

N A T O ———— O T A N



SERVICE DE PRESSE

PRESS SERVICE

OTAN/NATO, 1110 Bruxelles ■ Telephones: 241 00 40 - 241 44 00 - 241 44 90 TELEX: 23-867

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
=====

PA
REGISTRY

"NATO: A PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE"

ADDRESS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

THE RT. HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON

ANKARA UNIVERSITY, TURKEY

TUESDAY 5TH NOVEMBER, 1985

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
=====

EMBARGOED UNTIL: 3.15 P.M. LOCAL TIME 5TH NOVEMBER

One of the problems of diplomacy and government in the modern world is that it becomes increasingly difficult to find the time to leave one's office. NATO is unfortunately no exception to this rule; and a lot of the work of the Secretary General is inevitably concentrated at Headquarters. But I regard this as a trend to be resisted rather than encouraged; and I try to get out as often as possible. Visits to member countries are not just the icing on the cake. They are a vital part of the job, and one which I find invaluable. Both because they help me to maintain close contact with those responsible for the formulation of policy - many of whom I am glad to say are old friends. And because they allow me to participate, as a listener, as well as a speaker, in a wider debate on issues of concern to the Alliance.

The listening is at least as important as the speaking, and I always make a point of doing as much of that as I can. Because NATO policy, which is formed by consensus, can only be a blend and a distillation of the concerns and the ideas of the member nations. And the best way to find out about the concerns and ideas of any particular country is to go there.

On the speaking side, the job of the Secretary General is to speak for the Alliance and, where necessary, to explain why its policy has emerged in the form it has; or why it hasn't been able to go further in some particular direction. When I am in the United States, for example, I find myself trying to explain how certain issues are seen in Europe; and I may find myself somewhere in Europe trying to do the reverse.

And I spend time on both sides of the Atlantic emphasising that what we in the Alliance are seeking to defend is not only territory, but the values which we cherish. And that we do so not only for ourselves, but because we want to pass on to the next generation an inheritance of peace and freedom. I have found it a particular privilege, on this occasion as on others, to be able to address the issues of concern to the Alliance in a University setting: because our great universities symbolise so clearly both the values of which I have spoken, and the importance, the opportunities and the responsibilities of the younger generation.

In short, occasions like this are a rewarding as well as an important part of the Secretary General's job. But the combination of travel and public speaking has its pitfalls. One is that of generalisation: the idea, for example, that there is among the allies on this side of the Atlantic a single view on everything of concern to the Alliance. Of course there isn't. The European allies are fourteen sovereign states, who don't always agree with each other; any more than their citizens always agree with each other on matters of national policy.

Another pitfall would be to recognise the differences, but to react like the chameleon: by adapting to the local colour. The politician's equivalent of that is to tell people what they want to hear; and then to say something different next day in another place. The technique works only up to a point: chameleons may be rather good at self-preservation; but they have no answer to an environment like that of NATO, where even the best of camouflage is unlikely to survive scrutiny from sixteen different points of view.

So I try to be consistent, as well as to avoid misleading generalisation. And to reflect what I believe to be the interests of the Alliance as a whole. As I did recently in my own country, for example, when I spoke to a group particularly interested in European Community affairs about the importance of security considerations in the making of external policy. Speaking of political co-operation among the members of the Community, I emphasised that the job must be done in a way which served to strengthen the wider cohesion on which the Alliance depends; and that that in turn would mean ensuring that political consultations within NATO - which bring in Iceland, Norway and Turkey as well as the United States and Canada - were not taken any less seriously. And I added that, if anyone doubted the political and strategic importance of that, they should look at the map, look at the figures, and see for themselves what the countries I had mentioned contributed to our common security.

As I say, that was something which I said in England; but I would be happy to repeat it in any member country. Because it is true; and because it needs saying. Although I can assure you that we at NATO Headquarters do look at the figures; and we do look at the map; and we have seen for ourselves what the countries I have mentioned - and not least Turkey - contribute to our common security.

In short, you need have no doubt about the value which the Alliance attaches to Turkey. Your geographical position between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and the fact that you are one of only two allied countries to share a border with the Soviet Union, is not only a matter of obvious strategic importance. It also gives you a special insight into Soviet affairs, and your allies a special reason to welcome your contribution to the deliberations of the Alliance.

