

N A T O ———— O T A N

SERVICE DE PRESSE

PRESS SERVICE

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EMBARGOED SUMMARY - CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY EXPECTED
ABOUT 5:30 P.M. LONDON TIME THURSDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER 1987LORD CARRINGTON WARNS THAT NATO'S SECURITY PROBLEMS
WILL NOT END WITH MISSILE TREATY

LONDON - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Lord Carrington said on Thursday that a Soviet-U.S. intermediate-range missile (INF) treaty "can enhance stability in Europe, but we should not let any euphoria it engenders push us towards some mythical non-nuclear Nirvana."

Lord Carrington told the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House in London that nuclear weapons will remain essential to implementing NATO's strategy of flexible response, which will be "as valid after an INF agreement as it is today." He said that "just to count the kilotons, Europe will become a much less nuclear place - less nuclear, but not denuclearized.... For anyone to believe that under foreseeable circumstances we can survive without some nuclear weapons would be naive."

Lord Carrington also said: "Some may think that an INF agreement is likely to place greater political strains on the trans-Atlantic relationship. Already there are powerful voices arguing that the effects will be decoupling, will weaken the effectiveness of the defence guarantee that Europe continues to need from the United States." He said that he personally did not believe "we are on the slippery slope to decoupling." The tangible manifestation of the U.S. commitment to Europe's defence was the presence there of 326,000 troops.

"Flesh and blood," he said, "count for more than abstract deterrent concepts." NATO's most senior official said that "if the Americans were to think that their contribution was largely charity, a vestigial relic of the Marshall Plan existing for the sake of Europeans rather than themselves, then I would agree that we are in trouble. There is nothing more unlikely than the survival of NATO if it were felt by the North Americans that they were doing a favour to the Europeans out of friendship and good nature. If that were the basis, they wouldn't and shouldn't stay on.... But I do not believe this to be the case.... U.S. forces in Europe are a symbol and a guarantee of the fact that European security is a vital element in U.S. security."

Lord Carrington said that nevertheless an INF agreement "will change the landscape of Europe ... perhaps as profoundly as any development in a generation." Speaking of the implications of such an agreement, he said: "In the less nuclear world that we hope may be emerging through an INF agreement Western Europe will, I suspect, need to contribute more to collective security." He said that "in one sense the way forward will require an understanding of a paradox, nonetheless true for that. It is only by showing the determination to maintain deterrent forces that we are able to negotiate a lower level of armaments and exploit to the full the opportunities for a real improvement in East-West relations. An INF agreement would provide clear vindication for this approach."

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He pointed out that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was "very different from his predecessors, attuned to the Western media, mindful of the sorry state of the Soviet economy and apparently keen to rejuvenate it." He cautioned that an atmosphere improved by a "double-zero" INF agreement "should give us wider scope to test Soviet intentions against their conduct," but it could "also be a test of our own resolve; not to be carried away in a wave of euphoria at the first sign of an arms agreement.... We have yet to see lions lying down with lambs or T-72 tanks being beaten into Ukrainian tractors."

He also warned that "immediately upon an INF treaty's entry into force we shall confront the need to maintain stability in Europe during treaty implementation.... Temporary vulnerability and perhaps imbalances may arise... and could pose risks that we must guard against." He said NATO military commanders "must still be able to do their jobs and have assured us that they can do so provided certain systems - I am thinking particularly of dual-capable aircraft - are retained. We must be sensitive, too, to the equitable distribution of this inventory among allies, particularly (West) Germany, which bears unique burdens of geography."

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Full text of Lord Carrington's speech follows:

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NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO
THE RT. HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON

AT

ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CHATHAM HOUSE
LONDON

THURSDAY, 17TH SEPTEMBER 1987

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NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

It has been five years since I was asked to talk at Chatham House. That was on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which, as the Americans say, I "encumbered" at the time. I might have encumbered more than a few of the audience that night, too, for I had to explain what it was like to be Foreign Secretary in Her Majesty's government. Since then, I have had to leave this our island home and become international, although some of you may not be able to detect the change. You will, however, be grateful, that although I am now a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's international staff, I have agreed to speak tonight in that NATO official language which my mother spoke better. But I am afraid I am back to the same old routine: having told you five years ago how a Foreign Secretary spent his day. I thought I might tonight say a few things about the business of the NATO Secretary General, or at least how this NATO Secretary General sees his job and the Atlantic community we work in, and what at the present time are his preoccupations.

