annual Review, by setting out in a uniform and impartial way the state of each country's forces, the problems relative to their upkeep, and the resources being devoted to defence, has always provided, and will, it is hoped, continue to provide, a realistic basis for the allocation of mutual aid. Experience has amply borne out the conclusions reached in the early days of the Alliance that no simple and generally acceptable formula can be devised to measure each country's capacity to undertake defence. The Annual Review, without seeking to arrive at mathematical judgments in this respect, nevertheless gives a very fair picture of where the weaknesses lie, of where help between Allies is most needed, and of where it can most effectively be applied.

In view of the vital part played by the Annual Review, it is not surprising that the NATO authorities, desirous of making it as effective as possible, have recently examined
the extent to which the present procedure should be adapted in the light of past experience. Detailed studies have pointed to the desirability of introducing certain alterations in that procedure, for the purpose of achieving a closer correlation between the global requirements defined by the NATO military authorities and the individual contributions of member countries taken as a whole and at the same time inducing countries to undertake more precise commitments for the three-year period covered by the Review.

In practice the reform that has been decided provides for a review every three years of a much more complex nature than the customary annual reviews. Under the new procedure, the NATO military authorities, on the basis of their long-term requirements, will draw up with the assistance of the International Staff detailed military programmes for the following three years. The countries, having taken note of these programmes, will put forward any counter-proposals they may wish to make. This stage will be followed by an exhaustive exchange of views between the interested parties. The agreement reached under the new procedure will take the form of a statement by the countries at the close of the Ministerial meeting, announcing their intentions with respect to the forces they propose to place at the disposal of the Alliance for the following three years. These intentions must be firm and must be such that they can be accepted as an accurate statement of their national military goals. It is, however, understood that countries might find it necessary to make reservations with respect to the second and third years whenever, because of parliamentary procedures, they are unable to undertake firm commitments for more than one year ahead.

The introduction of the three-yearly review will considerably simplify the procedure of the intermediate annual reviews. Henceforth, these will be mainly devoted to the study of measures adopted by countries for implementing decisions taken at the time of the preceding three-yearly review.

In principle, the first three-yearly review is to take place in 1962.

FINANCING OF THE DEFENCE EFFORT

Any defence effort raises financial problems and calls for the reconciliation of military aims with economic capabilities. As the build-up of the Atlantic forces is undertaken within the framework of an Alliance, the main concern in this process of reconciliation must be to spread the financial and economic burden of the defence effort as fairly as possible between the different member countries.

The countries of the Alliance are, of course, far from having reached the same degree of economic development. Some of them in particular must give priority to raising the standard of living of their populations. It is therefore essential for NATO to ensure not only that the defence effort will not jeopardise the economic and social progress which the countries of the Alliance have so far obtained in conditions of freedom, but also that it does not impede their economic progress.
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Should the implementation of military programmes which are incompatible with the capabilities of a country have adverse economic consequences, the people of that country might hesitate to accept the necessary sacrifices. It must not be forgotten that whereas in the countries of the Communist world the defence effort is imposed, in the countries of the West it is freely accepted. Consequently, depending on the different economic and political considerations, the resources which can be devoted to defence vary considerably from country to country. However, the goals which the various countries are asked to attain for the defence of the Alliance must be based essentially on military considerations: strategic concepts, geographical factors, etc... In spite of their efforts at national level, a number of countries would, because of insufficient resources, have undoubtedly been unable to reach their goals if there had not been close co-operation, within the Alliance, with the wealthier countries extending aid, often on a large scale, to support the defence effort of the less favoured countries. The main source of this aid is known as 'mutual aid'
and is provided in a number of forms from the North American countries, particularly the United States.

If the extent of the financial effort made by the Alliance for its defence is to be fully appreciated, we must examine on the one hand the growth of national defence expenditures and, on the other, that of mutual aid.

**PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AND DEFENCE EXPENDITURES IN EUROPEAN MEMBER COUNTRIES (PER HEAD)**

Figures have been adjusted to 1954 price levels and converted in US dollars at 1954 official rates of exchange.
National Defence Expenditures

Four stages can be distinguished in the financial effort for the defence of the NATO countries.

Between 1949 and 1953 defence expenditures rose rapidly to three times their previous level. The increase was particularly marked in the North American countries where there had been large-scale disarmament after the Second World War. In these countries, expenditure nearly quadrupled in the years 1949 to 1953.

In 1954 and 1955, with the end of the war in Korea and a certain relaxation of international tension, there was a fall-off in defence expenditures which was more pronounced in the North American countries than among the European members of NATO. Compared with the peak levels of 1953, the total decline amounted to about 15%.

From 1956, however, a number of countries found it necessary to increase – sometimes quite substantially – their financial contribution to defence, particularly in view of developments in the international situation. This trend continued into 1957. In absolute terms the increase was the greatest in North America, but proportionately it was the greatest in Europe.

Since 1958, the rate of increase of defence expenditures has slowed down considerably; there is still, however, a slight upward trend both in Europe and in North America. Nevertheless, defence expenditures for the NATO countries as a whole have not yet regained the 1953 peak.

Be that as it may, a comparison of the present level of these expenditures with the 1949 level offers eloquent proof of the financial effort made in this sphere, even allowing for the fact that part of the increase must be attributed to the increase in salaries and in prices.

In spite of its magnitude, it has been possible for the defence effort of the NATO member countries to be accomplished without economic or social upheaval. From 1949 to 1960, overall production rose by over 50%. Indubitably, this expansion of resources was neither uninterrupted nor uniform in every country and too often it was accompanied by price increases. Nevertheless, it made it possible to satisfy military requirements, to increase the volume of investments and, at the same time, to raise the standard of living, for private consumption has increased at the same rate as overall production. Simultaneously, there has been a marked improvement in the balance of payments of the European countries. Gold reserves held by member countries of the OECD more than doubled between 1953 and 1960, trade restrictions were largely removed and most currencies have been made convertible. The countries of the West have also been able to give underdeveloped areas assistance which, while still inadequate, has nevertheless been substantial. These results are due both to the efficacy of national policies and to the co-operation achieved between the countries, particularly within the framework of international organizations.
## NATO Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

### 1 Contributions to Underdeveloped Countries

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<td>100</td>
<td>127</td>
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<td>6,692</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>116</td>
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### 2 Aid to Underdeveloped Countries as a percentage of Gross National Product of Donor Countries

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Aid from public sector</th>
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<td>0.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.68</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO Europe</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO North America</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Total</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Source:** OECD (See in particular "The Flow of Financial Resources to Countries in the course of Economic Development – 1956-1959" issued in March 1961).
Mutual aid

Mutual aid springs from a strategic necessity: the building up of armed forces in countries or regions unable to achieve the necessary level of effort entirely on their own owing to their limited resources. It has been, and still is, almost always negotiated on a bilateral basis between the donating country and the recipient country, even if the nature and the volume of such aid are partly the result of a collective assessment within the framework of the Annual Review.

Mutual aid has taken a great variety of forms:

- the supply, free of charge, of goods and services of a military nature, to certain countries by others which are better equipped industrially and have larger financial resources: e.g. military equipment, training the forces of the recipient country, etc.
- financial contribution by certain countries to the defence expenditures of others. These contributions have been made in the following ways: for the implementation of military programmes, the reimbursing of certain costs incurred by the recipient country or the assignment for military purposes of the counterpart funds representing goods delivered as economic aid.
- the temporary loan to certain countries of equipment or facilities belonging to other countries, such as warships, training areas, etc.

Putting into effect the precepts of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, many are the member countries who have provided mutual aid. Thus the United Kingdom has made ships available to other countries, the United Kingdom and France have trained specialists, particularly in the sphere of aeronautics, many other countries have provided spare parts, industrial drawings or training grounds and Germany has contributed to the cost of stationing Allied troops on its territory.

The bulk of mutual aid has, however, been contributed by the North American countries and particularly by the United States.

The first Canadian mutual aid programme was put into effect in 1950. The Canadian Government decided to re-equip its forces with American equipment, making available to the European countries the British equipment with which they had been supplied. Subsequently, this was followed by the delivery of modern equipment manufactured in Canada, particularly aircraft of the Sabre type. To give an approximate idea of the extent of this aid, the supplies made available by Canada, (not including aircraft), would have been sufficient to equip three ground divisions with vehicles, light arms and artillery.

In addition to providing equipment, Canada has also conducted an extensive pilot-training programme involving 1,000 to 1,500 pilots per year, for the benefit of the air forces of its European allies. Total Canadian aid since 1950 has amounted to 1,500 million dollars. This aid was not granted as a result of bilateral negotiations as is normally the case but was distributed by the NATO military authorities according to requirements.
The United States, which is the wealthiest and most highly-developed industrial country in the Alliance, has been the greatest contributor to the mutual aid programme. Since 1949 it has supplied aid to its European allies to the value of approximately 22,000 million dollars, quite apart from the purely economic aid under the Marshall Plan which alone accounted for nearly 10,000 million dollars. United States aid has been allocated on a purely bilateral basis and has been provided in a number of forms which can be summarised under three main headings: military aid proper, so-called ‘defence support’ economic aid, and intermediate aid.

The first has consisted mainly in the delivery of equipment and supplies to the forces of the European members of NATO: light weapons, artillery, tanks, aircraft, combat vehicles, ammunition, missiles, petroleum products, etc. These were supplied in very considerable quantities. United States military aid to its allies since the signing of the Treaty has amounted to nearly 16,000 million dollars. Most items were manufactured in the United States; however, large orders were also placed in European countries, particularly during the period 1953-1958 under the ‘off-shore’ programmes. The ‘off-shore’ contracts were particularly valuable since they made it possible both to develop the capacity of the armaments industry in Western Europe and to consolidate the economies of those countries by providing a source of dollars at a time when many of them were experiencing balance of payments difficulties.

The so-called ‘defence support’ economic aid, which must not be confused with the aid supplied under the Marshall Plan, has alone amounted to nearly 5,000 million dollars since the beginning of the Alliance. Its purpose is two-fold: to strengthen the economies of the recipient countries and to provide them with additional financial resources with which to increase their defence effort. Items delivered to the civilian services under this head produce counterpart funds in national currency which increase the budgetary resources of the various countries and enable them to finance a greater volume of military expenditure. This form of aid which has dwindled considerably over the past few years is no longer very appreciable except in two or three countries.

With aid of the intermediate type, which is basically a form of budgetary assistance, the United States has provided finance for certain national programmes of its allies. This form of aid dates back to the Lisbon Ministerial Meeting in 1952; although it has developed considerably over the years, it has never accounted for very large amounts (about a thousand million dollars in all) and it has now almost ceased to exist. One form of intermediate aid has, however, gained ground in recent years; it operates in the case of military programmes, particularly naval programmes, carried out by European countries, the financing of which is shared jointly by the United States and the countries concerned on the basis of a cost-sharing formula.
### TOTAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF NATO COUNTRIES

1949-1961

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<td>18,312</td>
<td>18,686</td>
<td>19,161</td>
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<td>885</td>
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<td>12,531</td>
<td>13,865</td>
<td>11,710</td>
<td>11,020</td>
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<td>...</td>
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<td>6,287</td>
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<td>2,655</td>
<td>2,767</td>
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<td>436</td>
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<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>1,681</td>
<td>1,571</td>
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<td>1,574</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>1,701</td>
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<td>14,559</td>
<td>33,398</td>
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<td>45,503</td>
<td>46,614</td>
<td>46,545</td>
<td>51,093</td>
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</table>

#### Area

| Total Europe (b) | Million US $ | 4,825 | 5,445 | 7,627 | 10,231 | 12,403 | 11,746 | 11,828 | 13,137 | 13,814 | 12,925 | 13,385 | 14,208 | 15,096 |
| Total North America | Million US $ | 13,952 | 15,054 | 34,618 | 49,727 | 51,591 | 44,671 | 42,337 | 43,661 | 46,377 | 47,243 | 48,256 | 48,199 | 52,796 |
| Total NATO (b)   | Million US $ | 18,777 | 20,499 | 42,245 | 59,958 | 63,994 | 56,417 | 54,165 | 56,798 | 60,191 | 60,168 | 61,641 | 62,407 | 67,892 |

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a. Before it acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (May 1955), the Federal Republic contributed to the defence budgets of certain NATO countries by the payment of occupation costs; moreover, it bore certain other costs which also fall within the NATO definition of defence expenditures. The total given in the column for 1953 represents the expenditures made under these various heads for the fiscal year 1953/54 (1 April - 31 March). The figures for the year prior to fiscal year 1953/54 have not yet been communicated to the Secretariat.

b. The totals for Europe and for NATO do not include German defence expenditures for the period prior to 1953, and for this reason they are not directly comparable to the totals for the following years.
CHAPTER 10

PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS

Before going deeply into this subject it is as well to reiterate that NATO is not a supra-national organisation and does not possess mandatory powers over national governments. In the present context, the effect of this is that the responsibility for equipping and maintaining forces remains a national prerogative. There is, therefore, no NATO production in the sense of orders being passed by NATO to producers and no NATO centralised logistic system.

When NATO was first set up in 1949, rearmament for defence was the order of the day. Forces were being expanded and equipment was needed for them. However, there were several major drawbacks to the rapid production of such equipment. The Second World War had left the armament industries of most of Western Europe in poor condition. Much of the industrial plant which had not been either destroyed or damaged had been changed over to civilian production. Economic difficulties made most countries unwilling to divert scarce resources to defence production or hardly-won foreign exchange to military purchases from abroad.

The immediate difficulties were met to a large extent by mutual aid in various forms from Canada and the United States, while the improvement in the economic climate gradually enabled most countries to provide more from their own resources.

PRODUCTION

The first attempts to rationalise defence production in NATO were made by the Military Production and Supply Board set up in November 1949, and its successor (in December 1950) the Defence Production Board. These Boards had studies prepared by specialists, recommending means of increasing production in fields where deficiencies were greatest. The Defence Production Board then drew up proposals which it referred to the Financial and Economic Board who, observing the financial implications of these proposals, decided that they could not be considered separately from all the other requirements involved in expanding the NATO forces. A temporary Council Committee was therefore set up in September 1951, one of whose responsibilities was to submit proposals for the reconciliation of military requirements, including arms and equipment, with the means available to NATO countries for defence.
From this review by the Temporary Council Committee sprang the Annual Review,* in which balanced defence plans are prepared, including plans for the production or procurement of arms and equipment in proportion to the total funds made available by member Governments for the purpose. This represented a useful advance in realistic planning and also provided a forum where recommendations could be put forward by the military authorities for the kind of equipment that countries should produce or procure for their forces.

Early in 1952 a Production and Logistics Division was set up as part of a newly-created International Staff of NATO. Its main rôle in the production field is to promote the most efficient use of the resources of the Alliance in the production of military equipment.

As a first task the Division took over the studies which had already been made concerning equipment deficiencies and existing capacity to meet them. Plans were made for correlated production programmes of major items of equipment, including aircraft artillery, small arms, radar and wireless sets, vehicles, ships and various types of ammunition.

It will be observed that these programmes were only limited in scope and no attempt was made to draw up any overall master plan for the equipment of all NATO forces which would parcel out production to the most efficient or economical sources. Such ideas, which had been canvassed in the very early days of NATO, made little progress because of lack of any supranational authority and ran into a number of obstacles. National authorities naturally tended to favour home industries and to be reluctant to finance multi-national projects. Member countries were at differing stages of economic and industrial efficiency. There were serious problems in respect of security. Furthermore, large programmes imposed upon industries would have had the effect of smothering incentive and reducing useful competition in the private industrial sector of many of the countries concerned.

Under these circumstances, even the limited programmes prepared by the International Staff with the help of countries did not achieve many spectacular results. In fact, in the areas where production was most usefully increased, it was usually North American aid in the form of off-shore procurement orders which acted as the spur.

The most interesting example, especially in the light of later developments, was that of fighter aircraft production. Belgium and the Netherlands had already co-operated in 1949 in the joint production under licence of British aircraft and engines. When the correlated programme for combat aircraft was agreed, which included the production of British, French and United States aircraft in five Western European nations, Belgium and the Netherlands continued their co-operation, adopting the Hawker Hunter fighter and agreeing on a joint production programme whereby the supply of components and the assembly work was divided between the United Kingdom,
Belgium and the Netherlands, while considerable financial support was given by the United States. This was in a sense the first co-operative production project in NATO. Useful results were also obtained under correlated production programmes for electronic equipment and for ammunition. In the latter case, large United States off-shore orders and grants towards the cost of establishing new plants helped to increase five-fold the overall ammunition production capacity of the European NATO countries.

**US ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID SHIPMENTS**

(Milliards of US Dollars)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Economic Aid</th>
<th>Military Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1949 (15 months)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.9</strong></td>
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**Economic Aid:**
The figures represent loans and grants under US Economic Defence Support and Intermediate Type Aid Programmes to NATO countries. They do not include economic aid from “Export-Import Bank” and any other form of aid provided by agencies other than ICA (formerly ECA, MSA, FOA).

**Military Aid:**
The above figures represent the value of military equipment, supplies, training programmes and other services granted to European NATO countries. The figures also include expenditures for the “Mutual Weapons Development Programme” and “Facilities Assistance Programme”, and expenditures for Infrastructure financed out of the 140 million dollars appropriated for US Department of Defence military functions.

* This total does not include assistance to the Associated States of Indochina for the support of their national forces, amounting to $ 254 million.
In the Spring of 1954, the Council set up a Committee to advise it and make recommendations on matters pertaining to defence production. Entitled the Defence Production Committee, it was composed of production counsellors from each national Delegation and was attended by a representative of the NATO military authorities. The preparation of studies and all other secretarial work was undertaken by the International Staff. The Committee took over the supervision of the work which had already been undertaken on correlated production programmes and of the other activities associated with production which had grown up since 1949, in particular work on standardization and the exchange of technical information.

**Standardization**

Standardization of items of equipment, components and spare parts was recognised at an early stage as being important because it can lead to a simplification of the logistic support of forces and also is a necessary forerunner of co-ordination of production. However, there are a number of reasons which limit progress in this direction. The first is a purely physical one, the wide geographical area covered by the Alliance with its differing territories, climates, customs and a host of other factors, some abstract, others concrete, which give rise to different requirements. Another reason is the existence of large quantities of equipment which cannot just be scrapped or discarded so long as it has some operational value. Also, countries have to be persuaded of the merits of adopting new equipment designed by some other nation, to say nothing of the economic and financial aspects.

In fact some degree of standardization was ensured at an early stage by the extensive range of items of equipment of North American origin received by countries under mutual aid. The need to find sources of spare parts for these items brought countries into close co-operation and groups of national experts were formed under the aegis of the Defence Production Committee to discuss these and similar problems, such as the conversion of drawings from United States measurements to the metric system.

The need for standardization does, in fact, vary from one item of equipment to another. In certain cases complete standardization is the only possible solution; sometimes it is sufficient to have standard or interchangeable components. Often, compatibility between different makes of equipment is enough. Technical standardization is not an end in itself and projects for standardization are therefore discussed with care between nations and the International Staff. The method employed is for the project to be discussed in a group of experts until a Standardization Agreement is reached. This is then circulated to the countries concerned for ratification and when all have given consent the result is sent to the Military Agency for Standardization for promulgation.

Examples of items or areas for which such technical Standardization Agreements have been promulgated are specifications for explosives of various types, vehicle components and attachments, a priority list of electronic valves, impact tests for steels for
guns, the adoption of a standard atmosphere for ballistic purposes, and rules for the conversion of dimensions on drawings of United States origin for countries using the metric system.

Exchange of technical information

Both the studies on correlated production and the work involved in standardization necessitated the exchange of much technical information, and this caused increased use of Groups of Experts, a technique which had been evolved during the earliest days of the Alliance. These Groups, consisting of qualified technicians from the countries concerned in the particular field or item of equipment under study would meet together, normally at the NATO Headquarters, to exchange views and information and try to arrive at a common policy. When the Defence Production Committee was set up these Groups came under its aegis; their work was reviewed, some were enlarged, others disbanded, and new ones created, as the need arose. A few of the original Groups do, in fact, still exist. Some of these Groups have been set up almost entirely for the exchange of technical information rather than for the standardization of any item of equipment, although, as will have been observed from the list of subjects for which Standardization Agreements have been promulgated, common procedures or rules do sometimes result from their discussions.

One of the most fruitful fields of study and exchange of views has been ammunition. Various manufacturing techniques have been and are still being discussed, as well as methods of packaging and storing the finished product. An interesting study, which resulted from the work of one Group of Experts, concerns methods of production of steel cartridge cases in substitution for brass. Another Group started by considering the different types of steel used in the manufacture of weapons, particularly guns, and this has since had its activities extended to cover other metals. Among other subjects on which information has been or is being exchanged are equipment for protection against chemical warfare, ballistics and a broad field of electronics equipment.

In order to permit as great an exchange of information as possible a working group of specialists was set up in 1955 to enquire into means of protecting proprietary technical information and, if possible, to formulate rules for the guidance of experts, so that they would not, for instance, communicate information which was not the property of their government but belonged to private firms or individuals. After succeeding in producing a set of rules for this purpose in 1956, the Group has drawn up and submitted a draft resolution which has been approved by the Council defining a procedure to be followed in the event of damage from disclosure or use of inventions or technical information within the framework of NATO. The Group has also prepared an agreement for the mutual safeguarding of secrecy of inventions relating to defence and for which applications for patents have been made. This agreement should remove the prohibition arising from the fact that the imposition of secrecy on an invention relating to defence in one of the NATO countries for which patent application had been
made entails usually the interdiction of application for a patent for the same invention in other NATO countries. The agreement provides that the governments shall safeguard and cause to be safeguarded the secrecy of inventions for which applications for patents have been received under agreed procedures, whenever the secrecy has been imposed on such inventions in the interests of national defence by the government which was the first to receive an application for a patent covering these inventions. This agreement has since been approved by the Council and member governments are taking the necessary steps to implement it. The Group is now undertaking further useful work in this unusual and important field.

**Co-operation in Research, Development and Production**

So far the activities described have been interesting and useful rather than far-reaching, and have not given signs of many concrete results that would justify the title of production. Some of the reasons for this have been indicated and remain true for most of what are called ‘conventional’ items of equipment. However, from the beginning of the Alliance a number of people have thought that real co-operation was called for in the vast and expensive field of equipping the Armed Forces of NATO. The recent advent of more complicated and more costly items of equipment, such as missiles and the more advanced type of aircraft, demand new manufacturing processes and facilities on quite a different scale. The financial and technical resources required to develop and produce these complicated weapon systems are available only to the very wealthiest countries and this has led all to consider more favourably closer co-operation in new projects.

After the gradual abandonment of the correlated programme approach described earlier, there was tacit agreement that any approach to production should be on the basis of individual projects. The first multinational venture to start within NATO itself for the development and production of a totally new major item of equipment began in 1954. This was the Lightweight Tactical Reconnaissance Aircraft, which is briefly described later.

A number of useful lessons on how to set about a co-operative venture of this kind were learned from this first experience, and a somewhat different approach was adopted on the next occasion. This was the NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft project, which started early in 1957, and is also described herein.

It may well be remarked that one project started in 1954 and a second started in 1957 do not represent a very rapid change in thinking on the part of the Alliance. In fact there were several reasons for this apparent lack of haste. First of all, the need for such close co-operation had not yet become so clear; secondly, there was no particular spur from the outside to shake nations from their natural conservatism. However, in the United States, where the full cost and complexity of planning and producing new weapons first became evident, new ideas started to sprout. So at the end of 1956 and in 1957 the United States started to make proposals for co-ordinated efforts and to give
information more readily on the equipment they were themselves developing and producing.

Then at the December 1957 Ministerial Meeting of the Council, which was held at the level of Heads of Government, President Eisenhower offered a wide range of support from the United States to strengthen the defensive armament of the Alliance. This was particularly aimed at helping the rapid establishment of joint European production of weapons by making available United States' technical knowledge and experience, and the results of research and development already undertaken. This offer was taken up readily and the Council gave the Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics a free hand to discuss it with nations, select suitable projects and work out methods of joint production. The first two projects so selected were the **HAWK** and **SIDEWINDER** missiles and the action taken to produce these in Europe is described later.

The Heads of Government meeting had expressed in no uncertain terms that the time had come for a much closer and more dynamic co-operation between countries in the field of armaments and this was taken to heart. The first proof of this came at the Defence Ministers Meeting in Spring, 1958, when the idea of the interdependence of nations and the need to make the best use through co-operation of the available technical resources of the Alliance were heavily emphasised. At this meeting proposals were tabled by European member countries. These proposals were remitted to the Defence Production Committee for examination and appropriate action. For some, plans for co-operative production had already been made; for others, such plans have since been made as in the case of the Mark 44 torpedo. In matters of naval equipment, a forum was provided, where the responsible national officers could meet and discuss their problems and seek common answers.

Another result of this new impetus was the submission by certain countries of proposals for some reorganization of the structure and procedures in **NATO** for handling co-operation in research, development and production of military equipment. The Council accepted the need for some changes and, as a first step, extended the terms of reference of the Defence Production Committee in order to permit it to discuss problems arising before the production stage is reached, such as applied research and development, with a consequential change in the title of the Committee to Armaments Committee. The Council then set up a Group composed of civilian and military representatives from both national and international sources to recommend new procedures for co-operation.

This Group produced a report setting out procedures for the implementation of future projects for research, development and production of modern weapons and equipment. These procedures were finally adopted by the Council in November 1959 and are being put into practice. They are based on the experience of the **NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft** which has in a sense acted as the pilot project, and cover the whole process from the first ideas of equipment, which tend to be the province of scientists or experimental workers, through the establishment of basic military
requirements, the preparation of operational characteristics and technical specifications, the submission and selection of designs, the development, production and testing of prototypes up to the series production of the fully developed equipment. The procedures are flexible to the extent that they need not be followed in their entirety; for example, if an item of equipment, which is already some way along the process in one country, is selected as meeting a NATO basic military requirement then the procedures would be brought into play from that point onwards. The greatest value of these procedures is in the provision they make for the fullest co-operation, not only between countries but between the military and technical sides of both national and international staffs.

Having now suitable procedures, the next step was to put them to good use. Consequently, at their meeting in the Spring of 1960 the Defence Ministers discussed the ways and means of achieving this and proposed that the Armaments Committee should draw up a list of projects, either at the research and development stage or at the production stage, and should take the necessary steps to implement those selected. The Committee reviewed a number of ideas submitted by countries and by the International Staff and drew up a list of projects which showed some signs of being suitable for co-operative effort. These are now under study.

For those which commanded sufficient support for immediate action to be taken, bodies known as Ad Hoc Mixed Working Groups were set up. In these bodies, which derive from the agreed procedures, all parties within NATO who are concerned in a given project can participate on an equal footing and can send the best qualified representatives, whether military or civilian, operational or technical. There are now more than twenty of these groups in existence, covering a wide range of arms and equipment.

The projects under consideration vary from equipment already at a late stage of national development or production, to concepts at an early research stage. The main emphasis is being placed on longer-term projects. The short-term has not, however, been neglected, and one of the effects of this new effort in co-operation has been to speed up existing projects and encourage certain new ones for common production to be set on foot. Amongst these latter may be mentioned the F104 STARFIGHTER Aircraft, which is described later.

This new effort is kept continually under review, and new proposals are added to the original list as appropriate. In this way there is a constant contact with the needs of nations and the possibilities of co-operation in research, development and production, thus making the most efficient use of the resources of the Alliance.

LIGHTWEIGHT TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

The idea of a very light jet fighter for close support of ground troops was conceived by the NATO military authorities and as no procedures existed within NATO for carrying out such a project through all its phases, SACEUR took the lead in 1954 in its implemen-
After the general specifications had been prepared, designs were drawn up and prototypes developed and constructed. Three prototypes were tested and one design, the Italian FIAT G. 91, with a British Bristol Orpheus engine, was selected for the first generation of the aircraft. This is now in full production, both in Italy and under licence in the Federal Republic of Germany. It has now entered into squadron services in both the Italian and German Air Forces.

MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT
In the course of the 1956 Annual Review, the Alliance’s potential deficiencies in modern maritime patrol aircraft were revealed and these were brought to the attention of the Council at the Ministerial Meeting in December of that year. Early in 1957 the Defence Production Committee discussed the problem and set up a Group of Experts both technical and operational, to study a method of developing and producing an aircraft on a multilateral basis in order to meet these deficiencies.

The NATO Military Authorities were first asked to formulate their basic military requirements for such a machine and these were submitted, describing the missions for which it was required and the main features, characteristics and capabilities which they considered necessary. After discussion the Group converted these requirements into operational characteristics, which gave a more detailed description of the type of aircraft and equipment required. The possibility of finding an existing aircraft which would meet these characteristics was examined but it was decided that a completely new aircraft would have to be designed. Technical specifications were then produced from the operational characteristics and these specifications were circulated to aircraft firms in various countries.

Design studies were submitted, and after examination by experts, the design finally selected as most suitable was the French Bréguet 1150. After further consultations, four countries – Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands – finally decided, with the assistance of the United States, to finance the research and development phase of this aircraft, including the manufacture of two prototypes. Agreement has been reached on the organization to carry out this phase. The design and manufacture have been entrusted to a consortium headed by Bréguet and including Dornier, Fokker, Sud-Aviation and the Belgian ABAP. This project is now proceeding satisfactorily. The first prototype has been tested at Toulouse. It was shown on the ground and in flight on 3 November, 1961 to the Secretary General of NATO, the French Minister of Defence and other civil and military dignitaries. It is now completing flight trials. For the prototypes, the engines are being supplied by Rolls Royce in the United Kingdom and much of the electronic equipment is being supplied by the United States. Arrangements regarding the production phase are now in hand.

THE HAWK SURFACE/AIR MISSILE SYSTEM
Early in 1958 five European countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, accepted the American offer to use United States government-owned property
rights and to facilitate industrial contracts for the manufacture in Europe of the HAWK surface-to-air missile system. Five European firms have combined to form an international corporation organised under French law and known as SETEL (Société Européenne de Téléguidage) to act as the European prime contractor for the production of this missile system. At governmental level the programme is supervised by an organization called the NATO HAWK Production Organization. This includes a Board of Directors, drawn from the participating countries, and the Management Office, internationally staffed, which conducts the day-to-day control of the production programme. This organization was set up by the Council in June 1959. The production is allocated on the principle that it should be proportional to the number of complete weapon systems which each nation agrees to buy from the prime contractor. Each industrial company concerned is to produce all the requirements in one or more selected major items and sub-assemblies of the weapon system, and the final delivery will be under the responsibility of SETEL.

THE SIDEWINDER AIR/AIR MISSILE SYSTEM
Here again an existing United States missile was chosen by a number of NATO European countries for production in Europe. These countries were Denmark, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway and Turkey, which joined at the end of 1959, with the assistance of the United States, to establish a co-ordinated programme. In this instance a German firm has been selected as the prime contractor. The missile is less complicated than the HAWK, and the organization for its production is consequently simpler. It includes a NATO Directing Group which is under the aegis of the Armaments Committee and a NATO Programme Officer concerned with the day-to-day management of the production programme. The arrangements for this organization were agreed by the Council in December 1959. Since that date, Belgium and Portugal have joined the programme. The first missiles assembled in Europe under this programme were delivered in November 1961.

ANTI-SUBMARINE TORPEDO
A co-ordinated programme in the production of the United States Mark 44 Anti-Submarine Torpedo in Europe is under way by France and Italy with United States co-operation. Production of this torpedo is also being established in the United Kingdom and in Canada under arrangements agreed upon earlier with the United States. In addition, a Group of Experts has been established by the Armaments Committee to assure full interchange of information amongst all those involved in the further development and production of this torpedo.

THE F 104G STARFIGHTER AIRCRAFT
In December 1960 four European countries, Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, announced that they had agreed to participate in a programme for the coordinated production in Europe of the F 104G STARFIGHTER Aircraft. This is a
multi-purpose aircraft capable of accomplishing fighter-bomber all-weather intercept and reconnaissance missions. The United States has assisted in the programme, and Canada, which is producing a similar aircraft for its own forces, has been closely associated with the project from the beginning and is contributing to the development work. In June 1961 the Council approved this programme as a NATO Programme. The Production Organization agreed by the Council at that time for the implementation of this programme, is similar to that provided for the HAWK Organization in having a Board of Directors and a Management Office. This programme is the largest single co-operative effort so far made in the development and production field.

LOGISTICS

Apart from the work done under the NATO Common Infrastructure Programme, which is treated separately within NATO, although it cannot be dissociated from the problem of the logistic support of the NATO forces, the achievements in the field of logistics have been few and rather specialised. In the early days of the Alliance, countries were content to maintain and supply their own national forces assigned to NATO without wishing to set up any centralised system. Experience, especially with large-scale military exercises and the growing complexity of equipment, is, however, now causing certain countries to have second thoughts. For reasons both of geography and command structure future progress in logistics is likely to take on a regional aspect and, in fact, one of the examples of action already taken – the supply of fuel in the field through the NATO Pipeline System, which is described below – is based on the regions. Other action taken up to now has tended to arise out of the production problems discussed earlier, and it is true to say that standardization, whether of components, or through the adoption of common items of new equipment, is the key to any real progress towards an integrated logistics system.

Codification of Equipment

All national armed forces must have available large stocks of equipment items, components and spare parts and must have a system of codification of equipment which enables them to be produced when required. For an Alliance, a unified system of codification is clearly very valuable, and indeed is essential if there is ever to be widespread use of common equipment and integration of logistic support. As a result of studies undertaken by the NATO Military Agency for Standardization with a view to promoting the use in member countries of such a unified system for codification, two standardization agreements were promulgated in January 1957. These provide for uniform systems of supply classification and item identification for use by the NATO Armed Forces, the systems adopted being in both cases the existing United States Federal Systems. The Council, acting on the recommendation of the Defence Production Committee set up in December 1957, a Panel on the Codification of Equipment composed of the heads of the national codification agencies or their representatives,
and a small secretariat was created in the Production and Logistics Division to service this Panel.

After carrying out the groundwork for the introduction of a NATO Codification System it became evident that to codify all items of existing equipment in all the armed forces of every NATO country would require far too much time from far too many valuable experts. The Armaments Committee (successor to the Defence Production Committee) therefore established in June 1960, a priority listing of the equipment on which all countries should concentrate their codification action, this equipment being, in the main, items to be used by more than one country or items newly developed and introduced into the Armed Forces.

**NATO Maintenance Supply Services System**

The need to find sources of spare parts for the extensive range of items of equipment of North American origin has been mentioned earlier in the discussion on production. At first, groups of experts examined the problem, then groups for the centralised procurement in Europe of certain parts were set up. Finally, towards the end of 1957, the United States proposed a completely new approach for the establishment of an effective regional system for the supply of spare parts by the progressive delegation of national functions to a central organization. A scheme was worked out by the national experts along the lines proposed by the United States, which was entitled the NATO Maintenance Supply Services System. This system, which was established by the Council in April 1958, on the recommendation of the Defence Production Committee, consists of a central agency which constitutes the management element of the system, working under the policy guidance of a Board of Directors composed of one member of each nation desiring to participate in the operation of the system. Up to date, all NATO countries except Canada and Iceland have decided to participate.

The main tasks of the Agency are to analyse the spare parts requirements of member countries as well as their own resources, to plan and adopt joint maintenance and overhaul arrangements, to organise the supply of spare parts, and to exchange information on technical problems. It has taken over all the work on spare parts formerly carried out by groups under the old Defence Production Committee, which were mainly concerned with aircraft, vehicles and certain types of artillery, small arms and electronic equipment, and is now concentrating particularly on the newer types of equipment. In particular, in November 1959, the Agency assumed responsibility for supply and maintenance services for the Forward Scatter Communications System.

A further step forward was taken in March 1960, when the establishment of a NATO Supply Centre at Chateauroux was formally authorised by the Board of Directors. Its first task was to ensure the supply and maintenance support of a certain number of American types of aircraft in use in Europe, and common stocks of spare parts for these have been built up at the Centre. This support is being extended to other types of equipment, namely to certain types of modern weapons.
One of the commonplace of modern warfare is the dependence of all sections of the armed forces on adequate supplies of fuel, without which they are paralysed. A great deal of study and discussion was devoted to this problem by SHAPE and associated bodies. As a consequence, there arose in 1952 a suggestion by the headquarters of Air Forces Central Europe that a number of storage tanks should be constructed in various NATO countries to hold reserve supplies for jet aircraft, and that wherever possible these tanks should be connected by pipelines. This idea appealed strongly to the land forces, who immediately asked to use the same pipelines to move motor fuel for army vehicles as well as the jet fuel already envisaged and correspondingly to increase the working tankage concerned.

The construction of a NATO Pipeline System under the common infrastructure programme was started during the autumn of 1952 after the basic standards and specifications had been worked out and agreed by all the countries concerned. Construction work has almost been completed and the whole system will finally comprise over 9,000 km. of pipelines, about 2 million cubic metres of fuel storage, a large number of pumping stations and other installations, such as tanker discharge facilities.

The System is divided up on a regional basis. The major part is an integrated network situated in the Central Europe region and constituting the most complicated and extensive system of pipelines in the world; this is now substantially in operation and its organization is described in more detail below. The remainder of the System is composed of separate systems of pipelines and associated storage in Denmark, Norway, Italy, Greece and Turkey, but these are not interconnected for both geographical and financial reasons, nor are they linked to the large Central European network. The central operation and maintenance of these systems are undertaken by national pipeline organizations acting in consultation with the NATO military authorities. The host nations are the normal users of these systems, but other NATO nations can use them by arrangement.

**Organization and operation of the NATO Pipeline System in the Central Europe Region**

The System in Central Europe lies in the territories of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and, in addition, three other nations, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States make use of it. It is operated by seven national pipeline divisions and a central co-ordinating controlling body which is known as the Central Europe Operating Agency.

This Agency, which was created by the Council in July 1957, is a civilian organization under the direction of a general manager, who is responsible jointly to two Central European bodies; one military, called the Central Europe Pipeline Office; and one political and financial, known as the Central Europe Pipeline Policy Committee. The Agency ensures that the network runs as an integrated, uniform system. It co-ordinates the overall activities of the seven divisions in all their routine technical
operations, in security and in nuclear defence, and is responsible for maintaining the most accurate accounting for fuel.

The concept of a multinationally-staffed agency operating under a directing body or bodies, which was evolved for this Central Europe pipeline system, has since been adopted not only for logistics, as in the NATO Maintenance Supply Service System, but also for production, as in the NATO HAWK Production Organization, and in the case of the F 104 Starfighter Aircraft, both of which have been described earlier.
CHAPTER 11

NATO'S COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE

The word 'Infrastructure' has been borrowed from the terminology used on the French Railways to denote such basic works as embankments, bridges, tunnels, etc. NATO has adopted this term to include all those fixed installations which are necessary for the deployment and operation of the armed forces, e.g. airfields, signals and telecommunications installations, military headquarters, fuel pipelines and storage, radar warning and navigational aid stations, port installations, etc. In view of the trend of modern weapons, certain mobile installations, closely associated with the fixed installations referred to above, have been deemed, as an exception to the rule, to be also an integral part of NATO Infrastructure.

Installations set up solely for the use of national forces are called 'National Infrastructure' and are paid for out of national budgets. Installations set up at the request of NATO international Commanders for the training of international forces in peacetime and for their operational use in wartime are called 'Common Infrastructure'. Such installations are financed collectively by member governments, the acquisition of the appropriate sites as well as the provision of certain local utilities remaining, however, a national responsibility.

Infrastructure planning gave rise to problems which originally seemed insoluble and formed the subject of lengthy discussions, but the final results may truly be said to represent some of the Alliance's most outstanding achievements.

This is the first time that the members of an alliance have pooled their resources in order to build up an adequate defensive force. NATO Common Infrastructure, an experiment stemming from a mutual determination to resist any act of aggression, is a remarkable demonstration of what can be achieved – even in the most technical fields – when the spirit of international solidarity prevails.

It also fulfils one of the purposes of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which recommends closer economic co-operation between member countries.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT

The need for common infrastructure first became apparent in 1950 after the Western Union had been formed under the Brussels Treaty. At that time the forces available were limited and an infrastructure programme of only some £32 million was envis-
aged. Most of the installations, consisting of airfields and signals networks, were to be set up in France and the Netherlands for the use of the five Brussels Treaty Powers (the U.K., France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). These Powers agreed to share the cost of supplementing the programme which came to be known as 'Slice I'. This was the origin of the principle of cost-sharing, which was later adopted by NATO for all subsequent Common Infrastructure programmes.

