DEFEENCE PLANNING AND POLICY
Development of NATO Strategy

NATO's Early Strategic Concept.

From its inception the defence policy of the Alliance has been essentially deterrent in nature. It has been designed to persuade any potential aggressor that war will not pay. The concept of deterrence has successfully kept the peace in Europe for over twenty years and is still valid today.

In the early days of the Alliance, NATO's strategy to realise this basic objective rested to a very considerable degree on the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the United States. In view of the very marked inferiority of NATO conventional strength in Europe such a strategy, which came to be styled "the strategy of massive nuclear retaliation", seemed to be the only one available.

But the importance of "a conventional option", and of building up the forces to make it possible, was always recognised. Under the protective umbrella of the United States nuclear forces, the most urgent task facing the Alliance immediately after the decision to set up integrated commands at the beginning of 1951 was that of building in the shortest possible time well equipped and well trained forces in
Europe capable of defending NATO territory against aggression. In that year the United States agreed to place its units in Germany under SACEUR’s command. France, the United Kingdom, and other members followed suit. In 1952 military targets (the Lisbon Force Goals) proposed by the Temporary Council Committee for the period up to 1954 were accepted; machinery for co-ordinating the military efforts of member countries had been set up; the command structure had been considerably improved; the forces of Greece and Turkey had been incorporated into Allied Command Europe; the strategic concept had been further developed; and the effectiveness of the armed forces had increased. And in the next four years further substantial progress was made. In particular, with the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany it became possible to plan for the forward defence of Europe much closer to the Iron Curtain.

Revised Strategic Concept - 1957.

It had speedily become apparent that the goals for conventional forces established at the 1952 Lisbon meeting were unrealistically high. At the same time technological advances both in the West and in the Soviet bloc had changed the premises on which the strategy had been based. In particular, Russia's newly acquired capacity to deliver a nuclear strike made a reappraisal of Western defence policy imperative. The strategic concept of massive retaliation was further evolved, on the assumption that it would
be necessary to use both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons at a relatively early stage of a conflict in response to any aggression that was not of a minor character. SACEUR was requested by the North Atlantic Council to base his forward planning on the assumption that a large variety of nuclear weapons would gradually be introduced into the forces both of the NATO countries and of the Soviet bloc. At the same time he was required to take account of a levelling off of the defence expenditures of member countries.

These developments were dramatised by the launching of the first Russian sputnik. The Heads of Governments of the NATO countries meeting shortly afterwards in Paris (December 1957) decided that NATO's defensive strength should take account of recent developments in weapons and techniques; that to this end it was necessary to establish stocks of nuclear warheads readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need; and that intermediate range ballistic missiles should be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The deployment of the stocks of nuclear warheads, and arrangements for their use, were to be decided in agreement with the countries directly concerned.

Since that time, the importance of nuclear weapons for NATO's defence and the increasing stockpile of such weapons in Europe have kept nuclear problems in the forefront of Ministerial consideration. A major action in this regard was taken at Athens in 1962, where the Ministers adopted the "Athens
Guidelines”. These outlined in general terms the situations in which it might be necessary to use nuclear weapons in NATO’s defence and the degree to which political consultation on such use might be possible. Both the United Kingdom and the United States specifically committed themselves to consult with their allies, time and circumstances permitting, before releasing their weapons for use.

At the beginning of 1963 the nuclear forces available to NATO Commanders were strengthened by the assignment to SACEUR of the United Kingdom’s V-bomber force and of three United States POLARIS submarines. These latter replace the Jupiter IRBM missiles which had been stationed in Italy and Turkey in conformity with the decision of the Heads of Government in December 1957 and which were by this time becoming obsolete. At the same time, in May 1963, the North Atlantic Council at its Ottawa meeting approved the measures taken to organise the tactical nuclear strike forces assigned to SACEUR. These measures included arrangements for broader participation by officers of non-nuclear member countries in the nuclear activities of Allied Command Europe and in the co-ordination of operational planning at the Headquarters of the United States Strategic Air Command at Omaha.