Your substantial effort in the defence field is well known to and appreciated by your Allies. Your armed forces are the second largest in NATO and their commitment and motivation second to none. I am of course aware that modernization is a particularly pressing problem; and I know too that this is an area in which the Alliance as a whole has a responsibility to help. NATO is after all about collective defence, and that requires a mutual sharing of burdens. No one can doubt that defence represents a considerable burden to the Turkish economy. Turkey allocates 5% of her GDP to defence, the fourth highest in the Alliance, and ahead of several members with economic structures in a better condition to make such an effort. All of which points to the need for the Alliance to do more by way of assistance to the Turkish defence effort.

I am glad that this visit will give me the opportunity to see something of this effort for myself, and to do so in the area near the border. I know that you have thoughtfully deployed some pretty impressive mountains in appropriate defensive positions; but history has shown that mountains are not enough. And the particular purpose of my visit will, of course, be to see the Turkish armed forces, without whose impressive contribution there could be no effective defence.

I hope that, for your part, you attach similar value to the Alliance; which is there to strengthen the security of its member countries. It has been remarkably successful in this since it was founded in the dark days after the last war; and I have no doubt that the Alliance, and the idea of collective defence for which it provides, are just as important now as they were then. Because it still takes strength to keep the peace; and determination to protect the freedom and liberties which we cherish; and collective effort to do successfully what continues to be necessary in both these respects.

Collective effort means just that. The Alliance is a partnership and must remain so. And partnerships, like rowing eights, work best if everyone is pulling his weight. You might say of that analogy that it is a model of a perfect world, and not a snapshot of the world in which we live. And of course you would have a point. I am not sure whether I am the cox or the coach of this particular team, but my position does give me a pretty good idea of who isn't working hard enough. And the model of the perfect world provides something against which to measure the extent of the shortfall.

The model is useful also for another reason: because it reflects what I believe to be a very strong feeling in the Alliance that we are all in the same boat; that we should all be facing in the same direction; and that we could probably all pull a little harder. Or, to put it another way, that policies which tend in that direction are in the interests of the Alliance as a whole, and ought to be encouraged. And that policies that point in a different direction should not be. Easier said than done, of course. But the Alliance has not held together as well as it has over the past 35 years just because it was easy.

It won't be all that easy in the future either. And, if you were to travel around the member countries asking what was likely to be the most difficult issue for the Alliance to face as a partnership, I suspect that one issue would emerge very clearly at the top of the poll: nuclear weapons.

The position on nuclear weapons within the Alliance is already pretty complicated. The United States, and at a much lower level of armament Britain and France, are nuclear powers. Other members of the Alliance, including Turkey, contribute in different ways to the nuclear aspects of our collective defence; and what the military call nuclear tasks are fairly widely spread throughout the Alliance. But there are also a number of special positions, which have been stated from the outset by the countries concerned and accepted by their Allies.

The situation may not be perfect, but it can be lived with. And, of course, it is not inflexible. We have, for example, deployed Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe given the clear need to do so, and with the help of some courageous politics on the part of the governments concerned. And we have also been able to reduce our inventories of shorter-range missiles - 1,000 weapons have already gone and we are working on the removal of 1,400 more - in keeping with our objective of keeping no more than is necessary for defence and deterrence.

If, as I hope, the meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev later this month leads to productive negotiations in Geneva and thence to agreement on substantial measures of nuclear disarmament, we shall be able to look forward to further reductions: more particularly, perhaps, of intercontinental and intermediate range weapons. And, further down the road and if the results of the research programme appear to justify it, we will need to consider the wider implications of a strategic balance seeking to rely more upon defensive weapons.

So there have been changes, and we would certainly like to see further reductions. But the point about all these examples is that decisions which affect the Alliance as a whole will have been taken by the Alliance, or on the basis of proper consultation in the Alliance. And that is surely fundamental to the concept of collective defence which lies at the heart of the North Atlantic Treaty.

That is why I am concerned, and the Alliance more generally is concerned, about those who want to change policy in the nuclear field, but who seem relatively unconcerned about the implications of those changes for the security of their allies. There are, at the very least, some important questions which need answering; and I tried to summarise them in a speech which I gave earlier this year in Oslo. If I may, I shall repeat them here. Not because I have any doubts about the approach of Turkey to these questions. But because they affect the security of the Alliance as a whole; and they have not become any less relevant, or any less important, with the passage of time.

