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EMBARGOED SUMMARY - CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY EXPECTED
ABOUT 8:15 P.M. BONN TIME THURSDAY, 5 MAY 1988

LORD CARRINGTON CAUTIONS AGAINST "SIREN SONGS" IN ARMS TALKS WITH USSR

BONN - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Lord Carrington warned on Thursday that "our interest in concluding binding agreements with the Soviet Union must not degenerate into allowing ourselves to be led by the siren songs of unilateral disarmers, misplaced fears or Soviet peace rhetoric into failing to distinguish between good and bad negotiations."

In one of his last speeches before handing over office to his successor Germany's Manfred Wörner in July, Lord Carrington said NATO must also not be led into "setting artificial time limits for agreements or forgetting the simple lesson well known to cyclists and skiers, that you can always go faster when you go downhill."

NATO's highest official told the German Society for Foreign Affairs that he did not mean "that we should resist dialogue, go slow on arms control or shelter behind a Maginot mentality.... But if Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev do not succeed in concluding a START agreement by the time of their summit later this month we should not regard it as a failure. Rather, we should see it as a measure of the importance of securing adequate verification arrangements in the areas still at issue. Agreements that cannot be adequately verified and that, therefore, cannot be used to build trust and overcome suspicion, can be as bad as no agreements at all."

Lord Carrington said that the publics as well as the governments of NATO must "have the courage to recognize that up-to-date nuclear forces will need to be with us for the foreseeable future if we want a stable, war-free Europe and a strong alliance. Some people may argue that this is not the time to labour painful truths when there may be a window of opportunity for major disarmament as a result of the INF agreement and Mr. Gorbachev's attractive image.... The fact is we simply do not know for certain what Mr. Gorbachev's motives are, whether or not they will endure.... What is not in question is that the changes, however genuine, have not yet altered the military realities or Soviet capabilities. Soviet defence programmes are still proceeding at full speed, nuclear as well as conventional, right across the board."

Lord Carrington said that by comparison to the gloomy picture four years ago, when he took office, there was success in the signing of the INF agreement, the establishment of on-site, on-demand intrusive military inspections by both sides, progress towards a 50% reduction in strategic systems, an effort to secure a chemical weapons ban and a recognition that East-West agreements must reflect the requirements of allied security.

"So," he said, "the alliance is a success story.... But the toughest thing about success is that you've got to keep on being a success."

Within the alliance there is "an increasing perception that the Europeans should take on a larger share of collective responsibility as the United States moves, not into isolationism or a secondary rôle, but to expecting more from a richer and stronger Europe." Lord Carrington stressed that "by sharing the nuclear burdens we enjoy the benefits." The U.S. commitment was made clear by the 330,000 U.S. troops deployed in Europe. Lord Carrington recalled that President Reagan had recently repeated that "an attack on Hamburg is indeed to be regarded in the same way as an attack on Chicago."

He said he had "no doubt whatever that the Americans are determined to continue to play their full part in the nuclear relationship; always provided, of course, that Europe does too." Subjects such as short-range missiles "should not be treated as an isolated problem. They are part of NATO's deterrent posture as a whole, part of the indivisible security of all members and part of the shared commitment to common defence."

At the same time Lord Carrington doubted there was "anyone in the alliance who would dispute that there is an over-concentration of short-range nuclear systems in Germany. But it is no good selecting a remedy that is worse than the illness."

He did not pretend that NATO's present strategy arrangements were "more than a series of compromises. But all the new ideas seem to me to pose greater problems than those they are designed to solve." The INF breakthrough had been obtained by a policy of "deploy but negotiate." Now it is a question of "maintain and negotiate," modernizing where necessary in order to keep effective.

Lord Carrington said that "we must never forget the predicament of Eastern Europe or wish it to remain what has been called a 'laboratory of twilight.' Eastern Europe is today in flux, uncertain about where the current trends in the Soviet Union might lead. In these circumstances there is a wider reason why NATO Europe should remain a rock of predictability, and not become a shifting sand."