Strategy of flexibility in response.

As the 1960s progressed there came the realisation that a large-scale attack on NATO, although certainly the most deadly danger and one against which NATO
must continue to be prepared, was nevertheless not the only possibility or perhaps the most likely one. Increasing account began to be taken of the possibility and the implications of aggression with relatively limited objectives, and of attacks of a minor or probing kind which might begin through miscalculation of NATO's will to resist but which could very rapidly expand or escalate. Moreover, it was noticeable that the Soviet Union was developing types of forces designed to enable it to deploy a significant military capability in any part of the world. In particular the increasing Russian penetration of the Mediterranean area posed a potential threat to NATO's Southern flank.

Secondly, the development of the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) as the principal means of delivering a nuclear warhead and the construction of hardened launching sites produced a capability to survive a surprise nuclear attack and retaliate within a matter of minutes. This capability was further enhanced by the development of the even less vulnerable weapon system represented by the nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine. Each side was thus in a position to destroy important areas of the potential enemy's territory and to annihilate a large proportion of his population even after itself being hit first. These developments reinforced the doubts about the assumption that a major nuclear war was the most likely form of conflict, and also about the credibility of a strategy of massive retaliation in circumstances other than a major nuclear
attack. A new and more flexible strategic concept was accordingly developed and was adopted by Ministers in December 1967.

The basis of this concept is that NATO should be able to deter, and (if deterrence fails) to counter, military aggression of any kind; and that this can be secured only through a wide range of forces equipped with a well-balanced mixture of conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear weapons. The purpose of this balance of forces, while retaining the principle of forward defence, is to permit a flexible range of responses combining two main capabilities: to meet any aggression at a level judged to be appropriate to defeat the attack, and to "escalate" the level, under full control, if defence at the level first selected is not effective. An aggressor must be convinced of NATO's readiness to use nuclear weapons if necessary; but he must be uncertain regarding the timing or the circumstances in which they would be used. In this connection, however, selective and limited tactical use of nuclear weapons could not be deferred until NATO's conventional defences were in a desperate position. First, in that case it would probably be neither feasible nor effective to use the nuclear weapons; the enemy would already have advanced too far and there would be a danger of hitting friendly troops or the civilian population. And secondly, our own forces would be in no condition to exploit and drive home the advantage gained by the use of the weapons.
Under the strategic concept of flexibility in response, with its increased emphasis on the need to be prepared for attacks of varying scales in any region of the NATO area, the aim is that NATO should have available a considerable sea, land, and air conventional combat potential, supported by nuclear weapons for tactical use, over and above the strategic nuclear forces. All these forces must be well organized and prepared for immediate employment. NATO's readiness posture and its capacity to reinforce, mobilise, and deploy in time of tension and crisis are the foundation of "controlled escalation".

**Crisis Management and Multinational NATO Forces.**

The importance of timely and effective decisions in a time of crisis is greater than ever under the new concept. By co-locating the Military Committee with the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, the machinery for consultation and decision-making, a vital aspect of crisis management, has been improved; and moreover action has been taken to provide the Allies with a NATO-wide communications system far more rapid and comprehensive than anything that has gone before.

In 1960 the first elements of a mobile force for Allied Command Europe were constituted. Various member countries assigned to SACEUR well equipped land and air component units immediately available for despatch to any threatened area, partic-
ularly on the flanks of Europe. Though capable of giving a good account of itself if attacked, this multinational force is primarily intended to demonstrate the solidarity of the Alliance in times of crisis or tension and to deter any enemy who might be tempted to launch an aggression with limited objectives in the hope of facing the Alliance with a "fait accompli" situation. Confronted with this force, he must realise with special clarity that in attacking it he would be attacking the NATO Alliance rather than the forces of one country. The force has held numerous exercises in both the Northern and Southern flanks of Allied Command Europe.