My general point was that those who criticise NATO strategy should be prepared to explain, more convincingly than they had so far, how the alternatives they offered would adequately preserve our security. And I went on to say that those who would have NATO abandon nuclear weapons altogether must say how the Alliance would cope with a Soviet Union enjoying a nuclear monopoly. Why in such circumstances would an aggressive Soviet Union launch a conventional attack which might prove costly, when it could so easily threaten a nuclear strike without fear of retaliation in kind? Dismissing the very possibility of such nuclear blackmail, or arguing that the Soviet Union would automatically follow NATO's example and get rid of its own nuclear weapons - all of them - was not to provide answers. It was merely wishful thinking.

If, on the other hand, the suggestion was that Western Europe, or those parts of it which wished to become nuclear-free zones, should themselves relinquish nuclear weapons, leaving it to the United States to hold the nuclear umbrella, then both ethical and practical questions arose. How ethical would it really be for Europeans to rely on the Americans to hold a nuclear umbrella which they themselves felt it immoral or dangerous to carry? And, more practically, would the American people accept such a lonely burden for long; and, even if they did, would anything short of an attack on the United States itself be deterred? I suggested that there were no certain answers; but that these were questions which should not be ignored.

And nor should the questions which had to be asked about nuclear-free zones. Could such areas be sure that their status would be respected by an opponent at times of high tension or war? And how possible was it to verify an opponent's nuclear targeting policy, which could be changed rapidly and in secret?

I concluded then, and it remains my conclusion, that these ideas had one thing in common: that they assumed much more than is prudent in the way of Soviet goodwill and good faith. And that concept of prudence seems to me to be the best guide for allied policy, both in the nuclear field and in the defence field more generally.

We are, as I have said, an Alliance of sixteen nations; their governments reflect a wide range of political opinion; and there is usually an election in the offing in one member country or another which may bring changes to the picture. So, while we can reasonably hope to maintain a common assessment of Soviet capabilities, we may well disagree to a greater or lesser extent about Soviet intentions and about how much is enough on our side.

The answer to that, as it seems to me, can be given in three points. First, that we should not encourage the journalistic tendency to proclaim "NATO in crisis" each time that we fall short of the unattainable ideal of complete agreement on everything. Second, that we should continue to work patiently - and when necessary in private - to reduce areas of disagreement to a minimum. And, finally, that we should be prudent - conservative with a little "c" - in our response to the advocates of change. By which I mean not that we should resist change on principle - an alliance of dinosaurs will not survive in a fast-moving world; but that we can justifiably require of the advocates of change, and especially of radical change to policies which have served us well over the years, that they should demonstrate both that their formula is better, and that we can move safely to it.

I believe that this general approach is very widely supported in the Alliance. And the stronger the consensus we can build, the better we shall be able to respond to the challenges of the future. And if we can do that successfully on the nuclear issues, then I see no reason why we should trip over the rather lower hurdles which face us in the field of conventional defence.

But conventional defence is nonetheless important, not least because we do not want to find ourselves drifting by neglect into a degree of dependence on nuclear weapons which no-one would consciously choose.

This general area has been very much at the forefront of Ministerial attention over the last year, and I shall be doing my best to keep it that way. We have, in fact, made rather a good start in doing the job which needs to be done - which is to improve our performance in terms of output. We have, for example, doubled the size of the common-funded infrastructure programme for the current five-year period; we are increasing - though not yet by enough - our holdings of crucial munitions; and, more generally, we have identified the key deficiencies which have to be dealt with in the coming years. The force planners have taken all this on board; and, while I do not expect miracles, I do expect the process of implementation - which will be closely monitored - to show a steady pattern of improvement. As it certainly will, if national governments continue to give this initiative their full support.

The exercise, as I have suggested, is intended to be a realistic one. One example of that realism is a clear recognition in the agreed documents of the need to do more to help those members countries who are economically least able to bear on their own the heavy costs of modernisation. And that, I suspect, is a point of some interest to Turkey.

Here too, it would be wrong to expect miracles. But this is very much part of the area where I want to see a steady pattern of improvement. As far as NATO itself is concerned, our ability to help is limited because that is the way that member nations, in their wisdom, have chosen to set the budget. But the fact that we now have a substantially increased infrastructure programme will be of direct benefit to Turkey. The programme has contributed much over the years to the essential underpinnings which all armed forces need; it has been responsive to the particular needs of Turkey; and we shall be doing our utmost to ensure that we have an even better story to tell in the future.