Since late 1951, the North Atlantic Council has approved successive Slices of Common Infrastructure which, at the end of 1960, totalled approximately £ 950 million. The whole of this amount is being financed collectively by NATO member countries under the terms of the various cost-sharing agreements.

The NATO military authorities used to submit annual infrastructure programmes to the North Atlantic Council for approval and a cost-sharing formula had to be devised for each of them till Slice IV was reached. Then, to avoid over-frequent discussions on cost-sharing, the Council requested the submission of rough cost estimates and a general outline of programmes designed to cover several years.

A single cost-sharing formula is applied throughout the duration of these general programmes, although the military authorities continue to submit to the Council details of the programmes and estimates relating to each annual Slice. The first of the longer-term programmes was drawn up for three years (1954 to 1956 – Slices V to VII), the second for four years (1957 to 1960 – Slices VIII to XI). In May 1960, the Council agreed on a single cost-sharing formula for Slices II to VII (1951 to 1956) to replace the four formulae previously applied to these Slices. A third programme has just been approved for the years 1961 to 1964 (Slices XII to XV).

The preparation of Common Infrastructure programmes covering several years gives the NATO military authorities the possibility of planning for some time ahead and marks a great step forward in the formulation of the military plans of the Alliance.

The total cost of NATO Common Infrastructure, including Slice I planned by Western Union, projects in Germany before the latter became a member of NATO and the four-year programme approved for 1961-1964, amounts to over £ 1,200 million.

COMMON FINANCING

The 'common installations' set up on a national territory and financed in common by the members of the Alliance, can be used by the forces of each member country. The country on whose territory installations are set up (the host country) cannot and should not alone bear the cost of these installations.

Furthermore, certain member countries, owing to their geographical position, require a greater number of installations than others; it would be unfair to impose too heavy a financial burden on them.

A contribution from the other countries which are users of the infrastructure installations is therefore the only fair way of sharing the cost. However, the host countries
still have to bear a fairly high proportion of the expenditure: the cost of purchases of land, of providing public utilities, etc.

The common financing of the installations is worked out on the basis of a cost-sharing formula drawn up by NATO and agreed by all. It is established in accordance with three essential criteria: (i) the contributive capacity of the member countries, (ii) the advantage accruing to the user country and (iii) the economic benefit for the host country.

The contributive capacity of the member countries is calculated on the basis of the national product, which is the best available indication of the wealth of a country and of its capacity to pay.

### THE INFRASTRUCTURE COST-SHARING FORMULA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Slice I</th>
<th>Slices II to VII</th>
<th>Slices VIII to XI</th>
<th>Slices XII to XV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>13.18%</td>
<td>5.462%</td>
<td>4.39%</td>
<td>4.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>6.021%</td>
<td>6.15%</td>
<td>5.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.767%</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>2.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>45.46%</td>
<td>15.041%</td>
<td>11.87%</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13.72%</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.750%</td>
<td>0.87%</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5.681%</td>
<td>5.61%</td>
<td>5.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.45%</td>
<td>0.155%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
<td>0.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>13.64%</td>
<td>3.889%</td>
<td>3.51%</td>
<td>3.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.280%</td>
<td>2.19%</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.146%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.371%</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>27.27%</td>
<td>12.758%</td>
<td>9.88%</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>43.679%</td>
<td>36.98%</td>
<td>30.85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This formula replaces the shares previously applied in Slices II, III, IVa and IVb to VII.

The expenses up to 50% of cost in Slice VIIb (entirely devoted to Germany) are completely paid by Germany.
The user country is required to contribute to common expenditure in proportion to the extent to which its forces will eventually employ the installations located on a given territory.

In calculating its contribution, account is taken both of the strength of the forces it will deploy and of the possibility of their deployment in various areas.

The economic benefits to the host country are by no means negligible: influx of foreign exchange, employment for local manpower, improvements to the local transport system, arrangements for rise of facilities (pipeline systems, modern telecommunications systems, etc.) which will subsequently strengthen the host country's general economy.

It has been decided that the airfields financed in common will be handed over without charge to the countries on whose territory they have been built should they no longer be required by NATO.

Despite the burden on the host country of expenditure which is not eligible for common financing (purchases of land and the provision of public utilities and other basic work known to NATO as 'local utilities'), it should be noted that, when the assets and the liabilities of common infrastructure in each of the NATO countries are weighed against each other, it is the assets that tip the economic and financial scales.

As NATO is an international, not a supranational, organization, it is really incorrect to speak of common funds; for NATO does not hold or administer the funds allocated to infrastructure; the members of the Alliance enter into mutual financial commitments and pay each other the required amounts on request, as they are needed. Expenditures are met by the host country with the agreed contribution from the other member countries to which it adds its own. Account is kept of all these transactions by the NATO Secretariat, which acts as a clearing-house, and only the quarterly debit balances of member countries give rise to actual payments.

**THE CONTROL OF EXPENDITURE**

The rules adopted for the effective control of common infrastructure costs represent a remarkable contribution to the solution of new international problems. Under this procedure, the NATO Military Committee submits detailed infrastructure cost estimates to the North Atlantic Council which then directs the Infrastructure Committee, consisting of members of the permanent delegations to NATO, to screen them and set an expenditure ceiling on the programme thus determined for the coming year. Expenditure authority, however, is in the hands of the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee (also composed of members of Delegations) whose terms of reference include close examination (with the help of technical experts of the NATO International Secretariat) of the estimates submitted and even suggesting alternative methods of carrying out the work required more economically but no less satisfactorily. The Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee also examines, with the help of the
PROCESSING OF NATO COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMMES & PROJECTS

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

NATO COMMANDS
HOST NATION
USER NATIONS

PROPOSE PROJECT FOR INCLUSION IN SHAPE OR SACLANT PROGRAM DEVELOPED JUSTIFICATION & COST ESTIMATE

SHAPE OR SACLANT

REVIEW PROPOSALS / JUSTIFICATIONS PUBLISH PROGRAMME

STANDING GROUP
MILITARY COMMITTEE

CONSIDERATION OF MILITARY ASPECTS
NECESSITY AND ADEQUACY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL

TECHNICAL EXPERTS
INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE

CONSIDERATION OF TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

TECHNICAL EXPERTS
INTERNATIONAL STAFF

CONSIDERATION OF TECHNICAL, FINANCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

REVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND PROGRAMME APPROVAL

DETAILED PLANNING

TECHNICAL EXPERTS
INFRASTRUCTURE P & P COMMITTEE

SCREENING OF PLANS AND ESTIMATES AUTHORITY TO COMMIT FUNDS

NATO COMMANDS
HOST COUNTRY
USER COUNTRIES

DEVELOPMENT / APPROVAL OF FINAL PLANS
HOST NATION STARTS SUBMISSION OF PROGRESS REPORTS

HOST COUNTRY

AWARD CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION

INTERNATIONAL STAFF
NATO COMMANDS HOST NATION USER NATIONS

INSPECTION DURING CONSTRUCTION PERIOD MAINTENANCE AS NECESSARY

INTERNATIONAL STAFF
NATO COMMANDS HOST / USER NATIONS

ACCEPTANCE INSPECTION ACCEPTANCE AUDIT OF ACCOUNTS

NATO COMMANDS
HOST NATION
USER NATIONS

USE OF FACILITIES
CONTROL OPERATIONAL MAINTENANCE

CONTRACT & CONSTRUCTION
NATO's Common Infrastructure

International Staff, the financial reports sent in by host countries which are having works carried out, and endorses every quarter the amount of the contributions due to the host countries by the other member countries concerned.

As regards the execution of infrastructure programmes, a system of international competitive bidding has been introduced: each NATO country contributing to the cost of a project is thus afforded an opportunity of benefitting from the economic advantages resulting from its implementation. It devolves on the governments of the member countries concerned to draw up the specifications which form the basis of the subsequent tenders and on the experts of the NATO International Staff to scrutinise all tenders from the technical standpoint and, at a later stage, to take part in the inspection of the works to make sure that they have been properly carried out.

A team consisting of representatives of the host country, user country (which in many cases is not the host country), and the military authorities under the chairmanship of the International Staff, inspects all projects after construction is finished and draws up a report for the Infrastructure Committee recommending that the project be accepted by NATO.

Moreover, during the execution as well as on completion of the works, an International Board of Auditors for Infrastructure Accounts, entirely unconnected with the host countries and responsible only to the North Atlantic Council, examines the financial statements made out by the host countries, thus ensuring the correctness of expenditures charged to NATO common funds.

The Planning and Execution of Infrastructure Programmes

The planning of infrastructure programmes proceeds as follows: as a first step, the Subordinate Commanders notify their Supreme Commanders of the infrastructure work required in their areas. The Supreme Commanders then co-ordinate these requirements after satisfying themselves that the installations proposed are essential for the support of the forces and are also suitable for joint use. During the preparation of the relevant draft programme, the Supreme Commanders consult the experts of the NATO International Staff to ensure that cost estimates are reasonable, that projects are technically sound and that military needs will be met at minimum cost to NATO.

The draft programme is then sent to the Standing Group and to the Infrastructure Committee of the North Atlantic Council. The Standing Group, after examining it from the standpoint of military necessity and urgency, submits its comments to the Military Committee. The Infrastructure Committee examines it from the financial and technical standpoints to make sure that the proposed installations are really suitable for joint use and therefore comply with the conditions of eligibility for common financing. The final reports from the Military Committee and the Infrastructure Committee are then submitted to the Council and considered simultaneously.
Once a programmed project has been approved by the Council, full responsibility for its implementation is assumed by the host country (the country on whose territory the installations are to be located). Nearly all NATO member countries have by now become host countries for certain projects. The host country must decide, in consultation with the NATO military authorities, the sites of the works to be carried out, must acquire the necessary land at its own expense and must draw up a plan which is then sent to the Supreme Commander for approval.

After the plan has been approved, the authorities of the host country prepare a detailed estimate of the construction costs which must be endorsed by the NATO Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee before any funds can be committed. The host government then invites firms in all NATO member countries to bid for the contract and notifies national delegations of the opening and closing bid dates. As soon as the contractor has been selected and work is under way, experts on the International Staff as well as representatives of the Supreme Commanders and of the user country visit the site and submit progress reports. The authorities of the host country send NATO requests for reimbursement, based on the current cost-sharing agreement, of the expenditures incurred.

**ACHIEVEMENTS**

In 1951, General Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, had at his disposal only a negligible number of airfields. Consequently for many years half the infrastructure programme was directly devoted to airfields. At the present time, NATO airfields, numbering about 200, are nearly all operational and could be used by the NATO forces in an emergency.

A new airfield costs between £2 to £4 million, depending on its geographical situation and installations; the total expenditure on airfields now amounts to about £400 million. They all comply with standards laid down by NATO military authorities and are suitable for all types of aircraft. In addition to runways and the like, there are such essential installations as fuel storage facilities for jet and other aircraft and electronic devices which permit aircraft to operate in all weather both day and night. To avoid bottlenecks in the conventional methods of transporting fuel (rail tankers, road tankers, tank barges etc.) use has been made of a new pipeline technique, and a vast oil pipeline system started in 1953, has now been almost completed.

Pipelines are used to convey fuel from a number of Atlantic and Mediterranean ports to airfields. They can be used not only for jet fuel but also for the petrol required for military vehicles and piston-engined aircraft. It is worth noting that when fully completed the NATO Pipeline System will comprise nearly 5,600 miles (9,000 kilometres) of pipe and storage for about 70 million cubic feet (2 million cubic metres) of fuel. Most of its installations have now been completed and are in use.
As soon as airfields have been completed and supplied with fuel, communications must be established both with each other and with the various headquarters so that full co-ordination can be achieved between the airfields and the different Allied fighter commands. The area to be covered extends from northern Norway to the eastern frontiers of Turkey, and within this area the various sectors must be linked together beyond the possibility of failure.

At present the signals network represents an investment of £150 million. It is estimated that on completion of the present infrastructure programme, about 27,300 miles (44,000 kilometres) of land lines, radio links and submarine cables will have been added to existing civilian networks. Training bases for the air forces are being constructed or are nearing completion in the Mediterranean area. Training areas are also planned for land forces to enable joint manoeuvres to be carried out.

A number of installations for naval forces have been constructed and are operational. Others are in the course of construction. They consist mainly of storage facilities for petroleum products, fuel lubricants and ammunition at naval bases.

Among other infrastructure projects mention must be made of missile sites and the corresponding facilities, storage, war headquarters, radio navigation aids and radar warning systems.
THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMME *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIRFIELDS PROGRAMME</td>
<td>£ 392 million**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfields 220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGNALS NETWORK</td>
<td>£ 155 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlines, submarine cables 27,000 miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and radio links 44,000 kilometres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEMS</td>
<td>£ 135 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pipelines 5,300 miles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,500 kilometres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storage 440 million Imp. gallons</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 million cubic metres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL FACILITIES</td>
<td>£ 85 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADAR WARNING INSTALLATIONS</td>
<td>£ 26 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR DEFENCE GROUND ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td>£ 24 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL AMMUNITIONS SITES</td>
<td>£ 24 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSILE SITES</td>
<td>£ 65 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER PROJECTS</td>
<td>£ 51 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* On the basis of estimated costs as of 30 June, 1961.
** The costs of airfields in Germany for Slices earlier than Slice VII are not included.
CHAPTER 12

TECHNICAL RESEARCH AND AIR DEFENCE

SHAPE AIR DEFENCE TECHNICAL CENTRE

The co-ordination of NATO countries' air defence is an increasingly important problem as a result of continuing progress in the sphere of aeronautics. As early as 1954 General Gruenther, then Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, expressed concern about the relative weakness of air defence within the NATO defence system. To remedy this, he suggested that air defence be studied as a whole and organized according to a general plan, each country of the Alliance putting into effect the part which concerned it.

However, the creation of an integrated air defence system entailed the solution of not only political and tactical but also technical problems, which in turn had to be considered from the point of view of all the NATO countries. It was, therefore, deemed essential to authorise SHAPE, as the executive command for the integrated air defence system, to secure the assistance of a technical and scientific Centre composed of experts drawn from all the member countries.

However, in view of the time inevitably required to conclude an agreement on the organization, structure, method of financing, and site of this centre, although its usefulness was unanimously recognised, the United States Government decided to bear the costs until NATO could take over, providing, naturally, that the Centre had proved its worth.

In point of fact this situation lasted until 1 July, 1960. Since that date, following a decision taken by the North Atlantic Council on 24 February, 1960, the financing of the Centre has devolved on the NATO countries, the necessary funds being made available by the Military Budget Committee.

Organization of the Centre

From the outset of the discussions between the United States and the other NATO member countries interested in setting up this Centre, the United States Government insisted that it be established and controlled by an existing civilian institution, non-profit-making and widely experienced in the organization of research institutes. After exhaustive enquiries, the U.S. Government decided upon a Dutch agency, RVO-TNO, created in 1947 by decree of the Defence Ministry in conformity with the law of 30 October, 1930, on scientific research in the Netherlands. An agreement was
concluded between the United States and the Netherlands, whereby the Netherlands Government undertook to extend to the Centre and to its foreign personnel all facilities necessary to enable it to function efficiently as an international Agency and subsidiary of SHAPE. Similarly, a contract was signed on 14 December, 1954, between the United States Government and the RVO-TNO, the latter being commissioned to administer the SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre.

On 10 November, 1954, the United States representatives reported to the North Atlantic Council on the projects which had been approved by General Gruenther, as testified by an exchange of letters with the Dutch Defence Ministry.

By agreement with SHAPE, the Director of RVO-TNO was appointed Director of the Centre, an office he still holds.

This Centre is now a well-organized and well-equipped technical institute, with a staff of 70 scientific experts drawn from fourteen of the fifteen NATO countries. It receives advice and recommendations from a Committee of National Representatives.

The North Atlantic Council decision of 24 February, 1960, has not affected the way in which it is organized, since the Netherlands Government, by an official statement made by its Permanent Representative in the Council, renewed, this time to NATO, the undertakings which it had given in 1954 to the United States Government.

The essential task of the Centre is to give SHAPE technical advice on the air defence of the NATO countries. Air defence is, of course, only one aspect of the defence system of the Atlantic Alliance and is, as such, inter-related with the other parts. The term 'air defence' should thus be taken in its widest sense. A distinction must be made between the organization of a general system of air defence by co-ordinating or integrating national systems, and the preparation of internationally co-ordinated plans for air defence weapons.

System-planning, system-evaluation and operations research, undertaken with a view to defining the optimum use of the technical components of the air defence system, therefore play an important part in the work of this agency. The same consideration also applies to the studies aimed at defining the specifications of air defence weapons, which must meet military requirements without losing sight of technical capabilities. It is self-evident that such activities of the scientific personnel are closely related to the task entrusted to SHAPE as regards the military co-ordination of the various contributions to the common air defence system, and that such work is therefore highly dependent on the problems which are regularly submitted to the Centre by SHAPE. But it is natural that highly qualified scientists should seek at times to initiate projects which would open the way for personal creative work in their individual fields.

Such projects are, of course, only approved by SHAPE and inserted into the programme of the Centre if they do not duplicate other work. As a general rule, they must relate to the technical aspect of the NATO air defence system as a whole, and to the integration and technical co-ordination of the various component parts.

To meet this requirement, the Centre must keep itself informed of the research and
development work undertaken in each country. In this it is assisted by the Committee of National Representatives, which organizes regular meetings between the Centre and the national research and development establishments.

Communications
Communications are of prime importance in air defence. In the very first months of the Centre's activity, therefore, the idea was put forward of an extensive network of up-to-date radio-communications covering the whole of the NATO territories from Norway to Turkey, and linking the main commands with one another and with SHAPE.

This system was based on a new technique called ionospheric and tropospheric scatter. The plans were approved by NATO in 1955. On an experimental basis, the Centre was instructed to establish a tropospheric scatter system from Oslo to Bod and an ionospheric system from Paris to Izmir. These two systems, installed at the expense of the United States, were completed in 1958 and 1959 respectively. They are now operating for military purposes.

Furthermore, the Centre has succeeded in adapting to ionospheric wave propagation an automatic device for correcting teleprinter messages. This is the TOR equipment, designed originally by the Netherlands postal authorities.

Finally, the Centre, generally speaking, pursues all research which can provide the military authorities with more reliable and more rapid communications.

In this respect the contribution which it makes to the NATO air defence system is substantial.

Aeronautical Research (AGARD)
The Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD) was recommended in January 1951, by a conference of NATO research directors called together by Dr. Theodore von Karman in his capacity as Chairman of the USAF Scientific Advisory Board.

The conference convened in Washington, D.C., in February 1951. The following countries were represented: Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.

All delegates agreed that in the present world situation, faced as they were with common problems of grave importance, there was an urgent need, as well as the existing potential, for working together in mobilizing to mutual advantage the scientific and technical skill, manpower, and facilities of all NATO nations.

The National Delegates submitted the following report of the conference's conclusions and recommendations:

"Resources, especially scientific manpower, exist in varying degrees within the NATO nations and we believe that an effort towards mutual co-operation is required to derive the greatest benefit from the total resources that are available."
"To achieve the objective of the common defense of the Treaty nations, progress in aeronautical techniques should be accelerated as much as possible. Such acceleration is dependent on advances in those pure and applied sciences which find an application in aeronautics, and will only be realised through the employment in research and development work of all highly-qualified personnel available, supported by the necessary material resources. By co-operation, science, which will play in any future conflict a rôle even greater than it did in World War II, will be rendered more effective. "All delegates were of the opinion that, without affecting the principles of national policies, it is possible to accomplish much by the exchange of information, and by the fullest use of qualified manpower and existing research and development facilities to mutual advantage. At the same time, it should be profitable to co-ordinate the planning of future facilities with a view to their common use. Much will be gained by the acceleration of research and development projects by common effort for the common good, and also by bringing together teams of leading scientists and engineers to consider and help in the solution of problems of common defence.

"In many countries during and since World War II, the important part played by research and development in defence planning has been recognised, and close working arrangements between science and defence have been established. Within the defence organization set up by the North Atlantic Treaty nations, the contribution which science can make to military planning must not be overlooked.

"The delegates were convinced that it is both urgent and practicable to bring about co-operation in the field of aeronautics for the common good, and with immediate benefit to all nations concerned. To achieve this, the conference unanimously recommends that a body be set up immediately within the framework of NATO as an "Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development" (AGARD).

"This Advisory Group should be composed of one or two appropriate scientific-technical representatives engaged in aeronautical research and development work from each of the member countries. There should also be a permanent secretariat which we suggest be located in Paris. The Group would meet once or twice a year, or as required, with meetings taking place in the various member countries.

"The Advisory Group would have the following objectives:

1. To review continuously the application of advances in aeronautical science to common defence problems.
2. To make recommendations for the solution of problems referred to it by agencies within NATO, including evaluation of research and development projects submitted by individual nations.
3. To make recommendations leading to improved co-operation among member nations in the field of aeronautical research and development.
4. To explore methods for facilitating exchange of information pertaining to aeronautical research and development".
The recommendations made were accepted by the Standing Group as a basis for a two-year trial period, and AGARD held its first meeting in Paris in May 1952. This trial period was satisfactorily completed in 1954 and the nations agreed that AGARD should become an official agency of the Standing Group of NATO.

Purpose and Organization
The Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD) acts in an advisory capacity to the Standing Group.

Its purpose is to bring together the leading aeronautical personalities of the NATO nations in order to recommend effective ways to use their research and development personnel and facilities for the common benefit of the NATO Community.

Each NATO nation represented in AGARD has appointed from one to three senior scientists as National Delegates, and the assembly of these National Delegates constitutes the governing body which meets once or twice a year. Between meetings authority is delegated to an Executive Committee consisting of the AGARD Chairman, four National Delegates, the Director, the Science Adviser to the Secretary General, and the Scientific Adviser to SACEUR.

The technical activity of AGARD is conducted by Panels and Committees working on selected research and development areas of particular importance to NATO. The Panels are formed from experts appointed by the member nations who meet approximately twice each year to co-ordinate their continuing work.


It was felt from the beginning that the greatest chance of influencing the advancement of the NATO work in aeronautics has been to select important objectives and to attempt to achieve real progress towards these. For this reason, no attempt has been made in establishing the Panels to cover the whole vast field of aeronautical research and development. Where formal Panels have not seemed the appropriate means of working on a problem, special committees or individual consultants have been used.

The problems which have been studied have been selected by the nations or have arisen from particular requests for advice from other NATO commands or organizations.

The Panels employ four principal methods for carrying out their mission, namely: co-operation and exchange of information through Panel Members; use of AGARD International Exchange and Consultants Programme; publication of surveys and research papers under the AGARDograph programme; and sponsoring of technical meetings, symposia and colloquia.

In addition to Panel activity, the International Exchange and Consultant Programme
organizes the exchange of personnel between the various countries to enable them to obtain valuable experience which could not otherwise be obtained.

The AGARD Headquarters located in Paris is manned by a permanent staff with the main function:

a. to maintain contact with National Delegates, the Standing Group, NATO Headquarters and military commands, and to be aware of the important items of research and development from the NATO viewpoint.

b. to take executive action upon the decisions of the Panels.

For those items of research and development which bear on the AGARD mission, the staff refers to the appropriate panel either as a whole, if so appropriate, or in part. If the particular topic is either partially or wholly outside the scope of the panel, then the staff has the task of organizing ad hoc groups, of engaging consultants, or studies under contract appropriate to particular problems.

Two problems whose urgency was stressed by the NATO Defence Research Directors, namely Propellants and Materials, were referred to the AGARD staff by the Science Adviser to the NATO Secretary General, since AGARD had existing panels active in these subjects.

Close liaison is maintained with other Agencies such as the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, Office of Naval Research, European Office Air Research and Development Command, for a better utilisation of U.S. consultants in Europe. Various fruitful programmes have been worked out and performed in collaboration with this group.
CHAPTER 13

CO-ORDINATION OF AIR TRAFFIC

Several thousand civil and military aircraft cruising, climbing and descending in all directions up to 60,000 feet at widely varying speeds are accommodated in the NATO European airspaces. The general aim of airspace organization and air traffic control is a pattern of movements in which each and all can be identified by the air defence organizations, can have sufficient freedom of movement to achieve their objectives (transport, training, interception, etc.) and last but not least, can be free from risk of collision even when visibility conditions and flying speeds preclude aircrews from taking timely avoiding action by visual sighting of other aircraft.

The importance of finding a satisfactory solution to these objectives can be summarised as follows. For economic operation civil transport aircraft must have access to direct routes and optimum cruising levels throughout the area, while at the same time military aircraft must have sufficient freedom of movement for elementary and operational training. Neither civil nor military authorities could in peacetime accept the risk of collision inherent in controlled flight at the existing traffic densities. To detect suspect or hostile air movements, it is necessary to know at all times the position and identification of all friendly civil and military air movements — otherwise the former could not be differentiated from the latter and defence would be impossible. In other words, an identified pattern is a prerequisite for avoiding aggression or resisting attack should the deterrent fail.

In general the problem is resolved by:

channelling the majority of transport aircraft sequentially in time or height into a predetermined network of routes linking major airports throughout the area and confining most military aircraft to selected areas (elementary training areas, gunnery and bombing ranges, low flying areas, etc.) between these routes or to the airspaces above them;

exchange of movement and identification data between ground control units — in particular air defence organizations and units controlling civil aircraft, as well as between aircraft and ground control systems for separation, change of destination, countering distress and changing weather conditions.
The specific measures needed to attain the stated objectives are a function of a large number of interdependent but frequently conflicting factors such as: numbers, types and performance characteristics of aircraft; types of missions (training, transport, interception, etc.); average and peak densities en route and in terminal areas; weather and topographical conditions and capacities and accuracies of navigational aid and control systems. The problem is further complicated by the fact that air movements are directed by and controlled from a very large number of civil and military authorities and control units (area control centres, air defence centres, radars, etc.), which leads to an extensive exchange of information for separation, identification, etc.

In NATO Europe, airspace organization and control must be aligned for the area as a whole as otherwise freedom of movement would be unacceptably impeded (neither controllers nor crews could possibly change operating procedures from one national control system to another in the time available – nor would airborne equipment be effective in such a situation): identification would be impossible and safety endangered.

THE COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN AIRSPACE CO-ORDINATION

As the authority to assign airspace, provide control systems, establish procedures and to operate aircraft is divided between a large number of civil and military national authorities as well as NATO and other international authorities and agencies (ICAO,* IATA,** communications and frequency co-ordinating agencies, etc.) a comprehensive solution for the area as a whole is only attainable by an extensive process of co-ordination, which in many cases was too complex and time-consuming for resolution through bilateral negotiations between states. As this situation was unsatisfactory both for civil and military users of the airspace, for national administrations and for the NATO authorities, who are responsible for training numerically large air forces in the area, for operational control of these in war and for air defence (the NATO Command areas and the United Kingdom) in both peace and war, the North Atlantic Council established in April 1955, a “Committee for European Airspace Co-ordination” to study and recommend measures to effect adequate and timely co-ordination, having regard to both civil and military requirements. The structure, problems and functions of this Committee are discussed in more detail in the following.

The members of CEAC are high-ranking civil and military representatives of NATO countries. NATO military authorities are represented on the Committee, in particular the Standing Group and the various commands (SHAPE, SACLAN and the Channel Command). The International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Air

* A UN specialised agency set up by the Convention on International Civil Aviation (signed at Chicago on 7 December, 1944) which co-ordinates international civil aviation.

** IATA includes most of the world airlines; it was set up in Havana in April 1945. Its aim is to promote safe and economical air transport, to provide means of co-ordination between air transport companies, and to co-operate with other international organizations such as ICAO.
The Committee reports to the North Atlantic Council. It recommends measures for co-ordinated civil and military airspace organizations and air traffic control either to the Council, the NATO military authorities or national administrations as appropriate. It establishes temporary sub-committees and expert working groups (radar, data handling, communications, procedures, etc.) as necessary to accomplish its tasks. In general the Committee reviews civil and military airspace requirements and methods of co-ordinating control systems and recommends agreed solutions for the area as a whole, which is then used by national administration, the NATO military authorities and other agencies concerned for executive action. Committee studies have led to a more cohesive pattern and improved conditions for all users by: re-alignment of certain airways, abolition of or re-adjustment of horizontal or vertical delineation of restricted areas; adjustment of climb-out and descent paths; amendment of airfield siting plans to avoid areas of high density. In certain high density areas, notably in the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force area in North Eastern France and Germany, where up to 1,200 sorties per day create intense congestion, Committee studies have led to the establishment of joint civil/military control centres and joint use of radars for monitoring of all traffic and immediate resolution of conflicting traffic situations. Procedures for crossing of airways by military aircraft under radar control and rules for flight in bad weather, more restrictive than ICAO rules, but more suitable for European conditions, have been established by the Committee and adopted by users. Measures have been recommended for ensuring dissemination of information on the ATC organization to all military aircrews and procedures for reporting and examination of near-miss incidents have been amended and improved.

**Upper Airspace**

Until 1959 the airspaces above approximately 20,000 feet were used almost exclusively by military aircraft and consequently the problem of co-ordinating civil and military use of airspace and air traffic control was largely limited to the lower airspaces. However, as civil jet transport aircraft cruising at 20,000 to 45,000 feet were employed in increasing numbers, it became necessary to extend co-ordinated airspace organization and control also to the upper airspaces. Committee studies of this problem defined the broad principles for a joint civil/military solution which are being applied in more detailed studies for an interim system up to, say, 1965 and a long-term system including modernisation of the control systems by conversion to semi-automatic data handling systems.

**Interim Plan**

The initial studies clearly showed the impracticability of simply extending lower airspace organization and methods to the upper airspaces, as aircraft would traverse...
these so fast that position reporting from aircraft and between ground control units would be excessive and impracticable in the time available. Consequently, nations have implemented a system of upper airspace regions which are much larger than those in being in the lower airspaces and data exchange requirements have been reduced accordingly. The detailed studies for this period will include increased use of radars for monitoring and separating civil and military air traffic; procedures for controllers and aircrews to effect this; joint use of radars and control centres; and conversion from existing and interim systems to the long-term completely modernised systems.

**Long-term Plan**

It is envisaged that conversion from existing systems (manual handling of movement data and transmission by telephone or teletype) to semi-automatic data extraction, processing, display and transmission systems will make it possible to control all operations from a few centres each controlling much larger areas than those in being for the lower airspaces and for the interim upper airspace systems. This will reduce data exchange requirements between civil and military systems and thus simplify the whole process of co-ordination and facilitate more effective use of available airspace. Committee studies of this problem include alignment of civil and military control areas; compatibility of technical equipment, compatible movement messages, alignment of procedures and navigational aid systems.

**Joint civil/military use of equipment**

As the employment of high-speed, high-flying jet aircraft for civil transport has generated control requirements similar to military requirements and as modern semi-automatic systems are costly to install and maintain, the Committee studies will include an assessment of the practicability of joint civil/military use of equipment and facilities.

**Future studies**

The problem of climbing and descending through lower airspace systems to upper airspace systems creates complex problems of co-ordination. As soon as the upper airspace systems are more clearly defined, the possibility of extending the modern upper airspace systems to the lower airspaces will be studied.

"**EUROCONTROL**" Organization for the safety of air navigation

As a corollary to CEEAC studies, nations are contemplating establishment of a supranational civil organization which, in co-ordination with national military authorities will plan and operate civil air traffic control systems across national boundaries over a wide area of NATO Europe. The planning currently taking place on this project is co-ordinated in the Committee with concurrent NATO planning.
Exercise planning
During large-scale NATO exercises, large numbers of sorties lead to congested airspace and necessitate special arrangements in respect of airspace organization and control to ensure civil and military aircraft safe, economic and flexible operation. It is, for example, necessary to redelineate certain airways and restrict military operations in high density civil traffic areas. CEAC has established methods and procedures to effect this co-ordination and draws up an overall plan for the exercise, which describes the area, date and time of the exercise as well as measures to be taken by non-exercise aircraft to ensure safe and economic passage. This plan is published by nations in Notices to Airmen in adequate time for all aircrews to acquaint themselves with the conditions that will be encountered and measures to be taken. These procedures have considerably improved operating conditions for all users.
Scientific co-operation is one of the most obvious ways, as the North Atlantic Treaty states, “to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation” of the peoples of the Atlantic Community. Basic and applied research enhance living standards and security alike. Scientific advance toward either goal is likely to support the other.

The decision by the Heads of Government of the NATO nations at a meeting in December 1957* prompted the North Atlantic Council to create a Science Committee and to appoint a full-time Science Adviser to the Secretary General. This action, taken in the wake of “sputnik”, reflected the view expressed in the reports of the Committee of Three** (the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Italy and Canada), the Task Force on Scientific and Technical Co-operation (Koepfli report),*** and the NATO Parliamentarians,**** that more should be done within NATO to mobilise the scientific and technical resources of the Alliance.

The NATO Science Adviser was to serve in a dual capacity:
1. He advises the Secretary General on scientific matters affecting the Alliance.
2. As Chairman of the Science Committee he participates in deliberations which may result in Committee recommendations to the Council; his small staff assist in implementing recommendations which the Council has approved.

STRENGTHENING WESTERN SCIENCE

NATO Science Committee discussions in early 1959 produced the suggestion that an independent study be made of ways whereby science in the Western world could be strengthened. The members of the Study Group included several of the most distinguished scientists in the NATO family of nations.

Two eminent private organizations helped: administrative support by the Fondation Universitaire of Brussels, and provision of part of the funds by the Ford Foundation (NATO supplied the remainder), proved extremely valuable in completing the task.

At various meetings between September 1959, and June, 1960 the Study Group

* See page 279.
** See page 260.
*** See page 289.
**** See page 294.
discussed the many problems of scientific co-operation. Their conclusions pertained to obstacles which impede the advance of Western science, the means whereby scientific progress may be promoted through national and international efforts, and the application of science. In many cases both the obstacles to scientific advance and the proposed remedies are not only scientific or technical in nature, but also have political, economic or administrative aspects. As the report states "...political obstacles... must be surmounted and the effectiveness of Western science must be increased, first by a return to a greater unity, and second by a conscious effort on the part of statesmen to devote adequate resources to science".

At its September 1960, meeting, the Science Committee proposed the establishment of two Study Groups to consider the creation of an International Institute of Science and Technology and of an International Centre in Auxiliary Support of Science, respectively, as recommended by the Study Group report. The North Atlantic Council approved these proposals; an announcement by the Secretary General in January 1961, heralded the formation of a group of eminent scientists to elaborate in detail the characteristics of the proposed International Institute. In response to a questionnaire issued by the Science Adviser on the other recommendations of the report, the governments have provided a wealth of information which will be useful as a basis for further action.

SCIENCE FELLOWSHIPS PROGRAMME

Personal contact between able young scientists and the seasoned minds which are often found in institutions in other countries can contribute both to the spread of scientific knowledge and to international understanding generally. Recognition of this truth prompted the Science Committee, in one of its earlier actions, to launch the NATO Science Fellowships Programme.

In 1959 and 1960, its first two years, the programme enabled over two hundred students to study in countries other than their own. Fields of study comprehended an impressive variety of topics in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, and engineering. The NATO countries provided $1,000,000 to support the programme in 1959, $1,750,000 in 1960, and $2,000,000 in 1961. The fellowships help to meet the needs of not only the less-developed NATO nations, whose lack of opportunities places them in a special category, but also of the more technologically advanced countries whose students may be faced by an insufficiency of grants for study in neighbouring lands. Although procedures adopted encourage only the most qualified applicants, these have been, in the majority of countries, two to five times larger than the number of fellowships available.

The programme's flexibility contributes greatly to its success. Each country handles the administrative arrangements in its own way, usually through an existing agency or ad hoc group of scientists. National policies differ as to the session of scientists; while some countries prefer to support scientists' post-doctorate studies for shorter or
longer periods, others choose to select pre-doctorate students for periods of a year or two.

Annual meetings of the programme administrators from each of the national agencies provide an opportunity to discuss problems of distribution of the awards. These meetings have helped all concerned to compare observations and improve their general understanding of the Programme.

ADVANCED STUDY INSTITUTES PROGRAMME

Scientists find it continuously difficult to keep up to date with the most recent advances in the various fields of research. The increasing volume of work published, the proliferation of new scientific journals, and the delays and expense of publication tend to aggravate this problem. In an effort to improve the situation, the Science Committee, following the recommendations of the Koepfli Committee, established the Advanced Study Institutes Programme, whereby scientists are brought together to discuss their work in an informal atmosphere.

This Programme enables scientists to arrange meetings at which specific topics are discussed at a very advanced level. The meetings which vary in duration from one to eight weeks permit exhaustive treatment of a given scientific topic by men whose reputation is world-wide. Participating in the discussions are younger people with a few years of experience in research, i.e. about doctoral level, as well as more senior persons attracted by the high quality of the programmes.

Thus the ‘Institutes’ fulfil several purposes. International understanding is improved by allowing scientists of different nations (over 110 in 1960) to meet and talk with one another; the education of young scientists is appreciably stimulated by the high level of instruction, and more senior scientists have the opportunity to engage in a frank exchange of views. Moreover, many of the studies undertaken are of vital importance if measured by their potential benefit to mankind.

To qualify for NATO support both the lecturers and other participants must be drawn from several NATO countries; however, persons from non-NATO lands also attend. In 1960, participants from 40 different countries attended. NATO spent $100,000 in 1959, and $200,000 in 1960 on the programme; $300,000 was expended in 1961. Three members of the Science Committee serve as an expert Advisory Panel to screen the applications. (A list, giving details of the NATO Advanced Study Institutes supported to date, is given as an annex.) The NATO grant, which usually covers only part of the total cost, often enables the scope of the meeting to be greatly improved, for example, by inviting distinguished foreign participants.

Subjects discussed vary widely, though topics in physics have predominated, probably because physicists have long appreciated the value of summer schools. However, the Programme is becoming more widely known now, and subjects recently covered range from food science and the improvement of livestock production, to underwater acoustics and the exploitation of solar energy.
RESEARCH GRANTS PROGRAMME

Scientific advances depend upon research; to sponsor specific research projects the Research Grants Programme was started in 1960. Though the Science Committee takes the view that scientific research is most appropriately financed on a national basis, it recognises that there are particular instances when the resources of NATO should be used. For example, some scientific fields, such as oceanography, are inadequately investigated because the subject is of an international nature, and for this reason unduly neglected by individual countries. Again, in a few of the NATO countries, funds devoted to research are meagre, and the Research Grants Programme has been used to sponsor a few active research projects, in the hope that these may have a catalytic effect and encourage governments to devote more resources to science.

The Research Grants Programme was established with an initial fund of $1,000,000 of which the greater part was allocated in 1960. To continue the Programme, the Council approved expenditure of a second sum of $1,000,000, of which $250,000 will be spent on oceanography and meteorology. An Advisory Panel of five distinguished scientists selects the projects for NATO support.

A list of the research grants awarded to date appears in Annex 18. Besides major fields supported by NATO, such as oceanography and meteorology, in which investigations are co-ordinated by representative committees, there are other projects of an international nature. For example, in the cosmic ray studies of Professor Powell, scientists from several countries are co-operating in evaluating the results, and the Greek and Italian authorities are helping in the actual conduct of the experiments. Similarly, scientists from Canada and the United States are participating in studies involving the measurement of the human physical characteristics of the populations of Greece, Italy and Turkey.

Though the larger part of the Programme is devoted to projects of this type, several research topics of purely national interest have been supported. Typical examples are the grants to the University of Athens to purchase and install a radiotelescope, and to the University of Istanbul to study the biochemistry of nucleic acids – a topic important in understanding the mechanism of heredity.

ADVISORY GROUPS

In a variety of fields, panels of expert advisers to the Science Adviser and Science Committee have proved to be a useful means of identifying problems and organizing programmes aimed to facilitate solutions. Such groups have been particularly active in the fields of oceanography, defence psychology and operations research.

Oceanography

The pursuit of wider scientific knowledge of the oceans, so vital in both its civil and
military applications, lends itself quite naturally to an approach based on international co-operation. A working group convened by the Science Adviser in February, 1959, recommended the establishment of a Sub-Committee on Oceanographic Research. Such a group, composed of representatives of most of the NATO nations, has held several meetings at which various possibilities for co-operation were thoroughly discussed. The group proposes to interest mathematicians, biologists, chemists, and physicists in oceanographic problems through assigning these scientists as research associates at existing laboratories.

