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EMBARGOED SUMMARY - CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY EXPECTED
ABOUT 5.30 P.M., ROME TIME, 24 OCTOBER 1986

LORD CARRINGTON: ARMS DUPLICATION A SCANDAL

ROME - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Lord Carrington said Friday of Western arms co-operation that duplication and lack of interoperability was "a scandal."

He told the Centre of Studies of International Conciliation in Rome: "We quite simply cannot afford to perpetuate a system which, to quote only one example, has resulted in three main battle tanks - four if you include the Americans - being lined up to fight the same battle in the same place on the same day; and not even being able to use the same ammunition."

Lord Carrington, himself a tank commander in World War II, said: "That is what I call a scandal. And examples could all too easily be multiplied. We need a joint political decision to avoid further such scandals in the future, and we need firm political agreement on the concrete steps that will be necessary. And if we had that, we would be well on the way to a European defence identity."

NATO's most senior official said he was "very much in favour" of a stronger European defence identity. The phrase "national defence" has an immediacy that "contribution to NATO" does not, and "we as Europeans, having pinned so much of our hopes for the future on a community that has no responsibility for defence, need to be particularly attentive to the danger that the requirements of defence may be under-appreciated if not overlooked."

Lord Carrington noted the efforts made by Italy and others through the re-activation of the Western European Union (WEU), but pointed out that the WEU leaves out seven of the 14 European members of NATO, "including the two that happen to share borders with the Soviet Union."

There were difficulties with the multiplicity of organizations in the field, but the prudent approach was "to assume that we shall be left to make the best of the institutions we've got, and so (it would be) more constructive to concentrate on how best to make these institutions work together towards a common objective ... to strengthen the contribution of the European allies to a trans-Atlantic partnership that remains fundamental to our security."

In the arms co-operation field, he called for "a more radical and comprehensive approach" that would get "to the roots of the problem of insufficient or wastefully duplicated expenditure on research and development, that will bring countries together at an early enough stage in the planning cycle to form a common assessment of what they need and that will keep them together for long enough to ensure a substantial degree of joint production and procurement." He said one idea would be to set up a number of jointly funded research and development institutes.

.../...

"Each would concentrate on a particular sector - for example armoured fighting vehicles, radar or artillery," he said. "Each would be jointly staffed as well as jointly funded. Different institutes would be located in different participating countries ... and all participating countries would have a share in the results."

Lord Carrington described the recent agreement in Stockholm on confidence-building measures as "a welcome step forward." He said that there were "also some encouraging signs from the negotiations on chemical weapons - and I need hardly add that the nuclear issues are now the focus of very active high-level diplomacy."

Despite the encouraging outcome in Stockholm, verification was a particularly important part of the agreement "and Mr. Gorbachev's more encouraging words will need to be fully reflected in what the Soviet negotiators are saying in the conference rooms."

Lord Carrington said Italy not only occupies a strategic position of the utmost importance, "but you provide a substantial contribution to the conventional strength of the alliance in all three arms - a contribution which I am glad to see being enhanced by some effective programmes of equipment modernization in key sectors." Lord Carrington recalled Italy's decision to deploy cruise missiles and said the Italian contribution to the alliance was "an impressive one."

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Full text of Lord Carrington's speech follows:

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RESUME SOUS EMBARGO - VERIFIER LA CONFORMITE DU TEXTE
PAR RAPPORT AU DISCOURS PRONONCE A ROME,
LE 24 OCTOBRE 1986, VERS 17h30

LORD CARRINGTON : LES DOUBLES EMPLOIS EN MATIERE
D'ARMEMENTS SONT UN SCANDALE

ROME - Le Secrétaire général de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN), Lord Carrington, a déclaré vendredi, à propos de la coopération occidentale en matière d'armements, que les doubles emplois et le manque d'interopérabilité constituaient "un scandale".

Au cours de la conférence qu'il a donnée au Centre italien d'étude pour la conciliation internationale, à Rome, il a déclaré : "Nous n'avons tout simplement pas les moyens de permettre que perdure une situation qui, pour ne citer qu'un exemple, est cause de ce que nous avons trois types de chars de bataille - quatre, si l'on y inclut celui des Américains - prêts à livrer la même bataille, au même endroit, le même jour, et qui ne sont seulement pas capables d'utiliser des munitions identiques".

