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NATO CONFIDENTIAL

To: Secretary General

cc. Deputy Secretary General
ASG for Political Affairs
ASG for Defence Planning and Policy
Executive Secretary

From: Deputy Executive Secretary

Summary record of a private meeting of the Council
held on Wednesday, 9th July, 1969

I. President Nixon's visit to South Asia
and Romania

II. Mr. Harmel's visit to Moscow

1. PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT TO SOUTH ASIA AND ROMANIA

The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE made the following statement:

"I would first like to acquaint the Council with President Nixon's general approach and attitude toward his tour later this month to five South Asian countries and to Romania.

"The tour will begin, as you know, with his attendance at the splash-down of Apollo Eleven on 24th July, and will terminate in a one-day visit to Romania on 2nd August. From the Apollo Eleven recovery area the President will proceed first with visits to the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India and Pakistan, and thereafter continue on to Romania. He plans to return to Washington on 3rd August. Secretary of State Rogers will accompany the President during his visits to the Philippines and Indonesia, and will then depart to pay visits himself to Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, Australia and New Zealand.

"As I informed you on 28th June shortly before its announcement, the objective of the President's visit to Asian capitals is to re-emphasize his long-standing concern with peace and progress in Asia. You may recall in this connection that he set out his thinking on future security arrangements for Asia in a lengthy article which appeared in the journal 'Foreign Affairs', in the fall of 1967, and he has reaffirmed his interest often since then in statements to the American public.

"President Nixon looks forward to frank and intimate consultations with the Asian leaders he will meet. He is convinced that the United States must remain a Pacific power, and that whatever frustrations we may have suffered should not

obscure the fact that Asia, an area of dense population and dynamic evolution is of intimate concern to the United States.

"The immediate concern of most countries in the area is, of course, Vietnam. In the longer term, however, our quest is for a lasting peace in Asia and an arrangement in which we are not drawn into conflict, but in which the peoples of Asia, with whatever support we can provide, can shape their own future free of foreign intervention. This is not a trip concerned with the tactics of current negotiations. It will have instead the longer-range objective of beginning to lay a foundation for a post-Vietnam South Asian policy in which American responsibilities and contributions can be redefined in the light of current realities.

"What the President plans to explore with leaders of South Asian countries is their notion of how they visualize the evolution of Asia, the problem of peace in the region and the problem of progress and human well-being there. Secretary Rogers' visits elsewhere in Asia are designed to complement the President's discussions. The President's meetings with government leaders, taken together with those Secretary Rogers will have, are intended to confirm our conviction that we have a profound interest in the future of Asia and in the establishment of lasting peace there.

"The question has been asked whether the President's tour in Asia can be associated in any way with the vague allusion by Mr. Brezhnev at the International Communist Conference to "putting on the agenda the task of creating a system of collective security in Asia". The answer is no-one knows enough about what the Soviets have in mind to attempt any sort of connection between the President's trip and the Brezhnev speech. The Council will recall that the US Delegation took the initiative in POLADS to call attention to what little we have to go on about Soviet ideas and to present the initial US analysis. I think it has already been made clear in the POLADS exchange that none of us is clear about what the idea involves. As Secretary Rogers remarked to the press several days ago, we have attempted to find out what they do have in mind but they have yet to enlighten us.

"The tour of Asian capitals and the visit to Romania are conceptually different. They are related only to the extent that they both take place on a single journey - the President's visit to Romania bears no substantive relationship to the visits in Asia which will go before.

"I would like next to discuss the Romanian visit, recognizing that it is of particular interest to the members of this Council. President Nixon was invited early in his Administration by President Ceausescu to visit Romania. The invitation was conveyed to Secretary Rogers by the Romanian Ambassador in Washington. The President's travel plans to the Pacific and Asia this month provided a convenient opportunity to accept.

"The Romanian Government, in word and deed, has shown an interest in normalizing and improving East-West relations. We take this at face value. The Council will recall, incidentally, that the President visited Romania in a private capacity in 1967 - a visit on which I was privileged to accompany him. This naturally heightens his interest in seeing something of the people and their accomplishments at this point. He will have in mind, of course, the efforts of the Romanians through the late Fifties and more obviously in the Sixties to recover for themselves something more of the economic and political attributes one normally associates with the status of a sovereign state. Their successful efforts, led first by Gheorghiu-Dej and now by Ceausescu, in partially consolidating Romanian control over their own economy, and identifying their own national goals for their economy, has been a notable step. Perhaps in part as a consequence of this, Romania is distinguished among Eastern states in the refreshing attitude it adopts today towards East-West relations.

