NATO SECRET

Record - Informal MC/CS Session

7 November 1969

SUMMARY RECORD

INFORMAL MEETING OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN
CHIEFS OF STAFF SESSION

Held on Saturday, 20 September 1969, commencing at 1000 hours
in the Music Room, 1st Floor Lancaster House
London, England

PRESENT

President: Vice Admiral H. M. van den Wall Bake
Chairman: Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson
Belgium: Lieutenant General C. Vivario
Canada: General F. R. Sharp
Denmark: General K. R. Ramberg
Germany: General U. Maiziere
Greece: Lieutenant General O. Angelis
Italy: General J. Vedovato
Luxembourg: Lieutenant Colonel M. Mayer
Netherlands: Vice Admiral H. M. van den Wall Bake
Norway: Vice Admiral F. Johannessen
Portugal: Lieutenant General H. C. dos Santos Paiva
Turkey: General M. Tagmac
United Kingdom: Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Charles Elworthy
United States: General E. G. Wheeler

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ALSO PRESENT

French Military Mission: Major General J. P. E. Spitzer (PART I only)
Supreme Allied Commander Europe: General A. J. Goodpaster
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic: Admiral E. P. Holmes
Allied Commander in Chief Channel: Admiral Sir John Bush
Director, IMS: Lieutenant General N. G. Palaiologopoulos
Vice Director, IMS: Lieutenant General T. R. Milton

COPY TO: MILREPS
FMM (PART I only)
SACEUR
SACLANT
CINCHAN
LIST B
SACEURREP
SACLANTREP

NATO SECRET
Record - Informal MG/CS Session

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Item | Page No.
--- | ---
President's Opening Remarks | 5

PART I

Item 1 | Adoption of the Agenda for PART I of the Meeting | 5

Item 2 | Report by the Military Committee Group of Experts on the Application of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) to the NATO Military Command, Control and Information System (NMCCIS) | 6

Item 3 | Preliminary Report of the Military Implication of the NATO Security Breach Detected 4 August 69 | 9

PART II

Item 1 | Adoption of the Agenda for PART II of the Meeting | 12

Item 2 | A Study on the Consequences of the New Strategic Concept (MC 14/5) in the ACCHAN Area - Statement by CINCHAN | 12

Item 3 | STANAVFORLANT Surveillance Mission - Statement by SACLANT | 14

Item 4 | Status Report on Subjects of Major Interest to the Military Committee - Relative Force Capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact | 17

Item 5 | Next Meeting | 18

Item 6 | Any Other Business | 18

6.a | Canadian Force Reductions | 18

NATO SECRET
Record - Informal MC/CS Session
**TABLE OF CONTENTS (Contd)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidents Closing Remarks</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENCLOSURE 1</td>
<td>Statement Released by the Canadian Minister of National Defence to the Press at 1030 hours, 19 September 1969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PRESIDENT'S OPENING REMARKS

The President in his opening remarks:

a. Welcomed the Chiefs of Staff, the Major NATO Commanders, the Military Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of the French Military Mission to the Military Committee.

b. Expressed regret that General V.A. Deslandes, Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces could not attend and hoped that he would find it possible to be present at the next MC/CS meeting.

c. Welcomed the following who were attending an MC/CS meeting for the first time:

- General F.R. Sharp, Canadian Forces, Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff
- General A.J. Goodpaster, US Army, SACEUR
- Major General J.P.E. Spitzer, French Army, Chief of the French Military Mission to the Military Committee.

d. Expressed the honour he felt in his appointment as President of the Military Committee and his belief that the role of the Committee in the Alliance would continue to be of the same intrinsic value as it had been over the past twenty years.

e. Said that he felt particularly privileged to act as host for the Military Committee in the Netherlands during the 1969 Tour.

f. Commented briefly on the main items for consideration that day and expressed the hope that the Committee's discussions would prove to be fruitful.

The President then invited the Chairman, Admiral Sir Nigel Henderson, to conduct the meeting.

ART I

Item 1 ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA FOR PART I OF THE MEETING

THE COMMITTEE ADOPTED the agenda for PART I of the meeting.
PART I

Item 2 REPORT BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE GROUP OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING (ADP) TO THE NATO MILITARY COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (NMCCIS)

The Chairman said that the ad hoc Group of Experts formed by the Committee(1) to consider the Application of Automatic Data Processing to the NATO Military Command, Control and Information System had first met on the 15 July and established 1 October 1969 as the target date for the completion of its report. This report had now been finalised and would be distributed in the near future.

The Chairman then thanked the Chiefs of Staff of those nations who had made the Experts concerned available at very short notice during a period in which many countries observed summer leave. The Experts provided were all of a high calibre, very well qualified and experienced in the complicated and highly specialised field of automatic data processing and had given their whole-hearted support in a co-operative and practical manner. He believed that the report when issued would be most worthy of the attention of the Chiefs of Staff and hoped that their interest would continue in the future.

He then invited Lieutenant General Milton, Vice Director, IMS, who had chaired the work of the Group to present a brief summary of the report.

Lieutenant General Milton, Vice Director, IMS, said that at the end of June 1969, the Military Committee had agreed(1) the formation of a Group of Experts on the Application of Automatic Data Processing to the NATO Military Command, Control and Information System (NMCCIS). The desired system was to serve the Military Committee for information and the MNCs and MSCs for command and control. The Military Committee appointed him as Chairman of this Group, which had met for the first time on 15 July and had set 1 October as a target date for the completion of its task.

The following had responded to the hasty requirement for the provision of experts for the Group:

Belgium
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
United Kingdom
United States
SHAPE
ACLANT
ACCHAN
and the IMS

(1) Record - MC-24-69, 3 July 69, PART I, Item 5
France attended only the first meeting but had expressed interest in future developments.

He was pleased to announce that the final report of this Group had been completed some three weeks ahead of the scheduled deadline and it only remained for the administrative details of publishing it to be completed, which would be effected before 1 October.

He believed that the report fulfilled every objective for which it had been intended and in fact provided more than was asked for. It contained complete annexes describing the necessary processes for achieving ADP capabilities throughout NATO and specifically supported in detail each proposal developed in the report itself. It also took into account the need to co-ordinate the military and civil ADP requirements of NATO.

The report identified the management organisation, special skills and principal objectives necessary for the NATO Military Command, Control and Information System. It also pointed out systems and management deficiencies which currently existed and the pitfalls to be avoided in the near future. Implementation of the recommendations of the report should therefore reduce the risk in terms of time and money and increase the ultimate capability of an improved NATO Military Command, Control and Information System.

The report was very specific with respect to three main areas:

a. Organisational Arrangements needed to manage and co-ordinate Command, Control and Information Systems and ADP support, both international and multinational.

b. NATO-Wide Systems Considerations, including recommended policy and guidelines.

c. The Centralised Support Structure which is so vital to the implementation and success of any undertaking of this type.

The principal recommendations of the report could be summarised as follows:

a. A new Command Systems Division to be formed in the IMS, having a staff responsibility for the Command, Control and Information System and ADP matters as well as those NATO-wide standardisation activities related to them. Initially, the nucleus of this division would be available from existing IMS resources with the exception of an Assistant Director and secretarial support.
b. A Command Systems Board and a Multinational Command Systems Working Group to be formed to replace the current DATOR Board and MEDAC respectively. These two proposed multinational organisations would be oriented towards Command, Control and Information Systems and ADP matters and would have an international point of contact in the proposed Command Systems Division of the IMS.

c. The Military Committee to manage the nation-wide ADP System and have direct technical support from a new Central Command Systems Support Agency (CCSSA).

d. Policies, principles and guidelines to be published to permit effective and cohesive command and control and ADP planning.

The report had taken note of the need to co-ordinate the military and civil ADP requirements. It concluded that further studies initiated by the North Atlantic Council on the overall NATO Command, Control and Information Systems should take into account the efforts made to improve the existing Military Command, Control and Information System and possibly make use of such military facilities to meet part of its own information requirements.

He stressed that the value of the report would be lost unless decisions and commitments were made at an early date to permit planning to continue so that a responsible Command, Control and Information System capability could be achieved by 1972.

THE COMMITTEE:

a. Took note of the statement made by the Vice Director, IMS, on the report to be issued by the NATO Military Committee Group of Experts on the Application of Automatic Data Processing to the NATO Military Command, Control and Information System and of the recommendations that this report would contain.

b. Noted that this report would be issued by the beginning of October 1969 and would then be considered by the Military Committee.
PART I

Item 3  PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE MILITARY IMPLICATION OF THE NATO SECURITY BREACH DETECTED 4 AUGUST 1969

The Chairman said that the NATO security breach detected on 4 August 1969 was still under investigation by the NATO Security Directorate and by the French Authorities who were conducting a interrogation of the man concerned. The results of both these activites were awaited. He believed this to be the worst security breach that NATO had ever experienced. He then invited Rear Admiral Poser, Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, IMS, to report on the current position and on the intentions regarding future security measures.

The Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, IMS, said that his report was based on interim reports by the Deputy Secretary General and the Director, NATO Security Directorate.

The facts were:

a. On 4 August 1969, Mr. F. Roussilhe, a French civilian, 40 years of age, had been taken into custody by the Belgian Security Service on suspicion of espionage for Rumanian Authorities. He had been employed for 17 years in NATO as a clerk in various positions, most recently in the Translators' Documentation Section.

b. Interrogation by the Belgian Security Service, the French Security Service and the NATO Security Directorate indicated that he had commenced his espionage work about 6 years before and had been very well paid for it.

c. Roussilhe had started by taking documents out of the building but later on had produced the espionage material asked for by micro-filming it himself. To give some idea about the extent of his later activity he had handed over to his controllers, embassy members, up to 7 rolls of film, which was approximately 240 pages of text, weekly.

