

24th April, 1967

FUTURE TASKS OF THE ALLIANCE: SUB-GROUP 2Meeting in the office of the Secretary General24th April, 1967

Present: Secretary General
Acting ASG for Political Affairs
Directeur du Cabinet
Special Adviser for Policy Planning

The Secretary General, before turning to the various questionnaires submitted by Rapporteurs in the HARMEL Exercise, pointed out that any intervention of the International Secretariat should occur at an early stage in the Exercise. If at all, the Secretariat should intervene before the discussions were subjected to the restraining influence of Government instructions.

The Secretary General then examined the questionnaires submitted by M. Paul-Henri Spaak as Rapporteur of Sub-Group 2. His comments, question by question, were as follows:

Questions 1 to 5

threat
The political content of the Alliance is as essential as the military one: they are inseparable, and the political element becomes even more essential in so far as the military ~~trend~~ seems to recede. However, the political element is not necessarily equal to the objective of an Atlantic Community. The aim of political solidarity within the Alliance is quite different from the Community objective and should not be linked with it. The Community objective is at best acceptable as a distant ideal.

Question 6

The Alliance was brought into being ^{main} to oppose Russian expansion, ~~not~~ ^{than} the spread of Communism as an ideology.

Questions 8 to 13

Just as the political and military contents of the Alliance are irrevocably linked and the political element is no less essential than the military one, there is, and inevitably should be, an indispensable tool to maintain political unity - in the form of the North Atlantic Council of which the first duty and tasks are political.

Question 14

usual *90 on*
~~It is dangerous for the continuance of the Alliance to depend upon the continuing of "Communism" and the possibility, according to Article 13 of the Treaty, for Alliance countries to leave the Alliance. In this context the Secretary General said that while taking the dim view of "declarations of intent", such a declaration, to the effect that no one would use the right of denunciation, might be acceptable if it would ~~cancel~~ ^{cancel} the enjoyment not use the right of denunciation unless~~

added *presence*
 if two conditions were ~~added~~: the ~~absence~~ of a serious political situation and that no decision would ever be taken without preceding full and timely political consultation.

Question 15

Even without military integration, there is a case for strong political inter-relationships and thus for their strengthening. In other words, the strengthening of political co-operation does not depend on the extent of military integration.

Question 18

The Secretary General ~~doubts whether this is quite true.~~ *would prefer a direct answer instead of*

Question 19

The Secretary General thinks that this question should be placed earlier in the paper, *and the answer already given is in the*

Question 20

The Secretary General's answer is negative, *especially after the 1954 protocols -*

Questions 23 to 26

The Secretary General believes it is right to raise the issue of consultation in this Sub-Group. He thinks in this context of the particular situation in East/West relations as a result of increasing détente. While it is no use repeating the general maxims of the Three Wise Men, it is relevant to ask what degree of solidarity is required in view of the détente and its implications. In this connection, the Secretary General suggests that the Alliance is entering into a new period: the causes of stress in the practice of consultation may move back to Europe: examples which come to mind include the German problem and the issue of proliferation.

Questions 27 and 28

The Secretary General thinks this is not possible in practice. He doubts whether one can extend consultation without commitments and reluctantly concludes that an exchange of views and information is the best that can be hoped for.

Questions 29 to 33

While a united Europe should certainly be as large and strong as possible, the Secretary General feels that an answer to inter-European co-operation within the Alliance does not depend on Great Britain's membership of the Six, the definition of the kind of Europe to be created, or the situation of Canada. The question depends upon the degree of European unification which, however, cannot be solved within the Alliance, nor prejudged or limited by the Alliance. Again, whether there shall be any European political or military consultation is a matter for the Europeans to decide although, to be sure, the effects of such consultation will have to be studied. (For the further remarks of the Secretary General on another aspect of the European problem, see below.)

Question 34

The signing of a Treaty of non-proliferation is important; but such a Treaty would not change the position of Europe and is therefore no condition for the study of possible inter-European co-operation within the Alliance.

Question 39

The true unification of Europe is, in the opinion of the Secretary General, not advanced far enough as to permit the assessment of any consequences in the Alliance.

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Having concluded his review of M. Spaak's paper, the Secretary General added the following observations which, he pointed out, are relevant not only to the questionnaire of M. Spaak but also to that submitted by State Secretary Schuetz, and indeed to the work of Sub-Groups 1 and 2.

The Secretary General emphasised that there is an imperative need to define what kind of Europe we consider when we speak of European Security, a European Settlement etc. Why? Because the Alliance, if it ~~is~~ - and the United States commitment to Europe - is to make any sense, must differentiate between Eastern and Western Europe. To speak lightheartedly of political and security arrangements for the whole of Europe really means playing into the hands of the Russians and the end of the Alliance. In a collective security system covering the whole of Europe, there is obviously no place for the Alliance. In this consideration, the Secretary General found yet another reason for ~~inclinings~~ inclining towards a bloc-to-bloc approach to East/West problems (the other consideration obviously being the fear that separate initiatives and moves will permit the Russians to play off one country against another).