Frankly, I often feel a bit wet in the job. Not, let me assure you, in the current British political meaning of moisture, but because I am forever getting drenched trying to operate from my bosun's chair in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. By that soggy figure of speech I mean of course that any NATO Secretary General must pay equal attention to Allies on both shores. I confess I am particularly mindful of that obligation tonight.

For in a matter of hours we shall know how near Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze have come to agreement on eliminating all intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Signs have pointed towards agreement for some weeks now, and I think we can all sense that there is "political will" certainly from both the American administration and I hope from the Soviet leadership. Whether the two Foreign Ministers close the deal, or whether the President and General Secretary sign on the dotted line, an INF treaty now seems to be emerging. Of course, even odds-on favourites [or "moral certainties" as the horse racing fraternity call them] can stumble at the last hurdle. But if all goes well an agreement with Senate ratification should be possible next year.

It is for me at any rate, interesting to compare this state of affairs with that which existed when I took office in 1984 as Secretary General. At that time no arms talks of any kind were in progress, the two super-powers, as a result of the invasion of Afghanistan, events in Poland and the SS-20/Pershing and cruise missile controversy were barely on speaking terms. Peace movements in Western Europe were strong and growing. The anti-nuclear lobbies were active and increasingly influential. The view was widely held that NATO was concerned only with the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe and unconcerned and neglectful of its other rôle of securing a more stable

relationship with the Warsaw Pact and security at a lower level of armaments. How much has changed in a comparatively short time. Voices are now raised querying the military wisdom of the current proposals and voicing doubts about their decoupling effect, suggesting that political expediency has replaced military security as the Alliance's priority.

For me, both these attitudes are misplaced. It was essential three or four years ago that we showed Allied resolution to deploy INF in the face of Soviet threats and blackmail. It is equally right that we should, when faced with a new and dynamic Soviet leader, test his intentions and seek to reduce the enormous quantity of nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere.

An INF agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as we have seen taking shape in their Geneva negotiations, will change the landscape of European security quite considerably, perhaps as profoundly as any development in a generation. It is from that changed landscape that we must look at "NATO and European Security".

There is no small irony, of course, in recognizing that much which will determine future European security, and I speak now as a European, will come from decisions taken in Washington and Moscow. Though Washington takes an infinity of trouble consulting its Allies, that is a bittersweet fact of life and of history which not a few eminent Europeans have regretted. But nostalgia will lead us nowhere. We had best simply acknowledge that European security is Atlantic security, and get on with it and indeed be thankful for it. For if it were not so, we should sleep less easily in our bed, and have to take some very difficult and expensive decisions.

Of course it is easier said than done. I shall turn in a moment to the quite specific challenges which an INF treaty will set for NATO and for Europe in particular as we seek to guarantee our security with fewer nuclear weapons than before. But I should stress at the outset that an agreement would be an historic achievement which we should welcome. For the first time in arms negotiating history there is the near prospect of phasing out a whole category of weapons, including ones which have caused such security concerns for Western Europe. It could also bring an immense improvement in East-West relations and, I hope, presage further progress in the arms control field. Agreements on the worldwide ban on chemical weapons and reductions in conventional forces, complicated though the latter is, would bring even greater benefits to the Alliance. It was unthinkable five years ago that the Soviet Union would take up the NATO "zero-option", let alone be willing to extend that to the worldwide elimination of INF missiles. After all that was the genesis of the twin-track decision. NATO resolve and solidarity

have been constant these past five years, both at the negotiating table and on the ground, and have been instrumental in bringing that about. But much has changed in the Soviet scene.

After an unsettled succession in Moscow, we now have in Mr. Gorbachev a new generation of Soviet leader: A product of his political heritage, but very different from his predecessors, attuned to the Western media, mindful of the sorry state of the Soviet economy and apparently keen to rejuvenate it. In the last year we have seen him recast the Soviet hierarchy, both civilian and military, with people apparently sympathetic to his own views. There is reason to expect he will try to move Soviet external policy in directions that will reduce tensions with the United States and with Western Europe. That would be one natural and essential corollary to the reforms he appears to be making at home. To revitalise the Soviet economy at the present rate of defence spending will be difficult.