Somewhat similarly, a Standing Naval Force Atlantic has been established under SACLANT since 1967. Composed of destroyer class ships contributed by the member countries in the area, this force, which flies the NATO flag, carries out in peacetime a programme of scheduled exercises, manoeuvres, and port visits. By rotating the ships composing the unit, the national naval forces contributing to STANAVFORLANT gain useful experience in working as a multinational team, in command and control procedures, communications, and surveillance, as well as tactics and operations. In times of crisis or tension this naval force has a capability for rapid deployment to a threatened area.

Again, an On-Call Naval Force for the Mediterranean was created in 1969. Similar in purpose to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, this naval force, as its name implies, is not usually in being but as-
sembles only when called upon, the ships remaining under national command in between exercises.

Allied Nuclear Planning and Policy

Recent Developments.

The important rôle assumed by nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy and the ever increasing complexity of political and technical problems raised by the availability of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons led to a need for the association of non-nuclear members of NATO with allied nuclear planning. This in turn led to the formation of the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group.

The Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC) is a committee of the Defence Planning Committee. Membership is open to any interested NATO country. It meets under the chairmanship of the Secretary General, normally at Ministerial level. At present it consists of twelve members: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. Its task is to propose to the Defence Planning Committee general policy on the nuclear affairs of the Alliance.

A second body, subordinate to the NDAC, is the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) consisting of seven or eight countries drawn from the membership of the NDAC. The composition of the NPG changes on an eighteen-month cycle so as to provide full
opportunity for all NDAC countries to participate in its work. The NPG meets at the level either of Defence Ministers or Permanent Representatives. Its task is to undertake the detailed work required as a basis for the preparation of policy and to formulate policy proposals for submission to the NDAC for endorsement and final approval by the DPC. The NPG's activities have spanned the full range of aspects of strategic and tactical use of nuclear weapons, and associated problems.

In keeping with the objective of enhancing the participation of all members, including the non-nuclear countries, in the nuclear defence affairs of the Alliance, the major part of the NDAC/NPG effort has been carried directly by Ministries in national capitals and country delegations in Brussels. To support this work, a small Nuclear Planning Directorate was created in the International Staff in 1966 under the supervision of the Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Policy.

One of the first accomplishments of the NPG was the elaboration, in collaboration with the Military Committee, of recommendations for the improvement of national participation in military operational nuclear planning at the levels of the Military Committee, the Major NATO Commands and subordinate Allied Commands. These recommendations were approved by the DPC in May 1968. Also in 1968, the NPG agreed, on the basis of detailed analyses, that in the light of current and foreseeable technological circumstances, the deployment of anti-ballls-
tic missiles in NATO Europe was not at present warranted.

Responding to the need for a workable consultation machinery, the NPG, during 1969, drafted general guidelines for a procedure to be followed in any future consultations on a question of actual use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Group completed work on a series of studies concerning the tactical use of nuclear weapons, which served as the basis for formulating political guidelines for the initial defensive tactical use of nuclear weapons by NATO.

Both guidelines were endorsed by the NDAC. They were approved by the DPC in December 1969 and serve as guidance for national authorities and directives to the NATO Military Authorities.

During 1970, the NPG brought to a conclusion several years of work on a specific aspect of tactical use of nuclear weapons by drafting special political guidelines for the possible use of atomic demolition munitions. At the same time, the Group developed a concept for the rôle of theatre nuclear strike forces. Both documents were endorsed by the NDAC and approved by the DPC in December 1970. They were issued as policy guidance for national authorities and directives to the NATO Military Authorities.

At their various meetings, the Ministers of the NPG have received briefings by the United States Secretary of Defense on the balance of strategic forces and held discussions on specific aspects of current or prospective future development.
NATO Force Planning

The Principles.

