

# HESITATION IN THE WEST ?


Address Delivered by

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In preparing the speech I am going to make before you, I realized that I must take one important precaution. I must tell you that I do not speak on behalf of the Atlantic Alliance. In my speech I shall touch upon a certain number of important and delicate problems on which the Atlantic Council has not yet begun its deliberations. In other cases it has not yet reached a definitive conclusion. And so what I am going to have the honor of saying to you on quite a few points will be my personal opinion, rather than that of the 15 governments in the Alliance.

This may put me into a somewhat unusual situation, but my 15 bosses have been extremely liberal toward me up to now. So long as I do not abuse this liberty they give me, they do not raise too many objections. This makes my position much more comfortable.

During the course of my speech, I would like to bring up some subjects of quite different nature.

First of all, I would like to examine the relations of your organization with NATO, and I would even like to take the liberty of trying to tell you what I think of the current international situation and the new problems that present themselves to the Atlantic Organization.

## **VALUE OF PARLIAMENTARY GROUP**

With regard to your own work, gentlemen, I would like to tell you—and do not take it as an improvised compliment or as flattery—I would like to tell you that I find it extremely important and truly useful and valuable.

But in reading through the reports that have been presented to me, I seem to have detected a certain hesitation, a certain doubt, by some persons about the actual usefulness and real value of your deliberations; and that is quite understandable, since it must be admitted that your situation—without a clearly defined, clearly determined status—is a rather special one.

Believe me, however, that, despite this absence of a clearly defined status, the NATO Council attaches a very great importance to what you say and what you do, and I would not have much difficulty showing you in a second how true this statement is.

When you have finished your discussions and when all your resolutions are made known, the Secretary-General and his assistants go over the results of your work and submit them to the Permanent Council, usually with comments of our own.

It must be realized that from that moment on, it is up to either a particular government or to the Secretariat—if it is held possible—to go back to one or another of your recommendations in order to see if there is a way of giving it certain force.

I believe we must state things as they are: this is only a possibility, but at the present time there is no obligation on the part of the governments or of the Secretariat to do so.

And therefore I understand that one may ask whether this method is satisfactory. If I were to give my personal reply to this question, I would say no.

## **MEANS OF IMPROVEMENT**

I believe that matters could be improved. Your rapporteurs—or at least some of them—seem to have tried to do this, and I read in the political resolution, at the bottom of a proposal in the political report, the following sentence:

“The Secretary-General shall present an annual report... this report shall be submitted to the North Atlantic Council and ultimately each foreign minister shall submit it to his national government.”

In the proposed military reforms, I read:

“The representative... shall be strongly urged to obtain...”

Gentlemen, may I give you my frank opinion? I do not think that this method is a good one. I believe that it is

trying to get the official character of your organization recognized indirectly, and that is not the road that should be followed. I believe that the problem is so important, it is so complex, that you cannot try to resolve it without having established a certain number of principles.

I fear that proposals such as those that I have just read cannot be approved by the Council, because they seem to me to consider as definitely settled certain questions that remain open. If I may permit myself to give you a word of advice, I believe that it would be well if—at one of your next meetings—this problem were placed on your agenda and if you opened a discussion on this question in order to arrive at a complete understanding. For, it must be said, the problem is extremely complex and difficult to resolve.

So far as I am concerned, I believe that an organization such as yours—which is not a governmental creation—contributes assistance of exceptional importance. Every year it brings together the parliamentary representatives of the different countries—those representatives who are most concerned with international problems and the problems of the Alliance, those who have also shown the greatest attachment to the Alliance and who have well understood its importance. This is truly an exceptional opportunity for discussion and for an examination of conscience.

## **GREATER PARLIAMENTARY ROLE**

I am more and more convinced—I always have been and now increasingly so—that an organization like NATO cannot really live and develop in a healthy fashion without real support from a parliamentary elite. In addition, I often have the impression that real parliamentary control would not be without value in the Atlantic Organization.

At the present time I myself am more a civil servant than a politician. I belong more to the administrative side of things than to the political side. Indeed, the experience I am presently acquiring supplements my political experience, and I believe I may say that the fear of a parliament is, for any administration, the beginning of wisdom.

To do away with this fear of a parliament, to do away with this parliamentary control, is, I believe, something that is not good in a democracy. And I personally believe that there are some who would be disposed to go as far in this direction.

Having said this, we must not conceal the fact that the difficulties are enormous. First of all, we must recognize that we do not have in the 15 countries that form the Atlantic Alliance the exact same conception of the role of parliament, its place in political life, its competence and its power. There would be a very complicated job of reconciliation to be done, I fear.

In addition, several of you, through common experience, know how dangerous it is to create political and parliamentary assemblies without power. On this point we now have in Europe some extensive experience. I myself have watched what I cannot call the decline of the Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg, which has been struggling along in an almost impossible situation: an assembly given little importance by the executive power, a consultative assembly that the executive power never consults.