But there is also room for scepticism about Mr. Gorbachev's foreign policy goals. Few politicians, particularly those in communist societies, take sharp tacks off a familiar course. And heavy tradition restrains. Russian and Soviet history runs thick with unforgettable tales of invasion and suffering caused by foreign powers, which helps us to understand Soviet paranoia about their own security. We have seen how that fear can drive to excess. Ask a Pole or Czech, or Afghan, for a first-hand assessment. One need not be an unreconstructed cold-war warrior to see the boon which a neutralised Western Europe, severed from alliance with the United States, would bring the Soviet Union, still fearful of invasion and encirclement, however implausible that threat may seem to us.

So the forecasts of Soviet intentions run two ways: towards greater détente on the one hand, towards seducing us, siren-like, into dropping our guard on the other. An atmosphere improved by a "double-zero" INF agreement should give us wider scope to test Soviet intentions against their conduct, and to see whether we can move to a less confrontational sort of East-West relations; because of course arms control is, or should, be only one aspect of a wider détente process. But it could also be a test of our own resolve; not to be carried away in a wave of euphoria at the first sign of an arms agreement.

We have seen glimmers of this brighter prospect in just the last fortnight or so. President Reagan has spoken in Los Angeles of "opportunities for better East-West relations too great to let pass by". His officials have met informally at Chautauqua with their Soviet counterparts to contemplate scientific and cultural exchanges on a scale unthinkable since the 1960s. For their part, the Soviets have accepted and arranged with alacrity British and American inspection of military manoeuvres under the Stockholm CDE "confidence-building

measures" provisions. These are encouraging developments, much to be welcomed.

Of course, we have yet to see lions lying down with lambs or T-72 tanks being beaten into Ukrainian tractors. Still, an environment in which there is increased Soviet contact with our Western democracies should offer the conditions for the growth of mutual trust between East and West. And mutual trust is the only basis for truly stable relations, not just between persons but among nations.

It is in fact mutual trust based on verifiable treaties which will enable successful implementation of an INF treaty - or any other arms reduction agreement - the Americans and Soviets conclude. And that leads directly to the core of what I want to address tonight: European security if and when an INF treaty has been signed. For that will, in effect, be NATO's agenda for at least the next five years and probably for some time thereafter. The Alliance Foreign Ministers, in their meeting at Reykjavik last June, recognized this by asking the NATO Council in permanent session to take a fresh look at how our arms control aspirations fitted implementation of our overall strategy. There was, I should note, no question in Foreign Ministers' minds that NATO's fundamental strategy was in any way compromised by the arms reduction goals we are pursuing. After all, that strategy rests solidly on the twin premises of deterrence and détente: both are tools to preserve European security. But it is not a bad thing at this juncture in our affairs for the Council to take a fresh look at these new developments.

To look now ahead, immediately upon an INF treaty's entry into force we shall confront the need to maintain stability in Europe during treaty implementation, although I should hope the most stringent methods of verification, fully and honestly employed will take care of that. But temporary vulnerability and perhaps imbalances may arise during implementation and could pose risks which we must guard against. This implementation period, three to five years say, will give NATO time to prepare for greater challenges to follow.

If the arms reduction treaty we have been anticipating becomes reality and its terms are faithfully implemented, Europe will bid goodbye to more than 300 American Pershing and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles now actually deployed. In addition, Chancellor Kohl has said that, in the event of a US-Soviet INF treaty, the 72 German Pershing-1A missiles will not be modernized when their useful lifespan ends in the early 1990s. We shall have done very well on the other side of the equation, for the Soviet Union will eliminate more than 600 intermediate-range missiles and launchers - whose introduction prompted NATO's 1979 decision to deploy our own intermediate-range missiles. That's just missiles; if you want

to count warheads, the Soviets could be removing more than 1,400 warheads. So what we all saw as the most destabilising element of the Soviet threat to Europe has been put into reverse. So, just to count the kilotons, Europe will become a much "less-nuclear" place.

Less nuclear, but not denuclearized. And that is as it should and can only be, as far ahead as we can see. An INF agreement can enhance stability in Europe, but we should not let any euphoria it engenders push us towards some mythical non-nuclear Nirvana. NATO's strategy of flexible response will be as valid after an INF agreement as it is today. And nuclear weapons will remain essential to implementing the strategy. For me to profess otherwise would be unrealistic and irresponsible. For anyone to believe that under foreseeable circumstances we can survive without some nuclear weapons would be naive.

That last sentence was not meant to sound like some Buddhist paradox; it simply states the central tenet of deterrence in the nuclear age. Unfortunately, recent debate seems to have blurred a distinction crucial to understanding the value of nuclear weapons, namely that those Allied nations which possess them, hold them to deter war, not to fight war. In their abhorrent power of mass destruction, the speed, accuracy and reliability of their delivery, and most important, our clear resolve to use them in self-defence, these weapons are intended to dissuade a potential adversary from ever attacking us.