NATO’s force planning, which must continuously be adapted to keep pace with changing circumstances and technological developments, is based on an evaluation of the relative force capabilities of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. This comparative study is continuously extended and updated by an effort of close co-ordination between the International Staff (Defence Planning and Policy Division), the International Military Staff, and NATO Military Authorities. The foundation for this study and indeed for all NATO force planning studies is the data base on NATO and Warsaw Pact forces which is regularly updated under the general supervision of the Defence Review Committee.

In determining the size and nature of their contribution to the common defence, member countries have full independence of action; and furthermore it is accepted that for internal budgetary reasons, national authorities are rarely in a position to make firm commitments for more than a year ahead. Nevertheless, the collective nature of NATO’s defences demands that in reaching their decisions governments take account of the force structure recommended by the NATO Military Authorities and of the long-term military plans of their partners. NATO’s procedures for common force planning must take into account the military requirements which have to be met, the best use of the available resources,
advances in science and technology, a rational division of effort among member countries, and the need for force plans to be within the countries’ economic and financial capabilities.

Economic and financial studies undertaken in this context have three main objectives: to ensure that adequate resources are applied to the fulfilment of agreed defence programmes; to contribute to the most rational use of available resources, in particular through long-term planning and through encouraging such concepts as cost effectiveness; and to progress as far as possible towards an equitable distribution of the economic and financial burden of the common defence.

These objectives are not easy to reach in an Alliance whose members differ widely from the economic viewpoint, and particularly in their population and stage of economic development. Member countries must weigh the resources they allocate to defence against such other requirements as the need to maintain economic expansion and social stability while also providing assistance to the developing countries. Those countries whose per capita income is still low must ensure that their defence effort does not hamper economic progress. At the same time, members of the Alliance must take account of developments in Communist countries and, not least, of Communist defence expenditures. For example, in real terms there was a continuous rise in Soviet defence and defence-related expenditures between 1965 and 1969 of about 5% to 6% per year on
average and the evidence is that the USSR is continuing to strengthen its military establishments still further.

The current procedures, by which NATO’s force plans are reviewed and projected year by year for a period of five years ahead, should make it possible to modify future force plans to meet changing circumstances, and also provide a firm basis on which countries can plan their force contributions.

**The Procedures.**

In the context of the current procedures for the NATO Defence Planning Review, NATO “Force Goals” represent the target which the Alliance sets itself as part of the process in the development of a NATO five-year Force Plan.

The process of drawing up NATO Force Goals begins with the Military Committee appreciation of the situation as it may face the Alliance for the period of the five-year planning review and a little beyond it. This appreciation attempts to identify all military factors and considerations likely to affect force structures, deployments, and equipment both in NATO and in the Soviet bloc during the period under review. It may also deal with the implications of technological and demographic development.

Ministers take full account of the Military Committee’s appreciation in the guidance they issue to the NATO Military Authorities for the preparation of Force Proposals for the relevant planning period.
This guidance adds in the political and economic factors affecting the development of NATO forces over the period and assesses their likely impact on the current strategic concept of the Alliance and in particular the preparation of the next set of Force Proposals.

The Force Proposals are now prepared by the Major NATO Commanders setting out country-by-country what the Commanders propose should be each one’s contribution in the planning period. These proposals are co-ordinated and reviewed by the Military Committee before being forwarded to the Defence Planning Committee, stating the reasons underlying the Proposals and any risks which might be associated with them. The Defence Review Committee (DRC) then conducts a searching examination of the Force Proposals on behalf of the Defence Planning Committee, in particular as regards the financial, economic, and political implications, the compatibility of the Force Proposals with the guidance given by Ministers, and the element of challenge in the Goals which each country is being asked to accept: a reasonable and realistic challenge in all the circumstances, but still a challenge which goes somewhat beyond the countries’ supposed intentions, in the interests of collective defence planning for the Alliance. The Defence Review Committee then reports to the Defence Planning Committee on its examination of the Force Proposals, on any adjustments which it believes necessary for economic or other reasons, and on
the associated risks as assessed by the Military Committee.

