THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

The NATO Handbook

1959
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 4 April, 1949. It proclaims in its preamble the determination of member governments 'to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'.

As well as constituting a defensive military alliance – the Parties consider an armed attack against one or more of them as an attack against them all – the Treaty also aims at developing economic, social and cultural co-operation between member countries.

The fifteen member countries of NATO are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

The seat of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is in Paris.
THE
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Why the Treaty was Signed

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, arose from a community of interest long visible in the history of the West, but never before given such clear recognition and expression in time of peace. Today, the North Atlantic Ocean no longer represents a vast barrier separating two continents, but the inland sea of a closely-linked community. Its seaways and adjoining waters serve a group of nations which have been nurtured in common traditions and which share a common respect for the rule of law, and individual liberty.

Two world wars demonstrated that an attack upon one of these nations threatened the security of the whole North Atlantic area, and that sooner or later, the others were drawn into the conflict. Twice in this century the Atlantic Community countries banded together to resist and finally overcome aggression in long and costly wars. Now, for the first time, they pooled their resources for collective defence before aggression started, in the hope and conviction that in this way they would preserve peace. To safeguard their security, these nations therefore agreed that an attack against one of them shall be considered an attack against them all.

The Treaty could not have come into existence without a major change in the policies of some of its signatories, and yet it was signed by twelve widely-spread nations, varying in size and importance from the United States to Luxembourg and representing two continents. North America was represented by the United States and Canada. From the other side of the Atlantic, the signatories were Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty in February, 1952, and the Federal Republic of Germany in May, 1955.

If the Treaty was the beginning of a new process, it was also the end of an old one. Its text, which appears on page 12, is to a large extent self-explanatory. To understand why it was signed at this time, and by these particular nations, it may be helpful to review briefly the circumstances which preceded it.

It would be a mistake to think of the Treaty as an agreement born entirely of the force of immediate circumstances. To some extent it
was part of a natural evolution, but the date of its signature was largely determined by the emergence of factors beyond the control of the signatory nations, and to this extent, the Treaty is a resolute response to the challenge of these circumstances.

The holocaust of the first World War produced a universal revulsion against violence and a determination to build an international organization which would not only prevent further resort to force, but also remove the circumstances which impelled nations to use force as a means of settling their differences.

The history of the League of Nations between the wars was a forceful reminder of the problems with which the victors of the second World War would have to contend in planning an organization of United Nations.

The victorious Allies of 1945 were confronted with a situation which had many parallels with that of 1919, but there was also a difference of profound significance: the United States, which had not joined the League of Nations, was in 1945 strongly in favour of setting up a new world organization and warmly supported the establishment of the United Nations at San Francisco in the same year.

It should be noted that the United Nations, like the League of Nations, was by definition meant to be all-embracing. It included not only like-minded nations; by its nature it repeated the bold attempt, which had failed once already, to establish a world order from which all would benefit.

It was soon apparent that intransigeance and bad faith on the part of certain members threatened the over-all effectiveness of the United Nations as an instrument for world peace. The foreign policy of many Western nations had become based so firmly on a belief in the ability of the United Nations to secure the peace of the world that armies were disbanded and armaments drastically reduced. The pressure of a war against a common enemy had cemented the East-West alliance during World War II. The aggressive Soviet expansionism of the post-war period soon shattered this alliance. Optimistic hopes for the dawn of a new era of international co-operation within the framework of the United Nations faded. It gradually became evident that the creation of the United Nations did not mean that international tensions, nor even open hostilities, had automatically become things of the past.

It is unnecessary here to set out the detailed history of Soviet post-war policy, but no account of the background of the North
Atlantic Treaty is intelligible without some reference to the principal actions taken by the Soviet Union since World War II.

The long list includes:
- pressure exerted on Iran for the maintenance of Soviet forces in the north of Iran,
- territorial demands on Turkey, including claims to bases in the Straits,
- fostering of guerilla warfare in Greece and support for the Communists who were stirring up civil war,
- seizure of control of the countries of Eastern Europe, culminating in the coup d'état in Czechoslovakia in 1948,
- the rejection of the Marshall Plan and subsequent efforts to cripple the economic recovery of the West,
- the organization of the Cominform,
- violations of the Potsdam Agreement,
- the year-long Berlin blockade,
- the blocking of peace treaties with former enemy countries,
- the continued maintenance of large Soviet forces throughout Eastern Europe, and the building up of 'satellite' forces,
- the recurrent abuse of the veto in the United Nations.

As these and many other events of the same kind succeeded each other, the Western Powers were not merely passive spectators, although they were slow to realize the dangers which faced them. In the midst of preoccupations concerned with reconstruction they set to work in the post-war period to win some assurance of security through the renewal of old alliances. In March, 1947, the United Kingdom and France signed a 50-year 'Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance' at Dunkirk. This bound the two countries together in case of a revival of German aggression, but it also declared that the two countries "will by constant consultations on matters affecting their economic relations with each other take all possible steps to promote the prosperity and economic security of both countries and thus enable each of them to contribute more effectively to the economic and social objectives of the United Nations". The Dunkirk Treaty was in conformity with the obligations of both countries under the United Nations Charter.

Only three months after the signing of the Dunkirk Treaty, another form of international collaboration developed and became all-important in the post-war recovery and reconstruction of Europe. Speaking at Harvard University on June 5, 1947, Gen. George C.
Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, announced a plan for the economic rehabilitation of Europe. He called on the European nations to unite for the purpose and promised American assistance. “Our policy,” said Mr. Marshall, “is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.” He insisted that ‘the initiative must come from Europe,’ and emphasized that by ‘Europe’ he meant ‘everything west of Asia’, including the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The immense significance of the Marshall Plan lay not so much in a generosity without historical precedent, nor in its vision and statesmanship, as in the fact that it revived close economic collaboration in Europe, by Europeans, for the common good. It provided the strong motive force which propelled Europe into a closer association within itself, as well as with the United States, and largely contributed to saving Europe from the very ‘hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos’ of which Mr. Marshall had spoken.

The troubled times bred two further international agreements. The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro was signed on September 2, 1947, by all states of the American continent except Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Canada. The Rio Treaty, essentially an alliance for mutual self-defence, offered a clear example of a ‘regional grouping’ within the Charter of the United Nations.

On March 17, 1948, the Brussels ‘Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence’ (the order of the two types of objectives should be noted) was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. This grouping of nations was known as Western Union. The Brussels Treaty conformed with the ‘ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations’. It was essentially a treaty of like-minded nations who were able to start their formal agreement in the acknowledgement of ‘the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage’. It aimed ‘to strengthen . . . the economic, social, and cultural ties by which they are already united’. It went further than this and seemed to anticipate the North Atlantic Treaty by resolving ‘to associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination.’

The articles of the Treaty went far towards creating, not merely a blue-print for economic, social, and cultural co-operation, but practical plans to translate the blue-print into action. Thus, the

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signatories agreed 'to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security', 'to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means', and to apply certain provisions to disputes between themselves.

The Brussels Treaty, like the Dunkirk Treaty, was intended to remain in force for 50 years. It expresses clearly the growing desire on the part of the signatories to draw closely together for more than merely military or economic reasons. In spirit and expression, this Treaty is the true forerunner of the North Atlantic Treaty.

A Consultative Council of the Five Nations was set up to carry out the aims of the Brussels Treaty. The first meeting of this Council in Paris on April 17, 1948, established, in addition to other Committees, a Permanent Military Committee to handle arrangements for common defence. On September 28, 1948, it was announced that consultation between the Ministers of Defence (set up as a Defence Committee) and the Chiefs-of-Staff of the Five Nations had led to the formation of a military planning branch and of a production and supply branch for the organization. A joint military organization for common defence, then known as Uniforce, was set up under the direction of Field Marshal Montgomery, with headquarters at Fontainebleau.

Three months after the signing of the Brussels Treaty, on June 11, 1948, the 'Vandenberg Resolution' was adopted by the U.S. Senate by a big majority. Sponsored by the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, it affirmed American determination 'to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence' under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, set forth the objective of 'progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements' in accordance with the Charter, and recommended the 'association of the United States . . . with such other regional and collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.'

From this date until the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April, 1949, a series of discussions took place among the governments of the Western Powers. In Washington, representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers, the United States, and Canada met throughout the summer. One immediate result of these informal conversations in Washington was the acceptance by Canada and the United States of an invitation to send observers to the permanent military organization set up under the Brussels Treaty.

The Washington talks were resumed in December, 1948, among the seven Powers (the Brussels Treaty Powers, the United States,
and Canada). In February, 1949, the Norwegian Foreign Minister visited Washington and London to obtain information about the terms of the draft treaty. Norway and Denmark had been discussing a possible Scandinavian Defence Pact with Sweden. They were under diplomatic pressure from Russia to stay out of any Atlantic Treaty, but accepted nevertheless an invitation to the Washington talks. Other invitations were extended to Iceland, Italy and Portugal.

After two months of negotiation, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.
CHAPTER II

What the Treaty Says

The North Atlantic Treaty is one of the shortest and clearest of international documents. It proclaims as its first objective the determination of member governments 'to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law'.

This agreement is far more than a defensive military alliance under which the allies agree to come to each other's assistance in the event of an armed attack against one or more of them. The signatories are seeking to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage economic and cultural cooperation between any or all of them.

Under Article 3, the Parties undertake unprecedented peacetime measures 'by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack'. Here is the deterrent aspect of the Treaty by which the signatories, through discouraging a potential aggressor in advance, hope to preserve the peace.

In its double aspect - its emphasis on social, cultural, economic and political progress as well as security - the Treaty is a reminder that these factors are in the long run indivisible. While striving to answer the security needs of the present, the Treaty looks forward from a troubled international past to a more enlightened future.

The inherent right of collective self-defence is impressively summed up in the statement that an armed attack against one or more Parties shall be considered an attack against them all (Article 5).

The Treaty comes within the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which states "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs . . .". The wording of the Treaty makes it clear that each Party is the judge of whether an 'armed attack' has taken place, and of what action, including the use of armed force, is required. This is logically the only possible position since NATO is not a supranational organization.

The obligation is placed on each member to assist the Party attacked by taking forthwith, individually as well as in concert with
the other signatory nations, 'such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.'

Any European nation may be invited to accede to the Treaty if it is thought to be in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area (Article 10). Possession of territory bordering on the North Atlantic is not a precondition of membership. In this connection it is interesting to examine the wording of the Protocol to the Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey (see page 16).

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
Washington D.C., 4 April, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by pro-
moting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

**ARTICLE 3**

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

**ARTICLE 4**

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

**ARTICLE 5**

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**ARTICLE 6**

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North At-
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

**ARTICLE 7**

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**ARTICLE 8**

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

**ARTICLE 9**

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

**ARTICLE 10**

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.
ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.
PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ON THE ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY

A protocol was signed by the Council Deputies in London on 22 October, 1951. After final ratification by all member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty on 18 February, 1952.

The text of the Protocol follows:

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4 April, 1949,
Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to that Treaty,
Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by Article II of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

ARTICLE II

If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America, be modified to read as follows:

`For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack --
(1) on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of

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any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
(2) on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when
in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in
which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed
on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediter­
ranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of
Cancer.'

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties
to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the
United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Govern­
ment of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each such
notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present
Protocol.

ARTICLE IV

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Gover­
ment of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof
shall be transmitted by the Government to the Governments of all
the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ON THE ACCESSION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

A protocol was signed in Paris on 23 October, 1954, by the mem­
bers of the North Atlantic Council assembled in Ministerial session.
After its final ratification by all member countries of the North
Atlantic Treaty, the Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the
Treaty on 5 May, 1955.

The text of this Protocol follows:
The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949,
Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to that Treaty, and

Having noted that the Federal Republic of Germany has, by a declaration dated 3rd October, 1954, accepted the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and has undertaken upon its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to refrain from any action inconsistent with the strictly defensive character of that Treaty, and

Having further noted that all member governments have associated themselves with the declaration also made on 3rd October, 1954, by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic in connection with the aforesaid declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany,

Agree as follows:

**ARTICLE I**

Upon the entry into force of the present Protocol, the Government of the United States of America shall on behalf of all the Parties communicate to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter the Federal Republic of Germany shall become a Party to that Treaty on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America in accordance with Article 10 of the Treaty.

**ARTICLE II**

The present Protocol shall enter into force, when (a) each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified to the Government of the United States of America its acceptance thereof, (b) all instruments of ratification of the Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty have been deposited with the Belgian Government, and (c) all instruments of ratification or approval of
the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany have been deposited with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government of the United States of America shall inform the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of each notification of acceptance of the present Protocol and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

**ARTICLE III**

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.
The North Atlantic Council met for the first time in Washington on September 17th, 1949. At this meeting it concentrated principally on the establishment of the different bodies provided for by Article 9 of the Treaty.

The Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers of member countries, decided to meet in ordinary session annually and at such other times as would be deemed desirable. Any Party to the Treaty could call an extraordinary session by invoking Article 4 or Article 5. All subsidiary agencies created by the Alliance were to be subordinate to the Council.

At this session, Mr. Dean Acheson, United States Secretary of State, presided as Chairman of the North Atlantic Council. It was decided that thereafter the chairmanship would rotate annually according to the English language alphabetical order of the member countries. English and French were adopted as the official languages of the Organization.

The Council also established the Defence Committee, which was charged with the task of drawing up unified defence plans for the North Atlantic area, and completed the military structure of the Alliance by setting up the following bodies:
- the Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs-of-Staff of the member countries (or their representatives), the Standing Group – the executive agency of the Military Committee – consisting of representatives of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Regional Planning Groups, responsible for the development of regional defence plans and their submission, through the Standing Group, to the Military Committee.

The Council's second session, held in Washington on November 18th, 1949, was largely devoted to questions of production and military supply, and to the economic and financial aspects of the
defence effort. The Council at this time decided to set up two further bodies:

- the *Defence Financial and Economic Board*, composed of the Finance Ministers of the member countries, and charged with the following tasks:
  
  To develop, in co-operation with the military authorities of the Alliance, 'overall financial and economic guides to... defence programmes';
  
  To establish limits to such programmes 'within available financial and economic resources';
  
  To review and make recommendations concerning:
  
  (a) the financial and economic impact on member countries of defence projects formulated by the military authorities of the Alliance;
  
  (b) financial arrangements for the execution of defence plans, particularly in respect to the exchange among member countries of materials and equipment;
  
  (c) currency problems created by the importation of material and equipment from non-member countries;
  
  (d) plans for the mobilization of economic and financial resources in time of emergency.

- The *Military Production and Supply Board*, responsible to the Defence Committee for the study of measures to increase the effectiveness of co-ordinated production, standardization and technical research in the field of armaments.

