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Per Authority IMSM-0462-02

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Overt and Covert Implementation of Measures of
the NATO Alert System

References: a. IMSWM-173-69, 16 July 1969
b. Danish Letter No. 939, 8 August 1969
c. German Letter GMR Ser. No. 4371/69, 11 August 1969
d. UK Letter UKM-108-69, 13 August 1969

1. By reference a, a draft MCM was distributed for national comments, after MNCs' concurrence with that paper had been received.

2. Most nations have now also indicated agreement with the draft MCM, except for three countries whose comments (references b, c and d) were distributed to you separately.

3. The IMS evaluation of the above comments is as follows:

a. Denmark and Germany

(1) The suggestion by Germany (reference c) to insert a recommendation to seek Military Committee advice is agreed; however, in order to avoid repetitions, the following wording for a new sub-paragraph 7b is recommended:

"b. for such considerations, the Military Committee's advice be sought on the feasibility and implications of implementing certain alert measures--overt or covert-- from a military viewpoint."

(2) Both countries (references b and c) suggest to insert the thought that nations, when considering alert implementations, should avail themselves of NAC/DPC consultation results and information or guidance from that authority. In view of the possibility that no such

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guidance may exist under certain circumstances, the two countries' proposal could be merged into a new sub-paragraph 7.c, which is recommended.

"c. methods and extent of implementation of alert measures be left to individual governments, which should, to the extent possible, take into account results of mutual information and consultation in the NAC/DPC and such guidance that may be derived therefrom."

b. United Kingdom. It is agreed in principle that a limitation of the MCM to the DPC, as desired by the UK, might be sufficient to discharge the given task. However, the reference DPC decision (DPC/D(69)3, 14 January 1969) clearly refers to the roots of this specific requirement which, from a military viewpoint, should not be dealt with in isolation from its background by merely stating the inappropriateness of the suggested classification of alert measures. Constructive proposals are deemed necessary to offset the somewhat negative reply by offering Military Committee advice and expertise, instead of expressing only agreement with SACEUR's views.

The reasoning in paragraph 2, reference d, cannot be supported. The AC/237 paper is an internal working paper, issued by the COECSWG Secretary on his own initiative to list an inventory of outstanding problems. Moreover, it cannot be expected that the future work on MC 67/2 will concern itself directly with political signalling effects, since it is to remain basically a military document. Finally, results are not likely to be achieved within the next one or perhaps two years. The DPC request for clarification of this issue is a problem of its own, the solution of which, if reached prior to MC 67/2 discussions, could well help to strengthen military grounds.

Recommendation

In view of the above and also taking into account that no other comments along the lines of the UK thoughts were received, it is

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
recommended that no change to paragraphs 4 - 6 be made.

An alternative solution, which would require reconsideration of the views expressed on the present draft, might be found by replacing the previous paragraphs 4 - 6 by a new concluding paragraph 4 along the following lines:

"4. Nevertheless the Military Committee recognizes that in certain circumstances it may be desirable to increase military readiness covertly if this is at all possible. Whilst, therefore, it does not consider that the establishment of a list of covert actions could be prepared in advance of particular situations, it would be quite possible to examine possible actions on a case-by-case basis as they arose. In such circumstances the Military Committee would recommend to the DPC those alert measures which it considered could possibly be taken without wide-spread public knowledge."

If this were agreed, the recommendation paragraph 7 (renumbered to 5) could remain as suggested in paragraph 3a above.

4. Your views on the IMS evaluation and recommendations (paragraph 3 above) would be appreciated by 15 September 1969 in order to reach agreement on the urgently needed reply to the DPC as soon as possible thereafter.



N. G. PALAIOLOGOPOULOS
Lieutenant General, Hellenic Army
Director, International Military Staff

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