Lord Carrington, qui était commandant de char pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, a ajouté : "Voilà ce que j'appelle un scandale. Et il ne serait que trop aisé de multiplier les exemples. Il nous faut une décision politique commune, pour éviter que ne se reproduisent de tels scandales, et un accord politique ferme, en ce qui concerne les mesures concrètes qui seront nécessaires. Quand cela sera fait, nous serons en bonne voie pour faire valoir une identité européenne en matière de défense".

Le premier représentant de l'OTAN s'est dit : "très chaud partisan" d'une identité européenne plus forte en matière de défense. Les mots "défense nationale" évoquent une réalité que l'on ne retrouve pas dans l'expression "contribution à l'OTAN", et "nous, Européens, qui avons placé tant d'espoirs pour l'avenir dans une communauté qui n'a aucune responsabilité de nature militaire, devons être particulièrement attentifs à ce que les besoins de la défense ne soient pas sous-estimés, voire ignorés."

Lord Carrington a relevé les efforts fournis par l'Italie et d'autres pays au travers d'une relance de l'Union de l'Europe occidentale (UEO), mais il a fait remarquer que sept des quatorze membres européens de l'OTAN ne font pas partie de l'UEO, "y compris les deux qui ont des frontières communes avec l'Union soviétique".

La multiplicité des organisations dans ce domaine est source de difficultés, mais la prudence nous dicte "de supposer qu'il nous appartiendra de tirer le meilleur parti des institutions dont nous disposons, et c'est pourquoi il serait plus constructif de s'attacher à les faire collaborer au mieux à la réalisation d'un objectif commun ... afin de renforcer la contribution des Alliés européens, dans le cadre d'une coopération transatlantique qui reste fondamentale pour notre sécurité".

A propos de la coopération en matière d'armements, il a préconisé "une démarche plus radicale et plus globale" qui "s'attaquerait aux causes profondes du problème des crédits de recherche et de développement insuffisants ou gaspillés par suite de doubles emplois; qui associerait les pays suffisamment tôt au processus de planification pour qu'ils puissent évaluer en commun leurs besoins, et qui les ferait collaborer assez longtemps pour qu'au niveau de la production et des achats en commun les résultats soient substantiels." Il a suggéré de créer un certain nombre d'organismes de recherche et de développement qui bénéficieraient d'un financement collectif.

"Chacun de ces organismes travaillerait dans un domaine particulier - par exemple, les véhicules blindés de combat, les radars ou l'artillerie. Leurs besoins en personnel et en financement seraient satisfaits par une action commune. Différents organismes seraient implantés dans différents pays participants ... qui tous auraient une part dans les résultats."

Lord Carrington a qualifié l'accord sur les mesures de confiance conclu récemment à Stockholm "d'heureux pas en avant". Il a déclaré : "quelques signes prometteurs sont également apparus dans les discussions sur les armes chimiques - et il est inutile de dire que les questions nucléaires font actuellement l'objet d'une activité diplomatique très intense et de haut niveau."

Les résultats obtenus à Stockholm sont certes appréciables, mais la vérification est un élément particulièrement important dans cet accord "et les paroles plus encourageantes de M. Gorbatchev devront transparaître intégralement dans les propos que tiendront les représentants soviétiques à la table des négociations."

Lord Carrington a déclaré que, non seulement, l'Italie occupe une position stratégique d'une extrême importance, mais ses trois armées apportent une contribution substantielle à la défense classique de l'Alliance - une contribution qu'il s'est dit heureux de voir rehaussée par un certain nombre de programmes efficaces de modernisation des matériels, dans des secteurs clés. Il a rappelé la décision de l'Italie de déployer des missiles de croisière et a jugé "impressionnante" la contribution de ce pays à l'Alliance.

