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EMBARGOED SUMMARY - CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY EXPECTED
ABOUT 10.30 A.M. WEST GERMAN TIME, 19TH DECEMBER 1985LORD CARRINGTON: CONSULTATION MUST BE A TWO-WAY STREET

KARLSRUHE, West Germany - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Secretary General Lord Carrington said Thursday that it would be "a sign of danger if people came to believe that effective consultation" within NATO was "something that the Americans owe to the Europeans, but that the Europeans do not necessarily owe to the Americans - or indeed to each other."

He told West German armed forces commanders that as far as NATO's future was concerned "I am an optimist." He said that some misunderstandings within the alliance "occur not because people are fundamentally disagreeing with each other - but because they are talking past each other." It was important to see this did not happen between allied governments.

Lord Carrington then went on to list the number of times senior U.S. officials, including President Reagan, had travelled to NATO to brief the allies on events in Geneva, and spoke of other major meetings that had ensured the consultation process within the alliance. But the process was a two-way street "and questions obviously do arise when, for example, Greece joins with a group of neutrals and non-aligned to address the Soviet Union and the United States on security issues; when a majority in the Danish Folketing (parliament) takes steps to disassociate itself from elements of allied strategy; and when major opposition parties in my country and in yours appear to be doing likewise."

NATO's highest official said that "there has been a significant movement away, in a number of allied countries, from the degree of bipartisanship that used to mark the approach to the main issues of foreign and defence policy." The potential consequences of this phenomenon were, in the short term, to weaken the Western position in disarmament talks because the Soviets would be convinced things would fall into their hands for nothing after some future election, and, in the longer term, to reduce regard by countries with a consistent approach to international affairs for the opinions of those countries whose view of their national interests seemed subject to change every four or five years.

Lord Carrington stressed that he was "talking of danger signs" and certainly did not believe "that the alliance is heading for the edge of the precipice." But there were nevertheless signs that needed watching, he said.

"The crucial point," he added, "is that of partnership. If that is to remain the basis of our security policy, then the rules of partnership should surely continue to apply. Those who claim a share of the benefits should carry a fair share of the burden...."

Lord Carrington said the most important thing on the military checklist "should be to make the best use of the resources ... available." The number two item was co-operation in the procurement and production of arms. He added: "I think it is high time that a lot more people got a lot more angry. Angry that there are four different main battle tanks, which cannot even use the same ammunition, lined up to fight the same battle in the same place on the same day. Angry that we cannot reliably identify our own planes. Angry that we cannot refuel and rearm them at someone else's base. And angry that being able to talk to the chap next door seems to be regarded as an optional extra - and an expensive one at that - by the people who design our communications systems."

He pointed out that "NATO as a whole gets less effective output per unit of input than the Warsaw Pact. That too is something to be angry about - and to put right."

Lord Carrington said that the fact that arms co-operation had been a major issue at recent NATO ministerial meetings "encourages me to think that we may now be able to do something about it."

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RESUME SOUS EMBARGO - VERIFIER LA CONFORMITE DU TEXTE
PAR RAPPORT AU DISCOURS QUI SERA PRONONCE A KARLSRUHE
LE 19 DECEMBRE 1985 VERS 10H30 (HEURE LOCALE)

LORD CARRINGTON : LA CONSULTATION DOIT ETRE A DOUBLE SENS

KARLSRUHE, République fédérale d'Allemagne, Lord Carrington, Secrétaire général de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, a déclaré jeudi que ce serait "un signe de danger si on en venait à considérer que la consultation effective" au sein de l'OTAN représente "une obligation des Américains envers les Européens, mais pas nécessairement des Européens envers les Américains - ni même les uns envers les autres".

S'adressant aux commandants des forces armées d'Allemagne de l'Ouest, il a dit, en ce qui concerne l'avenir de l'OTAN, "Je suis optimiste". Il a ajouté que certains malentendus se produisent au sein de l'Alliance "non pas à cause d'un désaccord fondamental, mais à cause du manque de dialogue véritable". Il est important de veiller à ce que cela n'arrive pas entre les gouvernements alliés.

Lord Carrington a ensuite rappelé les nombreuses visites que des hautes personnalités américaines, y compris le président Reagan lui-même, avaient faites à l'OTAN pour informer les Alliés de la situation à Genève, et il a évoqué d'autres réunions importantes qui avaient assuré le fonctionnement du processus de consultation au sein de l'Alliance. Mais ce processus doit être à double sens "et, manifestement, des questions se posent lorsque, par exemple, la Grèce se joint à un groupe de pays neutres et non alignés pour interpeller l'Union soviétique et les Etats-Unis sur des problèmes de sécurité; lorsqu'une majorité au parlement danois prend des décisions qui la dissocient de certains éléments de la stratégie alliée; et lorsque de grands partis de l'opposition, dans mon pays comme dans le vôtre, paraissent faire de même".