Effective deterrence, such as we have enjoyed for nearly forty years, does not require a magical number of nuclear weapons. But it will always require a sufficient number and mix of systems, albeit at lower levels than before, to preserve the credibility of the nuclear element in our deterrent posture. With an INF agreement, we will be well on our way to reducing NATO's nuclear arsenal, and with our own security uppermost in mind we shall have to look very carefully at the inventory after the Pershing-2s and cruise missiles have been removed. Our military commanders must still be able to do their job and they have assured us that they can do so provided certain systems - I am thinking particularly of dual-capable aircraft - are retained. We must be sensitive, too, to the equitable distribution of this inventory among the Allies, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, which bears unique burdens of geography.

Maintaining effective deterrence with the absolute minimum number of nuclear weapons has long been an Alliance goal and will continue so. After all, you will recall that at Montebello in 1983 NATO Defence Ministers meeting as the Nuclear Planning Group decided on dramatic reductions in the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. The number has already shrunk from more than 7,000 ten years ago to about 4,600 now, and could fall further. The Defence Ministers also mandated improvements

to NATO's residual nuclear weapons stocks, to enhance their reliability and the safeguards on their use. That equally important half of the Montebello decision must also be carried out if we are to preserve the essential minimum of deterrence.

But in addition to ensuring that we maintain an adequate posture towards the Warsaw Pact post-INF, we shall also have to face up to the implications for relations within the Alliance itself. Some may think that an INF agreement is likely to place greater political strains on the transatlantic relationship. Already there are powerful voices arguing that the effects will be decoupling, will weaken the effectiveness of the defence guarantee which Europe continues to need from the United States.

This will be added to the existing catalogue of potential divisive factors - so-called US continental drift towards a Pacific rather than Atlantic orientation; sharper trade competition with Europe given tighter world markets; problems over burdensharing with the European allies considered rich enough to contribute more towards their own defence; even perhaps the feeling that the present NATO defence strategy is tantamount to Americans being held hostage for European security. It is not going to be made easier to manage by pressures on the European side, whether from unilateralists; those who take a more benign view of Soviet intentions than is traditional in the US; or the increased emphasis on European integration in fora such as the WEU and EC.

The problem is not one that can be simply swept under the carpet - and I would not pretend to do so to such an audience. But equally I want to make it quite clear that I do not believe we are on the slippery slope to decoupling. And for better reason than that the NATO Secretary General is under a professional obligation to say so. To take the issue in its narrowest sense, there is no special magic about INF missiles as such - the Alliance managed to operate its flexible response strategy and preserve cohesion for many years without them; and the arrangements for their elimination also involve the removal of the far more numerous and destabilising Soviet systems which brought about their introduction in the first place.

More generally, the tangible manifestation of the American commitment to the defence of Europe is not the in-theatre missiles but the presence of 326,000 in-place troops and their dependents. There can be no greater demonstration of national commitment to the Alliance than the readiness of Americans, Canadians, and Europeans too, to send their own countrymen to what would be the front line, bearing the brunt of any initial attack on NATO Europe. Flesh and blood count for more than abstract deterrent concepts. Of course this raises another set of questions about Nunn amendments, and pressures for

US troop reductions, of why European members of the Alliance need to improve their own defence contributions, partly to forestall US withdrawal, partly because conventional defence should be enhanced anyway, and of why we need better use of existing resources through practical measures of co-operation. But I will spare you the conceptual crashing of verbal gears necessary to turn the corner into that avenue. Suffice it to say that those unfortunates who are familiar with my standard speeches will know that this is one of my abiding themes.

The main point for my purpose today is simply that the huge investment of American manpower, money and defence equipment in Europe itself, with the necessary nuclear as well as conventional elements, is proof positive of NATO's basic unity.

Now if the Americans were to think that their contribution was largely charity, a vestigial relic of the Marshall Plan, existing for the sake of Europeans rather than themselves, then I would agree that we are in trouble. There is nothing more unlikely than the survival of NATO if it were felt by the North Americans that they were doing a favour to the Europeans out of friendship and good nature. If that were the basis, they wouldn't and shouldn't stay on.

But I do not believe this to be the case. Both sides of the Alliance have to be honest about the reasons for their participation and apply the acid test of whether they each have sufficient self-interest to maintain NATO's cohesion and momentum.