RESUME SOUS EMBARGO - VERIFIER LA CONFORMITE DU TEXTE
PAR RAPPORT AU DISCOURS PRONONCE A ROME,
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Vous trouverez ci-après le texte intégral du discours de Lord Carrington

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"NATO AND EUROPEAN SECURITY"

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO
THE RT. HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON

TO THE
CENTRO STUDI PER LA CONCILIAZIONE INTERNAZIONALE
ROME

FRIDAY 24TH OCTOBER 1986

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

EMBARGOED UNTIL: 5.30 P.M. LOCAL TIME, 24TH OCTOBER

I have been Secretary General for over two years now; I have visited Italy on a number of occasions in that time; I have been fortunate enough to enjoy a close and friendly working relationship with the Italian government; but this is the first time that I have made a speech here in my present capacity. So perhaps I should start with a word of apology. And leave you to judge whether I should be apologising for leaving it so late, or for breaking an enjoyable silence.

As it happens, I am something of a believer in the maxim: "better late than never". Indeed, I suspect that that may be one of the basic qualifications for anyone required to take a degree of responsibility for the defence policies of democratic countries. (

When the Atlantic Alliance was founded nearly forty years ago, the title I have chosen for my remarks today - NATO and European Security - would have raised many more questions than it answered. Nobody knew whether the Alliance would work, or what it would become. European security was an aspiration, not a reality. And the reality was much more as Winston Churchill had described it when he began his famous post-war speech in Zurich with the words: "I wish to speak to you today about the tragedy of Europe"; and went on to say that:

" ... over wide areas a vast quivering mass of tormented, hungry, careworn and bewildered human beings gape at the ruins of their cities and their homes, and scan the dark horizons for the approach of some new peril, tyranny or terror."

That, thank God, is not the picture of Europe today. And it is certainly not the picture of Western Europe, where we have lived in peace; grown in prosperity; gone about our business in our own way; and enjoyed not only the right but the means to change our governments - and change them back again - in a democratic way. And where we have in the process developed a degree of unity which, while it still falls short of what many would wish, is nevertheless an immense political achievement.

An immense achievement not in the sense that we have necessarily moved beyond the all-night sittings and crisis headlines which have been so much part of the development of the Community. But because, for all our problems, no one now believes that war could once again break out between those great nations of Western Europe, whose outstanding capacity for quarrelsomeness accounts for so much of what we call history. And that really is something to be proud of.

So to talk of NATO and European security today raises a very different sort of question. Security has become something which people tend to take for granted. And some may think NATO as old-fashioned as the rambling prefabricated structure which serves it for headquarters. It will not surprise you if I say that I don't see things that way, and I suspect that you don't either. But the challenge is to convince others; and the younger generation deserves a better answer than some variation on the theme of "what was good enough for your grandfather, young man ...".

I believe that there is a better answer, but it is not necessarily a simple answer. Indeed, the search for simple answers is one of the things that tends to complicate the question.

The "what was good enough for your grandfather" school achieves simplicity - an essentially misleading simplicity - by failing to recognise or to take account of change. But it can be equally misleading to recognise a relevant change and then to over-dramatise its consequences.

To find the right answer requires a logic which should perhaps be called Giscardian rather than Cartesian, because it is based on the principle of "yes, but ...".

Yes, Western Europe is now much stronger - politically, economically and militarily - than it was when the Alliance was founded. Indeed, in terms of population, aggregate wealth and technological ability, it should be more than able to provide a sufficient counterweight to the military power of the Soviet Union. But no, it does not follow that this sufficient counterweight can most efficiently - or most safely - be provided by Western Europe alone.

Yes, it is true that the American commitment to the defence of Europe is based on something more than appreciation of our bright blue eyes. But no, it does not follow that we Europeans can safely take that commitment for granted, or claim a greater share in the benefits than in the burdens of what should be an equitable partnership.

Yes, it is true that the Pacific Basin is growing in importance, not least from the vantage point of the American West and South West. But no, it does not follow that the United States can safely remain indifferent to that part of a global challenge which remains concentrated in and on Europe.

