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EMBARGOED SUMMARY - CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY EXPECTED
ABOUT 7.00 P.M. LOCAL TIME WEDNESDAY 13TH NOVEMBER 1985

LORD CARRINGTON ON EAST-WEST NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS

STUTT GART, West Germany - Lord Carrington, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, said Wednesday that the Soviets were back at the negotiating table "showing what I hope may be signs of a genuine interest in moving forward."

Addressing an Atlantik Bruecke (Atlantic Bridge) meeting in Stuttgart, Lord Carrington said the alliance was going into the Geneva talks "in pretty good shape." There had been "significant improvement in the last few years in the resources devoted to defence," cruise and Pershing-2 missile deployment was being implemented on schedule, NATO was embarked on a "very sensible" exercise to remedy key conventional defence deficiencies and, despite contrary predictions, "the Soviet negotiators are back where they should have been all along - at the negotiating table."

Although the fine print in some Western newspapers was not as encouraging as the headlines regarding possible Soviet willingness to move forward, Lord Carrington said it "may contain a good deal of negotiating fat, and I am sure that the right course for the West is to assume that it does - to make it quite clear that the door remains open and to do all we prudently can to negotiate significant measures of disarmament."

Of the Strategic Defence Initiative, Lord Carrington said that if results of SDI research "mean that we shall have to look again at some aspects of allied strategy in the light of important new developments, then it won't be the first time. And if it turns out that the best of the new ideas fit quite nicely into allied strategy, that won't be the first time either."

He made three other points about SDI: firstly, do the research first and come to the conclusions after; second, research will not answer questions about political and strategic implications that will need to be thrashed out in the alliance before any decisions are taken; and third, if the case for SDI seems well founded, "it would be both in the American and in the wider allied interest to make the transition to a strategic balance more dependent on defensive weapons by way of negotiation with the Soviet Union."

He asserted that major strategic weapons reductions could be achieved "if the Soviet Union were prepared to follow the precedents of SALT-1 and -2, instead of trying to reintroduce one-sided definitions of what is strategic, which didn't work then and which aren't going to work now."

No one, however enthusiastic about SDI, is talking about deployment in anything like the same time scale. "So the answer is surely clear. Get on with the cuts. Build in whatever safeguards may be needed against the unilateral deployment of defences that would degrade the reduced offensive capabilities. And then talk about the next stage, which, given the timing, could well be another round of cuts," said Lord Carrington.

He said there was a "very wide degree of agreement" within NATO on what should be done in negotiations with the Soviets. The West should recall that it long ago proposed global prohibition of chemical weapons and destruction of all existing stocks, elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles and a 33% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons. The Russians were now also proposing substantial cuts and this is "the sort of competition which we welcome; and in which we have no intention of being left behind. The most recent developments in Geneva and Secretary Shultz' visit to Moscow make that abundantly clear." But any cuts must be fair and respect the security interests of both sides, he said.

No one could expect fully-fledged arms control agreements at Geneva, said Lord Carrington, but it would be "nice to see ... not just smiles, but a willingness on the part of Mr. Gorbachev to join his Western interlocutors in the search for common ground...."

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RESUME SOUS EMBARGO - VERIFIER LA CONFORMITE DU TEXTE PAR RAPPORT
AU DISCOURS QUI SERA PRONONCE LE MERCREDI 13 NOVEMBRE 1985
VERS 19 HEURES (HEURE LOCALE)

LORD CARRINGTON EVOQUE LES PERSPECTIVES DE NEGOCIATION EST-OUEST

STUTT GART - Lord Carrington, Secrétaire général de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, a déclaré mercredi que les Soviétiques étaient revenus à la table de négociation, "montrant ainsi, je l'espère, les signes d'un réel désir d'aller de l'avant."

Au cours d'une réunion d'"Atlantik Bruecke" ("Pont atlantique"), à Stuttgart, Lord Carrington a dit que l'Alliance s'engageait dans les conversations de Genève "en assez bonne condition". Il y avait eu "au cours de ces dernières années, une importante amélioration en ce qui concerne les ressources consacrées à la défense," le déploiement de missiles de croisière et de missiles Pershing-2 se déroulait comme prévu, l'OTAN avait entrepris une action "très judicieuse" pour remédier aux lacunes essentielles de la défense classique, et, malgré des prédictions contraires, "les négociateurs soviétiques sont revenus là où ils auraient dû toujours rester - à la table de négociation."