In the light of the reports by the Military Committee and the Defence Review Committee, the Defence Planning Committee recommends to Ministers a set of forces for adoption as NATO Force Goals, which countries are to use as the basis of their planning for the five-year period under consideration. With these Force Goals in mind, country Force and Financial Plans are duly formulated and forwarded to NATO, where they are analysed and discussed with the countries by both the NATO Military Authorities and the International Staff. When differences occur between the Plans and the Goals a first joint attempt is made to reconcile them by the international civil and military staffs and the Major NATO Commanders' representatives; these "trilateral" discussions are reported to the Defence Review Committee, which conducts a further critical "multilateral" examination, in committee, of countries' plans, particularly directed at eliminating, as far as possible, any remaining differences between country Force Plans and NATO Force Goals. On the basis of these multilateral examinations, the Defence Review Committee reports to the Defence Planning Committee how far countries have been able to meet the Force Goals, and why they have fallen short if indeed they have. At the same time, the Military Committee reports on the military suitability of the emerging Alliance-wide five-year Force Plan and on the degree of risk associated with it. In the light of these re-
ports, the Defence Planning Committee is in a position to recommend a five-year Force Plan to Ministers.

Ministers consider the Defence Planning Committee's report and recommendations for the NATO Force Plan from the viewpoint of its overall balance, feasibility, and acceptability, taking account also of the Military Committee's advice regarding the military suitability of the Plan and the associated degree of risk. This NATO five-year Force Plan is then adopted, on the understanding that countries are firmly committed only to its first year.

NATO's force planning procedures are thus the machinery for determining the forces required for the defence of the Alliance, co-ordinating national defence plans, and drawing them towards the agreed Goals in the best interests of the alliance as a whole, while also monitoring countries' actions in respect of the recommendations of studies — some of which may be undertaken independently of the procedures but can be introduced into the process at an appropriate stage when ready for implementation. It may be added that such collective consideration of countries' defence efforts and the attempt to harmonise them from an Alliance-wide point of view have contributed considerably to mutual understanding; they have provided the means for reaching agreement on what is both desirable and practicable, and in many cases have led to co-operative efforts for solving problems. It is significant that to enable this to be done, for two decades the countries of the Alliance
have agreed to the systematic exchange of detailed and precise information on their military, economic, and financial programmes on a scale previously unprecedented in peace or even in war, and have submitted these programmes to the examination and criticism of their partners.

**Distribution of the Defence Burden.**

While the main emphasis in the NATO force planning procedures is on the development of realistic defence plans at an acceptable cost, the question of equitably distributing the defence burden among member countries is kept in view. Consideration is given to the proportion of the national product devoted to defence, to per capita income, and to a wide range of other relevant factors such as population, state of development generally, balance of payments, taxation levels, and capital investment requirements. Reviewed in relation to each country's special circumstances, these factors assist in making a fair assessment of its contribution to the common defence effort. Some countries have substantial forces stationed outside their own territories, and in particular on the continent of Europe, so that their defence efforts involve a burden on their balance of payments; and this problem has increased as the easy balance of payments position of the United States in the early period of the so-called "dollar gap" has given way to several years of deficits. Special arrangements, mostly bilateral,
have been made to alleviate this problem, and ways of improving the position are constantly under review.

It may finally be remarked that the procedures which have been described, relatively new as they are, are not to be regarded as fixed and inflexible, and may be revised should circumstances so require.
Soviet Military Capability.

The Soviet armed forces have been developed carefully and systematically. They are a modern and formidable, well-balanced and organized force, capable of conducting both defensive and aggressive offensive operations. A large proportion of the Soviet state budget is spent annually on defence and defence-related research and development.

The Warsaw Pact countries have improved the quality of their armed forces considerably. Their total strength is now estimated to be about 4.5 million men and their modern equipment is almost exclusively Soviet made. The Warsaw Pact nations, like the Soviets, have increased their military budgets.

Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.