Le plus haut responsable de l'OTAN a dit que "dans un certain nombre de pays alliés, on s'est sensiblement éloigné du bipartisme qui marquait traditionnellement l'approche des principales questions de politique étrangère et de politique de défense". Ce phénomène risque, à court terme, d'affaiblir la position occidentale dans les pourparlers sur le désarmement - les Soviétiques étant persuadés qu'ils pourraient tout obtenir sans concession après quelque élection future - et, à long terme, d'amener les pays qui ont une approche constante des affaires internationales à donner moins de poids à l'opinion des autres pays dont la conception de leurs intérêts nationaux semble sujette à changement tous les quatre ou cinq ans.

.../...

Lord Carrington a souligné qu'il voulait "parler de signes de danger" et qu'il ne pensait certes pas "que l'Alliance s'approche du bord du précipice". Mais, a-t-il dit, il est certains signes auxquels il faut rester attentif.

"La question cruciale, a-t-il ajouté, est celle de la collaboration. Si celle-ci doit rester la base de notre politique de sécurité, alors, à coup sûr, les règles de la collaboration doivent continuer de s'appliquer. Ceux qui revendiquent une part des bénéfices doivent porter une part équitable du fardeau ..."

Lord Carrington a estimé que l'élément le plus important, sur le plan militaire, "doit être d'utiliser au mieux les ressources ... disponibles". Vient ensuite la coopération dans les domaines de l'acquisition et de la production d'armements. Lord Carrington a ajouté : "Il est grand temps, à mon avis, que nous soyons beaucoup plus nombreux à nous montrer beaucoup plus mécontents. Mécontents de ce qu'il y ait quatre chars de bataille différents, qui ne peuvent seulement pas utiliser les mêmes munitions, pour livrer le même combat, au même endroit, au même moment. Mécontents de ne pas pouvoir identifier de façon fiable nos propres avions. Mécontents de ne pas pouvoir ravitailler et réarmer ces avions sur une base d'un autre pays. Et mécontents de voir que la possibilité de parler à son voisin semble considérée comme une option spéciale - et, qui plus est, coûteuse - par ceux qui conçoivent nos systèmes de télécommunications."

Lord Carrington a souligné que "l'OTAN dans son ensemble obtient un moins bon rendement par unité d'investissement que le Pacte de Varsovie. C'est là un autre motif de mécontentement - et une autre faiblesse à corriger."

Le fait que la coopération en matière d'armements ait été l'une des grandes questions abordées lors des récentes réunions ministérielles de l'OTAN "m'encourage à penser que nous sommes peut-être maintenant en mesure d'agir dans ce sens", a dit Lord Carrington.

RESUME SOUS EMBARGO - VERIFIER LA CONFORMITE DU TEXTE PAR
RAPPORT AU DISCOURS QUI SERA PRONONCE A KARLSRUHE LE
19 DECEMBRE 1985 VERS 10h30 (HEURE LOCALE)

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"THE FUTURE OF NATO"

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO
THE RT. HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON

TO THE
28TH MEETING OF THE FEDERAL ARMED FORCES COMMANDERS
KARLSRUHE,
THURSDAY 19TH DECEMBER, 1985

Embargoed until: 10.30 a.m. 19th December

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To be here today is both an honour and a rather unnerving experience. I started life as a professional soldier; and I am very conscious as I look about me at the General Officers of the Federal Armed Forces that I ended my own military career in the rank of Major.

My only re-assurance in the face of so many stars is to recall my first meeting as Secretary General with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. They, too, were a formidable lot; and I explained to them my own somewhat limited military credentials much as I have done today. General Vessey looked at me, looked around the room, and said: "don't worry about that Secretary General: we're all former Majors here".

So perhaps I should address you as fellow former Majors.

I have been asked to speak about the future of the Alliance. It is not an easy subject; but it is a relatively safe one, because no-one really knows. I bring to the job one strong prejudice, and it is only proper that I should declare it: I am an optimist.

I am an optimist because I know that the Alliance has had difficulties to face throughout its existence, and that it has come through them successfully. And I am an optimist because I know that the people on whom the Alliance depends are of a quality which remains second to none. In other words, I know that the future will be a challenge; but I can think of a lot of good reasons why we should be able to meet it. And you in this room, and the men you command, are by no means the least of those reasons.

