



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ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION



Place du Maréchal  
de Lattre de Tassigny  
(Porte Dauphine)  
PARIS-XVI  
Tél. : KLEber 50-20  
Adresse télégraphique :  
OTAN PARIS ou  
NATO PARIS

NATO SECRET

To : Secretary General  
cc : Deputy Secretary General  
DSG/ASG for Economics and Finance  
ASG for Political Affairs  
From: Executive Secretary

Summary record of a private meeting of the Council  
held on Wednesday, 6th October, 1965 at 10.15 a.m.

- I. Rusk - Gromyko conversations.
- II. Indonesia.
- III. Kashmir
- IV. Disarmament

I. RUSK - GROMYKO CONVERSATIONS

The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE gave the Council an account of the conversations held between Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko on 29th September and 1st October, each of which had lasted for three hours including dinner. To sum up briefly, he said that the atmosphere was good but that there had been so signs of change in basic Soviet positions. The talks had covered disarmament questions, including non-proliferation and nuclear-free zones; the Indo-Pakistani conflict; and matters relating to Germany and European security.

2. On the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, Mr. Rusk, referring to the draft treaty recently tabled by the Soviet Union, suggested that an attempt should be made initially to study the minor differences between the Soviet and United States drafts with a view to eliminating them if possible.

3. On the subject of nuclear arrangements in NATO, Mr. Gromyko had said that Soviet opposition to the United States draft was based only on the desire to prevent proliferation and not on a desire to impair NATO cohesion. The Soviet Union would therefore be prepared to sign a treaty if the MLE and ANF concepts were abandoned. Mr. Rusk had replied that if the problem was only one of non-proliferation, then a solution could be worked out and a treaty agreed.

4. Mr. Gromyko was not very favourably inclined to the Fanfani proposal and thought there were little prospects of its acceptance.

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5. Mr. Gromyko, referring to the United States suggestion that a start to extending the Moscow Treaty might be made by banning tests down to those of magnitude 4.75, said that this was not acceptable because this threshold could not be separated from a moratorium on other tests.
6. Mr. Gromyko said that the US proposal for the transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses was unacceptable because of the problems of inspection. Mr. Rusk had urged the Soviets to give serious consideration on how to provide assurances that any disarmament measures agreed were carried out.
7. Commenting on the Soviet Union's attitude to a world disarmament conference, Mr. Rusk had said that he doubted the value of such a conference and thought one should not jeopardize progress on disarmament by creating what would be simply a new debating forum.
8. Mr. Gromyko had said that there was no change in the position of Cuba and the UAR regarding nuclear-free zones. He had urged the concept of a Central European nuclear-free zone. Mr. Rusk had replied that since Central Europe was only a few minutes away from the Soviet Union launch sites, this concept was meaningless.
9. Mr. Gromyko had expressed concern at the arms race in the Middle East, and referred to the General Assembly's resolution on a nuclear-free Africa, to which he said one should try to give juridical force. He had raised the question of European security and said that even if the situation in Europe was quiet, it was not normal. Mr. Rusk had replied that the United States recognised that a settlement must be reached but that the key thereto, as also to any major disarmament agreements, was German reunification. Mr. Gromyko had said that reunification was a matter for the two Germanies to negotiate; he claimed that the policies of the Federal Republic widened the gap between the two Germanies.
10. Mr. Rusk had replied that the United States and the Soviet Union might differ on the approach to reunification but that they should work towards it, and that East Germany should be allowed to express its free choice.
11. It had been agreed that, in general, the Soviet and US positions coincided on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, but Mr. Gromyko was opposed to converting the UN observer force into a peace-keeping force.
12. Mr. Gromyko had said that he was willing to renew discussion of the current US-Soviet exchange agreement.

XI. INDONESIA

13. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received a preliminary analysis by his authorities of the recent developments in Indonesia. He hoped that other governments would also contribute information.
14. As a first conclusion, it seemed that the coup of 30th September had failed. It was clear that the so-called anti-communist elements of the army were in control in Djakarta and in

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6/10

a large part of Java, which contained over half the population of Indonesia. As to the reasons why the revolt had broken out, and at this time, it was unlikely that the communist party was responsible. Sukarno's policy had been to keep a balance of power between the communists and the army, but developments in recent years had strengthened the position of the communists, so that it would not have been in their interest to stage a revolt now.

15. It seemed that the coup might have been triggered off by reports of Sukarno's health, a highly speculative subject. The Vienna doctors had indicated that, in the absence of an operation, which he had refused, he had no more than a year to live. His death would naturally cause a struggle for power in which timing would be important. It seemed the most likely explanation that Lt. Colonel Untung, of the palace guard, had triggered off the rebellion on his own initiative. If this was correct, it must have created an unpleasant problem for the communists by forcing them either to support the movement or to dissociate themselves from it. In fact they had done neither; they had kept silent and seemed to be in hiding. The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, seemed to be that this was a premature revolt by dissatisfied army officers, unsupported by the communists.