Bien que certains articles de journaux occidentaux n'aient pas été aussi encourageants que les gros titres en ce qui concerne un possible désir des Soviétiques d'aller de l'avant, Lord Carrington a observé qu'"il pourrait y avoir là une réelle volonté de négocier, et je suis persuadé que le bon choix, pour les Occidentaux, est de considérer qu'il en est bien ainsi - pour montrer très clairement que la porte reste ouverte et pour faire tout ce qu'il est possible de faire en restant prudent afin de négocier des mesures significatives de désarmement."

S'agissant de l'initiative de défense stratégique, Lord Carrington a dit que si les résultats de la recherche en matière d'IDS "sont tels que nous soyons amenés à reconsidérer certains aspects de la stratégie alliée à la lumière de nouveaux développements importants, ce ne sera pas la première fois. Et s'il apparaît que les meilleures des idées nouvelles s'insèrent parfaitement dans la stratégie alliée, ce ne sera pas la première fois non plus."

La question de l'IDS lui a inspiré trois autres observations : premièrement, attendons que les recherches aient été effectuées, avant de formuler des conclusions; deuxièmement, la recherche

n'apportera pas de réponse aux questions d'implications politiques et stratégiques qui devront être débattues au sein de l'Alliance avant toute décision; et, troisièmement, si l'IDS semble tout à fait fondée, il serait de l'intérêt à la fois des Américains et des Alliés en général que le passage à un équilibre stratégique reposant davantage sur les armes défensives s'effectue par la négociation avec l'Union soviétique."

Il a affirmé que des réductions majeures des armements stratégiques pourraient être opérées "si l'Union soviétique était prête à suivre les précédents de SALT-1 et -2, au lieu d'essayer de réintroduire des définitions partiales de ce qui est stratégique, définitions qui ne convenaient pas à l'époque et qui ne conviendront pas plus maintenant."

Personne, quel que soit son enthousiasme pour l'IDS, ne parle de déploiement en envisageant la même chronologie, tant s'en faut. "Dès lors, la conclusion est évidente. Opérons des réductions. Mettons sur pied toutes les garanties qui peuvent être nécessaires contre le déploiement unilatéral de moyens de défense qui compromettent les capacités offensives réduites. Et, ensuite, discutons de la prochaine étape, qui, vu les délais, pourrait bien être une autre série de réductions" a dit Lord Carrington.

Il a ajouté qu'il existe au sein de l'OTAN un "très large accord" sur ce qu'il faudrait faire dans des négociations avec les Soviétiques. Les Occidentaux doivent rappeler qu'ils ont depuis longtemps proposé une interdiction des armes chimiques et la destruction de tous les stocks existants à l'échelle mondiale, l'élimination des missiles nucléaires à portée intermédiaire, et une réduction de 33 % des armements nucléaires stratégiques. Les Soviétiques proposent maintenant, eux aussi, des réductions substantielles, et c'est "le genre de compétition que nous aimons, et où nous n'entendons nullement rester à la traîne. Les tous derniers développements de Genève et la visite de M. Shultz à Moscou ne laissent subsister aucun doute à ce sujet. Mais toute réduction doit être équitable, et respecter les intérêts des deux camps en matière de sécurité", a-t-il souligné.

Personne ne peut s'attendre à des accords complets de maîtrise des armements à Genève, a indiqué Lord Carrington, mais il serait "souhaitable qu'on y voie ... pas seulement des sourires, mais un désir de M. Gorbatchev de se joindre à ses interlocuteurs occidentaux dans la recherche de terrains d'entente".

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"THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: TODAY AND TOMORROW"

ATLANTIK BRÜCKE, STUTTGART

WEDNESDAY, 13TH NOVEMBER, 1985

SPEECH BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF NATO

THE RT. HON. THE LORD CARRINGTON

CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

EMBARGOED UNTIL: 7.00 p.m. local time 13th November

As I look back over some years of making and listening to speeches, I find it increasingly difficult to decide which is worse. But on this occasion, the answer is clear at least as far as I am concerned, because your invitation is a very welcome one. First, because you have been kind enough to say that I mustn't talk for too long, in order to leave more time for questions and answers. And second, because you have given me a splendid excuse not only to get away from NATO Headquarters; but to get away from that other staple element in my diet - visits to capital cities, and thus to government departments.