You do not need me to tell you that the military challenge is a very substantial one. It is true that Soviet defence spending seems now to be growing at a lesser rate than previously. But there is no doubt that it is growing; and that improved quality is making a significant contribution to a military effort which has never lacked for quantity.

Our task is not to match these numbers man for man, tank for tank or gun for gun; but to provide a sufficient counterweight. Sufficient to deter; and sufficient, should deterrence fail, to bring home to the aggressor his mistake.

The question of how much - or how little - may be sufficient for these purely defensive purposes is one to which you, as military men, will have answers. I use the word answers in the plural, not to suggest that there may occasionally be differences between the different armed services - perish the thought! But because the question of how much is enough is an immensely difficult one at the best of times; and it is likely to be made all the more so if we spend our time looking for a single and perfect answer, rather than for a series of practical approximations.

How much is enough also happens to be a question to which military men and Ministers of Finance will tend to give different answers. I suppose one definition of a parliamentary democracy is that it is a system where differences of this kind tend to get resolved in favour of the Ministers of Finance. But parliamentary democracies that want to go on being parliamentary democracies need to find answers that make sense also in military terms.

What this boils down to, in the crucial context of East-West relations, is that the political and military aspects of Alliance strategy are closely bound up one with the other. A sound defence, and the determination to maintain it, are essential to the political strategy; because without them, there is no prospect either of successful negotiation or of a satisfactory modus vivendi. And a soundly-based and constructive political approach is essential to the military strategy, because the defence posture of a democratic alliance can ultimately not be stronger than the political support on which it rests.

That, you may say, is a profoundly unoriginal thought. And you would be right. It has all been said time and time again. But it is nonetheless true - and nonetheless important - for that. Unfortunately, there are still some who seem to find the message hard to understand, or perhaps just plain wrong; and others who feel that one part of it needs emphasising at the expense of the other.

I suspect that this last category is particularly important in practical terms: indeed, it seems to me to account for quite a lot of the misunderstandings which arise within the Alliance, and within individual member countries, between people who are by no means on the fringe of the political system. Misunderstandings which occur not because people are fundamentally disagreeing with each other; but because they are talking past each other. Each is for his own reasons talking about something different; and they all too often fail to realise that they are talking about different sides of the same coin.

One of the important jobs of NATO is to try to ensure that that doesn't happen as between allied governments. That is why the Council, the Defence Planning Committee and the Military Committee are there: not literally in permanent session, but ready at any time to meet and to consider collectively whatever issue may be put before them. That is why the conference rooms at Headquarters are constantly full, if not over-flowing, as seemingly endless committees and sub-committees get on with their work. And that is why, in addition to the regular meetings of the Council in Permanent Session, we have this year had 11 meetings with Secretary Shultz, Ambassador Nitze or the leaders of the US negotiating team in Geneva; 8 meetings of the Special Consultative Group which has a particular remit on INF; and, of course, the special meeting of the Council with President Reagan immediately after the Geneva Summit.

The result of all this activity is not only mounds of paper and interpreters with sore throats - though I suspect that both may be true at the end of what has been a very busy year. It is also, and much more importantly, an Alliance in pretty good shape.

In pretty good shape on the military side, because we have taken the difficult political decisions involved in the deployment of INF, and deployment is being implemented on schedule. And because we have faced up also to the problems which confront us on the conventional side without, of course, forgetting the essential role of nuclear weapons in the business of deterrence.

I don't expect you to tell me that everything in the garden is now lovely, even if we are only a few days away from Christmas. And I know as well as you do just how difficult it is going to be to find the resources to do everything that we would wish - or even everything we may think necessary.

But we have got a good story to tell. We have doubled the size of the infrastructure programme; we are making progress on ammunition stocks, especially on the Central front; we have identified the key deficiencies; we are improving the force planning process and extending it further into the future (the Conceptual Military Framework makes a crucial contribution here); and last - but by no means least - we have got the attention of Ministers. I shall be doing what I can to ensure that we retain it, and with it the political commitment which is essential if we are to maintain the momentum.

The Alliance is in good shape also on the political side. We are not, as you know, much inclined to sing in unison; and it is not always easy to sing in harmony without a score and without investing the conductor with dictatorial powers. We cannot realistically aim at an identity of view on everything among the sixteen sovereign nations which make up the Atlantic Alliance; but we can work to ensure that the highest common factor is indeed a high one. And that I think we have achieved, both on the broad issues of East-West relations, and on most of the more specific questions which are currently the subject of East-West negotiation.