16. There were, however, elements in the picture which gave food for thought for the future. After the coup, the whole Cabinet had disappeared for several days. It was only now, on 6th October, that it was learnt that they had met in Bogor and sent a congratulatory cable to Peking on the anniversary of the Chinese revolution. Some members of the Cabinet had been absent at the time of the coup, for example Vice-Premier Subandrio, who was in Sumatra, and who was suspected of sympathy with the communists. He was now back at his post.

17. Sukarno had been captured and transported to an airbase near Djakarta, where his private plane was kept permanently against an emergency. Whether he was now free or a prisoner was unclear. It was not unlikely that he was silent of his own free will because he was waiting to see how events would turn out. On the other hand, if his health was failing, this might prevent him from taking an active part in developments.

18. The Army Chief of Staff and a group of generals had been killed in the early hours of the revolt. On 5th October they had been given a state funeral, attended by Subandrio and the Defence Minister, Nasution, who was anti-communist.

19. The officer put in charge by Sukarno to clean up the army was General Sujarto, who had commanded military activities against the Netherlands in Netherlands New Guinea and, later, operations against Malaysia. He was therefore not a communist. Fighting was continuing in Java, but the anti-communist elements seemed to be in control.

20. One should beware of the idea that an anti-communist movement meant a more pro-Western attitude. One should take into account, firstly, the disdain of soldiers for civilian underground agitation, and secondly, the fact that the army could not afford to be too anti-communist, since its equipment was supplied entirely

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by Russia and China, on whom the army therefore depended for future supplies. There had been large Western deliveries of arms in the past, but these had now been stopped.

21. What might happen in the future would depend largely on whether Sukarno was still able to wield effective power. If he was, it seemed most likely that he would aim at a political compromise restoring the former balance of power. However, even if real power now remained with the army, it seemed that it was in the general interest to have some sort of reconciliation in order to avoid civil war. It seemed that the prestige of both the communist party and Sukarno had been affected, and that the army was now in a better position than before.

22. It appeared doubtful that Indonesian foreign policy would be affected. The Netherlands considered that the policy of the last few years was so firmly anchored that a change was unlikely in the near future, except, of course, to the extent that the energy expended in internal political convulsions could not be directed abroad.

23. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received a considerable amount of information which bore out much of the Netherlands' conclusions. It was probable that the coup had been brought about by Untung and a group of military adventurers, perhaps used by the communists at a certain stage, but unsupported by them thereafter.

24. It seemed that Sukarno was now in Bogor, surrounded by his presidential guard and Sujarto's troops. He had made no public appearance or statement since 3rd October, which suggested that the troops had prevented him from so doing. The question now was whether these generals would take action against the communists, or be persuaded by Sukarno to resume the former balance between the two groups. There was a likelihood that, incensed at the assassination of their brother officers, they might decide to act on their own initiative; they might have reason to think that Sukarno had been privy to the original coup.

25. Nasution and Sujarto seemed firmly in command in Djakarta, where the communist-infiltrated official news agency had been closed down. Outside Djakarta the situation was obscure.

26. It was difficult to judge the morale and the state of loyalty of the lower officers. While probably shocked by the assassinations, they were unlikely to go against Sukarno's appeal for unity in the army. The other ranks might be expected to obey orders, at least initially. There was, however, a great split in the air force.

27. It could not be expected that these events necessarily meant a turn in Indonesian foreign policy which would be favourable to the West. All parties were anti-Western and in favour of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation. There was no doubt, of course, that the present confusion would diminish the effectiveness of the confrontation campaign.

28. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received information from the German Embassy in Djakarta despatched on 27th September, i.e. before the revolution. The report stated that Sukarno's behaviour showed an exaggerated messianic self-confidence and belief in the rôle of Indonesia, coupled with a

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disrespect for inter-governmental relations. He made flamboyant public statements, for example that "until a short time ago the fate of humanity was decided in Washington and Moscow, but it was now decided in Washington, Moscow, Peking and Djakarta". These gesturings should be seen against the background of a factious state facing great economic difficulties. Sukarno did not accept any international standards of behaviour or agreements with whose drawing-up Indonesia had not been associated. The only norm he admitted was the "law of the Indonesian revolution", a revolution which he claimed far surpassed the importance of the French and Russian revolutions. This idea was the basis for a most distorted concept of law and justice.

29. While past experience showed that Sukarno was capable of operating skilfully in a dangerous situation, his wild lack of restraint was the hallmark of declining rule. It seemed that this was a transitional phase in Indonesia, governed by extremes, and that the West must do what it could to maintain its position.

30. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities had received a considerable amount of material on the situation, which was both obscure and constantly changing. He thought that it might be difficult for Sukarno to reinstate the uneasy balance between the communists and the army, one reason being that it was the army which had the weapons. He thought that this was not inconsistent with the analysis of the situation presented by the Netherlands Representative.

