

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

MC 43/20 (Draft)(SD)

22 November 1967

IMS Control N° 0359

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Report on Exercise FALLEX 66

Reference: MC 43/20 (Draft)(Referral Note), 8 September 1966

1. By reference, the report on Exercise FALLEX 66 was forwarded for your consideration.

2. The comments received have been evaluated as shown in Enclosure 1.

3. The subject will be discussed at your meeting scheduled for 30 November 1967.

EZIO PISTOTTI
Lieutenant General, Italian Army
Director, International Military Staff

353.5/Fallex-66

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1 ENCLOSURE

- 1. Supporting Document

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EVALUATION OF COMMENTS ON MC 43/20

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|--------|------|------|------|---|---|
| 1. | | | | <p><u>GENERAL</u></p> <p><u>NETHERLANDS</u></p> <p>The consolidated report should be forwarded as a memorandum to the Secretary General, thus leaving open the possibility for subsequent discussion in the DPC and the Council.</p> | <p>AGREED.</p> <p>IMS suggests that the report be forwarded to the DPC. The head at page 2, therefore, should be changed to read: "A report by the MC to the DPC on Exercise FALLEX 66".</p> |
| 2. | | | | <p>It is suggested that discussion of the reference in a MC meeting should be scheduled under part II of such meeting.</p> | <p>AGREED.</p> |
| 3. | 3 | 5b | 5-8 | <p><u>SACEUR</u></p> <p>Considerable co-ordination of military and political injections was accomplished. A special co-ordination meeting in February 1966 was conducted for the specific purpose of agreeing the text and timing of all injections. Representatives from MODs, MNCs, MSCs, MCREP and the NAC International Staff attended.</p> | <p>The problem of co-ordinating military and political injections has increased in late exercises, due to the altered concept which is exercised. Although the co-ordination which was accomplished in FALLEX 66 was considerable, the military events went too far ahead of the political reaction. The military and political events should be co-ordinated to avoid a situation in which several NATO nations are at war, while NATO as a whole or within one single region has not even reached an alert stage where the forces could be assigned NATO.</p> |

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| 4. | 3 | 5e | | <p><u>DENMARK</u></p> <p>Approve MC 43/20 with the comment that the question of and guidelines for the operations mentioned under Reinforced Alert in section I, paragraph 5e and section II, paragraph 5f(3), be discussed in the light of the suggested procedures in the MC 67/2, according to which NATO General Alert can be declared within one single region.</p> | NOTED. |
| 5. | 3 | 5e | 23-28 | <p><u>UNITED KINGDOM</u></p> <p>We support this conclusion and, with particular regard to lines 23-28, believe that further consideration is necessary in order to establish a definite policy. The following amendment is accordingly proposed. Delete all after "system" in line 23 and insert: "Forces under NATO Command were ordered into combat within enemy territory during Reinforced Alert. No guidance exists for such operations and it is, therefore, considered that this problem should be studied and a definite policy evolved. This should include operations within own and enemy territory and on the high seas."</p> | <p>AGREED.</p> <p>Change lines 23-28 accordingly.</p> |

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| 6. | 3 | 5e | | <p><u>TURKEY</u></p> <p><u>Alerts:</u> In this paragraph, it was generally stated that the Alert systems are extremely complicated and possible measures should be taken to simplify or clarify them and also the reasons of delay even in some cases rendering inoperative has been explained. According to our point of view, this delay in the Alert system is created by not declaring the appropriate Alert measures and alerting the NATO Forces when it will be deemed necessary by the situations in the aggressor's scenario. As it has been observed during previous exercises and FALLEX 66, Reinforced Alert has been declared after several days of launching of actual offensive. This case will create a situation where national Alerts will be declared prior to NATO Alerts. But, the aim of the Alert system is to provide regularly staging of NATO assigned forces from peacetime condition to wartime condition.</p> <p>Therefore, all Alert situations and stages, except General Alert, should be declared during the political tension phase before the actual engagements and General Alert should be declared upon actual operations.</p> | <p>It is agreed that Alert measures also in an exercise should be declared in accordance with the developed situations. As seen from serial 3, considerable efforts were made in order to co-ordinate the political and military events, and thereby to get the Alert stages declared in accordance with the situations. However, as stated in section II, paragraph 5c, of the report, improvement in this area in future exercises is necessary, but it is not possible to avoid unrealistic situations completely. Since this problem rather belongs to paragraph 5b "Concept of the Exercise", it is suggested for reasons of clarification, in paragraph 5b, line, 6 after "political events" to add "and Alert measures".</p> <p><i>Declaration of alert measures</i></p> |