Some of my best friends, if I may coin a phrase, live in capital cities. And many of them, I fear, work in government departments. But there is much more to the Alliance than that; and so there ought to be, because the values which we seek to defend go wider and deeper than that; and so does the sort of future which we are trying to build. So it is always a pleasure to find myself, as I do today, in one of the great cities of the Alliance; and in one where people may occasionally think rather like the character in the Thurber cartoon, who glared at his wife across the breakfast newspaper and said: "sometimes the news from Washington makes me think that your Mother and Brother Ed are in charge". As it happens, I think that the news from Washington is rather better than that - but that is a point I shall come back to, if I may.

Your own organisation, which seeks on a non-partisan basis to further the cause of German-American friendship, is thereby actively involved in developing understanding of and support for what NATO is trying to do. And the name which you have chosen - that of Atlantic Bridge - is a particularly apt one in this context.

We have a saying in Britain about certain kinds of job that they are like painting the bridge over the Firth of Forth. The Forth Bridge is a long one; the Scottish climate is not exactly Mediterranean; and experience has shown that, as soon as the painting team has worked its way across to one end, then it is time to start again at the other. The job of explaining European preoccupations to Americans and American preoccupations to Europeans is a bit, like that; and the only answer is to have a lot of painting teams, so that they can work - and work towards each other - on both sides of the Atlantic.

I very much appreciate all that your organisation does in this respect. The Alliance would be much the poorer without such dedicated and effective support; and I should like to pay tribute in particular to your President, Dr. Kiep; to the Director of the Stuttgart Chapter, Dr. Bechtle; and to the personal interest in the work of the Atlantik Brücke which has been shown by Minister-President Spath. And, of course, to the people of Stuttgart and Baden-Württemberg, who make their own contribution to the Atlantic Bridge by acting as excellent hosts to the American and other allied forces who have the good fortune to be stationed here.

But to get back to the news from Washington. Or rather, to the news which everyone really wants to hear, which is the news which will be coming from Geneva next week.

It was, in retrospect, very foolish of me to agree to come here this week; and still more foolish to pick the title of "The Alliance Today and Tomorrow". Because, metaphorically at least, what the Alliance is mainly doing today is waiting to find out what will happen tomorrow. And that I can't tell you - although it may be some consolation that the same would have been true of a number of other people you might have invited here today.

But even if we can't say what is going to come out of Geneva, it is worth thinking for a moment about what is going in. And to start from the Western point of view, I would say that the answer is clear: it is an Alliance in pretty good shape.

We are in good shape first of all because we have had the sense to look to our defences; and because allied governments have made it clear that they intend to go on doing so. The figures, inevitably, vary from country to country; but overall there has been a significant improvement over the last few years in the resources devoted to defence. And it is very important also that the political decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing II missiles in the absence of a satisfactory negotiated solution has not only been taken - the recent decision of the Netherlands which I very much welcome, completes the picture; but is being implemented on schedule, despite a massive Soviet effort to blow us off course. And we are now also embarked on a very sensible, if not always very glamorous, exercise to remedy key deficiencies in the field of conventional defence.

All-in-all, therefore, we have some reason to look with satisfaction at what has been done and at what is being done. Which is not to say that we can afford to feel complacent about the future. The rate of growth in Soviet military spending may now be less high than it was, but the fact of continuing growth remains. Moreover, it is growth from a very high level in terms of quantity; and of a quality which we would be foolish to underrate.

The Alliance is in good shape also politically. The critics of INF deployment, you will remember, predicted something not far short of the end of the world if we went ahead. Or, at the very least, that the Soviet negotiators would continue their boycott of Geneva. What happened instead is a matter of record; and it happens also to be very much what cooler heads on the Western side were saying all along. The missiles are being deployed; the Soviet leaders have recognised that Western governments are not prepared to allow them a monopoly of this class of weapon; and the Soviet negotiators are back where they should have been all along - at the negotiating table.

Not only back at the negotiating table, but showing what I hope may be signs of a genuine interest in moving forward. The qualifying words may sound pedantic, but they are necessary; because the fine print is by no means as encouraging as some of the headlines we have been reading in the Western press. But the

fine print may contain a good deal of negotiating fat, and I am sure that the right course for the West is to assume that it does; to make it quite clear that the door remains open; and to do all that we prudently can to negotiate significant measures of disarmament.