During his service in NATO, Roussilhe had had access to many documents. It was, however, during the last two years, while working as the Head of the Translators' Documentation Section, that the major damage had been done. In this position, he had been able to call for any document which was retained by the Translators' Documentation Section or handled for translation purposes. Thus, whether documents were translated or not, they had been available to Roussilhe on an official basis.
When this very grave security breach was considered together with previous spy cases, especially the 1968 Imre case, it must be assumed that nearly all military and political documents of the Alliance over at least the last six years had been compromised. This included COSMIC TOP SECRET and some NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP documents. It did not include ATOMAL and EMERGENCY DEFENSE PLANS. In addition, the area of compromise encompassed subjects which, although less sensitive, provided valuable background material on the Alliance's thinking and cohesion. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact leaders should now be able to build up a comprehensive picture of existing weaknesses and strengths within NATO and to gain a thorough knowledge of NATO's approach to defense expenditures and of its methods of collective leadership and decision making.

In summary, final results of the investigations by the NATO Security Directorate and of the interrogation by the French Authorities were still outstanding. However, interim reports already showed that the damage done must be assessed as EXTREMELY GRAVE. Documents covering nearly all activities of the Alliance had been compromised, including those on which the Major NATO Commanders have based their plans for the defense of the Alliance.

Regarding security measures in the future he said that pending the final report and recommendations of the NATO Security Directorate, which was responsible for the examination of all questions affecting NATO security, the IMS had set up a working group for consideration of what steps might be taken to strengthen security within its own area. In addition, the Director, IMS, had proposed to the NATO Security Directorate that a Committee with representation from the IS and the IMS be established to investigate and recommend on security measures within NATO Headquarters at Evere. It was understood that this proposal had the support of the Secretary General and that a special committee would be formed in the near future.

The United States Member considered that this case, as with other national and NATO security breaches in the past, illustrated the general laxity in background checks on individuals employed in sensitive positions. The tendency was to assume that an initial screening on appointment remained valid thereafter. This was not necessarily true and he attributed many breaches of security to the fact that supervisors did not take notice of the personal habits of their employees, as regards such matters as drinking, womanising and spending beyond their apparent means, and were blind to changes in character.

In connection with the intentions for future security measures mentioned by the Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, IMS, he considered that the lesson to be learnt in this case was that security should be tightened to the point where it hurt. In this so-called time of peace and detente security was too lax and the tendency was not to believe that espionage could and did exist. The highly sophisticated and ingenious devices and methods used by spies reflected the great amount of effort put into espionage and the great importance and value attached to the acquisition of information which was not known to be compromised.
He urged that the representative of the IMS on the proposed joint US/IMS Committee take an extremely strong and rigid stand on the imposition of proper security measures to include checks on personnel, periodic rechecks from time to time, and vigilance by superiors on the actions and personal habits of their subordinates.

The United Kingdom Member welcomed and supported the remarks made by the United States Member. It was important that a report on this case should be provided to nations as soon as possible so that an assessment could be made of the loss of security involved in this case in the light of previous cases. The most vital NATO and national plans had been jeopardised and it was essential that new security measures should be introduced.

The Committee took note:

a. Of a preliminary assessment by the Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, IMS, of the military implications of the NATO security breach detected on 4 August 1969 which rated the damage done as EXTREMELY GRAVE.

b. Of the proposals for reviewing the security measures within the NATO Headquarters at Evere with a view to their improvement in the future.

c. Of comments made by the United States Member and endorsed by the United Kingdom Member, particularly:

   (1) The vital importance of tightening and improving security measures in NATO.

   (2) That such improvement should take into account procedures and the initial and subsequent security screening of personnel having access to sensitive material and also the continuous scrutiny of their behaviour by other responsible superiors.

d. That this case reinforced a decision taken in an earlier session that documents containing very sensitive information, in some cases of an ATOMAL nature, and including the operational plans of the Major NATO Commanders, should not be held in NATO Headquarters, Evere.

This concluded PART I of the meeting.
PART II

Item 1 ADOPTION OF AGENDA FOR PART II OF THE MEETING

THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ADOPTED the Agenda for PART II of the meeting.

Item 2 A STUDY ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT (MC 14/3) IN THE ACCHAN AREA - STATEMENT BY CINCHAN

The Chairman said that in October 1968, the Military Committee had approved a report on CINCHAN's Study on the Consequences of the New Strategic Concept in the ACCHAN Area and had considered the Study and the attached report to be a suitable basis from which CINCHAN should proceed with the preparation of a revised emergency defence plan and contingency plans for the ACCHAN area. In January 1969, the Secretary General had invited the DPC to note the report. The DPC had shown great interest and had suggested that CINCHAN provide its Members with a short briefing. CINCHAN would do so at the DPC meeting scheduled for 21 October 1969 and had kindly agreed to outline this forthcoming briefing to the Committee.

CINCHAN said that he had been invited by the Secretary General to be present when the DPC discussed his Study on 21 October, and he thought that the Chiefs of Staff might like to know what he intended to say.

In fact, he believed that there was very little to be said as the study was short and said precisely what it meant. He proposed, therefore, only to make a few opening remarks and to be prepared to answer questions.

The points he intended to make to the Committee were three. First, that the Study stemmed directly from the change in the strategy of NATO now embodied in MC 14/3 - it was not a whim of the Commander-in-Chief to do something different from his predecessors.

Second, he was aware that any study which produced a solution postulating more forces was liable to be suspect. He would make it clear that the requirement for more forces stemmed not from the Study itself but from the whole strategic concept embodied in MC 14/3. The crux of the whole paper was in paragraph 35, which he quoted in full:

"The important change in concept of operations, therefore, is that whereas under MC 14/2 the priority task in ACCHAN was the early evacuation of shipping, under MC 14/3 CINCHAN must be capable of a deterrent posture and maritime response before this stage is reached. The control of the ACCHAN area and maintenance of supplies to Europe and SACEUR thus become his primary task, while maintaining the capability to evacuate shipping, should...

(1) Record - MC-345, 8 Nov 68, Item 2.3
(2) MCM-88-68, 31 Oct 68
(3) CINCHAN CHEL 1554/6, 10 Jun 68
(4) PC/69/566, 14 Jul 69

NATO SECRET
Record - Informal MC/CS Session

-12-
The argument which had led to this conclusion had, of course, been agreed by the Military Committee.

The third point he intended to make was that the Channel Command, much misunderstood in some circles, was different to the other major Commands - both of which disposed very considerable maritime forces - in two important respects. First, the waters of the Channel Command were very much more restricted. This meant that the concentration of shipping was very great and countermeasures such as re-routing and dispersal were meaningless. Shipping must, therefore, be fought through the Channel and particularly its approaches if SACEUR was to receive the reinforcements and supplies, both from the US and the UK, that he would need at any level of hostilities postulated by MC 14/3. Secondly, the Command was vitally concerned with the control of merchant shipping. Paragraph 4 of the Study(1) showed the sort of density of shipping in peacetime required to keep the economy of Europe going - 200 ocean-going ships and 300 coasters at sea every day and 1100 ocean-going ships and 3500 coasters in harbour. This shipping, carrying one million tons a day to Europe, was routed through shallow waters - susceptible to mining - to reach Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, London and the other major ports of northwest Europe. The Channel Command was, therefore, vitally concerned with shipping control and minesweeping problems of a totally different scale to those faced by other Commands.

Finally, he intended to say that he knew of no Commander who would happily withdraw all his forces at the outset of hostilities. His job, as he saw it, was not the evacuation of shipping - it was to ensure that SACEUR got the supplies he needed, that Europe continued to be viable, and that the job which SACLANT did in the broad waters of the Atlantic was brought to a satisfactory conclusion in the ports of Europe. Only by so doing could the threshold be raised at which a decision to use nuclear weapons or accept the subjection of Europe must be made.

THE COMMITTEE TOOK NOTE of the statement by CINCHAN, outlining the points he intended to make when presenting his Study(1) to the DPC on the 22 October on the Consequences for the ACCCHAN Area of the New Strategic Concept.

(1) CINCHAN CHEL 1534/6, 10 Jun 68
PART II

Item 3

STANAVFORLANT SURVEILLANCE MISSION - ORAL STATEMENT BY SACLANT

SACLANT said that the recent surveillance carried out by the Standing Naval Force Atlantic in the Norwegian Sea was a NATO first. It was essential that the Committee understand and agree on what it accomplished and what it did not.

The Standing Naval Force was conceived as a contribution to the implementation of NATO's present strategy of flexible response as set forth in MG 14/3 and MG 48/3. The keystone to this strategy was, of course, deterrence, and an element of deterrence is surveillance - to show that we expected to know as much as we could about our prospective opponent. Two of the tasks assigned to NATO naval forces in peacetime by MG 118, Roles and Tasks of NATO Naval Forces and their Relationship to other NATO Forces were:

a. To demonstrate the unity and capability of NATO in order to discourage or counter Soviet maritime activity, and
b. To assist in providing intelligence necessary for an assessment of Soviet capabilities and intentions.

It was in this context that he had stated(1) his plan to employ the STANAVFORLANT in a surveillance role, consistent with the approved operational schedule of the force.

As the picture of Soviet maritime activity had begun to unfold in the Norwegian sea about 25 August, it had become apparent that an opportunity could develop to employ STANAVFORLANT in this manner, without disrupting the operational exercises already planned. This seemed a proper peacetime utilization of the force. He had, therefore, instituted(2) initial action to determine the feasibility of such a task and once determined, to inform the Military Committee of his intentions(1). Such employment of the force was to have a threefold purpose; to supplement the surveillance of the Soviets forces in the Norwegian sea; to give the Soviets visible evidence of NATO's dedication to the principle of freedom of the seas; and, quite simply, to exercise the Standing Naval Force in a role for which it was designed. Its purpose was not designed to test command and control procedures through the chain of command, or to create an urgent politico-military problem requiring short fuse action. As he had mentioned in his talk at SHAPEX, opportunities as sea were fleeting ones, and effective reaction must be geared accordingly. For this reason, he had utilized the "unless otherwise directed" procedure in stating his plan(1) to the Military Committee.