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| 7. | 4 | 5f | | <p><u>TURKEY</u></p> <p><u>Assignment of Naval Forces:</u> In this paragraph it is suggested that the permanent NATO Naval Forces be established and earmarked for assignment during the early stage of rising tension. Such a multi-national permanent NATO Naval Force cannot be established during the peacetime and employment of this force during the time of tension is not considered appropriate for the reasons that it will create many financial and political difficulties and Mediterranean Allied countries are not capable of forming such a force and such a force cannot be deployed in the Black Sea according to the Montreux agreement. The best suitable solution for this subject is to direct the efforts to reinforce the local Naval Forces.</p> | <p>The concept of a permanent Standing Naval Force (STANAVFOR) was agreed in principle by the MC/CS at their 38th Session on 9 May 1967. A detailed study of the problems concerning permanent Naval Forces is under way and will be considered by the MC in the near future. However, it is suggested that the Turkish comments be added as a footnote to paragraph 5f on page 4. At the end of paragraph 5f add an asterisk and, at the bottom of the page, add "x The Turkish authorities feel that creation of such a force in the Mediterranean would encounter many financial and political problems and, therefore, is not considered appropriate. Furthermore, such a force cannot be deployed in the Black Sea according to the Montreux agreement. The best suitable solution would be reinforcement of local Naval Forces."</p> |
| 8. | 4 | 5g | | <p><u>TURKEY</u></p> <p><u>Selective Release of Nuclear Weapons:</u> In this paragraph it is stated that selective release procedure of nuclear weapons is adequate. This statement may be correct when it is assumed that accomplishment of the requirements of the release of nuclear weapons be given to the national delegations by their respective governments in advance.</p> | <p>AGREED.</p> <p>Line 9, after "meet requirements" add: "However, it is emphasized that the procedures are only adequate if respective governments give the necessary authority in time to their Permanent Representatives to the NAC."</p> |

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| 8 Cntd. | | | | <p><u>TURKEY</u> But this cannot bring us to such a result that existing procedures of selective release of nuclear weapons are adequate. Because it is very likely that in many cases governments are reluctant to delegate this authority and they will keep in their own responsibility for political consultation and decision. In such a case selective release procedures will largely be limited in its application. Therefore, the statement of "the Selective release procedures were found adequate" should be deleted or this should be amended as "Existing Selective release procedures were found adequate if respective governments give the necessary authority in time to their Permanent Members in NATO Council".</p> | |
| 9. | 8 | 4c | 5 | <p><u>NETHERLANDS</u> It is the opinion that the non-participation of France should be mentioned in the report by means of some neutral wording.</p> | <p>AGREED. Add after "Ministries of Defence" "(Except MOD France and MOD Portugal)". The same wording is used in the summary report NATO Exercises 1966, reference MC 43/19, 15 September 1967, page 2, paragraph 4.</p> |

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| 10. | 9 | 5c | 8-17 | <u>SACEUR</u> During a period of rapidly rising tension, military action, especially in the flank countries, might well go ahead of political reaction. For example, a NATO country under attack by an aggressor could be expected to respond immediately by declaring national General Alert and war, yet NATO as a whole might take some longer time to react. | See serial 3. |
| 11. | 11 | 5f(2) | 4-7 | <u>NETHERLANDS</u> As logistic support is a national responsibility, the last sentence of paragraph 5f(2), page 11, lines 4-7, should be worded in the imperative, i.e. "When changes occur to plans, which have been previously and mutually agreed, NATO Commanders will inform national authorities". | AGREED. Change lines 4-7 accordingly. |
| 12. | 11 | 5f(3) | 17-27 | <u>BELGIUM</u> a. Whether the operations be defensive or offensive (pre-planned or not), they must be studied at the Military Committee level. This study's resultant proposals should then be "politically" ratified for subsequent publication as an amendment either to MC 66/1 (for defensive operations) or to the special guidance for Major NATO Commanders (for offensive operations). | NOTED. |

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| 12. Cntd. | | | | <u>BELGIUM</u> b. An NMDZ should be established and rules of engagement should be provided. | NOTED. |
| 13. | 11 | 5f(3) | | <u>TURKEY</u> In section II, paragraph 5f(3), has been stated that the establishment of NATO Maritime Defence Zone and provide rules of engagement within NMDZ should be considered. This is not applicable in our region due to the characteristic of Black Sea theater of operation. Because, NATO Maritime force cannot be employed in the Black Sea, neither in peacetime nor in tension or crises according to the Montreux agreement. | NOTED. |
| 14. | 13 | 5j | 27-28 | <u>UNITED KINGDOM</u> We would like this sentence to read "shortages in these types of equipment led to extensive use of telephones.....". | AGREED. Change lines 27-28 accordingly. |

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NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

27 November 1967

CORRIGENDUM NO. 1 to
MC 43/20 (Draft)(SD), 22 November 1967

Holders of MC 43/20 (Draft)(SD), 22 November 1967, Report on Exercise FALLEX-66, are requested for reasons of accuracy, to make the following pen and ink changes:

- a. Enclosure, page 4, serial 6, IMS Evaluation, change last paragraph to read: "Since this problem rather belongs to page 3, paragraph 5b, "Concept of the Exercise," it is suggested for reasons of clarification in paragraph 5b, line 6, after "NATO areas" to add "and declaration of alert measures."

Hans J. von Joeden

H. VON JOEDEN
Colonel, German Army
Assistant Secretary

*Corrected
Joh
7 Dec 67*

COPY TO: Same as basic