Looking ahead, Lord Carrington said that "the euphoria of détente is not the best climate for maintaining defence expenditures. The United States has also made it clear that it cannot itself shoulder a disproportionate share of the defence burden. The task of keeping all countries up to the mark will not therefore be easy." He said there "has to be an element of the Oliver Twist in all secretaries general, so I trust you will permit me to say that even in Germany ... trends in the defence budget are not encouraging."

But he also stressed that Germany hosts 400,000 military from six nations, is the site of 5,000 military exercises and of 580,000 air sorties annually, 110,000 of them at less than 1,500 feet.

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Full text of Lord Carrington's speech follows:



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NATO: BENEFITS AND BURDENS

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO
THE RT. HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON

AT

THE HOTEL DREESEN
BONN, GERMANY

THURSDAY, 5TH MAY 1988

EMBARGO: CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY
EXPECTED AT ABOUT 20.15 LOCAL TIME
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NATO: BENEFITS AND BURDENS

This, sadly, is my last visit to the Federal Republic as Secretary General. It is also the last of some 10 speeches that I have made in your country in that time. I am particularly glad that the German Society for Foreign Affairs, to whom I spoke in my first year, should provide the forum for this closing address and I am equally grateful for the opportunity to do so before such a distinguished and knowledgeable an audience.

To the extent that the title of my speech ever had much relevance to the content, I should make it clear at the outset that I am abandoning any pretences now. Whatever I say at this stage is in the nature of concluding thoughts about the Alliance in general.

And it is particularly apt that I should be doing so here. The Federal Republic's interests always seem to me to exemplify the interests of the Alliance as a whole.

For example, the artificial division of Europe and the way it has been enforced for so many years is felt most acutely here in Germany. But it is a problem which lies at NATO's heart.

The same is true of the basic character of the Alliance. It may be particularly important for the Federal Republic to further its legitimate interests from within a collective common security framework rather than by trying to stand alone. But that also applies to everyone else.

And when it comes to policies, these too are tailored to your own geo-strategic position; while responding to the needs of all. In no country is the military strategy of forward defence and flexible response more important. At the same time, nowhere is there a more evident need to address the underlying political issues, and to remember that the preservation of Western security is not an end in itself. It must also be a platform from which to reduce East/West tension.

In saying this I am well aware of the danger of platitudes or preaching to the converted. That is a temptation which it is usually as wise for a speaker to avoid as it is boring for the audience to listen to. But the temptation is all the stronger at present when one can point to real progress in advancing these basic interests. Consider, for example, the transformation in East-West relations.

When I took over as Secretary General in 1984, there was stagnation. The invasion of Afghanistan, events in Poland and the Soviet attempts to undermine NATO's resolve on nuclear policy - all had taken their toll. East and West were hardly on speaking terms. Both sides were seen by public opinion as concerned only with the introduction of new and more dangerous armaments into Europe.

Now we have developments which were unthinkable just a short time ago. We have success. And we have much greater clarity over some crucial points about the Alliance. Things are clearer because of the INF agreement last December. Let us hope it is a milestone on the road to major disarmament. Things are clearer too, because the INF achievement came from the coherent application of the Harmel principles - the twin-track of security and dialogue, not the slippery slope of unilateral disarmament or negotiations from weakness.

Some things are also clearer as a result of the NATO Summit in March. The declarations which the Heads of Government produced were not just proforma displays of unity and lip-service to orthodox Alliance principles. They were a powerful reaffirmation of those principles as the basis for moving forward with the Alliance's broadly based agenda.

And on that agenda, incidentally, I do wish the press had paid rather more attention than they did to the statement on arms control priorities which the summit produced. The central security problem in Europe has not changed. There is still an imbalance in conventional forces and the Warsaw Pact remains configured for offensive action. After 13 years of discussion in MBFR, we do not need exchanges of data, as the Warsaw Pact are now suggesting. We need agreement on a mandate for conventional stability negotiations. And the Summit document set out in detail an approach which should be as convincing for our publics as it should be compelling for bringing the other side to the table. A process leading to the self-evidently fair achievement of balanced force levels and equal ceilings in critical areas.