The control and supervision of the increasing number of civilian and military agencies of the Alliance could no longer be undertaken effectively by the Council in the course of its infrequent meetings. During their meeting of May 15th to 18th, 1950, the Ministers therefore decided to create a permanent civilian body responsible for regular political exchanges between member governments, for the execution of their directives, and for the co-ordination of the work of the subsidiary bodies of the Alliance. These were the tasks which devolved upon the *Council Deputies* of the Foreign Ministers.

Parallel to the work of organization, the Alliance devoted itself to the establishment of a common defence policy in the fields of armament production and of military strategy.

On October 6th, 1949, President Truman put his signature to the Mutual Defense Aid Programme. Credits for 1950 amounted to 1,450 million dollars, of which 1,000 million dollars were earmarked
for the NATO countries. The American Government was thus in a position to comply with the request for military and financial aid made by the Brussels Treaty Powers the day after the signature of the Treaty, and later by Denmark, Italy and Norway. On January 27th, 1950, bilateral agreements giving effect to the military aid programme were signed in Washington by the United States and the eight European NATO countries which had asked to participate.


On January 27th, the day of the signature of the bilateral agreements on military aid, President Truman approved the ‘integrated defence plan’ for the North Atlantic area.

Another step forward was taken on April 1st, 1950, when the Defence Committee, meeting at the Hague, approved the first draft of a four-year defence plan (the “medium term defence plan”), which had been worked out by the Military Committee, the Standing Group and the Regional Planning Groups.

II

June 1950 – May 1951

‘FORWARD STRATEGY’ – THE GERMAN QUESTION – UNIFIED AND INTEGRATED COMMAND – REORGANIZATION OF NATO

The Communist attack upon Southern Korea on June 25th, 1950, shocked the free world into a sharpened awareness of the threat which confronted it. When the Council met in New York on September 15th, 1950, its discussions were therefore centred on a single problem: how to defend the NATO area against an aggression similar to the one which had taken place in the Far East.

The Council agreed unanimously that a ‘forward strategy’ must be adopted in Europe, that is to say that any aggression must be resisted as far to the East as possible, in order to ensure the defence of all the European countries of the Alliance. But to carry out this
strategy, far greater resources would be required than those available to NATO at that time – which were approximately 14 divisions on the continent of Europe, as against some 200 Soviet divisions. Military strength would therefore have to be built up, and defence plans revised. It was also necessary to create at the earliest possible time ‘an integrated force under a centralised command, adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe’.

There was, however, a corollary to the principle subscribed to by the Council; the strategy adopted by NATO necessitated the defence of Europe on German soil, which would be impossible without the military and political participation of the Federal Republic of Germany. Mr. Acheson, the then Secretary of State of the United States, argued in favour of such participation, subject to precise limitations and guarantees. The Council failed, however, to come to a decision in view of the position adopted by France. It therefore adjourned on September 18th, 1950, so that the Ministers – and particularly those of the three Occupying Powers – might examine the question further. The three Powers not having succeeded in working out an acceptable solution to the problem, the Council, meeting again on September 26th, had to confine itself to making a broad statement according to which Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defence of Western Europe. At the same time the Defence Committee was asked to submit recommendations on how this should be done.

The French Government was meanwhile endeavouring to find a solution to the problem. On October 24th, 1950, it submitted to the French National Assembly a plan for ‘a European Army linked to the political institutions of a united Europe’. This plan was submitted to the Defence Committee on October 28th.

The Council Deputies and the Military Committee, to whom the question was referred, were able to agree that ‘an acceptable and realistic defence of Western Europe and the adoption of a forward strategy could not be contemplated without active and willing German participation’. This ‘participation must be within the NATO structure’.

The Council, meeting in Brussels on December 18th, 1950, recognized that ‘German participation would strengthen the defence of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’.

The principle of German participation in the common defence
was thus established. The Council invited the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to explore, in co-operation with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, ways of giving effect to this decision.

The President of the United States then proposed General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); this appointment was unanimously ratified by the Council during its Brussels meeting. The creation in peacetime of a unified military command was a step unprecedented in history. General Eisenhower was to set up his headquarters near Paris in the early months of 1951.

Towards the end of this period, important changes were made in the structure of the Organization. A communiqué issued on May 3rd, 1951, by the Council Deputies announced the incorporation of the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic Board within the Council, which thus became the sole Ministerial body of the Alliance. The communiqué announced that Heads of Government might attend meetings of the Council in person. As a general rule, governments would, according to the nature of the agenda, be represented by their Foreign Ministers or by other competent Ministers, in particular the Ministers for Defence or those responsible for Financial and Economic Affairs.

Two specialised agencies were set up:

The Defence Production Board, with powers greater than those of the Military Production and Supply Board which it superseded.

The Financial and Economic Board, whose task was to advise on economic and financial problems created by the defence programme. To this end it was to maintain close contact with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, both organizations being located in Paris.

III

June 1951 - February 1952

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE DEFENCE EFFORT – IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 2 – ACCESSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY TO THE ALLIANCE – THE PERMANENT COUNCIL

During this period, relations between East and West were increasingly strained. War continued in Korea and Indochina. The four
Occupying Powers failed in their efforts to organize discussions on Germany. In the United Nations there was still complete deadlock on the two questions bearing most closely on peace and security: disarmament and the control of atomic energy.

The NATO countries had therefore to continue their defence preparations, but the intensity of the effort required, and its prolongation, created economic and financial problems which were to an increasing degree to occupy the attention of the Alliance.

The composition of the Council, meeting in Ottawa from September 15th to 20th, 1951, bore witness to the importance attached to these problems: for the first time not only the Foreign Ministers of the member countries, but also the Defence Ministers and the Ministers of Finance or for Economic Affairs assembled together for a NATO meeting.

The military requirements of the Alliance as assessed by the Military Committee called for financial contributions far greater than those which the member states declared themselves to be able to make. Furthermore the effectiveness of the defence effort was threatened by a whole series of adverse factors: rising prices, the danger of inflation, unbalance of payments, difficulties regarding the distribution of raw materials.

The member governments were therefore faced with the dual task of building up their defence effort to the necessary level, while at the same time maintaining a sufficiently sound and stable economy – an essential condition for the military effort. In order to determine the best means of attaining two apparently incompatible objectives, the Ministers set up a ‘Temporary Council Committee’ (TCC) to study problems created by the need to reconcile, on the one hand, requirements of collective security and, on the other, the political and economic capabilities of the member countries.

The continuing tension between the countries of the Alliance and the Soviet world brought home to member governments the need to extend their co-operation to other fields. To this end the Council agreed on more active implementation of Article 2 of the Treaty, which advocates co-operation in non-military fields. A Ministerial Committee composed of representatives of Belgium, Canada, Italy, Norway and the Netherlands was set up to study measures to strengthen the Atlantic Community. Its proposals were to bear in particular on economic, financial and social co-operation, and collaboration in the cultural and information fields.

In addition to the above decisions on organizational problems, a
decision of considerable political and strategic significance was taken at the Ottawa meeting: the Council extended an official invitation to Greece and Turkey to join NATO.

Increasing international tension had led the governments of these two countries to seek the security which membership in NATO would give them. However, the broadening of NATO's boundaries to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Southern frontiers of the USSR brought with it increased responsibilities, both political and military. The problems arising out of this extension of the Alliance had been the subject of prolonged discussion, particularly by the Council Deputies. The outcome of these studies was favourable and, following the Council's invitation, the accession of Greece and Turkey, ratified by all the member states, took effect on February 18th, 1952.

The Temporary Council Committee started its work immediately after the Ottawa meeting. A decisive role fell to its Executive Board, whose members were Mr. Averell Harriman (United States), Chairman of the Committee, M. Jean Monnet (France) and Sir Edwin Plowden (United Kingdom), who soon became known to press and public as the 'Three Wise Men'.

The Committee submitted its report on December 18th, 1951. This document started by setting out the two governing principles which should be applied to the defence effort: the equitable sharing between member countries of the financial burden and the maintenance of a 'sound economic and social base' and 'a satisfactory rate of general economic expansion'. It went on to examine in detail each member country's defence programme, and make precise recommendations concerning goals to be set for 1952, and more general directives for the following years.

The Council session held at Lisbon from February 20th to 25th, 1952, was a landmark in the history of the Alliance. The main item on the agenda was the co-ordinated analysis of NATO defence plans based on the work of the Temporary Council Committee. The governments adopted the military goals proposed by the Report of the Wise Men, and undertook to contribute a total of 50 divisions, 4,000 aircraft and 'strong naval forces' by the end of 1952.

Another question of major importance was considered at Lisbon: the problem of German participation in the defence of the West. The Council gave its approval to the plans which were then being negotiated in Paris for setting up a European Defence Community. The Ministers adopted the report of the Atlantic Community
Committee, which advocated the expansion and liberalisation of trade as well as closer collaboration with other international bodies, in particular the OEEC.

Last but not least, the Lisbon meeting drastically reorganized the civilian agencies of the Alliance. The North Atlantic Council became a permanent body. Permanent Representatives were to remain in session in the intervals between ministerial meetings, the Council’s powers of decision being the same irrespective of its composition. A new function was created: that of Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With the title of Vice-Chairman, its holder was to assume in practice the chairmanship of the permanent Council, the title of Chairman continuing to pass in turn each year to the Foreign Ministers of the member countries. The NATO headquarters were to be located in Paris.

In the military field, this period was marked by the establishment of new commands: the Atlantic Command (SACLANT) set up on January 30th, 1952, at Norfolk, Virginia; the Naval Command and the Maritime Air Command for the English Channel and the Southern North Sea area set up in February, 1952. The two Commanders-in-Chief were made responsible to a ‘Channel Committee’, composed of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

IV

March 1952 - May 1955


During this period the Alliance set up the new institutions approved at Lisbon, and strengthened its defence system. In the political sphere, the problem of German participation in Western defence was pre-eminent.

On March 12th, 1952, Lord Ismay, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in the United Kingdom Government, was appointed Secretary General of NATO. In London the Council Deputies and the Defence Production Board ceased to exist, as did the Financial and Economic Board in Paris. Those of their members
who were to serve in the new International Secretariat moved into the Palais de Chaillot, and by the end of April, 1952, all the Permanent Representatives of the NATO member countries had assembled with their delegations in Paris.

Following General Eisenhower's request to be released from his duties in order to become a candidate in the American presidential elections, one of the first acts of the Permanent Council was, on April, 1952, to appoint General Matthew B. Ridgway (United States) Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

All the meetings of the Council during this period were, for practical reasons, held in Paris. It was at the first such meeting, which took place from December 15th to 18th, 1952, that the Council received the first report on the 'Annual Review' - procedure proposed by the Temporary Council Committee with a view to reconciling defence programmes with national resources and establishing an equitable distribution of the financial burden among the member countries.

Also for the first time, the Council at this session adopted a position on a question outside the area of the Treaty. It proclaimed its moral support for 'the resistance of the free nations' in Korea as well as in Indo-China, which deserved 'continuing support from the NATO governments'.

During this period, the Council at its ministerial meetings took a number of decisions connected with defence: common infrastructure programmes, correlated production programmes established with the assistance of offshore procurement; long-term planning; the co-ordination of national plans for civil defence and the wartime control and distribution of supplies, transport, etc.

On July 10th, 1953, General Alfred M. Gruenther (United States), former Chief-of-Staff to General Eisenhower and General Ridgway, succeeded the latter as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

In December, 1953, Lord Ismay was invited to attend the meeting in Bermuda of the Heads of Government of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. This invitation was a striking expression by the three powers of their confidence in the Alliance, and bore witness to the importance of NATO in international affairs.

The formula agreed at Lisbon for German participation in the common defence became invalid when, on August 29th, 1954, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the treaty establishing the European Defence Community. Fortunately, however, the countries concerned were able to put forward an alternative pro-
posal with a minimum of delay. At the suggestion of the British Government, the Foreign Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty powers and of Germany, Italy, the United States and Canada, assembled in London for discussions from September 28th to October 3rd, 1954. A number of decisions were reached at this Conference which were given final approval during a further series of meetings in Paris from October 20th to 22nd, 1954: a four-power conference (the three Occupying Powers and Germany), a meeting of the nine countries which had attended the London Conference, a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council. On October 23rd, the Paris Agreements were signed.

These Agreements embodied the following decisions:

- The termination of the occupation régime in Western Germany, the Federal Government agreeing to the maintenance on its territory of foreign forces at least equivalent in strength to those stationed there at the time of the signature of the Agreements.

- The accession of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to the Brussels Treaty, whose signatories were henceforth to constitute a 'Western European Union.'

- Within the framework of this Union, agreement on the maximum level of forces to be maintained by each member, and the institution of a system of control over force levels and armaments.

- An undertaking by the United Kingdom to maintain on the continent forces equivalent to those assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force). The United Kingdom stipulated, however, that it would not be bound by this obligation in the event of a serious overseas emergency. It also reserved the right to ask the Council to reconsider the financial arrangements for the maintenance of these forces if the drain on its foreign exchange proved too great.

- The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.

- The establishment of a unified military formation by assigning to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe all forces of member countries stationed within the area of his command, with the exception of certain forces needed for the defence of overseas territories, for internal protection and for police duties.

At the London Conference, Mr. Dulles had promised his colleagues that he would recommend to the President of the United States that American forces be maintained on the European Continent. President Eisenhower acted upon this recommendation on
March 5th, 1955, when he gave a public undertaking that these forces would be maintained for as long as necessary, and in so doing supplied an additional and essential guarantee of collective security.

By May 5th, 1955, the instruments of ratification of the Paris Agreements had been deposited by all the governments concerned and at the Ministerial Meeting of the Council which opened on May 9th the Federal Republic of Germany was officially welcomed as the fifteenth member of NATO.

V

June 1955–December 1956

THE GENEVA CONFERENCES—PROBLEMS OF NON-MILITARY CO-OPERATION

The entry into NATO of the Federal Republic of Germany marked the failure of Soviet attempts to prevent the participation of this country in common defence. The West was thus in a favourable position for renewing negotiations with the USSR on the main problems arising out of relations between East and West. A proposal for discussions was accordingly put forward by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and was favourably received in Moscow.

As a result, the Heads of Government of the United States, France, the United Kingdom and the USSR assembled for a 'summit conference' in Geneva from July 18th to 23rd, 1955. The three Western powers who were to take part in the Geneva Conference met with their allies in a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on July 16th for an exchange of views on the main items to be discussed. They were thus able to ensure that the positions they adopted at Geneva would reflect the general feeling of the members of the Alliance.

No agreement was reached at Geneva regarding the items on the agenda: the reunification of Germany, European security, disarmament, development of contacts between East and West. However, the four Heads of Government agreed upon a common directive for their Foreign Ministers concerning a second conference. At this meeting, which took place in Geneva from October 27th to November 16th, 1955, the four Foreign Ministers were unable to come to any agreement. On this occasion also, a Ministerial Meeting of the

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North Atlantic Council, held on October 25th, had made it possible to ensure unity of views among the member countries regarding the Western positions. Throughout the duration of the Geneva Conference the NATO governments were regularly informed and consulted through the Council.

