CONFIDENTIAL
SUMMARY RECORD
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10th May, 1951.

SUMMARY RECORD
OF
THE FIRST N.A.T.O. INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION MEETING
HELD AT
13, BELGRAVE SQUARE, LONDON, S.W.1.
ON
THE 12th, 13th, 14th APRIL, 1951.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE
<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Delegates</th>
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| Belgium   | M. Carlos Van Bellinghen, Director of Information, Belgian Foreign Office, Brussels.  
|           | M. Walravens, Director, Belgian Foreign Office, Brussels.                 |
| Canada    | Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie, Assistant Under Secretary of State, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.  
|           | Mr. S.F. Rae, Canada House, London.                                      |
|           | Mr. Campbell Moodie, Information Attaché, Canada House, London.           |
| Denmark   | Mr. Sigvald Kristensen, Chief of the Foreign Office Press Division, Copenhagen.  
|           | Mr. Ebbe Munck, Information Attaché, Danish Embassy, London.             |
|           | Mr. Tyge Kappel, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen.     |
| Iceland   | Mr. B. Gudmundsson, Chief of the Press Department, Icelandic Government, Reykjavik.  |
| Italy     | M. Carlo Perrone Capano, Director of the Press, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome.  
|           | M. F. Antinori, Press Attaché, Italian Embassy, London.                  |
| Luxembourg| M. Georges Heisbourg, Luxembourg Legation, London.                        |
|           | Mr. R.C. Pekelharing, Information Attaché, Netherlands Embassy, London. |
| Norway    | Mr. Hans Olav, Director, Norwegian Foreign Office, Information Service, Oslo.    |
|           | Mr. Helge Groth, Information Service, Norwegian Foreign Office, Oslo.    |
| Portugal  | Dr. José Manuel da Costa, National Secretary of Information of Portugal, Lisbon.  
|           | Senhor Joaquim Paco Clírcos, Head of the Press Department of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon. |
|           | Senhor Antonio Potier, Secretary, Portuguese Embassy, London.            |

/UNITED KINGDOM
2.

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. C.F.A. Warner, CMG, Assistant Under Secretary of State in charge of Information, Foreign Office, London.

Mr. Alan Moorhead, Chief P.R.O., Ministry of Defence, London.

The following will attend as required:

Sir Robert Fraser, CBE, Director-General, Central Office of Information, London.

Mr. Philip Jordan, CBE, Public Relations Adviser to Prime Minister, London.

Mr. S.C. Leslie, CBE, Head of Economic Information Unit, Treasury, London.

UNITED STATES

Mr. Edward W. Barrett, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Washington.

Mr. Francis Russell, Public Affairs Officer, State Department, Washington.

Mr. John Adams, Information Service, MDPE, Department of Defence, Washington.

Mr. Roscoe Drummond, Director of Information, ECLA - OSR, Paris.

Mr. Morrill Cody, United States State Department, Paris.

Mr. Luther Rood, I.S.A. State Department, Washington.

Mr. Joseph Charles, State Department, Washington.

Mr. John Devine, State Department, Washington.

Mr. Erasmus H. Kloman, Jr., State Department, Washington.

STANDING GROUP


SHAPE

Brigadier General Lanham, Chief of Public Information, SHAPE.

Colonel Cross, Deputy Chief of Public Information, SHAPE.

NATO Information Service

Chairman - Mr. T.F.M. Newton, Director

Mr. Geoffrey Parsons, Jr.

Mr. W.M. Newton

M. Jean Bellard

Mr. Livio Zeno-Zencovitch
THE CHAIRMAN introduced Ambassador Charles M. Spofford, Chairman of the North Atlantic Council Deputies, who opened the meeting.

(1) Statement by the Chairman of the Council Deputies

MR. SPOFFORD said the people of the NATO countries must have knowledge of, and confidence in the growing strength of the Atlantic Community. They must also understand that taxes, mobilization and shortages were the price of collective security. Furthermore, unity among the twelve partners must be preserved. These were objectives towards the attainment of which national information services could contribute. They might be termed "tactical" objectives. In addition, "the battle for men's minds" must be won. This was the "strategic" objective. The job to be done required imagination, wisdom, skill and even daring. To find an acceptable, commonly agreed answer as to how it was to be done was the reason for the Conference.

(2) Statement by Director of Information, NATO

The Chairman said that in the creation of physical defences NATO machinery was beginning to roll. But were similar advances being made in the creation of Atlantic bulwarks of the mind? Among our peoples there must be created not only the means of physical protection but even more fundamentally, the will to protect themselves. Military commanders recognize the importance of morale, and the role information could play in supporting it.

A modest beginning had been made at NATO Headquarters. The Service had as one of its primary aims the task of providing help to national services to the extent that its mandate and resources would permit. Its activities would be determined by what was wanted by the national information services. To be effective, however, the NATO Information Service would need facilities and support.

The role demanded of the Service seemed to combine two main functions: to assist national information services in publicizing NATO aims, and to assist them in countering adverse propaganda. The Service would not have great size or great financial resources. But with a small staff, adequate in numbers and ability, it could make a valuable contribution.
contribution to the Organization. It was proposed to establish the Service on a basis of the job to be done. The staff would be as international as possible.

(3) Statement by representative of the Standing Group
(Captain Beecher)

Captain Beecher said the Standing Group did not have a formal Public Information Organization. With the establishment of the Council Deputies and, later, the NATO Information Service it was recognized that public relations activities would be the responsibility of the higher authority. However, in the Standing Group there was provision for the formulation of a Public Relations Policy Committee which would serve the Standing Group in an advisory capacity. Establishment of that Committee depended upon approval being given by the Council Deputies.