One can go on enumerating a number of other positive features in the present landscape:

- The establishment of on-site, on-demand intrusive inspections pioneered by the Stockholm CDE agreement, all of which helps to build confidence between East and West and hence a basis for further arms agreements.
- The major progress made towards 50% reductions in strategic systems in START.
- The effort now being made over a chemical weapons ban.
- More generally, the belief within the Alliance that our arms control policy cannot be developed ad hoc. But that it needs to respond to the aspirations of public opinion; to prevent Mr. Gorbachev from appearing to run away with the initiative; to promote agreements which are consistent with the present state of East-West relations and above all, which reflect the requirements of our security. This of course is what the comprehensive concept launched by Ministers at Reykjavik last summer is all about and which is being developed by the NATO Council.

- We also have a better opportunity than before to secure progress on the question of basic human rights. The litmus of this being the outcome of the CSCE Review in Vienna when we will see just how far the Soviet Union is prepared to go in matching words with deeds.
- And beyond dialogue and détente, or rather, as the necessary underpinning for reliable progress in both, there is the strengthening of practical defence effort, from collective military activity such as the Conventional Defence Improvements Programme, better planning of force structures and armaments, to individual features such as military co-operation with Spain, evidence of convergence in defence thinking between the Alliance and France, and the signs that European efforts are moving in the right direction with the WEU security platform and the vessels deployed to the Gulf.

So, the Alliance is a success story. Much of it based on concrete achievements which have flowed from Western initiatives. I have been proud to be a part of it.

But the toughest thing about success is that you've got to keep on being a success. And the speed of change in international relations from idle to fast forward, has also brought some old dilemmas into sharper focus than before.

Within the Alliance there is an increasing perception that the Europeans should take on a larger share of collective responsibility as the United States moves, not into isolationism or a secondary rôle, but to expecting more from a richer and stronger Europe. Relations with the Soviet Union have become more complicated with Mr. Gorbachev's domestic reforms and foreign policy initiatives. Underlying both is the natural tendency of democracies to like the benefits of peace and détente, but to dislike the burdens and responsibilities that make progress possible. It is all too easy to wish away the military threat and to assume that there is no longer any need to take difficult defence decisions and keep up necessary military effort.

Which brings me to the question of theatre nuclear forces. It may well be prudent for a Secretary General whose main task is the management of consensus among sixteen different nations to duck nuclear issues. After all, no specific modernisation decisions on individual system deployments are required for the time being. But imminent departure from office, like the proverbial hanging, concentrates the mind wonderfully, and I hope this excuse will save me from summary lynching here or hereafter.

But it does seem to me that much of the current debate about short-range nuclear forces, the concerns which are expressed about the burden or threat which they represent, is in danger of missing or blurring the vital rôle which such forces

occupy in the Alliance - not only for forward defence and certainly not as instruments of warfighting in the classic military sense, but in terms of their contribution to deterrence.

A central dilemma over the last 20 years or so has been how to ensure that nuclear forces operate as a credible deterrent on behalf of all members; how to feel confident that they work for the benefit of Europe as well as for North America.

There are those of course who would reject the basic premise outright; who believe that nuclear deterrence is unworkable, unnecessary or, indeed, immoral. Such people exist on both sides of the Atlantic, not just in this continent alone, as Europeans sometimes complacently assume. The fact that they remain a minority in the political spectrum does not mean that they should not be taken seriously or that the case for retaining a broadly based variety of nuclear weapons in Europe is readily understood.

Moreover in focussing on the credibility of the nuclear guarantee in Europe, I am not suggesting any diminution in the rôle of conventional forces in our strategy, of keeping dependence on nuclear forces to the minimum; nor of downgrading the importance of political effort to lower tensions and reduce all kinds of weaponry through balanced arms control.