(1) LANTO 038, 27 Aug 69
(2) SACLANT to CINCEASTALTANT 262020Z, Aug 69
The surveillance had been entirely successful within the purposes he had stated. It had been conducted under closely controlled and monitored conditions with rules of engagement \(1\) tailored to provide a safe and non-provocative atmosphere. Its prime value lay not only in the intelligence gained, which could be important, but also in the employment of a NATO force in a posture of watching Soviet activities at sea in a similar manner to that which the Soviets were at that very moment doing in surveillance of EXERCISE PEACEKEEPER.

Recently, he had spoken to Commodore Veldkamp, Royal Netherlands Navy, the Commander of the Force who had felt, as he himself did, that, in addition to its prime value, the operation had helped to put meat on the bones of the STANAVFORLANT concept; demonstrated in a real way the inherent flexibility of the naval forces; provided the most realistic training yet available to STANAVFORLANT; demonstrated a procedure for control of the force under such conditions; enhanced to a significant degree the individual feeling within the force that a real NATO contribution had been made and finally provided intelligence information.

Examples of the intelligence information gained were:


b. An appreciable amount of technical information in the form of magnetic tapes and photographs, which upon detailed analysis might be of value in estimating trends and improvements in Soviet naval equipment.

In addition, it had afforded an opportunity for the STANAVFORLANT to inject NATO surveillance information directly into the recently established surveillance coordination centre system, thereby providing a means to exercise the procedure for information flow from NATO forces at sea as set forth in the SACLANT surveillance study \(2\).

He hoped that this initial demonstration of the potential usefulness of STANAVFORLANT in a surveillance role would be the prologue to a normal pattern; a pattern where Soviet commanding officers exercising at sea might come to expect NATO ships in their vicinity, just as routine as the reports received by NATO Commanders that Soviet ships were observing NATO maneuvers.

Finally he believed that the operation had been fully successful in meeting its objective and hoped that it would prove to be a significant milestone in NATO maritime experience.

(1)  LANTC 036, 27 Aug 69
(2)  OCL-31-69, 7 May 69

NATO SECRET
Record - Informal MC/CS Session
The Chairman said that it was routine for national forces to shadow Soviet forces and he believed that it should not be abnormal for NATO forces such as STANAVFORLANT to do the same. He also considered that it should be agreed that SACLANT's use of the "unless otherwise directed" procedure was correct and should be the normal, if not routine, procedure for the future. This procedure gave the Military Committee and the Chiefs of Staff the opportunity to veto a plan on military grounds and the DPC the opportunity to veto it on political grounds. It might well be necessary, however, to examine the terms of reference for STANAVFORLANT in the light of this procedure.

The United States Member said that he had no reservations on the usefulness of the surveillance mission conducted by STANAVFORLANT. However, his staff advised him that the terms of reference for STANAVFORLANT gave SACLANT the necessary authority to conduct these exercises and he questioned whether SACLANT's authority in this respect was not sufficiently clear or specific. He personally deplored the use of the "unless otherwise directed" procedure unless it was absolutely necessary.

The Chairman commented that the proposed terms of reference for STANAVFORLANT might not be clear enough and they would be re-examined to ensure that they were entirely clear to all concerned in the future. He hoped that more exercises of this nature would be undertaken in the future. The Soviets expected this type of activity and NATO forces should be seen.

THE COMMITTEE:

a. Took note of a statement by SACLANT on the STANAVFORLANT surveillance mission carried out on 30 August 1969 in the Norwegian Sea.

b. Agreed that SACLANT should continue to employ the STANAVFORLANT on similar missions within his Terms of Reference.

c. Took note that the Terms of Reference for the STANAVFORLANT were now under review to ensure that there could be no ambiguity in their interpretation.
The Chairman referred to a Status Report (1) on the Study of the Relative Forces Capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and drew special attention to its paragraph 8 which stated that the Military Committee would be receiving the Working Group report on 1 October 1969, that the DPC would consider it together with Military Committee comments on 20 November and that the Military Committee comments should, therefore, be in the hands of the Steering Committee by 13 November.

It now appeared certain that the completed Working Group report would not be ready until about the middle of October. A draft MC report would be issued as soon as possible thereafter but this would only leave about three weeks for the receipt of formal national comments before it was taken by the DPC on 13 November prior to its consideration at the Ministerial Meeting of the DPC in early December.

He asked Members whether they could accept a period of only three weeks as sufficient time to formulate national comments and said that if this was unacceptable it would be necessary to request the DPC to postpone Ministerial consideration of this subject.

The Canadian Member doubted whether a period of three weeks would be sufficient to permit him to give the subject the attention it deserved and to prepare meaningful comments. Informal comments would, however, be possible in that time. The Turkish Member also doubted whether a period of three weeks would be sufficient for national comments to be developed.

The Chairman urged that Members do their best to provide national comments in the period available and so avoid any postponement of Ministerial consideration of this subject.

THE COMMITTEE:


b. Took note that time for formal national comments on the Military Committee’s assessment of this study, due to be taken by Ministers at their December meeting, was now expected to be reduced to as little as three weeks (paragraph 9 of the report) (1)

(c) Agreed to make every endeavour to submit formal national comments on the Military Committee’s assessment in the reduced time that would now be available.

(1) IMSM-435-69, 25 Aug 69
ITEM 5

NEXT MEETING

The Committee agreed to hold its next meeting on Tuesday, 2 December 1969 at 1000 hours at NATO Headquarters, Evere, Brussels, Belgium.

ITEM 6

ANY OTHER BUSINESS

6a. CANADIAN FORCE REDUCTIONS

The Chairman referred to various reports particularly in newspapers published that day on the Canadian Government's final decisions on the reductions and deployment of the Canadian Forces for NATO and copies of the full statement were then distributed (enclosure 1). He then referred to discussions at a DPC meeting on the previous day, at which the Military Committee had been represented, and read out the essential elements of the Secretary General's summing up as follows:

"The sense of the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee, as revealed in their discussion this morning, may be summed up as follows:

1. Since 28 May, there has been extensive consultation amongst members of the Alliance participating in NATO's integrated military forces regarding the Canadian proposal to reduce its military contribution to NATO.

2. There have been positive developments in those consultations and the Canadian Government has shown willingness to make adjustments in its proposals, in the light of opinions expressed by other members of the Alliance, with the result that Canadian forces will continue to play a meaningful, though reduced, role in the implementation of the strategy of the Alliance.

3. It is necessary that the consideration of remedial measures should proceed in parallel with these consultations and in contact with the Canadian Authorities, so as to achieve a final outcome which will try to guarantee sufficient strength in the Central European Region.

4. The two closely linked questions of the Canadian Force Proposals and the consequential remedial measures are relevant and important for the prospects of negotiating balanced force reductions with the Warsaw Powers."

The Chairman then said that the task remained of negotiating for timely remedial measures to be taken to guarantee sufficient strength in the Central European Region.
SACEUR said that his headquarters had participated actively and perhaps even forcefully in the NATO consultation procedures on this subject. Under General Lemnitzer's direction an assessment had been made and after consultation with the DPC a counter-proposal had been prepared and considered by the Canadian Authorities. The Canadian Authorities had made adjustments to their programmes and indicated what the limits of these adjustments would be. Specific remedial measures had also been developed and proposed by SHAPE and an effort had been made to frame these proposals in concrete terms because of the pressing time factor. If a gap were to develop in the Central European Region it would be necessary to move expeditiously to try and organise these remedial measures.

His concern was twofold: it went beyond the immediate adverse and direct impact upon deterrence and defence which might occur and included concern on the equally serious danger of a declining spiral as other nations and their peoples took note of downward steps within NATO. There was a danger that such an attitude might spread and his view was that there was no military justification known to him for the reduction of forces and/or resources in the area of Allied Command Europe. Further that security for the NATO countries could only be weakened by force reductions or withdrawals.

The decision taken by the Canadian Authorities would as indicated provide a meaningful though reduced role in the fulfilment of the NATO strategy. The dimensions of the reduction were substantial and after the adjustments had been made the force would level out at about 5,000 in lieu of a force of the order of 10,000 that currently existed.

Two meetings had been held on the subject of remedial measures and the precise steps which the other NATO nations contributing to the North Central European Region were prepared to take were still not clear. In other cases the nature and size of the proposed steps had yet to be determined. He was, however, highly gratified with the positive attitude towards the proposals in principle which had been shown and this was true at the military level throughout and at higher levels in the case of many of the countries concerned. It seemed to him that this attitude was a very significant feature and it would be his purpose to build upon it. Concrete steps had been described in at least a preliminary way which would have real value in maintaining the strength in the Central European Area. Further procedures were not yet clear and would need to be worked out as consultations proceeded.

(1) SHAPE 1240.5/20, 16 Jul 69
(2) SHAPE 1240.5/20, 5 Aug 69
In conclusion SACEUR made the following three points:

a. It was incumbent upon all the NATO nations to seek to maintain its strength in the vital area concerned.

b. It was his intention that SHAPE would continue to advise and assist in order to facilitate and encourage the provision of the additional resources since defence could be no greater than the resources provided would permit.

c. It was only through the methods he had described that he could continue to fulfill the important objective of preserving unity of action in this area and making the forward defence concept effective and of keeping the deterrence credible.

Finally he asked for co-operation from nations and offered the co-operation of his headquarters and his command.