Each of the three Standing Group members had as a member of his staff an officer acting as an adviser on public relations and public information matters. The Standing Group in no way acted as a releasing agency for public information. Such information as was considered suitable for general release was made available through recognized information agencies—in future, this would presumably be done through the NATO Information Service. Public Information Officers at the Standing Group did, however, answer queries from the press, etc., and coordinated with member nations in preparing public statements and communiques.

(4) Statement by representative of SEEP-E (Brigadier-General Lanham)

General Lanham said General Eisenhower had authorized him to make the following statement on his behalf, a statement which epitomized his concept of the fundamental role of information in our common undertaking:

"Two years ago the governments of twelve free nations bound themselves together in a great alliance dedicated to the purpose of providing for their common security and thereby ensuring both freedom and peace. Success depends upon unity; among free men unity depends, first of all, upon full and free information.

"Many pitfalls and dangers attend us. Perhaps the most deadly is the assumption by some that this great work can be brought to fruition by edict. They seem to believe that it is sufficient for governments to make commitments and for statesmen to make ringing pronouncements, and all will be well. This is false. Our coalition will exist and prosper in direct proportion to the confidence and support given it by the free peoples of our several countries. This, in turn, depends wholly upon the effectiveness and honesty of the information that reaches them. Indispensable sources of information are their own governments and the international agencies they have created. At this critical juncture in history, it would be indeed a spurious economy to save a bit of money at the expense of the foundation upon which the house of freedom must stand."
"This is one problem that confronts us in the information field. A second turns on the question of the troops to be made available for defence. The fighting men of the free countries are not automatons. Free men do not fight and die for an empty slogan or for glamourized leaders. They fight, if they have to, and die, if die they must, for ideals that command their devotion. It is essential, therefore, that men in uniform be constantly aware of the purpose of their service and its significance. They must be in no possible doubt as to the critical value of their role in the great fraternity of freedom. This obligation devolves upon every leader from the smallest to the greatest.

"Given a worthy cause and a clear understanding that upon them rests the fate of liberty, and free soldiers will fight to the death. Let this quality be lacking and an army of democracy will collapse at the first shock of battle. This, then, is the second great information task that confronts NATO. The real foundation of this free coalition must be fact and understanding; it is up to us to see that these are provided."

In this great information effort the role of SHAPE was small but unquestionably vital. It was small in the sense that it confined itself strictly to military matters. But it was large in the sense that the degree of NATO's success would be measured by the degree of General Eisenhower's success in accomplishing his assigned mission. SHAPE could not escape the obligation of playing its proper part in the field of public information. To meet this obligation General Eisenhower had created an Office of Public Information. At present it was authorized a total of 16 officers and 16 enlisted people and civilians. It might eventually be authorized seven or eight more officers.

An approved accreditation policy, shortly to be published, would limit permanent accreditation to full-time employees of bona fide news media whose main assignment must be coverage of SHAPE. Temporary accreditation would be granted to some free lance journalists.

Referring to the importance General Eisenhower attached to "troop information", General Lanham said General Eisenhower did not contemplate SHAPE's embarking on an elaborate troop information programme. He felt member nations themselves would carry the major share of the work with such assistance as SHAPE might be able to give, and that maximum use must be made of existing agencies. If these assumptions proved unworkable, SHAPE would be compelled to abandon all thought of this vital work.
Problems of Organisation and Liaison

(1) Statements by Delegates

THE BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE (M. van Bellinghen) said propaganda, in Belgium, was superfluous. What was required was information about the achievements and aims of the Organization. It should best be disseminated by giving the widest possible publicity to special events, not by regular press releases and regular radio programmes.

The Belgian Government did not have a Ministry of Information. Information about NATO was disseminated by the Information Service of the Foreign Ministry, working as required in cooperation with the Defence Ministry.

THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said there was no government controlled information service in his country and no Ministry of Information. There was a small information division within the Department of External Affairs, however, which had a two-fold function: providing information about Canada abroad, and within Canada, providing information about Canada's foreign relations. The National Film Board was a Government agency. In the field of radio there were private companies in addition to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. These were the main agencies which Canada possessed, and the Government looked forward to doing their full part in the work of stimulating NATO information. With a combination of imagination and common sense it could best be disseminated and there was a great deal which could be done to encourage interchanges of information between NATO countries.

THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVE (M. Munck) said his Government did not have a Ministry of Information. It would be the task of the Foreign Office Press Department to collect and disseminate NATO news. He attached the greatest importance to the clearing-house activities which the NATO Information Service proposed to undertake. Non-Governmental activities were most important in Denmark, and much fine work was being done by people working outside governmental circles. For instance, about a year ago, with money collected privately, a group had undertaken to publish a newsletter on questions of current world interest. It had a wide circulation, was published monthly, and groups had been formed to discuss its contents. NATO information could best be disseminated by the utilization of such sources. The Danish Government did not react kindly to official propaganda.

THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE (M. Ercul) said his Government had a Ministry of Information to which Radio Diffusion Française was attached. Within the Foreign and Defence Ministries there was also a permanent sub-secretariat responsible for information services. In his opinion the NATO Information Service should collect, collate and disseminate to national services information concerning countries in the Soviet orbit and information concerning NATO countries themselves. National Information Services were best able to judge how the information thus provided could be utilized most effectively in their respective countries.

THE ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE said official propaganda was disliked in his country. However, more than four-fifths of the press were solidly behind NATO. The Government had excellent relations with independent radio and press commentators and would
welcome any help the NATO Information Service might be able to provide; Iceland's positions within the Treaty organization was special in the sense that she became a member without undertaking any military obligations.

THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that sustained effort on the part of the Government was necessary in order to counter communist propaganda. Among other things, an agency had been created (Agenzia Giornalistica Italia) for the purpose of guiding and supplying information to daily newspapers and political commentators. Posters, pamphlets and leaflets were widely distributed, and by beaming short- and long-wave broadcasts on satellite countries the Government carried its anti-communist activities further afield. In future, the Government proposed to increase the number of posters and pamphlets it produced; to broaden the scope of the Agenzia Giornalistica Italiana; to sponsor documentary films; to work closely with other Democratic parties and, by every possible means, to oppose communist theory and practice. National action was not enough; joint Western action on an international scale was required.

THE LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE said the information and press service of the Government had been set up at the time of the liberation for purely practical reasons. It was attached to the Ministère d'État. It had shown itself to be useful and had therefore been maintained. It dealt with press relations, answered queries from journalists, etc. There was no national Luxembourg news agency. His Government entirely approved the setting up of the NATO Information Service and was prepared to cooperate in every way possible.

THE NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE (Dr. Landre) said practically every Ministry in the Government had its own press officer. He was Director of the Dutch Government Information Service and was also Information Officer to the Prime Minister. Together, the information officers formed an information council; it had wide powers of decision. On questions of policy the Prime Minister's Information Officer was the government's spokesman as far as the press was concerned. He met daily with the information officers from the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs in order to coordinate their work.

The Government was not engaged in direct anti-communist propaganda for the reason that the public was opposed to it. But every facility was made available to the press, radio and newsreel companies so that, through them, the public would be kept informed. He would be glad to go back to his country with the knowledge that a new source of NATO Information had been developed.

THE NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE (Mr. Olav) said there was no national information service in Norway. There had been, however, for 10 years, a section of Public Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which fulfilled the same functions.
In the view of his Government, the NATO Information Service should carry out a programme of public information under the direction of the Council Deputies. Its task should be to make NATO known as a defence organization against the encroachments of Russian imperialism. To that end it should spread knowledge about NATO, and stress the common interest of NATO countries in preserving their way of life. It should also spread knowledge of true conditions in communist countries. In short, it should act as the coordinating organ for informational activities pertaining to NATO membership, its privileges and its obligations. It should advise the Treaty Nations on the general policy of information laid down by the Council Deputies and invite suggestions as to the implementation of such policy.

THE PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE (Dr. da Costa) said his country was practically immune to the dangers of communism. However, the Government was alert to the dangers of communist propaganda for which reason it desired actively to collaborate with the NATO Information Service. Communist conviction must be met with our own courageous conviction. The Western crusade should not, however, be a defence of capitalism which was abhorrent to the peoples of Europe.

The Press in Portugal was hostile to propaganda; information could not be forced upon them. However, information of value, in the sense of having publicity value, was always acceptable. His service was entirely disposed to give to, and receive from the NATO Information Service, information of mutual interest.

THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE (Sir Robert Fraser) said the Central Office of Information carried on a fairly extensive domestic Government Information Service. The Central Office of Information was a technical agency which received and carried out orders from Ministerial Departments who were themselves responsible for policy. An information programme about the defence of the West had been started about two years ago; it had been extended about a year ago to cover NATO. The programme included a series of lectures, and one of the lectures was about NATO. A film was being produced covering the defence of the West; in it NATO had a primary place. A certain amount of visual material had been produced and more was in preparation.

The Central Office of Information had found itself short of factual raw material which could be processed into various forms of publicity material. It would be a great step forward if the Central Office of Information could look to the NATO Information Service to provide that information, and also actual examples of things produced by Governments or by the Service itself.

THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE (Mr. Barrett) expressed the view that it was essential that the facts regarding NATO, the facts regarding the Eisenhower Command, the facts regarding the thoughts and convictions of the leaders who were embarking on this great movement, should be disseminated through all available information media. He was glad the Director of Information did not envisage a flamboyant information organization; but he hoped organization would not be too modest. The production of factual information and raw material was the kind of work that required manpower at headquarters. He looked forward to cooperating in every way possible with the other NATO Governments and with the NATO Information Service.
(2) Liaison

GENERAL LANHAN said he was convinced there should be a physical interchange of representatives between the NATO Information Service and SHAPE, and also between SHAPE and member Governments. If a film of interest to all the NAT nations was to be produced, for example, advice and guidance from Governments would be required. Simultaneous release of information also required coordination.

CAPTAIN BEECKL said he subscribed to the views expressed by General Lanhan. He added that the Standing Group hoped soon to make more information of a military nature available for release. The Security Coordinating Committee was at present engaged in reviewing Standing Group documents with a view to releasing the information they contained.

Delegates were generally agreed on the importance of the release of information on the military aspects of NATO. An important source of such information was the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme. The arrival of equipment shipped under MDAP was one of the facts which would help to build confidence.

MR. ADAMS (NDAP representative) said that once the general nature of the equipment had been revealed as moving forward he saw no objection to the matter being publicized.

There was considerable discussion as to how the NATO Information Service could most usefully establish liaison with National Information Services. The Chairman recalled a suggestion made in the Council Deputies to the effect that Governments might nominate two officials, one of whom would deal with incoming NATO material and the other, with information to be forwarded to the NATO Information Service. He asked if the suggestion was, in the opinion of delegates, a practical one.

It was agreed that each Government should be urged to make arrangements, as appropriate, to ensure that the NATO Information Service would be enabled to perform its functions efficiently and effectively, and without loss of time.