At the same time, much continues to be done bilaterally with individual allies. I should, of course, like to see as much of this sort of assistance as possible; and it would be right to acknowledge in particular the very substantial contributions made by the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. This is hardly the place to read out long lists of figures and equipment, but the picture is an impressive one. And I know that those involved in current negotiations will do their best to keep it that way.

There is also a very important link between advanced military equipment and advanced industrial performance. Your collaboration with the United States on the F-16 is an example of what I have in mind. And I think that the NATO-wide processes of arms co-operation could also usefully be developed, so as to provide wider opportunities for participation by allied countries.

Finally, and outside the military field, I know that NATO's Science for Stability Programme is well-regarded here in Turkey. And, indeed, at this University; which is, for example, actively engaged in research into mycotoxins as part of a wider project under the auspices of the Science for Stability Programme. The North Atlantic Council will soon be discussing the renewal of the overall programme; and I shall be doing my best to ensure that it is not only renewed, but financially expanded.

In short, the need for help is recognised; the record is nothing to be ashamed of; and we shall do our best to improve upon it. If I may risk a prediction, it would be that when I next visit Ankara - if you will have me - I shall be told that more has been done. But also that still more needs to be done. Because, if politics is the art of the possible, then finance seems increasingly to be the art of the very difficult.

Looking ahead in this way, but this time without making predictions, we may by then also find ourselves able to answer some of the questions about the new Soviet leadership which are at present very much on everyone's mind. It really shouldn't have come as a surprise to people in the West that someone who reached the top of the Soviet Union at the age of 54 should turn out to be a formidable politician; but the Gorbachev effect has clearly been magnified by the contrast with the recent past. And we now have to ask ourselves what else has changed, and what else is likely to change.

In the domestic field, Mr. Gorbachev's main preoccupation has been with the economy. The commanders have changed, but it remains a command economy. I have no doubt that it can be made to produce more without fundamental change to the system, because the signs are that the system was being run rather badly by people who had clearly run out of steam. But I do very much doubt whether it can be made to produce much more, in terms of quality as well as quantity, and to sustain that improvement, without the sort of changes which would have political as well as economic consequences. That will be an important yardstick against which to judge the new leadership.

Another, of course, will be its performance in external policy. And that again is a field where we have so far seen nothing which should surprise us: neither the more dynamic approach to the public presentation of policy, especially towards the West; nor the fact that the fine print makes it all look much less attractive than the headlines. But we should not assume that this is the final word. Indeed, we should be doing all we can to encourage Mr. Gorbachev to come boldly forward onto the common ground; and to build there through negotiation something of lasting benefit to both East and West.

I have no doubt that it can be done; and I have no doubt that Western governments are prepared to play their part to the full. Indeed, public opinion is too inclined to forget how much Western governments have already proposed. It is, after all, the Western side which has put forward the proposals on INF which are both balanced and radical: to eliminate this whole category of

weapons; or, if that is too radical for the Soviet Union, then to reduce them to the lowest equal level which Moscow can accept. And if the Soviet Union is now prepared to compete with us on who is prepared to reduce most in the strategic field, then that is competition which we welcome and in which we have no intention of being left behind. Though we shall continue to insist that the arithmetic is done on a basis which is fair; and that the aim is to reach agreements which are equally so.

What I do sometimes doubt is whether Western public opinion is sufficiently aware of some of the basic truths about East-West negotiations: that they are dealing with very complex issues, against a background of mistrust which may be regretted but which cannot be ignored; that they are therefore likely to take time; that to lose patience is to lose ground; and that it is pure wishful thinking to expect the Soviet Union to negotiate an equitable balance of forces with a Western side unable or unwilling to do what is necessary in its own defence.

In short, the politics cannot be separated from the defence; and the Alliance must do both well. And if that is a profoundly unoriginal thought on which to end, it also happens to be profoundly true. It has been the basis of consensus within the Alliance for many years; it was reconfirmed last year at the 35th Anniversary meeting in Washington; and it provides the basis on which I am confident that we shall be able to go forward together as successfully as we have in the past.

And for that, we shall need the continuing support of Turkey. That too remains of great importance. And I shall do all I can as Secretary General to ensure that our security partnership remains a close and productive one: to the benefit of Turkey, and to the benefit of the Alliance as a whole.