SACLANT said that the heart of his concern in the ACLANT area was the submarine threat. This threat was growing in capability, in sophistication and in the addition of more nuclear power submarines, and a significant advance had been demonstrated in the Soviet capability to operate this force. It was indeed a very grave threat.

Against this situation ACLANT had a declining anti-submarine warfare capability which had been documented in various papers presented to the Military Committee. He considered the situation to be extremely serious and he had expressed(l) his concern in this manner about the decline in ACLANT ASW capability when the HMCS Bonaventure was withdrawn in January 1970. He was gratified to know that there would be a partial replacement of this capability by the introduction of four new DDH type ships and in the knowledge of the Canadian capability in anti-submarine warfare, the contribution of these ships would be gratefully welcome. He had hoped that perhaps the HMCS Bonaventure might be retained until the four DDHs were received but the decision had been made that this could not be done.

He would work with the Canadian Authorities to adjust what could be done in the vital areas of the Atlantic adjacent to and extending from Canadian and United States posts and would look forward to the opportunity of working adjustments out in as meaningful and effective a manner as possible.

The Canadian Member said that within the means available Canada would co-operate fully to the extent suggested by the previous speakers.

(1) LANSEC 214, 19 Jun 69
The Chairman said that the Canadian proposals had been deplored from both a military point of view and from the possible effect the downward spiral might have on other countries. However, the immediate concern was remedial measures. He supported SACEUR's comments on the positive attitude being taken by countries and hoped that positive remedial steps would be taken. He also appreciated that Canada had modified the original proposals to a certain extent.

The DPC had shown appreciation of SACEUR's and SACLANT's efforts in the negotiations with the Canadian Authorities to mitigate the effect of the force proposals and he considered that the Military Committee should do the same.

THE COMMITTEE:

a. Took note of a report by the Chairman:

(1) Drawing attention to the statement made by the Canadian Minister of National Defence to the press on 19 September 1969 (Enclosure 1).

(2) Summarising the essential elements of the Secretary General's summing up in the DPC on 18 September on the subject of the Canadian Force Proposals for NATO.

b. Took note of comments made by SACEUR and SACLANT on their concern of the effects of the Canadian decision and problems which would accordingly confront them in their respective areas of command.

c. Took note that the DPC had showed its appreciation of the efforts made by SACEUR and SACLANT in the negotiations with the Canadian Authorities and endorsed its view.

d. Agreed that whilst deploring from a military point of view the Canadian decision and its consequences for other nations, every effort should be made to find timely means to remedy the effects of the reductions.

THE MEETING THEN RECONVENED IN PRIVATE SESSION.
PRESIDENT'S CLOSING REMARKS

The President in his closing remarks:

a. Expressed regret that the Committee had had no opportunity to formally say farewell to General Allard on his retirement as Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff and invited the Canadian Member to convey the Committee’s thanks and best wishes to him.

b. Expressed thanks to the authorities of the host countries for the arrangements made during the 1969 Military Committee tour and to the United Kingdom Member for the arrangements made for the Informal MC/CS Meeting.

c. Thanked Members for the spirit of co-operation evident during the discussions.

d. Thanked the Chairman for his conduct of the meeting.
STATEMENT RELEASED BY THE CanADIAN MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE TO THE PRESS AT 1030, 16 SEPTEMBER 1959

To set the scene for the statement I am about to make, I would refer you to two previous statements: the Prime Minister on April 3rd and my statement in the House of Commons on June 23rd. In these statements the rationale for changes in Canada's defence posture is set out with the roles for the forces stated as follows:

a. The surveillance of our territory and coastlines, i.e. the protection of our sovereignty;

b. The defence of North America in co-operation with United States forces;

c. The fulfilment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and

d. The performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.

The Government, as you will recall, has undertaken to restructure our forces over a period of time so that the equipment and training for the above roles at home and abroad will be compatible. As I informed the house at the beginning of June, we believe, barring unexpected international developments, that we can achieve the transition within a defence budget which will be maintained for the next three years at its current dollar level of 1. 90 billion per annum.

It is against this background that I will now elaborate on the outline force structure contained in my June 23rd statement which forecast the changes necessary to give substance to the Government's policy on Defence. There are still some central political decisions to be made but, by and large, the forthcoming scale of the Canadian Armed Forces can now be enunciated.

The force I am about to describe is considered by my military advisors to be a viable force capable of meeting the tasks set by the Government.

NATO SECRET
Record - Informal MC/CS Session

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC Disclosure
Extensive consultations have taken place in NATO over the past three months in fulfilment of the Government's undertaking to take account of the views of its allies in bringing about the planned and phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe. During these consultations, Canada has reaffirmed its intention to meet, in a responsible manner, its collective security obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty and to continue to play an active and constructive role in support of the values we share with our allies. Certain details remain to be worked out before firm commitments for 1970 are made by NATO Governments at the annual Ministerial Meeting in December, but the general makeup and roles of the Canadian forces for NATO can now be given. I can now also outline the changes being made to our forces in Canada.

NATO - EUROPE

First, I will deal with our NATO commitment in Europe. We plan to phase out our Brigade Group and our Air Division in Germany by the fall of 1970 when we will establish co-located land and air elements under one Canadian Headquarters. These will be in Southern Germany on our present Air Division bases at Lahr and Baden-Sollingen and will be interim forces for the next three years. They will use present equipment and will have a combined total strength of approximately 5,000 personnel. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe has assured me that this provides a structure which will allow Canadian forces to continue to fulfill in Europe a meaningful though reduced role.

The land force will be a mechanised battle group of approximately 2,500 personnel with an operational role in the Central Army Group area. The air element will be a group of three squadrons of CF-104S, one in the reconnaissance and two in the strike role. The Air Group will remain under operational command of the 4th Allied Tactical Air Force. The Brigade in Germany will drop the Honest John nuclear role when it is reconfigured next year and the nuclear strike role for the air element will continue only until January 1972. As I said, these are interim forces. For the post-1972 period we plan to equip a land element in Europe, of approximately the same size as the interim group, as a light airborne force and to convert the air element to a conventionally armed ground support or reconnaissance role.

We will continue to retain the commitment to provide from the forces in Canada an air-sea transportable Brigade Group to reinforce the NATO northern flank in an emergency. This Brigade Group will contain the Battalion Group which is on standby in Canada as an air-transportable force for the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land). Our similar commitment of a Battalion Group to NATO's southern flank will be discontinued in 1970.
Turning now to our NATO maritime commitment, we will continue to earmark virtually all of our Atlantic Operational Maritime Forces for assignment to the NATO Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) in the event of an emergency.

We will take out of commission the carrier Bonaventure and the escort maintenance ship Cape Scott in 1970. We will retain most of the tracker aircraft from the carrier for land based operations until 1973. We will retain the Cape Scott as an alongside workshop and accommodation facility in the dockyard in Halifax for the foreseeable future and will dispose of the Bonaventure as surplus.

Plans are continuing for bringing into service our second new operational support ship and the four helicopter-destroyers now being built. The manning of three existing destroyer escorts will be reduced to training levels over the next two years.

We will retain our Argus long-range patrol aircraft and increase their role in the Arctic while continuing their mid-ocean surveillance duties. We will employ our Tracker aircraft from shore bases on a coastal surveillance role until they are disposed of in 1973. We plan to replace the Argus after 1973.

Mobile Command Forces in Canada will remain at approximately their present level but will be restructured in 1970 from four Combat Groups to three (with headquarters in Calgary, Petawawa and Valcartier) and we will form a task force headquarters, initially at Gagetown (present location of the Fourth Combat Group headquarters), for subsequent location in the far north.

The airborne regiment is being retained and will have three commandos instead of the present two. The third commando is being formed in the Battle Group in Europe where it will share infantry duties with the 1er Bataillon, Royal 22e Regiment.

Infantry battalions in the Combat Groups will again have their normal four companies rather than the present three. We are re-equipping our artillery and armoured regiments in the Combat Groups with air portable artillery and air portable armoured vehicles. Some heavy mechanised equipment is being retained at Gagetown as training support for our interim land force in Europe.

We will move the Combat Arms School from Borden to Gagetown and we will move the Artillery School from Shilo to Gagetown where it will become part of the Combat Arms School.
NATO SECRET

As part of the reconfiguration in Europe in 1970, we will return the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry to Canada and station them at Shilo and return the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment and station them at Gagetown.

We are budgeting over the next few years for some 2,500 new 1 1/4 ton trucks to modernise our Land Force Vehicle Fleet and have recently signed a contract for 50 Bell Utility Tactical Transport Helicopters (UTTH) to be used primarily in Mobile Command. These twin-engine helicopters will be powered by Canadian-built engines from United Aircraft of Canada. Delivery will begin in 1971. A decision to revert to a nine-battalion, three-regiment infantry structure was based on military advice following the experience of recent years which convinced infantry corps officers that regiments of one, or even two battalions based, serious career, family and morale problems related to the necessity for frequent cross-postings. Consequently, it was decided to retain the three infantry regiments with the longest history of regular force service: The Royal Canadian Regiment, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry and the Royal 22e Regiment.

As a consequence, and regretfully, the following well-known Canadian infantry regiments will no longer form part of the regular force: The Canadian Guards, The Queens Own Rifles of Canada and The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada.

The 2nd Battalion, The Canadian Guards will be redesignated as the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, The Queens Own Rifles of Canada will be redesignated as the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. In our force restructuring it was also found necessary to remove one artillery and one armoured regiment from the regular force. Using the similarity principle, but retaining two recently organised Transport Corps units, we have decided that the 2nd Field Horse and the 4th Regiment, The Royal Canadian Horse Artillery AMFL no longer appear in the similar Force Order of Battle.

Participants of the Field Horse, The Red Hart and 4 AMFL will be transferred to other units as individuals, frequently remaining on the same base. For example, members of the Field Horse will be absorbed into the 2nd Battalion. 4TH when one unit moves to a new...