But there are two special features about nuclear forces which do not apply to conventional forces or for that matter to dialogue with the East. The first is the unique capacity to deter all war by posing the risk of damage to an aggressor which outweighs any possible gain to be had by the use or threat of force of any kind. The reason why nuclear weapons upset so many of our citizens are precisely the same reasons why they deter generals and political leaders on the other side. The second feature is that Europe alone, for all its economic and moral strength, remains unable to provide for its own nuclear security. We could theoretically provide for our own conventional defence - and frankly we ought to be doing more already - but the fact is that Europe cannot do without the United States at the nuclear level. British and French contributions, though important, are insufficient for the purpose and any idea of building them up to do so is as destabilising as it is unrealistic.

In these circumstances, the crucial means to ensuring that the US strategic umbrella is indeed available for Europe in a way which is both credible and politically acceptable to all has been through the participation of European members of the Alliance in the nuclear process, not just through giving general political support, important though that is, but by the basing and operation of a variety of systems of differing ranges and types, broadly deployed throughout the area. By sharing the nuclear burdens, we enjoy the benefits.

Of course the United States commitment is made clear by additional means, by the 330,000 troops deployed here, by the shared interests and values underpinning the Alliance as a whole. But it is also the linkage with strategic forces which these deployment arrangements demonstrate which makes a reality of these ringing declarations of ours. That, as President Reagan said again recently, an attack on Hamburg is indeed to be regarded in the same way as an attack on Chicago.

Isolated incidents and references taken out of context have led some people to question whether the United States is moving towards a limitation of that nuclear guarantee. As one who is in constant contact with the United States Administration, let me make it clear that I have no doubt whatever that the Americans are determined to continue to play their full part in the nuclear relationship; always provided of course that Europe does too. Indeed, I cannot think of any other administration which has taken more trouble to consult over East-West issues in the fullest sense. No fewer than 40 high level consultations have taken place in NATO in the past three years.

What I have said does not of course provide a specific answer to the way ahead on nuclear policy, whether on the START/SDI relationship, the handling of dual-capable systems in conventional stability talks or indeed the handling of short-range nuclear forces. The last topic - SNF - will I am sure occupy much attention in the future.

But if you look at the nuclear question in this way, it does I hope explain why subjects such as short-range missiles should not be treated as an isolated problem. They are part of NATO's deterrent posture as a whole, part of the indivisible security of all members and part of the shared commitment to common defence. Imbalances with the Warsaw Pact in any particular weapons strategy are not therefore a critical aspect or justification for any feeling that individual countries are being singled out to make special sacrifices. The important thing is that NATO's overall deterrent spectrum should continue to operate effectively. And it does.

Of course there are legitimate concerns in this area. I doubt whether there is anyone in the Alliance who would dispute that there is an over-concentration of short-range nuclear systems in Germany. But it is no good selecting a remedy which is worse than the illness. It is impossible to build up hopes of denuclearising Europe before tackling the conventional threat, to say nothing of the underlying political cause of which would convey the impression that we are embarking on a course which could weaken the vital coupling with longer-range and strategic nuclear forces on which the deterrent is based.

My own view is that short-range nuclear forces should and can be maintained within a policy which continues the present trend of reducing NATO's nuclear forces wherever possible, which

pays careful attention to the ranges of the systems resulting from necessary modernisation effort and which takes place within the overall context of a common strategy on security and arms control across the whole spectrum of forces. But it is also a policy which requires us all, by which I mean publics as well as governments, to have the courage to recognise that up-to-date nuclear forces will need to be with us for the foreseeable future if we want a stable war-free Europe and a strong Alliance.

Some people may argue that this is not the time to labour painful truths when there may be a window of opportunity for major disarmament as a result of the INF agreement and Mr. Gorbachev's attractive image. If not exploited now, they say, it could close forever. It is therefore vital that we have a correct analysis of developments in the Soviet Union and a clear idea of our reaction to it.

