



NATO CONFIDENTIAL

To: Secretary General

cc: Deputy Secretary General  
ASG for Political Affairs  
ASG for Defence Planning and Policy

From: Acting Executive Secretary

Record of a private meeting of the Council on  
Monday, 16th December, 1968

UNITED STATES PROPOSAL FOR EXPANSION OF THE EIGHTEEN NATIONS  
DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE (ENDC)

The CHAIRMAN said that he had convened the Council at the request of the German Delegation with a view to initiating consultation on the United States proposal for expansion of the ENDC. He recalled that a letter from the United States Permanent Representative on the substance of this proposal had just been circulated to all Delegations.

2. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that his request had not been provoked by the United States Delegation's letter which he had just received, but by information which had come to him on Friday, 13th December, from the German Embassy in Washington and from the German Mission in New York, mentioning contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the expansion of the ENDC and stressing that the matter was of such urgency that there would be no time to consult the NATO Council. His Government had asked him to express its disappointment with the procedure which had been followed and its hope that some time would be allowed for further consideration before any final decision. As the United States had for a long time advocated the inadvisability of any change in the ENDC membership, he wondered whether there had been a new assessment of the situation which had led them to take such an initiative. As for the essence of the proposal, he would like to know how the prospective new members would be selected - especially the countries from Latin America and Africa, whether any solution along the lines of the Vienna formula had been contemplated, and whether any country had presented its candidacy.

3. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received instructions in line with the information received by the German Representative. He was aware that his Government had hoped for some time to come to an arrangement which would allow for more countries to be admitted, but not in a way which would give the Warsaw Pact countries much greater representation than the NATO countries. The matter had been handled in the usual manner among delegations in New York and, although he was not fully informed as to the state of play, he was under the impression that action with a view to amending the relevant previous Resolution of the United Nations was as imminent as Mr. Grewe had indicated.

4. As regards the admissibility of such action, he pointed out that the experience gained during the Non Nuclear Conference had changed the situation and that it would be regrettable if this Conference were to expand in the future to become a large forum for propaganda purposes. He did not have the impression that any particular composition would be the consequence of a campaign by certain countries, although the possible candidates would have to get support from their regional partners. Referring to his letter, he recalled that the United States had at first proposed Japan, while the Soviet Union proposed Hungary. As the latter proposal was unacceptable to them, the United States had suggested Mongolia. The other four countries, the choice of which seemed negotiable, were Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Argentina and Tunisia.

5. As for the timing, he would have to enquire whether the tactical situation in the United Nations was such that a rapid decision would have to be taken before the closing of the General Assembly session.

6. Finally, he asked the German Representative whether the Federal Republic had pressed for its membership on the basis of the Vienna formula, i.e. representatives from the United Nations and the specialised agencies, the purpose being to exclude the GDR but not the Federal Republic.

7. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE replied that this was not the case. He pointed out that his Government, which until the present time had considered that the composition of the ENDC should remain unchanged, had not envisaged any candidacy. He further emphasised that if there was any expansion, the non members, especially the Western countries which were not well represented, would undoubtedly feel excluded.

8. Le REPRESENTANT de la BELGIQUE déclare que les problèmes évoqués par le Représentant de l'Allemagne se posent également pour tous les pays qui ne sont pas membres du Comité des Dix-huit. La procédure adoptée par les Etats-Unis, en la circonstance, l'étonne d'autant plus qu'à la réunion du 21 juillet dernier consacrée au problème du désarmement, il avait attiré l'attention sur un élargissement possible de l'ENDC et que selon la lettre du Représentant des Etats-Unis, le Gouvernement Américain envisageait cette éventualité depuis un certain temps. Par ailleurs, une phrase de cette lettre selon laquelle l'admission de nouveaux membres de l'OTAN ou du Pacte de Varsovie dans l'ENDC, susciterait des pressions de la part de pays faisant partie d'autres régions du monde, expose un principe politique sur lequel se fonde la tactique adoptée par les Etats-Unis et qui n'a jamais été discuté. Il estime qu'entre le 21 juillet et le début de décembre, un tel principe pouvait faire l'objet, non pas d'une simple information, mais d'une véritable consultation. Le fait que des négociations bilatérales aient été engagées sur un point de politique générale, c'est-à-dire, sur la base du principe de la compensation entre l'admission du Japon, allié des Etats-Unis, contre celle de la Mongolie, alliée de l'Union Soviétique, lui semble mettre en cause le principe même de la consultation. Il se demande si cette consultation reste possible après une offre des Etats-Unis, surtout si cette offre est acceptée.

9. Le REPRESENTANT des PAYS-BAS s'associe à ces remarques. Ses autorités étaient convaincues que l'élargissement de l'ENDC soulèverait des difficultés si considérables qu'il ne pourrait être envisagé mais elles s'attendaient à être consultées si cette éventualité se présentait. Sur le plan du principe il fait observer que l'équilibre que les Etats-Unis et l'Union Soviétique cherchent à établir en faisant entrer dans le Comité chacun un de leurs alliés, n'est pas celui que recherche l'Alliance. Son Gouvernement se demande si, pour permettre à un plus grand nombre de pays de participer aux travaux de l'ENDC, le principe de la rotation entre ses membres ne pourrait être envisagé.

