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I. METHOD OF OBTAINING INFORMATION ON AMMUNITION DEFICIENCIES AND PRODUCTION CAPACITIES

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1. THE CHAIRMAN gave a brief resume of the discussion which had taken place in the Council and which had led up to an instruction to the Staff to carry out a full survey of the ammunition supply situation, including stocks, deficiencies and production capacities, so as to guide the United States in formulating off-shore procurement proposals, and other delegations in considering revision or extension of their programmes. He considered that for practical reasons the study should be limited in the first instance to European NAT countries.

2. The Staff understood that European NAT countries were in process of giving to the United States Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) detailed information on ammunition stocks and deficiencies in connection with the United States revision of their end-item aid programme for the FY 1952/53. This information was also required by the Staff to enable them to carry out Council instructions, and he suggested that it would cause less trouble if the United States authorities were authorised by countries to pass to the Staff the information which they were collecting through the MAAGs.

3. The UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATE considered that it would probably be better if countries passed the required information to the Staff at first hand, and stated that, since he had not been previously aware that the MAAGs were collecting fresh information about ammunition deficiencies, he would prefer to discuss the question with the MAAG first of all before he agreed that the information they held would be appropriate to the present study and could be passed to the Staff. He made the following additional points:-

- (a) that the proposed study should set out the facts as to present production, unused capacities and deficiencies. Any political, economic or military factors which might over-ride production considerations should be incorporated into the study only at the second stage. This would avoid the presentation of a confused picture to the Council.
- (b) He considered that the study could be made without knowledge of stockholdings. If this was agreed, the great security risks involved in collecting in one document information on the ammunition stockholdings of all NATO European countries could be avoided.

4. Following the suggestion of the United Kingdom Delegate, it was agreed that information on stocks need not be provided on the understanding that the information on deficiencies would be given in sufficient detail to allow relevant priorities of needs both as between countries and as between types of ammunition to be assessed.

5. In the ensuing discussion, the TURKISH DELEGATE indicated that information on ammunition deficiencies in his country had already been passed direct to the Staff. The remaining delegations stated that they were prepared to allow MAAGs to pass to the Staff

the information which MAAGs were collecting, but there was general agreement that National Authorities must be given the opportunity to check this information with the MAAGs to ensure that it was complete and accurate.

6. The NETHERLANDS DELEGATE pointed out that the information being collected by MAAGs would be based on a 30 days war reserve, whereas SHAPE had officially adopted 90 days reserve provision. There would also be other differences between the MAAGs and the official Netherlands calculations of ammunition deficiencies. The International Staff representative expressed the view in reply that a deficiency based on 90 days war reserve provision might in fact be roughly calculated from the MAAGs figures if required.

7. The NORWEGIAN DELEGATE considered that, in later stages of the NATO study, strategic location factors should be considered, and drew attention to the factory which Norway had now constructed for the manufacture of certain types of ammunition under conditions of maximum military security.

8. The general view was expressed that if the Staff wished to raise any questions on the figures supplied through MAAGs, they would consult the national delegation concerned, as well as the United States authorities.

9. THE WORKING PARTY agreed:-

- (1) that the initial study to be made by the Staff should be purely factual;
- (2) that information on ammunition deficiencies and production capacities collected by the United States MAAGs from National Authorities could be passed to the International Staff, subject to checking, as mentioned in paragraph 5 above, and subject to the reservation made by the United Kingdom Delegate;
- (3) that the delegation concerned would be consulted if the Staff wished to raise questions on the information;
- (4) that the military factors to be taken into account at the appropriate stage of the NATO study should include consideration of strategic location;
- (5) that, in view of the security risks, information on ammunition stocks should not be collected by the International Staff.

II. AMMUNITION PRICES

10. THE CHAIRMAN suggested that the factual report to be prepared by the Staff would be incomplete unless it contained information on price levels in the various countries. He realised, however, the difficulties of quoting a price before it was known how much ammunition was to be ordered, and asked for the views of all delegations.

11. THE FRENCH DELEGATE considered that it would be impossible to supply reliable data on prices without knowing the quantities involved and without the exact specifications for each type of ammunition. The BELGIAN DELEGATE supported this view.

12. After discussion, the WORKING PARTY agreed:-

that a factual study by the Staff which did not include data on comparative prices would be acceptable in the first stage. If it was necessary at a later stage to make specific recommendations, prices would then have to be taken into account.

III. PROCEDURE TO BE FOLLOWED AFTER RECEIPT BY THE STAFF OF INFORMATION ON DEFICIENCIES AND CAPACITIES

13. THE CHAIRMAN stated that, on receipt of all the required information, the Staff would prepare its factual study and circulate this in draft form. The factual study would take account of preferences expressed by national production experts as to the orders which they would like to receive but would make no recommendations at this stage. It would be passed in draft form to delegations and there might be a further meeting of the Working Party to discuss the draft if any delegation so requested. Thereafter it would be presented to Council.

14. If, on the basis of the factual study, the United States tabled specific proposals as to ammunition off-shore procurement for comment by the Staff, a further study would be made, taking account of economic, military and political factors, and leading to detailed recommendations. In any event, when the United States proposals were received, an early meeting would be held at which they could be discussed multilaterally.

15. The WORKING PARTY concurred in the procedure suggested by the Chairman.

IV. OTHER BUSINESS

16. THE CHAIRMAN stated that, in continuance of studies on the possibilities of producing spare parts in Europe for United States pattern equipment, the Staff was now beginning a detailed study covering about 12 items of artillery and infantry weapons. He requested the national delegations to give all possible co-operation to the Staff in this work.

17. THE WORKING PARTY took note.

18. The meeting adjourned at 11.35 a.m.

Palais de Chaillot,
Paris, XVIIe.