Much ink has been spilled and voices made hoarse on the question of what is happening in the Soviet Union and whether Mr. Gorbachev is sincere. Optimists point to an unprecedented acceptance of the need to restructure Communism, to liberalise the economy, reduce military expenditures and promote better co-existence with the West.

Pessimists remind us that it is his own system that Mr. Gorbachev is seeking to make more efficient, not ours; that intentions could quickly change; that Soviet peace proposals still contain the old objective of splitting the Alliance and removing the United States from European defence arrangements; that the permanence of perestroika and glasnost cannot be guaranteed given the strength of vested interest and internal problems such as nationalism.

But this sort of debate always generates more heat than light. The fact is we simply do not know for certain what Mr. Gorbachev's motives are, whether or not they will endure. These are open questions. What is not in question is that the changes, however genuine, have not yet altered the military realities or Soviet capabilities. Soviet defence programmes are still proceeding at full speed, nuclear as well as conventional right across the board; and there is no evidence yet of the claimed new military doctrine in equipment or deployment trends.

What matters, it seems to me, is not that our analysis should remain cautious, but what we do as a result of that uncertainty. It does not mean that we should resist dialogue, go slow on arms control or shelter behind a Maginot mentality. On the contrary, it should make us all the more determined to secure the sort of arms control agreements which will reduce this uncertainty, which are designed in such a way as to ensure that Soviet behaviour will become safer and more predictable, even if present intentions may be less favourable. And for all I know the same may be true for the Soviet Union in its perceptions of us.

There is a lack of mutual confidence and trust which lies at the centre of East-West security problems and which progressive agreements can help to reduce.

The present situation does mean however that we have to be sensible about the sort of negotiations we engage in, the order in which we do it, the deals we should be prepared to accept.

Thus, for example, 50% reductions in strategic forces are important for all of us, not only in strategic terms but also for bolstering the effect of the INF agreement in Europe. Without it, the Soviet Union can retarget their strategic systems such as SS-24 and 25 to cover the targets which SS-20s cover now. But if Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev do not succeed in concluding a START agreement by the time of their summit later this month we should not regard it as a failure. Rather, we should see it as a measure of the importance of securing adequate verification arrangements in the areas still at issue. Agreements which cannot be adequately verified, and which therefore cannot be used to build trust and overcome suspicion, can be as bad as no agreements at all.

Similarly there is great interest in the question of further negotiations on theatre nuclear forces in Europe. But in terms of the requirements of our own strategy, one can appreciate the logic which says that it is difficult to decide what can be negotiated until there are some substantial results from conventional stability talks and we know the extent to which the Soviet Union is prepared to dismantle its conventional superiority.

In short, our interest in concluding binding agreements with the Soviet Union must not degenerate into allowing ourselves to be led by the siren songs of unilateral disarmers, misplaced fears or Soviet peace rhetoric into failing to distinguish between good and bad negotiations, setting artificial time limits for agreements, or to forgetting the simple lesson well-known to cyclists and skiers, that you can always go faster when you go downhill.

No doubt it comes as no surprise that you find me reliably orthodox on all these points. But my views stem from the experience of the past years and the results we have achieved, not just because Secretaries General defend the status quo come what may. There are sound reasons for sustaining current policy whether in the arms control field or elsewhere.

In terms of NATO strategy, for example, there are always proposals for change; and I do not pretend that our present arrangements are more than a series of compromises. But all the new ideas seem to me to pose greater problems than those which they are designed to solve. We know we cannot return to a

tripwire strategy; we know a "conventional-only" posture does not deter in a world where nuclear weapons exist, particularly when the forward defence imperative in our strategy precludes the classic conventional tactic of first conceding territory before mounting any counter attack. This does not mean we should not seek to reduce our dependence on nuclear forces, for example, through energetic exploration of new technology. The one certain thing about emerging technology is that it will continue to emerge. Self-denying ordinances on the side of the West will do nothing to enhance stability, given Soviet efforts in this field too. But the fact that there is always a reaction to an action, in new weapons developments, tends to have an effect which, if not self-cancelling, certainly does nothing to suggest that a better strategy is available or call flexible response itself into question.