(3) Pooling of Information for Public Purposes

THE CHAIRMAN said some Governments were already providing material to be made available to other Governments. If other Governments found themselves in a position also to do so, the Information Service would find itself in possession of great amount of material. The question arose as to whether the Service should have an editorial function in this matter. It might seem advisable to digest some of this material, to select from it, and in respect of some of it, merely to list briefly the nature of the material which could be provided on request. At the time of his appointment members of the Council expressed the hope that the new Information Service would not flood them with paper.

THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE expressed the view that decision in this matter rested with the NATO Information Service. His service was already supplying material which they were prepared to have circulated and which had been selected as suitable.

/ THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE
10.

THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE was doubtful as to whether material should be edited.

THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE (Mr. Barnier) said some Governments might not have the resources for handling material in quantity. On the other hand, for the NATO Information Service to undertake to edit material might necessitate a very large staff. It might be preferable, in some instances, for one Government to send material direct to all other NATO Governments. Security material should be distributed in this way. Processed information, ready for public release could also be sent through diplomatic channels. The information required from the NATO Information Service consisted of information about the building up of strength, and material for countering Soviet propaganda.

It was further agreed to formulate a resolution calling attention to the importance the meeting attached to the clearing house activities of the NATO Information Service.

(4) Spread of NATO Information by National Information Services through labour channels in member countries.

THE CHAIRMAN introduced Mr. Hakon Lie, Secretary of the Norwegian Labour Party who addressed the meeting. (The text of his speech is reproduced as Document AC/1-0/3).

THE CHAIRMAN said he hoped to get permission to have a trained labour man on his staff, someone respected in international labour union circles, whose task it would be to tailor information for insertion in labour journals. Such material would, of course, be distributed through national information Services. He invited comments on the proposal.

THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE (Mr. Ritchie) thought this might be a difficult and complicated task, and one which might better be left to national governments.

THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE agreed with the view expressed by the Canadian Representative. He doubted the wisdom of catering for labour circles, or any other circle, exclusively. What was required was documentation condemning the enemy which would be generally effective.
(5) Use of non-Governmental associations and of non-Governmental media

THE CHAIRMAN asked to what degree the NATO Information Service should feel free to discuss NATO with journalists from abroad.

The following views were expressed in the course of discussion:

(a) the NATO Information Service should limit themselves to straight information unless individual governments gave permission for discussions with their nationals to be carried further;

(b) if this practice proved to be too restrictive the Director of Information should seek the advice of the Council Deputies;

(c) the names of visiting journalists should be communicated to the national information service concerned.

(6) Economic, Social and Cultural Information in the NATO Programme

THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE (Mr. Leslie) referred to the impact of defence on national economies. In the field of information this aspect of the defence effort posed a very difficult problem. Even now it was being argued in some quarters that national economies could not sustain the added burden of rearmament, that living standards would fall disastrously, that there was inequality of sacrifice and so on. It was not easy to find constructive answers to such arguments. People had to be shown that rearmament was necessary, at whatever cost and at whatever sacrifice, if the Western way of life was to be preserved. To this end economic information should be pooled and exchanged by the NATO nations. The problem was of the utmost importance and merited special study.

Delegates next considered the texts of three proposed resolutions:

(1) Draft resolution on the release of military information which was adopted (Document: AC/1-D/4);

(2) Draft resolution on the release of economic information which was adopted (Document: AC/1-D/5);

(3) Draft resolution by the United Kingdom Delegation on the NATO Information Service as a clearing house for information (Document: AC/1-D/7). After discussion and amendment it was adopted (Document: AC/1-D/7 Final).

11. SECTION C/
(A) **Press**

Mr. Parsons said that a large staff was not required to handle the relationship between the NATO Information Service and the press. Up to the present however the manner in which press matters had been handled was not altogether satisfactory. This was due to a variety of causes, in particular:

(i) Shortage of staff.

(ii) The confidential nature of the majority of the NATO work.

(iii) The express wish of the Council Deputies that their deliberations should as far as possible be kept out of the limelight.

Nevertheless there had been occasions on which valuable publicity might have been obtained if the National Information Services had realized that there was a specific job to be done. For example, the United Kingdom had recently despatched the 11th Armoured Division to Germany almost without mention in the press, and large quantities of United States equipment had been delivered to European countries also without publicity.

Mr. Parsons put forward brief suggestions to improve the handling of press relationships as follows:

1. To encourage the exchange of visits between representatives of the national press, for example, the proposed visit of Italian journalists to the United States to see for themselves the extent of the United States defence effort. In this connection it was agreed that the numbers in each existing party should be kept small if the best value were to be obtained.

2. National Information Services should make arrangements to exhibit new types of up to date military equipment to press representatives.

3. Arrangements should be made for photographic and other material relating to the training of contingents from one NAT country in another (e.g. air training in Canada) to be transmitted to the National Information Service of the interested country.

4. National Information Services should make every effort to make known to the United States public the extent of Europe's defence effort. This was also highly important for Congressional purposes.

Mr. Parsons then referred to the statement made the previous day by Mr. Haakon Lie on the subject of relations with the Labour press. In his view it was essential to explain to the individual worker why he must be prepared to work longer hours, see deterioration in the real value of his wages and the postponement of improved social services if his support...
was to be enlisted. The best method of reaching the
individual worker was, in his view, through the recognised
Labour leaders, but he recognised that basic information
supplied to these leaders might have to be adapted to suit
individual audiences. He suggested that a Labour Press
Committee might be established in each country on which the
National Information Service would be represented and with
which the N.A.T. Information Service would work in close contact.
He was somewhat perturbed to note that even in countries
which had a Socialist government, strikes and other signs of
industrial unrest were still apparent, and he wondered what the
position would be if the Socialist governments were replaced by
Right wing governments.

THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE supported the
suggestion that there should be an organized interchange of
visits for journalists. The United Kingdom had some experience
of such visits and found that they produced worth while results.
The usual practice in the United Kingdom was to invite
individuals representing all shades of political opinion (except
Communist) and to arrange a programme for them lasting a week
to ten days, in the course of which every effort was made to
show them inter alia evidence of the increased defence effort.
In some cases newspapers which had previously been hostile to
the United Kingdom methods had changed their whole tone as a
result of such visits.

Although the United Kingdom was in favour of publicity
on the growing defensive strength of the N.A.T.O. countries, on
their increased production programmes and increased financial
effort, he felt that blatant propaganda should be avoided at
all costs. For a variety of reasons the emphasis which would
be laid on increased rearmament would vary from country and
this was one of the strongest arguments in favour of N.A.T.O.
publicity being handled by the National Information Services.
As regards methods, he was strongly of the opinion that it
was much more desirable to provide journalists with background
material rather than official hand outs, as individual
journalists could then take the credit for working up the
material on their own account. In particular, anti-Communist
material should always be disseminated unofficially.

With regard to relationship with the Labour press, he agreed that the best method of approach was through the
recognized labour leaders. The degree to which governments
were in a position to supply material direct to the Labour
organizations varied from country to country. As far as
the United Kingdom was concerned no difficulty arose at
present, and in his view the situation would not alter if the
Socialist government was replaced by a Right wing government.

/8.
On the policy issue regarding the role of the National Information Services, he pointed out that before the Council set up a N.A.T.O. Information Service it was mutually agreed that material provided by this Information Service should be channelled through the various National Information Services. This principle should in his view be adhered to at any rate for the time being, although in certain special cases National Governments might be prepared to agree to direct contact between the N.A.T.O. Information Service and the recipients in certain restricted fields. With regard to the role of the N.A.T.O. Information Service, his view was that this Service could be of the greatest assistance in suggesting topics to National Information Services and providing basic material. The N.A.T.O. Information Service could, in brief, prepare the orchestration for N.A.T.O. publicity.

In discussion the following points were made:

(a) In selecting journalists for the proposed visits care should be taken not to overlook radio and magazine journalists.

(b) The Netherlands Representative said that film material relating to recent manoeuvres in the Netherlands had been transmitted to the United States, and had had a wide showing on television.

(c) The United States Representative said that since World War II there had been a growing interest in international affairs amongst the United States people. This had taken a form of the creation of a number of enthusiastic groups and societies who were most anxious that their views on particular issues should be made known to the Administration. In order to meet this development the State Department had organized a series of conferences between representatives of the State Department and individual groups at which various aspects of international affairs were discussed. These conferences had been most successful as the groups felt that by this means they had made known their views to the Government and at the same time had been given the opportunity of learning the Government’s views. A system of this kind might with advantage be tried out in other countries.

(b) Publication

The Chairman drew attention to two documents which had been circulated that morning.

(1) Proposed texts for N.A.T.O. posters:

Full scale samples of these posters and of certain pamphlets were on show in Room 10 of No. 13, Belgrave Square. He realized that some of the exhibits would be more suitable for some countries than others, but he felt that it would be worth while for delegations to take the opportunity of inspecting...
inspecting them. The material had been prepared in the main with the assistance of ECA Paris. He stressed that the NATO Information Service was not a production unit and would not therefore be in a position to provide copies of these posters or pamphlets to the National Information Services.

(ii) Draft N. 10 handbook. This draft had been prepared with the object of bringing together in one publication basic material relating to NATO. This handbook was not yet complete, in particular the statements on the current defence efforts in the various NATO countries had so far only been made available by half of the member countries. He trusted that those countries who had not yet produced statements would do so at an early date.

The main use to which the material contained in the handbook might be put was either for distribution to individual journalists or for use by National Information Services in whatever way they thought fit. He would welcome comments from individual countries on the information which it was proposed to include in the handbook.

In discussion national representatives expressed their warm approval of the information contained in the draft handbook. The following points were mentioned:

(a) It would be most helpful if the handbook could be distributed to newspaper, society, and trade union libraries where it could be used by leader writers, feature writers etc. as desired.

(b) It was the intention to produce a printed version of the booklet after incorporating comments received from member countries. In this connexion it would be valuable to have an estimate from individual countries of the number of copies which they would require.

(c) It was intended also to produce the handbook in the French language as soon as practicable.

(d) It might be desirable to produce the handbook in a form suitable for universities and schools.

(e) Sections of the handbook relating to political and historical matters would be submitted to the Council.
Council Deputies for approval before publication, since if these sections were published with the NATO imprimatur, the inference would be that for example the interpretation of the events leading up to the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty were authoritative and official. For this reason only the factual information at present contained in the appendices of the handbook should be used publicly.

(C) Radio

16. MR. W.K. NEWTON said that in the field of radio there was little object in talking in general terms. The format of the programmes always had to be taken into account in using this medium. He submitted the following suggestions for consideration:

(a) "Spot news"

In his view "spot news" should be handled by the same kind of people who handled "spot news" for newspapers, though these might have to be reinforced in order to handle the more technical aspects of NATO work such as the activities of the Defence Production Board and the proposed Financial and Economic Board. Council meetings should of course be given the maximum radio coverage.

(b) Actualities.