For the last forty years this has not been in serious question. The Brussels Declaration of December 1974, for example, states the central point: "The continued presence of Canadian and substantial US forces in Europe plays an irreplaceable rôle in the defence of North America as well as Europe. Similarly the substantial forces of the European Allies serve to defend Europe and North America as well".

I am sure that those responsible for American policy, if they were to conduct a similar analysis of US interests now, would come to unexciting but reassuringly similar conclusions. True the United States has major Pacific and out-of-area preoccupations these days. There is nothing new about that; superpower interests are by definition global. But it does not downgrade the importance of Europe or weaken the particular bonds forged by common political, economic and cultural interests. The Americans cannot be indifferent to the security of Western Europe and the need to provide their indispensable contribution to deterrence. I was pleased to note in support of this that Mr. Weinberger said only last week that US forces in Europe are a symbol and guarantee of the fact that the security of Europe is a vital element in America's own security.

To agree with this as a general principle does not mean accepting that the present balance is either right or immutable. This goes for the balance of interests between all nations in a democratic Alliance, not just as between the US and Europe. There is room for debate over burdensharing, in its widest definition, whether it be about resources, force structures - nuclear basing for example - or about policies, such as Alliance priorities over arms control. But it does suggest, as indeed I firmly believe, that the answers to the questions must be found by frank discussion within the Alliance.

The point is of course clearly acknowledged in our regular activity. This activity may seem slow and cumbersome. From the outside the NATO Council gives the appearance of muddling through. Critics may see this as a weakness. It is of course very different for Mr. Gorbachev, whose consultation process is, to say the least, rather more straightforward than our own. We have watched enthralled while he has turned policy somersaults - as he did for example over the relationship between SDI and INF in the course of one week - without demur from or consultation with his Warsaw Pact subordinates. But democracies proceed differently; by consensus. Our positions are arrived at by shared analysis and effective consultation. This indeed is the democratic process which we are here to defend. This is why the positions we do arrive at have an inner strength which Mr. Gorbachev must envy.

Of course from time to time circumstances evolve in a way which calls for more than just the routine politico/military consultation process; when there are major developments in the East-West balance or indeed in inter-Alliance relations. Looking back over 30 years experience of NATO, I can identify a number of such occasions where the preservation of Alliance solidarity has required particular efforts. Sometimes these have taken the form of creating new fora for more intense and specialized consultation and concerting of views. Consider for example the creation of the NPG and of the Eurogroup which responded to particular needs in the late '60s. Sometimes the response to the challenge has been in weapons deployment, as in the case of INF. Sometimes it has been a matter of developing or rather making explicit in our strategy what is already implicit but has needed new emphasis.

We are not at a critical stage today. But there are developments which we have to look at long and hard in order to meet the challenges which they present, and take advantage of the opportunities which they may offer. There is the evolution of Soviet defence policy and arms control objectives. New weapons technology in all its forms is another preoccupation, as is what the pundits term "structural disarmament" - the problem of resource constraints and escalating costs. Public attitudes to defence underscore all of these things. Above all there is the

unprecedented number of arms control discussions and the need for the Alliance to have a clear sense of the interrelationships and priorities.

And this brings me back to my original theme. Our overall objective is easily stated: to preserve security, and our flexible response strategy, at lower levels of forces through mutually advantageous measures of arms control and disarmament. To achieve this will require difficult decisions and not just the review which Alliance Foreign Ministers asked the NATO Council to do in their meeting at Reykjavik in June and on which it is now embarked. The way forward will require an understanding of a paradox, nonetheless true for that. It is only by showing the determination to maintain deterrent forces that we are able to negotiate a lower level of armaments and exploit to the full the opportunities for a real improvement in East-West relations. An INF agreement would provide clear vindication for this approach. There are also challenges for the United States, but even greater ones for Western Europe. Amongst other things, in the less nuclear world which we hope may be emerging through an INF agreement Western Europe will, I suspect, need to contribute more to collective security.

But I do not want to give you the impression that I am pessimistic about the trends. I have spoken frankly tonight because you would expect it and because this is how the Alliance has always proceeded. When one compares Western Europe today with the enfeebled post-war wreckage of 40 years ago, it is clear that NATO has provided a framework of security in which Western society has been able to progress and flourish. The environment may be changing, but I am confident that we shall need for a long time to come to adapt our security arrangements within the transatlantic partnership, and preserve the continuity of peace.