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND

We are continuing close consultations with our US allies on the question of the immediate and future structure of North American Air Defence Forces. Canadian Air Defence Forces will remain such as they are for the present.

NATO SECRET
Record - Informal NC/CS Session

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
APPROVED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND

Air Transport Command's Long-Range Yukon Fleet will be reduced from 12 to 4 by 1973. The nine Cosmopolitans now in that command will be transferred to Training Command in 1972 for a new role. We will retain our 23 Hercules Troop and Cargo Aircraft but will reduce Transport Command's Dakota Fleet by approximately 15 during 1970. We are continuing our studies for the requirement for a long-range jet transport to replace the Yukons.

SEARCH AND RESCUE

Search and rescue continues to be an important part of our activities. We will maintain our present number of Rescue-Co-ordination Centres and over the next two or three years, improve our aviation capability in this field although slightly reducing the number of aircraft. This will be done by converting six of our Buffalo aircraft to this role and purchasing six new Stol aircraft capable of operating off land, water or snow. We will retire our Albatross aircraft and search and rescue Dakotas as the new aircraft come into service. We will also make some adjustments to our present helicopter distribution.

TRAINING COMMAND

Training Command will reflect the reduced size of the forces. The Dakota Navigation Trainer (23 aircraft) will be retired in 1972 and replaced with the Cosmopolitans from Air Transport Command. During 1970 our tutor and T-33 Trainer Fleet in this command will be reduced. We will retire the C-47 Expeditor Trainer (53 aircraft) also during 1970.

RESERVES AND CADETS

We intend to reduce the size of our Reserve Forces and we are consulting with the Conference of Defence Associations on how we can make the most effective use of a smaller Reserve Force in support of our revised Regular Force. I should stress, however, that the Reserves will continue to play a significant role in our defence structure. Our support for the cadet programme will continue at the present level of 100,000 cadets.

BASE CLOSURE

Some weeks ago, I announced the closing of a number of bases and facilities. At that time, I said a further announcement regarding a small number of other bases would be forthcoming. This is still the case. Final decisions have not yet been made on these bases but I expect to be able to make an announcement in a few weeks time.
PERSONNEL

To operate the reconfigured force I have just described, we will require approximately 82,000 military personnel and 30,000 civilians. This will mean a reduction of something in the order of 16,000 military and 5,000 civilian positions over the next three years. I previously announced that we will not institute a plan of forced attrition of military personnel for the purpose of reaching the new force levels. This is still our intention, and, in fact, we will continue recruiting at a reduced but still substantial level. A determined effort will be made to assist civilian personnel in finding new employment either in or out of the public service.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Defence Department is vitally interested in, and is contributing to, government studies now going on concerning use of the forces in the field of national development. Particularly, we are interested in such subjects as Government Maritime Operations, Government Air Transport Activities, Engineering Development and International Economic Aid. The Department has traditionally been in the forefront of national development and can be expected to contribute significantly in the future.
ADMIRAL VAN DEN WALL BAKE: Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, on the occasion of this informal meeting of the Military Committee in Chiefs of Staff Session I'd like to address a few words to you.

In the first place, it is a great pleasure for me to welcome at this meeting the members of the Military Committee, the Major NATO Commanders, the Military Representative of the Chiefs of Staff, and also the Chief of the French Military Mission.

I feel it is a pity that one Chief of Staff could not attend this meeting, and we all hope that General Deslandes, the Chief of Staff of Portuguese Armed Forces, will be able to be present at our next meeting.

Secondly, I want to extend a special word of welcome to those who attend for the first time in their present capacity. General Sharp, we are happy to see you here as the Chief of Canadian Defense Staff.

General Goodpaster, we trust that this Committee will also benefit from your views and considerations as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in the same way as we have always been enjoying the advice of your eminent predecessor.

Major General Spitzer, we appreciate your presence at this time as the Chief of French Military Mission of the Military Committee.

I further want to express the honor I feel in the appointment as your President of the Military Committee. I believe that the role of the Military Committee in the past 20 years of the Alliance has been of inestimable value and will continue to be so in the future.

I feel particularly privileged that I have had the opportunity to act as host for the Military Committee in the Netherlands during the 1969 tour. As we have all been quite aware again during the tour the Alliance is still in the process of implementing the new
strategy forward defense and flexible response. This strategy will affect our resources, our forces and the operational plans of the NATO Commanders.

Today I understand we are going to hear from the Allied Commander in Chief Channel, a statement of his views about the consequence of the new strategic concept for the Channel area. One of our important considerations for the future situation, the unrelenting and steady growth of Soviet maritime power and the gradual spread of its forces to other parts of the world.

When we the Standing Naval Force Atlantic was commissioned last year, being the first Military National NATO support in peacetime for operations on a permanent basis, we had a continuous means of showing NATO nations in the Atlantic area. In this context we expect the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic to give his assessment of an impromptu (inaudible) recently covered by the squadron.

Also within the scope of the new strategy comes the study of Relative Force Capability of NATO and the Warsaw Pact agenda asked for by the minutes in 1966.

The Military Committee will provide a substantive and appropriate contribution to this study and today we will receive a progress report of that subject of the strategic posture of the Alliance and the (inaudible) more than (inaudible) for weapons systems, calls for continuous evaluation of the systems necessary to gain and process information to assess the situation and to exercise command of the forces of the Alliance.

The Military Committee in permanent session agreed to a formation of an ad hoc group of experts to study the application of automated data planning and processing and information and for exercising command and control.

The statement of the work of this group will be given in the next meeting. For the moment I will confine myself to expressing the hope that our discussions today will prove to be fruitful and I now declare this NATO Committee open, and may I invite you, Mr. Chairman, to take the chair please.
ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you very much (takes Chair).

Gentlemen, there are one or two small administrative matters before we start on the agenda. I'd like to remind you please to raise your flags if you wish to speak and not to speak before the red light burns which shows that your microphone is alive.

Secondly, the speaker can always be heard on Channel 1 and the translation on Channel 2; that is to say, if you want to hear the opposite language from that which is being spoken, you switch to the channel which is different from the normal procedure of microphones that we are used to. I need hardly remind this Committee of the necessity for security. It is the practice to give no interviews, or substance of what we have discussed, to the press at any time. Anything you leave in this room will be closely guarded when it is unoccupied.

There will be an official photographer at the end of this morning's meeting. The reason it is being taken at the end is for security because this room has recently been cleaned for security purposes and the photographer might "unclean" it. Therefore, photographs are being taken at the end, not at the beginning as normally.

(End of Opening Remarks)
Item 1  ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA FOR PART I

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Now, the first item on the agenda, Part I, is the Adoption of the Agenda for Part I. If there is no objection to the agenda as presented, we will proceed with it.

(End of Item 1)
Item 2  THE APPLICATION OF AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING TO THE NATO MILITARY COMMAND, CONTROL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: The second item is the Application of Automatic Data Processing to the NATO Military Command, Control and Information System.

Now, as the first, as a result of the Ministers' decision and the Military Committee on 26 June 1969 a group of experts on the application of automatic data processing in NATO Military Command, Control and Information systems was formed. It first met on July 15 and established first October as the target date for the completion of the report.

I am pleased to say that the report has been completed and will be distributed to you in the very near future. General Milton, the Vice Director of the International Military Staff, chaired the work of this group and will give us a brief summary of the report in a moment.

I'd like to take this opportunity of thanking those of you who made the experts concerned available at very short notice and I realize over a period observed in most nations for summer leave. They are all of a very high caliber, well qualified and experienced in this complicated and highly specialized field, and I know General Milton has wholehearted support. I believe that the report when issued will be most worthy of your further attention. Some of you did take an interest in the work of this group and I hope this interest will continue in the future.

I will now ask General Milton to make the statement please.

General Milton.

GENERAL MILTON: Mr. Chairman, at the end of June the Military Committee took the formation of a group of experts on the application of Automatic Data Processing to the NATO Military Command Control and Information system, and I might interject here that when we speak of this system we should think of it as serving the Military Committee for information requirements and the Major NATO Commanders and
Subordinate Commanders, for command and control. The Military Committee appointed me as Chairman of this group. We met the first time on 15 July and set 1 October as the target date for our completion. The following nations responded to this hasty requirement for the provision of experts of the group: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, as well as SHAPE, ACLANT, ACCHAN, and of course the IMS. France attended only the first meeting with the expressed interest in future developments.

I am pleased to announce that the final report of this group of experts was completed as the Chairman as said, some three weeks ahead of scheduled deadline.

It now remains only for the administrative details of published reports to be completed and we shall have all this done before 1 October. I believe the report fulfills every objective for which it was intended and in fact provides more than was asked for. It contains complete index describing the necessary processes for achieving 80 capabilities throughout NATO, and specifically supporting in detail each proposal developed in the report itself.

It also takes into account the need to coordinate the military and several ADP requirements of NATO. The report identifies the management organization, special skills and principal objective necessary for the NATO Military Command Control and Information System.

It also points out systems and management deficiencies which exist now and the pitfalls to be avoided in the future. Implementation of the recommendations of the report should therefore reduce risks in terms of time and money and increase the ultimate capability of an improved NATO Military command, control and information system.

Now the report is very specific with respect to the three main areas: a) organizational arrangements needed to manage and coordinate command control and information systems of ADP.
support, both international and multinational; b) NATO-wide systems considerations including recommended policy and guidelines; and c) centralized support structure which is so vital to the implementation and success of any undertaking of this type.

The principal recommendations of the report can be summarized as follows: A new command systems division be formed in the IMS having a staff responsibility for the command; control and information system and ADP matters as well as those NATO-wide standardization activities related to them. Now initially the nucleus of this division is available from existing IMS resources with the exception of an Assistant Director and secretarial support.