And yes, it is true that both the North American and the European members face actual or potential threats to their security which have little or nothing to do with that of an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America. Terrorism is an obvious case in point. And no one would deny the existence of strategically-important flash points in various corners of the globe. But it does not follow either that the functions of NATO could sensibly be expanded to deal with all the security interests of each of its member states everywhere in the world; or that the importance for our security of "le East-West" - the traditional centre of NATO's concerns - has become any the less.

And that, in my view, is the key to questions about the continuing relevance of NATO to European security, and of European security to the North American members of NATO.

The maintaining of what I have called a sufficient counterweight to the military power of the Soviet Union is not enough to guarantee the security of members of the Alliance; but it is nonetheless necessary. Because military power which is not so balanced is politically significant of itself; because a threat of force need not be explicit to be effective; and because it is not necessary to prove anything sinister about the intentions of the Soviet leaders to establish the point that we would be at greater risk if they - or their successors - knew that they were technically capable of using force against us without fear of effective retaliation.

That proposition is an important one, not least because it goes some way towards indicating the sort of answer we should give to the difficult question of "how much is enough?". It implies, I would say correctly, that we do not need - as a defensive alliance - to match the Warsaw Pact gun for gun or man for man. And it implies, I would say equally correctly, that it is not enough to rely only on conventional strength against a potential opponent armed also with a very powerful nuclear capability. Conventional defences on their own provide no answer to the kind of threat that could safely be made by an unscrupulous nation with a nuclear monopoly: in effect, do as I say - and keep your defensive forces in barracks - or risk a devastating missile attack to which you will have no response.

What we need, therefore, is a sufficiency in the nuclear as well as in the conventional field; and it is in this context that we must look at the argument that Western Europe no longer requires, or no longer deserves, the support of the United States in providing it. The real point is not whether Western Europe could go it alone; but whether it would be in the interests of European security - or, for that matter, of North American security - if it were left to do so.

My answer to that question would be a most decided "no". No in the conventional field, because the Soviet capability is assured by a continuing transfer of resources from the civilian to the military sector much greater than parliamentary democracies would be willing to sustain in peacetime. The most probable result of our attempting to do so would be either a failure to achieve what was necessary by way of defence - which would weaken the security of North America as well as of Western Europe; or a transformation of our societies in a direction which few of us - on either side of the Atlantic - would wish to see.

And no also in the nuclear field. Partly because there are far too many nuclear weapons in the world already, and we ought to be doing all we can to find safe ways of cutting them down. And partly because the Soviet reaction to what the Europeans would have to do in the nuclear field to compensate for a withdrawal of the US umbrella might well prove seriously destabilising; and that again would be to the detriment of North American as well as European security.

That, in brief, is the argument for providing the sufficient counterweight in the way we have been trying to do it since the Alliance was founded: in a partnership between North America and Western Europe, to which each contributes a fair share. There may be room for argument over what constitutes a fair share; but the question is one to which reasonable solutions can be found provided that the underlying principle is agreed by all.

As I know that it is agreed by Italy. You not only occupy a strategic position of the utmost importance, but you provide a substantial contribution to the conventional strength of the Alliance in all three arms. A contribution which I am glad to see being enhanced by some effective programmes of equipment modernisation in key sectors.

Italy has also played a vital role in demonstrating that the Europeans are prepared to play their part in maintaining the effective deterrent which our strategy requires: not least, of course, in the decision to deploy INF, where the calm and consistent support of the Italian Government proved a crucial factor in keeping the Alliance on the right track.

In short, your overall contribution to the Alliance is an impressive one; it is very much appreciated by your allies; and I am glad to have this opportunity to say so on the public record.

Italy has played a major role also in the efforts to establish, most recently through the re-activation of the WEU, what is known in the jargon as a European defence identity. If that means what I think it means, I am very much in favour of it. And not least because it would be a source of weakness, not only to Western Europe but to the Alliance as a whole, if our defence efforts came to be regarded by the general public not as an essential element in our own security, but as some sort of historically-determined tribute to foreign gods. "National defence" has an immediacy which "contribution to NATO" does not. And we as Europeans, having pinned so much of our hopes for the future on a community which has no responsibility for defence, need to be particularly attentive to the danger that the requirements of defence may be underappreciated, if not overlooked.