The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces consist of about 350,000 men. They have a total of approximately 1,500 operational Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) and about 700 Intermediate and Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM and MRBM). These missiles constitute the main strategic threat to NATO, ICBMs covering the most distant targets, including those in the United States and Canada,
while IRBMs and MRBMs are primarily directed against targets in Western Europe. A new missile development, the "Multiple Re-Entry Vehicle" (MRV) has been in the trial stage for over two years and may now be available for deployment. This together with the "Fractional Orbital Bombardment System" (FOBS) which is to be used to evade the United States ballistic missile warning system constitutes a further increase in Soviet strategic missile capability. Furthermore, a limited Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system has become operational.

**Soviet Ground Forces.**

The Soviet ground forces have an estimated strength of 2,500,000 men, organized, so far as field units are concerned, in about 160 tank, motorised rifle, and airborne divisions. Approximately thirty of these divisions are in the Sino-Soviet border area, including two divisions in the People's Republic of Mongolia. Of the remaining divisions about 100 are located in Central USSR, West of the Ural mountains, and North of the Caucasus and thirty one in the other Warsaw Pact member countries: twenty in the German Democratic Republic, two in Poland, five in Czechoslovakia, and four in Hungary. These thirty one divisions are combat ready. The divisions stationed in the USSR, however, are at different levels of combat readiness. About three-quarters of them (some ninety), would be almost immediately available for operations. The seven airborne divis-
ions with approximately 50,000 men are combat ready and up to two of these divisions and their supporting elements could be air-dropped or air-landed simultaneously over medium ranges.

After World War II, the Soviets continued to modernise their ground forces. Particular emphasis has been placed on increased mobility, so that today the Soviets have only standardised armoured and motorised forces in addition to their airborne divisions. The cross-country and river-crossing capabilities of their units have been improved, as has their night-fighting ability. They have been equipped with heavier mobile weapons. One of the most important aspects of these modernisations has been a recent increase in conventional artillery and the equipping of ground forces with a variety of tactical nuclear weapons, some of which are mounted on tracked carriers to give them a higher degree of mobility. In general the Soviet forces are kept at a high level of proficiency from recruit training to advanced studies at military academies. They operate efficiently in both small and large-scale manoeuvres. All these developments make the Soviet army a modern, well-equipped and efficient fighting force, geared to the realities of the nuclear age.

Other Warsaw Pact Ground Forces.

Soviet strength is supplemented by forces provided by her allies totalling some 60 motorized rifle and tank divisions. There are about 6 East German, 15 Polish, 10 Czechoslovak, 6 Hungarian, 10 Ruman-

25
ian and 13 Bulgarian divisions. These armies are constantly improving in the fields of equipment, training and co-ordination with Soviet forces. Almost all the divisions are combat ready. As far as their reliability is concerned, it is assumed that these forces will support the Soviet Union in case of a conflict with NATO.

**Soviet Air Forces.**

The estimated strength of the Soviet Air Forces is at present of the order of about 6,000 fighters, 2,000 light, medium and heavy bombers, and 2,500 transport and other aircraft, totalling approximately 10,500 aircraft. About three-quarters of these, including some 3,000 air defence fighter aircraft, are likely to be of direct concern to the Alliance. The Soviet air forces are divided into five major components: Air Defence, Tactical, Long-Range, Transport and Naval Aviation. The quality of the aircraft is high and generally comparable with their Western counterparts. A large number of well protected airfields is available providing the Soviet air forces with a rapid redeployment capability and thus improving their flexibility and mobility. In view of this and the extensive air defence measures taken they also possess a high degree of survivability.

**Other Warsaw Pact Air Forces.**

These air forces comprise a total of some 2,500 aircraft, most of them being air defence fighters. It
can be assumed that the Soviets regard them as the forward element of their own air defence system.