The Foreign Ministers of the member countries, meeting in Paris on December 15th and 16th, 1955, were faced with a discouraging international situation: at Geneva, the USSR had opposed both the reunification of Germany and controlled disarmament, including the aerial inspections proposed by President Eisenhower as protection against surprise attack; furthermore, Soviet interference was increasing in the Middle East and Asia. Finally, the Soviet Union was pursuing the steady build-up of its military strength.

This meeting of the Council was largely devoted to defence questions: the approval of force goals for the three following years; the discussion of future defence plans; a statement of policy regarding the adoption by NATO's forces of new weapons; the reorganization and co-ordination of air defence.

A few weeks later, the outlook for the future appeared temporarily more hopeful. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party in the USSR which took place in Moscow from February 14th to 21st, 1956, seemed to indicate a changed attitude: at home, de-stalinisation, abroad a new policy of co-existence and peaceable relations.

The Foreign Ministers of the Alliance, meeting in Paris on May 4th and 5th, took note of this change in atmosphere, and considered the opportunities it might offer: "Present prospects", they declared in the communiqué, "seem to leave scope for further peaceful initiatives on the part of the Atlantic Powers. They are determined to pursue these initiatives with the same energy that they displayed in building up their defence organization and with which this will be maintained."

Whatever the future development of East-West relations, however, the Alliance was increasingly called upon to extend its activities beyond the field of defence, although this remained of the first importance. The Council appointed a Committee of Three Ministers: M. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr. Halvard Lange (Norway), Mr. Lester B. Pearson (Canada), to advise it on 'ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.'

Hopes of agreement inspired by the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party were soon deceived. The brutal suppression of
the Hungarian uprising and Soviet attempts at penetration and subversion in the Middle East dispelled illusions concerning the new trend in Soviet policy. At the same time, the Suez crisis led to certain divergencies which did not contribute to the unity of the member countries.

Against this critical background, the task of the Committee of Three took on even greater significance. Their report, prepared in close consultation with governments, was submitted to the Council which approved the recommendations it contained during its ministerial session in Paris from December 11th to 14th, 1956.

The main chapter of this document is devoted to political cooperation. In the development of this co-operation, the practice of mutual consultation plays an essential role: “It means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others”. Thus consultation within NATO was to become ‘an integral part of the making of national policy’. In order to improve methods of consultation, the Committee recommended that the Council make an ‘annual political appraisal’ on the basis of a report by the Secretary General.

The Committee also made recommendations regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes between member countries. It suggested that good offices procedures within NATO framework be followed before resorting to any other international agency. The Secretary General would be empowered to offer his good offices informally at any time to the countries involved in a dispute.

The Committee’s report also contained recommendations concerning co-operation in the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and information fields.

The principle of political consultation was not new to NATO, but the governments of the member countries had never before upheld it so forcefully. The approval of the report of the Three Ministers marked the beginning of a new era during which the co-ordination of foreign policy was to play an increasingly important role in the work of the Council.

However, political developments and the new aspects of the Soviet effort forced the Alliance to devote a growing measure of its attention to problems outside the area of the Treaty. Thus at
the Ministerial Meeting of December, 1956, the agenda included such questions as Soviet penetration in the Middle East, relations between Israel and the Arab States, and the Suez Canal.

Lord Ismay having announced his decision to retire from his functions in the Spring of 1957, the Council during this meeting appointed as his successor M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium, who took up his duties as Secretary General of NATO on May 16th, 1957.

In November, 1956, General Lauris Norstad (United States) succeeded General Gruenther as Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

VI

NATO from January 1957, to January 1958

DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENCE POLICY – DISARMAMENT – MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

The latter part of 1956 had been a difficult period for the Alliance, and the new and urgent problems with which it was faced led to a determined effort on the part of the member countries to strengthen NATO in every sphere.

In the defence field, the development of new weapons, with which the Soviets were already equipping their forces, necessitated a revision of military policy.

Politically, the countries of the Alliance were more than ever aware that their unity must at all costs be maintained. This unity was, moreover, enforced by the impasse between East and West, which gave rise throughout this period to a series of exchanges. Thus the need for political co-operation brought about a considerable development in the role of consultation.

Conscious of the problems arising out of the multiple forms assumed by the Soviet threat, the member states endeavoured also to lay the foundations of closer co-operation in the economic, scientific and technical fields.

In the non-military field, the activities of the Alliance were largely inspired by the report of the Three Ministers.

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The Meeting in Bonn* of Foreign Ministers on May 2nd and 3rd 1957 was concerned chiefly with defence policy. While Soviet propaganda was aimed at arousing public opinion everywhere against the equipment of the armed forces of Western Europe with atomic weapons, the USSR was steadily proceeding with the development of its own nuclear armaments. This policy of intimidation – which also found an outlet in messages addressed to certain members of the Alliance – was clearly directed towards Soviet monopoly of nuclear weapons on the European continent. The North Atlantic Council publicly denounced these tactics, and in reply firmly asserted the right of the Alliance to discourage aggression by the possession of the modern arms needed for its defence.

The Ministers also decided ‘to intensify the common policy for the restoration of Germany as a free and united state’ within the framework of a security system guaranteeing peace in Europe.

In March, 1957, the United Nations Disarmament Sub-Committee met in London. The Sub-Committee, which was set up as the negotiating body of the Disarmament Commission created by the General Assembly, was composed of delegations of five powers: the USSR and four NATO members – Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The Sub-Committee was, during the months that followed, the scene of continual opposition between Soviet and Western viewpoints on the question of disarmament. These negotiations were of major interest to the Alliance as a whole, from the standpoint both of general policy and of security. The four Western governments represented on the Sub-Committee therefore decided to inform their NATO partners of the proposals they were making to the USSR, and to keep them informed of the progress of the London talks. Mr. Harold Stassen and M. Jules Moch, the representatives on the Sub-Committee of the United States and France respectively, reported on two occasions to the Council.

In the light of the advice given by the military authorities of the Alliance, very complete discussions then took place which made it possible to arrive at a common position, and the proposals put forward by the four Western powers in London on August 29th, 1957, reflected a viewpoint common to all the member states. Consultation in the Council thus achieved positive results in the all-important field of disarmament.

* The Committee of Three had suggested that from time to time Council meetings take place away from Paris.
The Western proposals of August 29th comprised the following measures to be carried out under international control:

- the reduction of all types of armaments and military forces;
- the cessation of the production of fissionable material for military purposes;
- the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons;
- the suspension of nuclear weapons tests;
- the adoption of protective measures against the risk of surprise attack.

These proposals were immediately rejected by the USSR. However, it remained for the General Assembly of the United Nations to study them, and on November 14th the principles of the Western proposals were approved by a considerable majority, against the opposition of the Soviet bloc*. Subsequently the General Assembly set up a new disarmament commission which the USSR announced it would boycott.

This refusal to take part in disarmament negotiations increased the gravity of an international situation which was already disquieting: the Soviet policy of penetration was meeting with success in the Middle East, and particularly in Syria, where the situation was rapidly deteriorating. Furthermore, the launching of the first "Sputnik" presented world Communism and its allies with the theme of a vast propaganda offensive which, by claiming for the USSR technical superiority over the rest of the world, implied its military superiority, particularly in the field of long-range missiles. Thus, by its stand in the United Nations on disarmament, its political offensive in the Middle East and the exploitation of the Sputnik, the USSR carried on its campaign of intimidation and demoralisation against the West.

The countries of the Alliance met the challenge and began immediately to strengthen their ties.

As early as October, 1957, President Eisenhower and Mr. MacMillan met in Washington to consider what action might be taken in common to meet the new aspects of the Soviet threat. NATO's role in implementing this action was underlined by the fact that M. Spaak joined them for a part of their talks.

In order to mark with particular solemnity the unity of the Alliance, it was decided that the December meeting of the Council would, for the first time, be at the level of Heads of Government.

* 56 votes for, 9 against, and 15 abstentions.
This meeting took place in Paris from December 16th to 19th, 1957. In its Communiqué* the Council re-dedicated itself to the principles and purposes of the Alliance, and reaffirmed the common position of its members regarding the questions bearing most directly on peace and security: disarmament, and German reunification.

With regard to defence, the Council took a decision of major importance. This was to establish stocks of nuclear weapons and to put intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM’s) at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The deployment of these stocks as well as arrangements for their use were to be decided in agreement with the countries directly concerned. In announcing this decision, the Council recalled the circumstances which had made it necessary. In consideration were the Soviet Union’s boycott of disarmament discussions and the extensive programme being carried out by the USSR for the equipment of its forces with the most destructive nuclear weapons. The Heads of Government further decided upon yet closer co-ordination both of NATO forces and of the defence efforts of member countries. This should ensure that each nation made its most effective contribution to the needs of the Alliance, the best use of NATO’s resources being assured through the highest possible degree of standardisation and integration in all fields of defence.

While defence questions continued to be of capital importance, the Alliance was also faced with the necessity of carrying its activities into other fields, in order to meet new aspects of the Soviet threat. “Our Alliance”, stated the Heads of Government, “cannot therefore be concerned only with the North Atlantic area or only with military defence. It must also organize its political and economic strength on the principle of interdependence, and must take account of developments outside its own area.”

In the political field, the Heads of Government recognized the need for further improvement in consultation and for ‘a broad co-ordination of policies.’ In addition, they laid the foundations of cooperation in a new field: that of scientific and technical matters. They declared: “The full development of our science and technology is essential to the culture, to the economy and to the political and military strength of the Atlantic Community.” Consequently, the Council set up a Science Committee responsible for making

* See page 75 the texts of the Declaration and Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of December, 1957.
recommendations aimed at achieving the best possible sharing of tasks and pooling of scientific facilities and information.

Finally, the Council pronounced in favour of closer economic co-operation within the Atlantic Community and with the free world as a whole.

VII

NATO since January 1958

PLANNING FOR A SUMMIT CONFERENCE —
THE BERLIN QUESTION

Before the Heads of Government meeting began, the Soviet Union launched a diplomatic offensive, which continued afterwards and took the form of an avalanche of letters to the individual Heads of Government of the Alliance, mostly signed by Mr. Bulganin, who was at that time Prime Minister. These messages raised such issues as the calling of a summit meeting, the suspension of nuclear tests, the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, a 'denuclearised' zone in Europe, launching ramps for missiles, nuclear stocks in the NATO countries, the signing of a non-aggression pact, etc. and were evidently aimed at creating within NATO dissension which could then be exploited with a view to persuading member countries to negotiate separately with the Soviet Union. The NATO partners found in political consultation the answer to this attack. By agreeing to put up for discussion within the Council both the contents of the individual letters and the draft replies prepared by each of them, the Governments concerned achieved a remarkable degree of harmony in their views, even concerning problems on which agreement was rendered more difficult by the sensitivity of public opinion. In their December, 1957, declaration, the Heads of Government had reaffirmed their desire for peace through negotiation: "We are always ready to settle international problems by negotiation, taking into account the legitimate interests of all". Member countries were thus disposed to adopt a constructive attitude towards Soviet proposals for a summit meeting. Those countries to whom it had previously fallen to negotiate with the USSR agreed that preparations should, as far as possible, be undertaken within the NATO framework. Studies were, therefore, carried out by the Council on
procedural questions and a possible agenda, with a view to agreeing on a common position.

In order to follow up the decisions taken on defence questions in December, 1957, the Defence Ministers of the Alliance met in Paris on the 15th, 16th and 17th of April, 1958. They agreed on measures “to achieve greater co-ordination and to widen co-operation among member countries both with respect to defence research, development of production and to the organisation of forces.” They also confirmed their support of a NATO defensive strategy based “on the concept of a strong deterrent, comprising the Shield, with its conventional and nuclear elements, and the nuclear retaliatory forces”.

Shortly after this meeting from May 5th to 7th, 1958, the Council met at ministerial level in Copenhagen. It discussed, first and foremost, political and economic co-operation. A report prepared by the Secretary General figured on the agenda for the first time, in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Three concerning an annual political appraisal. This document emphasised the very real progress that had been made by the Alliance in the field of political co-operation.

Regarding a possible summit conference, the Council adopted a positive attitude, with the proviso that such discussions should offer prospects of important questions being settled: in other words, they should “be properly prepared and take place in a favourable atmosphere”. If a summit meeting were to materialize, the questions of German reunification and controlled disarmament should be discussed.

With regard to the latter point, the Council demonstrated its willingness to negotiate by proposing partial measures which could serve as test cases and which might later be applied on a wider scale. The Council pointed out: “Agreement on measures necessary, for example, to prevent surprise attack or to detect nuclear explosions might go far towards demonstrating the possibility of agreement on disarmament, improving its prospects and accelerating its application when reached”.

Negotiations for a summit conference continued in May and June, 1958, but the Soviet attitude did not encourage hopes of agreement. On June 16th, 1958, the Soviet Government signified its lack of serious interest by publishing without warning the exchange of correspondence up to that point.

During the summer of 1958 the North Atlantic Council continu-
ed to be the forum for Western consultation on a number of matters involving relations with the Soviet Union. These included the suspension of tests of nuclear weapons and the prevention of surprise attacks.

The USSR appeared to drop interest in a Summit Conference when it failed to divert attention to the situation in the Middle East and thereby to obtain agreement to a conference on its own terms. Western attempts to revive the subject during the period proved fruitless.

Other matters, chiefly of political interest, also occupied NATO at this time, although the consequences of the decisions on military and related matters made by the Heads of Government in December 1957 continued of course to demand close attention. During the summer of 1958 the Secretary General played an active role in attempting to settle the dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland over fishing rights and in September he placed concrete proposals on the Cyprus dispute before the interested parties.

As the year drew to a close the question of Germany's future and that of Berlin in particular dominated the scene. On November 10th, 1958, Mr. Krushchev declared that the USSR desired to terminate the present status of Berlin. The Soviet Government confirmed this intention in its letter of November 27th, 1958, and announced that it proposed to transfer to the authorities at Pankow within six months all the powers it exercised in East Berlin by virtue of the 1945 agreements, and also the control of communications between Western Germany and Berlin.

At its regular meeting from the 16th to the 18th December, 1958, the Council in ministerial session gave special attention to the question of Berlin. The Council associated itself fully with the views expressed on the subject by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany in their statement of 14th December, 1958*. Shortly thereafter these four powers consulted the Council about their

* The Council Communique states in part: "The Council recalls the responsibilities which each member state has assumed in regard to the security and welfare of Berlin, and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers in that city. The member states of nato could not approve a solution of the Berlin question which jeopardised the right of the three Western Powers to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities require it, and did not assure freedom of communication between that city and the free world. The Soviet Union would be responsible for any action which had the effect of hampering this free communication or endangering this freedom."