The news from Washington is that this is precisely what the U.S. Administration is trying to do. There has, as you know, been extremely close consultation in the Alliance on these matters, and the result has been a very wide degree of agreement on what we ought to be doing. Which in broad outline can be summarised in three points.

First, it is perfectly reasonable to recall that some very substantial Western proposals have been on the table since long before the recent flurry of Soviet activity: global prohibition of chemical weapons for example, together with the destruction of all existing stocks; the elimination of the whole category of intermediate range nuclear missiles which is the principal issue in the INF talks; and a 33% reduction in strategic nuclear weapons.

Second, the fact that the Soviet Union has now put forward proposals of its own for substantial cuts, is the sort of competition which we welcome; and in which we have no intention of being left behind. The most recent developments in Geneva and Secretary Shultz' visit to Moscow make that abundantly clear.

And thirdly, that we shall continue to insist on rules of the game which are fair to both sides. If proposals for 50% cuts are to be taken seriously, then the answer to the question "50% of what?" must be one which can lead to an equitable result, respecting the security interests of both sides.

I have no doubt that it is possible to combine equity of this sort - and the degree of verification necessary to ensure it - with measures of disarmament which deserve to be called radical. Such are the proposals which President Reagan and his negotiating team are urging on their Soviet interlocutors, and I have no doubt that they will continue to do so. But I don't know how Mr. Gorbachev will react.

He is obviously a formidable politician. And the only surprising thing about that is that some people in the West appear to be surprised. Surely no one really believed that the Soviet political system was an easy one to get to the top in - to say nothing of doing so in as short a time as Mr. Gorbachev?

In foreign policy, he and Mr. Shevardnadze have been quick to exploit a concept which owes its origin to Riccardo rather than to Marx: the law of comparative advantage. At least in the sense that it is comparatively easy to smile more, and more effectively, than did Mr. Chernenko and Mr. Gromyko.

In domestic policy, Mr. Gorbachev has made vigorous use of a tool whose agricultural and political applications substantially pre-date our current ideological differences: the pruning knife. And there are plenty of people recently in charge of important sectors of the Soviet economy who will know exactly what I mean.

My guess is that the pruning will do what any gardener would tell you that it would do: stimulate some new growth, but leave the basic characteristics of the tree unchanged. And I would guess that the smiling will be equally predictable in its effects: some people will welcome the smile and then go on to look at what lies behind it; and some people will just welcome the smile.

Geneva should be about more than smiling, although I would certainly not dismiss that as a contribution to a more constructive relationship between East and West. Neither, of course, should one expect Geneva to result in fully-fledged agreements on arms control: the negotiators are not that far ahead. What it would be nice to see is something between the two: not just smiles; but a willingness on the part of Mr. Gorbachev to join his Western interlocutors in the search for common ground, and in seeking to build on it something of benefit to both sides.

I have deliberately spoken of Western interlocutors in the plural because, although the meeting in Geneva will be a bilateral one between the United States and the Soviet Union, the subject of East-West relations is most certainly not. The relationship between the superpowers is, of course, immensely important; but it is only part of a wider picture.

A wider picture which is built up on the Western side by a rather complex interplay of what each allied country does to develop its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe; and of what we do collectively as an Alliance, not only in taking the measures necessary for our defence, but in encouraging an approach to East-West relations which I would like to think is cautious where it has to be, but nevertheless positive and outward-looking.

I suspect that I shall get into trouble if I pursue this idea of interplay too far. We are, after all, dealing with politics; and I can easily see the domestic political attraction of a much simpler picture, where individual governments get the credit for talking about disarmament and trade, while NATO gets the blame for deploying missiles.

That picture may be a simpler one, but it is also dangerous and wrong. Or perhaps I mean that it would be dangerous if it were not wrong. Either way, it is right to keep two points clearly in mind - and in the mind of public opinion generally, as well as in our own. The first, despite the efforts of the slogan-writing left to claim the opposite, is that NATO is

a policy instrument of its member nations. And the second is that nations committed to collective defence must find ways of working out together what is politically supportive of that defence, and what might tend to undermine it.