10. Le REPRESENTANT de l'ITALIE déclare qu'il a été également informé par la Délégation italienne aux Nations unies des pour-parlers entre les deux co-Présidents du Comité des Dix-huit. Bien que son Gouvernement n'ait pas d'objection de principe à un élargissement, il n'est pas convaincu que les travaux y gagneraient en efficacité. Il fait observer que même avec la composition actuelle, la plus grande partie des responsabilités est exercée par les deux co-Présidents. Sur le plan de la procédure suivie, il s'associe aux remarques qui ont été faites. Après avoir précisé que les deux Membres occidentaux du Comité des Dix-huit n'ont pas été consultés, il insiste sur l'importance qu'aurait eu une consultation dans le cadre de l'Alliance dont les travaux sont largement influencés par ceux du Comité des Dix-huit sur le désarmement.

11. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government's first reactions were on the same lines as those which had already been expressed by other Permanent Representatives. In addition to previous remarks, which he largely endorsed, he pointed out that if the ENDC was to be increased by six new non-European members, the present disproportion between the Western members, Italy and the United Kingdom, and the rest of the Committee would be further aggravated. His Government thought that consultation should take place before such a proposal became effective. But he wondered whether the proposal which had been put forward to the Soviets could be amended once accepted by them. Finally, he would like to know the extent to which the ENDC could be increased without spoiling it as a forum for negotiation.

12. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that his Government had been aware for some time that Japan and Yugoslavia were pressing for admission to the ENDC. Canada had then taken the position that, although there was some legitimacy in those countries asking to participate, uncontrolled expansion of the ENDC was unacceptable. However, when the United States and the Soviet Union started their bilateral negotiations, it was felt that the best solution would be to leave them to find a way out, provided that the four following principles were taken into consideration:

- the process of enlargement should not perpetuate a discriminatory situation;
- no consideration should be given to the possibility of rotation amongst members or of geographical representation, since these ideas had not attracted interest among the countries concerned;

- for the same reason, the idea of granting observer status to some countries - as an alternative to enlargement - should be discarded;
- the United States and the Soviet Union should take into account the ultimate need to provide membership for Communist China.

13. As the bilateral contacts seemed to have reached a decisive point, the Canadian Representative agreed to the German request for an immediate consultation in NATO, which could take place before the Soviet Delegation received instructions. Referring to the last paragraph of Ambassador Cleveland's letter, according to which "the United States would inform all present and prospective members of the ENDC prior to proposing a slate of new members", he asked whether this meant that no decision had yet been taken about the membership of countries from Latin America and Africa. He stressed that, in this case, it would be more appropriate if members of the Alliance were not only informed but consulted.

14. The PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE said that his Government had been all the more surprised not to be officially informed by the United States since, on 24th July, it had received indications of a possible expansion of the ENDC to include Japan, Bulgaria and Argentina. In his view the ENDC should not exceed 25 members in order to be able to work effectively.

15. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE noted that, in substance, most of the comments amounted to the question of whether any change was needed in the composition of the ENDC. He understood that there had been a widespread view in New York during the last few months that the situation was getting gradually out of control and that the ENDC might become a forum for propaganda purposes. He did not doubt that an interesting consultation could take place on the points raised, but he would have to seek guidance from his Authorities in order to know whether the present state of play would make it possible. As he understood it, the United States was being asked by its Allies to consult in NATO about the substance of the matter before deciding to go ahead, regardless of the Soviet's answer.

16. The CHAIRMAN agreed with the United States Representative that this was the essential point. He had noted a general agreement that consultation was needed on points of substance such as the balance between countries, especially the European participation, in the ENDC, the opportunity for and the size of any enlargement, and the principle of rotation. He suggested that the matter should be further discussed in the Council as soon as delegations, and in particular the United States, had received the necessary instructions.

17. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE having asked whether, in the next six days, the United Nations Assembly would have to endorse any change to Resolution 1722 which had created the ENDC, the UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE recalled that the ENDC had not been established as a United Nations' body and that Resolution 1722 only endorsed an agreement reached between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries which had previously formed a bilateral Committee which they decided to expand. He would think that the same kind of procedure would be followed, i.e. that the new

composition would be endorsed by the UNGA. This procedure would avoid the ENDC being considered as a sub-committee of the General Assembly.

18. The CHAIRMAN pointed out that before this stage could be reached there should be an agreement between the two co-chairmen and then between the members of the ENDC, which, in his view, would leave some time for consultation in NATO.

19. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE suggested that consultation between the NATO delegations in New York might be easier.

20. The CHAIRMAN stated that one could not rule out the possibility of governments agreeing to consult directly in New York.

21. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE made it clear that such a hasty decision would destroy the basis of the consultation since it affected the confidence of members of the Council.

22. The COUNCIL:

took note of the above statements and agreed to continue the discussion whenever required.

5/1/1969

K.W. Anderson

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