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NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT FORCE COMPARISONS  
SECOND EDITION

Statement by the Secretary General

May I extend a warm welcome to you all. On behalf of the Alliance I am pleased to introduce the 1984 edition of our Force Comparisons study. As you are all aware this is the second publication of this nature, the first being in 1982.

I would like to stress that any attempt to measure and compare the forces of East and West is highly complex. It depends on a wide range of judgements which are capable of many interpretations. Moreover, any study that looks only at static indices can paint only part of the picture. It cannot address effectively unquantifiable factors, although these would, of course, have a significant impact on the outcome of any conflict.

I should also like you to note that a NATO Force Comparison represents the consensus of all fourteen member nations which participate in the integrated military structure of the Alliance. Unfortunately, as with the last edition, the forces of neither France nor Spain have been included. We were obviously conscious of the criticism that this omission attracted last time and therefore have endeavoured to find a formula which would enable some account to be taken of these forces. This has not proved possible. I personally regret that these forces are not represented but there are understandable reasons why this should be so. However details of the forces concerned are available in other documents.

We have been conscious of the need, for the sake of comparability, to maintain as much continuity as possible with the previous edition. On the other hand we have also tried to improve the presentation of the material. In this respect I wish to draw your attention to several changes.

In order to present a more complete picture of those land forces which could actually be brought to bear, Figure 2 offers two comparisons. These draw a distinction between forces which would be immediately available, either as in-place or as rapidly deployable forces; and those which, because of their low states of readiness or their location, would be available over a longer timeframe as total reinforcements.

This distinction makes only a marginal difference to the NATO figures presented here. But it does make a considerable difference to the figures presented for Warsaw Pact forces because we now exclude from the comparison those forces at a lower state of readiness in the six Western Military Districts of the Soviet Union which do not border on NATO countries.

I would ask you to note, however, that the ratios worsen considerably for NATO under conditions of full reinforcement on both sides.

The distinction between high and low readiness forces is carried forward into the section on Regional Considerations. To be consistent with Figure 2, the numbers of divisions, tanks and guns held at high states of readiness have been identified. Apart from this addition, the remainder of the Regional Section represents simply an update of the information presented in 1982.

While the way we have counted maritime forces remains the same as two years ago, the information has been presented in a slightly different way to make it easier to compare numbers. However there are fundamental differences in the missions of the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. As we have said in the text, because of these differences, simple numerical comparisons of types of ships do not tell the full story. Because of the inherent mobility of naval forces, we have included further information on those naval forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada which are not normally deployed in the NATO area.

More details on the forces included in the publication and on the basis for comparison are contained in the Explanatory Notes at the end of the brochure.

Trends over the past 10 years for major conventional weapons systems of land forces are shown in Figures 3 and 5. With one exception you will notice that the advantage in favour of the Warsaw Pact continues to increase. The sole example where the gap is narrowing is in anti-aircraft artillery as shown in Figure 5. However, the companion graph in Figure 5 for surface-to-air missile launchers points out that the Warsaw Pact, in this instance, is moving from old technology to new technology at a significantly faster rate than NATO. This technological shift is occurring in all weapons systems but is particularly evident here.

With respect to nuclear forces, there are several notable points when comparing this edition with the preceding one. The Soviet Union has continued its deployment of SS-22 missiles; there are now 378 SS-20 missiles on launchers deployed compared to 300 at the time of the 1982 Force Comparisons. This increase took place while the INF arms control negotiations were in progress and during the so-called moratorium by the Soviet Union which it announced in May 1982. The charts also depict the NATO deployment

of 41 LRINF missiles, which began at the end of 1983 in the absence of a concrete arms control agreement. These deployments will continue but can be reversed, halted or modified upon the achievement of a balanced, equitable and verifiable agreement calling for such actions.

With respect to INF aircraft, the Warsaw Pact have increased their substantial superiority. This is a result primarily of additional deployments of FLOGGER and FENCER aircraft. On the NATO side, the number of INF aircraft has been reduced; VULCAN bombers have been retired and there has been a further small reduction in numbers resulting from the continuing transition from older F-4 and F-104 aircraft to F-16 and TORNADO. Finally, NATO's traditional advantage in the field of short-range nuclear forces has disappeared as the Warsaw Pact have given their 152 mm guns a nuclear capability.

These significant increases by the Warsaw Pact have to be set against NATO's restraint in replacing obsolete systems with newer systems and the restraint demonstrated by the Montebello Decision - a decision to reduce NATO's stockpile of nuclear warheads in Europe by a further 1,400 over the next five years.

In conclusion, let me emphasize once again that a force comparison of this kind is only one element by which the East-West military relationship can be judged. It provides an analysis of one set of indicators of military power. It does not say how these indicators would interact in time of war. In this sense this edition of the Force Comparisons provides no cause for alarm nor for complacency. It demonstrates that the disparities with which NATO has lived for many years continue to exist. We have never argued nor have we tried to match the Warsaw Pact man for man or weapon for weapon. But the growth of Warsaw Pact military power is persistent and steady. The preservation of our deterrent means that our response must be likewise.