A command systems board and a multinational command systems working group should be formed to replace the current DATOR Board and MEDAC, respectively. These two proposed multinational organizations will be oriented toward command, control and information systems and ADP matters and would have an international point of contact in the proposed Command Systems Division of the IMS.

c) The Military Committee should manage the nation-wide ADP system and have direct technical support from a new central command system support agency.

d) Policies, principles and guidelines should be published to permit effective and cohesive command and control of ADP planning. The report has taken note of the need to coordinate the military and civil ADP requirements.

It concludes that further studies initiated by the North Atlantic Council on the overall NATO Command Control and Information systems should take into account the efforts to improve the existing Military Command Control and Information System and possibly make use of such military facilities to meet part of its own requirements.
Finally I'd like to stress that the value of this report will be lost without the decisions and commitment being made at an early date to allow planning to commence so that a responsive command, control and information capability can be achieved by the 27th.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMLRAL HENDLERSON: Thank you, General Milton. We expect this report in October and in order to get on with decisions we need to pay early attention to it. By no less can we achieve the 27th date. Any Chief of Staff or MNC care to comment on General Milton's statement? It will be issued to you. Any comments? If there are no comments we take note of General Milton's statement and the report will be available in October and it will then be taken by the Military Committee and we expect national comments. Thank you.

(End of Item 2)
ITEM 3 PRELIMINARY MILITARY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FOLLOWING THE NATO SECURITY BREACH DETECTED ON 4 AUGUST 1969

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: We will now go on to the next item on the agenda, which concerns the Military Preliminary Damage Assessment following the NATO Security Breach detected on 4 August 1969. The breach is still under investigation by the NATO Security Directorate and by the French authorities who are conducting an interrogation of the man concerned, and we are awaiting the results of both these activities.

In the meanwhile Admiral Poser, as the Assistant Director, Intelligence Division of the International Military Staff is going to give you a verbal report on where we stand today and what our intentions are with regard to this matter. I believe that to be the worst security breach we have ever had in NATO.

Admiral Poser, will you go ahead please?

ADMIRAL POSER: Mr. Chairman, the following information on the latest NATO security breach is based on interim reports by the Deputy Secretary General and the Director, NATO Security Directorate. The facts are:

On 4 August 1969 Mr. Don(?) Roussilhe, a French citizen, 40 years of age, was taken into custody by the Belgian Security Service on suspicion of espionage for the Romanian authorities. He had been employed for 17 years in NATO as a clerk in various positions, most recently in the Translators' Documentation Section.

Interrogation by the Belgian Security Service, French Security Service and the NATO Security Directorate indicated that he commenced his espionage work about six years ago and he was very well paid for that. Roussilhe started by bringing out documents but later on produced espionage material asked for by microfilming it himself.

To give an idea of the extent of his last activities, he used to hand over to his contemporary Embassy members up to seven rolls...
of film, that is, approximately 240 pages of text weekly. When
one considers a preliminary military damage assessment, it should be
borne in mind that Roussilhe, during his service in NATO had access
to many documents. It was however during the last two years while
working as the Head of the Translator's Documentation Section that
the NATO damage was done. In this position he was able to call for
any document which was retained by the Translators' Documentation
Section or handled for translation purposes.

Thus whether the documents were translated or not they were
available to Roussilhe on an official basis. When this very grave
security breach is seen in connection with previous spy cases,
especially the 1968 Imre case, it must be assumed that nearly all
military and political documents of the Alliance over at least the last
six years have been compromised. This includes Cosmic Top Secret
and some nuclear planning group documents. It does not include
ATOMAL and Emergency Defense Plans.

In addition, the area of compromise encompasses subjects which
although less sensitive provide variable background material of
the Alliance thinking and cohesion. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact
leaders should now be able to build up a comprehensive picture
of expenditures and strength with the NATO, and to gain a formal
knowledge of NATO's approach to defense expenditures and of its
methods of collective leadership and decision-making.

To sum up the full military damage assessment: Final reports
of investigation by the NATO Security Directorate and of the interro-
gation by the French authorities are still outstanding. However,
interim reports already show that the damage done must be assessed
as extremely grave. Documents covering nearly all activities of the
Alliance have been compromised including those on which the Major NATO
Commanders have based their plans for the defense of the Alliance.
To finish my brief, I'd like to say a few words about security measures in the future: Pending the final report and recommendations of the NATO Security Directorate which is responsible for the examination of all questions affecting NATO security. IMS has sent out a working group for consideration of what steps might be taken to strengthen security within its own area. In addition, the Director, IMS, has proposed to the NATO Security Directorate to establish a Committee with representation from IS and IMS to investigate a recommendation on security measures within NATO Headquarters. It is understood that this proposal has the support of the Secretary General and that a special committee will be formed in the near future.

When the full and detailed report is received it will be forwarded to the Military Committee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you, Admiral Poser. Now, if you have any questions we will try and answer them within the limitations imposed upon us as the case is still under investigation, and I would mention that in this respect there are still other leads which are being followed up. I also remind you that the detailed knowledge of the findings of this assessment so far rests with the NATO Director of Security who is responsible for the Secretary General for this matter.

In my view, this case shows the importance in keeping as close as possible to ourselves all our sensitive plans as we have in the past. It reinforces what we have said before, that we do not want ATOMAL papers and operational papers and operational plans of Commanders to be available in the NATO Headquarters at Evere.

Would any Chief of Staff or NNCs care to make any comments of Admiral Poser's statement? It will be circulated. US, General Wheeler?

GENERAL WHEELER: I think that all of us that are within our national boards each have had similar experiences in the past.
some more damaging than others. The lessons that I have learned from our own experience is that we are all of us too lax in checking on the background of individuals who are employed in sensitive positions, we tend to assume that because a man has had a clean bill of health when he was first hired to a job, that he is going to remain a similar unbleached character for the rest of his life, and that is not necessarily true.

I blame sometimes the breaches of security upon the fact that the supervisor of the criminal does not take notice of his personal habits, that is as to drinking, womanizing, spending large sums of money which obviously he does not obtain through his employment and otherwise exhibiting a blindness to a change in the character of the man.

Furthermore, the lesson to be learned here, and I note in the Admiral's statement that action is being taken to institute security measures, is that we'd better tighten our security measures to a point where it hurts. We are too lax, we are in the so-called time of peace and detente, people are inclined to believe that because they are not engaged in espionage why, no one else is, which of course is absolutely contrary to the facts.

I have seen some of the devices that are used and the means by which these spies operate. They are highly sophisticated, they are ingenious, they reflect a great effort on the part of the enemy to be taking information undetected because detected information is frequently of very little value to them.

All I am really urging here, Mr. Chairman, and colleagues, is the very obvious one and that is that the representatives of the IMS on this Committee I think should take an extremely and hard-nosed and rigid position as regards the imposition of proper security measures on personnel, rechecks from time to time, examinations or vigilance on the part of superiors as to actions of their subordinates.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MARSHAL ELWORTHY: Mr. Chairman, I welcome what General Wheeler has just said and I certainly would like to support the remarks he has made. I am sure we'd all agree that it is most important that we should as soon as possible have this report which we have been told will be made available to us in order that we can assess better what this latest instance and previous ones have done in terms of loss of security and most particularly in what methods we can introduce the new methods effectively to combat it.

This I think is absolutely essential, particularly when we realize that here are our most vital NATO plans and indeed our most vital national plans jeopardized in this manner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you very much. If there are no other comments I'd ask the Committee to take note of Admiral Poser's statement and the remarks by the US and the UK Representatives. I'd like to assure the Committee from the military side I will do my best to insure and to enforce that security is looked at continuously and forcefully at all times.

Now, if there are no comments we will pass on to the next item. Thank you.

(End of Item 3)
Item 4  ANY OTHER BUSINESS

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Now is there Any Other Business any member would like to raise under Part I of the agenda? If not, we will pause for a few moments and continue with Part II of this meeting.

Thank you. This concludes Part I.

(Part I concluded at 1020 hours)
Item 1  ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA FOR PART II

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Gentlemen, we will continue the meeting, and the next item is to adopt the agenda for Part II of this meeting, and assuming that this is adopted we will pass on to the next item.

(End of Item 1)
Item 2  A STUDY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT (MC 14/3) IN THE ACCHAN AREA

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: This concerns the Study of the Consequences of the New Strategic Concept in the ACCHAN Area.

Now at MC/PS meeting on 31 October 1969, the report on the consequences of the new strategic concept in the ACCHAN area was approved, and the Military Committee considered the study and the attached report to be a suitable basis from which CINCHAN, Commander in Chief Channel, should proceed with the preparation of a revised emergency defense plan and contingency plans for the ACCHAN area.

In January 1969 the Secretary General invited the DPC to note the report. The DPC showed great interest in the report and suggested that CINCHAN should give them a short briefing on it. He is due to do so on 22nd of October and has kindly agreed to give an outline of his forthcoming briefing to us today, and I will give the floor to Admiral Bush. Admiral Bush, please.

ADMIRAL BUSH: Mr. Chairman, as you said, I have been invited by the Secretary General to be present when the DPC discuss the Channel study on 22 October, and I thought the Chiefs of Staff might like to hear what I intend to say to this Committee.

In fact I believe there is very little to be said because the study is short and says precisely what it means. I propose therefore only to make a few opening remarks to the Committee and be prepared to answer their questions.

The points I intend to make to the Committee are three: first, this study stems directly from the change in the strategy of NATO now embodied in MC 14/3. It is not a whim of the Commander in Chief to do something different from his predecessors.

Second, I am aware that any study which produces a solution postulating more forces is liable to be suspect. I shall make it
clear to the Committee that the requirement for more forces stems not from the Channel study itself but from the whole strategic concept embodied in 14/3. The crux of the whole paper is in paragraph 35 which I will quote in full to save you summing it up.