There are of course more limited proposals such as no first use declarations. An initially seductive idea. But when you are certain, as I am, that ours is a defensive alliance, that it exists to deter all use of force and that a key element in dissuasion is uncertainty about the response which an aggressor would face, then you can see why no first use proposals weaken deterrence rather than improve it.

More generally, it seems to me that this is the last time to relax or change our posture when it has brought success so far but when the East-West scene is otherwise uncertain. We achieved the breakthrough on INF by holding firm to our basic approach of 'deploy but negotiate' and it was the Soviet Union which saw the virtue in a change of direction and in joining us in serious arms control. Now it is not so much a question of 'deploy', but of 'maintain' and negotiate, modernising where necessary in order to keep effective. The recipe will continue to work, provided we stay united and sustain the defence effort involved.

And there is a further political case for continuing to project an image of reliability and consistency which it is all too easy for us to overlook in our main preoccupations with the internal affairs of the Alliance and with the activities of the Soviet Union. As I said at the beginning, our defence posture does not exist for its own sake but because of the ideals and principles which underpin it. One of these concerns is Eastern Europe. We have no interest as an Alliance to interfere there. But equally, as an Alliance, we must never forget the predicament of Eastern Europe or wish it to remain what has been called a 'laboratory of twilight'. Eastern Europe is today in flux, uncertain about where the current trends in the Soviet Union might lead. In these circumstances there is a wider reason why NATO Europe should remain a rock of predictability, and not become a shifting sand.

It will be evident from all I have said that I am not pessimistic about NATO's future in terms of its policies conceptual or practical. Provided we are sensible about security and patient about results on the arms control side of the account, I have little doubt that NATO will cope and do so in a more coherent way than may sometimes have been the case in the past. What does concern me just as much is our determination to continue to provide the material resources, the defence effort necessary to sustain such policies.

The euphoria of détente is not the best climate for maintaining defence expenditures. The United States has also made it clear that it cannot itself shoulder a disproportionate share of the defence burden. The task of keeping all countries up to the mark will not therefore be easy, particularly as a balanced conventional stability agreement cannot be regarded as lying just round the corner.

I am afraid there has to be an element of the Oliver Twist in all Secretaries General, so I trust you will permit me to say that even in Germany which carries so much of the defence burden, trends in the defence budget are not encouraging and that there must be a question, particularly given the demographic problems, as to whether the critical limit has not been reached.

The end of a long speech is not the time to embark on a new theme or for crystal ball gazing. But I suspect that the next few years will call for a particularly energetic and imaginative effort to stretch resources to cover defence commitments and to do so in a way which is seen to be a fair sharing of alliance burdens, not just in terms of resources but over the political responsibilities too. And I would expect European groupings, including the WEU to need to play an important rôle, always remembering that this must take place within the framework of the Alliance as a whole.

In concluding, I cannot help feeling that I have lectured you too much on responsibilities and obligations without doing enough to acknowledge what Germany already does for the Alliance. Throughout my time as Secretary General, I have been able to count on full German support, both militarily and politically. I am sure that too few people realise how much Germany does do for Western security, not just by way of obvious things such as resources, manpower and equipment, but through the unquantifiable military burdens. The Federal Republic acts as host to some 400,000 military from six different nations. Each year, some 5,000 military exercises take place on your territory and 580,000 air sorties take place over it, 110,000 at less than 1,500 feet. The social and political commitment which this calls for deserves far more credit than it has received so far, and I thank you for it.

I therefore have no doubt that the Federal Republic will continue to take its full share of Alliance responsibilities. And it is of particular satisfaction to me on the eve of the 33rd anniversary of Germany's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty that you will be doing so, with a German at the head of this Organization. I could not think of a better man than Manfred Woerner to take over the helm and I wish him well.