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replies to the Soviet Note of November 27th, 1958, on Berlin, and the Council approved these replies.

The December meeting also considered more general questions. The communiqué referred to "the widening of political consultation" and stated that although the existing machinery of NATO was well suited to the needs of the Alliance "the more systematic study of long-term political questions" might improve the process of consultation. The communiqué reiterated the need to improve the defensive power of the Alliance, in view of the continuing increase in Soviet armaments, and re-affirmed that "NATO defensive strategy continues to be based on the existence of effective shield forces and on the manifest will to use nuclear retaliatory forces to repel aggression".
CHAPTER IV

The present structure of the Organization

I. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority in NATO. It is composed of representatives of the member countries. These being sovereign states, equal in status, all decisions of the Council are taken unanimously.

The Council may meet at the level either of Ministers or of Permanent Representatives.

At ministerial meetings of the Council, the members of the Alliance are represented by one – or several – of their Ministers (for Foreign Affairs, Defence, Finance, Economic Affairs, etc.) according to the agenda of the meeting. They may also be represented by Heads of Government.*

Permanent Representatives of the member countries, who hold the rank of Ambassador, meet between ministerial sessions, thus ensuring the continuous functioning of the Council with effective powers of decision.

The Council meets at ministerial level two or three times a year, and once or twice a week at the level of Permanent Representatives. The latter can be called together at short notice and at any time. In the course of the last six years, the Council has held more than 600 meetings. Whatever the level at which the Council meets, its chairman is the Secretary General of NATO.

Each year the Foreign Minister of a member state is President of the Council. The Presidency rotates annually according to the alphabetical order of the NATO countries.**

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* In December, 1957, the Council met for the first time at the level of Heads of Government.
** See Appendix 6, page 80, list of Chairmen of the North Atlantic Council.

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II. THE CIVILIAN SIDE

Council Committees*

The Council has established a number of committees and working groups. They examine the problems submitted to them by the Council and make recommendations.

The International Staff/Secretariat**

SECRETARY GENERAL

The Secretary General, M. Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium), who is also Chairman of the North Atlantic Council, is responsible to the Council for organizing its work and directing the International Staff/Secretariat.

A Deputy Secretary General assists the Secretary General in the exercise of his functions, and replaces him in his absence. Since September 15th, 1958, M. Alberico A. Casardi (Italy) has occupied this post.

THE DIVISION OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

This Division is directed by the Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs. Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh (United Kingdom) was appointed on September 15th, 1958. The Division includes a Political Directorate, an Information Directorate and a Press Section.

The duties of the Political Directorate are:

(a) Political liaison with delegations and the preparation of reports on political subjects for the Secretary General and the Council;
(b) Liaison with other international organizations, both intergovernmental and non-governmental;
(c) Activities in the cultural field connected with Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs is Chairman of the Committee of Political Advisers (established in 1957, following the recommendations of the Committee of Three) and of the Committee on Information and Cultural Relations.

The Information Service and Press Section

In co-operation with national information authorities, the Information Directorate has the task of informing public opinion about the aims and achievements of the Atlantic Alliance. Through films,
periodicals, radio and television programmes, publications and exhibitions, the Information Service seeks to improve public understanding among the member countries and to encourage a feeling of unity and community of interests.

Daily contacts with the press are ensured by a Press Section headed by the Chief Press Officer.

**THE DIVISION OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE**

This Division is directed by the Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance, M. François-Didier Gregh (France), who, since September 15th, 1958, has the rank of Deputy Secretary General, and in this capacity assists the Secretary General more particularly with defence problems.

This Division's responsibilities are:

(a) The study of economic matters of concern to the Alliance, especially any with political effect on defence problems, or any likely to influence the well-being of the Atlantic Community, and in this connection the constant scrutiny of the economic positions of the member countries in regard to the defence effort.

(b) The study of the overall financial aspects of defence by country, within the framework of the plans laid down by the military authorities, and the national defence budgets; and the analysis and estimate of the cost by services of the defence programmes (Annual Review).

(c) Lastly, the organization and direction of the statistical studies required to assess the NATO defence effort.

**THE DIVISION OF PRODUCTION AND LOGISTICS**

This Division is directed by the Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics, Mr. Ernest Meili (United States). The Division's rôle is:

(a) To promote the most efficient use of the Alliance's resources in the production of military equipment.

This includes especially:

i) the study of problems of production and of the supply of equipment within the framework of the defence plans;

ii) the study of the standardization of equipment and parts of equipment;

iii) research and exchange of technical information;

iv) participation in the Annual Review.

(b) To assure technical and financial supervision of the infra-
structure programme. This supervision is exercised through the Infrastructure Committee and the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee.

THE OFFICE OF THE SCIENCE ADVISER
This Office is directed by the Science Adviser, Dr. Norman F. Ramsey (United States), who is also Chairman of the Science Committee. His responsibilities are:
(a) To advise the Secretary General on scientific matters of concern to NATO;
(b) To provide continuity between meetings of the Science Committee and to direct the activities of working groups as well as to prepare programmes dealing with specific scientific and technical matters;
(c) To ensure scientific liaison and co-operation with NATO military and civil authorities, with those concerned with scientific policy in member countries, and with other international organizations in the scientific field.

THE OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This office is directed by the Executive Secretary, Lord Coleridge (United Kingdom), who is also Secretary to the North Atlantic Council.

He is responsible to the Chairman for arranging the Council’s work, seeing that action is taken on Council decisions, and coordinating the activities of the Council’s committees.

The office of the Executive Secretary provides the secretariat for these committees, and is responsible for producing records, reports and other documents required by them.

The Civil Emergency Planning Office is responsible to the Executive Secretary.

The Civil Emergency Planning Office
This section is headed by the Senior Civil Defence Adviser, who also provides technical assistance to the committees concerned with civil emergency planning in time of war, and to national civil defence services.

THE PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION SERVICE
This Service is directly under the Secretary General. The Head of Personnel and Administration is responsible for the general admi-
nistration of the International Staff, as well as for the preparation of the budget.

**THE SERVICE OF THE FINANCIAL CONTROLLER**

This independent Service is headed by the Financial Controller, who is appointed by the Council and is responsible for the control of expenditures within the framework of the budget.

**III. THE MILITARY SIDE**

The higher military organization of NATO comprises the Military Committee, its executive agency – the Standing Group – the Commands and a Regional Planning Group.

**The Military Committee**

The Military Committee is the senior military authority in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is composed of a Chief-of-Staff of each member country. Iceland, however, having no military forces, may be represented by a civilian.

The chairmanship of the Military Committee rotates annually in the alphabetical order of countries.

At the level of Chiefs-of-Staff the Military Committee meets regularly – at least twice a year – and whenever else it may be found necessary. It is responsible for making recommendations and supplying guidance on military questions to subordinate authorities.

In order to enable the Military Committee to function in permanent session with effective powers of decision, each Chief-of-Staff appoints a Permanent Military Representative. Between meetings of the Chiefs-of-Staff, their Permanent Military Representatives deal with and settle, in permanent session, questions which come within the province of the Military Committee, except those which, by their nature and scope, require the approval of the Chiefs-of-Staff.

The Chairman of the Military Committee in Permanent Session is appointed by the Military Committee in Chiefs-of-Staff Session, for a definite period of two years.

**The Standing Group**

The Standing Group is composed of representatives of the Chiefs-of-Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is the executive agent of the Military Committee. The Chairmanship
of the Standing Group rotates among the three countries every three months. The members of the Standing Group are at the same time the representatives of their Chiefs-of-Staff in the Military Committee in Permanent Session.

The Standing Group is the superior body responsible for the highest strategic guidance in areas in which Allied NATO forces operate. As such, it is the body to which the NATO Commanders are responsible. On certain subjects it draws its authority from the Military Committee.

To ensure the integrated defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area, the Standing Group has the task of co-ordinating defence plans originating in NATO Commands and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group, and of making appropriate recommendations thereon to the Military Committee and ultimately to the Council.

The Standing Group is represented on the North Atlantic Council in Paris by a general officer assisted by an Allied staff composed of officers drawn in rotation from all member nations, thus ensuring close co-operation between the NATO civilian and military authorities.

It is through this Standing Group Representative (SGREP) that the military advice, recommendations and decisions of the NATO military authorities are communicated to the Council or submitted to it for approval. Conversely, the Standing Group is kept regularly informed of the work and decisions of the Council.

The Standing Group has also the following NATO military agencies under its authority: the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) in London, the Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD) and the NATO Defence College, located in Paris. Also directly subordinate to the Standing Group are: the European Military Communications Co-ordinating Committee (EMCCC), the European Long Lines Agency (ELLA), the European Radio Frequencies Agency (ERFA) and the European Naval Communications Agency (ENCA).

**Commands**

The strategic area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is divided, to take account of geographical as well as political factors, among three Commands and a Regional Planning Group. The authority exercised by these different Commands varies in form and is conditioned by these factors and by the situation in peacetime or in wartime.
The forces of member countries are divided into forces assigned in peacetime to NATO Commands, forces earmarked for these Commands and forces remaining under national command. The NATO Commanders are responsible for the development of defence plans for their respective areas, for the determination of force requirements and for the deployment and exercise of the forces under their Command. All their reports and recommendations regarding forces and their logistic support are referred to the Standing Group.

The organization of these Commands is flexible enough and the liaison between them close enough to allow for mutual support in the event of war, and the rapid shifting of the necessary land, sea and air forces to meet any situation likely to confront the North Atlantic Community.

I. THE EUROPEAN COMMAND

This Command covers the land area extending from the North Cape to North Africa and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey, but excludes the United Kingdom, Portugal and Algeria, the defence of which is a national responsibility.

This area is under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), whose headquarters, between Paris and Versailles, are known as SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).

SACEUR

The first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe was General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower (United States), who was replaced on June 1, 1952, by General Matthew B. Ridgway (United States). He was succeeded on July 11, 1953, by General Alfred M. Gruenther (United States). The latter was replaced on November 20, 1956, by General Lauris Norstad (United States).

SACEUR is responsible, under the general direction of the Standing Group, for the defence of the Allied countries situated in the area under his Command against any attack, and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe would, in time of war, control all land, sea and air operations in this area. Internal defence (including that of Corsica, Sardinia and Sicily) and defence of coastal waters remain the responsibility of the national authorities concerned, but the Supreme Commander would have full authority to carry out such operations as he considered necessary for the defence of any part of the area under his Command.

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SACEUR's peacetime functions are defined as:

a) organizing, training and equipping the North Atlantic forces assigned and earmarked to his Command so as to ensure that they are knit together into one unified force;

b) preparing and finalising defence plans;

c) making recommendations to the Standing Group about such matters as the instruction, training, equipping and support of his forces, and indeed on any military questions which affect his ability to carry out his responsibilities in peace or war.

Although the Supreme Commander receives his directions from the Standing Group, he nevertheless has the right of direct access to the Chiefs-of-Staff of any of the Powers and, in certain circumstances, to Defence Ministers and Heads of Government. In addition, all the North Atlantic countries, with the exception of Iceland, maintain military liaison officers known as National Military Representatives (NMR) at SHAPE, who are responsible for liaison with their Chiefs-of-Staff.

The special responsibility of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is to further the organization, equipment, training and mobilization of national forces allocated to the Supreme Commander.

SACEUR also has a Naval Deputy and an Air Deputy.

**Commands subordinate to SACEUR:**

There are four subordinate Commands directly responsible to SACEUR:

a) **THE NORTHERN EUROPE COMMAND**

   The Commander-in-Chief Northern Europe has under him a Commander Allied Naval Forces Northern Europe, a Commander Allied Land Forces Norway, a Commander Allied Land Forces Denmark and a Commander Allied Air Forces Northern Europe.

b) **THE CENTRAL EUROPE COMMAND**

   The Commander-in-Chief Central Europe has under him a Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe, a Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe, and a Commander Allied Naval Forces Central Europe.

c) **THE SOUTHERN EUROPE COMMAND**

   The Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe has under him a Commander of Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern
Europe, two Commanders Allied Land Forces, one for Southern Europe and one for South-Eastern Europe, and a Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe.

d) THE MEDITERRANEAN COMMAND

The Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean has under him the Commanders of the Gibraltar-Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean, Central Mediterranean, South-Eastern Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean and North-Eastern Mediterranean areas.

A general view of the military structure outlined above is given in the chart on page 90.

II. THE ATLANTIC OCEAN COMMAND

This Command extends from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North America to those of Europe and Africa, including Portugal, except for the Channel and the British Isles.

The first Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) was Admiral Lynde D. McCormick (United States), who was succeeded by Admiral Jerauld Wright (United States) on April 1, 1954. SACLANT’s headquarters are at Norfolk, Virginia.

SACLANT

The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) who, like SACEUR, is directly responsible to the Standing Group, is in charge of the Allied Command of the North Atlantic Ocean area. SACLANT’s peacetime responsibilities are defined as:

a) preparing and finalising defence plans;

b) conducting joint and combined training exercises;

c) laying down training standards and determining the establishment of units;

d) supplying the NATO authorities with information on his strategic requirements.

The primary task in wartime of the Allied Command Atlantic is to ensure security in the whole Atlantic Area by guarding the sea lanes and denying their use to an enemy. SACLANT has responsibility for islands in this area, such as Iceland and the Azores.

His authority in the event of war covers, in particular:

- determination of the general forces policy;
- direction of overall operations;

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SACLANT's responsibilities are almost entirely operational. Unlike SACEUR, he has no forces permanently attached to his Command in peacetime. However, for training purposes and in the event of war, forces earmarked by the nations involved are assigned to his direction. Although these forces are predominantly naval, they also include ground and land-based air forces.

Like SACEUR, SACLANT has the right of direct access to the Chiefs-of-Staff and, as occasion demands, to the appropriate Defence Ministers and Heads of Government.

**Commands subordinate to SACLANT:**
At present there are three Commands subordinate to SACLANT:

a) **THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA**, whose Commander-in-Chief has under him an Ocean Sub-Area Command, a U.S. Atlantic Sub-Area Command, and a joint Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area and Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area Air Command.

b) **THE EASTERN ATLANTIC AREA**, under the joint Command of the Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area and the Air Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area. Responsible to them are Commander Northern Sub-Area, Commander Central Sub-Area, Commander Bay of Biscay Sub-Area, Commander Submarine Force Eastern Atlantic, Air Commander Northern Sub-Area and Air Commander Central Sub-Area.

c) **THE STRIKING FLEET ATLANTIC COMMAND**, whose chief bears the title of Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic.

A general view of the military structure outlined above is given in the chart on page 91.

