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EMBARGOED SUMMARY - CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY EXPECTED ABOUT  
19H30 - NETHERLANDS TIME - FRIDAY, 24TH MAY, 1985

LORD CARRINGTON ASKS WHY ANTI NUCLEAR-MOVEMENTS' POLICY SHOULD BE  
CONSIDERED LESS RISKY THAN NATO'S.

THE HAGUE - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Secretary General Lord Carrington questioned Friday why it should be assumed that the policy of the anti-nuclear campaigners involves "less risk overall than the one we have."

In remarks to an Atlantic Committee round-table conference in The Hague, the NATO secretary general said his experience of World War II "has made me less dismissive of the destructiveness of conventional war than some in the anti-nuclear movement appear to be." He added: "I also find that the anti-nuclear campaigners are rather better at publicising what everyone knows - that a major nuclear conflict would be more destructive still - than at explaining precisely what their policy is, and why we should assume it to involve less risk than the overall policy we have."

Lord Carrington asserted that if the West is to achieve nuclear arsenal reductions safely it must do so jointly with the Soviet Union and "we therefore need to consider what is likely to help the negotiating process and what is not." He said if he were "playing the hand in Geneva" he would "know very well which developments in the policy of allied governments would be helpful to me in pressing for equitable and reliable agreements - and which would be unhelpful, in that they would reduce the pressure on the Russians to negotiate seriously."

Lord Carrington recalled that cruise missile deployment was already under way in Belgium, West Germany, Italy and Britain and said he had "no doubt that this has contributed to the Soviet decision to return to Geneva." He said the Soviet leaders would take Western offers to reverse, halt or modify cruise missile deployment seriously provided they were convinced the only alternatives were deployment or successful negotiations.

Alluding to cruise missile deployment in The Netherlands, Lord Carrington said: "The message is an important one, and I hope that The Netherlands will play their part in getting it across."

Effective deterrence was ensuring that there was always someone in the Soviet Politburo who would say any gains from an

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attack "cannot conceivably outweigh the risk," and that "this more cautious view should prevail." He thought it most unlikely these conditions would be met if the West renounced the option of first use of nuclear weapons to resist an attack. "The deterrent works not because the Soviet leaders are certain that we will, but because they cannot be certain that we won't" use nuclear weapons. A no-first-use policy would reduce the uncertainty and increase the risk of conventional war. The burden of proof that what they were advocating was better than present policy lay with the advocates of a non-nuclear defence.

Lord Carrington warned that in addition to common sense in armaments cooperation, "new money will be needed, too" for the defence of Western ideals. He said we should remember that "peace and freedom are not the least of the social services which governments are there to provide and, moreover, that they are something which we owe to future generations as well as to our own."

He called for bipartisanship in Western democracies "if they are to deal effectively with a Soviet leadership which works to a much longer political timetable." Soviet leader Gorbachev's post has "no retirement age and immunity to the electoral process."

Of the U.S.-proposed Strategic Defence Initiative, Lord Carrington said "I would have to be deaf, blind and impenetrably stupid not to be aware of European concerns about the SDI." But it was also extremely difficult to explain to Americans why European opponents of nuclear weapons "seem equally vigorously opposed to research into the prospects of a strategic balance in which offensive nuclear weapons will play much less of a part, and defensive systems a much larger one."

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The full text of Lord Carrington's speech follows :

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"THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE"

ATLANTIC COMMITTEE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

THE HAGUE - 24TH MAY, 1985

REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION,

THE RT.HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON

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EMBARGOED UNTIL 19.30 HOURS FRIDAY, 24TH MAY, 1985

## "THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE"

Talking about the state of the Alliance to a distinguished and knowledgeable audience makes me sympathise with the dilemma of the headmaster on speech day. He knows that the assembled parents and governors will be the first to criticise if he sounds complacent; but he knows too that they have not come there to be told that the quality of the staff is appalling; that the quality of the pupils is worse; and that the roof is about to fall in - either literally or metaphorically.

In my case, the job has been made even harder, because the programme organisers have contrived to sandwich me between speakers who are known to have their own views on the subject; and whose very considerable reputations have not been founded solely on the practise of reticence. It follows that I would expect one of the great truths about the Alliance to be very fully exposed in the course of your proceedings: the truth that an alliance which depends on the continuing support of free nations can never be insulated from the political furnace in which the relevant decisions are made, criticised and changed.