Two working groups of the Sub-Committee are conducting studies to measure the currents at various depths in the Faroe-Shetland and Gibraltar Straits. Scientists and oceanographic vessels from several NATO countries are participating in these expeditions, which are of fundamental importance in understanding the movements of water and energy from one ocean to another, and the resulting climatic changes in the Northern Hemisphere. Other projects sponsored by the Sub-Committee are concerned with forecasting storms and the automatic recording of ocean characteristics.

**Defence Psychology**

The Advisory Group on Defence Psychology first met in December 1959. Its first major accomplishment has been the convening of a symposium held in NATO Headquarters in July 1960. 175 defence psychologists, representing eleven NATO countries, freely exchanged views on the personal practices required to improve military efficiency, and considered recent research results bearing on the theory of psychological science. The three main themes of the symposium were 'Identification and Assessment of Human Abilities', 'Training and Military Education', and 'Group Productivity'.

The group held a second symposium, on a clarified basis, in August 1961. This was concerned with 'Human Engineering', i.e. design of equipment from the standpoint of human characteristics and limitations.

**Operations Research**

The Office of the Science Adviser, who since 1961 is called Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, is becoming a focal point for work carried out in one of the newest fields of scientific co-operation, known as operations research, which one might define as the use of scientific methods as a basis for executive decision. It identifies problems and evaluates possible solutions through the assignment of numerical values to the various possibilities. With financial assistance from the United States Mutual Weapons Development Programme, NATO sponsored two operations research Summer Courses given by Professors from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1958 and 1959. The second of these, which was held at the Training Centre for Experimental Dynamics in Brussels, attracted 120 students from most of the NATO countries.

An Advisory Panel on Operations Research met in March 1960, and agreed on
recommendations which the Science Committee, at its April 1960, meeting, invited the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs to implement. One of these pertained to short courses by visiting experts in countries less advanced in operations research techniques. The panel arranged for four experts – a Frenchman, a Briton and two Americans – to conduct a highly successful course at Freiburg in August 1960. Two of these courses were held at Venice in August 1961, and at Munich in September. In addition, the panel has made steady progress in three other areas: one-year assignments of foreign experts to university and governmental groups, (three experts have been assigned for the academic year 1961-62 to scientific institutes in Norway, Italy and Germany), fellowships for study and training at foreign institutions offering lecture courses and practical experience with a working operations research group; and exchange of personnel between well established and newly formed groups.

Meteorology
An Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Meteorology has reviewed a number of research projects that may prove suitable for NATO support. Noting that the present practice of dispersing available teaching and research personnel in meteorology among very small units is highly inefficient, they recommended that NATO should earmark from the Research Grants Programme $ 16,000 for travel and related expenses incurred in visits of staff between institutions, and $ 40,000 for support of research associates working in one of the larger research groups. The Science Adviser is implementing these recommendations.

Military Service for Scientists
For those NATO countries having compulsory military service, the proper utilisation of scientists in national defence efforts poses special considerations. After discussing this subject, the Science Committee requested the governments to provide information on the situation prevailing in their respective countries. Upon reviewing the information received, the Committee, at its January 1961 meeting, agreed to establish a small study group to analyse the systems applied in the various countries from the standpoint of the effects on scientific research and the education of scientists.

Other Areas
An Advisory Group on Space Research, meeting in March 1960, discussed possibilities of international co-operation and exchanged information in national programmes for the organization of space research. In September 1960, an Ad Hoc Working Group on Civil Communications discussed the relationship between the European civil network and the NATO military network. At the instigation of the Science Adviser who strongly desired the continuation of the excellent technical training provided by the Training Centre for Experimental Aerodynamics, an Ad Hoc Working Group under his chairmanship agreed on proposals for the future financial requirements of the Centre. In December 1960, an Advisory Panel on the Electronics Structure of Atoms
and Molecules discussed problems in their field and made suggestions for improvement. The Science Committee is encouraging similar meetings of experts in other fields.

MILITARY RESEARCH CO-OPERATION

The Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific Affairs has discretionary powers in matters of defence science. In general, the Science Committee and Science Adviser have devoted more attention to the general field of basic research than to specific defence matters. This direction of effort reflects both the urgent need for NATO action in the former area, and the fact that the Scientific Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe does concern himself primarily with applied science of military interest. Of course, many vital scientific areas, by their very nature, cannot be subdivided meaningfully into ‘military’ or ‘non-military’ categories.

Annually, the Assistant Secretary-General for Scientific Affairs, in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics, convenes the defence research directors of the various NATO countries. The Supreme Commanders and the directors of NATO research agencies and technical centres have also participated. These meetings have proved extremely valuable in facilitating informal discussions on common military research problems at the highest level.

An area where still more progress is needed is that of exchange of information. The Science Committee, in co-operation with the Documentation Committee of AGARD (Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development)* has sought since its inception to devise mutually agreed agreements designed to inform as wide an audience as practicable of the existence of documents of scientific or technical interest, which often have a military security classification, and for making requests for their distribution. At the instigation of the Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, the AGARD committee is preparing reports on the documentation situation in their respective countries as part of a NATO-wide survey. In addition, the Science Committee is continuing to follow the progress made by the governments in carrying out the Committee’s request, approved by the Council, to review national practice in classification of information and to declassify information that has lost its original defence significance.

The Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs enjoys close relationships with AGARD in several areas. Co-operation has focussed on documentation (cited above), materials, and propulsion. Technical advance in regard to military equipment depends in many cases on the capabilities of materials. The Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs recommended that an attempt be made to define the limits of basic scientific knowledge of the properties of materials, and to find ways of overcoming

* See page 59.
present limitations. AGARD agreed to organize a symposium which was held in April 1961, at which papers were presented and a general discussion held. Both the Science Committee and the Defence Research Directors have stressed the importance of the chemistry of propellants for rocket propulsion. At the suggestion of the Science Adviser, AGARD held a symposium on the chemistry of propellants in June 1959. A second symposium on solid propellants took place in January 1961. Papers were presented, and a report has been issued summarizing conclusions and delineating areas where further research is needed.

Briefing and visits have proved useful in keeping the Science Committee informed of the work of military research organizations. In this way the Committee has displayed its interest in the activities of the SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre* in the Hague and the SACLANT Anti-Submarine Warfare Research Centre at La Spezia, as well as of the Centre of Formation in experimental dynamics at Rhode-St.-Genèse, Belgium.

* See page 131.
CHAPTER 15

CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty specifies that "In order effectively to achieve the objectives of the Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack".

To fulfill this requirement, the members of the Alliance are obliged to maintain and develop their civil potential in peacetime and to prepare for particular situations arising in time of war. So far as NATO is concerned, Civil Emergency Planning covers the measures necessary to enable each NATO country to resist any kind of attack, including a thermo-nuclear attack.

In any future war there will be two fronts to defend: the Military Front and the Home Front. They are complementary and of equal importance, as between them they form the NATO shield. Civil Emergency Planning, the subject of this section, relates to the Home Front. A well-organized Home Front defence must be regarded as a powerful deterrent to aggression because the temptation for a potential enemy to attack would be far greater if it knew that any member of the Alliance was totally unprepared to meet an air attack against its main centres. It is obvious that no civil population could stand up to an all-out thermo-nuclear attack for very long unless arrangements had been made for its defence. A strong Home Front defence, therefore, must add to the overall military strength of NATO. (The term 'Home Front Defence' in connection with Civil Emergency Planning excludes such active measures as fighters, missiles and anti-aircraft artillery, etc., which strictly speaking are part of the military deterrent.)

The responsibility for home defence measures is essentially a national affair. Such measures are, however, subject to yearly review by the Council so that progress can be noted and the general state of preparedness assessed. This yearly review parallels that on the military side, though it is somewhat different in character since the great majority of the members of the Alliance have military commitments to NATO (in that they have undertaken to provide certain land, naval and air forces to be built up within agreed times). On the civil side, on the other hand, the commitments, although equally important, are not subject to any time limit as regards their implementation.
EMERGENCY PLANS

The general co-ordination of Civil Emergency Planning is undertaken in NATO by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, which was set up at the end of 1955. The Chairman of this Senior Committee is the Secretary General of NATO; the members are the national representatives who are responsible for Civil Emergency Planning in their own countries. On the International Staff/Secretariat side there is a Civil Emergency Planning Office which also includes technical advisers for Civil Defence, Civil Aviation, Inland Transport, Communications, medical questions and refugees. A number of specialised Boards and Committees, such as the Civil Defence Committee, the Board for Inland Surface Transport, the Petroleum Planning Committee, the Civil Communications Committee, etc., receive guidance from the Senior Committee, from which they depend, with regard to the specific subjects of international planning to be studied. Each year the Committees report progress to the Senior Committee.

To co-ordinate the work of Committees with regard to policy matters of general concern, and to prepare studies on specific subjects such as the organization of international civil wartime agencies for transport and supplies, and refugees, the Senior Committee has set up its own Co-ordinating Committee. This Committee works in very close collaboration with the International Staff. The Chairman is the Head of the NATO Civil Emergency Planning Office; the members are drawn from the national Delegations to NATO.

In order to guide the work of Civil Emergency Planning, the Senior Committee has laid down certain planning assumptions. This means that each of the Committees has been given an appreciation of the scale of attack which can be expected, of the most important and most likely targets, and of the general effects which modern weapons may be expected to have.

The Senior Committee has also laid down for each Committee what it regards as the most important objectives, i.e. the arrangements which should be considered first and which are of the greatest importance during the survival period.

Among the fundamental assumptions on which all Civil Emergency Planning is based the first and most important is that the critical period of any future thermo-nuclear war will be the first month, of which the first three or four days are likely to be of special importance.

If the military and home fronts can, as a result of their preparations, successfully get through this period, known as the 'survival period', it is believed that at least half the battle will be won. The Senior Committee and its committees are therefore concentrating on the minimum requirements which would enable the civil population to survive this short period at the beginning of a war during which thermo-nuclear weapons would be used in their fullest strength.

The greatest emphasis is placed on saving human lives and on making the provisions required to enable the population to carry on.
RADII OF DAMAGE OF A 1-MEGATON THERMO-NUCLEAR BOMB (LONDON)

Zone A: Total destruction  Zone B: Irreparable damage  Zone C: Moderate to severe damage  Zone D: Light damage
Another important problem concerns a warning system. It is possible that there might be a short strategic warning period during which certain emergency measures could be executed, though such a period cannot of course be counted on. This period is of special significance because measures such as the evacuation of the population have to be pre-arranged. All European NATO countries have already set up their national warning systems though due to geographical location they can only expect a few minutes' notice. In order to extend this period as much as possible warning will be given by the most advanced radar post available.

Canada and the United States have installed through a joint defence project three warning lines to give notice of impending attack; at the present time they should provide an appreciable tactical warning with variations, of course, depending on distance between the warning lines and probable targets. As an additional safeguard, arrangements are being improved for warnings along the Pacific and Atlantic Seaboards so that any aircraft attempting to come in over the sea to avoid the three main warning lines will also be picked up on the two flanks.

One of the tasks on which NATO is engaged at present, in a working group, is to arrange an ‘international fallout warning’. An international fallout warning necessitates close international co-operation such as an exchange of meteorological information, particularly in regard to upper winds to heights of 80,000 to 100,000 feet.

SURVIVAL REQUIREMENTS

It must be noted that in the case of the explosion of a 1-megaton bomb (H bomb), virtually complete destruction would occur in a radius of 1.8 miles from the point of explosion (ground zero point) and severe destruction to a distance of about 4 miles from ground zero, while moderate damage and partial damage would occur to radii of respectively 5.5 and 7.4 miles from the point of explosion.

The explosion of a 50-megaton bomb (equivalent to 50 million tons of TNT) would result in total destruction within a radius of 9 miles from the point of explosion; irreparable damage to approximately 27 miles, and severe devastation with some chance of survival in the areas between 27 miles and 45 miles from explosion point. Beyond that there would be a zone of partial damage within 57 miles. The effects of radioactivity would, however, extend to approximately 100 miles, gamma rays being able to prove fatal even at this distance.

There can be no doubt that any attack with thermo-nuclear weapons would be particularly devastating during the first few days of war. Apart from the vast numbers of people killed outright and many more injured, transport and communications systems would be destroyed or crippled, and production, public utility systems, etc., would be destroyed or severely damaged.

Thus, the scale of destruction likely to be caused by thermo-nuclear weapons and the magnitude of the resulting problems point to the need for advance preparations for this critical period.
RADII OF DAMAGE OF A 1-MEGATON THERMO-NUCLEAR BOMB (NEW YORK)

Zone A: Total destruction  Zone B: Irreparable damage  Zone C: Moderate to severe damage  Zone D: Light damage
The aim of Civil Emergency Planning is, of course, to reduce the effects of enemy attacks on the civilian population, its main object being the saving of human lives and the limitation of damage. The main survival requirements therefore, can be set out under a number of broad headings:

**Maintenance of Government Control**

It is clearly of vital importance that control should be maintained at all levels of government, central and local, during the survival period. If this is to be done, there must obviously be adequate emergency legislation.

It is also essential that arrangements be made providing for protected war headquarters away from main target areas for both central and local government headquarters. Drastic measures undoubtedly would be necessary involving a form of Cabinet Government due to the impossibility of carrying on as in peacetime. This of course includes the necessary assignment of tasks and responsibilities in advance.

A special study of the requirements of emergency planning has been made by a working group at the instance of the Senior Committee.

**Survival of the Population**

Supreme importance is, of course, attached to the survival of the population. It is hoped that this can be accomplished either by removing persons from probable target areas or providing them with shelters.

The cost of building shelters to give adequate protection against all the effects of a thermo-nuclear explosion within a radius of about 5 miles is enormous, and most members of the Alliance have so far not attempted to make any such provision. On the other hand, general agreement that provision should be made in any case for shelter against fallout has been reached. In most countries studies are being made of measures which can be applied to different types of dwellings, commercial buildings, etc., and there is a special working party responsible for making technical recommendations to the Civil Defence Committee on all aspects of this problem. It is generally accepted that a balanced combination of evacuation or dispersal and of shelters provides the broad answer to the problem of survival.

The general policy then is to try and evacuate or disperse people from the centre of probable target areas and to provide shelters for the remainder. Evacuation and dispersal plans are being worked out by most NATO countries and a number of practical tests have already been held, both in the United States and Canada, of dispersal arrangements. With regard to shelters, the process is much slower because of the cost, but plans are now being carefully studied.

**Civil Defence**

A well-organized civil defence is an essential part of survival.

A number of NATO member countries have established civil defence colleges in order to train volunteers to form the cadres for future civil defence teams. Their training
RADII OF DAMAGE OF A 1-MEGATON THERMO-NUCLEAR BOMB (PARIS)

Zone A: Total destruction  Zone B: Irreparable damage  Zone C: Moderate to severe damage  Zone D: Light damage
includes theoretical courses given by lecturers and practical field-work arranged by instructors.

In most NATO countries in Europe civil defence is divided into two echelons, the first consisting of volunteers responsible for local defence, and the second comprising mobile columns. On the North American Continent there are also local volunteers, but mobile columns do not exist. They are replaced by what are called mutual support arrangements, organized of volunteers in areas surrounding probable targets. In Europe one country (Norway) has total conscription for civil defence, all persons between the ages of 45 and 55 having to put in a certain number of hours a year for ten years – the younger age group supplies the mobile columns and the older the local defence personnel. In the Netherlands, the mobile columns are provided by the military forces, the personnel drafted by national conscription. This country has also recently introduced a form of conscription for local Civil Defence forces which is used to fill gaps where it has proved impossible to attract an adequate number of volunteers. In the United Kingdom, the second echelon is now being found by giving special training to units of the territorial army. The original scheme of the mobile defence corps provided by the army with conscripted personnel has been wound up with the decision to abandon conscription. France has just promulgated a decree which will enable the government to allocate personnel aged 37 or over for Civil Defence duties. Provision is also made to conscript women for this work. Mobile columns are equipped and trained for rescue, firefighting and first-aid, including ambulances. In some countries they are also equipped for debris clearance, bridge-building and emergency feeding. Normally a civil defence organization is made up as follows:

A CONTROL SECTION, which is responsible for the direction of operations and includes certain important reconnaissance duties, particularly in connection with radio-active fallout.

A WARDEN SERVICE, which forms a main link with the civil population and has important duties on the ground, such as reporting damage and casualties and carrying out reconnaissance for radio-activity. This section obviously must work in close contact with the police and in some cases is actually run by the police themselves.

RESCUE AND FIRST AID. Personnel in this section is trained in rescue and first aid, particularly for dealing with casualties who are trapped under debris. For this work a sort of manpack is being developed which enables the personnel to carry certain essential equipment on their backs and to move about over the debris.

AMBULANCE SECTION. This section is normally equipped with ambulances and stretcher bearers who are trained in first aid. It may also include mobile first aid posts.

WELFARE. This section, which is composed in most cases of women, is needed to cover all the welfare needs of the people who are bombed out of their houses or
who have been evacuated, to deal with emergency feeding, emergency clothing, etc. **Communications.** The importance of adequate communications is so great that there may have to be a special communications section which would deal with wireless messages, messengers, etc.

**Fire Service.** The Fire Service may be separate, as in the United Kingdom, or it may be an integral part of the civil defence. It is a service which exists in peacetime but which needs to be greatly expanded in time of war. One of its biggest problems is the provision of water for firefighting since it is almost certain that water mains will be broken and supplies disrupted and it will be necessary to rely entirely on static water supplies from rivers, lakes, or artificial dams. Arrangements for the provision of static water must be carefully worked out in peacetime and may involve considerable expenditure.

**Police.** Police are a peacetime service which must continue during time of war with the task of maintaining control. Again, the normal peacetime forces will need to be augmented by volunteers.

However efficient the Civil Defence and other services may be, they will probably never be sufficient to meet the enormous problems which will arise. Particular importance is therefore attached to self-help on the part of the civil population. This means, first of all, educating the population in what it may have to face and how it can help itself. Self-help means the acquiring of some elementary knowledge about first-aid, home nursing, fire-fighting and emergency cooking and knowing what sort of reserves of food and water to have in the house. In any future war the entire nation will be involved and will be in the front line, and every responsible person must therefore be trained to defend himself and his home and so make his contribution to maintaining the integrity of the home front.

Civil defence is dealt with in **NATO** by means of a Civil Defence Committee which has set up working groups to consider problems of special technical difficulty or importance. There also exists as part of the Civil Emergency Planning Office a Civil Defence Adviser whose task is to advise all NATO committees and NATO countries and to act as a sort of clearing house for the exchange of information. The office contains a film and film-strip library as well as a publications library, the contents supplied by members of the Alliance and which are available on loan. In addition, a Civil Defence Bulletin is regularly issued with the object of disseminating information concerning civil defence.

**Hospitals**

The primary responsibility of caring for the casualties caused by air attack presents particularly difficult problems since in peacetime hospitals are normally situated in built-up areas which are most likely to be bombed and would have to be transferred to temporary buildings or other hospitals situated in areas less likely to be attacked. A special NATO Medical Committee has been set up to consider these problems working closely with **SHAPE**, since the whole hospitalisation problem is a joint civil and military
responsibility. A Medical Consultant's post has also been created on a temporary basis in the Civil Emergency Planning Office to assist in this important work.

**Food**
In order to survive, the population must of course be fed. The NATO Food and Agriculture Committee is concerned with seeing that all NATO countries have sufficient stocks of food to carry them over the survival period. The Committee has recommended that all Governments should initiate an official policy of encouraging the population to build up household stocks as a vital measure of survival. Obviously, under fallout conditions, countless lives would be saved by such measures. The Committee is also studying the protection of food-crops and livestocks from radiation in order to give guidance to countries.

**Transportation**
The maintenance of all forms of transport is of vital importance. The problems of shipping are dealt with by the Planning Board for Ocean Shipping; of inland transport and emergency port facilities, by the Planning Board for Inland Surface Transport; and of air by the Civil Aviation Planning Committee. The main object of these boards is to organize on an international basis the best use of available resources and to try to ensure the maintenance of at least minimum services under all foreseeable circumstances.

**Communications**
If control is to be maintained, good communications are essential. In the event of thermo-nuclear war it is to be expected that telephone and telegraph systems will be badly disrupted. It is necessary, therefore, to ensure that wireless and broadcasting facilities are available in order to give instructions to the public and issue warnings about such matters as fallout as well as to insure the minimum needs in all vital fields of civil defence, both national and international. The special committee which is examining all aspects of the problem of communications is the Civil Communications Planning Committee.

**Fuel Supplies**
The arrangements necessary to ensure adequate fuel supplies for civil and military use in wartime are the responsibility of the Petroleum Planning Committee so far as petrol, oil and lubricants are concerned. Solid fuels have been dealt with by another Committee, which has now completed its task.

**Industry**
During the recovery period after a nuclear attack, surviving industry will have to be put back into operation as soon as possible to ensure the countries' vital needs. Vital installations that have been damaged will have to be repaired, existing raw materials
will have to be allocated by priorities. All this entails a sound national wartime organization. The Industrial Planning Committee studies these problems to give guidance to the countries of the Alliance.

**Manpower**

In war, the authorities responsible for labour will have calls for every category of manpower from all sectors of the national economy. Legislation and organization are required for the control and allocation of such labour and priorities establishment. In particular, the best utilisation of highly qualified scientific and technical skills has to be envisaged. These problems are studied by the Manpower Planning Committee.

**International Supply Machinery**

However difficult the situation, there will clearly be a need for some form of international wartime supply machinery, not only to cover the survival period but to help with the situation which will subsequently arise. This machinery will be concerned with both military and civilian needs. Under instructions from the Senior Committee, the International Staff, in collaboration with the Civil Emergency Co-ordinating Committee, is now elaborating plans for setting up an International Wartime Supply Agency, together with its necessary links with the military and shipping authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF CIVIL DEFENCE COLLEGES IN THE DIFFERENT NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BELGIUM</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Florival (near Brussels)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CANADA</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Arm prior (Ontario)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DENMARK</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bernstoff (near Copenhagen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRANCE</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nainville-les-Roches (Seine et Oise)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FED. REP. OF GERMANY</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Staff School (Bad Godesberg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Schools at Marienthal and Kiel and various provincial schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GREECE</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Civil Defence Training Schools, near Athens; Municipal Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ITALY</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fire College, Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NETHERLANDS</strong> . . . . . . Barneveld (near Utrecht)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NORWAY</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Grorud (near Oslo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PORTUGAL</strong> . . . . . . . . . . . . A Staff School in Lisbon and three regional schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED KINGDOM</strong> . . . . . . Sunningdale (Berkshire) – Staff College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Falfield (Gloucestershire) – Technical Schools</td>
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<td>Easingwood (York) – ” “</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taymouth Castle (Perthshire) – ” “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNITED STATES</strong> . . . . . . A Staff School at Battle Creek, Michigan and three regional training establishments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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CHAPTER 16

CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

The NATO member countries have for many years, in some cases for centuries, enjoyed close cultural relations. It has not been necessary, therefore, for NATO to promote such relations, much less initiate them. Based on these already existing ties, it could usefully foster a community feeling between the member countries for, as the ‘Committee of Three’ pointed out in its report of 13 December, 1956, such feeling exists only to the extent that people recognise their common cultural heritage and are conscious of the innate values they share in their way of living and thinking.

NATO’s cultural programme is aimed at encouraging studies of both the Alliance and the Atlantic Community and, in accord with a further recommendation of the Committee, with promoting exchanges between European and North American members of the Alliance. Planning of the programme has also taken into account the fact that member countries for the large part belong to other international organizations working in the cultural field.

Within this clearly defined framework NATO took two steps. It initiated a Fellowship Programme and a Visiting Professorship Programme.

THE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAMME

The Fellowship Programme was set up in 1955 to encourage the study of problems relating to the Alliance and the North Atlantic Community. Over the last five years, 90 fellowships have been awarded, mainly to graduate students or young university professors. (A list of titles of studies will be found at the end of this chapter.) The programme was established “to encourage studies leading to publication on various aspects of the community of interests, of traditions and of outlook of the Atlantic Alliance countries, to throw light on the history, present status, and future outlook of the Atlantic Community concept and the problems which confront it”.

The candidates are selected on the basis of special aptitude and experience as already revealed in their university work. Academic qualifications, professional experience and published material are of course factors which are also taken into account.
CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

THE VISITING PROFESSORSHIPS PROGRAMME

The Visiting Professorships Programme initiated during the academic year 1958/59 offers university professors the opportunity of lecturing over a period of 10 to 20 weeks at a university in another NATO country on the other side of the Atlantic. The programme, which affects 10 professors each year, requires candidates to lecture in fields of study of direct interest to NATO. The object of these lectures is "to reveal the common traditions and historical experience of the countries of the North Atlantic area considered as a community, and to give insight into its present needs and future development. The lectures should preferably deal with historical, political, constitutional, legal, social or economic problems and possibly with those of a cultural, linguistic or scientific nature".

The results have been most encouraging. In addition to the value derived from the lectures, the contacts made by the professors either during their courses or outside the university, have strengthened interest in the problems of their countries and emphasised the need for closer cultural ties between all countries of the Atlantic Alliance.

During the last few years, NATO has supported arrangements for seminars or lectures on questions of interest to the Alliance at the universities of Oxford, Princeton and Freiburg-in-Breisgau.

Within the limits set, and in view of their very nature, these activities cannot show rapid and spectacular results, nor is this the aim. The intention is rather to explain and justify the community feeling which is already discernable in public opinion of the countries of the Alliance, and on which, in the last resort, the unity of the free world depends.

LIST OF SELECTED TOPICS STUDIED BY NATO FELLOWS

NATO and Economic Co-operation between the Atlantic Powers.
Intergovernmental and Supranational Elements in the Structure and Functions of NATO.
The division of competence between NATO's civil and military Organizations.
NATO and the Western European Union movement.
NATO, cornerstone of U.S. Foreign Policy.
Possibilities of a Point IV Programme within NATO's framework.
The Atlantic Alliance's Foundations and Outlook.
Common policy and the settlement of disputes within alliances.
A comparative study of the relations between the individual and the State.
The prospects for economic growth in NATO countries.
The social and political philosophy of the West: its basic tenets.
The developing links between NATO and European Organizations.
The Common Market in relation to the unity of the Atlantic Alliance.
The basic ideologies of Western Civilisation.
Juridical problems raised by the developing economic, social and cultural bonds between NATO Members.
Techniques of financing rearmament policy.
Public opinion in the North Atlantic Community.
NATO and the problem of European security; legal arrangements and political realities.
Private investments of NATO countries in underdeveloped areas of the world.
The common cultural and ideological pattern behind the North Atlantic Alliance.
NATO as an instrument of political conciliation.
CHAPTER 17

INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

In democratic States, the consent of the people lies at the root of all national action. The people, however, can only approve – or disapprove – a policy if they have been given unbiased information on the problems involved and the solutions proposed. Information, regarded both as a function of government and as a means of enlightening public opinion, is consequently basic to all true democracies, at the national level no less than in the international sphere. That is why, in the Report of the Committee of Three, a special chapter is devoted to co-operation in the field of Information. It contains the following statement: “The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore, they must be informed not only of NATO’s aspirations, but of its achievements”. The Report goes on to say, however, that the important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national Information Services. This is plain common sense. The Atlantic Alliance comprises fifteen countries whose peoples, though they share the same ideals, have different traditions and temperaments. National Information Services are the best judges of the right approach to public opinion in their respective countries, consequently only they can present problems to the general public in a manner calculated to convey the most striking and objective picture of the relevant ideas and facts. According to the writers of the Report, although national Information Services must be in a position to meet this requirement, they will not be able to do so “if member governments do not make adequate provision in their national programmes for that purpose”. The Report continues: “It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist national governments in this work. The promotion of information about, and public understanding of, NATO and the Atlantic Community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members”. The few lines quoted above give an admirable summary of the scope of NATO information activities and of the spirit in which they have been conducted for many years.
PRESS RELATIONS

Relations with the press occupy a peculiar position for, unlike the other NATO information activities, which are all within the province of the Information Service, the Press Service is operated by a special unit of the International Staff.

The freedom enjoyed by the press in democratic countries gives to that medium a particularly important part to play with regard to informing and enlightening public opinion. The Press Service, which is one of the organs of the Secretariat, is designed to perform the necessary function of liaison between the press and the Organization. In this dual role it provides up-to-date information to the Secretariat, through its press review, press clippings and its use of international wire services. It is also responsible for keeping journalists informed of NATO decisions and activities and for providing correspondents with background material. That is done by issuing press communiqués and statements and by daily contacts with individual correspondents. The Head of the Service, as official spokesman for the Organization, gives press conferences during the Ministerial meetings which are generally held two or three times a year.

The Press Service has a specialised library of some 2,000 books in addition to periodicals, and a documentation and archive section, available to anyone interested in NATO. The Service issued in the Autumn of 1961 a comprehensive bibliography of all important books and articles published on NATO and related subjects.

OTHER INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

All information activities other than press relations are the responsibility of the NATO Information Service. Each year, the Director of Information submits a Programme of Activities to the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations; after it has been unanimously approved by the latter, it forms the basis of all projects launched by the Information Service.

The funds at the disposal of the Information Service for carrying out this Programme in 15 countries are very small compared with the huge amounts spent on anti-Western propaganda by the Soviet Government and the various Communist organizations. In view of these financial limitations, NATO confines its activities essentially to supplying information and documentation to such groups and individuals with an influence on public opinion in their own circles as can be counted on to re-disseminate any knowledge of NATO they have themselves acquired.

Thus, the NATO Information Programme is directed primarily at 'opinion makers' such as journalists, radio and TV correspondents, lecturers, parliamentarians, trade union leaders, political writers, professors, school-teachers, troop information officers, youth leaders, students, etc. The Programme comprises a wide range of activities.
Direct contact

In the information field, there is no substitute for direct contact, i.e., exchanges of views or a briefing followed by questions and answers. The value of direct human relations is inestimable, for they alone enable convictions to be hammered out or an error of judgment to be corrected. Though direct contact can obviously only be effected on a comparatively small scale, it represents one of the most important aspects of NATO information activities.

Not a day goes by without a group or several groups of visitors from one NATO country or another, drawn from all classes of society, being received at the NATO Permanent Headquarters, SHAPE and, very often, other international agencies. NATO officials, chosen with reference to the occupational category of the visitors, conduct briefings which are always followed by discussions. The schedule for visits often includes the showing of a film. At the end of 1961, more than 400 groups totalling approximately 18,000 persons including 3,500 members of the Allied armed forces, had thus visited the NATO Headquarters in Paris.

Troop Information Courses represent a similar activity in a related field. These courses are organized for officers and NCOs in the Allied forces who have special responsibilities in the field of education. The courses, which last several days, are held in Paris, under the guidance of NATO civil and military personalities. Lectures on a wide range of subjects of interest to all are followed by discussions in which everyone takes part. Particular value attaches to these courses since they provide those attending them with a body of information which they find of great assistance for the fulfilment of their specialised duties when they return to their units.

In 1961, about nine international courses attended by roughly 300 officers and NCOs were held. In addition, there were briefings followed by discussions at the NATO Defence College for the pupils of military academies, schools and other institutions of the member countries.

In order to stimulate interest in NATO affairs among youth leaders in member countries, many projects have been completed or are being carried out under NATO auspices with the close co-operation of international as well as national Youth Movements. Within this context, courses of a national as well as an international character have been organized, besides seminars for youth leaders, students, young trade unionists and workers of all the NATO countries. Moreover, every year one of the member governments acts as host to an International Youth Seminar for studies on the Atlantic Alliance and related subjects.

The activities described above, based as they are on personal contact and therefore necessarily limited in their scope, have nevertheless proved extremely effective, mainly on account of their impact on all classes of society. They supplement, but never clash with, information activities involving indirect contact, the coverage of which is very much wider.
Indirect contact

The communication of information by indirect contact has been developed over the years by the use of all the customary media: books, pamphlets, folders, radio, television, exhibition, photographs, cinema films and many other visual means of reaching the general public.*

Since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO has produced many publications. NATO - THE FIRST FIVE YEARS by Lord Ismay, the Organization's first Secretary General, was published in 1954. It was followed in 1957 by FACTS ABOUT NATO, addressed mainly to lecturers. Successive editions of these works are now out of print, hence the publication of the present work of reference.

For more general use, the Information Service distributes every year a NATO HANDBOOK which explains very briefly the origins of NATO, its aims and its achievements. Independently of these works of reference, a monthly magazine, the NATO LETTER, has been published since 1953. Now greatly improved both in appearance and content, it is sent free of charge to anyone who takes a serious interest in the Alliance and its problems. It carries articles and comments on all matters relating directly or indirectly to NATO and the Atlantic Community. It is published under the authority of the Secretary General of NATO, but its articles do not necessarily reflect the views of the North Atlantic Council or of individual member governments.

The NATO LETTER appears every month in English and French, the two official NATO languages, but there are also Italian and German editions. The combined print-run is around 110,000 copies per month. Condensed quarterly editions are also issued in Danish, Greek and Turkish.

To the publications mentioned above, intended for a special readership, must be added others with a more popular appeal, ranging from pamphlets on subjects of topical interest to folders with an annual circulation within the NATO countries of a million copies or thereabouts.

Although produced in abundance, the printed word can no longer meet all the information requirements of what to some extent is no longer the reading public but one which is also a large consumer of broadcasting, television and cinema programmes. A Section of the Information Service therefore grants facilities to radio and television networks for the preparation of programmes on NATO and its activities. To this end, it organizes guided tours of radio and television journalists to civil and military headquarters throughout the NATO area. It also writes scripts and shoots film sequences presented in such a way that radio and television can use this material as they think fit. A small number of complete programmes can also be delivered on request.

The FILM Service of this Section has also produced quite a large number of films with a running commentary in English or French. Versions in the other NATO languages have either been completed or are in preparation. Most of these films deal with subjects not normally covered by national film producers, whether private or govern-

* A detailed list of Information material can be obtained by writing to the NATO Information Service.
ment-sponsored. They are devoted more particularly to international co-operation in all the fields with which NATO is concerned.

The Information Service also operates a PHOTO Service of which use is made by an increasing number of illustrated periodicals. For some years now, the total number of prints distributed annually has exceeded 8,000. In addition, the PHOTO Service produces photo features which are readily accepted by the popular magazine press throughout the Alliance.

Moreover, the VISUAL AIDS Service provides instructional material for any bodies or associations, both civil and military, anxious to bring to the knowledge of their personnel or members the aims and activities of NATO. This material includes wall maps of the NATO area, organization charts showing the civil and military structure of the Organization, film strips and small panel displays. The last named, for which there is a steady demand, are easily transported and have captions in the different languages of the NATO countries.

Under the Information Service too, are the MOBILE INFORMATION CENTRES, consisting of trailer-caravans convertible into small exhibitions, complete with film show. These mobile centres, which have already visited several NATO countries, traverse rural areas for choice and stop at small townships where they are sure of a warm welcome since, to their own intrinsic worth, there is the added attraction of a novelty.

CO-OPERATION WITH THE ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

In all the NATO countries private societies now help the NATO Information Service and Government Information Services. These are the national voluntary organizations affiliated to the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA).* The citizens' committees or associations in question do a great deal to assist the Information Service in its difficult task of spreading knowledge of NATO. Set up to promote the aims of the North Atlantic Treaty and to support its action, they do their best, with the generally very meagre funds at their disposal, to create in their respective countries a current of opinion favourable to NATO and its action. Their assistance takes many forms: the distribution of printed matter, the organization of lectures, symposia, seminars, exhibitions, etc. The Atlantic Treaty Association has been particularly active in disseminating information about NATO among school-children. It organizes a teachers' conference every two years in one of the countries of the Alliance. In 1960, the Association arranged a conference on "International Relations in the University" and a similar conference will be held in 1962. Other activities include courses for Allied military officers, summer camps for young people and Round Table Conferences in several member countries. In this manner, the Association supplements and broadens the scope of NATO information activities.

* For a list of national voluntary organizations belonging to the Atlantic Treaty Association, see page 307.
PART III
CHRONOLOGY
CHRONOLOGY

1945

26 June The United Nations Charter is signed at San Francisco.

1947

4 March France and the United Kingdom sign a 50-year Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance at Dunkirk.

12 March President Truman delivers his message to Congress urging the United States of America “to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure” (Truman Doctrine) and requesting the appropriation of direct financial aid to Greece and Turkey.

5 June General of the Army George C. Marshall, United States Secretary of State, speaking at Harvard, announces a plan for the economic rehabilitation of Europe. This speech initiated the action which led to the European Recovery Programme.

1948

22 January Mr. Ernest Bevin, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the House of Commons, proposes a form of Western Union.

22 February The Communist Party in Czechoslovakia gains control of the government in Prague through a coup d'état.

17 March The Brussels Treaty – a 50-year treaty of economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence – is signed by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

11 April Secretary of State Marshall and Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett begin exploratory conversations with Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and Senator Tom Connally on security problems of the North Atlantic area.

16 April The Convention for European Co-operation is signed by the Foreign Ministers of sixteen European countries and by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Western Zones of Occupation in Germany. The OEEC was set up under Article 1 of the Convention.

11 June The United States Senate adopts Resolution 239, known as the ‘Vandenberg Resolution’.
1948 (cont.)

6 July  Mr. Lovett and the Ambassadors in Washington of the Brussels Treaty Powers and of Canada begin discussions about North Atlantic defence.

27-28 September  The Defence Ministers of the Brussels Treaty Powers decide to create a Western Union Defence Organization.

25-26 October  The Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers announces "complete agreement on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic and on the next steps to be taken in this direction".


1949

15 March  The negotiating Powers invite Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal to adhere to the North Atlantic Treaty.

18 March  The text of the North Atlantic Treaty is published.

31 March  The Soviet Government presents a memorandum to the twelve prospective signatories claiming that the Treaty is contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

2 April  The twelve governments repudiate the Soviet assertions in a common note.

4 April  The North Atlantic Treaty is signed in Washington by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.

8 April  Texts published of requests by the Brussels Treaty Powers, Denmark, Italy and Norway for United States military and financial assistance.

24 August  The North Atlantic Treaty enters into effect upon the deposit in Washington of the final instruments of ratification.


6 October  Mutual Defence Assistance Act of 1949 is signed by President Truman.


1950


27 January  President Truman approves the plan for the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area, thus releasing $900,000,000 of military aid funds.

9 May  The French Government proposes the creation of a single authority to control the production of steel and coal in France and Germany, open for membership to other countries (Schuman Plan).

1950 (cont.)


1 August Announcement is made in Ankara that the Turkish Government has decided to make formal application for Turkey's adhesion to the North Atlantic Treaty.


26 September North Atlantic Council, fifth session, New York (continued).

2 October Turkey accepts Council invitation to be associated with the military agencies of NATO in Mediterranean defence planning.

5 October Greece accepts Council invitation to be associated with Mediterranean defence planning.

24 October French Prime Minister, M. René Pleven, outlines to the National Assembly his plan for a European unified army, including German contingents, within the framework of NATO (Pleven Plan).

28-31 October The NATO Defence Committee discusses the methods by which Germany might participate in the defence of Western Europe, and refers the political and military aspects of the problem to the Council Deputies and Military Committee respectively for further study.

18-19 December North Atlantic Council, sixth session, Brussels.

19 December The Council appoints General Dwight D. Eisenhower (United States) Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

19 December The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, acting on the invitation of the North Atlantic Council at its sixth session, authorise the Allied High Commissioners in Western Germany to open discussions with the Federal Republic on a possible German contribution to the defence of Western Europe (Petersberg negotiations).

20 December The Consultative Council of the Brussels Treaty Powers decides to merge the military organization of the Western Union into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

1951

24 January The French Government announces it will convene a Conference to discuss the European Army Plan.

15 February Conference on the setting up of a European Army opens in Paris.

1951 (cont.)

18 April Representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany sign a joint declaration formally setting up the European Coal and Steel Community.

3 May The Council Deputies announce important changes in the top structure of NATO, namely the incorporation by the North Atlantic Council of the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee. The Council thus becomes the sole Ministerial body of the Organization.

19 June An agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Status of their Forces (Military Status Agreement) is signed in London by the Council Deputies on behalf of their governments.