**III. THE CHANNEL COMMITTEE AND CHANNEL COMMAND**

The Channel Committee consists of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff (or their representatives) of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Directly under the Channel Committee is the Allied Command Channel exercised jointly by the Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel and the Allied Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief Channel. Their Command covers the English Channel and the southern North Sea.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel is Admiral Sir Guy
Grantham (uk). The Allied Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief Channel is Air Marshal Sir Bryan V. Reynolds (uk).

A general view of the military structure outlined above is given in the chart on page 92.

IV. CANADA-UNITED STATES REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP

This Planning Group, which covers the North American area, develops and recommends to the Military Committee, through the Standing Group, plans for the defence of the Canada-United States region. It meets alternately in Washington and Ottawa.

Other NATO military agencies

NATO DEFENCE COLLEGE
The NATO Defence College, which was set up following a suggestion by General Eisenhower, was inaugurated on November 9, 1951, for the training of officers who will be needed to serve in key capacities in NATO organizations. It is housed in the Ecole Militaire in Paris. The Commandant of the NATO Defence College is Lieutenant General Tekin Ariburun (Turkey). The classes consist of approximately fifty students per term, most of whom are officers having the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel (or equivalent) or above, and civilian officials from the NATO countries. The study course is for approximately 23 weeks. 14 classes, comprising a total of 746 officers, have now completed their studies at the College.

MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION
This body was set up in London early in 1951 as a subsidiary agency of the Standing Group, from which it receives guidance and direction. It is composed of representatives of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, but the other NATO Powers also have accredited representatives. Its purpose is to facilitate military standardization, both procedural and material, among member nations, and to promulgate standardization agreements. With regard to defence equipment, the agency makes use of the work of international technical expert groups. Liaison is provided by the Production and Logistics Division of the International Staff.

COMMUNICATIONS AGENCIES IN EUROPE
Established in Paris, August, 1951:
- The European Military Communications Co-ordination Commit-
tee (EMCCC) and the European Naval Communications Agency (ENCA). Both deal with signals matters pertaining to the defence of Western Europe and the associated NATO area.

- The European Long Line Agency (ELLA). ELLA studies all matters relating to the use of naval telecommunication facilities by the armed forces in Europe.

Established in London:

- The European Radio Frequencies Agency (ERFA). ERFA collects all available information on radio frequencies and prepares plans for allocation and assignment of frequencies.

**ADVISORY GROUP ON AERONAUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (AGARD)**


Its objective is to bring together leading aeronautical experts of the NATO nations with a view to recommending effective ways of utilizing their respective research and development personnel and facilities for the common benefit of the NATO community.
CHAPTER V

NATO's Activities and Achievements

From the time of the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty, the member governments recognized that while co-operation for defence was the first and most urgent task, it was also essential that this same co-operation be extended to other fields. The success of any alliance is in fact dependent on the extent to which its members agree on all matters of common interest. During the first years of NATO's existence, its action in other fields was limited by the urgent necessity to fulfil its defence obligations. As soon, however, as the build-up of the NATO forces had ensured a certain measure of security, it became possible for the NATO partners to extend their co-operation to wider fields.

Today NATO is active in many spheres: political co-operation, common defence, economic, scientific and technical co-operation, civil emergency planning, information, cultural exchanges.

POLITICAL CO-OPERATION

The Atlantic Alliance has attained its fundamental objective: the maintenance of peace and security. This basic achievement has been largely responsible for the increasing importance of political co-operation in NATO. The direct threat having failed to bring about the collapse of the West, the USSR has carried the struggle into other realms. In the last few years, in addition to military pressure, a series of political offensives have been directed against the member countries with a view to dividing them, reducing their psychological resistance and weakening their positions by extending Soviet influence to other parts of the world.

In pursuit of these aims, the Soviets have exploited such issues as: the relaxation of international tensions, disarmament, suspension of nuclear tests and suppression of nuclear weapons. They have sought, more or less openly, to neutralize a part of Western Europe (Rapaki Plan), to perpetuate the status quo in Eastern Europe and to pursue their policy of political and economic penetration in the countries of Africa and Asia, particularly in the Middle East.

If the Alliance is to withstand the Soviet threat in all its aspects
and adapt itself to constantly changing circumstances, its members must achieve ever closer political co-operation. This may take a variety of forms, from the routine exchange of views and information to prior consultation with a view to establishing a common or co-ordinated policy.

To quote the words of the report of the Three Ministers* on non-military co-operation within the Alliance, consultation "means the discussion of problems collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of the others..."

"...A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible."

The Council is the main instrument of political co-operation within NATO and devotes an increasing proportion of its time to this task. It is assisted by a Committee of Political Advisers composed of members of national delegations to NATO — generally the deputies to the Permanent Representatives — which constitutes a valuable forum for exchanges of views leading to a common assessment of problems affecting the Alliance.

Political co-operation has led to positive results regarding matters of major importance: the establishment in 1957 of a common policy on disarmament, the preparation of co-ordinated replies to the numerous communications addressed by the Soviet leaders since 1957 to the member governments, the planning of a summit conference and the co-ordination of the Western points of view on the question of Berlin.

It cannot, however, be denied that alongside the successes there have been instances where political co-operation has been lacking. The close and effective co-operation in the field of East-West relations has not always been paralleled in the case of problems arising in other parts of the world where the sense of solidarity before a common threat is less pronounced. The risk of disagreement is then correspondingly greater.

* See page 31.
However, the positive results recently achieved show that progress has been accomplished in NATO. This progress cannot but continue if the governments of the member states apply loyally and consistently the principle of exchange of information, and consultation in the earliest stages of policy formation.

This form of political co-operation gives promise of development: the constant exchange of opinions and information tends to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and unity of views. Governments which are willing to inform each other in advance of their intentions will take greater account of the interests and views of their allies when formulating national policies. Moreover, genuine consultation, even though it may not always lead to the establishment of a single, unified policy, is of itself, when it is practised consistently, an effective instrument for the harmonization of policies.

It must be realized that these methods have often necessitated a radical change of thinking and of practice on the part of the governments who submit their ideas and plans to the comments — and often the criticism and objections — of their partners. This implies, particularly in the case of the major powers, a considerable measure of goodwill and some sacrifices for the common cause. This is the price that has to be paid in order to establish up-to-date and efficient diplomatic methods in NATO and to bring about unity of views and of action without abandoning the principles of sovereignty and equal rights.

DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

Defence planning in NATO is based on the constitution of integrated forces and their provision with the essential military installations; the plan, however, has been, and always will be limited by political considerations and by the economic and financial capacities of the member countries: this is an axiom in NATO. In fact, despite the growing military strength of the Alliance and the increase in defence costs, the economies of the member countries continue to prosper, as can be seen by the rise in their living standards these last years.

Two basic aspects of joint defence planning deserve particular mention, namely the co-ordination and standardization of research and production; and the 'annual review' whereby the defence burden is more evenly shared among the NATO partners.
Defence Planning

(a) Production and Standardization
The choice and supply of equipment needed for the armed forces, as well as the establishment of production programmes, are a national responsibility; NATO aims at co-ordinating national programmes, in accordance with recommendations made by the Organization’s military authorities. This co-ordinating work is done, under the direction of the Armaments Committee, by Working Groups of national experts and with the help of the Production and Logistics Division of the International Staff.

During the first years of the Alliance, NATO’s efforts in this field were directed primarily toward the standardization of certain types of equipment and the exchange of information relating to production techniques. A Working Group of legal experts from the countries concerned has established the principles to be applied in order to achieve the widest possible exchange of technical information, and at the same time to protect patent rights.

The rapid evolution of armament production techniques has now led to co-operation in the development and production of modern weapons especially designed to meet the operational requirements of the NATO Commands. One of the examples which illustrate this problem is the case of the light tactical fighter aircraft; prototypes of this fighter have been designed and built to meet a precise operational requirement of shape, and several member countries are scheduled to order it for their forces.

The need for closer co-ordination has now also made itself felt in the field of maintenance of existing equipment. The North Atlantic Council has established a NATO system of supply, maintenance and repair of spare parts which will lead to progressive delegation to NATO by the countries concerned of powers which up to now have been exclusively national.

(b) Annual Review
The co-ordination of the defence efforts of the Alliance is guided by two basic principles:
(1) the reconciliation of the defence programmes with the political, economic and financial capacities of the members of the Alliance;
(2) the establishment of an equitable allotment of contributions for defence among the member countries.

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The Annual Review is one of the basic ways of attaining these objectives. It is an all-year-round exercise and boasts an original feature, in that it is carried out multi-laterally and not nationally. It leads to a high degree of co-operation between NATO civilian and military authorities. Moreover, the amount of information which the member governments give about their armed forces and their economic and financial position is greater and more detailed than allies have ever before exchanged, whether in time of war or, *a fortiori*, of peace.

The Annual Review enables firm goals to be set for the defence efforts of each member country for the coming year, and provisional and planning goals for the second and third years respectively. It makes possible the assessment of progress achieved in the defence build-up. By establishing a co-ordinated and balanced military programme, it aims at securing the best return on the resources devoted to defence.

**Defence Achievements**

(a) **Armed Forces**

When, on December 19, 1950, the North Atlantic Council appointed General Eisenhower to be the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, he had at his disposal some 12 divisions, most of them organized for occupation duties, 400 aircraft, and the same number of ships. Eight years later, the strength of NATO's armed forces has increased four or fivefold, and they are infinitely more effective in terms of other factors such as fire-power, combat value and a common plan. As stated in Chapter III, the North Atlantic Council has taken the necessary steps to ensure that the defensive system benefits from the most recent developments in weapons and other techniques. All member countries are being equipped with the most modern weapons, and in December, 1957, the North Atlantic Council meeting at the level of Heads of Government decided that in view of Soviet policy in this field, stocks of nuclear warheads would be made available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need, and intermediate range ballistic missiles would have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use are being studied by NATO military and civilian authorities in consultation with the states directly concerned.
(b) **Infrastructure**

The NATO forces have also benefited from a common infrastructure programme, which includes fixed installations such as airfields, telecommunications networks, fuel pipelines, etc., without which modern armies cannot operate. All this is financed in common: no one country, however strong, could have paid for so vast a programme. In 1951, the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe had at his disposal only a negligible number of airfields. Consequently, half of the infrastructure programme was devoted to airfields and, at the present time, there are about 160 airfields which can be used by jet planes.

In the communications field, a total of 26,500 miles (43,000 kms) of submarine cables, land lines and radio links have been programmed and are being added to the existing civilian networks. As a result, the communications networks of certain member countries, especially Italy, Norway, Greece and Turkey, and even those between France and the United Kingdom, have been greatly extended and are more efficient than before NATO.

By the end of 1958, some 5,600 miles (9,000 kms) of fuel pipelines and storage tanks with a total capacity of 418 million Imperial gallons (900,000 m³) were planned, and a large part under construction. The operation of this network in course of construction has presented the Alliance with fresh problems regarding the management of commonly financed installations. The Council therefore created a "NATO Pipeline Committee", and a number of regional management boards have been set up with the participation of member countries.

All infrastructure projects are carried out by civilian enterprises of the member countries. Contractors are chosen by international competitive bidding and the work is financed in common by the member countries according to cost-sharing formulae negotiated in the North Atlantic Council.

These are some of NATO's achievements, plates of the shield which it is forging to protect peace and freedom. But the shield is still thin and needs constant strengthening: the NATO forces in Europe oblige a potential aggressor to exercise caution, but they are insufficient to remove all threat of attack. On the other side of the iron curtain, which is barely one hundred miles east of the Rhine, the U.S.S.R. alone has 175 active divisions; nor must we forget that NATO's air force is a fraction of that of the Soviet Union.

[58]
However impressive the defence achievements of NATO, they are still inadequate. To be sure, the disparity between the forces of the free world and those of Soviet-dominated Europe is no longer so great as it was. Then again, the NATO forces are not the only ones available to the West, but it would be folly to slacken the effort and to return to a situation bound to offer temptations to nations pursuing a policy of aggression.

PREPARATION OF CIVIL EMERGENCY PLANNING

NATO is also concerned with many aspects of wartime civil emergency planning.

In November, 1955, the Council set up a Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee with the task of co-ordinating activities relating to emergency planning, or in other words the measures required for the defence of the 'Home Fronts' of NATO.

This Committee has established a procedure of yearly review of the progress made in this field in all NATO countries. This parallels to some extent the Annual Review of the defence effort and thus enables NATO to assess the whole defence position of the Alliance on both the civil and the military sides.

Among the matters examined in the course of this review are measures to ensure the continuation of governments (including plans for their relocation in case of need) in time of war, control of ocean shipping, European inland surface transport, control and distribution of food supplies, agricultural problems, control of petroleum products, raw materials, coal and steel, civil aviation, civil defence, manpower and emergency medical preparations.

The object of these preparations is to enable civil populations to survive in case of war.

AIR TRAFFIC CO-ORDINATION

The existence in the European countries of NATO of national air forces engaged in daily training and operational flying, as well as the continuing expansion of both civil and military traffic, makes it necessary to co-ordinate civil and military flights over European NATO countries.
In April, 1955, the North Atlantic Council set up a Committee on European Airspace Co-ordination. Its task is to promote safety as well as economy of operation for both military and civil users of the airspace while preserving maximum freedom for the training of NATO air forces. This is achieved by harmonizing the needs of the civil and military authorities (both national and international) who are represented in the Committee.

The Committee studies problems of air traffic control and air navigation in order to find solutions acceptable to all NATO countries; they are then examined on a world-wide basis by the International Civil Aviation Organization.

**ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION**

NATO is, of necessity, constantly preoccupied with the economic problems related to the defence efforts of member countries and with ensuring that these defence efforts are commensurate with economic capabilities. In the broader sphere of general economic co-operation, NATO must naturally take into account the activities of the numerous specialized international organizations in which its members exert a preponderant influence. The common economic interests of the member countries, however, can be furthered by increased inter-member collaboration within these international bodies and also by consultations within NATO itself.

The latter tendency has grown recently, especially with regard to problems of direct concern to the Alliance, for instance those with political implications or which affect the economic well being of the whole Atlantic Community. In its Report the Committee of Three recommended that this practice be developed and that the necessary steps be taken for a regular exchange of information and consultations on many topics. The Committee also recommended that the procedure proposed for the settlement of political differences be

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* The chief international bodies concerned with economic co-operation are the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), which includes as members or associates all the NATO countries as well as Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland; the Organization for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Financial Corporation (IFC), and various other United Nations institutions including the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).
used under certain circumstances to further settlement of important economic disputes between the member countries.

The North Atlantic Council, meeting at the level of Heads of Government in December, 1957, decided that, without duplicating the work of other agencies, it should from time to time, and in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, review economic trends and assess economic progress, with a view of making suggestions for improvements either through existing organizations or by the efforts of individual countries, or in special cases by new initiatives. To assist the Council, there is a Committee of Economic Advisers composed of members of national delegations to NATO. Like the Committee of Political Advisers, this Economic Committee meets regularly and constitutes a useful forum for exchange of views leading to a common assessment of problems affecting the Alliance.