The 1st Earl of Salisbury once said that "he that will be impatient of slander must procure himself a chair out of this world's circle". If you substitute controversy for slander, you will find that the Atlantic Alliance has in this respect been very much in this world's circle from the beginning. And that is where it will have to remain, if its political and military strategy is to make sense, and to retain the support necessary to its effective implementation.

We won't be able to do this as an Alliance if our contribution to the debate is limited to a rehearsal of past achievements, with the conclusion - expressed or implied - that what was good enough for your father, young man, should be good enough for you. That is the logic of the dinosaur; and the limitations of its defences are a matter of record. The Alliance would not have done as well as it has over the last thirtyfive years or so if it had been unable to accommodate change, and there will be changes to be made also in the future.

I have no problem with that. But I do think that the onus is on those who advocate change to establish that what they have to offer is better than what we have at present - and that we can make the move in safety.

That to my mind is a test which continues to prove too stiff for those who claim that what they call non-nuclear defence could provide a satisfactory alternative to present NATO strategy; and for those who argue that the American commitment to the defence of Western Europe is no longer in the interests of one or both. But it is the shading nearer the middle, rather than the black and white of these extremes, which sheds the more interesting light on the issues of most concern to the Alliance.

That these issues include the nuclear is not something which I need go out of my way to emphasise here in the Netherlands. The subject is indeed a controversial one, and it is likely to go on being controversial - even if the debate could be confined to those who would accept, as I do, some such starting point as the following:

- first, that there are far too many nuclear weapons in the world;
- second, that they cannot be disinventated;
- third, that the process of making the major reductions we want, if it is to be managed safely, must be managed jointly with the Soviet Union;
- and, finally, that the necessary Soviet co-operation is unlikely to be forthcoming if the Soviet leaders come to believe that the West is unable or unwilling to maintain a sufficient counterweight to Soviet military power.

To speak of a sufficient counterweight is, of course, to beg the difficult and important question of how much is enough. To say that there are too many nuclear weapons in the world must surely be right, in the sense that we would all be better off if the United States and the Soviet Union were to agree to the deep reductions proposed by the Americans, and then go on to negotiate an even lower balance. But it does not follow that significant reductions by one side alone could be accomplished without harmful consequences: either for the prospects for successful negotiations; or, more importantly, for the effectiveness of the deterrent.

Effective deterrence means ensuring two things. First, that there should always be someone in the Politburo to say: "That's all very well, but we cannot be sure of the nature of the response or the extent of the possible damage to us. The gains that have been suggested are no doubt attractive, but they cannot conceivably outweigh the risk". And second, that this more cautious view should prevail.

I think it most unlikely that these conditions could be satisfied if the Soviet Union were to be convinced that we would never resort to nuclear weapons in response to a conventional attack; and that is why I disagree with those who would have us renounce the option of first use. And the crucial word here is option. We concluded many years ago, and I am sure rightly, that we should not commit ourselves in advance to use nuclear weapons in any particular circumstances; and that remains our policy today. The deterrent works not because the Soviet leaders are certain that we will, but because they cannot be certain that we won't. To remove that uncertainty would increase the risk of conventional war.

A policy of no-first-use would remove or very substantially diminish that uncertainty. The more difficult question is how far it would be affected by steps towards unilateral nuclear disarmament in the West which fell short of leaving the Soviet Union with an effective monopoly. The answer is that we don't really know, and that we have to judge as best we can where to strike the balance.

My own view, perhaps not surprisingly, is a conservative one. It is influenced by the fact that my experience of the last war has made me less dismissive of the destructiveness of conventional war than some in the anti-nuclear movement appear to be. I also find that the anti-nuclear campaigners are rather better at publicising what everyone knows - that a major nuclear conflict would be more destructive still - than at explaining precisely what their policy is, and why we should assume it to involve less risk overall than the policy we have. And finally, I go back to my starting point: if we want to achieve major reductions in nuclear arsenals, and to manage the business safely, we will have to do this with the Soviet Union; and we therefore need to consider carefully what is likely to help the negotiating process and what is not.