8 July The Petersberg negotiations are suspended.

24 July The Paris Conference approves an interim report to governments, recommending the creation of a European Army. General Eisenhower agrees to co-operate in working out the military problems.


20 September Agreement signed in Ottawa on the Status of NATO, National Representatives and International Staff (Civilian Status Agreement).

9-11 October Temporary Council Committee (tcc), first session, Paris. Executive Bureau (Three Wise Men) established.

17-22 October Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey is signed in London by the Council Deputies acting on behalf of their governments.

19 November Inauguration of the NATO Defence College, Paris.

24-28 November North Atlantic Council, eighth session, Rome.

1952

30 January Council Deputies, acting on behalf of the Council, appoint Vice-Admiral Lynde D. McCormick (United States) Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

18 February Greece and Turkey accede to the North Atlantic Treaty.


12 March Announcement is made of the appointment of Lord Ismay, the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, as Vice-Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, and Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
CHRONOLOGY

1952 (cont.)

4 April Third anniversary of the signing of the Treaty. Lord Ismay takes office and the North Atlantic Council assumes responsibility for the tasks hitherto performed by the Council Deputies, the Defence Production Board and the Economic and Financial Board. The international staffs serving those agencies are amalgamated into one organization with headquarters in Paris.

10 April Activation of Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

16 April NATO opens its provisional Headquarters at the Palais de Chaillot, Paris.

28 April The North Atlantic Council, now in permanent session, holds its first meeting in Paris. Appoints General Matthew B. Ridgway (United States) Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to succeed General Eisenhower.

27 May The Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the German Federal Republic sign in Paris the Treaty setting up the European Defence Community. Representatives of the North Atlantic Treaty governments sign a Protocol to the Treaty on Guarantees given by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to the members of the European Defence Community.


1953

28 February A Treaty of “friendship and collaboration” is signed in Ankara between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.


10 July The North Atlantic Council appoints General Alfred M. Gruenther (United States) to succeed General Ridgway as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

5 December Lord Ismay attends the Bermuda Conference (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) as observer for NATO.

14-16 December The North Atlantic Council meets in Ministerial session in Paris.

1954

17 February North Atlantic Council appoints Admiral Jerauld Wright (United States) to succeed Admiral McCormick as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.

23 April North Atlantic Council meets in Ministerial session in Paris.

26 April Opening of Geneva Conference convened by France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States for the purpose of reaching a settlement of the Korean problem and of considering the question of the re-establishment of peace in Indo-China.

29 April The French National Assembly refuses to ratify the European Defence Community (EDC) project.
1954 (cont.)

7 May
In their reply to a Soviet note dated 31st March, France, the United Kingdom and the United States reject the USSR's bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

17-18 June
Meeting at The Hague of the Constitucent Conference of the Atlantic Treaty Association sponsored by the International Atlantic Committee (representing pro-NATO voluntary organizations). The constitution of the Association is agreed upon.

2 September
Admiral Sir George Creasy replaces Admiral Sir John Edelsten as Allied Commander-in-Chief, Channel.

6 September
Opening of Manilla Conference which culminates in the signing of the treaties setting up SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization).

28 September
Meeting in London of the Conference of Nine to seek an alternative to the EDC.

3 October
Close of London Conference; it is decided to invite Italy and the German Federal Republic to accede to the Brussels Treaty.

20-22 October
Four-Power Conference in Paris: the decisions of the Conference of Nine are endorsed and a protocol adopted, terminating the occupation régime in the Federal Republic.

23 October
Signing of the Paris Agreements. The North Atlantic Council endorses the decisions taken at both the London and Paris Conferences and invites the German Federal Republic to join NATO. Italy and the German Federal Republic also accede to the Western European Union (WEU) set up under the terms of the Paris Agreements.

17-18 December
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Paris.

1955

26 January
The USSR ends the state of war with Germany.

24 February
Signing of Baghdad Pact (Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and the United Kingdom).

5 March
President Eisenhower, acting on a promise made by Mr. Dulles at the London Conference, undertakes publicly to maintain United States forces in Europe for as long as is necessary.

17 April
Opening of the Bandung Conference of the 'uncommitted' countries of Asia and Africa.

5 May
The German Federal Republic officially accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty.

7 May
The USSR denounces the Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet Treaties.

9-11 May
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. A public ceremony marks the entry into NATO of the German Federal Republic.
1955 (cont.)

14 May
The USSR concludes the Warsaw Pact with its European satellites by way of reply to the accession of Federal Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.

15 May
Signing of Austrian State Treaty.

7 June
The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States invite the USSR to take part in a Four-Power Conference in Geneva from 18 to 21 July.

16 July
Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council to enable the Allies to exchange views before the Geneva Conference.

18-21 July
The so-called Summit Meeting at Geneva. No agreement is reached but a 'directive' is given to the Foreign Ministers on the continued examination of the outstanding questions.

18-23 July
First Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in Paris.

8 August
Opening in Geneva of the first conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

6 September
Start of the crisis in Cyprus.

8 September
Chancellor Adenauer visits Moscow.

25 October
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States submit to their colleagues proposals they intend to make at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva on the 27th.

27 October-11 November
Four-Power Meeting of Foreign Ministers in Geneva. Abortive.

15-16 December
Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The Council decides to equip the Atlantic forces with the most advanced weapons, i.e. atomic weapons, and adopts the principle of strengthening air defence by achieving closer co-operation between the European NATO countries in this field.

30 December
The USSR signs a treaty with the Pankow régime, granting it the prerogatives of a State.

1956

27 January
The Pankow régime is admitted to the Warsaw Pact.

14 February
Opening of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party: commencement of 'de-Stalinisation'.

4-5 May
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Mr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway), and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada) are instructed to submit recommendations to the Council on how to improve and extend co-operation between the NATO countries in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.
1956 (cont.)

2 June  Mr. Chepilov replaces Mr. Molotov at the head of Soviet Foreign Affairs.

28 June  Riots at Poznan, in Poland.

26 July  The Egyptian Government nationalizes the Suez Canal.

17 August  The Communist Party is banned in the German Federal Republic.

29 September  Franco-German Agreements on the Saar.

23 October  People's rebellion in Hungary starts.

29 October  Beginning of the Israeli Sinai campaign.

31 October  Franco-British intervention in the Suez Canal area.

4 November  Soviet troops crush the Hungarian People's rebellion.

6 November  President Eisenhower re-elected President of the United States.

9 November  General Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, bids farewell to the Council.


20 November  General Lauris Norstad, new Supreme Allied Commander Europe, takes command.


12 December  Announcement of the United States plan of aid to Middle East.

1957

1 January  Political integration of the Saar with the German Federal Republic.

10 January  Mr. Harold Macmillan succeeds Mr. Anthony Eden as United Kingdom Prime Minister.

6 February  General Speidel is appointed Commander-in-Chief Land Forces Central Europe.

15 February  Mr. Gromyko replaces Mr. Chepilov at the Soviet Foreign Office.

23 March  The United States accedes to the Baghdad Pact.

24 March  Signature of the Rome Treaties setting up Euratom and the European Common Market.

8 April  Reopening of the Suez Canal.

2-3 May  Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bonn. The Council says goodbye to Lord Ismay and decides to intensify its efforts in favour of German reunification by means of free elections.
1957 (cont.)

7 May Admiral Sir Guy Grantham succeeds Admiral Sir George Creasy as Commander-in-Chief Channel.

16 May Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak takes up his post as Secretary General of NATO.

29 July Signing in Berlin of a declaration by the Governments of France, the German Federal Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States, affirming the identity of their policies with regard to the reunification of Germany and to European security.

1 August Unification of the Air Defence Commands of the United States and Canada. Installation of an integrated Headquarters at Colorado Springs.

29 August Proposals approved by all the NATO countries are submitted to the Disarmament Sub-Committee in London.

14 September The General Assembly of UN condemns the Soviet intervention in Hungary.

27 September Mr. Hammarskjöld is re-elected Secretary General of the United Nations for five years.

4 October The first Sputnik is launched.

7 October Creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency with headquarters in Vienna.

14 October Mr. Lester B. Pearson, one of the ‘Wise Men’ of the Committee of Three, is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

23-25 October President Eisenhower and Mr. Harold Macmillan, joined later by Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, meet in Washington. A declaration of common purpose is issued by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, underlining the interdependence of the countries of the free world. It is decided that the Atlantic Council will meet at the level of Heads of Government.


16-19 December Meeting of Heads of Government in Paris. A solemn declaration reaffirms the principles and purposes of the Atlantic Alliance. The Council decides to arm NATO with the most effective weapons. It also decides to promote closer co-operation in the economic field.

1958

31 January The first United States satellite ‘Explorer I’ is launched.

19 March First meeting in Strasbourg of the European Parliamentary Assembly.

27 March Mr. Khrushchev replaces Marshal Bulganin at the head of the Soviet Government.

15-17 April In compliance with decisions taken by the Heads of Government in December, 1957, the Defence Ministers of the NATO countries meet in Paris. They reaffirm the defensive character of NATO strategy.
1958 (cont.)

5-7 May  Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Copenhagen. The Council declares that it is in favour of negotiations with the Eastern Bloc provided they are properly prepared and offer prospects of a settlement of the outstanding questions.

7 August  The atomic submarine 'Nautilus' establishes the first link between the Atlantic and the Pacific passing beneath the North Pole.

10 November  Mr. Khrushchev announces that the ussr wishes to terminate the status assigned to Berlin.


27 November  The Soviet Government confirms Mr. Khrushchev's position on Berlin.

16-19 December  Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The Council associates itself fully with the views expressed by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States on Berlin and on the right of the Western Powers to remain there.

31 December  The Western Powers reject Mr. Khrushchev's plan for Berlin.

1959

1 January  Entry into force of the European Common Market.

13 February  Vice-Admiral Sir Manley Power is appointed Commander-in-Chief Channel in replacement of Admiral Sir Guy Grantham.

19 February  An Anglo-Greco-Turkish Conference decides that Cyprus shall become independent on 19 November, 1960.

21 February-3 March  Mr. Macmillan visits the ussr.

26 February  President Eisenhower issues proclamation on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty.

24 March  Iraq withdraws from the Baghdad Pact.

2-4 April  Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington arranged to coincide with the Tenth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, observed, moreover, in all the NATO countries.

15 April  Resignation of Mr. John Foster Dulles, United States Secretary of State.

11 May  Four-Power Meeting of Foreign Ministers (France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the ussr) on the German question opens in Geneva.

4-10 June  An Atlantic Congress is held in London organized by the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians; attended by 700 delegates, the conference is opened by Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II. The Congress, in particular, recommends the creation of the Atlantic Institute.

19 June  The Geneva Conference is adjourned.
1959 (cont.)

13 July
Resumption of the Geneva Conference.

25 July-
Mr. Richard Nixon, Vice President of the United States, visits the USSR.

2 August

5 August
Second adjournment of the Geneva Conference; the four Ministers issue a statement on disarmament.

9 August
The Baghdad Pact becomes CENTO (Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, the United Kingdom and the United States). Its Headquarters is set up in Ankara.

15-23 September
Mr. Khrushchev visits the United States. There are conversations between the President of the United States and his Soviet guest at Camp David.

15 November
Fifth Conference of NATO Parliamentarians in Washington.

4 December
President Eisenhower, on a trip to Europe, pays a visit to the North Atlantic Council.

15-22 December
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council. The meeting marked the inauguration of the new NATO Headquarters at the Porte Dauphine in Paris; it was largely devoted to discussing East/West negotiations, in preparation for a new Summit Meeting.

16 December
Mr. Spaak informs the Council of the wish of Admiral Jerauld Wright (SACLANT) to be relieved of his Command.

1960

29 February
Admiral Robert L. Dennison (US) succeeds Admiral Jerauld Wright as Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.

15 March
The United Nations Ten Power Disarmament Committee starts negotiations in Geneva.

23 March
Start of a visit to France by Mr. Khrushchev at the invitation of the French Government.

1 May
American U2 aircraft is shot down over Soviet territory.

2-4 May
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul. The member countries review the situation prior to the Summit Meeting.

16 May
Abortive Summit Meeting in Paris (France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR).

19 May
French, United Kingdom and United States Foreign Ministers report to the Atlantic Council on the breakdown of the talks.

27 June
The Communist delegates to the Geneva Conference walk out.

16 August
Cyprus becomes an independent republic.

September
Mr. Khrushchev attends the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York and indulges in demonstrations.

8 November
Mr. John Kennedy is elected President of the United States.
1960 (cont.)

10 November  Summit Meeting in Moscow of the leaders of 81 Communist countries. Approval of Mr. Khrushchev's concept of peaceful co-existence.


14 December  The OECD becomes the OEC, with the United States and Canada among its membership. (The Convention still requires ratification by the Parliaments before it comes into force).


1961

1 January  Inception of the Atlantic Institute with provisional Headquarters set up in Milan.

1 February  Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak, NATO Secretary General, informs the Council of his decision to resume active participation in the political life of his country. The Council accepts his resignation.

17 February  In a note to the German Federal Republic, the Soviet Union reverts to the Berlin question.

5 March  Mr. Spaak leaves his post of Secretary General. Mr. Alberto Casardi, Deputy Secretary General, replaces him provisionally.

18 April  The North Atlantic Council offers the post of Secretary General of NATO to Mr. Dirk U. Stikker, Permanent Representative of the Netherlands on the North Atlantic Council.

21 April  Mr. Dirk U. Stikker takes up his appointment as Secretary General of NATO.

8-10 May  Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo. The Council once more confirms its position on Germany, as expressed in its declaration of December, 1958. The Council also decides to consider ways and means of helping Greece and Turkey to expedite implementation of their development programmes.

2-3 June  Meeting of Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna. Aim: personal contact and general exchange of views.

13 August  The 'Vopos' seal off the Eastern sector of Berlin. The Allied Powers send a note of protest.

31 August  The USSR resumes nuclear tests.

30 September  The OECD Convention comes into force.

17 October  Opening of the Twenty-Second Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Mr. Khrushchev waives the end-of-year time-limit for settlement of the Berlin question. De-Stalinisation is intensified.
1961 (cont.)

26 October  Admiral Sir Alexander Bingley succeeds Admiral Sir Manley Power as Commander-in-Chief Channel.

30 October  The USSR detonates a bomb of over 50 megatons.

8 November  Mr. Cabot Lodge is appointed Director General of the Atlantic Institute. The permanent Headquarters of the Institute is set up in Paris.

13-15 November  Seventh Conference of NATO Parliamentarians.

APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1

ARTICLE 51
OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS

24 October, 1945

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
APPENDIX 2

EXTRACTS FROM THE BRUSSELS TREATY*

17 March, 1948

The titular heads of the participating States:
Resolved to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations; To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage; To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united; To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;
To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression; To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression; To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;
Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;
Have appointed... their plenipotentiaries... who... have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.
The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Consultative Council referred to in Article vii as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organizations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organizations.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialized agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

* The Brussels Treaty has been modified by the 'Paris Agreements' (Protocol revising and completing the Brussels Treaty); see page 232.
The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest, relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialized agencies. They will endeavour to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

**ARTICLE III**

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

**ARTICLE IV**

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

**ARTICLE V**

All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

**ARTICLE VI**

The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any of the other High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty. None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

**ARTICLE VII**

For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will create a Consultative Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately
convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.

ARTICLE VIII

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provision: The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice by referring them to the Court...

ARTICLE IX

The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited...

ARTICLE X

The present Treaty... shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years... Done at Brussels, this seventeenth day of March, 1948...
Whereas peace with justice and the defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms require international co-operation through more effective use of the United Nations: Therefore be it Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest, and that the President be advised of the sense of The Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

1. Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.
2. Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.
3. Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.
4. Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.
5. Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.
6. If necessary, after adequate effort towards strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Conference called under Article 109 or by the General Assembly.
APPENDIX 4

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington D.C., 4 April, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.
**ARTICLE 5**

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**ARTICLE 6**

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.*

**ARTICLE 7**

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**ARTICLE 8**

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

**ARTICLE 9**

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

* Modified by the Greece-Turkey Protocol (See page 201).
ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the governments of the other signatories.
APPENDIX 5

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY

London, 22 October, 1951

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4 April, 1949, Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty, Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article II of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

"For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
i. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
ii. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance
thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such notification and of the date of the
entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified
copies thereof shall be transmitted by the Government to the governments of all the Parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty.
APPENDIX 6

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Paris, 23 October, 1954

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on 4 April, 1949, Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to that Treaty, and Having noted that the Federal Republic of Germany has, by a declaration dated 3 October, 1954, accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken upon its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of that Treaty, and Having further noted that all member governments have associated themselves with the declaration also made on 3 October, 1954, by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic in connection with the aforesaid declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany, Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall on behalf of all the Parties communicate to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter the Federal Republic of Germany shall become a Party to that Treaty on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

The present Protocol shall enter into force, when (a) each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified to the Government of the United States of America its acceptance thereof, (b) all instruments of ratification of the United States of America modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty have been deposited with the Belgian Government, and (c) all instruments of ratification or approval of the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government of the United States of America shall inform the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each notification of acceptance of the present Protocol and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.
ARTICLE III

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the governments of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.
APPENDIX 7

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY REGARDING THE STATUS OF THEIR FORCES

London, 19 June, 1951

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4 April, 1949,
Considering that the forces of one Party may be sent, by arrangement, to serve in the territory of another Party;
Bearing in mind that the decision to send them and the conditions under which they will be sent, in so far as such conditions are not laid down by the present Agreement, will continue to be the subject of separate arrangements between the Parties concerned;
Desiring, however, to define the status of such forces while in the territory of another Party;
Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. In this Agreement the expression—
   a. 'force' means the personnel belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of one Contracting Party when in the territory of another Contracting Party in the North Atlantic Treaty area in connexion with their official duties, provided that the two Contracting Parties concerned may agree that certain individuals, units or formations shall not be regarded as constituting or included in a 'force' for the purposes of the present Agreement;
   b. 'civilian component' means the civilian personnel accompanying a force of a Contracting Party who are in the employ of an armed service of that Contracting Party, and who are not stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in, the State in which the force is located;
   c. 'dependent' means the spouse of a member of a force or of a civilian component, or a child of such member depending on him or her for support;
   d. 'sending State' means the Contracting Party to which the force belongs;
   e. 'receiving State' means the Contracting Party in the territory of which the force or civilian component is located, whether it be stationed there or passing in transit;
   f. 'military authorities of the sending State' means those authorities of a sending State who are empowered by its law to enforce the military law of that State with respect to members of its forces or civilian components;
   g. 'North Atlantic Council' means the Council established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty or any of its subsidiary bodies authorised to act on its behalf.

2. This Agreement shall apply to the authorities of political sub-divisions of the Contracting Parties, within their territories to which the Agreement applies or extends in acce-
dance with Article xx, as it applies to the central authorities of those Contracting Parties, provided, however, that property owned by political sub-divisions shall not be considered to be property owned by a Contracting Party within the meaning of Article vii.

ARTICLE II

It is the duty of a force and its civilian component and the members thereof as well as their dependents to respect the law of the receiving State, and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the present Agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the receiving State. It is also the duty of the sending State to take necessary measures to that end.

ARTICLE III

1. On the conditions specified in paragraph 2 of this Article and subject to compliance with the formalities established by the receiving State relating to entry and departure of a force or the members thereof, such members shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations and immigration inspection on entering or leaving the territory of a receiving State. They shall also be exempt from the regulations of the receiving State on the registration and control of aliens, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right to permanent residence or domicile in the territories of the receiving State.

2. The following documents only will be required in respect of members of a force. They must be presented on demand:
   a. personal identity card issued by the sending State showing names, date of birth, rank and number (if any), service, and photograph;
   b. individual or collective movement order, in the language of the sending State and in the English and French languages, issued by an appropriate agency of the sending State or of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and certifying to the status of the individual or group as a member or members of a force and to the movement ordered. The receiving State may require a movement order to be countersigned by its appropriate representative.

3. Members of a civilian component and dependents shall be so described in their passports.

4. If a member of a force or of a civilian component leaves the employ of the sending State and is not repatriated, the authorities of the sending State shall immediately inform the authorities of the receiving State, giving such particulars as may be required. The authorities of the sending State shall similarly inform the authorities of the receiving State of any member who has absented himself for more than twenty-one days.

5. If the receiving State has requested the removal from its territory of a member of a force or civilian component or has made an expulsion order against an ex-member of a force or of a civilian component or against a dependent of a member or ex-member, the authorities of the sending State shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned within their own territory or otherwise disposing of him outside the receiving State. This paragraph shall apply only to persons who are not nationals of the receiving State and have entered the receiving State as members of a force or civilian component or for the purpose of becoming such members, and to the dependents of such persons.
ARTICLE IV

The receiving State shall either
a. accept as valid, without a driving test or fee, the driving permit or licence or military driving permit issued by the sending State or a sub-division thereof to a member of a force or of a civilian component; or
b. issue its own driving permit or licence to any member of a force or civilian component who holds a driving permit or licence or military driving permit issued by the sending State or a sub-division thereof, provided that no driving test shall be required.

ARTICLE V

1. Members of a force shall normally wear uniform. Subject to any arrangement to the contrary between the authorities of the sending and receiving States, the wearing of civilian dress shall be on the same conditions as for members of the forces of the receiving State. Regularly constituted units or formations of a force shall be in uniform when crossing a frontier.

2. Service vehicles of a force or civilian component shall carry, in addition to their registration number, a distinctive nationality mark.

ARTICLE VI

Members of a force may possess and carry arms, on condition that they are authorized to do so by their orders. The authorities of the sending State shall give sympathetic consideration to requests from the receiving State concerning this matter.

ARTICLE VII

1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,
   a. the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State;
   b. the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences committed within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of that State.

2. a. The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State.
   b. The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of that State, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending State.
   c. For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a security offence against a State shall include:
      (i) treason against the State;
      (ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of that State, or secrets relating to the national defence of that State.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:
   a. The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation to
      (i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent;
      (ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.
   b. In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
   c. If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.
4. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall not imply any right for the military authorities of the sending State to exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in the receiving State, unless they are members of the force of the sending State.
5. a. The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their dependents in the territory of the receiving State and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.
   b. The authorities of the receiving State shall notify promptly the military authorities of the sending State of the arrest of any member of a force or civilian component or a dependent.
   c. The custody of an accused member of a force or civilian component over whom the receiving State is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the sending State, remain with that State until he is charged by the receiving State.
6. a. The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offence. The handing over of such objects may, however, be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them.
   b. The authorities of the Contracting Parties shall notify one another of the disposition of all cases in which there are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.
7. a. A death sentence shall not be carried out in the receiving State by the authorities of the sending State if the legislation of the receiving State does not provide for such punishment in a similar case.
   b. The authorities of the receiving State shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the sending State for assistance in carrying out a sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the authorities of the sending State under the provision of this Article within the territory of the receiving State.
8. Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offence within the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party. However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the sending State from trying a member of its force for any violation of rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an offence for which he was tried by the authorities of another Contracting Party.
9. Whenever a member of a force or civilian component of a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled:
   a. to a prompt and speedy trial;
   b. to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made against him;
   c. to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
   d. to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
   e. to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to have free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the receiving State;
   f. if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and
   g. to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at his trial.
10. a. Regularly constituted military units or formations of a force shall have the right to police any camps, establishments or other premises which they occupy as the result of an agreement with the receiving State. The military police of the force may take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security on such premises.
b. Outside these premises, such military police shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the authorities of the receiving State and in liaison with those authorities, and in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among the members of the force.
11. Each Contracting Party shall seek such legislation as it deems necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within its territory of installations, equipment, property, records and official information of other Contracting Parties, and the punishment of persons who may contravene laws enacted for that purpose.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Each Contracting Party waives all its claims against any other Contracting Party for damage to any property owned by it and used by its land, sea or air armed services, if such damage:
   (i) was caused by a member or an employee of the armed services of the other Contracting Party in the execution of his duties in connexion with the operation of the North Atlantic Treaty; or
   (ii) arose from the use of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft owned by the other Contracting Party and used by its armed services, provided either that the vehicle, vessel or aircraft causing the damage was being used in connexion with the operation of the North Atlantic Treaty, or that the damage was caused to property being so used.

Claims for maritime salvage by one Contracting Party against any other Contracting Party shall be waived, provided that the vessel or cargo salvaged was owned by a Contracting Party and being used by its armed services in connexion with the operation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. a. In the case of damage caused or arising as stated in paragraph 1 to other property owned by a Contracting Party and located in its territory, the issue of the liability of any other Contracting Party shall be determined and the amount of damage shall be assessed, unless the Contracting Parties concerned agree otherwise, by a sole arbitrator selected in accordance with sub-paragraph b. of this paragraph. The arbitrator shall also decide any counter-claims arising out of the same incident.
b. The arbitrator referred to in sub-paragraph a. above shall be selected by agreement between the Contracting Parties concerned from amongst the nationals of the receiving
State who hold or have held high judicial office. If the Contracting Parties concerned are unable, within two months, to agree upon the arbitrator, either may request the Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies to select a person with the aforesaid qualifications.

c. Any decision taken by the arbitrator shall be binding and conclusive upon the Contracting Parties.

d. The amount of any compensation awarded by the arbitrator shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 e. (i), (ii) and (iii) of this Article.

e. The compensation of the arbitrator shall be fixed by agreement between the Contracting Parties concerned and shall, together with the necessary expenses incidental to the performance of his duties, be defrayed in equal proportions by them.

f. Nevertheless, each Contracting Party waives its claim in any such case where the damage is less than:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>B. fr. 70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>$ 1,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Kr. 9,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>F. fr. 490,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Kr. 22,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Li. 850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>L. fr. 70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Fl. 5,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Kr. 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Es. 40,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>£ 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$ 1,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Any other Contracting Party whose property has been damaged in the same incident shall also waive its claim up to the above amount. In the case of considerable variation in the rates of exchange between these currencies the Contracting Parties shall agree on the appropriate adjustments of these amounts.

3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article the expression “owned by a Contracting Party” in the case of a vessel includes a vessel on bare boat charter to that Contracting Party or requisitioned by it on bare boat terms or seized by it in prize (except to the extent that the risk of loss or liability is borne by some person other than such Contracting Party).

4. Each Contracting Party waives all its claims against any other Contracting Party for injury or death suffered by any member of its armed services while such member was engaged in the performance of his official duties.

5. Claims (other than contractual claims and those to which paragraphs 6 or 7 of this Article apply) arising out of acts or omissions of members of a force or civilian component done in the performance of official duty, or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which a force or civilian component is legally responsible, and causing damage in the territory of the receiving State to third parties, other than any of the Contracting Parties, shall be dealt with by the receiving State in accordance with the following provisions:

a. Claims shall be filed, considered and settled or adjudicated in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State with respect to claims arising from the activities of its own armed forces.

b. The receiving State may settle any such claims, and payment of the amount agreed upon or determined by adjudication shall be made by the receiving State in its currency.

c. Such payment, whether made pursuant to a settlement or to adjudication of the case by a competent tribunal of the receiving State, or the final adjudication by such a tribunal denying payment, shall be binding and conclusive upon the Contracting Parties.
d. Every claim paid by the receiving State shall be communicated to the sending States concerned together with full particulars and a proposed distribution in conformity with sub-paragraphs e. (i), (ii) and (iii) below. In default of a reply within two months, the proposed distribution shall be regarded as accepted.

e. The cost incurred in satisfying claims pursuant to the preceding sub-paragraphs and para. 2 of this Article shall be distributed between the Contracting Parties, as follows:

(i) Where one sending State alone is responsible, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed in the proportion of 25 per cent. chargeable to the receiving State and 75 per cent. chargeable to the sending State.

(ii) Where more than one State is responsible for the damage, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed equally among them: however, if the receiving State is not one of the States responsible, its contribution shall be half that of each of the sending States.

(iii) Where the damage was caused by the armed services of the Contracting Parties and it is not possible to attribute it specifically to one or more of those armed services, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed equally among the Contracting Parties concerned: however, if the receiving State is not one of the States by whose armed services the damage was caused, its contribution shall be half that of each of the sending States.

(iv) Every half-year, a statement of the sums paid by the receiving State in the course of the half-yearly period in respect of every case regarding which the proposed distribution on a percentage basis has been accepted, shall be sent to the sending States concerned, together with a request for reimbursement. Such reimbursement shall be made within the shortest possible time, in the currency of the receiving State.

f. In cases where the application of the provisions of sub-paragraphs b. and e. of this paragraph would cause a Contracting Party serious hardship, it may request the North Atlantic Council to arrange a settlement of a different nature.

g. A member of a force or civilian component shall not be subject to any proceedings for the enforcement of any judgment given against him in the receiving State in a matter arising from the performance of his official duties.

h. Except in so far as sub-paragraph e. of this paragraph applies to claims covered by paragraph 2 of this Article, the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any claim arising out of or in connexion with the navigation or operation of a ship or the loading, carriage, or discharge of a cargo, other than claims for death or personal injury to which paragraph 4 of this Article does not apply.

6. Claims against members of a force or civilian component arising out of tortious acts or omissions in the receiving State not done in the performance of official duty shall be dealt with in the following manner:

a. The authorities of the receiving State shall consider the claim and assess compensation to the claimant in a fair and just manner, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the injured person, and shall prepare a report on the matter.

b. The report shall be delivered to the authorities of the sending State, who shall then decide without delay whether they will offer an ex gratia payment, and if so, of what amount.

c. If an offer of ex gratia payment is made, and accepted by the claimant in full satisfaction of his claim, the authorities of the sending State shall make the payment themselves and inform the authorities of the receiving State of their decision and of the sum paid.

d. Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving State to entertain an action against a member of a force or of a civilian component unless and until there has been payment in full satisfaction of the claim.
7. Claims arising out of the unauthorized use of any vehicle of the armed services of a sending State shall be dealt with in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article, except in so far as the force or civilian component is legally responsible.

8. If a dispute arises as to whether a tortious act or omission of a member of a force or civilian component was done in the performance of official duty or as to whether the use of any vehicle of the armed services of a sending State was unauthorized, the question shall be submitted to an arbitrator appointed in accordance with paragraph 2 b. of this Article, whose decision on this point shall be final and conclusive.

9. The sending State shall not claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving State for members of a force or civilian component in respect of the civil jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving State except to the extent provided in paragraph 5 g. of this Article.

10. The authorities of the sending State and of the receiving State shall co-operate in the procurement of evidence for a fair hearing and disposal of claims in regard to which the Contracting Parties are concerned.

**ARTICLE IX**

1. Members of a force or of a civilian component and their dependents may purchase locally goods necessary for their own consumption, and such services as they need, under the same conditions as the nationals of the receiving State.

2. Goods which are required from local sources for the subsistence of a force or civilian component shall normally be purchased through the authorities which purchase such goods for the armed services of the receiving State. In order to avoid such purchases having any adverse effect on the economy of the receiving State, the competent authorities of that State shall indicate, when necessary, any articles the purchase of which should be restricted or forbidden.

3. Subject to agreements already in force or which may hereafter be made between the authorized representatives of the sending and receiving States, the authorities of the receiving State shall assume sole responsibility for making suitable arrangements to make available to a force or a civilian component the buildings and grounds which it requires, as well as facilities and services connected therewith. These agreements and arrangements shall be, as far as possible, in accordance with the regulations governing the accommodation and billeting of similar personnel of the receiving State. In the absence of a specific contract to the contrary, the laws of the receiving State shall determine the rights and obligations arising out of the occupation or use of the buildings, grounds, facilities or services.

4. Local civilian labour requirements of a force or civilian component shall be satisfied in the same way as the comparable requirements of the receiving State and with the assistance of the authorities of the receiving State through the employment exchanges. The conditions of employment and work, in particular wages, supplementary payments and conditions for the protection of workers, shall be those laid down by the legislation of the receiving State. Such civilian workers employed by a force or civilian component shall not be regarded for any purpose as being members of that force or civilian component.

5. When a force or a civilian component has at the place where it is stationed inadequate medical or dental facilities, its members and their dependents may receive medical and dental care, including hospitalization, under the same conditions as comparable personnel of the receiving State.

6. The receiving State shall give the most favourable consideration to requests for the grant to members of a force or of a civilian component of travelling facilities and concessions
with regard to fares. These facilities and concessions will be the subject of special arrange­ments to be made between the Governments concerned.

7. Subject to any general or particular financial arrangements between the Contracting Parties, payment in local currency for goods, accommodation and services furnished under paragraphs, 2, 3, 4 and, if necessary, 5 and 6, of this Article shall be made promptly by the authorities of the force.

8. Neither a force, nor a civilian component, nor the members thereof, nor their dependents, shall by reason of this Article enjoy any exemption from taxes or duties relating to purchases and services chargeable under the fiscal regulations of the receiving State.

ARTICLE X

1. Where the legal incidence of any form of taxation in the receiving State depends upon residence or domicile, periods during which a member of a force or civilian component is in the territory of that State by reason solely of his being a member of such force or civilian component shall not be considered as periods of residence therein, or as creating a change of residence or domicile, for the purposes of such taxation. Members of a force or civilian component shall be exempt from taxation in the receiving State on the salary and emoluments paid to them as such members by the sending State or on any tangible movable property the presence of which in the receiving State is due solely to their temporary presence there.

2. Nothing in this Article shall prevent taxation of a member of a force or civilian compo­nent with respect to any profitable enterprise, other than his employment as such member, in which he may engage in the receiving State, and, except as regards his salary and emoluments and the tangible movable property referred to in paragraph 1, nothing in this Article shall prevent taxation of which, even if regarded as having his residence or domicile outside the territory of the receiving State, such a member is liable under the law of that State.

3. Nothing in this Article shall apply to ‘duty’ as defined in paragraph 12 of Article xi.

4. For the purposes of this Article the term ‘member of a force’ shall not include any person who is a national of the receiving State.

ARTICLE XI

1. Save as provided expressly to the contrary in this Agreement, members of a force and of a civilian component as well as their dependents shall be subject to the laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities of the receiving State. In particular the customs authorities of the receiving State shall have the right, under the general conditions laid down by the laws and regulations of the receiving State, to search members of a force or civilian component and their dependents and to examine their luggage and vehicles, and to seize articles pursuant to such laws and regulations.

2. a. The temporary importation and the re-exportation of service vehicles of a force or civilian component under their own power shall be authorized free of duty on presentation of a triptyque in the form shown in the Appendix to this Agreement.

b. The temporary importation of such vehicles not under their own power shall be governed by paragraph 4 of this Article and the re-exportation thereof by paragraph 8.

c. Service vehicles of a force or civilian component shall be exempt from any tax payable in respect of the use of vehicles on the roads.

3. Official documents under official seal shall not be subject to customs inspection. Couriers, whatever their status, carrying these documents must be in possession of an
individual movement order, issued in accordance with paragraph 2 b. of Article m. This movement order shall show the number of despatches carried and certify that they contain only official documents.

4. A force may import free of duty the equipment for the force and reasonable quantities of provisions, supplies and other goods for the exclusive use of the force and, in cases where such use is permitted by the receiving State, its civilian component and dependents. This duty-free importation shall be subject to the deposit, at the customs office for the place of entry, together with such customs documents as shall be agreed, of a certificate in a form agreed between the receiving State and the sending State signed by a person authorized by the sending State for that purpose. The designation of the person authorized to sign the certificates as well as specimens of the signatures and stamps to be used, shall be sent to the customs administration of the receiving State.

5. A member of a force or civilian component may, at the time of his first arrival to take up service in the receiving State or at the time of the first arrival of any dependent to join him, import his personal effects and furniture free of duty for the term of such service.

6. Members of a force or civilian component may import temporarily free of duty their private motor vehicles for the personal use of themselves and their dependents. There is no obligation under this Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use of roads by private vehicles.

7. Imports made by the authorities of a force other than for the exclusive use of that force and its civilian component, and imports, other than those dealt with in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Article, effected by members of a force or civilian component are not, by reason of this Article, entitled to any exemption from duty or other conditions.

8. Goods which have been imported duty-free under paragraphs 2 b., 4, 5 or 6 above:
   a. may be re-exported freely, provided that, in the case of goods imported under paragraph 4, a certificate, issued in accordance with that paragraph, is presented to the customs office: the customs authorities, however, may verify that goods re-exported are as described in the certificate, if any, and have in fact been imported under the conditions of paragraphs 2 b., 4, 5 or 6 as the case may be;
   b. shall not normally be disposed of in the receiving State by way of either sale or gift: however, in particular cases such disposal may be authorized on conditions imposed by the authorities concerned of the receiving State (for instance, on payment of duty and tax and compliance with the requirements of the controls of trade and exchange).

9. Goods purchased in the receiving State shall be exported therefrom only in accordance with the regulations in force in the receiving State.

10. Special arrangements for crossing frontiers shall be granted by the customs authorities to regularly constituted units or formations, provided that the customs authorities concerned have been duly notified in advance.

11. Special arrangements shall be made by the receiving State so that fuel, oil and lubricants for use in service vehicles, aircraft and vessels of a force or civilian component, may be delivered free of all duties and taxes.

12. In paragraphs 1-10 of this Article:
   ‘duty’ means customs duties and all other duties and taxes payable on importation or exportation, as the case may be, except dues and taxes which are no more than charges for services rendered;
   ‘importation’ includes withdrawal from customs warehouses or continuous customs custody, provided that the goods concerned have not been grown, produced or manufactured in the receiving State.

13. The provisions of this Article shall apply to the goods concerned not only when they are imported into or exported from the receiving State but also when they are in transit.
through the territory of a Contracting Party, and for this purpose the expression 'receiving State' in this Article shall be regarded as including any Contracting Party through whose territory the goods are passing in transit.

ARTICLE XII

1. The customs or fiscal authorities of the receiving State may, as a condition of the grant of any customs or fiscal exemption or concession provided for in this Agreement, require such conditions to be observed as they may deem necessary to prevent abuse.

2. These authorities may refuse any exemption provided for by this Agreement in respect of the importation into the receiving State of articles grown, produced or manufactured in that State which have been exported therefrom without payment of, or upon repayment of, taxes or duties which would have been chargeable but for such exportation. Goods removed from a customs warehouse shall be deemed to be imported if they were regarded as having been exported by reason of being deposited in the warehouse.

ARTICLE XIII

1. In order to prevent offences against customs and fiscal laws regulations, the authorities of the receiving and of the sending States shall assist each other in the conduct of enquiries and the collection of evidence.

2. The authorities of a force shall render all assistance within their power to ensure that articles liable to seizure by, or on behalf of, the customs or fiscal authorities of the receiving State are handed to those authorities.

3. The authorities of a force shall render all assistance within their power to ensure the payment of duties, taxes and penalties payable by members of the force of civilian component or their dependents.

4. Service vehicles and articles belonging to a force or to its civilian component, and not to a member of such force or civilian component, seized by the authorities of the receiving State in connexion with an offence against its customs or fiscal laws or regulations shall be handed over to the appropriate authorities of the force concerned.

ARTICLE XIV

1. A force, a civilian component and the members thereof, as well as their dependents, shall remain subject to the foreign exchange regulations of the sending State and shall also be subject to the regulations of the receiving State.

2. The foreign exchange authorities of the sending and the receiving States may issue special regulations applicable to a force or civilian component or the members thereof as well as to their dependents.

ARTICLE XV

1. Subject to paragraph 2 of this Article, this Agreement shall remain in force in the event of hostilities to which the North Atlantic Treaty applies, except that the provisions for settling claims in paragraphs 2 and 5 of Article VIII shall not apply to war damage, and that the
provisions of the Agreement, and, in particular of Articles m and vii, shall immediately be reviewed by the Contracting Parties concerned, who may agree to such modifications as they may consider desirable regarding the application of the Agreement between them.

2. In the event of such hostilities, each of the Contracting Parties shall have the right, by giving 60 days' notice to the other Contracting Parties, to suspend the application of any of the provisions of this Agreement so far as it is concerned. If this right is exercised, the Contracting Parties shall immediately consult with a view to agreeing on suitable provisions to replace the provisions suspended.

ARTICLE XVI

All differences between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be settled by negotiation between them without recourse to any outside jurisdiction. Except where express provision is made to the contrary in this Agreement, differences which cannot be settled by direct negotiation shall be referred to the North Atlantic Council.

ARTICLE XVII

Any Contracting Party may at any time request the revision of any Article of this Agreement. The request shall be addressed to the North Atlantic Council.