It says, "The important change in concept of operations therefore is that whereas under 14/2 the priority task in ACCHAN was the early evacuation of shipping under 14/3 CINCHAN must be capable of a deterrent posture and maritime response before this stage is reached. The control of the ACCHAN area and maintenance of supplies to Europe and SACEUR thus becomes his primary task, while maintaining the capability to evacuate shipping only should the need arise.

The argument which led to this conclusion has of course been agreed by this Committee.

The third point I intend to make is the Channel Command, much misunderstood in some circles, is difficult to the other two Commands, both of which dispose very considerable maritime forces in two important respects.

First, the waters of the Channel Command are very much more restricted. This means that the concentration of shipping is extremely great and countermeasures such as re-routing and dispersal are meaningless.

Shipping must therefore be fought through the Channel and particularly its approaches if SACEUR is to receive the reinforcements and supplies, both from the United States and United Kingdom that he will need at any level of hostilities postulated by MC 14/3.

Secondly, the Command is vitally concerned with the control of merchant shipping. Paragraph 4 of the study shows the sort of density of shipping in peacetime required to keep the economy of Europe going, 280 ocean-going ships encountered every day, and 300 coasters at sea, and 1100 ocean-going ships and 3500 coasters in harbor.

This shipping which carries a million tons a day to Europe has to be routed through shallow waters un navigable to ships.
to reach Rotterdam, Antwerp, Hamburg, London and the other NATO ports or northwest Europe.

The Channel Command is vitally concerned with shipping control and minesweeping problems of a totally different scale to that faced by other Commands.

And finally, that I know of no Commander who would have withdrawn all forces at the outset of hostilities. My job as I see it is not the evacuation of shipping, it is to insure that SACEUR gets the supplies he needs, that Europe continues to be viable and the job that SACLANT does in the broad waters of the Atlantic is brought to a satisfactory conclusion in the ports of Europe.

Only if I can do that can the threshold be raised at which a decision to use nuclear weapons or accept the subject of Europe must be made. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you very much, Admiral Bush. Well, I think the Committee has been aware for some time of this change of concept. Operations in the Channel area, and it is only raised now because Admiral Bush is going to discuss with the DPC who have shown such an interest.

Would anybody care to comment on Admiral Bush's statement at this stage? Well, we all appreciate your making it, Admiral Bush, and good luck with the Committee. Thank you. (Laughter)

(End of Item 2)
Item 3 STANAVFORLANT SURVEILLANCE MISSION

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: The next item concerns the STANAVFORLANT Surveillance Mission. As the President said, Admiral Holmes has a statement for us on the surveillance mission carried out by STANAVFORLANT, Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, on the 30th of August this year.

Admiral Holmes will you go ahead, please?

ADMIRAL HOLMES: Mr. Chairman, the recent surveillance carried out by the Standing Naval Force Atlantic in the Norwegian Sea was a NATO first, and I think it is essential that we understand and agree on what it accomplished and what it did not.

Now, the Standing Naval Force was conceived as a consideration to the implementation of NATO's present strategy of flexible response as set forth in MC 14/3 and MC 48/3. The keystone of this strategy is of course deterrence and an element of deterrence is surveillance. That is to show that we expect to know as much as we can about our prospective opponent.

Two of the tasks assigned to NATO Naval Forces in peacetime by MC 118, that is the roles and tasks of NATO Naval Forces and their relationship to other NATO forces, are:

To demonstrate the unity and capability of NATO in order to discourage or counter Soviet maritime activity, and to assist in providing intelligence necessary for an assessment of Soviet capabilities and intentions.

It was in this context that I stated my plan to employ the STANAVFORLANT in the surveillance role consistent with the approved operational schedule of the Force.

Now as the picture of Soviet maritime activity began to unfold in the Norwegian Sea about 25 August, it became apparent that an opportunity could develop to employ the Standing Naval Force in this manner without disrupting the operational exercises already planned. This seemed a proper peacetime utilization of the Force.

I therefore instituted initial action to determine the feasibility of such a task, and once determined, to inform the
Military Committee of my intentions. Such employment of the Force was to have a threefold purpose: first, to supplement the surveillance of the Soviet Forces in the Norwegian Sea, and second, to give the Soviets visible evidence of NATO's dedication to the principle of freedom of the seas, and last, and quite simply, to exercise the Standing Naval Force in a role for which it was designed. Its purpose was not to test command and control procedures through the chain of command or to create an urgent politico-military problem requiring short fuse action.

As I mentioned in my talk at SHAPEX, opportunities at sea are fleeting ones and effective reaction must be geared accordingly. And for this reason I utilized the "unless otherwise directed" procedure in stating my plan to the Military Committee.

The surveillance was entirely successful within the purposes stated above. It was conducted under closely controlled and monitored conditions with rules of engagement tailored to provide a safe and non-provocative atmosphere. Its prime value lies not only in the intelligence gained which can be important, but also in the employment of a NATO Force in a posture of watching Soviet activities at sea, as they even today are doing in surveillance of exercises which are now in progress.

Recently I talked with Commodore Veldkamp of the Royal Netherlands Navy, the Commander of the Force. He feels, as do I, that in addition to this prime value, the operation helped to put meat on the bones of the Standing Naval Force concept. It demonstrated in a real way the inherent flexibility of Naval Forces, provided the most realistic training yet available to Standing Naval Forces, demonstrated the procedure for control of the Force under such conditions, enhanced to a significant degree the individual feeling within the Force that a real NATO contribution had been made, and finally, provided some intelligence information.

Some examples of this information are that there was a continuous flow of timely NATO intelligence on the position, composition, movement and operations of the Soviet Naval Force which aided...
in SACLANT's assessment of Soviet activity.

And secondly, there is an appreciable amount of technical information in the form of magnetic tapes and photographs which upon detailed analysis may be of value in estimating trends and improvement in Soviet Naval equipment.

Further, it afforded an opportunity for the STANAVFORLANT to inject NATO surveillance information directly into the recently established surveillance coordination center system, thereby providing a means to exercise the procedures for information flow from NATO forces at sea as set forth and envisaged in the SACLANT surveillance study.

I would hope that this initial demonstration of the potential usefulness of Standing Naval Force in a surveillance role will be the prologue to a normal pattern, a pattern where Soviet commanding officers exercising at sea may come to expect NATO ships in their vicinity, just as routinely as the report received by NATO Commanders that Soviet ships are observing NATO maneuvers.

And in summation, Mr. Chairman, I believe the operation was fully successful in meeting its objective and we have passed what I hope will prove to be a significant milestone in NATO maritime experience. Thank you.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you, Admiral Holmes. It is routine now for national forces to shadow Soviet forces and, as Admiral Holmes said, I believe it should not be abnormal for NATO forces in the form of STANAVFORLANT to do the same and I believe that we should all agree that SACLANT's procedures of doing this "unless otherwise directed" is the correct one. This will give the Military Committee, that is their Chiefs of Staff, the opportunity to veto on military grounds, to veto, if necessary, and it will be up to the DPC to veto on military grounds if necessary. But let us get this in the right perspective and let us agree that this should be a normal, if not a routine procedure for the future.

It may be that we should have to look at the terms of reference in the STANAVFORLANT to make sure that everything is is in line.
Would any of the Staff care to comment? US, General Wheeler?

GENERAL WHEELER: I'd like to ask a question, Mr. Chairman. I have no reservation at all about the proper right of the usefulness of the shadowing exercises as conducted by the Standing Naval Force. However, at the time that the message came in from Admiral Holmes my staff informed me that the terms of reference of force gave SACLANT ample authority to conduct the exercise.

Now if I am wrong in view of what you just said, Mr. Chairman, that Admiral Holmes' authorities in this area, is not clear. I know that in his message, and he used "unless otherwise directed" it is a phrase which I personally deplore, unless it is absolutely necessary for it to be used.

My question is, are the terms of reference unclear or are they specific?

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you, General Wheeler. The answer to that, the terms of reference are fairly clear (laughter). It may be as you said, they are not clear enough and we are looking to make sure they are entirely clear in the future, and there will be no doubt that when they are interpreted, so they are considered clear, and this was what Admiral Holmes did, and the Military Committee did, but there were some other people who didn't quite interpret it that way and we will make sure everybody gets it right in the future.

GENERAL WHEELER (Microphone not on, inaudible)

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Any other comments? Well, we should hope to see more of this in the future without being provocative, what the Soviets expect of us, and let them see NATO.

(End of Item 3)
Item 4  STATUS REPORT ON SUBJECTS OF MAJOR INTEREST TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Now we will turn to Item 4 which concerns the Status Report on Subjects of Major Interest to the Military Committee, and this really concerns the Relative Force Capability Study.

Now there is a document, IMSM-435, 29th of August which is a status report on the study of the Relative Force Capability of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and I'd like to draw your special attention to paragraph 8 on page 3 of that report which says that the Military Committee will be receiving the Working Group Report on the 1st of October 1968, I am sorry, 69, and that the DPC would consider it together with the Military Committee's comments on 20 November, and that the Military Committee's comments should therefore be in the hands of the Steering Committee by 13 November.

Now it appears that the Open Ended Working Group's complete report will not be ready until about the middle of October. A draft military report will be issued as soon as possible thereafter, but this will only leave about three weeks for nations to consider it and to give formal national comments before it is taken by the DPC on the 13th of November and therefore before it goes to Ministers. And my question to you is can you accept three-week period for you to formulate national comments after the report has been received? If you cannot, we should have to go to the DPC and ask for this item to be postponed from the Ministers' agenda, which we'd like to avoid if we can.

Would anybody care to comment please? I hear a little discussion around the table. Would any nation care to say that he cannot accept this? Otherwise I will accept that all nations can accept it. Canada?

