

AS (PPT)

cc. Mr. Chapman

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
AND EUROPEAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(USRO)



OTAN-NATO
PLACE DU MARÉCHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY
PARIS XVII^E - FRANCE
May 5, 1967

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Colleague:

For the use of your Representative to Sub-Group 2 of the Future Tasks of the Alliance Study in preparation for the meeting of the Sub-Group on Monday, May 8, I enclose, as agreed at the Sub-Group 2 meeting on May 5, two copies of the May 4 letter from Mr. Robert R. Bowie to Mr. Paul-Henri Spaak.

I would be grateful if you could assure that your Representative receives the letter as soon as possible.

Sincerely,
James N. May

James N. May
Deputy Secretary of Delegation

The Lord Coleridge, Executive Secretary
Secretaries of Delegations

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1967

Dear Mr. Spaak:

No doubt Ambassador de Staercke has already reported to you on the April 26th Meeting of Sub-Group 2. The "questionnaire", which you produced on such short notice, was very useful in sparking an initial discussion.

At the April 26th Meeting, Ambassador de Staercke invited members to send you personal views about the work of the Sub-Group. No doubt you have received, or will be receiving, comments from other members.

In considering present and prospective relations among the Atlantic countries and the role of NATO over the next decade, the Sub-Group, I think, needs to examine three broad areas:

1. What interests or tasks do the Atlantic countries have in common currently and for some-time to come? (e.g., defense and deterrence, monetary stability and economic growth; promotion of and management of detente; arms control; underdeveloped countries.)

2. What are the factors which cause friction among the Atlantic countries and impede cooperation? (e.g. disparity in size between the United States and individual NATO members; recession of fear of Soviet political and military pressure; differing allied views on European structure and Atlantic ties; fear of US-USSR collusion; differing global outlooks of the United States and individual European members.)

3. The

His Excellency
Paul Henri Spaak.

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3. Which tasks are most appropriate for NATO to undertake? What measures might improve its members' capacity for joint action?

Without prejudging the Sub-Group's conclusions, I am reasonably certain that question No. 2 above will reveal at least two major causes of friction.

First, disparity in size and power between the United States and individual European members. This disparity in many fields -- military, political, economic, technological -- causes inevitable difficulty in spite of good will on the part of both the United States and the European members of NATO. My guess is that this situation will only be remedied substantially when Europe has achieved some kind of entity able to act in one or more of the above-mentioned fields. This is obviously a situation which is not likely to change in the near future. Nevertheless, once the cause and the potential cure are recognized, the present inadequacies may be easier to manage or live with for a period.

Second, the feeling in Europe that the threat of Soviet aggression has receded means that NATO members are less willing to pursue common interests at the expense of immediate, narrower, national interests.

There is no ready-made solution to these problems; however, I do believe it is important to get these facts of life into the open. In spite of the willingness in principle to face controversial issues at the first

meeting,

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meeting, several members at the second meeting seemed to have second thoughts when faced with the actual prospect of looking into sources of tension among the Allies. I am glad that Ambassador de Staercke agreed that the study would lose much of its value if controversial issues were avoided.

Although your questionnaire was very helpful in stimulating an initial discussion, I am taking the liberty of suggesting that it could be condensed somewhat. In particular, I doubt whether we should spend too much time on what the Treaty means or in focusing on short-term issues. Rather, I venture to suggest that we should be looking to our common interests and tasks over a longer period of time.

I look forward to seeing you on May 8.

Sincerely,

Robert R. Bowie
Counsellor

COPY TO:

Ambassador de Staercke

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SPECIAL GROUP ON THE FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE
SUB-GROUP 2: "INTER-ALLIED RELATIONS"

ISSUES

I. Ideological Bases and Unity of the Alliance

1. What are the continuing joint interests or tasks of the Allies in defense and deterrence, and in the political, economic and technological fields?

2. May we assume that the Alliance will continue to serve the interests of its members for the indefinite future?

3. Have the changes in the policy of the USSR and the European Communist countries lessened the incentive of the Allies to take common decisions concerning the problems posed by Soviet military and political strength? For the NATO area? For areas adjacent to NATO? For other areas?

II. Possibility of Strengthening the Links Between the Allied Countries as a Whole

1. Will a frank examination of causes of friction among the Allies assist in understanding how to improve allied cooperation -- in the near term? In the long term?

2. What

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2. What are the main obstacles to joint action and policy?

3. How far can consultation achieve harmonization of policy among the allies, or at least insure that decisions are taken in the light of knowledge of the views of other allies?

4. In view of differing degrees of interest among allies, can the Alliance continue to develop flexible systems of effective consultation among those Allies who are concerned with specific subjects?

5. What other measures will facilitate joint action?

III. Prospects for Inter-European Cooperation within the Alliance

1. Should an effort be made to organize a European caucus or cooperation within the Alliance?

2. If so, what should be the scope of this cooperation? Should it be political? Military? Economic? Technological?

IV. Long and Short-Term Consequences of European Unification

What are the likely long and short-term consequences for the Alliance of steps toward European unification?

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