This term covered on the spot reports by radio observers, recordings, interviews, inspections, manoeuvres, the launching of ships, first hand production stories. The task of a N.A.T. Information Service in this field was important but straightforward. It consisted in looking out for likely stories in advance and giving early warning to the national radio networks. There was room for cooperation in this particular field between the national networks, for example in the supply of speakers and reporters.

(c) Commentaries.

It was worth considering whether or not national radio networks should introduce for example weekly commentaries on NATO affairs. The success of the commentary depended on obtaining a first class commentator and the necessary material. The co-operation of both the military and civilian agencies of NATO in this particular field was essential.

(d) Talks by national leaders and leading NATO personalities.

On certain special occasions, e.g. the recent second anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, it was valuable to have radio speeches by national leaders and NATO personalities. The material for the scripts could be provided by the NATO Information Service.

(e) Discussions

Certain issues and developments might lend themselves particularly to this type of treatment and the N.A.T. Information Service might help in suggesting the names of suitable speakers.
(f) Features.

He advocated the use of the simple expository type using radio actors and such characters as the "man in the street". In addition, illustrated documentary material would be most valuable, for example actual recordings taken in armaments factories. Authoritative documentative treatment was also useful in exposing the actual situation in the Soviet Union. The NAT Information Service might well act as a clearing house for suggested treatment and supply sample scripts. It was, however, imperative to employ one first class script writer rather than a team of writers.

(g) Question and answer type of programme.

While it was important to avoid giving the impression of being didactic it would be possible to include serious questions relating to NAT activities in a programme of this type where questions of all kinds were submitted by listeners and the answers given by men of some eminence in public life.

(h) Women's programmes

Most radio networks have regular women's programmes. The preparation of the material for these programmes was however a delicate matter and any mistake was liable to boomerang.

(i) Countering Soviet propaganda.

This was a difficult subject to handle as there was always a danger that the only result of publicizing Soviet propaganda was to give it a wider distribution than it would otherwise have had and to increase its appeal to the untutored mind. The use of any Soviet propaganda material for counter propaganda use must therefore be very carefully supervised. The Soviet Union had a definite policy with regard to every single area in the world and one of the most effective methods of combating this policy was to publicize in the individual area concerned what Soviet propaganda was saying about it.

(j) International programmes.

There was some value in having a programme which was aimed primarily at one country but into which speeches etc., from another country were interpolated, provided that bilingual speakers could be used. Experience had shown that direct broadcasts to two or more countries were not really effective.

To sum up, the role of the NAT Information Service in the radio field was in his view to supply basic facts and materials and to submit ideas. It was important to realize however that ideas were only of use to radio if they were suitable to this particular medium. In dealing with broadcasting the speed factor was even more important than newspaper reporting, as practical resources have to be set up in order to disseminate the information. For technical reasons material for radio use does not lend itself for transmission through a chain of non-expert hands.

/Mr. W.M. Newton
MR. W. M. NEWTON said that it might be of interest to delegates to know that the British Broadcasting Corporation was that day transmitting in their overseas service the first of a long and comprehensive series entitled "North Atlantic Report." These broadcasts would be weekly and would last approximately half an hour each.

(D) Films and Visual Displays

Mr. Bullard suggested ways in which films and visual displays could be used for NATO purposes.

(a) Newsreels

Events which were likely to make a favourable impression on public opinion should be filmed and distributed widely in the 12 NATO countries, e.g., the arrival in Europe of troops and equipment, troop manoeuvres and NATO Conferences. If private agencies were not disposed to record such events the NATO Information Service, in cooperation with ECA, could arrange for newsreel to be made. Some firms considered films of this kind "political" and refused to distribute them on that account. He would be glad to have suggestions as to how this difficulty could be overcome.

(b) Documentary films

Five countries were at present engaged in the production of documentary films which would highlight the defensive spirit of the Atlantic Community. In some instances the NATO Information Service had been able to suggest themes and to offer advice and assistance. Other films had already been made and were available for distribution: "International Air School" and "Alien Orders" (British); "Strategy for Victory" and "Tito Western Ally" (March of Time); and "General Eisenhower" (State Department). In the field of counter-propaganda the importance of documentary films should not be overlooked.

The NATO Information Service could act as a coordinating agency so as to avoid duplication of effort; it could suggest themes and offer advice as to production; and it could in some instances facilitate production by enlisting the cooperation of military agencies and the ECA. The Service hoped to build up a catalogue of films and a small film library, both of which would be put at the disposal of national governments.

(c) Photographs

There were four possible ways in which the NATO Information Service could be of help: by providing facilities to photographers during international meetings; by obtaining permission from military agencies for photographs to be taken; by reproducing photographs on request; by establishing at Headquarters a photo library.

(d) Posters

This was a delicate matter. Some countries were very much/
much opposed to using posters; yet in other countries, France and Italy for example, posters were considered an acceptable and valuable media. The possibility of producing a series of posters suitable for display in all NATO countries should be considered.

A NATO poster contest might stimulate interest among young people. Furthermore, it would be useful to devise a NATO symbol.

The most important factor in the use of these media was the will to use them.

(E) Educational and Other Outlets

Dr. ZEKO-ZENCOVICH said that the use of educational and other outlets was not within the immediate control of National Information Officers. The main question was to decide what steps should be taken to publicize NATO in universities, schools and other educational establishments. It should be possible to stress the theme of a common membership of the Atlantic community and to trace back affinities of the member countries through the ages. Themes of this kind might be included in the university and school curricula. Other methods to adopt might include the preparation of appropriate bibliographies and the arranging of special conferences. In general, the matter would have to be decided by the National Information Services in conjunction with national educational authorities.