That is a result not only of regular consultation, but of effective consultation. We cannot afford, in this respect as in others, to follow the advice of the tailor who commended a length of cloth to a customer with the words "never mind the quality, sir, feel the width". You do, of course, need enough width to cover what has to be covered. But, for the rest, it is the quality that makes the difference.

And quality, when it comes to consultations over policy, means much more than telling each other what is going to happen. It means working together to elaborate policies that reflect the interest of the Alliance as a whole. And that, in turn, requires a strong sense of partnership - of common commitment to common objectives - among the member nations.

That is very much the spirit in which allied governments have addressed the major issues which have confronted the Alliance during the year and a half that I have been Secretary General: the deployment of INF; the conventional defence initiative; the resumption of US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva, and the meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev. I see no reason why we should not continue in the same spirit, and with equal success. But there is no invisible hand to ensure that this will always be so. It will, on the contrary, require a conscious and continuing political effort, and a clear eye for signs of danger.

It would indeed be a sign of danger if people came to believe that effective consultation of the kind I have been describing is something that the Americans owe to the Europeans; but that the Europeans do not necessarily owe to the Americans - or indeed to each other.

And questions obviously do arise when, for example, Greece joins with a group of neutrals and non-aligned to address the Soviet Union and the United States on security issues. When a majority in the Danish Folketing takes steps to disassociate itself from elements of allied strategy. And when major opposition parties, in my country and in yours, appear to be doing likewise.

There is, of course, a measure of reassurance to be found in the obvious answers. Defence policy in a democracy cannot and should not be immune from the political process; new ideas must be heard and tested in debate; East-West contacts, if they are to develop into something constructive and promising for the future, cannot be restricted to the intermittent exchange of ballet troupes; and, besides, parties tend to act rather differently when they are in government.

And yet I am not entirely reassured; because there has been a significant movement away, in a number of allied countries, from the degree of bipartisanship which used to mark the approach to the main issues of foreign and defence policy. One could spend a good deal of time arguing about why that has occurred; and to point to increasing anxiety about nuclear weapons seems to me to be as much part of the question as part of the answer.

Whatever the origins of the phenomenon, its potential consequences are clear. In the shorter term, the Western position in disarmament negotiations can only be weakened if the Soviet leaders are encouraged to believe that things are going to fall into their hands for nothing after the next election - or the one after that. And in the longer term, countries whose view of their national interests seems subject to change every four or five years will find their interests increasingly disregarded by those able to show the necessary consistency in their approach to international affairs.

I am, let me repeat, talking of danger signs; I am not trying to suggest, and I certainly don't believe, that the Alliance is heading for the edge of the precipice. But there are nevertheless signs that need watching; and the issues which underly them need watching too.

My concern as Secretary General is not only that they should be watched, but that they should be addressed from the point of view of the Alliance as a whole. And that surely means that we should start from the fundamentals, and look at the individual issues in the framework thus provided.

The fundamentals are that Western Europe lives in the shadow of a very considerable military power, proclaiming an ideology which has made its way in the world by force and not by persuasion. We have every reason to believe that our system works better; and every reason to want to be left alone to run our affairs as we think best. But for that, we need to do more than talk about our values: we need to be ready to defend them.

The need for American help in doing that was obvious enough at the end of the last war, when Western Europe was politically, economically and militarily exhausted. It may be less obvious now. But the burden of proof must surely be on those who claim that there is a better alternative to the system of collective defence and transatlantic partnership which has stood us in such good stead over the last 36 years.

To attempt to carry that burden of proof in open argument is not easy; but that debate is at least one which focusses attention on the essentials of what we are trying to do and of how best to do it. In that respect, it seems to me rather more constructive than the ostensibly less radical approach, which consists of chipping away at bits of the system without too much concern for the strength of what remains.

The crucial point, once again, is that of partnership. If that is to remain the basis of our security policy, then the rules of partnership should surely continue to apply. Those who claim a share of the benefits should carry a fair share of the burden; and what is fair should be a matter for collective rather than individual decision.

To say that is not to argue against change in Alliance policy, or against change in the contributions of individual member countries. There has been plenty of change over the last 36 years, and there will no doubt be more in the years to come. But I hope that it will be change decided upon only after the most careful collective examination of its implications for the Alliance as a whole.

Now that is all very Secretary-General-like and proper - or at least I hope it is. But some slightly more pointed questions may also be in order.

Why, for example, when there is a possibility of negotiating 50% reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, are people in the West arguing for a freeze? Common sense would seem to suggest that a freeze without provisions for verification would remove from the Soviet Union much of the incentive to agree to reductions; and that a freeze with an effective regime for verification would present much of the negotiating difficulties of reductions. So why distract attention from what is surely the more desirable objective?