31. The CHAIRMAN said that he assumed the Council would wish to come back to this subject at a later date.

III. KASHMIR.

32. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he had received material on the current state of Indo-Pakistani relations and the problem of aid.

33. The United Nations, as was well-known, was finding it very difficult to maintain the cease-fire. India was conscious that she had emerged as the stronger power. President Ayub was in an awkward position, under strong pressure to continue the struggle. The United States thought that his decision to accept the cease-fire had been reached only by a narrow margin. Pakistan felt that she had received inadequate United Nations assurances on Kashmir, and there was heavy emotional pressure on President Ayub to continue fighting; this would constitute a test for his leadership. President Ayub was aware that Pakistan could not secure Kashmir militarily, and that he could reach no more than a stalemate, at a great cost to his economic development goals. It was estimated that these goals might have been set back for two to four years as a result of the conflict so far. President Ayub might also feel that there would be an effort to reach a settlement through the United Nations. His reputation was staked on the achievement of a negotiated settlement. It would be noted that he was doing his utmost to maintain his position and also to secure lines of retreat as necessary (for example by his effusive thanks to China). The room he had for manoeuvre was considerably narrowed. There was evidence of dissatisfaction among the military, and there would be heavy pressure to replenish the equipment lost so far. The situation in Pakistan was thus very difficult, and the West should avoid any steps which might tighten Pakistan's ties with China.

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34. It was against this background that one should consider any question of aid. He was speaking of economic aid in the first place, since such aid was relevant to the prospects of a settlement. The United States had had to show great caution on forward aid commitments and to make it clear that neither side should take it for granted. The United States was concerned at Pakistani moves to co-operate with China, since they threatened the security of the sub-continent and necessitated a re-assessment of aid policies. United States military aid was still suspended. The government had told Congress that it would be consulted regarding the situation in the sub-continent on any new proposals for economic aid; in the meantime, food and other shipments were continuing under existing agreements.

35. There were questions which must be answered urgently now. The West must be reasonably assured that India and Pakistan would not use any aid to resume the fighting. There must also be a military disengagement and a lessening of tension. Developments in the sub-continent called for a serious assessment by the United States of its aid policy. He thought that all the NATO allies would agree that the Security Council resolution of 20th September provided the best guidance for the future in this connection.

36. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that, over the years, Italy had sent observers to the original cease-fire line. U Thant had now invited Italy to send new observers. The first group had been despatched on 26th September and a second group on 5th October.

37. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that Belgium also had provided military observers since 1948. To a request by U Thant for further observers, Belgium had replied in principle that she was prepared to send ten more. It appeared that their departure had been delayed, but purely for UN financial considerations.

38. He agreed with the United States Representative that the major question of continuing aid called for consideration by the allies.

39. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that his country had also been invited to send ten observers, of which three had already left. He agreed with the United States Representative that the Council should study the question of aid.

40. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's comment that the United Nations should go no further than send observers, he thought that in view of the precarious nature of the cease-fire it was obvious that the United Nations should envisage sending an effective peace-keeping force. He asked whether Mr. Rusk and Mr. Gromyko had talked of the possibility of using economic aid to bring pressure to bear on India and Pakistan.

41. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he had no information on this subject.

IV. DISARMAMENT

42. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE, referring to the draft non-proliferation treaty tabled in Geneva at the end of September by the Soviet Delegation, thought that it would be desirable for the Council to discuss this draft. He recalled that the German Representative had incited in previous Council discussions the desire of his government that all matters bearing on European security should be

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discussed in NATO. He suggested that, possibly at the initiative of one of the four Western countries represented in Geneva, the Council might study in what way the tabling of the Soviet draft treaty was likely to affect the disarmament discussions.


43. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he would be glad to see the Soviet draft studied in NATO, and suggested that it might be referred, in the first place, to the Committee of Political Advisers.

44. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE also supported the proposal by the Belgian Representative. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's comment that his opposition to the US draft was based only on the desire to prevent proliferation, and was not directed against the cohesion of the Alliance, he suggested that the Council should study the relationship between a non-proliferation treaty and nuclear arrangements in the Alliance.

45. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his authorities had begun to analyse the Soviet draft. He thought that it would be valuable to have an analysis of the differences between this draft and the draft treaties discussed in the Council. He suggested that the Committee of Political Advisers might prepare such an analysis, and said that Canada would be glad to contribute.

46. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that he assumed his authorities would agree to the proposal by the Belgian Representative. Referring to Mr. Gromyko's comments on non-proliferation, he said that it was clear that the Soviet draft had other targets than the MLF and ANF concepts, and that the Soviets were opposed to any participation by the non-nuclear NATO allies in the nuclear defence of the Alliance.

47. The CHAIRMAN, summing up, noted that it was agreed that the Committee of Political Advisers should, as a matter of urgency, study the possible repercussions for the disarmament discussions of the tabling of the Soviet draft non-proliferation treaty; that it should analyse the differences between the various draft treaties; and that its Chairman should report to the Council at the earliest possible date.

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