(F) Ministerial Speeches and Speeches by officials

Mr. PARSONS said this was a somewhat delicate field as it was clearly impossible either for the NATO Information Service or the National Information Services to instruct Ministers what they should say. On the other hand the NATO Information Service might be of use in providing material to those responsible for preparing drafts of ministerial speeches, in such a way as to stimulate widespread action. He would welcome the views of the national representatives on this particular suggestion.
SECTION D

Strategy in the Ideological Struggle

(1) Speech by M. Jean Paul David

THE CHAIRMAN introduced M. Jean Paul David, member of the French National Assembly and President of "Paix et Liberté," who addressed the meeting.

(The text of his speech is reproduced separately).

(2) Soviet propaganda: counter-propaganda and factors affecting public morale in neutral countries

THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE (Mr. Barrett) said the State Department prepared a good deal of material concerning Soviet internal and external propaganda, based on monitoring reports, press surveys, etc. He would be glad to make this documentation available to the NATO Information Service's common pool of information.

The Stockholm Peace campaign had not been a success in the United States. The Government had taken the initiative in exposing its real purpose. To this end they had enlisted the support of private organizations and of influential individuals. The facilities of the Voice of America and the U.S.I.S. had also been utilized in this connection.

The communists' attempt to monopolize the word "peace" faced the Western countries with a long-term problem. In his opinion the Information Service should give priority to the collection and dissemination of material illustrative of the way the problem was being met in member nations.

THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE (Mr. Warner) said that in the United Kingdom it is most necessary to avoid giving the impression of an overt official propaganda campaign. Only Ministers could do open, official anti-communist propaganda, and they were doing so.

The United Kingdom's experience showed that in countries where this is the case the way to work was by giving reliable information and guidance confidentially to journalists, publicists, and key men in other walks of life, who desired it.

The first essential was to have a thorough knowledge of Soviet and communist theory and current tactics. The second was only to issue absolutely reliable information. It is necessary therefore to have an efficient research and intelligence organization for the special purpose of studying communist theory, policy, tactics and propaganda.

As regards the target, in countries such as the United Kingdom it was less important because it was almost impossible to indoctrinate and convert the small number of real communists. The people to aim at were the fellow-travellers and sympathisers and the general public who were liable to be deceived by activities and propaganda which looked innocent but which were organized by the communists for their purposes. It was in addition of course important to explode
the myth of the Soviet paradise. The public must be so indoctrinated that they automatically saw through communist manoeuvres and reacted to them in an intelligent way.

The method then was to accumulate facts about life in the Soviet Union and in the Satellite countries, and facts on Soviet and communist policy and methods in the outside world. These should be fed confidentially to writers, speakers, non-governmental organizations, and key people in all walks of life. When possible, the communists should be condemned out of their own mouths by quoting communist statements which exploded their own propaganda.

Public opinion should be analysed into its different sections, e.g. labour and trades union, churches, scientists, teachers and students, etc., and appropriate contacts secured leading into each of these sections, to whom guidance and factual information should be given on a confidential basis.

The United Kingdom Government would gladly put the results of their research and intelligence currently at the disposal of the member Governments.

THE PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE (Senhor d'Arcos) said the Communist Party was illegal in his country. On the other hand communism was not a problem for the reason that labour was, and had for 20 years been the best protected class in the country. The Government had no counter-propaganda programme. The Stockholm Peace Campaign had some small effect in public opinion, but the newspapers were quick to expose its real purpose. Neutralism, too, had some adherents but this was being overcome. In future, it would be necessary to show the public that the sacrifices they were called upon to make were essential if our civilization was to be defended. In this task the NATO Information Service could be most helpful. It was Portugal's intention to reorganize the Department so as to ensure close collaboration between the two services.

THE NORSKELANDS REPRESENTATIVE (Mr. Clav) said Mr. Enoksen Lie had presented Norway's case very fully and thoroughly. The Communist Party was steadily losing influence in Norway; at the last election they lost all the seats they previously held in the National Assembly. Furthermore, the Communists were divided amongst themselves. The Government's problem was one of security rather than one of keeping the Communists in check.

THE NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE (Dr. Leuven) said the situation in the Netherlands was much the same as in the United Kingdom in that overt governmental activity was unacceptable to the public. More could, and was being, accomplished by giving facts concerning the Soviet to private organizations, the churches, etc., who helped to inform and mould public opinion. That they were doing effective work was proved by the fact that the Communists were steadily losing in numbers and influence. The communists had one newspaper, but they did not produce posters, pamphlets or propaganda films. Unquestionably they would try to exploit to their own advantage the cost of the defence programme.
THE LUXEMBOURG REPRESENTATIVE (M. Hoisbourg) said communism was losing ground in Luxembourg. Of the 51 Deputies in the Chamber only five were communist. There was one communist daily newspaper but its circulation was not great. Pro-Government and Socialist newspapers were both active in countering communist propaganda.

THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said the communists in his country were active and quite efficient propagandists, but the effectiveness of their efforts in this field were negated to a large extent by the counter-measures undertaken by the Government.

THE ICELANDIC REPRESENTATIVE said the Unification Party of the Workers Socialist Party (Communist Party) was solidly affiliated to Moscow although some of the members might be nationally conscious. All the democratic parties in Iceland were firmly united against the communists who held only nine out of the 52 seats in Parliament. The Communists' one daily newspaper was the only outlet for mass propaganda; its circulation was only 12-14% of the total circulation of all dailies. However, the Communists were also very energetic in conducting evening classes and discussion groups. The Labour Party now controlled the Trade Union Association; only two or three unions continued to be dominated by the Communists.

THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE said the Communist Party in France had considerable, but steadily diminishing importance. It was appreciated that the doubts and hesitations of party members should be exploited to the fullest extent. This could be done in two ways: through official channels and through private organizations. In both instances it would be preferable for the National Information Service to take the initiative in providing factual information about NATO. Material carrying the NATO imprint might be regarded as propaganda. However, in the provision of raw material the NATO Information Service could be of the greatest help, and he looked forward to the closest cooperation between the two services.

THE DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said the Communists, immediately after the war, had faced the Government with a problem, but thanks to the Labour movement and Marshall aid, that condition no longer existed. However, the war of ideas was a continuing struggle. It required special weapons, and the NATO Information Service could supply them. In Denmark overt propaganda material was not required; what was wanted was material which could be adapted to Denmark's special requirements. Very good results had been achieved by the Government, working with and through private organizations.

THE CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE said the Canadian Government had no Ministry of Information and did not sponsor propaganda campaigns. However, the press had been effective in exposing and countering Communist propaganda, and ministers frequently made statements designed to accomplish the same end. For instance, the Secretary of State for External Affairs had made several effective speeches dealing with the Stockholm Peace Campaign which was the Communists' main weapon in Canada at the present time. American imperialism provided another propaganda line but this was wholly unsuccessful; Canadians knew Americans too well. As to counter-propaganda, the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation carried programmes directed to Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union; it was hoped they achieved something, in a modest way.
THE BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE (M. Valckenas) said only 23 of the members of Parliament were Com. unionists; formerly the Party held 10% of the seats. Syndicates and young intellectuals were the chief targets of propaganda today, and among the latter group it was proportionately more successful. Communists were also attempting to foment unrest among foreign workers—Italian miners, for example—and no effective means had yet been devised of countering their activity in this field. He would like to see a committee of experts brought together to decide what could be done in the field of education; the NATO Information Service might be able to suggest ways in which intellectuals could be reached.

(3) NATO Information Service Assistance

Mr. W. M. Newton said the Information Service had for some time been distributing a daily analysis of Soviet and satellite propaganda. Documentation which might also be provided included:

(a) a bibliography of books and other material which exposed communist activity;

(b) information on forced labour and other aspects of Soviet policy;

(c) an anthology of statements by communist leaders designed to expose shifts in Cominform policy;

(d) information regarding successful counter-propaganda measures and examples of material which had been used effectively;

(e) information regarding new Communist personalities who might be travelling from one country to another.

Drawn up in a cogent, careful, detailed way such documentation should command the attention of intellectuals, among others.

It might also be possible for the NATO Information Service to offer help in one country by getting statements or speakers from other countries. For instance, if Italian miners in Belgium were being subjected to communist propaganda, as had been said earlier in the meeting, it should be possible to have an Italian miner from Britain go to Belgium to tell the miners the same sort of tricks were being used in the United Kingdom.

Mr. Newton raised the following questions which, in his opinion, required a policy decision:

(a) It had been suggested that all countries should use "agreed figures." How were figures to be agreed?

(b) It had been agreed that the widest dissemination should be given to the facts concerning the growing strength of NATO. In so doing, there was a danger of playing into the hands of Soviet propaganda, the main theme of which at the present time was the aggressive intentions of the West. How was this danger to be avoided?
The Chairman invited delegates to express their opinions in writing on the proposals made and problems raised by Mr. Newton.

Resolutions

Delegates had before them a number of draft resolutions. The Chairman explained that all resolutions adopted by the meeting would go forward as recommendations to the Council Deputies. Final approval would rest with the Deputies as representatives as their respective Governments. He proposed to incorporate the resolutions in a comprehensive report to the Deputies.

The resolutions tabled included:

(a) Draft resolution by the Italian Delegation on Initiative in the Counter-Propaganda Field (Document AC/1-D/6). After discussion and amendment it was adopted (Document AC/1-D/6 (Final));

(b) Draft resolution by the United States Delegation on the NATO Information Service Programme, Future Meetings and Liaison (Document: AC/1-D/8). After discussion and amendment it was adopted (Document: AC/1-D/8 (Final));

(c) Draft resolution by the United States Delegation on the Formation of Informal Information Committees in Nato Countries (Document: AC/1-D/9). After discussion and amendment it was adopted (Document: AC/1-D/9 (Final)).

Press Release

Delegates had before them a Draft Press Release by the United States Delegation and the Nato Information Service (AC/1-D/10). Mr. Parsons said Ambassadơ Spofford, on behalf of the Council Deputies, had approved the text for release on the understanding that General Gruenther also approved, on General Eisenhower's behalf, the release of the General's statement.

THE DELEGATES:

(1) Agreed it would be prudent to issue a press release in view of the fact that the news of the Conference had already appeared in the press;

(2) Agreed to delete General Eisenhower's statement in view of the fact that it was likely to be widely publicized.

The final text of the press release was subsequently circulated as Document AC/1-D/10 (Final).

Hand Book

In response to a query the Chairman said the Hand Book would not become an official document until it had been approved by the Council Deputies. It was his intention to incorporate in the text submitted to Deputies corrections suggested by Delegates. For that reason he hoped corrections would be forthcoming at an early date.

/ J. Jana Kathy
Anna Kathly

THE UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said morning editions carried the news about Anna Kathly's trial; probably the release had been inspired by Mr. Lie and his colleagues. He suggested the Conference might undertake to organize a campaign to make Anna Kathly's name resound as a martyr.

Adjournment

THE PORTUGUESE REPRESENTATIVE, on behalf of the meeting, expressed appreciation to the Chairman.

The meeting adjourned.