And similarly with chemical weapons. The radical proposal - and the worthwhile objective - is the world-wide ban, with effective provisions for verification, for which allied governments are working. Have those who advocate special zones, into which chemical weapons could so easily be re-introduced from the Eastern side, stopped to consider the Soviet reaction to what they are proposing? Why should we expect the Soviet leaders to agree to an equitable global agreement - and to give up what is well on the way to becoming a monopoly of such weapons - if they can negotiate on the crucial European front an agreement which leaves them with a distinct advantage?

And, more generally, why should we expect Moscow to negotiate seriously on nuclear weapons if half the Soviet Ambassadors in Western Europe are reporting that unilateral measures of disarmament are just around the corner?

I can't help thinking that the politicians and campaigners in the West who come up with some of these ideas are asking themselves the wrong questions. They are not asking: what will the Soviet leaders do if we do this, and what will be the consequences?

All this would be sad at any time. But it is particularly sad now, when we really do have a chance to bring about substantial improvements to our security. And to do so, let me emphasise, without in any way endangering the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union.

We can do so first of all by taking steps to raise the nuclear threshold. I know that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a nuclear threshold in a strategy of flexible response, where what we have is an option to use nuclear weapons and not a commitment to do so in any particular circumstances. But you know what I mean.

We have already decided - without reciprocity from the other side - to reduce our nuclear weapons in Europe by 2400; and, in addition, to remove one warhead for each one deployed under the 1979 decision. And we can probably go further in this direction, given sensible decisions on distribution and on

modernisation where it is needed. More importantly, we have significantly improved the ratio of new to old equipment in our conventional forces; and, as I have already mentioned, we are committed to a policy of conventional defence improvement in a well-defined framework. I do not expect miracles, but I do expect a steady pattern of improvement where it counts most - which is where you, and your colleagues in other NATO forces, will notice it most.

To do this successfully will require a determined effort both by the politicians and by the military. Item number one on the political check-list should be to provide the necessary resources: which will mean not leaving the Minister of Defence to argue his case alone in Cabinet; and recognising defence for what it is - not a voracious competitor of the social services, but the most fundamental social service of them all.

Number one on the military check-list should be to make the best use of the resources which are available. By planning ahead; by facing up in good time to the difficult task of setting priorities; by choosing decisively where choices have to be made, instead of taking refuge in bureaucratic fudges which end up with too much butter being spread too thinly; and by resisting the temptation to gold-plate.

Number two, on both the check-lists, should be co-operation in the procurement and production of arms. We have spent much too long looking worldly-wise and saying "Ah, but you don't know the difficulties". On the contrary, we do know the difficulties. Indeed, we hear of little else. And I think it is high time that a lot more people got a lot more angry. Angry that there are four different main battle tanks - which can't even use the same ammunition - lined up to fight the same battle in the same place on the same day. Angry that we cannot reliably identify our own planes. Angry that we cannot refuel and rearm them at someone else's base. And angry that being able to talk to the chap next door seems to be regarded as an optional extra - and an expensive one at that - by the people who design our communication systems.

It would be too easy - and wrong - to blame the designers. The fault lies elsewhere: somewhere deep in that great swamp, where the politicians, the industrialists and the military get together to lay plans which take little account of the plans being laid in the next swamp along. And the result, if not the process, is clear for all to see: NATO as a whole gets less effective output per unit of input than the Warsaw Pact. That too is something to be angry about. And to put right. The fact that the issue of arms co-operation has been a major one at the recent Ministerial meetings of the Council as well as the DPC, encourages me to think that we may now be able to do something about it.

Finally, we can improve our security position by negotiating with the Soviet Union agreements which strike a balance which is fair, and which can be relied upon to remain so.

Nobody is going to wave a magic wand and produce by tomorrow 50% reductions in strategic weapons; an interim agreement on INF; an effective ban on chemical weapons; troop reductions to an equal ceiling in Vienna, and practical confidence-building measures in Stockholm. But these are nevertheless agreed objectives; and what has happened this year, from the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Mr. Gromyko in January to the summit in November, gives grounds for cautious optimism.

The future of the Alliance does not depend on our reaching any particular agreement at any particular time. Nor, more generally, does it depend on Soviet goodwill. What it does depend on, and will continue to depend on, is the strength of purpose of its member states. We know what we want, which is to live in peace and freedom. We know how to set about it, by maintaining strong defences as well as a strong commitment to better East-West relations. And we know that we are much more likely to achieve that by working together, in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

That is surely a pretty sound basis on which to build a future. And, as I said at the beginning, I am an optimist.