**SCIENTIFIC CO-OPERATION**

It is increasingly evident that progress in the field of scientific and technical co-operation can be decisive in determining the security of nations. This progress is also vital if the Western world is to play an appropriate role in relation to economically under-developed areas. There is in particular an urgent need to improve the quality and to increase the supply of scientists, engineers and technicians. While recruitment, training and utilization of scientific and technical personnel are primarily national responsibilities, the North Atlantic Council has felt that consultation and co-operation within NATO could stimulate the member countries to adopt more positive policies in this field and, in some cases, could help guide them in the most constructive directions. In December, 1957, the Council, meeting at Heads of Government level, decided to establish a Science Committee on which all NATO countries are represented by men highly qualified to speak authoritatively on scientific policy. In addition, a scientist of outstanding qualifications was appointed as Science Adviser to the Secretary General and Chairman of the Science Committee. The Science Committee has studied means for strengthening science in NATO nations and is formulating programmes aimed at supporting national efforts in the fields of pure and applied science as well as of defence research. Means for increasing the effectiveness and the number of co-operative research projects among the NATO nations are being examined. A NATO scientific
exchange fellowship programme had been established as well as a NATO fund to support advanced study institutes in science.

INFORMATION AND CULTURAL RELATIONS

It is clear that if the peoples of the member countries are to support NATO they must be aware of its activities and achievements. The primary responsibility for enlightening public opinion rests with the individual member governments. It is the duty of the International Secretariat to help them, and since 1952 the Organization in Paris and the governments concerned have striven unceasingly to inform the public of the purpose and the aspirations of the Alliance.

All the usual media are employed: press, cinema, radio, television, publications, etc. NATO mobile exhibits have also toured a number of member countries. More than 12 million people have visited them and have carried home leaflets and pamphlets describing in simple language the aims and the achievements of the Alliance.

Another important information activity is the organization of group visits, information tours and conferences. Groups of visitors representing many sectors of public opinion are coming in increasing numbers to visit the Headquarters of NATO, SHAPE, and other NATO Commands. During the past year over 9,000 people have been briefed at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris. Since 1953, more than 500 newspaper men and other personalities in a position to influence public opinion have taken part in information tours to NATO countries, sponsored and largely financed by NATO. Several hundred officers and NCO's from the armed forces of member countries have attended courses lasting about a week each, to familiarize them with the Alliance. In addition, conferences of youth leaders are organized at the Palais de Chaillot or in member countries, in order to promote closer relations between NATO and youth organizations. During 1958, a Conference for Trade Union Leaders from different member countries was held. This Conference, in addition to the smaller national groups of trade unionists which visited the Palais de Chaillot, helped to establish closer relations between NATO and the trade union movement.

In July, 1955, a first Conference of Members of Parliament from all NATO countries was held in the Palais de Chaillot under the chairmanship of Senator Robertson of Canada. Some 200 Members
of Parliament attended this conference. They agreed that the speakers of the Parliaments concerned should be invited to send delegates to similar Assemblies each year. Since 1955, the Conference is an annual event and is continually widening the range of its interests.

Voluntary organizations in support of NATO have been founded in fourteen member countries.* In February, 1955, an international organization known as the Atlantic Treaty Association was set up to co-ordinate the activities of these national organizations.

NATO also gives encouragement to a large number of individual projects undertaken by the member countries with a view to the development of cultural exchanges between the European countries and their North American allies. It has established a Fellowship Programme to encourage people to study in NATO countries problems of concern to the Alliance. In January, 1957, the Council approved a Visiting Professorship Programme which enables a certain number of university professors to teach for one term at the Organization's expense at universities in NATO countries other than their own. The Council has also taken steps to encourage seminars on subjects of interest to NATO.

* See Page 93.
Prospects for the future

From the preceding chapters emerge the positive results achieved since the Treaty was signed nine years ago. They may be summed up as follows:

- The Alliance has fulfilled its primary objective: the preservation of peace and security.
- Soviet expansion westward, which was proceeding at an alarming rate during the years following the Second World War, has been halted. Not one square inch of territory in Europe has fallen under Soviet domination since the signature of the Treaty.
- The Treaty has been instrumental in setting up a unified defence system, which has thus far provided effective protection to the members of the Alliance.
- Despite the burden imposed by their military obligations, the countries of the Alliance have increased their economic prosperity and raised their standard of living. This would not have been possible had it not been for the wide application of the principle of mutual aid advocated in Article 3 of the Treaty.
- The member countries have developed a system of remarkably close and effective political co-operation in connection with problems arising out of their relations with the Soviet bloc.
- They have laid the foundations of increased co-operation in the economic, scientific and technical fields.

In the years to come, the Alliance must consolidate and expand its achievements in these various fields; today there exists already a common Western policy based on two fundamental concepts: the need to maintain the defensive strength of the Alliance, and the unremitting search for acceptable solutions to international problems.

In the absence of agreement on general, controlled disarmament, the NATO countries must maintain and strengthen their common defences. The decisions reached in the military field by the Heads of Government in December, 1957, took account of an elementary fact: the countries of the Alliance cannot afford to place their forces at a disadvantage in respect to a possible enemy by equipping them with less powerful weapons. It would be criminal to limit the
capacity to resist of the NATO countries by bringing only obsolete weapons to bear against the ultra-modern equipment of a power which has frequently announced its intention of utilizing its atomic arsenal in case of war.

The decisions taken at Bonn in May, 1957, and further defined in Paris in December, 1957, concerning the equipment of NATO's forces with nuclear weapons have sometimes been criticized by people who believe in good faith that they might have dangerous consequences. It is in this connection relevant to note that there are three categories of nuclear weapons:

(1) Those which are strictly defensive, such as rockets with nuclear warheads designed to protect towns - and their inhabitants - against air attack. All the experts are agreed that rockets fitted with atomic warheads are the only defence against large-scale air raids. It is unthinkable that the countries of the Alliance would refrain from defending their towns and peoples to the best of their ability, on the grounds that this defence would be too costly or too dangerous.

(2) Tactical nuclear weapons, which are really an improved form of artillery. As long as the Soviets proclaim that their own artillery is equipped with atomic weapons, the forces of the Alliance cannot rely merely upon obsolete weapons dating from the pre-atomic era.

(3) Intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles which, according to the oft-repeated statements of its leaders, the USSR would use in the event of war. The countries which may have to defend themselves against such attacks must be similarly equipped in order to be able to destroy the bases from which ballistic missiles would be launched.

During their meeting of December, 1957, the Heads of Government stressed the fact that, while the NATO countries must possess the most effective means of defence in line with recent technical developments, the deployment of nuclear stocks and arrangements for their use will be decided in agreement with the states directly concerned. It has, moreover, been stated by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe that there is no question of setting up launching ramps for ballistic missiles in all NATO countries; they will be placed only at certain sites, with the agreement of the governments concerned.

While taking these major decisions in the field of defence, the
North Atlantic Council has consistently expressed the determination of all its members to continue to seek agreement with the USSR on the outstanding political issues which divide them from the Communist world. Chief among these is a solution of the German question, linked with European security arrangements, and an agreement on controlled disarmament. The member countries have worked together to establish a common position on these issues and to maintain at all times a unity of view and action. They will continue to do so.

The Alliance must also follow attentively events connected with the Soviet offensive in Africa and Asia, particularly in the Middle East, and, if possible, agree on a common viewpoint or concerted action in this field.

Finally, NATO must contrive so to co-ordinate its common action with the individual positions adopted by its members as to prevent any divergence of opinion which might jeopardize the unity and the interests of the Atlantic Community.

To achieve this, the NATO countries must endeavour to arrive at closer political co-operation*, the constant practice of which – particularly in the field of consultation – is itself a factor of increased understanding and harmony.

This form of co-operation presents a further advantage: it leads governments to bear constantly in mind the scale of importance of current problems, to give weight to those factors which should keep its members united as against those which may divide them, and thus brings the policy of the Western powers into line with its underlying principle: the defence of their liberty and security.

Furthermore, future progress and efficiency depend upon extending the principle of sharing tasks and responsibilities. As was stated in October, 1957, by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on concluding their discussions in Washington: “the concept of national self-sufficiency is now out of date. The countries of the free world are interdependent, and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found”.

In fact only through this division of tasks, taking account of the capabilities and the particular aptitudes of each country, can greater efficiency of action together with maximum economy of resources be achieved. This principle should be applied in all fields: political, economic, military, scientific and technical.

* See page 53.
Finally, NATO must be able to rely on the support of public opinion in each of the member countries. This is an all-important factor of success in a community of free peoples; it is essential to the maintenance both of the defence effort and of political cohesion in the Alliance. NATO must therefore strive unceasingly to improve knowledge of its aims and achievements among the citizens of its member countries, and to explain the efforts they are called upon to make in order that it may accomplish its task. They will thus be more conscious of belonging to a community of nations upon whose existence their security and freedom depend.
APPENDIX 1
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
(24 October, 1945)

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

APPENDIX 2*
Extracts from the Brussels Treaty
(17 March, 1948)

The titular heads of the participating states:

Resolved to reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations; To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage; To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united; To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression; To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression; To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;

Have appointed... their plenipotentiaries... who... have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organize and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the co-ordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Consultative Council referred to in Article VII as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organizations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organizations.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialized agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher

* The Brussels Treaty has been modified by the 'Paris Agreements' (Protocol revising and completing the Brussels Treaty).
standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations of immediate practical interest, relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialized agencies.

They will endeavour to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

ARTICLE III
The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples toward a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilization and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

ARTICLE IV
If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

ARTICLE V
All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI
The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any of the other High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE VII
For the purpose of consulting together on all the questions dealt with in the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will create a Consultative Council, which shall be so organized as to be able to exercise its functions continuously. The Council shall meet at such times as it shall deem fit.

At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties, the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit the High Contracting Parties to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise; with regard to the attitude to be adopted and the steps to be taken in case of a renewal by Germany of an aggressive policy; or with regard to any situation constituting a danger to economic stability.

ARTICLE VIII
In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provision:

The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force,
settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice by referring them to the Court...

**ARTICLE IX**

The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited...

**ARTICLE X**

The present Treaty... shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years...

Done at Brussels, this seventeenth day of March, 1948...

**APPENDIX 3**

Analysis of the terms of the Paris Agreements

The Paris Agreements comprise:

1. **Documents signed by two Parties** (France and the Federal Republic of Germany). Subject: Franco-German disputes (the resolution of cultural, economic and other difficulties) and the Saar.

2. **Documents signed by four Parties**: France, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany relating to German sovereignty:
   a. Protocol on the termination of the Occupation régime in the Federal Republic;
   b. Amendments to the Convention on Relations between the Occupying Powers and the Federal Republic (Revocation of the Occupation Statute, Retention of Rights, stationing of allied forces, state of emergency, hypothesis of reunification);
   c. Amendments to the Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces in Germany;
   d. Amendments to the Finance Convention;
   e. Amendments to the Convention on the Settlement of Matters arising out of the War and the Occupation;

(The Conventions cited at a, b, c, d and e above are those signed in Bonn on 26 May, 1952, and designed to end the Occupation régime).

3. **Documents signed by five Parties**: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and the United Kingdom. Subject: Declaration inviting the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty.

4. **Documents signed by seven Parties**: Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. Subject:
   a. Protocol revising and completing the Brussels Treaty;
   b. Protocol on the forces of Western European Union;
   c. Protocol on the control of armaments;
   d. Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments;
   e. Exchange of letters relating to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice;
   f. Resolution on the Production and Standardization of Armaments.

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5. Documents signed by the 14 North Atlantic Treaty countries:
   b. Resolution by the North Atlantic Council to implement Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference (authority of saeum);
   c. Resolution of Association taking note of the obligations accepted by the Federal Republic on the signature of the London Agreements and of the declaration relating to such obligations.

APPENDIX 4

Summary of the Report of the Committee of Three on non-military co-operation in NATO

At its Ministerial session on 4-5 May, 1956, the North Atlantic Council set up a committee of three Foreign Ministers – Mr. Halvard Lange, M. Gaetano Martino and Mr. Lester B. Pearson – ‘to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community.’


In their General Introduction the three Ministers declare that recent events had increased international tension and reduced the hopes raised since Stalin’s death of finding a secure and honourable basis for co-existence with the Communist Powers. Inter-Allied relations had also suffered considerable strains. Unless the NATO countries could achieve common policies by full and timely consultation on issues of common concern the very framework of Atlantic co-operation would be endangered.

The foundation of NATO was the political obligation which member governments had taken for collective defence. The best present deterrent against military aggression lay in the entire acceptance by all the NATO governments of this political commitment. Changes in national policy or strategy which affected the coalition should be made only after collective consideration.

The need for military co-operation was as great as ever, but it had become increasingly realized, since the Treaty was signed, that security today was far more than a military matter and that the civil and military aspects of security could not be considered in watertight compartments. North Atlantic political and economic co-operation, however, could be strengthened only if member governments, especially the more powerful ones, were willing to work to a much greater extent than hitherto with and through NATO for more than purposes of collective military defence.

The basic factor underlying the coming together of the Atlantic nations for good and constructive purposes was that the nation state relying exclusively on national policy and power was inadequate for either progress or survival in the nuclear age. The NATO countries must be brought to realize that the transformation of the Atlantic Community into a vital and progressive political reality was no less important than any purely national purpose.

The Committee prefaced its recommendations on Political Co-operation by stating that governments should discuss problems in the North Atlantic Council in the early stages of policy formation and before national positions became fixed. In order to harmonize policies governments should, whenever possible, make NATO consultations an integral part of the formation of national policies. There could not be unity in defence and disunity in foreign policy.
In this connection the Ministers recommended:

a) that in order to strengthen the process of political consultation Foreign Ministers should each year make an appraisal of the political progress of the Alliance: the basis of this annual political appraisal is to be a report submitted by the Secretary General;

b) that a Committee of Political Advisers from each delegation, aided when necessary by specialists, be set up to assist the Permanent Representatives and the Secretary General in discharging their responsibilities for political consultation;

c) that to assist the peaceful settlement of inter-member disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly, members should submit them to good offices procedures within NATO before resorting to any other international agency, except in the case of legal or economic disputes for which specialized organizations exist; and that the Secretary General should be empowered, in certain eventualities, to offer his services to attempt to reach settlement of such issues.

These procedures are in harmony with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter and Article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

The Committee recognized the importance of parliamentary support for NATO and recommended that representatives of the member governments and senior members of the NATO civilian and military agencies should attend the conference of parliamentarians from member countries to inform it of the state of the Alliance and the problems confronting it.

With regard to economic co-operation the Committee declared that economic, like political co-operation is and must remain wider than NATO. While NATO should avoid duplicating the operating functions of other international organizations designed for various forms of economic co-operation, NATO consultation should take place whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance were involved; particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole.