To the extent that institutions can help, it must be confessed that we are not ideally served. Of the European members of NATO, the French are not members of the EUROGROUP. The Community, for reasons which are well-known and fully understandable - though not necessarily wholly admirable - does not deal with defence; and it is very hesitant in its approach even to the more political aspects of national security. And the WEU leaves out seven of the fourteen European members of NATO, including the two which happen to share frontiers with the Soviet Union.

Tempting as it might be to speculate about institutional reform, it seems more prudent to assume that we shall be left to make the best of the institutions we've got. And so more constructive to concentrate on how best to make these institutions work together effectively towards a common objective: which, in my view, should be to strengthen the contribution of the European allies to a transatlantic partnership which remains fundamental to our security.

I do not think that the members of the WEU would disagree, and it is not for me to tell them how best to play their part in this common endeavour. But there is one thing which I very much wish they would do, and that is to direct the political energies of both Foreign and Defence Ministers into making real progress in the field of arms co-operation. Not, certainly, in order to take over work which is being done - and increasingly well done - in the wider European framework of the IEPG; and, in collaboration with the Americans and the Canadians, in NATO. Nor to duplicate or cut across it. But in order to exploit the potential of a smaller and perhaps more homogeneous body for taking bold steps which others could then follow.

Arms co-operation is at present a field where there is no lack of good intentions - and perfectly genuine good intentions. Where people really are coming to understand that we can't just keep on duplicating our research and development efforts, and producing equipment which is both too much and too little: too much in cost, and too little in the quantities deployed. And where, for all the practical difficulties and the well-publicised failures, we do also have some successes to show.

But it would be an exaggeration to say that we have had an excess of bold steps. Other programmes may capture the headlines, with a vision of major challenges and of the mobilisation of considerable resources in response; but in the field of arms co-operation, it is still a question of inching forward project-by-project; and one of the problems is that even the projects which succeed may form an insufficient basis for the research and development effort needed to ensure further such successes in the future.

We surely need an approach that is both more radical and more comprehensive. An approach that will get to the roots of the problem of insufficient or wastefully duplicated expenditure on research and development; that will bring countries together at an early enough stage in the planning cycle to form a common assessment of what they need; and that will keep them together for long enough to ensure a substantial degree of joint production and procurement.

Of course it's difficult. But it is a lot more difficult to see how any modern armaments industry worthy of the name is going to survive in Europe, and provide the equipment we need at a price we can afford, unless we have the courage to change our ways.

One idea which might work would be to set up a number of jointly funded research and development institutes. Each would concentrate on a particular sector - for example, armoured fighting vehicles, radar or artillery; each would be jointly staffed as well as jointly funded; different institutes would be located in different participating countries; participation would be open to all IEPG countries; and all participating countries would have a share in the results. And an incentive to apply those results co-operatively when the stage of production and procurement is reached.

As I say, that is only an idea. I have no doubt that there are others, and they may be better. But we really do need to agree on something, and to agree on it fairly quickly, if we are to avoid the nonsenses of the past and use our resources more effectively in the future. We quite simply cannot afford to perpetuate a system which, to quote only one example, has resulted in three main battle tanks - four if you include the Americans - being lined up to fight the same battle in the same place on the same day; and not even being able to use the same ammunition.

That is what I call a scandal. And examples could all too easily be multiplied. We need a joint political decision to avoid further such scandals in the future; and we need firm political agreement on the concrete steps which will be necessary. And if we had that, we would be well on the way to a European defence identity worthy of the name.

A speech about NATO and European Security which ended there would in brevity. But it would leave out something as fundamental to NATO as it is to European security more generally: the crucial dimension of East-West relations.

Those who rely for their news on the headlines might be excused for thinking that NATO has nothing to do with the political side of East-West relations. Because the journalistic convention seems to be that it is nations that call for negotiations and the development of contacts, and NATO which calls for the deployment of the missiles and greater spending on conventional defence.

Well, that may be life; but it isn't a fair appreciation of NATO's role. And if, as I firmly believe, we need a strong Alliance - both to ensure our security and to enable us to work successfully for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe - then we must all play our part in getting across the basic truths on which Alliance strategy rests: that defence and dialogue are the two sides of a single coin; that we will quite simply not succeed in establishing the better East-West relationship we would all like to see if we do not continue to do what is necessary to maintain a sound defence; and that we cannot hope to keep a stable peace by military means alone.