**Soviet Navy.**

The Soviet Navy consists of four fleets: the Pacific, Baltic, Black Sea, and Northern Fleets. The Pacific Fleet is not of direct concern to NATO. The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets share the problem of limited and difficult access to the open sea and, in wartime, would have to force a passage through narrow straits unless they had redeployed in advance. During and since the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East in 1967 the Soviets have established a greatly increased presence in the Mediterranean, reaching at times a total of sixty or more ships of all types.

The Northern Fleet, with direct access to the Atlantic Ocean, forms the main threat against the lines of communication between America and Europe.

A significant aspect of Soviet naval strength lies in its submarine fleet, comprising about 380 submarines, of which three-quarters are long-range ocean-going types, capable of operation almost anywhere in the Atlantic or Pacific. This impressive Soviet submarine force, like the rest of the fleet, has been undergoing extensive modernisation and has rapidly increased in recent years. It probably now includes eighty nuclear-propelled submarines, some of which are capable of firing missiles from underwater to a range up to 1,500 miles. Many of
the conventionally-powered submarines are also armed with missiles. The largest number of Soviet submarines belong to the Northern Fleet and thus have access to areas of vital importance to the Alliance.

The pride of the Soviet surface fleet is now the cruiser-destroyer force, estimated at approximately 120 ships, including two helicopter cruisers. Many modernised ships or new classes of ships, fitted with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, have been sighted. The tendency to equip newly constructed ships with guided missiles rather than conventional weapons is also evident in quite small classes of vessels such as a fast patrol boat which has surface-to-surface missiles. Recently a larger craft of that kind with improved SSM armament became operational. Soviet Naval Forces include an estimated six brigades of naval infantry, subordinate to the four Soviet fleets. Each of these fleets is backed up by its own Fleet Air Force consisting of strike/reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft, with a number of transport aircraft in support. Nearly all Soviet medium-range naval aircraft can carry anti-ship missiles with ranges of about 100 nautical miles.

The Soviet Union was for many years essentially a land power, and the fleet was regarded as an extension of the army. However, in 1962 the navy was accorded its own position as an individual service and is now required both to perform its own
purely maritime tasks, and to co-operate in joint inter-service defence plans. This seems to indicate a growing appreciation of the proper application of seapower. Proof of this is to be found in the increasingly frequent appearances of Soviet fleet units in the Atlantic, in particular South of the Tropic of Cancer, and in the Indian Ocean far from their home bases, as well as in the continued Soviet build-up in the Mediterranean.

**Soviet Merchant Fleet and Intelligence Collecting Vessels.**

Another threat which was not fully appreciated until recently lies in the growth of the Soviet merchant and fishing fleets. From very modest beginnings, both have grown spectacularly in recent years. The Soviet "fish factory" ships and trawlers now range over the world's oceans, and it is significant that a high proportion of them are equipped for intelligence gathering. They carry comprehensive monitoring equipment and highly sophisticated electronic gear. Their speed is often in excess of that usually associated with such craft. It is not unusual for such a trawler to attach itself to NATO formations during exercises as an uninvited and extremely persistent observer.

The Soviets are devoting considerable attention to merchant shipping. The target that has been set for their merchant fleet, which at present has a tonnage of approximately 13 million, has been announced as more than 22 million tons by 1980.
Other Warsaw Pact Navies.

These Navies are small and mainly equipped to assume responsibility for the defence of home waters. They include a naval infantry force of almost two divisions with adequate sealift capability. Combined Warsaw Pact exercises have been carried out in both the Baltic and Black Seas, and an improved operational capability has been demonstrated.

Conclusions.

Although a military balance still exists between East and West when their military potential is viewed as a whole, the Warsaw Pact maintains a clear superiority of conventional forces in the European region. This advantage may be assumed to be offset by NATO’s numerical superiority in tactical nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear parity or even superiority appears to be a Soviet objective. Should they reach this goal, the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact could swing in favour of the latter, thus enabling the USSR to take greater risks in trying to impose their will not only on their allies but on NATO countries and the rest of the world as well.
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