The Committee furthermore recommended that the procedures suggested for the peaceful settlement of political disputes should also be available for any major economic dispute appropriate for NATO consideration.

In view of the variety of economic subjects which have to be examined by NATO the Committee proposed the creation under the Council of a Committee of Economic Advisers, to include officials from member governments, and, when fitting, specialists from capitals.

The Three Ministers also made recommendations about scientific and technical co-operation, and recommended that a conference be convened of one or two outstanding authorities from each country to study problems concerning the recruitment, training and utilisation of scientists, engineers and technicians, and to propose specific measures for future international co-operation in this field.

The Committee set out the general principles which should guide member governments in their Cultural Co-operation and made various practical suggestions to facilitate co-operation between the NATO International Staff and national Information Services in the Information field and for increased information activity on behalf of the Alliance.

NATO can carry out the non-military tasks required of it without structure changes, the Ministers said in the final chapter of their Report on Organization and Functions. In this connection they recommended inter alia that:

a) more time should be allowed for Ministerial Meetings of the Council;

b) Foreign Ministers’ meetings should be held whenever required and occasionally elsewhere than Paris;

c) the link between the Council and member governments should be strengthened. Occasionally, special government officials or permanent heads of foreign ministries should attend Council meetings;
d) the role of the Secretary General and the International Staff should be enhanced; the Secretary General should preside over Ministerial Meetings of the Council as well as over those of the Permanent Representatives, and he should be responsible for promoting and directing the process of consultation between the NATO members in the spheres covered by the Committee's report.

Council Resolutions

I. RESOLUTION ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

WHEREAS the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, under Article 1 of that Treaty, have undertaken "to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered";

WHEREAS the parties have further undertaken to seek to eliminate conflicts in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them;

WHEREAS NATO unity and strength in the pursuit of these objectives remain essential for continuous co-operation in military and non-military fields;

THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:

REAFFIRMS the obligations of all its members, under Article 1 of the Treaty, to settle by peaceful means any dispute between themselves;

DECIDES that such disputes which have not proved capable of settlement directly shall be submitted to good offices procedures within the NATO framework before member governments resort to any other international agency except for disputes of a legal character appropriate for submission to a judicial tribunal and those disputes of an economic character for which attempts at settlement might best be made initially in the appropriate specialized economic organizations;

RECOGNIZES the right and duty of member governments and of the Secretary General to bring to its attention matters which in their opinion may threaten the solidarity or effectiveness of the Alliance;

EMPowers the Secretary General to offer his good offices informally at any time to member governments involved in a dispute and with their consent to initiate or facilitate procedures of enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration;

AUTHORIZES the Secretary General where he deems it appropriate for the purpose outlined in the preceding paragraph to use the assistance of not more than three permanent representatives chosen by him in each instance.


II. RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF THREE ON NON-MILITARY CO-OPERATION IN NATO

WHEREAS the North Atlantic Council at its meeting in Paris on 5th May established a Committee composed of the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Canada and Norway to advise the Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community;

WHEREAS the Committee of Three has now reported on the task assigned to it and has submitted to the Council a number of recommendations on such ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields;
THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL:
TAKES NOTE of the Report of the Committee of Three and
APPROVES its recommendations; and
INVITES the Council in Permanent Session to implement in the light of the comments made by governments the principles and recommendations contained in the Report; and
INVITES the Secretary General to draw up for consideration by the Council such further specific proposals as may be required for the implementation of these recommendations and to report periodically on the compliance with these recommendations by governments.
AUTHORIZES the Committee of Three to publish their report.

APPENDIX 5

Text of the Declaration and Communiqué of the December, 1957, Ministerial Meeting (Heads of Government)

I. DECLARATION

We, the representatives of fifteen nations of the North Atlantic Alliance, believing in the sanctity of those human rights which are guaranteed to all men of free nations by their constitutions, laws and customs, re-dedicate ourselves and our nations to the principles and purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty. This Treaty has been in effect for nearly nine years. It was founded to protect the right of our peoples to live in peace and freedom under governments of their own choice. It has succeeded in protecting this right. Building on our experience and confident in the success already obtained, we have agreed together upon means to give added strength to our Alliance.

At the end of the Second World War, the armies of the West were largely disbanded. The Soviet Union did not demobilise. Its expansionist policy impelled us to establish our Treaty and to build up our armed forces.

We are an organization of free countries. We have learned to live and work together in the firm conviction that our fundamental unity and our combined strength are indispensable to our own security and to the peace of the world.

The meaning of our Alliance is clear. We have given a solemn guarantee, each to the other, to regard an attack upon one as an attack upon all, to be resisted with all the forces at our command. Faithful to the Charter of the United Nations we reaffirm that our Alliance will never be used for aggressive purposes. We are always ready to settle international problems by negotiation, taking into account the legitimate interests of all. We seek an end to world tension, and intend to promote peace, economic prosperity and social progress throughout the world.

We continue firmly to stand for comprehensive and controlled disarmament, which we believe can be reached by stages. In spite of disappointments, we remain ready to discuss any reasonable proposal to reach this goal and to lay a solid foundation for a durable peace. This is the only way to dispel the anxieties arising from the armaments race.

The free world faces the mounting challenge of international Communism backed by Soviet power. Only last month in Moscow the Communist rulers again gave clear warning of their determination to press on to domination over the entire world, if possible by subversion, if necessary by violence. Within the North Atlantic Treaty there is no place for the concept of world domination. Firmly believing in peaceful change through democratic means, cherishing the character of our peoples and vigilant to safeguard their freedom, we will never yield to such a threat.

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For the entire world it is both a tragedy and a great danger that the peoples under international Communist rule— their national independence, human liberties and their standard of living as well as their scientific and technological achievements— have been sacrificed to the purposes of world domination and military power. The suppression of their liberty will not last for ever. Already in these countries there is evidence of the growing desire for intellectual and economic freedom. If the free nations are steadfast, the totalitarian menace that now confronts them will eventually recede.

Established to defend the peace, our Alliance will also enable us to reach our objectives of economic and social progress. For this purpose we have agreed to co-operate closely to enable us to carry the necessary burden of defence without sacrificing the individual liberties or the welfare of our peoples. We shall reach this goal only by recognising our interdependence and by combining our efforts and skills in order to make better use of our resources. Such efforts will now be applied particularly to the peaceful use of atomic energy and to the development and better organization of scientific co-operation.

To the many nations which have gained their independence since the end of the Second World War and to all other peoples, who like ourselves are dedicated to freedom in peace, we offer our co-operation on a basis of complete equality and in spirit of fraternity.

Conscious of our intellectual and material resources, convinced of the value of our principles and of our way of life, without provocation but equally without fear, we have taken decisions to promote greater unity, greater strength and greater security not only for our own nations but also, we believe, for the world at large.

II. COMMUNIQUE

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

1. The aim of the Soviet bloc is to weaken and disrupt the free world. Its instruments are military, political and economic and its activities are world wide. To meet this challenge the free world must organize its resources—moral, military, political and economic—and be ready to deploy them wherever the situation demands. Our Alliance cannot therefore be concerned only with the North Atlantic area or only with military defence. It must also organize its political and economic strength on the principle of interdependence, and must take account of developments outside its own area.

2. In the course of our meeting we have therefore reviewed the international situation and, in particular, the dangers to world peace arising from Soviet actions and threats. In spite of the dangers of the situation which are obvious to all, the Soviet Union has made no real contribution to the solution of major problems causing international tension. We have especially in mind the problems of the reunification of Germany in freedom, and the continuing anomaly of the isolation of Berlin—the capital of Germany. We renew and reaffirm our declaration of 23rd October, 1954 which had in view the establishment on a firm basis of the security and freedom of Berlin. The perpetuation of injustice to the German people undermines international confidence and endangers peace. At the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government in July, 1955, the Soviet leaders took a solemn commitment that "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security". We call upon the Soviet Government to honour this pledge.

3. We have reviewed the situation in the Middle East. In line with the peaceful aims of our Alliance, we confirm the support of our Governments for the independence and sovereignty of the states in this region, and our interest in the economic well-being of their peoples. We believe that the stability of this important area is vital to world peace.
4. We express our interest in the maintenance of peace and the development of conditions of stability and economic and political well-being in the vitally important continent of Africa. We hope that the countries and peoples of that continent who are disposed to do so will co-operate within the free world in efforts to promote these purposes. We affirm the readiness of our countries to co-operate for our part with the countries and peoples of Africa to further these ends. Historic, economic and other friendly ties between certain European countries and Africa would make such co-operation particularly desirable and effective.

5. In the course of our review of the international situation we have given consideration to recent serious events in Indonesia. We view them with concern.

THE WORKING OF THE ALLIANCE

6. The strength of our Alliance, freely concluded between independent nations, lies in our fundamental unity in the face of the danger which threatens us. Thanks to this fundamental unity, we can overcome our difficulties and bring into harmony our individual points of view. In contrast, as events in Hungary have shown, the Soviet bloc is held together only by political and military coercion.

7. Although progress has been made, further improvement is needed in our political consultation. We are resolved to bring this about. Our Permanent Representatives will be kept fully informed of all government policies which materially affect the Alliance and its members. In this way, we shall be able to draw fully on each other's political experience and to ensure a broad co-ordination of our policies in the interest, not only of the Alliance, but of the free world as a whole.

In addition, to strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance, the Permanent Council and the Secretary General should ensure effective consultation, including, where necessary, procedures of conciliation at an early stage.

DISARMAMENT

8. We recall that in the course of this year, the Western countries taking part in the London Disarmament talks put forward to the Soviet Union, with the unanimous agreement of NATO, a series of concrete proposals providing, subject to effective controls:

- for reduction of all armaments and military forces;
- for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- for the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons;
- for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests;
- for measures to guard against the risk of surprise attack.

9. We note with regret that these various proposals, which would halt the armaments race and add to world security if they were accepted, were rejected en bloc by the Soviet Union, although they had been approved by 56 members of the United Nations.

10. We regret that the Soviet Union has brought about a deadlock in the disarmament negotiations by declaring their intention to boycott the United Nations Disarmament Commission which had been extended, by a strong majority of the General Assembly, to include 25 nations.

11. We denounce Soviet tactics of alternating between peace propaganda statements and attempted intimidation by the threat of nuclear attack.

12. We deplore, also, that the leaders of the USSR do not allow the Soviet populations to be impartially informed and enlightened by the services of the United Nations at the same time as the populations of other member countries, as to the danger of destruction to which all peoples would be exposed in the event of general war. A resolution to this effect was adopted in November, 1957,
by the General Assembly of the United Nations by 71 nations against 9 nations of the Soviet bloc.

13. We emphasise that, in order to be effective, any disarmament agreement implies adequate international control, that the acceptance of such control is the test of a true desire for peace and that the Soviet Union refuses to put this principle into practice.

14. We have decided to establish a Technical Group to advise on problems of arms control arising out of new technical developments.

15. In spite of the successive setbacks given by the Soviet Union to the cause of controlled disarmament and of peace, the NATO Council will neglect no possibility of restricting armaments within the limits imposed by security and will take all necessary action to this end.

16. We state our willingness to promote, preferably within the framework of the United Nations, any negotiations with the USSR likely to lead to the implementation of the proposals recalled above.

17. Should the Soviet government refuse to participate in the work of the new Disarmament Commission, we would welcome a meeting at Foreign Ministers' level to resolve the deadlock.

NATO DEFENCE

18. The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made it clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the USSR should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age.

19. As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defences. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

20. To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the Council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

21. The deployment of these stocks and missiles and arrangements for their use will accordingly be decided in conformity with NATO defence plans and in agreement with the states directly concerned. The NATO military authorities have been requested to submit to the Council at an early date their recommendations on the introduction of these weapons in the common defence. The Council in permanent session will consider the various questions involved.

22. Recognising the rapidly growing interdependence of the nations of the free world, we have, in organizing our forces, decided to bring about closer co-ordination with a view to ensuring that each NATO member country makes its most effective contribution to the requirements established by the Alliance. Better use of the resources of the Alliance and greater efficiency for its forces will be obtained through as high a degree of standardization and integration as possible in all fields, particularly in certain aspects of air and naval defence, of logistic support and of the composition and equipment of forces. We have agreed that a military conference should be held at Ministerial level in the early months of 1958 to discuss progress made in these fields in the light, in particular, of the results of the 1957 Annual Review.

23. As regards defence production, we have decided, in view of the progress
already made, to take further measures within NATO to promote the co-ordination of research, development and manufacture of modern weapons including intermediate range ballistic missiles.

24. The best means of achieving co-ordinated production of advanced weapons needed by our forces will be studied as a matter of urgency. Those NATO countries whose programmes have already reached a very advanced stage have offered to share with their allies significant production techniques and results of their research work in order to stimulate a truly productive effort in the defence production field.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CO-OPERATION

25. We recognise that in most of our countries more should be done to increase the supply of trained men in many branches of science and technology. The full development of our science and technology is essential to the culture, to the economy and to the political and military strength of the Atlantic Community.

26. We realise that progress will depend on vigorous action within individual states and in particular on the devoted contribution of teachers and scientists. We must increase the provision for the training of young people in scientific and technical subjects and must also ensure that the free pursuit of fundamental research continues to flourish. Each of our governments will therefore reappoint the support being given to scientific and technical education and to fundamental research.

27. We seek to increase the effectiveness of national efforts through the pooling of scientific facilities and information and the sharing of tasks. We must build on the established tradition of the universality of true science. Our governments will support the international organizations doing work in this field.

28. We have decided to establish forthwith a Science Committee on which all of the NATO countries will be represented by men highly qualified to speak authoritatively on scientific policy. In addition, a scientist of outstanding qualifications will be appointed as Science Adviser to the Secretary General of NATO.

29. The Science Committee will be responsible in particular for making specific recommendations to the Council for action on a proposal by the French Government for a Western Foundation for Scientific Research and on the many other valuable proposals which have been put forward by the NATO Task Force on Scientific and Technical Co-operation and by the NATO Parliamentarians Conference.

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

30. We are united in our common purpose to promote the economic and social development of our peoples and to assist the peoples of other countries to achieve the same objective. We consider that the purpose of government in a free society is to enlarge the opportunity of the individual rather than to subordinate him to the state.

31. We will co-operate among ourselves and with other free governments to further the achievement of economic stability, a steady rate of economic growth, and the expansion of international trade through the further reduction of exchange and trade barriers.

32. We reaffirm the desirability of a closer economic association between the countries of Western Europe, which we deem to be in the interest of all countries, and we will accordingly lend encouragement to the successful development of the European Economic Community and of a European Free Trade Area in which full account would be taken of the interests of the less developed member countries. We attach particular importance to these initiatives being worked out in such a way as to strengthen not only the participating countries but also the
relations within the Atlantic Community and the free world as a whole. We recognise the interdependence of the economics of the members of NATO and of the other countries of the free world.

