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COMMITTEE ON THE ANNUAL REVIEW

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DRAPER
ON THE U.S. SUBMISSION FOR THE ANNUAL REVIEW

Note by the Secretary

There is attached a copy of a statement made by the United States Permanent Representative on the United States submission for the Annual Review.

This is referred in the first instance to the Committee on the Annual Review for consideration at its meeting on 7th November, 1952.

(Signed) R. G. BARNES

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIe.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR DRAPER
ON THE U.S. SUBMISSION FOR THE ANNUAL REVIEW

I regret that I was not here when the question of the completeness of the U.S. submission was raised. I received reports while in Washington which indicated that certain delegations were reading somewhat far-reaching implications into the absence of Table 12 in the U.S. submission. My Government is concerned that there should be any such misunderstanding, and I accordingly am discussing the problem with the Council as soon as possible after my return.

I must first say that there is no change in the position of my Government as stated by Ambassador Merchant and as reproduced and distributed. (+)

To refer to past history for the moment, I wish to assure you that at the time of the development of the NATO questionnaire, the United States' decision not to submit the detailed equipment tables had not been reached. It was only shortly before the submission was made that the final, carefully considered, decision not to provide that particular information was made, a conclusion that was reached at the cabinet level, and, as we believe, in the interests of NATO itself. Naturally, it would have been far better to have had this decision last Spring. However, my embarrassment arises from the timing of my Government's decision, not from its nature.

The view has been expressed, I understand, that lack of information regarding total United States production of each of the key items involved will make difficult, or perhaps even impossible, the sort of NATO supply planning envisaged by the Council at Lisbon. The interest of the United States in such multilateral planning is well known and the implications of the U.S. decision on this important NATO work was given full consideration before the cabinet level decision was reached. My Government concluded that the carrying out of the NATO supply planning job could go forward effectively without detailed knowledge of the total time-phased production plan of each of the critical weapons which will flow from the major source of the free world's defense production. On the other hand, the bringing together into one document of all such information would offer a prize beyond value to the espionage agents of the potential aggressor.

I believe that the facts bear out our conviction that the Annual Review can be successfully conducted without a U.S. Table 12. The production staff can isolate and determine country-by-country the most critical equipment deficiencies in meeting force targets. A U.S. Table 12 would show that the U.S. has undertaken to produce the required equipment for all of

(+) CE/E/D16, dated 11th October, 1952.

its own forces. Furthermore, the U.S. MDAP programs will fill certain of the deficiencies revealed by the submissions of our allies, which is what is really needed from us for the Annual Review. The International Staff can match requirements with prospective availabilities, including our projected deliveries, to find out the overall deficiencies which result from presently planned programs. This thick document gave to you details of delivery projections from our Fiscal Year 1950-1952 end item aid programs. We have undertaken to give you, as soon as possible and in as much detail as possible, similar information about our Fiscal Year 1953 program. With this mass of information, NATO supply planning can certainly proceed and proceed effectively.

Now it can, of course, be argued that you must have the full story on total U.S. production in order that there may be a genuine multilateral review of the use being made of assets available in NATO countries. My Government, after the most intensive consideration at the highest level, squarely faced this problem which stems from the fact that my Government has other international obligations, and produces most of the strategic reserves for the rest of the free world. Our solution to this dilemma was expressed in Paragraph D of the U.S. submission. We stated that the U.S. concludes, subject to the Korean War and certain other necessary qualifications, "that production will be adequate to permit the allocation of equipment during 1953 at rates sufficient to meet the screened requirements of eligible U.S. types of both the unit and the training equipment of the forces that the countries can raise, train, and maintain, in accordance with the force plan that results from this Annual Review."

You have, therefore, the full details of our end item aid program, as presently developed, and additional information is in preparation. You have our assurance that it should be possible to allocate enough from our total production in 1953 to meet the screened equipment requirements of the forces our alliance can raise, train and maintain. You have in our Table 5 full information about our total production program, in value terms. Finally, you have our offer to consider on a case-by-case basis requests for additional production information required during the course of the Annual Review.

Thus, while we have not submitted details of our production of individual, sensitive items, we have nonetheless provided the raw materials for NATO supply planning and have done more - we have indicated a flexibility in our programming of aid which insures that NATO supply planning will be meaningful. The mere submission by the U.S. of Table 12 could never accomplish this. On the other hand, all the material we are submitting would be wasted and true multilateral planning would be impossible unless the countries which need this equipment do submit Table 12 promptly.

Given these facts, we firmly believe that it will not profit any of us to indulge in a lengthy discussion of principle, or to attempt to read into the situation erroneous conclusions as to the devotion of the U.S. to the NATO goal of rapidly increasing multilateral action. If you will recall the efforts of the U.S. to link aid commitments to the Annual Review, and the U.S. request to NATO for guidance as to priorities, off-shore procurement and allocation of end items, and if you will consider seriously the security implications involved, I feel sure you will agree that our decision was reached in all sincerity. I suggest that we push ahead with the Annual Review and during its course, and out of its conclusions, achieve the maximum possible from the principle of multilateral action to which we all adhere.