ARTICLE XVIII

1. The present Agreement shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify each signatory State of the date of deposit thereof.

2. Thirty days after four signatory States have deposited their instruments of ratification the present Agreement shall come into force between them. It shall come into force for each other signatory State thirty days after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

3. After it has come into force, the present Agreement shall, subject to the approval of the North Atlantic Council and to such conditions as it may decide, be open to accession on behalf of any State which accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify each signatory and acceding State of the date of deposit thereof. In respect of any State on behalf of which an instrument of accession is deposited, the present Agreement shall come into force thirty days after the date of the deposit of such instrument.

ARTICLE XIX

1. The present Agreement may be denounced by any Contracting Party after the expiration of a period of four years from the date on which the Agreement comes into force.

2. The denunciation of the Agreement by any Contracting Party shall be effected by a written notification addressed by that Contracting Party to the Government of the United States of America which shall notify all the other Contracting Parties of each such notification and the date of receipt thereof.
3. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the receipt of the notification by the Government of the United States of America. After the expiration of this period of one year, the Agreement shall cease to be in force as regards the Contracting Party which denounces it, but shall continue in force for the remaining Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE XX

1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the present Agreement shall apply only to the metropolitan territory of a Contracting Party.

2. Any State may, however, at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or accession or at any time thereafter, declare by notification given to the Government of the United States of America that the present Agreement shall extend (subject, if the State making the declaration considers it to be necessary, to the conclusion of a special agreement between that State and each of the sending States concerned), to all or any of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible in the North Atlantic Treaty area. The present Agreement shall then extend to the territory or territories named therein thirty days after the receipt by the Government of the United States of America of the notification, or thirty days after the conclusion of the special agreements if required, or when it has come into force under Article xviii, whichever is the later.

3. A State which has made a declaration under paragraph 2 of this Article extending the present Agreement to any territory for whose international relations it is responsible may denounce the Agreement separately in respect of that territory in accordance with the provisions of Article xix.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement.

Done in London this nineteenth day of June, 1951, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory and acceding States.
APPENDIX 8

PROTOCOL ON THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY HEADQUARTERS SET UP PURSUANT TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Paris, 28 August, 1952

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington on 4th April, 1949, Considering that international military Headquarters may be established in their territories, by separate arrangement, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and Desiring to define the status of such Headquarters and of the personnel thereof within the North Atlantic Treaty area, Have agreed to the present Protocol to the Agreement signed in London on 19th June, 1951, regarding the Status of their Forces:

ARTICLE 1

In the present Protocol the expression
a. ‘the Agreement’ means the Agreement signed in London on 19th June, 1951, by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces;
b. ‘Supreme Headquarters’ means Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe, Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and any equivalent international military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty;
c. ‘Allied Headquarters’ means any Supreme Headquarters and any international military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty which is immediately subordinate to a Supreme Headquarters;
d. ‘North Atlantic Council’ means the Council established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty or any of its subsidiary bodies authorised to act on its behalf.

ARTICLE 2

Subject to the following provisions of this Protocol, the Agreement shall apply to Allied Headquarters in the territory of a Party to the present Protocol in the North Atlantic Treaty area, and to the military and civilian personnel of such Headquarters and their dependents included in the definitions in sub-paragraphs a., b. and c. of paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Protocol, when such personnel are present in any such territory in connection with their official duties or, in the case of dependents, the official duties of their spouse or parent.
ARTICLE 3

1. For the purpose of applying the Agreement to an Allied Headquarters the expressions 'force', 'civilian component' and 'dependent', wherever they occur in the Agreement shall have the meanings set out below:

a. 'force' means the personnel attached to the Allied Headquarters who belong to the land, sea or air armed services of any Party to the North Atlantic Treaty;

b. 'civilian component' means civilian personnel who are not stateless persons, nor nationals of any State which is not a Party to the Treaty, nor nationals of, nor ordinarily resident in the receiving State, and who are (i) attached to the Allied Headquarters and in the employ of an armed service of a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty or (ii) in such categories of civilian personnel in the employ of the Allied Headquarters as the North Atlantic Council shall decide;

c. 'dependent' means the spouse of a member of a force or civilian component, as defined in sub-paragraphs a. and b. of this paragraph, or a child of such member depending on him or her for support.

2. An Allied Headquarters shall be considered to be a force for the purposes of Article ii, paragraph 2 of Article v, paragraph 10 of Article vii, paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 of Article ix, and Article xiii, of the Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

The rights and obligations which the Agreement gives to or imposes upon the sending State or its authorities in respect of its forces or their civilian components or dependents shall, in respect of an Allied Headquarters and its personnel and their dependents to whom the Agreement applies in accordance with Article 2 of the present Protocol, be vested in or attached to the appropriate Supreme Headquarters and the authorities responsible under it, except that:

a. the right which is given by Article vii of the Agreement to the military authorities of the sending State to exercise criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction shall be vested in the military authorities of the State, if any, to whose military law the person concerned is subject;

b. the obligations imposed upon the sending State or its authorities by Article ii, paragraph 4 of Article iii, paragraphs 5 a. and 6 a. of Article vii, paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article viii, and Article xiii, of the Agreement, shall attach both to the Allied Headquarters and to any State whose armed service, or any member or employee of whose armed service, or the dependent of such member or employee, is concerned;

c. for the purposes of paragraphs 2 a. and 5 of Article iii, and Article xiv, of the Agreement the sending State shall be, in the case of members of a force and their dependents, the State to whose armed service the member belongs, or, in the case of members of a civilian component and their dependents, the State, if any, by whose armed service he is employed;

d. the obligations imposed on the sending State by virtue of paragraphs 6 and 7 of Article viii of the Agreement shall attach to the State to whose armed service the person belongs whose act or omission has given rise to the claim or, in the case of a member of a civilian component, to the State by whose armed service he is employed or, if there is no such State, to the Allied Headquarters of which the person concerned is a member. Both the State, if any, to which obligations attach under this paragraph and the Allied Headquarters concerned shall have the rights of the sending State in connection with the appointment of an arbitrator under paragraph 8 of Article viii.
ARTICLE 5

Every member of an Allied Headquarters shall have a personal identity card issued by the Headquarters showing names, date and place of birth, nationality, rank or grade, number (if any), photograph and period of validity. This card must be presented on demand.

ARTICLE 6

1. The obligations to waive claims imposed on the Contracting Parties by Article viii of the Agreement shall attach both to the Allied Headquarters and to any Party to this Protocol concerned.

2. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article viii of the Agreement,
   a. property owned by an Allied Headquarters or by a Party to this Protocol and used by an Allied Headquarters shall be deemed to be property owned by a Contracting Party and used by its armed services;
   b. damage caused by a member of a force or civilian component as defined in paragraph 1 of Article vii of this Protocol or by any other employee of an Allied Headquarters shall be deemed to be damage caused by a member or employee of the armed services of a Contracting Party;
   c. the definition of the expression ‘owned by a Contracting Party’ in paragraph 3 of Article viii shall apply in respect of an Allied Headquarters.

3. The claims to which paragraph 5 of Article viii of the Agreement applies shall include claims (other than contractual claims and claims to which paragraphs 6 or 7 of that Article apply) arising out of acts or omissions of any employees of an Allied Headquarters, or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which an Allied Headquarters is legally responsible, and causing damage in the territory of a receiving State to third parties, other than any of the Parties to this Protocol.

ARTICLE 7

1. The exemption from taxation accorded under Article x of the Agreement to members of a force or civilian component in respect of their salaries and emoluments shall apply, as regards personnel of an Allied Headquarters within the definitions in paragraph 1 a. and b. (i) of Article 3 of this Protocol, to salaries and emoluments paid to them as such personnel by the armed service to which they belong or by which they are employed, except that this paragraph shall not exempt any such member or employee from taxation imposed by a State of which he is a national.

2. Employees of an Allied Headquarters of categories agreed by the North Atlantic Council shall be exempted from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the Allied Headquarters in their capacity as such employees. Any Party to the present Protocol may, however, conclude an arrangement with the Allied Headquarters whereby such Party will employ and assign to the Allied Headquarters all of its nationals (except, if such Party so desires, any not ordinarily resident within its territory) who are to serve on the staff of the Allied Headquarters and pay the salaries and emoluments of such persons from its own funds, at a scale fixed by it. The salaries and emoluments so paid may be taxed by the Party concerned but shall be exempted from taxation by any other Party. If such an arrangement is entered into by any Party to the present Protocol and is subsequently modified or terminated, Parties to the present Protocol shall no longer be bound under the first sentence of this paragraph to exempt from taxation the salaries and emoluments paid to their nationals.
ARTICLE 8

1. For the purpose of facilitating the establishment, construction, maintenance and operation of Allied Headquarters, these Headquarters shall be relieved, so far as practicable, from duties and taxes, affecting expenditures by them in the interest of common defence and for their official and exclusive benefit, and each Party to the present Protocol shall enter into negotiations with any Allied Headquarters operating in its territory for the purpose of concluding an agreement to give effect to this provision.

2. An Allied Headquarters shall have the rights granted to a force under Article XI of the Agreement subject to the same conditions.

3. The provisions in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article XI of the Agreement shall not apply to nationals of the receiving States, unless such nationals belong to the armed services of a Party to this Protocol other than the receiving State.

4. The expression 'duties and taxes' in this Article does not include charges for services rendered.

ARTICLE 9

Except in so far as the North Atlantic Council may decide otherwise,

a. any assets acquired from the international funds of an Allied Headquarters under its capital budget and no longer required by the Headquarters shall be disposed of under arrangements approved by the North Atlantic Council and the proceeds shall be distributed among or credited to the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in the proportions in which they have contributed to the capital costs of the Headquarters. The receiving State shall have the prior right to acquire any immovable property so disposed of in its territory provided that it offers terms no less favourable than those offered by any third party;

b. any land, buildings or fixed installations provided for the use of an Allied Headquarters by the receiving State without charge to the Headquarters (other than a nominal charge) and no longer required by the Headquarters shall be handed back to the receiving State, and any increase or loss in the value of the property provided by the receiving State resulting from its use by the Headquarters shall be determined by the North Atlantic Council (taking into consideration any applicable law of the receiving State) and distributed among or credited or debited to the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty in the proportions in which they have contributed to the capital costs of the Headquarters.

ARTICLE 10

Each Supreme Headquarters shall possess juridical personality; it shall have the capacity to conclude contracts and to acquire and dispose of property. The receiving State may, however, make the exercise of such capacity subject to special arrangements between it and the Supreme Headquarters or any subordinate Allied Headquarters acting on behalf of the Supreme Headquarters.

ARTICLE 11

1. Subject to the provisions of Article VIII of the Agreement, a Supreme Headquarters may engage in legal proceedings as claimant or defendant. However, the receiving State and the
STATUS OF MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Supreme Headquarters or any subordinate Allied Headquarters authorized by it may agree that the receiving State shall act on behalf of the Supreme Headquarters in any legal proceedings to which that Headquarters is a party before the courts of the receiving State.

2. No measure of execution or measure directed to the seizure or attachment of its property or funds shall be taken against any Allied Headquarters, except for the purposes of paragraph 6 a. of Article vii and Article xiii of the Agreement.

ARTICLE 12

1. To enable it to operate its international budget, an Allied Headquarters may hold currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency.

2. The Parties to the present Protocol shall, at the request of an Allied Headquarters, facilitate transfers of the funds of such Headquarters from one country to another and the conversion of any currency held by an Allied Headquarters into any other currency, when necessary to meet the requirements of any Allied Headquarters.

ARTICLE 13

The archives and other official documents of an Allied Headquarters kept in premises used by those Headquarters or in the possession of any properly authorized member of the Headquarters shall be inviolable, unless the Headquarters has waived this immunity. The Headquarters shall, at the request of the receiving State and in the presence of a representative of that State, verify the nature of any documents to confirm that they are entitled to immunity under this Article.

ARTICLE 14

1. The whole or any part of the present Protocol or of the Agreement may be applied, by decision of the North Atlantic Council, to any international military Headquarters or organization (not included in the definitions in paragraphs b. and c. of Article I of this Protocol) which is established pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.

2. When the European Defence Community comes into being, the present Protocol may be applied to the personnel of the European Defence Forces attached to an Allied Headquarters and their dependents at such time and in such manner as may be determined by the North Atlantic Council.

ARTICLE 15

All differences between the Parties to the present Protocol or between any such Parties and any Allied Headquarters relating to the interpretation or application of the Protocol shall be settled by negotiation between the parties in dispute without recourse to any outside jurisdiction. Except where express provision is made to the contrary in the present Protocol or in the Agreement, differences which cannot be settled by direct negotiation shall be referred to the North Atlantic Council.
ARTICLE 16

1. Articles xv and xvii to xx of the Agreement shall apply as regards the present Protocol as if they were an integral part thereof, but so that the Protocol may be reviewed, suspended, ratified, acceded to, denounced or extended in accordance with those provisions independently from the Agreement.

2. The present Protocol may be supplemented by bilateral agreement between the receiving State and a Supreme Headquarters, and the authorities of a receiving State and a Supreme Headquarters may agree to give effect, by administrative means in advance of ratification, to any provisions of this Protocol or of the Agreement as applied by it.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

Done in Paris this 28th day of August 1952, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory and acceding States.
AGREEMENT ON THE STATUS OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION,
NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES
AND INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Ottawa, 20 September 1951

The States signatory to the present Agreement,
Considering that for the exercise of their functions and the fulfilment of their purposes it is
necessary that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its international staff and the repre­
sentatives of Member States attending meetings thereof should have the status set out
hereunder,
Have agreed as follows:

PART I. GENERAL

ARTICLE 1

In the present Agreement,
a. 'the Organization' means the North Atlantic Treaty Organization consisting of the
Council and its subsidiary bodies;
b. 'the Council' means the Council established under Article 9 of the North Atlantic
Treaty and the Council Deputies;
c. 'subsidiary bodies' means any organ, committee or service established by the Council or
under its authority, except those to which, in accordance with Article 2, this Agreement
does not apply;
d. 'Chairman of the Council Deputies' includes, in his absence, the Vice-Chairman acting
for him.

ARTICLE 2

The present Agreement shall not apply to any military headquarters established in pursuance
of the North Atlantic Treaty nor, unless the Council decides otherwise, to any other military
bodies.

ARTICLE 3

The Organization and Member States shall co-operate at all times to facilitate the proper
administration of justice, secure the observance of police regulations and prevent the occur­
rence of any abuse in connexion with the immunities and privileges set out in the present
Agreement. If any Member State considers that there has been an abuse of any immunity or privilege conferred by this Agreement, consultations shall be held between that State and the Organization, or between the States concerned, to determine whether any such abuse has occurred, and, if so, to attempt to ensure that no repetition occurs. Notwithstanding the foregoing or any other provisions of this Agreement, a Member State which considers that any person has abused his privilege of residence or any other privilege or immunity granted to him under this Agreement may require him to leave its territory.

PART II. THE ORGANIZATION

ARTICLE 4

The Organization shall possess juridical personality; it shall have the capacity to conclude contracts, to acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property and to institute legal proceedings.

ARTICLE 5

The Organization, its property and assets, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case the Chairman of the Council Deputies, acting on behalf of the Organization, may expressly authorize the waiver of this immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution or detention of property.

ARTICLE 6

The premises of the Organization shall be inviolable. Its property and assets, wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any other form of interference.

ARTICLE 7

The archives of the Organization and all documents belonging to it or held by it shall be inviolable, wherever located.

ARTICLE 8

1. Without being restricted by financial controls, regulations or moratoria of any kind, a. the Organization may hold currency of any kind and operate accounts in any currency; b. the Organization may freely transfer its funds from one country to another or within any country and convert any currency held by it into any other currency at the most favourable official rate of exchange for a sale or purchase as the case may be.

2. In exercising its rights under paragraph 1 above, the Organization shall pay due regard to any representations made by any Member State and shall give effect to such representations in so far as it is practicable to do so.
ARTICLE 9

The Organization, its assets, income and other property shall be exempt:

a. from all direct taxes; the Organization will not, however, claim exemption from rates, taxes or dues which are no more than charges for public utility services;

b. from all customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports in respect of articles imported or exported by the Organization for its official use; articles imported under such exemption shall not be disposed of, by way either of sale or gift, in the country into which they are imported except under conditions approved by the Government of that country;

c. from all customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports and exports in respect of its publications.

ARTICLE 10

While the Organization will not as a general rule claim exemption from excise duties and from taxes on the sale of movable and immovable property which form part of the price to be paid, nevertheless, when the Organization is making important purchases for official use of property on which such duties and taxes have been charged or are chargeable. Member States will whenever possible make the appropriate administrative arrangements for the remission or return of the amount of duty or tax.

ARTICLE 11

1. No censorship shall be applied to the official correspondence and other official communications of the Organization.

2. The Organization shall have the right to use codes and to despatch and receive correspondence by courier or in sealed bags, which shall have the same immunities and privileges as diplomatic couriers and bags.

3. Nothing in this Article shall be construed to preclude the adoption of appropriate security precautions to be determined by agreement between a Member State and the Council acting on behalf of the Organization.

PART III. REPRESENTATIVES OF MEMBER STATES

ARTICLE 12

Every person designated by a Member State as its principal permanent representative to the Organization in the territory of another Member State, and such members of his official staff resident in that territory as may be agreed between the State which has designated them and the Organization and between the Organization and the State in which they will be resident, shall enjoy the immunities and privileges accorded to diplomatic representatives and their official staff of comparable rank.
ARTICLE 13

1. Any representative of a Member State to the Council or any of its subsidiary bodies who is not covered by Article 12 shall, while present in the territory of another Member State for the discharge of his duties, enjoy the following privileges and immunities:
   a. the same immunity from personal arrest or detention as that accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;
   b. in respect of words spoken or written and of acts done by him in his official capacity, immunity from legal process;
   c. inviolability for all papers and documents;
   d. the right to use codes and to receive and send papers or correspondence by courier or in sealed bags:
   e. the same exemption in respect of himself and his spouse from immigration restrictions, aliens registration and national service obligations as that accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;
   f. the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;
   g. the same immunities and facilities in respect of his personal baggage as are accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;
   h. the right to import free of duty his furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up his post in the country in question, and, on the termination of his functions in that country, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty, subject in either case to such conditions as the Government of the country in which the right is being exercised may deem necessary;
   i. the right to import temporarily free of duty his private motor vehicle for his own personal use and subsequently to re-export such vehicle free of duty, subject in either case to such conditions as the Government of the country concerned may deem necessary.

2. Where the legal incidence of any form of taxation depends upon residence, a period during which a representative to whom this Article applies is present in the territory of another Member State for the discharge of his duties shall not be considered as a period of residence. In particular, he shall be exempt from taxation on his official salary and emoluments during such periods of duty.

3. In this Article 'representative' shall be deemed to include all representatives, advisers and technical experts of delegations. Each Member State shall communicate to the other Member States concerned, if they so request, the names of its representatives to whom this Article applies and the probable duration of their stay in the territories of such other Member States.

ARTICLE 14

Official clerical staff accompanying a representative of a Member State who are not covered by Articles 12 or 13 shall, while present in the territory of another Member State for the discharge of their duties, be accorded the privileges and immunities set out in paragraph 1 b., c., e., f., h. and i. and paragraph 2 of Article 13.

ARTICLE 15

Privileges and immunities are accorded to the representatives of Member States and their staffs not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves, but in order to safeguard the
independent exercise of their functions in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty. Consequently, a Member State not only has the right, but is under a duty to waive the immunity of its representatives and members of their staffs in any case where, in its opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the purposes for which the immunity is accorded.

ARTICLE 16

The provisions of Articles 12 to 14 above shall not require any State to grant any of the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national or to any person as its representative or as a member of the staff of such representative.

PART IV. INTERNATIONAL STAFF AND EXPERTS ON MISSIONS FOR THE ORGANIZATION

ARTICLE 17

The categories of officials of the Organization to which Articles 18 to 20 apply shall be agreed between the Chairman of the Council Deputies and each of the Member States concerned. The Chairman of the Council Deputies shall communicate to the Member States the names of the officials included in these categories.

ARTICLE 18

 Officials of the Organization agreed upon under Article 17 shall:

a. be immune from legal process in respect of words spoken or written and of acts done by them in their official capacity and within the limits of their authority;

b. be granted, together with their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with and dependent on them, the same immunities from immigration restrictions and aliens' registration as is accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;

c. be accorded the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions as are accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;

d. be given, together with their spouses and members of their immediate families residing with and dependent on them, the same repatriation facilities in time of international crisis as are accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank;

e. have the right to import free of duty their furniture and effects at the time of first arrival to take up their post in the country in question, and, on the termination of their functions in that country, to re-export such furniture and effects free of duty, subject in either case to such conditions as the Government of the country in which the right is being exercised may deem necessary;

f. have the right to import temporarily free of duty their private motor vehicles for their own personal use and subsequently to re-export such vehicles free of duty, subject in either case to such conditions as the Government of the country concerned may deem necessary.
ARTICLE 19

Officials of the Organization agreed under Article 17 shall be exempt from taxation on the salaries and emoluments paid to them by the Organization in their capacity as such officials. Any Member State may, however, conclude an arrangement with the Council acting on behalf of the Organization whereby such Member State will employ and assign to the Organization all of its nationals (except, if such Member State so desires, any not ordinarily resident within its territory) who are to serve on the international staff of the Organization and pay the salaries and emoluments of such persons from its own funds at a scale fixed by it. The salaries and emoluments so paid may be taxed by such Member State but shall be exempt from taxation by any other Member State. If such an arrangement is entered into by any Member State and is subsequently modified or terminated, Member States shall no longer be bound under the first sentence of this Article to exempt from taxation the salaries and emoluments paid to their nationals.

ARTICLE 20

In addition to the immunities and privileges specified in Articles 18 and 19, the Executive Secretary of the Organization, the Co-ordinator of North Atlantic Defence Production, and such other permanent officials of similar rank as may be agreed between the Chairman of the Council Deputies and the Governments of Member States, shall be accorded the privileges and immunities normally accorded to diplomatic personnel of comparable rank.

ARTICLE 21

1. Experts (other than officials coming within the scope of Articles 18 to 20) employed on missions on behalf of the Organization shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities so far as is necessary for the effective exercise of their functions while present in the territory of a Member State for the discharge of their duties:
   a. immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage;
   b. in respect of words spoken or written or acts done by them in the performance of their official functions for the Organization, immunity from legal process;
   c. the same facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions and in respect of their personal baggage as are accorded to officials of foreign Governments on temporary official missions;
   d. inviolability for all papers and documents relating to the work on which they are engaged for the Organization.

2. The Chairman of the Council Deputies shall communicate to the Member States concerned the names of any experts to whom this Article applies.

ARTICLE 22

Privileges and immunities are granted to officials and experts in the interests of the Organization and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves. The Chairman of the Council Deputies shall have the right and the duty to waive the immunity of any official or expert in any case where, in his opinion, the immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to the interests of the Organization.
ARTICLE 23

The provisions of Articles 18, 20 and 21 above shall not require any State to grant any of the privileges or immunities referred to therein to any person who is its national, except:

a. immunity from legal process in respect of words spoken or written or acts done by him in the performance of his official functions for the Organization;
b. inviolability for all papers and documents relating to the work on which he is engaged for the Organization;
c. facilities in respect of currency or exchange restrictions so far as necessary for the effective exercise of his functions.

PART V. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

ARTICLE 24

The Council shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of:

a. disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private character to which the Organization is a party;
b. disputes involving any official or expert of the Organization to whom Part iv of this Agreement applies who by reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived in accordance with the provisions of Article 22.

PART VI. SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS

ARTICLE 25

The Council acting on behalf of the Organization may conclude with any Member State or States supplementary agreements modifying the provisions of the present Agreement, so far as that State or those States are concerned.

PART VII. FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 26

1. The present Agreement shall be open for signature by Member States of the Organization and shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all signatory States of each such deposit.

2. As soon as six signatory States have deposited their instruments of ratification, the present Agreement shall come into force in respect of those States. It shall come into force in respect of each other signatory State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE 27

The present Agreement may be denounced by any Contracting State by giving written notification of denunciation to the Government of the United States of America, which will
notify all signatory States of each such notification. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the receipt of the notification by the Government of the United States of America.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement. Done in Ottawa this twentieth day of September, 1951, in French and in English, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which will transmit a certified copy to each of the signatory States.
APPENDIX 10

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE ACCESSION TO THE TREATY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Paris Agreements, 23 October, 1954

These documents, known as the PARIS AGREEMENTS, were signed in Paris on 23 October 1954, after the London Conference (28 September – 3 October, 1954), the Paris Conference (20 – 22 October 1954) and a Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Council (23 October, 1954). In London, the so-called Nine-Power Conference, in addition to the seven countries signatories of agreements, was attended by the United States and Canada. In Paris, the so-called Four-Power Conference was attended by the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

ANALYSIS OF THE TERMS OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS

The Paris Agreements comprise:

1. Documents signed by two Parties (France and the Federal Republic of Germany).
   Subject: Franco-German disputes (the resolution of cultural, economic and other difficulties) and the Saar.

2. Documents signed by four Parties (Four-Power Conference) France, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, relating to German sovereignty:
   a. Protocol on the termination of the Occupation Régime in the Federal Republic;
   b. Amendments to the Convention on Relations between the Occupying Powers and the Federal Republic (Revocation of the Occupation Statute, Retention of Rights, stationing of allied forces, state of emergency, hypothesis of reunification);
   c. Amendments to the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces in Germany;
   d. Amendments to the Finance Convention;
   e. Amendments to the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation;
   f. Exchange of letters;
   (The Conventions cited at a., b., c., d. and e. above are those signed in Bonn on 26 May, 1952, designed to end the Occupation Régime).

To these documents should be added:
   h. A Tripartite Declaration on Berlin.

3. Documents signed by five Parties: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and the United Kingdom. Subject: Declaration inviting the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty.
4. *Documents signed by seven Parties*: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. Subject:
   a. Protocol revising and completing the Brussels Treaty;
   b. Protocol on the forces of Western European Union;
   c. Protocol on the control of armaments;
   d. Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments;
   e. Exchange of letters referring to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice;
   f. Resolution on the Production and Standardization of Armaments.

5. *Documents signed by the 14 North Atlantic Treaty countries*:
   b. Resolution by the North Atlantic Council to implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference (authority of SACEUR);
   c. Resolution of Association taking note of the obligations accepted by the Federal Republic on the signature of the London Agreements and of the declaration relating to such obligations.

Hereunder is the text of all the official documents, with the exception of:
1. The documents signed by two parties (France and the Federal Republic of Germany) which only concern the two signatory countries.
2. The amendments to the Bonn Conventions (a., b., c., d. and e.), which are replaced by a summary of the Conventions and of the amendments made to them entitled: "Summary of the Five Annexes attached to the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Régime", as well as 2 f. the exchange of letters.

**FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE**

*Paris, 23 October 1954*

The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany agree as follows:

**1. PROTOCOL ON THE TERMINATION OF THE OCCUPATION REGIME IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

**ARTICLE 1**

The Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Finance Convention, the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation, signed at Bonn on 26 May 1952, the Protocol signed at Bonn on 27 June, 1952, to correct certain textual errors in the aforementioned Conventions, and the Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the Forces and
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their Members signed at Bonn on 26 May, 1952, as amended by the Protocol signed at Bonn on 26 July 1952, shall be amended in accordance with the five Schedules to the present Protocol and as so amended shall enter into force (together with subsidiary documents agreed by the Signatory States relating to any of the aforementioned instruments) simultaneously with it.

ARTICLE 2

Pending the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution, the following provisions shall apply:

1. The rights heretofore held or exercised by the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation shall be retained and exercised by them, and nothing in any of the instruments mentioned in Article 1 of the present Protocol shall authorise the enactment, amendment, repeal or deprivation of effect of legislation or, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, executive action in those fields by any other authority.

2. On the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Military Security Board shall be abolished (without prejudice to the validity of any action or decisions taken by it) and the controls in the fields of disarmament and demilitarisation shall thereafter be applied by a Joint Four-Power Organization to which each of the Signatory States shall appoint one representative and which shall take its decisions by majority vote of the four members.

3. The Governments of the Signatory States will conclude an administrative agreement which shall provide, in conformity with the provisions of this Article, for the establishment of the Joint Four-Power Commission and its staff and for the organization of its work.

ARTICLE 3

1. The present Protocol shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. The Instruments of Ratification or Approval shall be deposited by the Signatory States with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. The present Protocol and subsidiary documents relating to it agreed between the Signatory States shall enter into force upon the deposit by all the Signatory States of the Instruments of Ratification or Approval as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. The present Protocol shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each Signatory State with certified copies thereof and notify each State of the date of entry into force of the present Protocol. In faith whereof the undersigned Representatives duly authorized thereto have signed the present Protocol.

Done at Paris this twenty third day of October, 1954, in three texts, in the English, French and German languages, all being equally authentic.
2. ANNEXES I TO V ATTACHED TO THE PROTOCOL ON THE TERMINATION OF THE OCCUPATION REGIME IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Since these Annexes can only be understood in the light of the Conventions signed in Bonn in 1952, they have been replaced in the present work by a brief recapitulation of the Conventions and a summary of the amendments made to them.

SCHEDULE I

This Schedule amends the former "Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany". The introductory words have changed since 1952 from "the three Occupying Powers" to a list of the four Powers who have "entered into the following Convention setting forth the basis of their new relationship".

Article 1 of the Schedule states that the three Powers will terminate the Occupation régime in Western Germany, revoke the Occupation Statute, and abolish the offices of the Land Commissioners. The Federal Republic is accorded "the full authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external affairs".

Article 2 lays down that the Three Powers retain their rights "relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the reunification of Germany and a peace settlement".

In the original Convention, Article 2 had included in these reservations the right to station troops in Germany. Under the new arrangements, allied troops will remain in Germany as at present "pending the entry into force of the arrangements for the German defence contribution" and, after that, remain with the consent of the Federal Government. Their position is covered in a separate convention, the text of which is given below. Thus, the new status of the Federal Republic is taken into consideration without jeopardising the rights of the three Powers in Berlin.

Articles 4 and 5 deal with the responsibilities obtained by the three Powers relating to the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security. The Convention states that, after the coming into force of the German defence contribution, "the forces of the same nationality and effective strength as at that time may be stationed in the Federal Republic". The Convention is open to any State which is not a signatory but which had forces stationed in Germany on October 23, 1954 – i.e. Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Luxembourg and Denmark. The Convention is to expire "with the conclusion of a German peace settlement or if at an earlier time the signatory States agree that the development of the international situation justifies new arrangements".

With regard to the protection of the security of allied forces in Germany, allied rights "shall lapse when the appropriate German authorities have obtained similar powers under German legislation enabling them to take effective action to protect the security of those forces, including the ability to deal with a serious disturbance of public security and order".

Article 10 of the Schedule sets out the terms under which the Convention may be reviewed; they are:

a. "Upon request of any one of them, in the event of the reunification of Germany, or an international understanding being reached with the participation or consent on steps towards bringing about the reunification of Germany, or the creation of a European federation".

b. "In any situation which all the signatory States recognize has resulted from a change of a fundamental character in the conditions prevailing at the time of the entry into force of the present convention".
SCHEDULES II AND III

Schedule II amends the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of foreign forces and their members in the Federal Republic. The third Schedule brings up to date the Finance Convention. The German Government will provide a monthly average contribution of 600m. marks for the support of the allied forces from the entry of the Convention into force until the arrangements for the German defence contribution are completed. These provisions apply only until June 30, 1955. During the first year of the German defence contribution, the Federal Republic will make available a total amount of 3,200m. marks for the support of the allied forces.

SCHEDULES IV AND V

Schedule IV amends the Convention "on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the war and the occupation". It makes clear that existing programmes of de-centralisation will be completed. Legislation concerning the reorganization of the German coalmining, iron and steel industries being applied at the time of the entry into force of the present arrangements "shall be maintained in force insofar and so long as de-concentration measures ordered before that date are still to be carried out or claimants are still to be protected."

Article 10 sets up a mixed committee of experts whose task is defined as the consideration of "applications for extensions of the final time for the disposition of securities required by regulations or orders of the Allied High Commission or its subordinate bodies or by reason of the terms of a plan approved by any such order".

The eight-line Schedule V makes three alterations in the "Agreement on the Tax Treatment of the forces and their members", in the original Bonn Agreement.

3. LETTERS

Ten letters were exchanged following the signing of the agreements: letter from the Chancellor to the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs, letters from the three High Commissioners to the Chancellor and letters from the three Ministers for Foreign Affairs to the Chancellor. These letters deal with specific points in the Bonn Conventions which were deleted therefrom by mutual consent, the Parties concerned having agreed to deal with them by an exchange of letters.

In the absence of the text of the Conventions their contents would be virtually unintelligible, so they have been omitted from the present work.

4. CONVENTION ON THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Paris, 23 October, 1954

In view of the present international situation and the need to ensure the defence of the free world which require the continuing presence of foreign forces in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1

1. From the entry into force of the arrangements for the German Defence Contribution, forces of the same nationality and effective strength as at that time may be stationed in the Federal Republic.

2. The effective strength of the forces stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article may at any time be increased with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic.

3. Additional forces of the States Parties to the present Convention may enter and remain in the Federal territory with the consent of the Government of the Federal Republic for training purposes in accordance with the procedures applicable to forces assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, provided that such forces do not remain there for more than thirty days at any one time.

4. The Federal Republic grants to the French, the United Kingdom and the United States forces the right to enter, pass through, and depart from the territory of the Federal Republic in transit to or from Austria (so long as their forces continue to be stationed there) or any country Member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on the same basis as is usual between Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty or as may be agreed with effect for all Member States by the North Atlantic Council.

ARTICLE 2

The present Convention shall be open to accession by any State not a Signatory, which had forces stationed in the Federal territory on the date of the signature of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Régime in the Federal Republic of Germany signed at Paris on 23 October, 1954. Any such State, desiring to accede to the present Convention, may deposit with the Government of the Federal Republic an Instrument of Accession.

ARTICLE 3

1. The present Convention shall expire with the conclusion of a German peace settlement or if at an earlier time the Signatory States agree that the development of the international situation justifies new arrangements.

2. The Signatory States will review the terms of the present Convention at the same time and subject to the same conditions as provided for in Article 10 of the Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany.

ARTICLE 4

1. The present Convention shall be ratified or approved by the Signatory States and Instruments of Ratification or Approval shall be deposited by them with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany which shall notify each Signatory State of the deposit of each Instrument of Ratification or Approval. The present Convention shall enter into force when all the Signatory States have made such deposit and the Instrument of Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

2. It shall also enter into force on that date as to any acceding State which has previously
deposited an Instrument of Accession in accordance with Article 2 of the present Convention and, as to any other acceding State, on the date of the deposit by it of such an Instrument.

3. The present Convention shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, which will furnish each State Party to the present Convention with certified copies thereof and of the Instruments of Accession deposited in accordance with Article 2 and will notify each State of the date of the entry into force of the present Convention and the date of the deposit of any Instrument of Accession.

In faith whereof the undersigned Representatives duly authorized there have signed the present Convention.

Done at Paris this 23rd day of October, 1954, in three texts, in the English, French and German languages all being equally authentic.

5. THREE-POWER DECLARATION ON BERLIN

Paris, October 23, 1954

The following statement was issued on 23 October 1954, by the Foreign Ministers of the French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States of America:

"With respect to Berlin, in addition to the Allied security guarantees for the city in the London communiqué of October 3, 1954, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have noted with deep satisfaction the close and friendly cooperation between the Allied and Berlin authorities. The Three Powers are determined to ensure the greatest possible degree of self-government in Berlin compatible with Berlin's special situation. Accordingly, the three Governments have instructed their representatives in Berlin to consult with the authorities of that city with a view to implementing jointly and to the fullest degree possible the foregoing principles".

NINE-POWER CONFERENCE

1. DECLARATION INVITING ITALY AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO ACCEDE TO THE BRUSSELS TREATY

Paris, 23 October, 1954

The Governments of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Parties to the Brussels Treaty of March the 17th, 1948 for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for legitimate collective self-defence; Aware that the principles underlying the association created by the Brussels Treaty are also recognised and applied by the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy; Noting with satisfaction that their devotion to peace and their allegiance to democratic institutions constitute common bonds between the countries of Western Europe; Convinced that an association with the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy would represent a new and substantial advance in the direction already indicated by the Treaty;
Decide,

in application of Article ix of the Treaty, to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to this Treaty, as modified and completed in accordance with the decisions of the Conference held in London from September the 28th to October the 3rd 1954, which are recorded in its Final Act.

2. PROTOCOL MODIFYING AND COMPLETING THE BRUSSELS TREATY

Paris, 23 October, 1954

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on March the 17th, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, on the one hand, and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand, inspired by a common will to strengthen peace and security; desirous to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe; convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the Treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims; having taken into consideration the decisions of the London Conference as set out in the Final Act of October the 3rd, 1954 and its Annexes; have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Who, having exhibited their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the Treaty as modified and completed by the present Protocol. The High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol consider the Protocol on Forces of Western European Union (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. n), the Protocol on the Control of Armaments and its Annexes (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. m), and the Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. iv) to be an integral part of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE II

The sub-paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty: "to take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" shall be modified
to read: “to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe”.
The opening words of the 2nd paragraph of Article i shall read: “The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article vii...”

ARTICLE III

The following new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article iv: “In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

Articles iv, v, vi and vii of the Treaty will become respectively Articles v, vi, vii and viii.

ARTICLE IV

Article vii of the Treaty (formerly Article vii) shall be modified to read as follows:

1. “For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organizations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.

2. This Council shall be known as the ‘Council of Western European Union’; it shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary: in particular it shall establish immediately an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in Protocol No. iv.

3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols ii, iii and iv it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments”.

ARTICLE V

A new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article ix: “The Council of Western European Union shall make an Annual Report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe”.

The Articles vii, ix and x of the Treaty shall become respectively Articles x, xi and xii.
ARTICLE VI

The present Protocol and the other Protocols listed in Article I above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.
They shall enter into force when all instruments of ratification of the present Protocol have been deposited with the Belgian Government and the instrument of accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.
The Belgian Government shall inform the governments of the other High Contracting Parties and the Government of the United States of America of the deposit of each instrument of ratification.
In witness whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done at Paris this twenty third day of October 1954 in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

PROTOCOL NO. II ON FORCES OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

Paris, 23 October, 1954

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, Having consulted the North Atlantic Council, Have appointed..., Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

1. The land and air forces which each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall place under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime on the mainland of Europe shall not exceed in total strength and number of formations:
a. for Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the maxima laid down for peacetime in the Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty on the Establishment of a European Defence Community signed at Paris, on 27 May, 1952; and
b. for the United Kingdom, four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force;
c. for Luxembourg, one regimental combat team.

2. The number of formations mentioned in paragraph 1 may be brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make them suitable for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, provided that the equivalent fighting capacity and total strengths are not exceeded.

3. The statement of these maxima does not commit any of the High Contracting Parties to build up or maintain forces at these levels, but maintains their right to do so if required.
ARTICLE 2

As regards naval forces, the contribution to NATO Commands of each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be determined each year in the course of the Annual Review (which takes into account the recommendations of the NATO military authorities). The naval forces of the Federal Republic of Germany shall consist of the vessels and formations necessary for the defensive missions assigned to it by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization within the limits laid down in the Special Agreement mentioned in Article 1, or equivalent fighting capacity.

ARTICLE 3

If at any time during the Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits specified in Articles 1 and 2, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ARTICLE 4

In order that it may establish that the limits specified in Articles 1 and 2 are being observed, the Council of Western European Union will regularly receive information acquired as a result of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Such information will be transmitted by a high-ranking officer designated for the purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

ARTICLE 5

The strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be fixed by agreements within the Organization of Western European Union, having regard to their proper functions and needs and to their existing levels.

ARTICLE 6

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, that is to say four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. She undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the High Contracting Parties who should take their decision in the knowledge of the views of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency. If the maintenance of the United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, she will, through Her Government in the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the United Kingdom formations are maintained. In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article 1 of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals. Done at Paris this twenty-third day of October, 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

PROTOCOL NO. III ON THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

Paris, 23 October, 1954

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Have appointed...,

Have agreed as follows:

Part I. Armaments not to be manufactured

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, take note of and record their agreement with the Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (made in London on 3 October, 1954, and annexed hereto as Annex I) in which the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are defined in Annex II. These armaments shall be more closely defined and the definitions brought up to date by the Council of Western European Union.

ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, also take note of and record their agreement with the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in the same Declaration that certain further types of armaments will not be manufactured in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, except that if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a recommendation for an amendment to, or cancellation of, the content of the list of these armaments is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany submits a request accordingly, such an amendment or cancellation may be made by a resolution of the Council of Western European Union passed by a two-thirds majority. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are listed in Annex III.
ARTICLE 3

When the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties who have not given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the High Contracting Parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of Western European Union.

ARTICLE 4

Without prejudice to the foregoing Articles, the types of armaments listed in Annex IV will be controlled to the extent and in the manner laid down in Protocol No. IV.

ARTICLE 5

The Council of Western European Union may vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris on the twenty-third day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

Annex I

The Federal Chancellor declares:
that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons chemical weapons or biological weapons, as detailed in paragraphs I, II and III of the attached list;*
that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraphs IV, V and VI of the attached list.** Any amendment to or cancellation of the substance of paragraphs IV, V and VI** can, on the request of the Federal Republic, be carried out by a resolution of the Brussels Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority, if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a request is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
that the Federal Republic agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organization to ensure that these undertakings are observed.

* Reproduced in Annex II
** Reproduced in Annex III
Annex II

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs i to m and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

i. Atomic Weapons

a. An atomic weapon is defined as any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilise, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning.

b. Furthermore, any part, device, assembly or material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, any weapon as set forth under paragraph a., shall be deemed to be an atomic weapon.

c. Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes plutonium, Uranium 233, Uranium 235 (including Uranium 235 contained in Uranium enriched to over 2.1 per cent by weight of Uranium 235) and any other material capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear fission or fusion or other nuclear reaction of the material. The foregoing materials shall be considered to be nuclear fuel regardless of the chemical or physical form in which they exist.

ii. Chemical Weapons

a. A chemical weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use for military purposes, the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralysant, growth-regulating, anti-lubricating or catalysing properties of any chemical substance.

b. Subject to the provisions of paragraph c., chemical substances, having such properties and capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in paragraph a., shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

c. Such apparatus and such quantities of the chemical substances as are referred to in paragraphs a. and b. which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from this definition.

iii. Biological Weapons

a. A biological weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, harmful insects or other living or dead organisms, or their toxic products.

b. Subject to the provisions of paragraph c., insects, organisms and their toxic products of such nature and in such amounts as to make them capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in a. shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

c. Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the insects, organisms and their toxic products as are referred to in paragraphs a. and b. which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from the definition of biological weapons.
Annex III

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs iv to vi and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

iv. Long-range Missiles, Guided Missiles and Influence Mines

a. Subject to the provisions of paragraph d., long-range missiles and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the speed or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

b. Subject to the provisions of paragraph d., influence mines are defined as naval mines which can be exploded automatically by influences which emanate solely from external sources, including influence mines developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof.

c. Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or with the weapons referred to in paragraphs a. and b. shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

d. Proximity fuses, and short-range guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence with the following maximum characteristics are regarded as excluded from this definition:
   - Length, 2 metres;
   - Diameter, 30 centimetres;
   - Speed, 660 metres per second;
   - Ground range, 32 kilometres;
   - Weight of war-head, 22.5 kilogrammes.

v. Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes

"Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes are:

a. Warships of more than 3,000 tons displacement;

b. Submarines of more than 350 tons displacement;

c. All warships which are driven by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or by gas turbines or by jet engines".

vi. Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes

Annex IV

LIST OF TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE CONTROLLED

1. a. Atomic
    b. biological, and
    c. chemical weapons.
   In accordance with definitions to be approved by the Council of Western European Union as indicated in Article i of the present Protocol.

2. All guns, howitzers and mortars of any types and of any roles of more than 90 mm. calibre including the following component for these weapons, viz., the elevating mass.
3. All guided missiles.
   
   Definition: Guided missiles are such that the speed or direction or motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile; these include V-type weapons developed in the recent war and modifications thereto. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

4. Other self-propelled missiles of a weight exceeding 15 kilogrammes in working order.

5. Mines of all types except anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

6. Tanks, including the following component parts for these tanks, viz:
   a. the elevating mass;
   b. turret castings and/or plate assembly.

7. Other armoured fighting vehicles of an overall weight of more than 10 metric tons.

8. a. Warships over 1,500 tons displacement;
   b. submarines;
   c. all warships powered by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines;
   d. small craft capable of a speed of over 30 knots, equipped with offensive armament.

9. Aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kilogrammes.

10. Ammunition for the weapons described in paragraph 2 above.

11. a. Complete military aircraft other than:
   (i) all training aircraft except operational types used for training purposes;
   (ii) military transport and communication aircraft;
   (iii) helicopters;
   b. air frames, specifically and exclusively designed for military aircraft except those at (i), (ii) and (iii) above;
   c. jet engines, turbo-propeller engines and rocket motors, when these are the principal motive power.

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PROTOCOL NO. IV ON THE AGENCY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty, Having agreed in accordance with Article IV of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, to establish an Agency for the Control of Armaments, Have appointed..., Have agreed as follows:

Part I. Constitution

ARTICLE 1

The Agency for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") shall be responsible to the Council of Western European Union (hereinafter referred to as "the Council"). It shall consist of a Director assisted by a Deputy Director, and supported by a
staff drawn equitably from nationals of the High Contracting Parties, Members of Western European Union.

ARTICLE 2

The Director and his staff, including any officials who may be put at the disposal of the Agency by States Members, shall be subject to the general administrative control of the Secretary General of Western European Union.

ARTICLE 3

The Director shall be appointed by unanimous decision of the Council for a period of five years and shall not be eligible for re-appointment. He shall be responsible for the selection of his staff in accordance with the principle mentioned in Article 1 and in consultation with the individual States Members concerned. Before filling the posts of Deputy Director and of the Heads of Departments of the Agency, the Director shall obtain from the Council approval of the persons to be appointed.

ARTICLE 4

1. The Director shall submit to the Council, through the Secretary General, a plan for the organization of the Agency. The organization should provide for departments dealing respectively with:
   a. the examination of statistical and budgetary information to be obtained from the members of Western European Union and from the appropriate NATO authorities;
   b. inspections, test checks and visits;
   c. administration.

2. The organization may be modified by decision of the Council.

ARTICLE 5

The costs of maintaining the Agency shall appear in the budget of Western European Union. The Director shall submit, through the Secretary General, to the Council an annual estimate of these costs.

ARTICLE 6

Officials of the Agency shall be bound by the full NATO code of security. They shall in no circumstances reveal information obtained in connexion with the execution of their official tasks except and only in the performance of their duties towards the Agency.
Part II. Functions

Article 7

1. The tasks of the Agency shall be:
a. to satisfy itself that the undertaking set out in Protocol No. III not to manufacture certain types of armaments mentioned in Annexes II and III to that Protocol are being observed;
b. to control, in accordance with Part III of the present Protocol, the level of stocks of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III held by each member of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe. This control shall extend to production and imports to the extent required to make the control of stocks effective.
2. For the purposes mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Agency shall:
a. scrutinise statistical and budgetary information supplied by members of Western European Union and by the NATO authorities;
b. undertake on the mainland of Europe test checks, visits and inspections at production plants, depots and forces (other than depots or forces under NATO authority);
c. report to the Council.

Article 8

With respect to forces and depots under NATO authority, test checks, visits and inspections shall be undertaken by the appropriate authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In the case of the forces and depots under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Agency shall receive notification of the information supplied to the Council through the medium of the high-ranking officer to be designated by him.

Article 9

The operations of the Agency shall be confined to the mainland of Europe.

Article 10

The Agency shall direct its attention to the production of end-items and components listed in Annexes II, III and IV of Protocol No. III, and not to processes. It shall ensure that materials and products destined for civilian use are excluded from its operations.

Article 11

Inspections by the Agency shall not be of a routine character, but shall be in the nature of tests carried out at irregular intervals. Such inspections shall be conducted in a spirit of harmony and co-operation. The Director shall propose to the Council detailed regulations for the conduct of the inspections providing, inter alia, for due process of law in respect of private interests.
ARTICLE 12

For their test checks, visits and inspections the members of the Agency shall be accorded free access on demand to plants and depots, and the relevant accounts and documents shall be made available to them. The Agency and national authorities shall co-operate in such checks and inspections, and in particular national authorities may, at their own request, take part in them.

Part III. Levels of Stocks of Armaments

ARTICLE 13

1. Each member of Western European Union shall, in respect of its forces under NATO authority stationed on the mainland of Europe, furnish annually to the Agency statements of:
   a. the total quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex IV to Protocol No. III required in relation to its forces;
   b. the quantities of such armaments currently held at the beginning of the control years;
   c. the programmes for attaining the total quantities mentioned in a. by:
      (i) manufacture in its own territory;
      (ii) purchase from another country;
      (iii) end-item aid from another country.

2. Such statements shall also be furnished by each member of Western European Union in respect of its internal defence and police forces and its other forces under national control stationed on the mainland of Europe including a statement of stocks held there for its forces stationed overseas.

3. The statements shall be correlated with the relevant submissions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ARTICLE 14

As regards the forces under NATO authority, the Agency shall verify in consultation with the appropriate NATO authorities that the total quantities stated under Article 13 are consistent with the quantities recognised as required by the units of the members concerned under NATO authority, and with the conclusions and data recorded in the documents approved by the North Atlantic Council in connexion with the NATO Annual Review.

ARTICLE 15

As regards internal defence and police forces, the total quantities of their armaments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified by the members; provided that they remain within the limits laid down in the further agreements to be concluded by the members of Western European Union on the strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe.
ARTICLE 16

As regards other forces remaining under national control, the total quantities of their armaments to be accepted as appropriate by the Agency shall be those notified to the Agency by the members.

ARTICLE 17

The figures furnished by members for the total quantities of armaments under Articles 15 and 16 shall correspond to the size and mission of the forces concerned.

ARTICLE 18

The provisions of Articles 14 and 17 shall not apply to the High Contracting Parties and to the categories of weapons covered in Article 3 of Protocol No. III. Stocks of the weapons in question shall be determined in conformity with the procedure laid down in that Article and shall be notified to the Agency by the Council of the Western European Union.

ARTICLE 19

The figures obtained by the Agency under Articles 14, 15, 16 and 18 shall be reported to the Council as appropriate levels for the current control year for the members of Western European Union. Any discrepancies between the figures stated under Article 13, paragraph 1, and the quantities recognised under Article 14 will also be reported.

ARTICLE 20

1. The Agency shall immediately report to the Council if inspection, or information from other sources, reveals:
   a. the manufacture of armaments of a type which the member concerned has undertaken not to manufacture;
   b. the existence of stocks of armaments in excess of the figures and quantities ascertained in accordance with Articles 19 and 22.

2. If the Council is satisfied that the infraction reported by the Agency is not of major importance and can be remedied by prompt local action, it will so inform the Agency and the member concerned, who will take the necessary steps.

3. In the case of other infractions, the Council will invite the member concerned to provide the necessary explanation within a period to be determined by the Council; if this explanation is considered unsatisfactory, the Council will take the measures which it deems necessary in accordance with a procedure to be determined.

4. Decisions of the Council under this Article will be taken by majority vote.

ARTICLE 21

Each member shall notify to the Agency the names and locations of the depots on the mainland of Europe containing armaments subject to control and of the plants on the mainland of
Europe manufacturing such armaments, or, even though not in operation, specifically intended for the manufacture of such armaments.

**ARTICLE 22**

Each member of Western European Union shall keep the Agency informed of the quantities of armaments of the types mentioned in Annex iv to Protocol No. iii, which are to be exported from its territory on the mainland of Europe. The Agency shall be entitled to satisfy itself that the armaments concerned are in fact exported. If the level of stocks of any item subject to control appears abnormal, the Agency shall further be entitled to enquire into the orders for export.

**ARTICLE 23**

The Council shall transmit to the Agency information received from the Governments of the United States of America and Canada respecting military aid to be furnished to the forces on the mainland of Europe of members of Western European Union. In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article i of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris this twenty-third day of October 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

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I have the honour to make the following communication to Your Excellency in order to place on record the undertaking of the Federal/Italian Government regarding the application and interpretation of Article x (formerly Article viii), of the Brussels Treaty. The Federal/Italian Government undertake, before the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty and the related Protocols and their Annexes are ratified by the High Contracting Parties, to declare their acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance with Article x (formerly Article viii) of the Treaty, having made known to the Parties the reservations accompanying their acceptance. The Federal/Italian Government understand that, in the view of the other High Contracting Parties, paragraph 5 of Article x (formerly Article viii) of the Treaty leaves the way open for concluding agreements on other means of settling disputes between Them, and that the undertaking in question shall in no way prejudice the possibility of opening discussions immediately with a view to establishing other methods of settling possible disputes in the application or interpretation of the Treaty.

**IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S LETTER ONLY**

Moreover, in the opinion of the Federal Government, the widening of the Brussels Treaty may give rise to a number of doubts and disputes as to the interpretation and application of
the Treaty, the Protocols and their Annexes, which may not be of fundamental importance
but mainly of a technical nature. The Federal Government consider that it is desirable to
establish another, simpler procedure for the settlement of such matters.
The Federal Government therefore propose that the High Contracting Parties should discuss
the problems set out above at once, with a view to reaching agreement on an appropriate
procedure.

IN LETTERS FROM BOTH FEDERAL AND ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS

I should be grateful if Your Excellency would confirm that (THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED)
agree with this letter. The exchange of letters thus effected will be considered as an Annex to
the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, within the meaning of Article iv,
paragraph 1, of the said Protocol.

REPLY TO THE LETTERS FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC AND OF ITALY TO THE OTHER GOVERNMENTS SIGNATORY
OF THE PROTOCOL MODIFYING AND COMPLETING THE BRUSSELS
TREATY

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's communication of (date)
and to state that (THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED) have noted with satisfaction that the Govern­
ment of the Federal Republic of Germany/the Italian Government undertake to declare their
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance
with Article x (formerly Article viii) of the Brussels Treaty, having made known to the High
Contracting Parties the reservations accompanying their acceptance.
I confirm that (THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED) interpret paragraph 5 of Article x (formerly
Article vii) of the Treaty as stated in the third paragraph of Your Excellency's communi­
cation.

(IN THE REPLY TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S LETTER ONLY)

With regard to the fourth and fifth paragraphs of Your Excellency's communication, (THE
GOVERNMENT CONCERNED) are in agreement with the proposal of the Federal Government that
the High Contracting Parties should discuss at once the question of establishing an appro­
priate procedure for the settlement of the possible disputes to which the Federal Government
draw attention.

(IN THE REPLY TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS)

They also agree to consider this exchange of letters as an Annex to the Protocol modifying
and completing the Brussels Treaty within the meaning of Article iv, paragraph 1 of the said
Protocol.

4. RESOLUTION ON PRODUCTION AND STANDARDISATION OF
ARMAMENTS (ADOPTED BY THE NINE-POWER CONFERENCE ON
21 OCTOBER, 1954)

The Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
Anxious to increase the effectiveness of their common Defence forces to the maximum,
Desirous of ensuring the best possible use of their available armament credits by means of the
rational organization of production,
Noting the importance in this connection of standardising weapons and weapon components,
Desirous of facilitating any agreements to this end between all or certain of the Seven
Powers:
1. Recall the decision taken at the London Conference to set up a Working Party to study the draft directives submitted by the French Government on 1 October, 1954 and such other documents as might subsequently be submitted on the problem of the production and standardisation of armaments.

2. Agree to convene a Working Group in Paris on the 17, January 1955 of the Representatives of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, to study the draft directives and other documents referred to in the foregoing paragraph, with a view to submitting proposals to the Council of Western European Union when it comes into being.

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

1. TEXT OF THE PROTOCOL ON THE ACCESSION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
(SEE APPENDIX 6, PAGE 203)

2. RESOLUTION TO IMPLEMENT SECTION IV OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

1. Recognising the necessity of strengthening the structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of reinforcing the machinery for the collective defence of Europe, and desirous of specifying the conditions governing joint examination of the defence effort of member countries,

2. Recalls that:
   a. the resources which member nations intend to devote to their defence effort as well as the level, composition and quality of the forces which the member nations are contributing to the defence of the North Atlantic area are each year subject to collective examination in the NATO Annual Review for the purpose of reaching agreement on force goals, taking into account expected mutual aid;
   b. the defence expenditures incurred by the member nations and the extent to which the recommendations emerging from the Annual Review have been carried out are the subject of periodical review during the year.

3. Agrees with the terms of the Agreement on Forces of Western European Union; and that with respect to the forces which the members of Western European Union will place under NATO Command on the mainland of Europe and for which maximum figures have been established in that Agreement, if at any time during the NATO Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits established in this Agreement, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to unanimous approval by the members of Western European Union, expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

4. Decides that all forces of member nations stationed in the area of the Allied Command Europe shall be placed under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe or
other appropriate NATO Command and under the direction of the NATO military authorities with the exception of those forces intended for the defence of overseas territories and other forces which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has recognised or will recognise as suitable to remain under national command.

5. Invites member nations to make an initial report for consideration and recognition by the Council on those forces which they plan to maintain within the area of Allied Command Europe for the common defence, but not to place them under the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, taking into account the provisions of relevant NATO directives bearing on that subject; the initial report will include a broad statement of the reason for which the above forces are not so placed. Thereafter, if any changes are proposed, the North Atlantic Council action on the NATO Annual Review will constitute recognition as to the suitability and size of forces to be placed under the authority of the appropriate NATO Command and those to be retained under national command.

6. Notes that the agreements concluded within the framework of the Organization of Western European Union on the internal defence and police forces which the members of that Organization will maintain on the mainland shall be notified to the North Atlantic Council.

7. Agrees, in the interest of most effective collective defence, that in respect of combat forces in the area of Allied Command Europe and under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe;
   a. all deployments shall be in accordance with NATO strategy;
   b. the location of forces in accordance with NATO operational plans shall be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe after consultation and agreement with the national authorities concerned;
   c. forces under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and within the area of Allied Command Europe shall not be re-deployed or used operationally within that area without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, subject to political guidance furnished by the North Atlantic Council, when appropriate, through normal channels.

8. Decides that:
   a. integration of forces at Army Group and Tactical Air Force level shall be maintained;
   b. in view of the powerful combat support units and logistic support organization at Army level, integration at that level and associated Air Force level will be the rule, wherever formations of several nationalities are operating in the same area and on a common task, provided there are no overriding objections from the point of view of military effectiveness;
   c. wherever military efficiency permits, in light of the size, location and logistic support of forces, integration at lower levels, both in the land and air forces, shall be achieved to the maximum extent possible;
   d. proposals to the North Atlantic Council, indicating any increases in commonly financed items of expenditure, such as infrastructure which might be entailed by the adoption of such measures, should be submitted by the NATO military authorities.

9. Agrees that, in order to improve the capability of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to discharge his responsibilities in the defence of Allied Command Europe, his responsibilities and powers for the logistic support of the forces placed under his authority shall be extended.

10. Considers that these increased responsibilities and powers should include authority:
   a. to establish, in consultation with the national authorities concerned, requirements for the provision of logistic resources*;

* By logistic resources should be understood all the matériel, supplies, installations and parts thereof necessary for the prolonged conduct of combat operations.
PARIS AGREEMENTS

b. to determine, in agreement with the national authorities concerned, their geographic distribution;
c. to establish, in consultation with these authorities, logistic priorities for the raising, equipping and maintenance of units;
d. to direct the utilisation, for meeting his requirements, of those portions of the logistic support systems made available to him by the appropriate authorities;
e. to co-ordinate and supervise the use, for logistical purposes, of NATO common infrastructure facilities and of those national facilities made available to him by the national authorities.

11. Agrees that, in order to ensure that adequate information is obtained and made available to the appropriate authorities about the forces placed under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe including reserve formations and their logistic support within the area of Allied Command Europe, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe shall be granted increased authority to call for reports regarding the level and effectiveness of such forces and their armaments, equipment and supplies as well as the organization and location of their logistic arrangements. He shall also make field inspections within that area as necessary.

12. Invites nations to submit to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe such reports to this end as he may call for from time to time; and to assist inspection within the area of Allied Command Europe by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of these forces and their logistic support arrangements as necessary.

13. Confirms that the powers exercised by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime extend not only to the organization into an effective integrated force of the forces placed under him but also to their training; that in this field, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe has direct control over the higher training of all national forces assigned to his command in peacetime; and that he should receive facilities from member nations to inspect the training of those cadre and other forces within the area of Allied Command Europe earmarked for that Command.

14. Directs the NATO military authorities to arrange for the designation by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of a high-ranking officer of his Command who will be authorised to transmit regularly to the Council of Western European Union information relating to the forces of the members of Western European Union on the mainland of Europe acquired as a result of the reports and inspections mentioned in paragraphs 11 and 12 in order to enable that Council to establish that the limits laid down in the special agreement mentioned in paragraph 3 above are being observed.

15. Agrees that the expression 'the area of Allied Command Europe' as used throughout this resolution shall not include North Africa; and that this Resolution does not alter the present status of the United Kingdom and United States forces in the Mediterranean.

16. Directs the NATO Military Committee to initiate the necessary changes in the directives to give effect to the above policies and objectives of the North Atlantic Council.

3. RESOLUTION ON RESULTS OF THE FOUR AND NINE POWER MEETINGS

Adopted by the North Atlantic Council on 22 October, 1954

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:
Recognising that all the arrangements arising out of the London Conference form part of one general settlement which is directly or indirectly of concern to all the NATO Powers and has therefore been submitted to the Council for information or decision;
Have learnt with satisfaction of the arrangements agreed between the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and of the Federal Republic of Germany for the termination of the Occupation Régime in the Federal Republic as set forth in the Protocol communicated to the Council;
Welcome the decision of the Brussels Treaty Powers to invite the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty as modified and completed by the Protocols and other documents communicated to the Council, and hereby record their agreement with the provisions of those Protocols and documents insofar as they concern action by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
Welcome the extension of the Brussels Treaty as an important step toward the achievement of European unity; and express confidence that there will be the closest co-operation between the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which remains the foundation of the security and progress of the Atlantic Community.
Take note with satisfaction of the statements made on 29 September, 1954 in London by the United States Secretary of State and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, and of the declaration by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom concerning the maintenance of United Kingdom forces on the continent of Europe;
Finally, Record their deep satisfaction at the happy conclusion of all the above arrangements which together constitute a decisive step in fortifying the North Atlantic Alliance and uniting the Free World.

4. RESOLUTION OF ASSOCIATION

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

Welcoming the declaration made in London by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October, 1954 (Annex A), and the related declaration made on the same occasion by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic (Annex B),
Notes with satisfaction that the representatives of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty have, on behalf of their Governments, today associated themselves with the aforesaid declaration of the Three Powers.

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The German Federal Republic has agreed to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.
Upon her accession to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Brussels Treaty, the German Federal Republic declares that she will refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of the two treaties. In particular the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States.
DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic,
Being resolved to devote their efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and in particular with the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter:
(i) to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
(ii) to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations take preventive or enforcement action;
(iv) to ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with the principles of the Charter so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Having regard to the purely defensive character of the Atlantic Alliance which is manifest in the North Atlantic Treaty, wherein they reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and undertake to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the principles of the Charter and to refrain, in accordance with those principles, from the threat or use of force in their international relations,

Take note that the German Federal Republic has by a Declaration dated 3 October accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States;

Declare that:
1. They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German Government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs.
2. In their relations with the Federal Republic they will follow the principles set out in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.
3. A peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.
4. The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.
5. The security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers there are regarded by the Three Powers as essential elements of the peace of the free world in the present international situation. Accordingly they will maintain armed forces within the territory of Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it. They therefore reaffirm that they will treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves.
6. They will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in
violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter threatens the integrity and unity of
the Atlantic Alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three
Governments, for their part, will consider the offending Government as having forfeited its
rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic
Treaty and its protocols. They will act in accordance with Article 4 of the North Atlantic
Treaty with a view to taking other measures which may be appropriate.

7. They will invite the association of other member States of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization with this Declaration.
Chapter I

General Introduction

The Committee on Non-Military Co-operation, set up by the North Atlantic Council at its session of May, 1956, was requested: "to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community".

2. The Committee has interpreted these terms of reference as requiring it 1. to examine and re-define the objectives and needs of the Alliance, especially in the light of current international developments; and 2. to make recommendations for strengthening its internal solidarity, cohesion and unity.

3. The Committee hopes that the report and recommendations which it now submits will make NATO's purely defensive and constructive purposes better understood in non-NATO countries, thereby facilitating and encouraging steps to lessen international tension. The events of the last few months have increased this tension and reduced hopes, which had been raised since Stalin's death, of finding a secure and honourable basis for competitive and ultimately for co-operative co-existence with the Communist world. The effort to this end, however, must go on.

4. Inter-allied relations have also undergone severe strains. The substance of this report was prepared by the Committee of Three in the course of its meetings and inter-governmental consultations last September. Subsequent events have reinforced the Committee's conviction that the Atlantic Community can develop greater unity only by working constantly to achieve common policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern. Unless this is done, the very framework of co-operation in NATO, which has contributed so greatly to the cause of freedom, and which is so vital to its advancement in the future, will be endangered.

5. The foundation of NATO, on which alone a strong superstructure can be built, is the political obligation that its members have taken for collective defence: to consider that an attack on one is an attack on all which will be met by the collective action of all. There is a tendency at times to overlook the far-reaching importance of this commitment, especially during those periods when the danger of having to invoke it may seem to recede.

6. With this political commitment for collective defence as the cornerstone of the foreign and defence policies of its members, NATO has a solid basis for existence. It is true, of course, that the ways and means by which the obligation is to be discharged may alter as political or strategic conditions alter, as the threat to peace changes its character or its direction. However, any variations in plans and strategic policies which may be required need not weaken NATO or the confidence of its members in NATO and in each other; providing, and the proviso...
is decisive, that each member retains its will and its capacity to play its full part in discharging
the political commitment for collective action against aggression which it undertook when it
signed the Pact; providing also – and recent events have shown that this is equally important –
that any changes in national strategy or policy which affect the coalition are made only after
collective consideration.

7. The first essential, then, of a healthy and developing NATO lies in the whole-hearted
acceptance by all its members of the political commitment for collective defence, and in the
confidence which each has in the will and ability of the others to honour that commitment if
aggression should take place.

8. This is our best present deterrent against military aggression, and consequently the best
assurance that the commitment undertaken will not be engaged.

9. However, this deterrent rôle of NATO, based on solidarity and strength, can be discharged
only if the political and economic relations between its members are co-operative and close.
An Alliance in which the members ignore each other’s interests or engage in political or
economic conflict, or harbour suspicions of each other, cannot be effective either for de-
terrence or defence. Recent experience makes this clearer than ever before.

10. It is useful, in searching for ways and means of strengthening NATO unity and under-
standing, to recall the origin and the aims of the Organization.

11. The Treaty which was signed in Washington in 1949 was a collective response – we had
learned that a purely national response was insufficient for security – to the fear of military
aggression by the forces of the USSR and its allies. These forces were of overwhelming strength.
The threat to Greece, the capture of Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the pressure
against Yugoslavia showed that they were also aggressive.

12. While fear may have been the main urge for the creation of NATO, there was also the
realization – conscious or instinctive – that in a shrinking nuclear world it was wise and
timely to bring about a closer association of kindred Atlantic and Western European nations
for other than defence purposes alone; that a partial pooling of sovereignty for mutual
protection should also promote progress and co-operation generally. There was a feeling
among the governments and peoples concerned that this close unity was both natural and
desirable; that the common cultural traditions, free institutions and democratic concepts
which were being challenged, and were marked for destruction by those who challenged
them, were things which should also bring the NATO nations closer together, not only for their
defence but for their development. There was, in short, a sense of Atlantic Community,
alongside the realization of an immediate common danger.

13. Any such feeling was certainly not the decisive, or even the main impulse in the creation
of NATO. Nevertheless, it gave birth to the hope that NATO would grow beyond and above the
emergency which brought it into being.

14. The expression of this hope is found in the Preamble and in Articles 2 and 4 of the
Treaty. These two Articles, limited in their terms but with at least the promise of the grand
design of an Atlantic Community, were included because of this insistent feeling that NATO
must become more than a military alliance. They reflected the very real anxiety that if NATO
failed to meet this test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it, even
though the need for it might be as great as ever.

15. From the very beginning of NATO, then, it was recognized that while defence co-
operation was the first and most urgent requirement, this was not enough. It has also become
increasingly realized since the Treaty was signed that security is today far more than a
military matter. The strengthening of political consultation and economic co-operation, the
development of resources, progress in education and public understanding, all these can be as
important, or even more important, for the protection of the security of a nation, or an
alliance, as the building of a battleship or the equipping of an army.
16. These two aspects of security – civil and military – can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments, either within or between nations. Perhaps NATO has not yet fully recognized their essential inter-relationship, or done enough to bring about that close and continuous contact between its civil and military sides which is essential if it is to be strong and enduring.

17. North Atlantic political and economic co-operation, however, let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such co-operation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best; slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. This will not be the case, however, unless the member governments – especially the more powerful ones – are willing to work, to a much greater extent than hitherto, with and through NATO for more than purposes of collective military defence.

18. While the members of NATO have already developed various forms of non-military co-operation between themselves and have been among the most active and constructive participants in various international organizations, NATO as such has been hesitant in entering this field, particularly in regard to economic matters. Its members have been rightly concerned to avoid duplication and to do, through other existing international organizations, the things which can best be done in that way.

19. Recently, however, the members of NATO have been examining and re-assessing the purposes and the needs of the Organization in the light of certain changes in Soviet tactics and policies which have taken place since the death of Stalin, and of the effect of the present turmoil in Eastern Europe on this development.

20. These changes have not diminished the need for collective military defence but they have faced NATO with an additional challenge in which the emphasis is largely non-military in character. NATO must recognize the real nature of the developments which have taken place. An important aspect of the new Soviet policies of competitive co-existence is an attempt to respond to positive initiatives of the Western nations aimed at improving, in an atmosphere of freedom, the lot of the economically less-developed countries, and at establishing a just and mutually beneficial trading system in which all countries can prosper. The Soviet Union is now apparently veering towards policies designed to ensnare these countries by economic means and by political subversion, and to fasten on them the same shackles of Communism from which certain members of the Soviet bloc are now striving to release themselves. The members of NATO must maintain their vigilance in dealing with this form of penetration.

21. Meanwhile some of the immediate fears of large-scale all-out military aggression against Western Europe have lessened. This process has been facilitated by evidence that the Soviet Government have realised that any such all-out aggression would be met by a sure, swift and devastating retaliation, and that there could be no victory in a war of this kind with nuclear weapons on both sides. With an increased Soviet emphasis on non-military or paramilitary methods, a review is needed of NATO’s ability to meet effectively the challenge of penetration under the guise of co-existence, with its emphasis on conflict without catastrophe.

22. Certain questions now take on a new urgency. Have NATO’s needs and objectives changed, or should they be changed? Is the Organization operating satisfactorily in the altered circumstances of 1956? If not, what can be done about it? There is the even more far-reaching question: ‘Can a loose association of sovereign states hold together at all without the common binding force of fear?’

23. The Committee has been examining these questions in the light of its firm conviction that the objectives which governments had in mind when the Pact was signed remain valid; that NATO is as important now to its member states as it was at that time.
24. The first of these objectives – as has already been pointed out – is security, based on collective action with adequate armed forces both for deterrence and defence.

25. Certainly NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of this objective remain as essential as they were in 1949. Soviet tactics may have changed; but Soviet armed might and ultimate objectives remain unchanged. Moreover, recent events in Eastern Europe show that the Soviet Union will not hesitate in certain circumstances to use force and the threat of force. Therefore the military strength of NATO must not be reduced, though its character and capabilities should be constantly adapted to changing circumstances. Strengthening the political and economic side of NATO is an essential complement to – not a substitute for – continuous co-operation in defence.

26. In spite of these recent events Soviet leaders may place greater emphasis on political, economic and propaganda action. There is no evidence, however, that this will be permitted to prejudice in any way the maintenance of a high level of military power in its most modern form as a base for Soviet activity in these other fields.

27. We should welcome changes in Soviet policies if they were genuinely designed to ease international tensions. But we must remember that the weakening and eventual dissolution of NATO remains a major Communist goal. We must therefore remain on guard so long as Soviet leaders persist in their determination to maintain a preponderance of military power for the achievement of their own political objectives and those of their allies.

28. This brings us again to the second and long-term aim of NATO: the development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper even than the necessity for common defence. This implies nothing less than the permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the promotion of their greater unity and the protection and the advancement of the interests which, as free democracies, they have in common.

29. If we are to secure this long-term aim, we must prevent the centrifugal forces of opposition or indifference from weakening the Alliance. NATO has not been destroyed, or even weakened, by the threats or attacks of its enemies. It has faltered at times through the lethargy or complacency of its members; through dissension or division between them; by putting narrow national considerations above the collective interest. It could be destroyed by these forces, if they were allowed to subsist. To combat these tendencies, NATO must be used by its members, far more than it has been used, for sincere and genuine consultation and cooperation on questions of common concern. For this purpose, resolution is more important than resolutions; will than words.

30. The problem, however, goes deeper than this. NATO countries are faced by a political as well as a military threat. It comes from the revolutionary doctrines of Communism which have by careful design of the Communist leaders over many years been sowing seeds of falsehood concerning our free and democratic way of life. The best answer to such falsehoods is a continuing demonstration of the superiority of our own institutions over Communist ones. We can show by word and deed that we welcome political progress, economic advancement and orderly social change and that the real reactionaries of this day are these Communist regimes which, adhering to an inflexible pattern of economic and political doctrine, have been more successful in destroying freedom than in promoting it.

31. We must, however, realize that falsehoods concerning our institutions have sometimes been accepted at face value and that there are those, even in the non-Communist world, who under the systematic influence of Communist propaganda, do not accept our own analysis of NATO’s aims and values. They believe that while NATO may have served a useful defensive and deterrent role in the Stalinist era, it is no longer necessary even for the security of its members; that it is tending now to become an agency for the pooling of the strength and resources of the ‘colonial’ powers in defence of imperial privileges, racial superiority, and Atlantic hegemony under the leadership of the United States. The fact that we know these views to be
false and unjustified does not mean that NATO and its governments should not do everything they can to correct and counteract them.

32. NATO should not forget that the influence and interests of its members are not confined to the area covered by the Treaty, and that common interests of the Atlantic Community can be seriously affected by developments outside the Treaty area. Therefore, while striving to improve their relations with each other, and to strengthen and deepen their own unity, they should also be concerned with harmonizing their policies in relation to other areas, taking into account the broader interests of the whole international community; particularly in working through the United Nations and elsewhere for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the solution of the problems that now divide the world.

33. In following this course, NATO can show that it is more than a defence organization acting and reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and dangers arising out of Soviet policy. It can prove its desire to co-operate fully with other members of the international community in bringing to reality the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should take place, but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political and moral initiative to enable all countries to develop in freedom, and to bring about a secure peace for all nations.

34. Our caution in accepting without question the pacific character of any Soviet moves, our refusal to dismantle our defences before we are convinced that conditions of international confidence have been restored, will, particularly after the events in Hungary, be understood by all people of sincerity and good-will. What would not be understood is any unwillingness on our part to seek ways and means of breaking down the barriers with a view to establishing such confidence.

35. The coming together of the Atlantic nations for good and constructive purposes -- which is the basic principle and ideal underlying the NATO concept -- must rest on and grow from deeper and more permanent factors than the divisions and dangers of the last ten years. It is a historical, rather than a contemporary, development and if it is to achieve its real purpose, it must be considered in that light and the necessary conclusions drawn. A short-range view will not suffice.

36. The fundamental historical fact underlying development is that the nation state, by itself and relying exclusively on national policy and national power, is inadequate for progress or even for survival in the nuclear age. As the founders of the North Atlantic Treaty foresaw, the growing interdependence of states, politically and economically as well as militarily, calls for an ever-increasing measure of international cohesion and co-operation. Some states may be able to enjoy a degree of political and economic independence when things are going well. No state, however powerful, can guarantee its security and its welfare by national action alone.

37. This basic fact underlies our report and the recommendations contained therein which appear in the subsequent chapters.

38. It has not been difficult to make these recommendations. It will be far more difficult for the member governments to carry them into effect. This will require, on their part, the firm conviction that the transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and vigorous political reality is as important as any purely national purpose. It will require, above all, the will to carry this conviction into the realm of practical governmental policy.
CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

I. Introduction

39. If there is to be vitality and growth in the concept of the Atlantic Community, the relations between the members of NATO must rest on a solid basis of confidence and understanding. Without this there cannot be constructive or solid political co-operation.

40. The deepening and strengthening of this political co-operation does not imply the weakening of the ties of NATO members with other friendly countries or with other international associations, particularly the United Nations. Adherence to NATO is not exclusive or restrictive. Nor should the evolution of the Atlantic Community through NATO prevent the formation of even closer relationships among some of its members, for instance within groups of European countries. The moves toward Atlantic co-operation and European unity should be parallel and complementary, not competitive or conflicting.

41. Effective and constructive international co-operation requires a resolve to work together for the solution of common problems. There are special ties between NATO members, special incentives and security interests, which should make this task easier than it otherwise would be. But its successful accomplishment will depend largely on the extent to which member governments, in their own policies and actions, take into consideration the interests of the Alliance. This requires not only the acceptance of the obligation of consultation and co-operation whenever necessary, but also the development of practices by which the discharge of this obligation becomes a normal part of governmental activity.

42. It is easy to profess devotion to the principle of political – or economic – consultation in NATO. It is difficult and has in fact been shown to be impossible, if the proper conviction is lacking, to convert the profession into practice. Consultation within an alliance means more than exchange of information, though that is necessary. It means more than letting the NATO Council know about national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others.

II. Consultation on foreign policies

A. SCOPE AND CHARACTER OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION

43. The essential role of consultation in fostering political co-operation was clearly defined by an earlier NATO Committee on the North Atlantic Community in 1951:

"...The achievement of a closer degree of co-ordination of the foreign policies of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, through the development of the 'habit of consultation' on matters of common concern, would greatly strengthen the solidarity of the North Atlantic Community and increase the individual and collective capacity of its members to serve the peaceful purposes for which NATO was established. ... In the political field, this means that while each North Atlantic government retains full freedom of action and decision with respect to its own policy, the aim should be to achieve, through exchanging information and views, as wide an area of agreement as possible in the formulation of policies as a whole".
"Special attention must be paid, as explicitly recognized in Article 4 of the Treaty, to matters of urgent and immediate importance to the members of NATO, and to 'emergency' situations where it may be necessary to consult closely on national lines of conduct affecting the interests of members of NATO as a whole. There is a continuing need, however, for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the attitudes and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation necessarily rests on the more powerful members of the Community."

44. These words were written five years ago. They hold true now more than ever before. If we can say that they have not been ignored by NATO we must also recognize that the practice of consulting has not so developed in the NATO Council as to meet the demands of political changes and world trends. The present need, therefore, is more than simply broadening the scope and deepening the character of consultation. There is a pressing requirement for all members to make consultation in NATO an integral part of the making of national policy. Without this the very existence of the North Atlantic Community may be in jeopardy.

45. It should, however, be remembered that collective discussion is not an end in itself, but a means to the end of harmonizing policies. Where common interests of the Atlantic Community are at stake consultation should always seek to arrive at timely agreement on common lines of policy and action.

46. Such agreement, even with the closest possible co-operation and consultation, is not easy to secure. But it is essential to the Atlantic Alliance that a steady and continuous effort be made to bring it about. There cannot be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.

47. There are, of course, certain practical limitations to consultation in this field. They are sufficiently obvious in fact to make it unnecessary to emphasize them in words. Indeed the danger is less that they will be minimized or evaded than that they will be exaggerated and used to justify practices which unnecessarily ignore the common interest.

48. One of these limitations is the hard fact that ultimate responsibility for decision and action still rests on national governments. It is conceivable that a situation of extreme emergency may arise when action must be taken by one government before consultation is possible with the others.