That, you may say, is a strikingly unoriginal thought. And you would be right. But the thought is right too. And it is just as important now as when it was first formulated. If, as I hope, we are now at the beginning of a new and more promising chapter in East-West relations, it is very much because the allies held firmly to both parts of this dual strategy during the difficulties of the last few years. And if we are to take advantage of the opportunities which may now be on hand, it is the same dual strategy which should serve as our guide.

Not least because we have to respond to the old as well as to the new in Mr. Gorbachev.

That he is a new face is beyond dispute. That he wields a new broom must seem all too clear to a large number of elderly gentlemen who were until recently in important jobs in the Soviet Union. And that he has struck a new note in some of the things he has been saying about arms control and disarmament is what gives us reason to hope that we may now be able to make some progress along the lines which we in the West have long been advocating: radical reductions in nuclear weapons; a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons; bringing armed forces in the MBFR reductions area down to a common ceiling; and practical measures to increase confidence by adding a degree of transparency to military activities.

On that last point, Stockholm has marked a welcome step forward; there are some encouraging signs from the negotiations in chemical weapons; and the nuclear issues were, of course, very much at the centre of high-level attention at Reykjavik.

There are those who may be tempted to dismiss Reykjavik as a failure; but an experienced mountaineer will ask not only "did they conquer the peak?", but also "how high did they climb, and have they established a base for a further attack?" And that seems to me the right way to look at Reykjavik. The answer is that the two sides climbed very high indeed - and certainly much higher than would have been thought possible a few years ago; and that the negotiators return to Geneva in an excellent position to make further progress.

All that is very much to the good; and allied governments will continue to work actively to reach agreement in all these fields, without making progress in some areas hostage to difficulties in other ones that are not clearly related.

If Mr. Gorbachev will follow us along that route, I am confident that we shall be able to negotiate agreements that respect the legitimate security interests of both sides, and that strengthen European security to the benefit of us all. But the "if" remains, despite the encouraging outcome of Stockholm; and despite the fact that what has begun to emerge from Reykjavik is much more ambitious than anything that was being negotiated on before. You can only really decide whether an agreement is fair, and can be relied upon to remain so, when you have seen the small print; verification is particularly important in this context; and Mr. Gorbachev's more encouraging words will need to be fully reflected in what the Soviet negotiators are saying in the conference rooms.

To say that is to counsel realism, not despair. If this is a new chapter, we are still very much at the beginning of it; and the negotiators, have alot of work still to do. I have no doubt that there is common ground; and that we can build on it to the advantage of both East and West. But we are not there yet.

And we should remember that East-West relations is not only a question of negotiations on arms control and disarmament. Both the bilateral and the multilateral agenda goes much wider than that. And that wider agenda - as reflected in the Helsinki Final Act - will be at the forefront of our attention when representatives of the 35 participating states meet in Vienna next month.

These are all areas where Italy has played, and continues to play, a major part. Your experience in the field of East-West relations, and your active involvement in it, make a significant contribution to the counsels of the Alliance. NATO is the stronger for it; and the prospects for a real improvement in East-West relations are the better for it.

And that, perhaps, is as good a place as any to draw these remarks to a close. One could go on for hours about NATO and about European security and still leave many important questions out of account. I do not propose to go on for hours; and I would feel happier if you were to select the questions to which we should devote the time we have left.

But, before I do so, let me leave one thought with you. We have only recently come through a rather difficult period in East-West relations, for reasons - including Afghanistan, Poland and the deployment of SS.20 missiles targetted on Western Europe - that are too well known to need restating. We have come through it in pretty good shape and we have every reason to face the future - including future negotiations with the Soviet Union - with confidence.

And with a confidence that is soundly-based on the democratic that has so successfully combined the strength of North America and Western Europe to keep the peace. Let us not neglect those strengths, nor that essential combination, as we move towards the no less important task of improving the quality of that peace.