"The President will take up this visit in keeping with his general attitude in dealing with communist countries - that is, to deal with them on a frank basis. What he is prepared to do is to explore ways of improving day-to-day bilateral relations. He will also be interested in hearing the views of the Romanian leaders on international questions, and he will be prepared to present his own.

"We expect the Romanians may raise the question of trade. On this, it is our policy to do whatever we can realistically do to liberalize East-West trade and to increase trade with Eastern Europe on goods which do not have military importance. But to do this we have to have some mutuality; that is, US interests must also be considered. If we find in our discussions with Romania - or indeed other East European countries - that it is in the best interests of the United States to increase trade, then we can ask Congress to enact legislation which would give most-favored-nation tariff treatment.

"We do not know whether the question of China or the recognition of China will be raised, but it is conceivable that the Romanians may wish to discuss this in the context of the relationship between the non-communist and the communist world. If so, we do not intend to make any specific proposal to the Romanians concerning tactics in which this relationship might evolve. Rather we would confine our discussion to the fairly general level of how peace may be preserved in a world of philosophically different governmental systems.

"As for topics we might raise with the Romanian leaders, we would welcome an early expression of any views our Allies may have.

"There are no plans, tentative or otherwise, to extend the tour to include visits to other countries, and there are no prospects of meeting with other leaders. Let me say in this connection that the President did give thought to the possibility of also accepting an invitation to visit Yugoslavia, but his schedule did not permit him to do so on this occasion. He remains deeply interested, of course, in friendly relations with Yugoslavia - and I might add that he does hope to visit Yugoslavia during his term in office.

"A question has arisen about whether it would not have been wise for the United States or for the Romanians to discuss the visit plans in advance with the Soviet Union. I am not able to say whether the Romanian Government did not do so itself. In any event, certainly none of us need feel under obligation to check with the USSR before making visits to sovereign countries. The Soviets, after all, feel under no obligation to clear visits to the West with the US or any other third country - nor should they. And, of course, the trip is in no sense an anti-Soviet gesture; it is a gesture toward better East-West relations.

"To sum up then: we are willing and interested to talk to those communist leaders who themselves indicate an interest in talking. The Romanian leaders have indicated their concern about the relationship between the countries of the communist world and other countries. They have indicated considerable interest in discussing their views with the President. He has accepted their invitation to go and hear them, and he intends to set out his own views."

2. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he would confine his remarks to President Nixon's visit to Romania, an event which might have far-reaching implications. In his view, one factor that must be taken into account was the Romanian interpretation of the "Budapest Appeal". According to the Belgian Ambassador in Bucharest, the Romanian Government agreed that the United States and Canada should participate in any conference on European security but held the view that preparations for such a conference ought to be limited to European countries. This view was contrary to the Western approach which was that the participation of the North-American members of the Alliance in the preparatory work was essential.

3. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he would welcome a discussion on the subjects that might be raised between President Nixon and the Romanian leaders. He had noted Ambassador Ellsworth's remark to the effect that the President's general attitude would be in line with the Alliance's agreed policy. He asked whether it was likely that the Romanians would ask for the United States' views about the resolution on a European security conference which they might present to the next general assembly of the United Nations, using as a pretext the 25th Anniversary of the end of World War II. He was aware that when this possible initiative had been discussed in POLADS, no agreement had been reached regarding the attitude the Allies should adopt. So far, his Government's reactions had been rather negative because it was felt that such a resolution could give rise to polemics and pure propaganda. He expressed the hope that President Nixon, whose attitude might have a decisive influence, would explain to the Romanians that their initiative could be harmful.

4. As regards Soviet reactions to President Nixon's visit to Romania, he could accept the view expressed by Ambassador Ellsworth that most probably the process of negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding major issues such as SALT or the Middle East, would not be affected. On the relations between Romania and the Soviet Union, there was a tendency in Moscow to consider this visit as provocative, which might lead to reactions such as the cancellation of Mr. Brezhnev's visit to Bucharest or some delay in the signature of the Mutual Assistance Treaty between the two countries.