Easier said than done. But one of the remarkable things about the Alliance is how well we have done it. Nobody can pretend that we have held together as well as we have over the last 35 years because there were never any problems. Or because we naturally all saw those problems in the same light. There are, for example, quite enough variations in the way individual Western European countries look at the Soviet Union to make it seem quite natural that the American perspective should be different again. As in some respects it clearly is. And no one in their right senses would expect the German view of East-West relations to coincide absolutely and in every point with that of your allies.

Your allies, as both the public record and the private diplomacy make clear, share your commitment to the freedom of Berlin and support the right of free and peaceful self-determination for the German people: NATO communiques mean what they say. The allies also share, though perhaps not always quite to the same extent, your vivid sense of a divided continent. But you are the divided nation.

NATO today is what it is because it has learned to live with differences of perspective. Not in the sense of ignoring them; nor in the opposite sense of assuming that nothing constructive can be done because they exist. But, as I said at the outset, by accepting that this is a complex area; and by assuming that a rational choir, having set themselves the objective of singing in harmony without a score and without investing the conductor with dictatorial powers, will show the necessary spirit of give and take.

NATO tomorrow will depend on more of that same spirit. There will be crises, of course, if only because there will be newspapers and - I hope - a vigorous and free press. But I don't think that the Alliance will founder.

Which is not to say that there is not the potential for serious disagreements. At the more philosophical level, for example, there is the question of a Western European defence identity. Or, if you like, the tendency of some people on both sides of the Atlantic to see Western Europe in defence terms as a grown up child which has not left home. At the more practical level, there is burden-sharing: who is doing what, more especially in terms of conventional defences, and are the Europeans doing enough?

And somewhere in between, and perhaps hardest of all, there is the nuclear debate. If we in the West need a sufficient counterweight to the nuclear as well as to the conventional power of the Soviet Union - and I strongly believe that we do - then is

there really any alternative to maintaining it through a form of partnership in which the European members, as they do now, bear some of the burden, as well as enjoying the benefits?

If the European answer to such partnership continues to be yes, then I see no reason why we should not be able to deal successfully with the sort of questions which may be thrown up when we know more about what will come out from the research programme into SDI. That may strike you as unfashionably and perhaps even certifiably optimistic. But if the results of the research mean that we shall have to look again at some aspects of allied strategy in the light of important new developments, then it won't be the first time. And if it turns out that the best of the new ideas fit quite nicely into allied strategy as it was anyway, that won't be the first time either.

There seem to me only three things which really need to be said about the SDI at the present time. The first is that it is not a bad procedure to follow what I understand to be the scientific method; which is to do the research first and to come to the conclusions after. The second is to emphasise that the research in hand will answer a lot of questions about what may be technically and financially feasible, but that it will not address a lot of questions about political and strategic implications which will need to be thrashed out in the Alliance before any decisions are taken.

And the third is that, if the case for an SDI seemed well-founded, it would be both in the American and in the wider allied interest to make the transition to a strategic balance more dependent on defensive weapons by way of negotiation with the Soviet Union. That, in itself, should offer some reassurance to Mr. Gorbachev, if he is worried about a sudden American break-out into strategic defence after he has agreed to a substantial reduction in offensive weapons. And the point is no doubt one which could be translated into appropriate safeguards by the negotiators.

So I do not think that there need be a problem about reasonable assurances. But if the American and Soviet positions remain apart, the question of what is and is not reasonable may well be a focus for public debate after Geneva.

My own reply would be that major reductions in strategic weapons could be agreed upon fairly quickly if the Soviet Union were prepared to follow the precedents of SALT I and II, instead of trying to reintroduce one-sided definitions of what is strategic which didn't work then and which aren't going to work now. But no one, however enthusiastic they may be about the SDI, is talking about deployment in anything like the same time-scale. So the answer is surely clear. Get on with the cuts. Build in whatever safeguards may be needed against the unilateral deployment of defences which would degrade the reduced offensive capabilities. And then talk about the next stage. Which, given the timing, could well be another round of cuts.

I said that I wanted to leave as much time as possible for questions; and that will mean sitting down without further delay. But let me say one more thing before I do. This year has marked the 30th anniversaries both of the accession of the Federal Republic to the North Atlantic Treaty and of the Bundeswehr. If we look back over those thirty years, we see a lot of hard work; we see the allies each contributing their share; and we see peace, freedom and prosperity. Accidents, as the popular saying goes, do happen. But I am quite sure that all that is not an accident. And that the transatlantic bridge which you do so much to maintain is as important now as ever it was.