33. We affirm the interest of our governments in an enlargement of the resources, both public and private, available for the purpose of accelerating the economic advancement of the less developed areas of the free world.

34. We have decided that the North Atlantic Council, without duplicating the work of other agencies, shall from time to time, and in the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty, review economic trends and assess economic progress, and may make suggestions for improvements either through existing organizations or by the efforts of individual countries, or in special cases by new initiatives.

* * *

35. Under present circumstances, our defensive Alliance takes on a new significance. Only an intensified collective effort can safeguard our peoples and their liberties. We have, together, ample capacity in freedom to defend freedom.

36. We have taken a series of decisions which will promote greater strength and greater security not only for our own nations but also for the world at large.

APPENDIX 6

Chairmen of the North Atlantic Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949-50</td>
<td>Mr. Dean G. Acheson</td>
<td>(United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-51</td>
<td>M. Paul van Zeeland</td>
<td>(Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-52</td>
<td>Mr. Lester B. Pearson</td>
<td>(Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-53</td>
<td>Mr. Ole Bjørn Kraft</td>
<td>(Denmark)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-54</td>
<td>M. Georges Bidault</td>
<td>(France)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Pierre Mendès-France</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>M. Stephanos Stephanopoulos</td>
<td>(Greece)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>Mr. Kristinn Gudmundsson</td>
<td>(Iceland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>M. Gaetano Martino</td>
<td>(Italy)</td>
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Presidents of the North Atlantic Council*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>M. Gaetano Martino</td>
<td>(Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Giuseppe Pella</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>M. Joseph Bech</td>
<td>(Luxembourg)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>Mr. Joseph M. A. H. Luns</td>
<td>(Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX 7

List of Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council and of NATO senior civil and military officials

North Atlantic Council
Chairman: M. Paul-Henri Spaak

Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>M. André de Staercke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>M. Jules Léger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>M. Mathias Aagaard Wassard</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In accordance with the recommendations of the Committee of Three, it was decided that each year a Foreign Minister of one of the member countries would become President of the North Atlantic Council, and that the Secretary General would be Chairman at all working sessions of the Council.
France  M. Pierre de Leusse
Federal Republic of Germany  Mr. Herbert Blankenhorn
Greece  M. Michel Melas
Iceland  Mr. Hans G. Andersen
Italy  M. Umberto Grazzi
Luxembourg  M. Paul Reuter
Netherlands  Mr. Dirk U. Stikker
Norway  Mr. Jens M. Boyesen
Portugal  M. Antonio de Faria
Turkey  M. Selim Sarper
United Kingdom  Sir Frank Roberts
United States  Mr. W. Randolph Burgess

Military Committee:
Chairman (1959): General José Antonio da Rocha Beleza Ferraz (Portugal)
Chairman of the Military Committee in Permanent Session: General Benjamin
R. P. F. Hasselman (Netherlands)

Members and Permanent Representatives:
Belgium  Lieutenant General Baron Jacques de Dixmude
Permanent Representative  Major General Antoine del Marmol
Canada  General Charles Foulkes
Permanent Representative  Air Vice-Marshal M. M. Hendrick
Denmark  Admiral E. J. C. Qvistgaard
Permanent Representative  Major General Erik Rasmussen
France  General Paul Ely
Permanent Representative  Air Chief Marshal Max Geleé
Federal Republic of Germany  General Adolf Heusinger
Permanent Representative  Brigadier General Hans-Georg von Tempelhoff
Greece  Lieutenant General Constantine Dovas
Permanent Representative  Major General Spyros Diamantopoulos
Italy  General Giuseppe Mancinelli
Permanent Representative  Lieutenant General Umberto de Martin
Luxembourg*  Colonel Guillaume Albrecht
Permanent Representative  Lieutenant General H. Schaper
Netherlands  Rear Admiral Guillaume Albrecht
Permanent Representative  Vice Admiral P. J. E. Jacobsen
Norway  Rear Admiral Skule V. Storheill
Permanent Representative  General C. Sanchez de Castro da Costa Macedo
Portugal  Brigadier General Julio M. Pereira
Turkey  General Rusta Erdelhun
Permanent Representative  Admiral Aziz Ulusan
United Kingdom  Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir William Dickson
Permanent Representative  Admiral Sir Michael M. Denny
United States  General Nathan F. Twining
Permanent Representative  Admiral Walter F. Boone

Standing Group:
France  Air Chief Marshal Max Geleé
United Kingdom  Admiral Sir Michael M. Denny
United States  Admiral Walter F. Boone
Director  Brigadier General Joseph R. Loiret (France)

* Luxembourg is represented on the Military Committee in Permanent Session by the Belgian Representative.
Standing Group Representative:
Major General T. W. Parker (USA)

Allied Command Europe:
Supreme Allied Commander Europe: General Lauris Norstad (USA)
Deputy Supreme Commander: General Sir Richard Gale (UK)
Naval Deputy: Admiral Pierre Barjot (France)
Air Deputy: General Leon W. Johnson (USA)

Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe:
   Lieutenant General Sir Horatius Murray (UK)
   (a) Commander Allied Naval Forces Northern Europe:
       Vice-Admiral A. R. Pedder (UK)
   (b) Commander Allied Air Forces Northern Europe:
       Major General Norman D. Sillin (USA)
   (c) Commander Allied Land Forces Denmark:
       Lieutenant General C. V. Hjalf (Denmark)
   (d) Commander Allied Land Forces Norway:
       Major General O. Dahl (Norway)

Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe:
   General Jean E. Valluy (France)
   (a) Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe:
       General Hans Speidel (Fed. Rep. of Germany)
   (b) Commander Allied Naval Forces Central Europe:
       Vice Admiral Henrik Bos (Netherlands)
   (c) Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe:
       Air Chief Marshal Sir George H. Mills (UK)
   (d) Commander Second Allied Tactical Air Force:
       Air Marshal J. H. Edwardes-Jones (UK)
   (e) Commander Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force:
       General Frank Everest (USA)
   (f) Commander Northern Army Group:
       Lieutenant General Sir Dudley Ward (UK)
   (g) Commander Central Army Group:
       General Henry I. Hodes (USA)

Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe:
   Admiral Charles R. Brown (USA)
   (a) Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe:
       Lieutenant General Aldo Rossi (Italy)
   (b) Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe:
       Lieutenant General Richard C. Lindsay (USA)
   (c) Commander Allied Land Forces South Eastern Europe:
       Major General Paul D. Harkins (USA)
   (d) Commander Naval Striking & Support Forces Southern Europe:
       Admiral Charles R. Brown (USA)
   (e) Commander Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force:
       Major General Luigi Bianchi (Italy)
   (f) Commander Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force:
       Major General Brooke E. Allen (USA)

[82]
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Mediterranean:
Admiral Sir Alexander Bingley (UK)
(a) Commander Gibraltar-Mediterranean:
Rear Admiral R. S. Foster-Brown (UK)
(b) Commander Western Mediterranean:
Vice Admiral P. M. J. R. Auboyneau (France)
(c) Commander Central Mediterranean:
Vice Admiral Francesco Ruta (Italy)
(d) Commander Eastern Mediterranean:
Vice Admiral C. Tsatsos (Greece)
(e) Commander South East Mediterranean:
Rear Admiral Sir Charles Madden (UK)
(f) Commander North East Mediterranean:
Admiral S. Altincan (Turkey)
(g) Commander Submarine Forces Mediterranean:
Captain T. E. Barlow (UK)

Allied Command Atlantic:
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic:
Admiral Jerauld Wright (USA)
Deputy Supreme Commander: Vice Admiral W. J. W. Woods (UK)
Commander-in-Chief Western Atlantic Area:
Admiral Jerauld Wright (USA)
(a) Commander United States Atlantic Sub-Area:
Vice Admiral William C. Cooper (USA)
(b) Commander Canadian Atlantic Sub-Area:
Rear Admiral H. F. Pullen (Canada)
(c) Commander Ocean Sub-Area:
Vice Admiral William C. Cooper (USA)

Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area:
Admiral Sir William Davis (UK)
Air Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area:
Air Marshal Sir Bryan V. Reynolds (UK)
(a) Commander Northern Sub-Area:
Vice Admiral Sir John Cuthbert (UK)
(b) Air Commander Northern Sub-Area:
Air Vice Marshal P. D. Cracroft (UK)
(c) Commander Central Sub-Area:
Admiral Sir Mark Pizey (UK)
(d) Air Commander Central Sub-Area:
Air Vice Marshal G. I. L. Saye (UK)
(e) Commander Bay of Biscay Sub-Area:
Vice Admiral F. P. Jourdain (France)
(f) Commander Submarine Force Eastern Atlantic Area:
Rear Admiral B. W. Taylor (UK)

Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic:
Vice Admiral Robert B. Pirie (USA)

Channel Committee:
Belgium
Permanent Representative: Commodore L. J. J. Robbins
France
Permanent Representative: Captain H. A. G. Ceulemans
Netherlands
Permanent Representative: Admiral H. L. J. M. Nomy

[83]
Permanent Representative Captain L. E. H. Reeser
United Kingdom Admiral of the Fleet Earl Mountbatten of Burma
Permanent Representative Rear Admiral D. P. Dreyer

Allied Command Channel:
Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel:
Admiral Sir Guy Grantham (UK)
Allied Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief Channel:
Air Marshal Sir Bryan V. Reynolds (UK)
(a) Commander Nore Sub-Area Channel:
Vice-Admiral Sir Robin Durnford-Slater (UK)
(b) Maritime Air Commander Nore Sub-Area Channel:
Air Commodore K. V. Garside (UK)
(c) Commander Plymouth Sub-Area Channel:
Vice Admiral Sir Richard Onslow (UK)
(d) Maritime Air Commander Plymouth Sub-Area Channel:
Air Vice Marshal G. I. L. Saye (UK)
(e) Commander Benelux Area Channel:
Vice Admiral G. B. Fortuyn (Netherlands)
(f) Commander Cherbourg Sub-Area Channel:
Vice Admiral Y. M. R. Le Hagre (France)
(g) Commander Brest Sub-Area Channel:
Vice Admiral F. P. Jourdain (France)

International Staff/Secretariat:
Secretary General: M. Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium)
Deputy Secretary General: M. Alberico A. Casardi (Italy)
[Directeur de Cabinet: M. André Saint-Mieux (France)]
Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance, with the rank of
Deputy Secretary General: M. François-Didier Gregh (France)
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs:
Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh (UK)
Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics:
Mr. Ernest Meili (USA)
Science Adviser to the Secretary General: Dr. Norman F. Ramsey (USA)
Executive Secretary: Lord Coleridge (UK)
Senior Civil Defence Adviser: Sir John Hodson (UK)
Head of the Personnel and Administration Service:
Commander Wopke Johan de Vries (Netherlands)
Financial Controller: M. Jean Bastin (Belgium)
* * *
Director of Information: Mr. Joseph B. Phillips (USA)
Chief Press Officer: Mr. Edward E. Key (UK)

APPENDIX 8

Abbreviations

ACE Allied Command Europe
ACCHAN Allied Command Channel
ACLANT Allied Command Atlantic
AFCENT Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFSOUTH Allied Forces Southern Europe
AFMED Allied Forces Mediterranean
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<th>AGARD</th>
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<tr>
<td>CHANCOMTEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCAPMED</td>
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<td>CINCEASTLANT</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCENT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCHAN</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Channel &amp; Southern North Sea</td>
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<td>CINCMAIRCHAN</td>
<td>Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief Channel</td>
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<td>CINCMED</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief British Naval Forces in the Mediterranean</td>
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<td>CINCNORTH</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe</td>
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<td>CINCSOUTH</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe</td>
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<td>CINCWESTLANT</td>
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<td>Commander U.S. Atlantic Sub-area</td>
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<td>Canada-United States Regional Planning Group</td>
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<td>European Defence Community</td>
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<td>European Radio Frequency Agency</td>
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<td>Military Agency for Standardization</td>
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<td>Military Committee</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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NATO CIVIL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION
FEBRUARY, 1959

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

PRESENDET: Changez Annually
CHAIRMAN: The Secretary General

MILITARY COMMITTEE
STANDING GROUP
STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE

SECRETARY GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT

COUNCIL COMMITTEES

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC

CHANNEL COMMITTEE
ALLIED COMMAND CHANNEL

CANADA - U.S.
REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP

For certain operational matters
NATO MILITARY ORGANIZATION
FEBRUARY, 1959

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

MILITARY COMMITTEE

STANDING GROUP
Washington U.S.

STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE
Paris

ALIEd COMMAND EUROPE
Paris France

ALIEd COMMAND ATLANTIC
Norfolk U.S.

CHANNEL COMMITTEE
London U.K.

ALIEd COMMAND CHANNEL
Portsmouth/Northwood U.K.

CANADA - U.S. REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP
Washington U.S.

*In Washington D.C., U.S., when in Permanent Session
NATIONAL VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS BELONGING TO THE ATLANTIC TREATY ASSOCIATION

36, CRAVEN STREET, LONDON, W.C. 2

BELGIUM:
The Belgian Atlantic Committee
88 Avenue de la Couronne, Brussels.

CANADA:
The Canadian Atlantic Co-ordinating Committee
230, Bloor Street West, Toronto, S. Ontario.
The Committee is constituted by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the United Nations Association of Canada.

DENMARK:
The Danish Atlantic Association
18 Frederiksholms Kanal, Copenhagen.

FRANCE:
a. The French Committee for the Study of NATO
   Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère,
   54 rue de Varenne, Paris, (Vle).
b. The French Association for the Atlantic Community
   185 rue de la Pompe, Paris, (XVIe).

GERMANY:
The German Atlantic Society
Kaiser Friedrichstrasse 10, Bonn.

GREECE:
The National Council for Public Enlightenment
4 Oudos Alexandrou Soutsou, Athens.

ICELAND:
Western Co-operation
Mr. Sigurdur Magnusson
c/o "Morgenbladid", Reykjavik.

ITALY:
The Italian Atlantic Committee
Piazza Gioacchino Belli 2, Rome.

LUXEMBOURG:
The Luxembourg Atlantic Association
Mr. Arthur Calteux, 25, rue Albert Philippe, Luxembourg.

NETHERLANDS:
The Netherlands Atlantic Committee
Nassau ZuiIensteinstraat 9,
The Hague.

NORWAY:
The Norwegian Atlantic Committee
Box 1552, Vika Postktr., Oslo.

TURKEY:
The Turkish Group of the ATA
Institut des Relations Internationales, Université d'Ankara.

UNITED KINGDOM:
The British Atlantic Committee
36, Craven Street, London, W.C. 2

UNITED STATES:
The American Council on NATO
22 East 67th Street, New York 21, N.Y.