Here again, there can be no proof. But we have sufficient experience of Soviet negotiating techniques to know that they are unlikely to look seriously for the common ground in the conference room, if they believe that that ground can be shifted in their direction by political pressure from the outside. If I were playing the hand in Geneva, I know very well which developments in the policy of allied governments would be helpful to me in pressing for equitable and reliable agreements; and which would be unhelpful, in that they would reduce the pressure on the Russians to negotiate seriously.

It is at this stage, for those of you who may have been waiting for it, that I should like to say a word about the deployment of CRUISE missiles in the Netherlands. Deployment, as you know, is already underway in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. I have no doubt that this has contributed to the Soviet decision to return to Geneva. And I am optimistic that our offer to reverse, halt or modify these deployments as part of a satisfactory negotiated package will be taken seriously by the Soviet leaders - provided that they can be convinced that the alternatives really are deployment or successful negotiation, and that there is no third course. The message is an important one, and I hope that the Netherlands will play their part in getting it across.

So on the nuclear side, how much is enough remains a difficult question; and one which I believe should be answered with the negotiating situation very much in mind, and with a careful eye to the message we may be conveying to Moscow. But this is not a recipe for immobility. The radical proposals for

reductions in strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons are those which have been made from the Western side. And it is also we who have taken the initiative in making unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear weapons: we reduced by one thousand in 1980, and are presently reducing by the further one thousand four hundred decided upon at Montebello in 1983. In neither case, unfortunately, has there been any matching response by the Soviet Union.

How much is enough is also very much a live issue on the conventional side, but the guidelines here are perhaps a little clearer. No-one is arguing that we need to match the Warsaw Pact tank for tank and gun for gun; and debate within the Alliance has now put in better perspective the fear that improvements in allied conventional capabilities might tend to lessen the credibility of the deterrent.

What would indeed weaken the deterrent is a change of policy on the lines advocated by the anti-nuclear campaigners. But if we stick to the main points of our strategy, a more effective conventional performance would seem to me entirely positive in its effects. And that is the conclusion implicit in what Ministers agreed in the Defence Planning Committee last December, when they called for a coherent effort to improve our conventional defence; in the work which has been done since then in the permanent machinery; and in the further very important meeting of DPC Ministers which has just taken place in Brussels.

It is, of course, much easier to agree to the general proposition that improvements are necessary than to decide precisely what should be done, and in what order and by whom. What we have achieved so far - in making specific improvements in the fields of infrastructure and sustainability, in identifying other deficiencies which require attention, and in providing a framework for better longer-term planning - is only a beginning. What is necessary now is that nations should pursue the task with the determination that has been so evident over the last six months, so that we can look forward to a consistent pattern of improving output.

This is by no means only a question of greater resources. No-one, for example, who looks at all closely at the extent to which chauvinism and complacency continue to frustrate common sense in armaments co-operation, can have any doubt about how much could be achieved by a more sensible use of existing resources. But new money will be needed too, and we shall have to keep hammering away at the basic truth that what a defensive alliance needs by way of defence should be a function of what it is there to defend us against, not of what cabinet colleagues would like to spend on other things. We should remember, more particularly in this anniversary year, that peace and freedom are not the least of the social services which governments are there to provide; and, moreover, that they are something which we owe to future generations as well as to our own.

I mentioned earlier one of the great truths about the Alliance. Another, which I have been doing all I can to publicise, is that NATO is just as much a political as a military Alliance. What I have just been saying about deterrence and about conventional defence is a case in point: there cannot, in a democracy or a democratic alliance, be something called "military strategy", which survives independently of political strategy and political consensus. But it is equally true that no political strategy, however strongly it may be supported in our Parliaments and in our election campaigns, will get us very far in the real world of East/West relations if it is not backed by the determination to retain sufficient military strength.

On the political side, I have been struck since taking over as Secretary General by the quality of the work which we do collectively to define Soviet capabilities and to analyse the factors which affect Soviet policy. I have also been struck by the extent of agreement which has been reached and sustained, not least as a result of the very important work done at and between the Ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council in December, 1984 and May, 1985.