In general there was a danger that Romania might be more exposed than before to Soviet pressure.

5. Turning to the more general question of the Alliance's attitude towards East-West relations, he expressed the view that the time had come to reconsider the policy guidelines set out in CM(69)18(Final) in the light of President Nixon's visit to Romania and Mr. Harmel's visit to Moscow. Referring to paragraph 34 (g) (iv), he pointed out that since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, all the members of the Alliance had taken care, as recommended, to avoid any steps which might expose Czechoslovakia and Romania to further coercive Soviet pressures or counter-measures. He would be interested to know whether the general opinion was that a more active policy towards the East from now on would entail less considerable risks.

6. Finally, he informed the Council that the Minister of State in the Foreign Office, Mr. Roberts, would visit the Trade Fair at Vlno in September and that he would have talks with Czechoslovak Ministers in Prague, and then pay a visit to Belgrade. He would report to the Council any points of interest arising from these various visits.

7. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that his Government was looking forward to receiving a detailed account of President Nixon's trip. As for the reactions of the parties concerned in this event, he was aware that there was a certain amount of annoyance in the Soviet Union, as well as some anger against Romania. But on the whole it seemed doubtful that the Soviet leaders would take the risk of impeding any of the projects in hand, either with the United States or even with Romania. In Romania, the announcement had raised great expectations. It seemed that Moscow had been notified at the last minute, but that it had not been consulted. According to the Romanian Ambassador in Ottawa, his country's attitude was that of a sovereign state. However, he expressed the hope that Moscow would finally understand that President Nixon's visit was opening up new possibilities. He also expressed the hope that the United States would be sympathetic towards a possible Romanian initiative on European security in the UN General Assembly.

8. In Yugoslavia, there appeared to be some disappointment that President Nixon had not chosen to visit Belgrade first, together with some doubts about the possible effect of the visit on United States-Soviet relations, although in public statements officials simply pointed out that Yugoslavia had always been in favour of a policy of contacts between statesmen.

9. From the Canadian point of view, it was too early to guess whether the results would be positive or negative but it was very important that the Allies should avoid statements or actions which might detract from the chances of a positive result.

10. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had welcomed the opportunity for consultation provided by Ambassador Ellsworth's statement. As for the Romanian Resolution on European Security, he associated himself with the United Kingdom Representative.

that the Council would be given information on the visit so that member countries could co-ordinate their efforts. Commenting on the Romanian initiative at the United Nations, he said that while the French Government had a number of reservations in this connection, it was somewhat reluctant to reject the proposal publicly, since the reasons behind it were understandable. However, there appeared to be no need to oppose the Romanian move since it would no doubt prove unsuccessful in any case, considering the little enthusiasm it had aroused among Romania's partners.

13. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities were not concerned by foreseeable developments on the Eastern side; however, they would like to have more information about the intentions of the United States. They wondered whether President Nixon's visit to Romania was part of a deliberate policy in the context of US-USSR relations and vis-à-vis the satellites, with which the United States might intend to negotiate separately. In any event, they hoped that the Allies would be consulted in due time. Finally, he asked whether there was a connection between this visit and the negotiations on a European Security Conference. As for a possible Romanian Resolution about European Security, he shared the view expressed by the United Kingdom Representative.

14. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE expressed the hope that in the long run President Nixon's initiative would prove beneficial for East-West relations. According to information he had received from Moscow, the Soviet reaction was a mixture of irritation and caution. It was probable that the Soviet leaders would not wish to jeopardise the prospects of negotiations with the United States and that they had not yet made up their minds regarding their final attitude towards Romania. The Italian Government would be very interested to know in due time the United States assessment of the results of the visit.

15. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that in preparing President Nixon's trip, his Government would give the most careful consideration to the remarks which had just been made. With regard to the Romanian proposal, to be discussed in the General Assembly, he pointed out that so far his Government had taken a reserved attitude without formally opposing the proposal. He was aware that the Chairman of the Political Committee was about to submit a report to the Council on this matter which would give an opportunity to have a full discussion. On the relations between the USSR and Romania, he agreed with the various speakers that it might be some time before the Soviet reactions could be fully assessed.