49. Another limitation is the difficulty, and indeed the unwisdom, of trying to specify in advance all the subjects and all the situations where consultation is necessary; to separate by area or by subject the matters of NATO concern from those of purely national concern; to define in detail the obligations and duties of consultation. These things have to work themselves out in practice. In this process, experience is a better guide than dogma.

50. The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments, before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. If they have not the desire and the will to do this, no resolutions or recommendations or declarations by the Council or any Committee of the Council will be of any great value.

51. On the assumption, however, that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are recommended:

a. members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality but as a preliminary to effective political consultation;

b. both individual member governments and the Secretary General should have the right to raise for discussion in the Council any subject which is of common NATO interest and not of a purely domestic character;

c. a member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm
policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible;
d. in developing their national policies, members should take into consideration the interests and views of other governments, particularly those most directly concerned, as expressed in NATO consultation, even where no community of view or consensus has been reached in the Council;
e. where a consensus has been reached, it should be reflected in the formation of national policies. When for national reasons the consensus is not followed, the government concerned should offer an explanation to the Council. It is even more important that where an agreed and formal recommendation has emerged from the Council's discussions, governments should give it full weight in any national actions or policies related to the subject of that recommendation.

B. ANNUAL POLITICAL APPRAISAL

52. To strengthen the process of consultation, it is recommended that Foreign Ministers, at each Spring meeting, should make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance and consider the lines along which it should advance.
53. To prepare for this discussion, the Secretary General should submit an annual report:
   a. analysing the major political problems of the Alliance;
   b. reviewing the extent to which member governments have consulted and co-operated on such problems;
   c. indicating the problems and possible developments which may require future consultation, so that difficulties might be resolved and positive and constructive initiative taken.
54. Member governments, through their Permanent Representatives, should give the Secretary General such information and assistance, including that of technical experts, as he may require in preparing his report.

C. PREPARATION FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATION

55. Effective consultation also requires careful planning and preparation of the agenda for meetings of the Council both in Ministerial and permanent session. Political questions coming up for discussion in the Council should so far as practicable be previously reviewed and discussed, so that representatives may have background information on the thinking both of their own and of other governments. When appropriate, drafts of resolutions should be prepared in advance as a basis for discussion. Additional preparatory work will also be required for the annual political appraisal referred to in the preceding section.
56. To assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation, there should be constituted under the Council a Committee of Political Advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists from the capitals. It would meet under the chairmanship of a member of the International Staff appointed by the Secretary General, and would include among its responsibilities current studies such as those on trends of Soviet policy.
III. Peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes

57. In the development of effective political co-operation in NATO, it is of crucial importance to avoid serious inter-member disputes and to settle them quickly and satisfactorily when they occur. The settlement of such disputes is in the first place the direct responsibility of the member governments concerned, under both the Charter of the United Nations (Article 33) and the North Atlantic Treaty (Article 1). To clarify NATO's responsibilities in dealing with disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly and to enable NATO, if necessary, to help in the settlement of such disputes, the Committee recommends that the Council adopt a resolution under Article 1 of the Treaty on the following lines:

a. re-affirming the obligation of members to settle by peaceful means any disputes between themselves;

b. declaring their intention to submit any such disputes, which have not proved capable of settlement directly, to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before resorting to any other international agency; except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal, and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialized economic organization;

c. recognizing the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to the attention of the Council matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

d. empowering the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to the parties in dispute, and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration; and

e. empowering the Secretary General, where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in d. above, to use the assistance of not more than three Permanent Representatives chosen by him in each instance.

IV. Parliamentary Associations and the Parliamentary Conference

58. Among the best supporters of NATO and its purposes are those Members of Parliament who have had a chance at first hand to see some of its activities and to learn of its problems, and to exchange views with their colleagues from other parliaments. In particular, the formation of national Parliamentary Associations and the activities of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries have contributed to the development of public support for NATO and solidarity among its members.

59. In order to maintain a close relationship of Parliamentarians with NATO, the following arrangements are recommended:

a. that the Secretary General continue to place the facilities of NATO Headquarters at the disposal of Parliamentary Conferences and give all possible help with arrangements for their meetings;

b. that invited representatives of member governments and the Secretary General and other senior NATO civil and military officers attend certain of these meetings. In this way the Parliamentarians would be informed on the state of the Alliance and the problems before it, and the value of their discussions would be increased.
CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

I. Introduction

60. Political co-operation and economic conflict are not reconcilable. Therefore, in the economic as well as in the political field there must be a genuine desire among the members to work together and a readiness to consult on questions of common concern based on the recognition of common interests.

61. These common economic interests shared by the members of NATO call for:
   a. co-operative and national action to achieve healthy and expanding economies, both to promote the well-being and self-confidence of the Atlantic peoples and to serve as the essential support for an adequate defence effort;
   b. the greatest possible freedom in trade and payments and in the movement of manpower and long-term capital;
   c. assistance to economically underdeveloped areas for reasons of enlightened self-interest and to promote better relations among peoples; and
   d. policies which will demonstrate, under conditions of competitive co-existence, the superiority of free institutions in promoting human welfare and economic progress.

62. A recognition of these common NATO interests, and collective and individual efforts to promote them, need not in any way prejudice close economic-relations with non-NATO countries. Economic, like political co-operation, is and must remain wider than NATO. At the same time, the NATO countries have an interest in any arrangements for especially close economic co-operation among groups of European member nations. It should be possible – as it is desirable – for such special arrangements to promote rather than conflict with the wider objectives of Article 2 of our Treaty, which are of basic importance to the stability and well-being, not only of the North Atlantic area, but of the whole non-Communist world.

II. NATO and other organizations

63. While the purposes and principles of Article 2 are of vital importance, it is not necessary that member countries pursue them only through action in NATO itself. It would not serve the interests of the Atlantic Community for NATO to duplicate the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation.* NATO members play a major part in all these agencies, whose membership is generally well adapted to the purposes they serve.

64. Nor do there now appear to be significant new areas for collective economic action requiring execution by NATO itself. In fact, the common economic concern of the member nations will often best be fostered by continued and increased collaboration both bilaterally

* The outstanding instances are the Organization for European Co-operation and Development (OECD) (which includes all NATO countries and four others); the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the various other United Nations agencies including the Economic Commission for Europe. Several NATO members participate actively in the Colombo Plan for promoting economic development in Asia. Most members are taking an active part in technical assistance programmes and are also participating in discussions of proposals for the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED).
and through organizations other than NATO. This collaboration should be reinforced, however, by NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved, particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole. This, in turn, requires a substantial expansion of exchange of information and views in NATO in the economic as well as in the political field. Such economic consultation should seek to secure a common approach on the part of member governments where the questions are clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance. Action resulting from such a common approach, however, should normally be taken by governments either directly or through other international organizations.

65. NATO, as such, should not seek to establish formal relations with these other organizations, and the harmonizing of attitudes and actions should be left to the representatives of the NATO governments therein. Nor is it necessary or desirable for NATO members to form a 'bloc' in such organizations. This would only alienate other friendly governments. There should, however, be consultation in NATO when economic issues of special political or strategic importance to NATO arise in other organizations and in particular before meetings at which there may be attempts to divide or weaken the Atlantic Alliance, or prejudice its interests.

III. Conflicts in economic policies of NATO countries

66. NATO has a positive interest in the resolution of economic disputes which may have political or strategic repercussions damaging to the Alliance. These are to be distinguished from disagreements on economic policy which are normally dealt with through direct negotiations or by multilateral discussions in other organizations. Nothing would be gained by merely having repeated in NATO the same arguments made in other and more technically qualified organizations. It should, however, be open to any member or to the Secretary General to raise in NATO issues on which they feel that consideration elsewhere is not making adequate progress and that NATO consultation might facilitate solutions contributing to the objectives of the Atlantic Community. The procedures for peaceful settlement of political disputes discussed in the previous chapter should also be available for major disputes of an economic character which are appropriate for NATO consideration.

IV. Scientific and technical co-operation

67. One area of special importance to the Atlantic Community is that of science and technology. During the last decade, it has become ever clearer that progress in this field can be decisive in determining the security of nations and their position in world affairs. Such progress is also vital if the Western world is to play its proper role in relation to economically underdeveloped areas.

68. Within the general field of science and technology, there is an especially urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. Responsibility for recruitment, training and utilization of scientific and technical personnel is primarily a national rather than an international matter. Nor is it a responsibility solely of national governments. In the member countries with federal systems, state and provincial governments play the major part, and many of the universities and institutes of higher learning in the Atlantic area are independent institutions free from detailed control by governments. At the same time, properly designed measures of international co-operation
could stimulate individual member countries to adopt more positive policies and, in some cases, help guide them in the most constructive directions.

69. Certain activities in this connection are already being carried out by other organizations. Progress in this field, however, is so crucial to the future of the Atlantic Community that NATO members should ensure that every possibility of fruitful co-operation is examined. As a first concrete step, therefore, it is recommended that a conference be convened composed of one or at the most two outstanding authorities, private or governmental, from each country in order:

a. to exchange information and views concerning the most urgent problems in the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and the best means, both long-term and short-term, of solving those problems;

b. to foster closer relations among the participants with a view to continued interchange of experience and stimulation of constructive work in member countries; and

c. to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field, through NATO or other international organizations.

V. Consultation on economic problems

70. It is agreed that the Atlantic Community has a positive concern with healthy and accelerated development in economically underdeveloped areas, both inside and outside the NATO area. The Committee feels, however, that NATO is not an appropriate agency for administering programmes of assistance for economic development, or even for systematically concerting the relevant policies of member nations. What member countries can and should do is to keep each other and the Organization informed of their programmes and policies in this field. When required, NATO should review the adequacy of existing action in relation to the interests of the Alliance.

71. The economic interests of the Atlantic Community cannot be considered in isolation from the activities and policies of the Soviet bloc. The Soviets are resorting all too often to the use of economic measures designed to weaken the Western Alliance, or to create in other areas a high degree of dependence on the Soviet world. In this situation it is more than ever important that NATO countries actively develop their own constructive commercial and financial policies. In particular, they should avoid creating situations of which the Soviet bloc countries might take advantage to the detriment of the Atlantic Community and of other non-Communist countries. In this whole field of competitive economic co-existence member countries should consult together more fully in order to determine their course deliberately and with the fullest possible knowledge.

72. There has been a considerable evolution in NATO's arrangements for regular economic consultation. In addition, a number of economic matters have been brought before the Council for consideration on an ad hoc basis. No substantial new machinery in this field is called for. However, in view of the extended range of topics for regular exchange of information and consultation described above, there should be established under the Council a Committee of Economic Advisers. This group should be entrusted with preliminary discussion, on a systematic basis, of the matters outlined above, together with such tasks as may be assigned by the Council or approved by the Council at the Committee's request. It would absorb any continuing function of the Committee of Technical Advisers. Since its duties, would not be full-time, member governments could be represented normally by officials mainly concerned with the work of other international economic organizations. Membership, however, should be flexible, the Committee being composed, when appropriate, of specialists from the capitals on particular topics under consideration.
CHAPTER 4

CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

73. A sense of community must bind the people as well as the institutions of the Atlantic nations. This will exist only to the extent that there is a realization of their common cultural heritage and of the values of their free way of life and thought. It is important, therefore, for the NATO countries to promote cultural co-operation among their peoples by all practical means in order to strengthen their unity and develop maximum support for the Alliance. It is particularly important that this cultural co-operation should be wider than continental. This, however, does not preclude particular governments from acting on a more limited multilateral or even bilateral basis to strengthen their own cultural relations within the broader Atlantic framework. The Committee welcomes the measures for cultural co-operation within the Atlantic Community which have been initiated by private individuals and non-governmental groups. These should be encouraged and increased.

74. To further cultural collaboration, the Committee suggests that member governments be guided by the following general principles:
   a. government activities in this field should not duplicate but should support and supplement private efforts;
   b. member governments should give priority to those projects which require joint NATO action, and thus contribute to a developing sense of community;
   c. in developing new activities in the cultural field, NATO can most fruitfully place the main emphasis on inspiring and promoting transatlantic contacts;
   d. there should be a realistic appreciation of the financial implications of cultural projects.

75. In order to develop public awareness and understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community, the Council should work out arrangements for NATO courses and seminars for teachers.

76. NATO and its member governments should broaden their support of other educational and related activities such as the NATO Fellowship and Scholarship Programme; creation of university chairs of Atlantic studies; visiting professorships; government-sponsored programmes for the exchange of persons, especially on a transatlantic basis; use of NATO information materials in schools; and establishment of special NATO awards for students.

77. Governments should actively promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations and a specialist should be added to the International Staff in this connection. Conferences under NATO auspices of representatives of youth organizations such as that of July, 1956, should be held from time to time.

78. In the interests of promoting easier and more frequent contacts among the NATO peoples, governments should review and, if possible, revise their foreign exchange and other policies which restrict travel.

79. In view of the importance of promoting better understanding and goodwill between NATO service personnel, it would be desirable, in co-operation with the military authorities, to extend exchanges of such personnel beyond the limits of normal training programmes. Such exchanges might, as a first step, be developed by governments on a bilateral basis. In addition, member governments should seek the assistance of the Atlantic Treaty Association and other voluntary organizations in the further development of such exchanges.

80. Cultural projects which have a common benefit should be commonly financed. Agreed cultural projects initiated by a single member government or a private organization, such as the recent seminar held at Oxford or the Study Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Treaty Association on ‘The Rôle of the School in the Atlantic Community’, should receive financial support from NATO where that is necessary to supplement national resources.
CO-OPERATION IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

81. The people of the member countries must know about NATO if they are to support it. Therefore they must be informed not only of NATO's aspirations, but of its achievements. There must be substance for an effective NATO information programme and resources to carry it out. The public should be informed to the greatest possible extent of significant results achieved through NATO consultation.

82. NATO information activities should be directed primarily to public opinion in the NATO area. At the same time an understanding outside the NATO area of the objectives and accomplishments of the Organization is necessary if it is to be viewed sympathetically, and if its activities are not to be misinterpreted.

83. The important task of explaining and reporting NATO activities rests primarily on national information services. They cannot discharge this task if member governments do not make adequate provisions in their national programmes for that purpose. It is essential, therefore, that such provision be made. NATO can and should assist national governments in this work. The promotion of information about, and public understanding of NATO and the Atlantic Community should, in fact, be a joint endeavour by the Organization and its members.

84. One of NATO's functions should be to co-ordinate the work of national information services in fields of common interest. Governments should pool their experiences and views in NATO to avoid differences in evaluation and emphasis. This is particularly important in the dissemination of information about NATO to other countries. Co-ordinated policy should underline the defensive character of our Alliance and the importance of its non-military aspects. It should cover also replies to anti-NATO propaganda and the analysis of Communist moves and statements which affect NATO.

85. In its turn, the NATO Information Division must be given the resources by governments as well as their support, without which it could not discharge these new tasks – and should not be asked to do so.

86. In order to facilitate co-operation between the NATO Information Division and national information services, the following specific measures are recommended:
   a. an Officer should be designated by each national information service to maintain liaison with NATO and to be responsible for the dissemination of NATO information material;
   b. governments should submit to NATO the relevant information programmes which they plan to implement, for discussion in the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations. Representatives of national information services should take part in these discussions;
   c. within the NATO Information Division budget, provision should be made for a translation fund so that NATO information material can be translated into the non-official languages of the Alliance, according to reasonable requirements of the member governments;
   d. NATO should, on request, provide national services with special studies on matters of common interest.

87. The journalists' tours sponsored by NATO should be broadened to include others in a position to influence public opinion, such as trade union and youth leaders, teachers and lecturers. Closer relations between private organizations supporting NATO and the NATO Information Division should also be encouraged.
CHAPTER 6

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

88. The Committee considers that NATO in its present form is capable of discharging the non-military functions required of it. Structural changes are not needed. The machine is basically satisfactory. It is for governments to make use of it.

89. At the same time, certain improvements in the procedures and functioning of the Organization will be required if the recommendations of this report are to be fully implemented. The proposals in this Chapter are submitted for this purpose.

A. MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL

90. More time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings. Experience has shown that, without more time, important issues on the agenda cannot be adequately considered. Decisions concerning some of them will not be reached at all, or will be reached only in an unclear form.

91. Efforts should be made to encourage discussion rather than simply declarations of policy prepared in advance. Arrangements for meetings should be made with this aim in view. For most sessions, the numbers present should be sharply restricted. In order to facilitate free discussion, when Ministers wish to speak in a language other than French or English, consecutive translation into one of these official languages should be provided by interpreters from their own delegations.

92. Meetings of Foreign Ministers should be held whenever required, and occasionally in locations other than NATO Headquarters. Ministers might also participate more frequently in regular Council meetings, even though not all of them may find it possible to attend such meetings at the same time. The Council of Permanent Representatives has powers of effective decision: in other words, the authority of the Council as such is the same whether governments are represented by Ministers or by their Permanent Representatives. Thus there should be no firm or formal line between Ministerial and other meetings of the Council.

B. STRENGTHENING THE LINKS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

93. It is indispensable to the kind of consultations envisaged in this report that Permanent Representatives should be in a position to speak authoritatively and to reflect the current thinking of their governments. Differences in location and in constitutional organization make impossible any uniform arrangements in all member governments. In some cases it might be desirable to designate a high official in the national capital to be concerned primarily with NATO affairs. The purpose would be to help both in fostering NATO consultations whenever national policies impinge on the common interest of the Atlantic Community, and in translating the results of such consultation into effective action within the national governments.

94. To ensure the closest possible connection between current thinking in the governments and consultations in the Council, there might be occasional Council Meetings with the participation of specially designated officials or the permanent heads of foreign ministries.
C. PREPARATION FOR COUNCIL MEETINGS

95. Items on the agenda of Ministerial Meetings should be thoroughly examined by Permanent Representatives and relevant proposals prepared before Ministers meet. For this purpose it may be found desirable for governments to send senior experts to consult on agenda items before the meetings take place.

96. The preparation of questions for discussion in the Council should be assisted by appropriate use of the Council's Committees of Political and Economic Advisers. (Recommendations on the establishment of these Committees are set forth in Chapter 2, paragraph 56, and Chapter 3, paragraph 72).

97. In the case of consultations on special subjects, more use should be made of senior experts from national capitals to assist permanent delegations by calling them, on an ad hoc basis, to do preparatory work. Informal discussions among specialists with corresponding responsibilities are a particularly valuable means of concerting governmental attitudes in the early stages of policy formation.

98. Member governments should make available to one another through NATO "basic position material" for background information. This would help the Alliance as a whole in the consideration of problems of common concern and would assist individual governments to understand more fully the reasons for the position adopted by any member country on a particular issue which might be its special concern, but which might also affect in varying degrees other members of NATO.

D. THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF

99. To enable the Organization to make its full contribution, the rôle of the Secretary General and the International Staff needs to be enhanced.

100. It is recommended that the Secretary General preside over meetings of the Council in Ministerial, as he does now in other sessions. Such a change with respect to the conduct of the Council's business would follow naturally from the new responsibilities of the Secretary General, arising out of the recommendations of this report. It is also warranted by the Secretary General's unique opportunities for becoming familiar with the problems and the activities of the Alliance as a whole.

101. It would, however, still be desirable to have one Minister chosen each year as President of the Council in accordance with the present practice of alphabetical rotation. This Minister, as President, would continue to have especially close contact with the Secretary General during and between Ministerial Meetings, and would, as at present, act as the spokesman of the Council on all formal occasions. He would also preside at the formal opening and closing of Ministerial sessions of the Council.

102. In addition:
   a. the Secretary General should be encouraged to propose items for NATO consultation in the fields covered by this report and should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation;
   b. in view of these responsibilities member governments should undertake to keep the Secretary General fully and currently informed through their permanent delegations of their governments' thinking on questions of common concern to the Alliance;
   c. attention is also called to the additional responsibilities of the Secretary General, recommended in connection with the annual political appraisal (Chapter 2, paragraph 52), and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 2, paragraph 57).

103. The effective functioning of NATO depends in large measure on the efficiency, devotion
and morale of its Secretariat. Acceptance of the recommendations in this report would impose on the Secretariat new duties and responsibilities. Governments must, therefore, be prepared to give the International Staff all necessary support, both in finance and personnel. If this is not done, the recommendations of the report, even if accepted by governments, will not be satisfactorily carried out.

ANNEX 1

COMMITTEE OF THREE: FORMAL RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

The Committee of Three, consisting of Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway), and Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada), was established by the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session on 5 May, 1956, with the following terms of reference:

"...to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community"

2. The Committee held its first meetings 20 to 22 June, 1956, at NATO Headquarters in Paris. During these discussions, the procedure to be followed by the Committee was established, and it was decided to send a Questionnaire to each NATO member government in order to obtain its views on a number of specific problems with respect to co-operation in the political, economic, cultural and information fields and regarding the organization and functions of NATO. In addition, the Committee issued a memorandum containing explanatory notes and guidance to assist countries in the preparation of their replies to the Questionnaire. The Questionnaire was circulated on 28 June, 1956, and governments were requested to submit their replies by 20 August.

3. The Committee reassembled in Paris on 10 September, 1956, and held a series of meetings lasting until the 22nd of that month. After having examined and analysed the replies to the Questionnaire, the Committee held consultations with each member country individually. The purpose of these consultations was to clarify, where necessary, the position taken by governments in their replies, and to discuss with the representatives of other governments in a preliminary way certain views of the Committee.

4. The consultations took place in the following order:

Wednesday, 12 September:
a.m. Iceland (represented by Mr. H. G. Andersen, Permanent Representative of Iceland to the North Atlantic Council).
p.m. Turkey (represented by Mr. N. Birgi, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Thursday, 13 September:
a.m. The Netherlands (represented by Mr. J. W. Beyen, Minister for Foreign Affairs).
p.m. Greece (represented by Mr. E. Averof, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Friday, 14 September:
a.m. Belgium (represented by Mr. P.-H. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs).
p.m. Germany (represented by Professor Hallstein, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs).

Monday, 17 September:
a.m. Luxembourg (represented by Mr. M. J. Bech, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs).
a.m. France (represented by Mr. C. Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs).
p.m. United States (represented by Senator George, special representative of President Eisenhower).
p.m. Portugal (represented by Mr. P. Cunha, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

Tuesday, 18 September:
a.m. Denmark (represented by Mr. Ernst Christiansen, Deputy Foreign Minister).
p.m. United Kingdom (represented by Mr. Anthony Nutting, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs).

5. In addition the Committee met the following groups:
a. On Wednesday, 12 September, meeting with the Standing Committee of the Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO countries, consisting of the following persons:

   Belgium: Mr. Frans Van Cauwelaert. Mr. A. de Meeler.
   Canada: Senator, The Hon. Wishart McL. Roberston, P. C.
   France: Mr. Maurice Schumann.
   Germany: Herr F. Berendsen. Dr. Richard Jeager.
   Netherlands: Mr. J. J. Fens. Mr. J. L. Kranenburg. Mr. E. A. Vermeer.
   Turkey: Colonel Seyfi Kurtbeck.
   United Kingdom: Colonel Walter Elliott, C.H., M.C., M.P.
   United States: Congressman Wayne L. Hays, M.C.

b. On Saturday, 15 September, meeting with the Atlantic Treaty Association, represented by:
   Count Morra, Chairman;
   Dr. Nord, Vice-Chairman;
   Dr. Flynt, Vice-Chairman, and Mr. John Eppstein, Secretary General.
   and a number of delegates from national member organizations.

c. On Tuesday, 18 September, meeting with General Billotte and Mr. Barton, representing the Signatories of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity.

6. As a result of these consultations a draft report to the Council was prepared. In this work the Committee benefited from the expert advice of three special consultants. They were Professor Lincoln Gordon (Harvard University), Professor Guido Carli (Rome) and Mr. Robert Major (Oslo).

7. The Committee met again in New York on 14 November and re-examined the report in the light of the important world events which occurred in the interval since its September meeting. The Committee, after approving the report, furnished the other Foreign Ministers with an advance copy, preparatory to consideration of the report by the North Atlantic Council.

ANNEX 2

COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

I. Resolution on the peaceful settlement of disputes and differences between members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Whereas the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, under Article 1 of that treaty, have undertaken "to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered";
Whereas the parties have further undertaken to seek to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them;
Whereas NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of these objectives remain essential for continuous co-operation in military and non-military fields;

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:
Reaffirms the obligations of all its members, under Article 1 of the Treaty, to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;
Decides that such disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before member governments resort to any other international agency except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialized economic organizations;
Recognizes the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to its attention matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;
Empowers the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to member governments involved in a dispute and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration;
Authorizes the Secretary General where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in the preceding paragraph, to use the assistance of not more than three permanent representatives chosen by him in each instance.

2. Resolution on the report of the Committee of Three on non-military co-operation in NATO

Whereas the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Paris on 5th May established a Committee composed of the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Canada and Norway to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community;
Whereas the Committee of Three has now reported on the task assigned to it and has submitted to the Council a number of recommendations on such ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields;

The North Atlantic Council:

Takes note of the Report of the Committee of Three and Approves its recommendations; and
Invites the Council in Permanent Session to implement in the light of the comments made by governments the principles and recommendations contained in the Report; and
Invites the Secretary General to draw up for consideration by the Council such further specific proposals as may be required for the implementation of these recommendations and to report periodically on the compliance with these recommendations by governments.
Authorizes the Committee of Three to publish their report.
APPENDIX 12

DECLARATION AND COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Paris, 16-19 December, 1957

I. DECLARATION

We, the representatives of fifteen nations of the North Atlantic Alliance, believing in the sanctity of those human rights which are guaranteed to all men of free nations by their constitutions, laws and customs, re-dedicate ourselves and our nations to the principles and purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty. This Treaty has been in effect for nearly nine years. It was founded to protect the right of our peoples to live in peace and freedom under governments of their own choice. It has succeeded in protecting this right. Building on our experience and confident in the success already obtained, we have agreed together upon means to give added strength to our Alliance.

At the end of the Second World War, the armies of the West were largely disbanded. The Soviet Union did not demobilise. Its expansionist policy impelled us to establish our Treaty and to build up our armed forces. We are an organization of free countries. We have learned to live and work together in the firm conviction that our fundamental unity and our combined strength are indispensable to our own security and to the peace of the world.

The meaning of our Alliance is clear. We have given a solemn guarantee, each to the other, to regard an attack upon one as an attack upon all, to be resisted with all the forces at our command. Faithful to the Charter of the United Nations we reaffirm that our Alliance will never be used for aggressive purposes. We are always ready to settle international problems by negotiation, taking into account the legitimate interests of all. We seek an end to world tension, and intend to promote peace, economic prosperity and social progress throughout the world.

We continue firmly to stand for comprehensive and controlled disarmament, which we believe can be reached by stages. In spite of disappointments, we remain ready to discuss any reasonable proposal to reach this goal and to lay a solid foundation for a durable peace. This is the only way to dispel the anxieties arising from the armaments race.

The free world faces the mounting challenge of international Communism backed by Soviet power. Only last month in Moscow the Communist rulers again gave clear warning of their determination to press on to domination over the entire world, if possible by subversion, if necessary by violence. Within the North Atlantic Treaty there is no place for the concept of world domination. Firmly believing in peaceful change through democratic means, cherishing the character of our peoples and vigilant to safeguard their freedom, we will never yield to such a threat.

For the entire world it is both a tragedy and a great danger that the peoples under international Communist rule – their national independence, human liberties and their standard of living as well as their scientific and technological achievements – have been sacrificed to the purposes of world domination and military power. The suppression of their liberty will not
last for ever. Already in these countries there is evidence of the growing desire for intellectual and economic freedom. If the free nations are steadfast, the totalitarian menace that now confronts them will eventually recede.

Established to defend the peace, our Alliance will also enable us to reach our objectives of economic and social progress. For this purpose we have agreed to co-operate closely to enable us to carry the necessary burden of defence without sacrificing the individual liberties or the welfare of our peoples. We shall reach this goal only by recognising our interdependence and by combining our efforts and skills in order to make better use of our resources. Such efforts will now be applied particularly to the peaceful use of atomic energy and to the development and better organization of scientific co-operation.

To the many nations which have gained their independence since the end of the Second World War and to all other peoples, who like ourselves are dedicated to freedom in peace, we offer our co-operation on a basis of complete equality and in a spirit of fraternity.

Conscious of our intellectual and material resources, convinced of the value of our principles and of our way of life, without provocation but equally without fear, we have taken decisions to promote greater unity, greater strength and greater security not only for our own nations but also, we believe, for the world at large.

II. COMMUNIQUE

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

1. The aim of the Soviet bloc is to weaken and disrupt the free world. Its instruments are military, political and economic, and its activities are world-wide. To meet this challenge the free world must organize its resources - moral, military, political and economic - and be ready to deploy them wherever the situation demands. Our Alliance cannot therefore be concerned only with the North Atlantic area or only with military defence. It must also organize its political and economic strength on the principle of interdependence, and must take account of developments outside its own area.

2. In the course of our meeting we have therefore reviewed the international situation and, in particular, the dangers to world peace arising from Soviet actions and threats. In spite of the dangers of the situation which are obvious to all, the Soviet Union has made no real contribution to the solution of major problems causing international tension. We have especially in mind the problems of the reunification of Germany in freedom, and the continuing anomaly of the isolation of Berlin - the capital of Germany. We renew and reaffirm our declaration of 23 October, 1954 which had in view the establishment on a firm basis of the security and freedom of Berlin. The perpetuation of injustice to the German people undermines international confidence and endangers peace. At the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government in July, 1955, the Soviet leaders took a solemn commitment that "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security". We call upon the Soviet Government to honour this pledge.

3. We have reviewed the situation in the Middle East. In line with the peaceful aims of our Alliance, we confirm the support of our Governments for the independence and sovereignty of the states in this region, and our interest in the economic well-being of their peoples. We believe that the stability of this important area is vital to world peace.

4. We express our interest in the maintenance of peace and the development of conditions of stability and economic and political well-being in the vitally important continent of Africa. We hope that the countries and peoples of that continent who are disposed to do so
will co-operate within the free world in efforts to promote these purposes. We affirm the readiness of our countries to co-operate for our part with the countries and peoples of Africa to further these ends. Historic, economic and other friendly ties between certain European countries and Africa would make such co-operation particularly desirable and effective.

5. In the course of our review of the international situation we have given consideration to recent serious events in Indonesia. We view them with concern.

THE WORKING OF THE ALLIANCE

6. The strength of our Alliance, freely concluded between independent nations, lies in our fundamental unity in the face of the danger which threatens us. Thanks to this fundamental unity, we can overcome our difficulties and bring into harmony our individual points of view. In contrast, as events in Hungary have shown, the Soviet bloc is held together only by political and military coercion.

7. Although progress has been made, further improvement is needed in our political consultation. We are resolved to bring this about. Our Permanent Representatives will be kept fully informed of all government policies which materially affect the Alliance and its members. In this way, we shall be able to draw fully on each other's political experience and to ensure a broad co-ordination of our policies in the interest, not only of the Alliance, but of the free world as a whole.

In addition, to strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance, the Permanent Council and the Secretary General should ensure effective consultation, including, where necessary, procedures of conciliation at an early stage.

DISARMAMENT

8. We recall that in the course of this year, the Western countries taking part in the London Disarmament talks put forward to the Soviet Union, with the unanimous agreement of NATO, a series of concrete proposals providing, subject to effective controls:

- for reduction of all armaments and military forces;
- for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- for the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons;
- for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests;
- for measures to guard against the risk of surprise attack.

9. We note with regret that these various proposals, which would halt the armaments race and add to world security if they were accepted, were rejected en bloc by the Soviet Union, although they had been approved by 56 members of the United Nations.

10. We regret that the Soviet Union has brought about a deadlock in the disarmament negotiations by declaring their intention to boycott the United Nations Disarmament Commission which had been extended, by a strong majority of the General Assembly, to include 25 nations.

11. We denounce Soviet tactics of alternating between peace propaganda statements and attempted intimidation by the threat of nuclear attack.

12. We deplore, also, that the leaders of the USSR do not allow the Soviet populations to be impartially informed and enlightened by the services of the United Nations at the same time as the populations of other member countries, as to the danger of destruction to which all peoples would be exposed in the event of general war. A resolution to this effect was adopted
in November, 1957, by the General Assembly of the United Nations by 71 nations against 9 nations of the Soviet bloc.

13. We emphasize that, in order to be effective, any disarmament agreement implies adequate international control, that the acceptance of such control is the test of a true desire for peace and that the Soviet Union refuses to put this principle into practice.

14. We have decided to establish a Technical Group to advise on problems of arms control arising out of new technical developments.

15. In spite of the successive setbacks given by the Soviet Union to the cause of controlled disarmament and of peace, the NATO Council will neglect no possibility of restricting armaments within the limits imposed by security and will take all necessary action to this end.

16. We state our willingness to promote, preferably within the framework of the United Nations, any negotiations with the USSR likely to lead to the implementation of the proposals recalled above.

We are also prepared to examine any proposal, from whatever source, for general or partial disarmament, and any proposal enabling agreement to be reached on the controlled reduction of armaments of all types.

17. Should the Soviet government refuse to participate in the work of the new Disarmament Commission, we would welcome a meeting at Foreign Ministers' level to resolve the deadlock.

NATO DEFENCE

18. The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the USSR should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age.

19. As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defences. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

20. To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

21. The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defence plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned. The NATO military authorities have been requested to submit to the Council at an early date their recommendations on the introduction of these weapons in the common defence. The Council in permanent session will consider the various questions involved.

22. Recognising the rapidly growing interdependence of the nations of the free world, we have, in organizing our forces, decided to bring about closer co-ordination with a view to ensuring that each NATO member country makes its most effective contribution to the requirements established by the Alliance. Better use of the resources of the Alliance and greater efficiency for its forces will be obtained through as high a degree of standardisation and integration as possible in all fields, particularly in certain aspects of air and naval defence, of logistic support and of the composition and equipment of forces. We have agreed
that a military conference should be held at Ministerial level in the early months of 1958 to
discuss progress made in these fields in the light, in particular, of the results of the 1957
Annual Review.

23. As regards defence production, we have decided, in view of the progress already made,
to take further measures within NATO to promote the co-ordination of research, development
and manufacture of modern weapons including intermediate range ballistic missiles.

24. The best means of achieving co-ordinated production of advanced weapons needed by
our forces will be studied as a matter of urgency. Those NATO countries whose programmes
have already reached a very advanced stage have offered to share with their allies significant
production techniques and results of their research work in order to stimulate a truly pro-
ductive effort in the defence production field.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

25. We recognise that in most of our countries more should be done to increase the supply
of trained men in many branches of science and technology. The full development of our
science and technology is essential to the culture, to the economy and to the political and
military strength of the Atlantic Community.

26. We realise that progress will depend on vigorous action within individual states and in
particular on the devoted contribution of teachers and scientists. We must increase the pro-
vision for the training of young people in scientific and technical subjects and must also
ensure that the free pursuit of fundamental research continues to flourish. Each of our
governments will therefore re-appraise the support being given to scientific and technical
education and to fundamental research.

27. We seek to increase the effectiveness of national efforts through the pooling of scientific
facilities and information and the sharing of tasks. We must build on the established tradition
of the universality of true science. Our governments will support the international organi-
zations doing work in this field.

28. We have decided to establish forthwith a Science Committee on which all of the
NATO countries will be represented by men highly qualified to speak authoritatively on scientific
policy. In addition, a scientist of outstanding qualifications will be appointed as Science
Adviser to the Secretary General of NATO.

29. The Science Committee will be responsible in particular for making specific recom-
mendations to the Council for action on a proposal by the French Government for a Western
Foundation for Scientific Research and on the many other valuable proposals which have
been put forward by the NATO Task Force on Scientific and Technical Co-operation and by
the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

30. We are united in our common purpose to promote the economic and social develop-
ment of our peoples and to assist the peoples of other countries to achieve the same objective.
We consider that the purpose of government in a free society is to enlarge the opportunity of
the individual rather than to subordinate him to the state.

31. We will co-operate among ourselves and with other free governments to further the
achievement of economic stability, a steady rate of economic growth, and the expansion of
international trade through the further reduction of exchange and trade barriers.

32. We reaffirm the desirability of a closer economic association between the countries of
Western Europe, which we deem to be in the interest of all countries, and we will accordingly lend encouragement to the successful development of the European Economic Community and of a European Free Trade Area in which full account would be taken of the interests of the less-developed member countries. We attach particular importance to these initiatives being worked out in such a way as to strengthen not only the participating countries but also the relations within the Atlantic Community and the free world as a whole. We recognise the interdependence of the economies of the members of NATO and of the other countries of the free world.

33. We affirm the interest of our governments in an enlargement of the resources, both public and private, available for the purpose of accelerating the economic advancement of the less-developed areas of the free world.

34. We have decided that the North Atlantic Council, without duplicating the work of other agencies, shall from time to time, and in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, review economic trends and assess economic progress, and may make suggestions for improvements either through existing organizations or by the efforts of individual countries, or in special cases by new initiatives.

35. Under present circumstances, our defensive Alliance takes on a new significance. Only an intensified collective effort can safeguard our peoples and their liberties. We have, together, ample capacity in freedom to defend freedom.

36. We have taken a series of decisions which will promote greater strength and greater security not only for our own nations but also for the world at large.
COMMUNIQUE ISSUED
AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING
OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Oslo, 8-10 May, 1961

The North Atlantic Council held its Spring Ministerial meeting in Oslo from 8 to 10 May, 1961, under the chairmanship of its new Secretary General, Mr. D. U. Stikker.

I

2. Since the Atlantic countries united twelve years ago, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to ensure their common defence, their Alliance has safeguarded peace and freedom. But the menace which drew them together is now not only military but also has world-wide political, economic, scientific and psychological aspects.

3. The North Atlantic Alliance threatens no one. It will never be used for aggression. It seeks to eliminate war and the causes of war. But it is resolved to defend the right of its peoples to live in freedom. In the world as it is today the unity and strength of the Atlantic Alliance is essential to peace and the survival of liberty. Its collective resources – moral and material alike – are fully adequate to this task. Confident in their strength, in the will of their peoples, and in the truth of the ideals they uphold, the fifteen Atlantic nations dedicate themselves anew to building a world free from the false doctrine of continuing and inevitable conflict.

II

4. During the meeting the Ministers reviewed developments in the international situation. Aware of the intensified efforts of the Communist bloc to foment and exploit conflicts and to extend its domination over an ever-increasing area, the Ministers reaffirmed their resolve to meet this challenge.

5. For their part the Atlantic nations are ready to make their contribution towards achieving an equitable and just settlement of outstanding political questions. They deplore Soviet unwillingness to reciprocate.

6. Ministers noted with regret the lack of progress on the reunification of Germany. They reaffirmed their conviction that a peaceful and just solution for the problem of Germany including Berlin is to be found only on the basis of self-determination. With particular regard to Berlin, they reiterated their determination, as expressed in the Declaration of 16 December, 1958, to maintain the freedom of West Berlin and its people. As to the often repeated threat by the Soviet Union to sign a separate peace treaty, they reaffirmed the statement in the 1958 Declaration that “the denunciation by the Soviet Union of the inter-allied agreements on Berlin can in no way deprive the other parties of their rights or relieve the Soviet Union of its obligations”.

7. Disarmament by stages under effective international control remains one of the principal objectives of the Governments of the Alliance. The Council expressed the hope that the
initiation by the United States of America of consultations with the USSR for the purpose of arriving at a mutually acceptable procedure will permit the resumption of negotiations about the end of July. They agreed that the position of those members of the Alliance participating in the disarmament discussions will be developed in close consultation in the North Atlantic Council.

8. With regard to the Geneva negotiations on the suspension of nuclear tests, the Council noted with approval that the United States of America and the United Kingdom had tabled a comprehensive draft treaty offering a basis for agreement. They regretted that the negative attitude of the Soviet Government has raised new difficulties. They expressed the hope that that Government will move promptly to join in an effective treaty as a first and significant step towards disarmament.

9. The task of helping the less-developed areas of the world to raise their social and material standards is one of the major challenges of our time. It is a challenge which the Members of the Atlantic Alliance gladly accept; and in their examination of the world situation Ministers gave high priority to this question. They took note with satisfaction of the large volume of free world aid—dwarfing that granted by the Sino-Soviet bloc—and reaffirmed their determination to increase these efforts.