I have been fortunate in my inheritance. But I am aware also of the effort which will be needed to maintain it. Agreement on general principles and broad conclusions does not translate automatically into agreement on what to do next in specific circumstances; and agreement between governments does not guarantee the degree of bipartisanship which the Western democracies must seek to sustain if they are to deal effectively with a Soviet leadership which works to a much longer political timetable.

Mr. Gorbachev may feel that he can work to a political timetable longer than most. He has, after all, succeeded to a post which, while infinitely more powerful than any in the gift of the House of Lords, appears to share with that august body two important characteristics: no retirement age, and immunity to the electoral process.

Mr. Gorbachev will no doubt be getting, from Mr. Gromyko and from other veterans of Soviet foreign policy, a good deal of advice about how to conduct relations with the West. But I suspect that what will be crucially important is the conclusions which he himself will draw from the experience of his first few years at the helm. And that gives a very special significance to the Geneva negotiations and, more generally, to what Allied governments are now saying and doing in the field of East/West relations.

I would be very surprised if there were not Soviet Ambassadors in the West who make something of a habit of advising that there is no reason for the Soviet team at this or that conference to get down to serious negotiations, because the



Western position is going to move in their direction anyway - after a few more months of apparent stalemate, or during the next election campaign, or after the next election. And I have no doubt at all that there are those in Moscow who are happy to get such advice, and ready to do what they can to have it prevail. If that is the advice in which Mr. Gorbachev comes to believe, the task of negotiating with the Soviet Union agreements which genuinely respect the security interests of the West, and can be relied upon to go on doing so, will be made very much harder.

The answer is in our hands. Not, I fear, in the hands of the Secretary General of NATO. Nor even in the hands of the Allied governments of today. It is a wider political and democratic community in all our countries which, having willed the ends of peace and freedom - and having chosen the means of defence to the extent necessary and negotiation to the extent possible - must give to these broad concepts a definition precise enough, and above all consistent enough, to give them the best chance of realisation.

It is, of course, much easier to say 'amen' to that as a general proposition than to apply it in practice to the contentious issues of the day, whether Siberian gas, CRUISE missiles or the SDI. The pipeline is behind us; I have said my piece about CRUISE missiles; and I will add only a word about the SDI.

I would have to be deaf, blind and impenetrably stupid not to be aware of European concerns about the SDI; and I regard it as an important part of my job to help to ensure that these concerns are understood and taken account of in Washington. And I believe they are - certainly to a much larger extent that some of the more vociferous critics on this side of the Atlantic have been prepared to accept.

It is equally part of my job to try to ensure that American preoccupations are understood in Europe. And here I will say only one thing. It is extremely difficult to explain to an American audience, many of whom have their own worries about nuclear weapons, why it is that European opponents of nuclear weapons seem equally vigorously opposed to research into the prospects of a strategic balance in which offensive nuclear weapons will play much less of a part, and defensive systems a much larger one.

The critics of the SDI have a number of answers to this point. Answers which tend to assume that one can already say what the results of the research will be; and what will be the effect on the strategic balance of deploying any such system in a world where the Soviet Union will do its best either to swamp or to match new defences - or both. Now perfect foresight is no doubt a very handy thing to have; but there is less of it around than is claimed, and to claim it is not always politically very productive.

The best approach to the SDI, as it seems to me, is to support research as necessary and prudent, not least in the light of Soviet capabilities and interest in this field; to conduct it at an appropriate level and within the constraints of the ABM Treaty; and to ensure that there is a clear firebreak between that process and any decision to proceed to deployment. That will be the stage at which we shall have to consider very carefully not only the answers which the research programme may produce to the technical and financial questions of how and how much, but also the wider political and strategic implications for the Alliance as a whole. And as President Reagan said recently in Strasbourg:

"When the time for decisions on the possible production and deployment of such systems comes, we must and will discuss and negotiate these issues with the Soviet Union"

To conclude on a more general note, I am conscious that I have talked more about some of the issues which confront the Alliance than about the state of the Alliance as such. But the whole purpose of the Alliance is to confront such issues - sensibly, collectively, and in the interests of future generations as well as our own. It can best be judged by how it performs this task. Looking back over decades of peace, freedom and prosperity in Western Europe, my judgement would be that it has not done too badly. It will need your continuing support, but I see no reason to believe that it will do any less well in the future.