GENERAL SHARP: I doubt if we could give the attention it deserves in that time. We can obviously comment in that time but I doubt if it would be meaningful.
ADMIRAL HENDERSON: By that you mean you could not have a formal national position or a Chief of Staff position?

GENERAL SHARP: Yes.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: But you can have an informal one? Thank you. Turkey? General Tagmac?

GENERAL TAGMAC (spoken by General Sunalp): Mr. Chairman, I think the time available wouldn't be sufficient for Turkey too, the fact has been known by you on various occasions and I am very doubtful whether or not we will be able to give our comments within three weeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you General Sunalp for General Tagmac. Well, having heard the Canadian and Turkish doubts, I nevertheless think we should try and pursue this matter so that the Ministers can look at it rather than at this stage asking them to postpone it.

So with your agreement we will pursue this course and it does give you a reduced time in which to consider the paper before it goes to the DFC and Ministers. Thank you. Well that is adopted, that procedure.

(End of Item 4)
Item 5  NEXT MEETING

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Now on the agenda, the next meeting. The December Ministerial meeting will be held in Brussels on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th December, and can I assume that you will wish to hold the next meeting, formal meeting on Tuesday the 2nd of December? No objections? In the absence of any comments we will adopt that procedure, and the next meeting will be held on Tuesday, 2 December in Brussels.

Now, turning to Any Other Business. . . I am sorry, Germany, General De Maiziere?

GENERAL DE MAIZIERE: Please excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I will propose we have this meeting on the 2nd of December in the morning and not in the afternoon so that we have time enough to evaluate the result of this meeting and to inform our Ministers in due time before the next. Our Ministers will come together in the DPC meeting. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you, General De Maiziere. Can we adopt that the meeting will begin at 10 o’clock on Tuesday morning? Has anybody objection to that? If not, we will agree to have it at 10 o’clock on Tuesday, the 2nd. Thank you very much for raising that.

(End of Item 5)
Item 6 ANY OTHER BUSINESS

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Turning now to Any Other Business, I have one item which concerns the Canadian Force proposals for NATO.

You all have no doubt seen various reports, particularly in today’s newspaper on the Canadian Government’s final decisions on the reductions and redeploymen of the Canadian Forces for NATO, and copies of the full statement are being circulated to you now.

I think you may also like to hear the results of the DPC discussion on this subject on Thursday, at which you were represented, and I'd like to read out the Secretary General's summing up of that meeting on this subject. It reads as follows:

"The session of the meeting of the Defense Planning Committee as revealed in their discussion this morning may be summed up as follows: One, since 28 May there has been extensive consultation among members of the Alliance participating in NATO’s integrated military forces regarding the Canadian proposal to reduce its military contribution to NATO. There have been positive developments in these consultations and the Canadian government has shown willingness to make adjustments in its proposals in the light of opinions expressed by other members of the Alliance with the result that Canadian forces will continue to play a meaningful though reduced role in the implementation of the strategy of the Alliance. It is this theory that the consideration of the NATO remedial measures should proceed parallel with these consultations and in contact with the Canadian forces so as to achieve a final outcome which will try to guarantee sufficient strength in the Central European region.

"The second closely linked questions of the Canadian force proposals and the consequential remedial measures which are relevant and important for the prospect of negotiating balanced force reductions within the Warsaw Pact Powers."

And this ends the quote of the Secretary General's summing up. You can see therefore that we are now left with the task of negotiating the timely remedial measures to be taken to try and..."
guarantee sufficient strength in the Central European region
and also in the Atlantic.

Would anybody care to comment on the matter of the Canadian
Force proposals on the understanding that considerations for
remedial measures have so far not progressed very far. General
Goodpastor? SACEUR.

GENERAL GOODPASTOR: Mr. Chairman, it might be useful for me
to give a bit of background and address in broad terms some views
and conclusions as to where we are and what may lie ahead.

I'd say first that my headquarters has participated actively
and perhaps even forcefully in the NATO procedures followed to
this point. Under General Lemnitzer's direction and assessment, it
was made following consultation with the DPC, we prepared a counter-
proposal which was considered by the Canadian authorities. They
made adjustments to their programs and indicated to us what the limits
of those adjustments would be. Specific remedial measures were also
developed within our headquarters and proposed. An effort was made
to make these concrete because the time factor was pressing us
very much.

If a gap were to develop in the Central European region it would be
necessary to move expeditiously to try to organize these remedial
measures. Our concern was two-fold: it went beyond the immediate
adverse impact, immediate and direct impact upon deterrents and
defense which we assessed might occur, and I'd like to bring to the
attention of the Military Committee the second concern which to me
at least is equally serious and that is the danger of a declining
spiral as other nations take note and their people take note of
downward steps within NATO.

There is a danger that such an attitude might spread and our
view is that there is no military justification known to us for
reduction of force and of resources in the area of Allied Command
Europe.

Further, that security for our countries can only be weakened
by a force reduction or withdrawals.
Now, where do matters stand? I will speak briefly because, to quote my predecessor, giving a status report on this matter which is still being dealt with is a little like trying to paint a moving train, we hope the train continues to move.

The decision taken by the Canadian authorities will, as indicated, provide a meaningful though reduced role in fulfillment of the NATO strategy. The dimensions of that reduction are substantial, after the adjustments have been made the force will level out at a force of about 5000 in lieu of the force of the order of 10,000 that has existed.

On the side of the remedial measures two meetings have been held. It is not yet clear precisely what steps the other nations which contribute to North Central European region will be prepared to take, or in some cases what the nature and size of those steps might be.

I am highly gratified however that a positive attitude toward the proposals in principle has been shown and this is true throughout at the military level and at higher levels in the case of many of the countries concerned. It seems to me that is a very significant feature and it will be my purpose to rule upon that positive attitude.

Concrete steps have been described in at least a preliminary way which will have real value in maintaining the strength in the Central European area.

The further procedures are not yet clear. I am sure that in part those will have to be worked out as we proceed, as we know what dimension and kind of problem still exist.

I'd just make three broad points in conclusion: I'd say it is clear enough that it is incumbent upon all of us to seek to maintain strength in that vital area. Second, that it is my intention that my headquarters will continue to advise and assist as best we can in order to facilitate and encourage the provision of the additional resources since the defense can be no greater than the resources provided will permit.
And finally, it is only through that means that we can continue to fulfill the important objective of preserving our units of action in this area, of making our forward defense under the new concept effective, and of keeping our deterrents credible. I ask for cooperation and I offer the cooperation of my headquarters and my command. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you very much, General Goodpaster.

Admiral Holmes, would you care to say something? Admiral Holmes, SACLANT.

ADMIRAL HOLMES: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take this opportunity to say something that I have said many times. The heart of my concern and the Allied Command Atlantic area, is the submarine threat and the situation as of today is that this threat is growing, is growing in capability, in sophistication, the addition of more nuclear power submarines and a significant advance has been demonstrated in the Soviet capability to operate this force.

It is indeed a very grave threat of which I am sure all members, all persons seated here, are quite aware.

Against this situation, we have a declining anti-submarine warfare capability which has been documented in various papers which have been presented to the Committee. I'd say again that I consider this an extremely serious situation and I have expressed my concern in this light about the loss of a part of our anti-submarine warfare capability when we lost the Bonaventure. I am gratified to know that there will be a partial replacement of this capability by the introduction of new EDH type ships, four will in due course be commissioned, and knowing the Canadian capability and the submarine in general, the contribution of these ships will be gratefully welcomed.

I'd hoped that perhaps the Bonaventure might be retained until the four new EDHes are received, but the decision has been made that this cannot be done.

I'd say we will look and work with the Canadians to adjust what we can do in the vital area of the Atlantic, adjacent to and
extended from the Canadian and United States coast, and I look forward to the opportunity of working these out to be as meaningful and as effective as can be. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Thank you, Admiral Holmes. Would anybody else care to comment on the statement? General Sharp, would you care to say anything at this stage?

GENERAL SHARP: I don't believe I can add anything to what has already been said on this matter. Up till now within the meaning of available, to us, we will of course cooperate fully to the extent that has been suggested by the previous speakers. Aside from that, I don't think I have anything to add. I wish I had (laughter).

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: Well, thank you very much. We have all deplored from the military point of view the Canadian proposals in the past, and also from the point of view, as SACEUR mentioned, of the possible effect the downward spiral effect on other countries.

Now that the Canadian action is now passing into history, and we are more concerned immediately with remedial measures and what steps we can take to fill the gaps and to mend the fences, and I support what General Goodpaster said, that we appreciate the positive action that countries are taking and we hope will continue to take, to try and put things right as far as possible. We also appreciate that Canada has modified original proposals to a certain extent.

The DPC showed appreciation of SACEUR's and SACLANT's efforts in negotiating with the Canadians and finding this somewhat compromising solution, and I think we as the Military Committee should even indorse what the DPC said in the way of appreciation to SACLANT and SACEUR.

Does any Chief of Staff, or would any Chief of Staff like to comment? Is that your pencil, General Wheeler, in action?

GENERAL WHEELER: (Microphone not on and inaudible)

ADMIRAL HENDERSON: I think there is no more to be said at this stage unless anybody wishes to do so, take note of the formal statement by the Canadian Minister of Defense, of the Secretary General's summing up of the DPC meeting, and of what SACEUR and
SACLANT have said today, and do our best to remedy things as far as we can.

Now, that concludes that item. Has any member of the Committee anything he wishes to raise under Any Other Business? Or any MNOs? If not, that concludes the informal part of this meeting and I'd appreciate it if the Chiefs of Staff and MILREPs could stay behind for a private session when we are going to discuss a domestic matter of the Chiefs of Staff, and the remainder may go.

(Informal meeting adjourned at 11:15 hours)