16. He had noted that the Press Conference given on 8th July by the Romanian Ambassador, Mr. Marinescu, about the celebrations commemorating the 25th Anniversary of the liberation of Romania - to which Soviet Communist Party and Government leaders had been invited - had got a certain coverage in the Soviet Press. This might indicate that the Soviet leaders did not want to show any irritation for the moment. As regards East-West relations in general, he welcomed the constructive suggestion made by various speakers to the effect that the political guidelines in CM(69)18(Final) should be reconsidered once the results of President Nixon's trip were known. He felt, however, that the United States initiative was fully consistent

with the guidelines. In this respect he quoted paragraph 34 (b) and (c), recommending:

"not to leave the initiative to the Soviet Union, which would use it to its own purposes and try to create embarrassment for the West;

"to conduct these exchanges in a manner so as not to validate the concept of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.",

as well as paragraph 34 (g), according to which the Allies should:

"differentiate their approaches towards the USSR and other countries of Eastern Europe taking into account the political orientation of each of them."

17. In conclusion, he expressed appreciation for the comments made and the information given. He was prepared to give the Council the fullest report once the visit was over.

18. The CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussion, expressed satisfaction that the useful consultations which had taken place were to be continued in due course. He thought that some of the points raised about the United States' intentions had already been answered by Ambassador Ellsworth in his opening statement to the effect that President Nixon had no intention of making an unfriendly gesture towards the Soviet Union. However, he felt that the implications might be multiple and that it would be necessary to handle information about the visit in such a way that no hostile interpretation could be given. From what he knew of the Soviet reactions, he would be surprised if Romania did not have to pay some price. Finally, he had noted that the United States had reconfirmed its intention to discuss with its allies questions of direct concern to them, in accordance with the policy laid down in paragraph 5 of the Washington Communiqué.

19. Turning to the Romanian initiative in the United Nations, he suggested that the report by the Chairman of the Political Committee should be discussed during one of the next meetings of the Council. From this report, which he had just received, he had understood that the Romanian initiative had got a very cool reception in the Eastern bloc countries and in some neutral circles. Finally, he had noted Ambassador Ellsworth's statement about the Political guidelines. Generally speaking, he agreed that the United States initiative was in line with the spirit of the document. He felt, however, that the possible revision of the guidelines might usefully be undertaken after Mr. Harmel's visit to Moscow and President Nixon's visit to Romania.

/II. VISIT OF MR. HARMEL TO MOSCOW

20. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE confirmed that Mr. Harmel would visit Moscow from 23rd to 26th July. He would himself accompany his Minister, and make a full report to the Council as soon as possible.

per pro K.W. ANDREAE

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Report of a discussion by the Permanent Representatives
at a luncheon meeting on 30 June 1969

Ambassador de Staercke mentioned that Mr. Harmel wanted to know whether the Russians knew about Mr. Nixon's planned trip to Rumania. Ambassador Ellsworth replied by saying that ^{he did not know} ~~as far as he knew, the Russians had not been informed~~ and that the Nixon Administration did not see this visit as having any effect on Soviet/U.S. relations. Mr. Nixon feels that visits such as this will help develop friendly relations between the East and the West. He will go with no specific proposals but merely wants to listen to Mr. Ceausescu. Ambassador Ellsworth noted that President Tito had also invited President Nixon. In a personal aside, Ambassador Ellsworth thought that Mr. Nixon may have decided to go to Rumania because when he visited Bucharest in 1967 he had been received almost officially by the Rumanians. Ambassador de Staercke questioned whether there was a risk in such a visit and asked whether the President had taken this decision all by himself. Ambassador Birgi also asked why there had been no consultation as there had been with the planned visit of Mr. Harmel to Moscow. At this point Ambassador de Staercke noted that Mr. Harmel had now fixed the dates of 23rd-26th July for that visit.

Ambassador Campbell thought that the Asian aspect of the Nixon visit should not be ignored, particularly in the light of the ^{recent} Soviet interest in the ~~recent~~ South East Asian security. Ambassador Ellsworth promised to raise this problem of consultation ^{on} ~~and~~ such matters in the future when he was in the

United States later this week.

Several ambassadors, including Ambassadors Campbell, Birgi, de Ferrariis and de Staercke thought it important to have a discussion in the Council on the Nixon visit. Ambassador Ellsworth agreed.

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