10. The Ministers discussed the problems of long-term planning within the Alliance in the non-military sphere on the basis of a report presented by the Council in Permanent Session, dealing with the future development and role of the Alliance in the political, economic, civil emergency planning and other fields. Proceeding from this report they gave guidance to the Permanent Council for strengthening the cohesion of the Alliance.

The Council recognised that much progress had been made in developing an increased unity of purpose and harmonization of action by its Members. It emphasized the importance for this purpose of close, constant and frank consultation in order to make effective the growing unity of the Atlantic Alliance.

11. The Ministers invited the Council in Permanent Session, in close co-operation with the military authorities, to continue its studies of all aspects of the military posture of the Alliance, with a view to improving its deterrent and defensive strength. They requested the Council to submit these studies when ready and to report to the Ministerial Meeting in December.

12. Ministers gave special attention to the economic problems affecting Greece and Turkey. Bearing in mind the important contribution made by these two countries to the common defence, they considered ways and means of assisting efforts being made by Greece and Turkey to speed up development programmes and improve the living standards of their peoples.
The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Paris from 13 to 15 December, 1961. A thorough examination was made of the problems confronting the Alliance. The world-wide Communist threat to freedom, the problem of relations between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Bloc, in particular Berlin, were its central concern.

2. The aim of the peoples of the Atlantic Community is a stable order in which no man and no nation need fear for their existence, their liberty or their future. World peace cannot indefinitely rest on a precarious balance of mutual terror.

3. The Alliance seeks peace and disarmament. But this desire has consistently been frustrated by the Soviet Bloc. The Western Powers have presented a series of plans for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government has, however, so far refused to accept an effective and universally applicable system of international control, without which no nation could have confidence in a disarmament agreement. It envisages only verification of the arms destroyed, while rejecting control of the arms that remain. It is still the earnest hope of the Alliance that despite previous disappointments disarmament negotiations when resumed will yield useful results.

4. On the question of the abolition of nuclear tests, the Soviet Union has argued, evaded and obstructed for over three years, and through more than three hundred meetings. The Soviet Union, while professing to negotiate in good faith, must for many months past have been secretly preparing the longest series of nuclear tests yet carried out, culminating in the largest nuclear explosion yet known.

5. At the same time as the Soviet Union has been attempting to intimidate the peoples of the Free World with demonstrations of its nuclear strength, it has intensified its efforts to get the whole of Berlin at its mercy, to impose a discriminatory status on Germany, to perpetuate her divided state, and to break up the Atlantic Alliance. With these ultimate aims in mind, the USSR has artificially provoked a crisis over Berlin. Disregarding the obligations it has undertaken, the Soviet Union has cut Berlin in two. The walling-in of the people under its control has once more demonstrated to the world the real nature of the Communist system and the irresistible attraction of a free society. Ministers expressed their sympathy with all those for whom the raising of this wall in Berlin has meant the separation of families and the denial of escape to freedom in the West. They also expressed their admiration of the courage and attachment to freedom of the people of Berlin, and reiterated their conviction that a just and peaceful solution of the problem of Germany, including Berlin, must be found on the basis of self-determination.

6. In the spirit of the agreed policy of the Alliance, the Ministers recalled their communiqué on Berlin of 16 December, 1958, and reaffirmed their determination to protect and defend the liberties of West Berlin, and ensure to its people the conditions for a free and prosperous life.

7. Established rights and obligations, solemnly confirmed in international agreements,
cannot be extinguished unilaterally by the stroke of a pen – by the signature by the Soviet Government of a ‘peace treaty’ with a régime which represents no one but its Soviet masters. The three Western Powers who bear special responsibilities for Berlin stand by their clear obligation to protect those who have put their trust in them. Acting in close co-operation with their NATO allies, they have taken the necessary measures to maintain their rights and to fulfil their obligations. Confirming their agreement on this policy, the members of the Alliance reaffirmed the responsibilities which each member state has assumed in regard to the security and welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers in that city. They agreed to maintain close consultation on this question.

8. The Council heard statements on Berlin by the Foreign Ministers of the countries most directly concerned, and was informed of the intention to resume diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union, in accordance with the aims which the West is pursuing for the maintenance of world peace and in the hope that these contacts might serve to determine whether a basis for negotiation could be found. Their colleagues approved the resumption of diplomatic contacts and expressed the hope that a negotiated settlement could be achieved. After full discussion of the situation, the Council agreed that the Alliance must continue on its resolute course, combining strength and firmness of purpose with a readiness to seek solutions by peaceful means.

9. Ministers noted the improvements made by member countries in their force contributions, particularly in response to the aggravation of the military threat arising from the deterioration in the Berlin situation. Units have been reinforced and their state of readiness enhanced. A mobile task force has been established. There have been advances in co-operative programmes for defence research and production, as well as in communications and infrastructure. Ministers also noted the progress made by the Council in its study of the long-term problems of improving the deterrent and defensive strength of the Alliance. They instructed the Permanent Council to continue its examination of these urgent questions at an early date.

10. The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance threatens no one. In the world as it is today the Alliance must more than ever look to its defence, in view of the ever-increasing military capability of the Communist bloc and its manifest intention to expand its domination. So long as the Communist bloc is unwilling to agree to real disarmament, the countries of the Alliance must continue to strengthen their forces and modernise equipment so as to be able to deal with any form of attack. Only by an increased defence capability can the Alliance continue to deter Communist aggression. This will require still further dedication and effort from the NATO nations: but the clear and growing threat they face leaves no alternative.

11. In considering Civil Emergency Planning, particularly the protection of the civilian population, the Council recognised that such measures represented an essential element in the defence effort of NATO countries.

12. In the economic field the Council noted that a mission of high-ranking personalities had been set up in conformity with a decision taken at the last Ministerial Meeting to study ways and means of assisting the efforts of Greece and Turkey to speed up their development programmes and improve the living standards of their peoples. The mission will report to the Council before the end of April, 1962.

13. Ministers emphasized the importance for member states, not only of raising the living standards of their peoples, while maintaining an economic structure capable of supporting an adequate defence system, but also of expanding aid to the developing countries. The economies of the NATO countries are far stronger now than when the Alliance was formed. Ministers stressed the need to strengthen and deepen co-operation between all member countries in order to continue this progress.

14. The next Ministerial Meeting of the Council will be held at Athens from 3 to 5 May, 1962.
1. We were asked by the Council to make recommendations for a possible conference on scientific and technical co-operation. In doing so, we have found it necessary to consider more generally the question whether there is need for NATO to take any action in this field. The results of our deliberations are set out below.

PART I. GENERAL STATEMENT

A. THE PROBLEM

2. The economic and military strength of industrialised nations depends today on their scientific and technical capacity. The force of this generalisation has been demonstrated by events in NATO countries during the post-war years. It has also been dramatically underlined by the ever-increasing technical achievements of the USSR and by the knowledge that she is devoting relatively greater resources to scientific and technical education than are the countries of the West, one of her aims being to outstrip the NATO Alliance both in the military and economic fields. Differences in the supply of scientific and technical manpower and in the application of scientific and engineering knowledge are also factors, although not the only ones, which determine the relative positions of NATO countries in the world of trade and finance. As such they contribute to the dangerous disequilibrium which now characterizes the economic scene in the West. Moreover, the prestige of the West will depend to a large extent on the ability of NATO countries to put scientific and technical resources at the disposal of the
less industrialised countries of the world; they can do this as well as meet their own requirements only if there is an adequate supply of scientific and technical manpower available.

3. The great increases of the past decade in economic activity have been associated in all NATO countries with educational measures designed to increase the number of trained scientists and engineers. Until now, practically all the countries concerned have nevertheless suffered from a severe shortage of scientific and technical manpower. This condition reflects the fact that a continuing and rising demand for highly trained manpower will reveal itself as an immediate need, whereas it takes considerable time to train new personnel, or to alter educational institutions. The problem of scientific manpower in most countries is that in recent years the gap between demand and supply has remained far too wide.

4. In our view the main reason for this disparity is that the considerations outlined above have not been sufficiently appreciated by those responsible for deciding policy, with the result that bold and imaginative action has been lacking. Even where this has not been the case, the extent of educational reform and expansion has not always been in keeping with the magnitude of the problem. Both these conditions are reflections of a third, namely, that in some countries the tremendous interest of the general public in science and technology has not matured into an informed opinion which will support the financial and other measures necessary to secure a sufficiently rapid growth of scientific and technical resources. The concern shown by Parliamentarians in establishing a Special NATO Parliamentary Committee on Technical and Scientific Personnel encourages us to believe that this situation may be changing.

B. THE ROLE OF NATO

5. The future of the West is dependent to an ever-increasing degree on the rate at which science and technology advance. It is therefore in NATO's interest to do all it can to bring about the general conditions which will accelerate the pace of scientific progress. It is clearly of the utmost concern to NATO that the efforts of member countries to strengthen their economies and defences both in their own and in the common interest should not be hampered by shortages of trained manpower or other deficiencies in science and technology. In particular, NATO should be able, as a pivotal point of Western co-operation, to assist in the direction now most needed, that is by assuring itself that endeavours to deal with the problem have the support of the governments concerned.

6. In the field in which it has unique responsibility, namely defence, NATO needs in the first place to ascertain the requirements for scientific and technical manpower which arise from current and projected NATO defence plans, not only so that the defence commitments of individual countries can be related to their available scientific resources, but also in order that measures may be initiated to make good deficiencies. Further, it is in the interest of all that NATO should more effectively use existing scientific resources by improved co-operation between member countries in defence research, and we therefore wish particularly to draw the attention of the Council to the proposals set out in paragraphs 62-73 (summarized in paragraph 73) for improving such co-operation. Finally, NATO should assure itself that, in the event of an emergency, national plans exist for bringing about the best utilization of scientific resources in the common interest.

7. The general ways in which NATO could help alleviate the present situation are:
   a. by bringing the influence of the Alliance to bear on member governments to implement existing, and if need be, expanded national programmes for the development of scientific and technical resources;
   b. by directly organizing, where appropriate, co-operative international activities in an effort
to economize in the use of scientific resources by member countries and to stimulate scientific exchange;
c. by encouraging or materially assisting other agencies which are able to further NATO aims.

8. So far as a. is concerned, we believe that NATO is in a better position than any other international organization to influence and encourage the efforts of member countries. With regard to b., it is necessary to consider whether NATO could usefully organize other international institutions and activities such as AGARD (Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development), the Brussels Training Centre for Experimental Aerodynamics and The Hague Air Defence Technical Centre. In the case of c., NATO should be free to lend material assistance to organizations able to advance specific NATO objectives and should support those other international agencies, such as OEEC, which are already doing effective work that will contribute to NATO’s interests.

PART II. RECOMMENDATIONS TO COUNCIL

A. A NATO SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE AND SCIENTIFIC ADVISER

9. We consider that if NATO’s concern in these matters is to lead to any effective continuing action, the first necessity is to establish a Scientific Committee of the Council and to appoint a Scientific Adviser to deal with the matters discussed in this Report. Inasmuch as such a Scientific Committee would only be brought together for periodic meetings, the Scientific Adviser would provide the day-to-day continuity of NATO action in this field. While the Committee would develop its own programme of action in the light of prevailing circumstances, we believe that it should have the following broad functions:

a. to advise the Council on problems of science and technology of concern to the NATO Alliance;
b. to propose to the Council recommendations concerning:
   (i) steps which member countries might take to strengthen the scientific and technical resources available to NATO;
   (ii) direct action by NATO itself designed to initiate co-operative activities between member countries;
   (iii) support which NATO might give to other organizations whose efforts are of particular concern to the members of the Alliance;
c. to set up such ad hoc working groups or other bodies as may be required to formulate proposals for action in relation to specific scientific and technical problems;
d. to keep itself informed of and to consider as appropriate the scientific needs of any co-operative scientific and technical institutions set up under NATO auspices;
e. to review at suitable intervals the scientific and technical progress of member countries insofar as it bears on problems of general concern to NATO, and in particular with respect to:
   (i) measures agreed to by Council;
   (ii) action under NATO auspices to improve scientific co-operation and exchange;
   (iii) action in connection with programmes of other agencies which are of particular concern to NATO;
f. to maintain liaison with other agencies fostering international scientific and technical co-operation.

Throughout the body of the Report there are references (summarized in Part iv) to specific matters with which NATO should concern itself, and which in general would be appropriate for consideration by the Scientific Committee.
10. The Committee should we suggest be composed of one representative of each member government, able to speak authoritatively on scientific policy. It should meet not less than twice each year and more frequently at the discretion of the Secretary General. Since the Committee would be the main forum for discussion of scientific and technical matters within the NATO organization, the military authorities should be appropriately represented.

11. The main function of the Scientific Adviser would be to give impetus and direction to the work of the Committee. He and a small staff would ensure continuity between meetings and would be responsible for servicing such working parties or other groups as may be established by the Committee to deal with specific scientific and technical matters. As the Secretary General's adviser on scientific questions, he would also have the important responsibilities for scientific liaison with the NATO military authorities, with those concerned with scientific policy in member countries, and with other international organizations in this field. Such functions could only be discharged effectively by a person of high calibre and of standing in the scientific world.

B. A NATO POLICY CONFERENCE

12. We have examined the question whether the NATO role outlined above (paragraphs 5-8) can be most effectively developed by calling a general conference of experts; and whether such a conference is likely to contribute to the solution of the problems of scientific and technical co-operation of concern to NATO. Our conclusion is that a conference to deal in detail with technical problems is not what is most required.

13. Broadly speaking, we believe that the individual problems can be clearly stated, and we have attempted to do so briefly in the main body of our Report. The immediate need is for a policy discussion at a high level in order to formulate broad goals within the following fields of activity:
   a. international support for governments in carrying out plans to increase the output of scientific and technical manpower;
   b. the scope for international co-operation in research between NATO countries;
   c. the achievement of a proper balance between the civil and defence research efforts.

14. For this reason, and bearing in mind our concept of the special NATO policy role in this field, we recommend that NATO should call a Policy Conference, limited to three representatives from each member country. The Policy Conference would also serve the following important purposes:
   a. to associate with the proposed NATO policy in this field many of those whose action, understanding and support in the countries will be essential to its success;
   b. to associate the representatives of those countries which were not represented on the Task Force with the proposed NATO policy;
   c. to bring these problems to a higher level of policy consideration in some countries; and
   d. to provide an opportunity for a public statement by those in authority and best qualified to speak on the urgency of these problems.

15. In Part III of the Report we identify and in Part IV we summarize the principal matters of concern to NATO in each of the three broad areas of policy that would be discussed at the Conference. Our Report could therefore conveniently constitute a briefing document for the discussions. If a Scientific Committee and a Scientific Adviser are appointed, then we consider that they should be asked to undertake the additional preparatory work essential to the success of the Conference.
C. SUMMARIZED RECOMMENDATIONS TO COUNCIL

16. We have been concerned not only to draw attention to specific problems, but also to outline the machinery and methods which would enable NATO to make a continuing contribution to the scientific strength of the Atlantic Community. The Task Force accordingly recommend that the Council should:

1. endorse the general appraisal set out in paragraphs 5-8 of NATO's role in relation to problems of scientific and technical co-operation;

2. take note that an immediate way of making significant savings of and more effectively using the scientific and technical resources available to NATO is by improved international co-operation in defence research and development, and that principles for improving such co-operation are proposed in paragraphs 62-73 and summarized in paragraph 73;

3. establish a Scientific Committee of the Council, constituted and with functions as outlined in paragraphs 9-10, to deal with these problems on a continuing basis;

4. appoint a Scientific Adviser of high calibre to be responsible within NATO for day-to-day action in this field, as suggested in paragraph 11;

5. call a NATO Policy Conference to discuss, on the basis of Parts m and r v of the Report, policy in relation to increasing the output of scientific and technical manpower, international co-operation in research, and the balance between the civil and defence research efforts, as recommended in paragraphs 12-15;

6. give its authority, either now or following the Policy Conference referred to at 5. above, to a public statement calling the attention of NATO countries to the vital importance of strengthening their science and technology.
APPENDIX 16

EXTRACTS OF THE REPORT BY THE NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS’ COMMITTEE:
TRAINED MANPOWER FOR FREEDOM

November, 1957

INTRODUCTION

In November, 1956, the Second Conference of Members of Parliament from the NATO countries established a Special Committee on Scientific and Technical Personnel. It was asked to report to this year’s meeting of the NATO Parliamentary Conference (November 1957), whatever findings it deemed appropriate with respect to these three topics:

a. The present situation with respect to the training of scientific and technological personnel in the NATO countries;

b. The relationship between NATO utilization of the existing potential resources in this field and the utilization of similar resources by the Soviet bloc;

c. The development of resources of scientific and technological personnel sufficient to enable the NATO countries to maintain their individual and collective capacities to resist armed attack and to continue their economic growth essential to their strength and well-being.

During the Conference the following members have served on the Committee:

BELGIUM
Mr. P. de Smet
Mr. Arthur Gilson

CANADA
Dr. R. P. Vivian

DENMARK
Mr. Willy Heising
Mr. Adolf Sorensen

FRANCE
Mr. Armengaud
Mr. Deixonne
Mr. Longchambon
Mr. Viatte

GERMANY
Dr. George Kleising
Graf Adelmann

GREECE
Mr. Panos Yokas

ICELAND
Mr. B. Grondal

ITALY
Professor Amedeo Giacomini

LUXEMBOURG
Mr. Eugene Schaus

NETHERLANDS
Mr. C. L. Patijn

NORWAY
Mr. Bernt Ingvaldsön
Mr. Sverre Rostoft

TURKEY
Mr. Richard Fort
Mr. Martin Maddan
Mr. Charles Pannell
UNITED STATES
Senator Henry M. Jackson (Chairman)
Senator Kuchel
Congressman Corbett
Congressman Smith

This Special Committee is one of several international groups which have been concerned
with the shortage of trained scientific and technical manpower in the NATO Community.
The Organization of European Economic Cooperation has made numerous studies of the
manpower question, and has encouraged member states to survey their needs. This year, it
published a particularly helpful report entitled “The Problem of Scientific and Technical
Manpower in Western Europe, Canada, and the United States”.
NATO has also been concerned with this problem from almost the time it was founded. This
year, on the recommendation of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in
NATO, the NATO Council appointed a task force to report to it before the end of the year on the
desirability of calling an international conference on the supply of trained manpower and on
other problems of scientific co-operation.
The previous work of OEEC and NATO has been of great value to the Special Committee. It also
feels indebted to many private citizens and to the executive agencies of the member states for
their counsel and co-operation.
The Chairman wishes to express his special thanks to his Committee colleagues for their
excellent memoranda and suggestions, which alone made possible the following findings and
recommendations.

HENRY M. JACKSON, U.S.A., Chairman

RECOMMENDATIONS

PART I.

1. AN ATLANTIC COMMUNITY TALENT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

It is recommended that there now be established a NATO-sponsored and NATO-financed
Talent Development Programme, designed to produce annually at least 500 doctoral degree
holders with research experience in the fields of maximum importance for the defence and
economic well-being of the NATO Community.

2. AN AWARDS PROGRAMME FOR TEACHERS AND STUDENTS IN SECONDARY
   SCHOOLS

It is recommended that NATO sponsor and finance an annual awards programme in mathematics or science for outstanding secondary school students, together with their instructors.

3. SUMMER STUDY INSTITUTES

It is recommended that immediate steps be taken to increase the number and variety of
summer study institutes within the NATO Community, in order to extend the influence of
outstanding scholarly talent in fields now hampered by a shortage of teachers.

4. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGES OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL

It is recommended that NATO member states expand their international exchange-of-persons
programmes involving scientists and engineers and advanced students, and in this connec-
tion, enter into agreements to mutually recognize equivalent degrees.
5. CO-OPERATIVE PROJECT RESEARCH UNDER NATO SPONSORSHIP
It is recommended that NATO sponsor and finance additional important co-operative training and research projects which particularly lend themselves to international action.

6. A EUROPEAN-WIDE EMPLOYMENT CLEARING HOUSE
It is recommended that a European-wide employment clearing house for scientists and engineers be established.

7. THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY
It is recommended that industry give a greater support to academic institutions by making scientists and engineers in its employ available for teaching and assignments in secondary schools and universities, and by helping sponsor and staff summer teaching and research institutes.

8. MAINTENANCE OF NATIONAL REMEDIAL MANPOWER PROGRAMMES
It is recommended that the member governments be invited by the NATO Council to maintain appropriate programmes for remedying the manpower problem on the national level.

9. AN INFORMED PUBLIC OPINION
It is recommended that the NATO Parliamentary Conference, the NATO Council, the member governments, and all non-governmental bodies concerned, maintain a continuing and vigorous programme to focus public attention on the necessity of remedying the manpower shortage problem.

PART II.

1. A NATO DEFENCE MISSILE TRAINING CENTER
It is recommended that a NATO Defence Missile Training Center be established immediately.

2. A NORTH ATLANTIC INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE STUDIES
It is recommended that a North Atlantic Institute for Defence Studies (AIDS) be immediately established.
APPENDIX 17

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE STUDY GROUP ON INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN SCIENCE (1960)

All Western nations, and indeed all nations, should recognize that pure and applied science play a fundamental rôle in national development. Science represents a social and political force of decisive importance.

The principal recommendations made in this Report may be summarized as follows:

I. NATIONAL PLANNING AND SUPPORT OF SCIENCE

A. All Western nations should have one or more science councils or organizations responsible for the support of fundamental and applied science, and for the maintenance of quality and breadth of scientific education. The group in charge of such organizations should possess executive authority and should include scientists with demonstrated executive ability.

B. A goal of Western nations should be to devote as much of their national income as possible to encourage research and development appropriate to their needs and their interests. For basic scientific research we recommend a level of the order of 0.2% of the Gross National Product as a target for all countries. For applied research and development the experience of technically advanced countries indicates that a goal of 2% of Gross National Product is both desirable and achievable.

II. INCREASING QUALITY AND NUMBERS OF SCIENTISTS AND TECHNICIANS

A. Measures should be introduced by all countries to increase the numbers of their scientists. Apart from general educational programmes, whose object would be to kindle an enthusiasm for science in secondary schools, all governments should consider:

i. The extension of the period of compulsory education to 16 years of age and, where necessary, the provision of financial assistance for higher education.

ii. The increased provision of opportunities for higher education in science.

iii. The improvement of the terms of service of academic and scientific institutions.

iv. Where lacking, the introduction of national prizes in recognition of outstanding work in science, particularly by younger men.

B. Since a training in science provides a valuable educational discipline and a basis for understanding much of our modern culture and some of the major forces which transform society today, an education in science should not necessarily be limited to those destined to become professional scientists.

C. Attention should be given in many Western countries to the reform of the structure of
universities and other institutions concerned with the advancement of science, with particular respect to number of professorial chairs, opportunities for advancement, matters of salaries, staff-student ratio and international exchange. The exchange of scientists between industries and universities should be encouraged; more specifically, there should be no obstacles to the transition of senior scientists from industry to universities.

D. The teaching of science in secondary schools should be improved. All countries should introduce measures to increase the number of highly qualified teachers. Combining part-time teaching in secondary schools with work in universities should also be considered.

E. Measures should be devised to encourage women to enter professional scientific occupations in greater numbers.

F. The training of technicians for science and technology requires greater national attention in order to assure the greater supply of highly skilled individuals. Attention should be given to the establishment of new Technicians' Training Institutions, co-operative training arrangements permitting combined work and study, and the extension of correspondence training. This matter is particularly important in developing the technical capacity of underdeveloped nations. Standards of teaching and requirements for examinations should conform as far as possible to norms accepted in highly developed countries.

III. ELIMINATING OBSTACLES TO RESEARCH BY NATIONAL ACTION

A. The national agencies responsible should do all in their power to remove the obstacles, such as those inhibiting granting of visas, which reduce the free inter-change and employment of scientists among some of the Western nations. The countries should release universities and government research institutes from the traditional administrative regulations which too often impede the activities and growth of these institutions.

B. Nations should encourage expansion of research in industry by granting tax reduction on the funds which industrial organizations contribute to research, either in their own or in other laboratories. Donors of gifts for research to universities and non-profit making research institutes should also be given tax reductions.

C. Nations where currency is controlled should allow scientific research organizations access to the foreign currency necessary for the purchase of equipment and other needed materials.

IV. INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH CO-OPERATION

A. Research and educational centres serving the needs of two or more countries are proposed in several fields of science and engineering which have particular importance at the international level. Those discussed in the report include the following fields: oceanography, meteorology, ecological effects of pesticides, science of materials, and space science. Such centres could be distributed among different nations and preferably be attached to universities. Alternatively, one or more of such centres could form part of an International Institute of Science Technology or an Atlantic or European University. The establishment of an International Institute of Science and Technology merits further study by an appropriately chosen group.

B. International funds should be made available to assist the technically less-developed nations, especially in the North Atlantic family, to promote science and engineering at the national level, on condition that such funds are used to mobilise national funds for this purpose.
C. Every encouragement should be given by the international agencies, such as NATO, UNESCO and OEEC, which sponsor science in the West, to promote the exchange and employment of scientists between nations. This should be done in close co-operation with the national agencies.

D. ICSU, in collaboration with the International Federation for Documentation and UNESCO, should be asked to do everything possible to improve documentation by the following actions:

i. Organization of collaboration between editors of chief scientific journals to ensure uniformity in publication practices.

ii. Affiliation of principal documentation centres within countries.

iii. The evolution of a single international system of indexing.

iv. Arrangements for the provision in all cases of authors' abstracts.

v. Encouragement of additional reviews of broad scientific fields.

vi. Reduction of airmail tariffs for transmittal of single copies of scientific publications to libraries and scientific associations.

The proliferation of scientific journals should be discouraged.

The agencies concerned with documentation of scientific literature should receive greater support from agencies sponsoring science in the West.

E. An international centre in auxiliary support of science is proposed, namely a clearing house to expedite the transfer of research equipment.

F. International agencies which distribute cultural literature should include scientific publications which provide an accurate picture of current scientific developments.

G. All international organizations, including NATO, should co-ordinate their scientific and educational activities as closely as possible.
The following scientists received NATO Research Grants since 1960:

Professor E. R. Caianello (Naples):
To hold advanced seminars in mathematics, physics and chemistry.

Professor E. A. Kreiken (Ankara):
To purchase a microphotometer and exchange astronomical students with the University of Milan.

Professor H. Perlitz (Ankara):
To purchase X-ray crystallographic equipment.

Professor B. Tanyel (Ankara):
To purchase general electronic equipment.

Professor H. Mosby (Bergen):
Oceanographic studies recommended by the Sub-Committee on Oceanographic Research.

Professor C. F. Powell (Bristol):
Co-operative studies of cosmic rays, using high altitude balloons.

Professor K. Alexopoulos (Athens):
To provide a fund for spares for various items of scientific equipment.

Professor M. Anastasiadis (Athens):
To purchase a recorder to measure ionospheric phenomena.

Professor A. Ferreira (Lisbon):
To install registering gravimeters in the Azores and Timor.

Mr. F. Abecasis (Lisbon):
To study the use of groyne systems in the prevention of coastal erosion.

Mr. F. Abecasis (Lisbon):
To study factors affecting the stability of rubble mound breakwaters.

Central Armaments Laboratory (Arceuil, France):
To study the fundamental aspects of metal deterioration, and crystalline deformations at high temperatures and friction velocities.

Dr. P. Dohrn (Naples):
To provide a table at the Zoological Station for scientists from Greece, Portugal and Turkey.

Dr. A. Sanengen (Oslo):
To develop an electron diffraction apparatus of novel design.

Professor S. T. Tekeli (Ankara):
To study factors involved in the deterioration of pekmez (concentrated grape juice).

Professor R. Ermin (Istanbul):
To purchase equipment for hydrobiological research.

Professor S. Akdik and Professor A. Sengun (Istanbul):
To buy equipment and chemicals to study the metabolism of nucleic acids using isotopic tracer techniques.

Professor S. Tunakan (Istanbul):
To buy a monochromator, an X-ray crystallographic unit, and a machine for liquefying air.
Professor M. Hasman (Istanbul):
To buy equipment for studies on the functions of lignin and gibberellic acid.

Mr. G. T. Prance (Oxford):
To support the Oxford University Botanical Expedition to Turkey, 1960.

Professor M. Merlin (Bari):
To enable three foreign physicists to visit the University of Bari.

Dr. T. von Karmán (Paris):
To undertake a preliminary anthropometric study in Greece, Italy and Turkey.

Professor I. Mariolopoulos (Athens):
To buy and install a radiotelescope.

Professor J. R. de A. Santos (Coimbra):
To buy some equipment for research in nuclear physics.

Dr. G. Randers (Lillestrøm):
To construct a neutron spectrometer.

Professor Y. Vardar (Ege):
To buy equipment to study plant auxins under isotopic tracer techniques.

Dr. J. Brossel (Paris):
To study the magnetic resonance produced in lead, thallium and helium (\(^{4}\)He) by electron bombardment.

Professor L. Villa (Milan):
To study the molecular structure and heterogeneity of deoxyribonucleic acid from human leukemic leucocytes.

Dr. G. Righini (Arcetri) and Professor C. Macris (Athens):
To study the influence of solar cycle phase on solar prominences and the behaviour of the brilliant floculi of the chromosphere.

Professor R. Margaria (Milan):
To investigate the electrical activity of the muscles of the diaphragm.

Professor S. Ranzi (Milan):
To study the growth-stimulating effects of biological extracts on embryonic cells.

Dr. A. Saplakoglu and Dr. S. Elçi (Ankara):
To study crop quality in relation to soil type.

Professor A. N. Terzioglu (Istanbul):
To buy books and periodicals for the mathematical library.

Professor U. d'Ancona (Venice):
To buy equipment for hydrobiological studies in the Adriatic Sea.

Dr. M. Witunski (St. Louis, U.S.A.):
To carry out observations during solar eclipse.

Faculty of Agriculture (Ankara):
To buy equipment for an isotope laboratory.

Professor J. Roche (Paris):
To carry out research into substituted guanidines and phosphorylated derivatives with energy-rich phosphoric bond of biological origin.

Professor M. Delbrück (Cologne):
To study photo-chemical changes in deoxyribonucleic acid.

Professor I. Rizzi (Bari):
To study leukemia and chemical carcinogenesis.

Dr. P. Dohrn (Naples):
To improve facilities for marine research at the Zoological Station.

Professor M. Faro (Lisbon):
To study generalised harmonic analysis.
Dr. A. J. Southward (Plymouth) :
   To carry out research into the physiology and ecology of barnacles.

Professor C. F. Powell (Bristol) :
   To carry out co-operative studies of cosmic rays using balloons.

Dr. A. T. J. Dollar (London) :
   To organize expeditions to Jan Mayen Island to study the geological and glaciological conditions.

Professor P. Groen (de Bilt, Netherlands) :
   To buy equipment for wave recording project.

Professor Walter Hansen (Hamburg) :
   To investigate hindcasting problems.

Dr. O. Dahl (Norway) :
   To carry out preparatory laboratory experiments on principles of determination of temperature and density of sea water, using self-recording buoys.

Dr. O. Dahl (Norway) :
   For later phases of the buoys project.

Professor H. Lacombe (Paris) :
   To study the measurements of currents in the Gibraltar Straits.

Professor Hakon Mosby (Norway) :
   To provide salaries for research associates, engaged on NATO oceanographic activities.

Professor Hakon Mosby (Norway) :
   To measure currents in the Faroe-Shetland Channel.

Mr. Richard Hardwick (Cambridge) :
   To support the Cambridge Botanic Expedition to the Pindus Mountains.

Professor S. Lissitzky (Marseille) :
   To study the toxicity of scorpion venoms.

Professor R. Daudel (Paris) :
   To study atoms and molecules by the application of wave mechanics.

Dr. Malamos (Athens) :
   To study chemical protection from radioactivity.

Professor E. Vassy (Paris) :
   To carry out combined airglow and ionospheric observations.

Professor Califano (Naples) :
   To carry out biochemical studies on the morphogenesis of fungi.

Professor Puppi (Bologna) :
   To study elementary particle properties with bubble-chamber technique.

Professor D. Dugue (Paris) :
   To study the design of experiments and variables.

Professor Caglioti (Rome) :
   To study the chemistry of co-ordination compounds.

Professor M. Merlin (Italy) :
   To enable three foreign physicists to visit the University of Bari. (Continuation of Grant No. 21).

Professor R. Margaria (Milan) :
   To investigate the electrical activity of the muscles of the diaphragm.

Professor L. Carapiperis (Athens) :
   To make a systematic and detailed study of the Etesian winds.

Professor M. Anastassiadès (Athens) :
   To study the influence of meteorological factors on VHF and UHF radio wave propagation.
Dr. D. Ilias (Athens):
To measure air pollution by radio-active fallout in the Greek area.

Professor H. Bagda (Ankara):
To purchase isotopes for the study of hormone movement in plants.

Dr. Rosst (Cambridge):
To study the reactions of carbon dioxide in biological systems.

Dr. P. H. Davis (Edinburgh):
To carry out a botanical expedition in Anatolia.

Professor A. Love (Montreal):
To carry out biosystematic studies of plants on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean.

Dr. C. L. Smith (Cambridge):
To investigate morphological changes produced by microbeam irradiation.

Professor R. G. Busnel (Jouy-en-Josas):
To study sounds emitted by marine mammals.
NATO--sponsored meetings of scientists from different countries were held at the places indicated in the following list, which also gives the names of the main lecturers and the topics discussed.

*Les Houches* (France):
  - Professor C. Dewitt
  - Elementary particles.

*Varenna* (Italy):
  - Professor G. Polvani
  - Nuclear processes at low energies (Wilkinson, of Oxford)
  - Biophysics (Rashevsky, of Chicago)
  - Physics of micro-waves (Gozzini, of Pisa).

*Corfu* (Greece):
  - Professor K. Alexopoulos
  - Thermal vibrations in solids.

*Naples* (Italy):
  - Professor E. R. Caianello
  - Many-body problems and field theory.

*Breukelen* (Netherlands):
  - Professor J. H. Oort
  - Structure and evolution of the Galactic System.

*Göttingen* (Germany):
  - Dr. H. Stegeman
  - Protein Analysis.

*Risø* (Denmark):
  - Dr. M. N. Rosenbluth
  - Plasma Physics.

*Ispra* (Italy):
  - Dr. A. Merlìni
  - Radiation damage in solids.

*Manchester* (United Kingdom):
  - Professor M. Lipston
  - Modern methods of crystal structure determination.

*Newbattle Abbey* (United Kingdom):
  - Professor N. Kemmer
  - High energy physics.

*Glasgow* (United Kingdom):
  - Professor J. Hawthorn
  - Food Science.

*Kjeller* (Norway):
  - Dr. G. Randers
  - Fuel elements for water cooled power reactors.

*Mariensee* (Germany):
  - Professor M. Witt
  - Improving the productivity of livestock.
Corfu (Greece):
Professor M. Anastassiades
Physics of the upper atmosphere.

Oxford (United Kingdom):
Professor C. A. Coulson
Theoretical chemistry.

Montreal (Canada):
Dr. L. E. H. Trainor
Theoretical physics.

Ghent (Belgium):
Professor W. Dekeyser
Solid state theory.

West Berlin (Germany):
Dr. O. Nacke
Medical documentation.

Les Houches (France):
Professor Cecile Dewitt
Low temperature physics.

Breukelen (Netherlands):
Professor B. R. A. Nibber
Statistical mechanics.

Göttingen (Germany):
Dr. H. Stegeman
Protein analysis.

Mariensee (Germany):
Professor M. Witt
Scientific problems of recording systems and breeding plans of domestic animals.

Corfu (Greece):
Professor M. Anastassiades
The influence of meteorological and astronomical factors on the propagation of radio waves in communication.

Hamburg (Germany):
Professor W. Hansen
Physical oceanography, especially hindcasting problems.

Naples (Italy):
Professor E. R. Caianiello
Biophysics.

Newbattle Abbey (Dalkeith United Kingdom):
Dr. G. A. P. Wyllie
Fluctuations and irreversible processes.

Cargese (Corcisa):
Professor M. Levy
Elementary particles theory and many body problem.

Kjeller (Norway):
Dr. F. Leid
Real height distribution of electron density in the ionosphere.

Varenna (Italy):
Professor G. Polvani
Cosmic radiation and space research (B. Peters)
Evidence for gravitational theories (C. Moller)
Liquid helium (G. Careri)
Semiconductors (R. A. Smith)
Nuclear physics (V. F. Weisslof)

La Spezia (Italy):
Professor V. E. Neilly
Underwater acoustics.

Athens (Greece):
Adm. G. Spanides
Exploitation of solar energy.

Bergen (Norway):
Professor B. Trumpy
Many-body problems.

Montreal (Canada):
Professor J. H. Quastel
Biochemistry.
APPENDIX 20

NATIONAL VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS BELONGING TO THE ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

BELGIUM
The Belgian Atlantic Association, 4 rue Saint-Jean, Brussels.

CANADA
The Canadian Atlantic Co-ordinating Committee, 230, Bloor Street West, Toronto, S. Ontario. The Committee is constituted by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the United Nations Association of Canada.

DENMARK
The Danish Atlantic Association, Forchhammersvej 13, Copenhagen, 5.

FRANCE
The French Association for the Atlantic Community, 185, rue de la Pompe, Paris, (xvii).

GERMANY
The German Atlantic Society, Koblenzerstrasse 102, Bonn.

GREECE

ICELAND
Association for Western Co-operation, Tjarnagata 16, Reykjavik.

ITALY
The Italian Atlantic Committee, 27, Piazza di Firenze, Rome.

LUXEMBOURG
The Luxembourg Atlantic Association, 9, rue Clairefontaine, Luxembourg.

NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands Atlantic Committee, Nassau Zuilensteinstraat 9, The Hague.

NORWAY
The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Youngsgaten 11, vaerelse 533, Oslo.

PORTUGAL
The Portuguese Atlantic Committee, Rua Almeida Brandao 39, Lisbon.

TURKEY
The Turkish Group of the ATA, Institut des Relations Internationales, Université d’Ankara, Ankara.

UNITED KINGDOM
The British Atlantic Committee, 36, Craven Street, London, W.C. 2

UNITED STATES
The Atlantic Council of the United States, Inc. 1616 H. Street, N.W. Washington D.C.
ABBREVIATIONS

ACCHAN  Allied Command Channel
ACE  Allied Command Europe
ACLANT  Allied Command Atlantic
AFCENT  Allied Forces Central Europe
AFMED  Allied Forces Mediterranean
AFNORTH  Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFSOUTH  Allied Forces Southern Europe
AGARD  Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development
CHANCOMTEE  Channel Committee
CINCAFED  Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean
CINCEASTLANT  Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area
CINCENT  Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe
CINCHAN  Commander-in-Chief Channel and S. North Sea
CINCMED  Commander-in-Chief British Naval Forces in the Mediterranean
CINCNORTH  Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe
CINSOUTH  Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe
CINWESTLANT  Commander-in-Chief Western Atlantic Area
COMMAIRCENTLANT  Commander Maritime Air Central Sub-Area
COMMAIRCHAN  Commander Allied Maritime Air Force Channel
COMMAIREASTLANT  Commander Maritime Air Eastern Atlantic Area
COMMAIRNORLANT  Commander Maritime Air Northern Sub-area
COMBISLANT  Commander Bay of Biscay Atlantic Sub-area
COMCANLANT  Commander Canadian Atlantic Sub-area
COMCENTLANT  Commander Central Atlantic Sub-area
COMNORASDEFLANT  Commander North American Anti-Submarine Defence Force Atlantic
COMNORLANT  Commander Northern Atlantic Sub-area
COMOCEANLANT  Commander Ocean Atlantic Sub-area
COMSTRIKEFLANT  Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic
COMSUBEASTLANT  Commander Submarine Force Eastern Atlantic
CUSRPG  Canada-United States Regional Planning Group
EDC  European Defence Community
ELLA  European Long Lines Agency
EMCCC  European Military Communications Co-ordinating Committee
ENCA  European Naval Communications Agency
ERFA  European Radio Frequency Agency
MAS  Military Agency for Standardization
MC  Military Committee
NMR  National Military Representatives with SHAPE
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT  Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
STREP  Standing Group Representative
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
TCC  Temporary Council Committee
WEU  Western European Union
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