Such a situation involves, I believe, disadvantages and drawbacks for an assembly that are difficult to estimate; should not the creation of such an assembly necessarily include assurance of its success?

If I may give you a word of advice, it is to put this problem before you for study. You are the best qualified persons to carry out this examination and eventually make concrete proposals that your governments would be obliged to look into.

In the interim, we must content ourselves with what exists and, in line with the procedures presently in use, I would like to say a few words about your various resolutions.

## **THE PARLIAMENTARIANS' RECOMMENDATIONS**

I have little to say for the moment on your political and military resolutions, because I will deal with them when I take up the international situation. But in reading your report on defence, it seemed to me that you ask for what everyone who understands the importance of the Atlantic Alliance asks for: you ask for strengthening of the defence system.

In the political field, you ask for a greater part in the conduct of foreign policy; you want to follow negotiations, to be confidently informed and, at the same time, to support a policy thus developed. All this seems excellent to me, and all this can lead to important discussions between you and me, or between you and the Atlantic Organization.

I have also read with great interest the report on economic questions, presented by Senator Javits (United States), and I must say that I admire its contents, its clarity, its depth and its realism. However, it seems to me that there is a preliminary question which also must be submitted to your examination and made subject to your discussion.

## **NATO'S ECONOMIC ROLE**

Once and for all, I think we must try to determine definitively the powers of NATO in the economic field. I believe that there is a great deal of equivocation and much contradiction on this subject. It is certainly time that we try to clarify it.

I rarely take part in a NATO meeting in which it is not vigorously stressed (and rightfully so) that the Atlantic Alliance cannot be merely a military alliance, that it must co-ordinate the foreign policy of the 15 countries, concern itself with an economic programme and follow up its development.

I have never attended an Atlantic meeting without hearing these things said. I am forced to confess that when, on different occasions, I tried to give practical meaning to these resolutions, I ran up against almost completely impossible obstacles; and it must be admitted that NATO's progress and success in the economic field have been extremely modest.

It has also seemed to me that even in your own organization there are those who have their doubts as to NATO's fitness to play a role in the economic field; and several persons seemed to indicate that some of the points raised in Senator Javits' report were not really within NATO's competence.

I am particularly impressed by the fact that a discussion was opened to find out if NATO is a competent body to establish a policy vis-à-vis the under-developed countries. Now, as I shall have occasion to explain to you shortly, this is one of the essential problems, and it is therefore a question on which a decision must be reached; should NATO tackle this subject or not?

Now before drafting too many economic resolutions, I believe it is important to examine first the question of principle. Was it or was it not a mistake to write Article II into the Treaty? If it was not a mistake—if it was right to provide for possible co-ordination within NATO of the member countries' economic

policy—it is necessary to say so. There must be a halt to taking refuge behind a negative principle when proposals are presented to NATO.

## SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

I come now to the report by Senator Jackson (United States) on scientific questions. I want to emphasize that I fully approve the following paragraph:

“Each of the members of the NATO Parliamentarians’ Conference may consider himself proud to see that the North Atlantic Council and the governments of the member countries have given such favorable endorsement to such a large number of their recommendations.”

This is by no means an exaggeration by the rapporteur; it is an expression of the truth, and there is no doubt that, as regards scientific co-operation, your Assembly has taken the initiative in proposing several suggestions that have later been accepted by the governments.

The first proposal of which you were the real initiators was the idea of establishing a Scientific Committee and to name a scientific advisor to NATO. These proposals have been realized and are functioning well. I will not go into the report’s list of other questions discussed by NATO and the projects currently under way.

I would like to say that there is another field in which I am interested, along with the scientific achievements: these are the achievements in the cultural field. We have made certain progress within the Organization. I have obtained authorization to make certain expenditures in this field, and you know that I follow with interest the efforts made to create an Atlantic Cultural Institute.

Progress is being made. Competent people have taken up the question, and perhaps we shall soon have an Atlantic Cultural Institute set up next to NATO. And so, on this subject, we can say we are satisfied; and here speaking on behalf of the entire Organization, I thank you for the initiatives you have taken and for the manner in which you have presented them, and I advise you to continue your task.

Experience has taught me that it is very difficult to ask governments for the considerable sums that would be needed if we wanted to cover in one stroke the entire range of scientific

and cultural problems. But I have learned from experience that if well-studied projects and practical and precise proposals are presented, governments will then show the necessary willingness; and I can say that not a single project presented by NATO's Scientific Advisor during the past few years has not been accepted and financed by the governments after examination.

I repeat, therefore, that we have reason to thank you, reason to be satisfied with what has been accomplished. But having said this, I join the rapporteur in saying that all this is nothing compared to all that could be done. I would like to dwell for a moment on this last idea—the appreciation of what we have accomplished in the face of what remains to be done—because I have the same preoccupation when it comes to our other fields of activity.

## **PROGRESS SINCE 1945**

Like everyone else, I probably have an optimistic side and a pessimistic side. On my optimistic days, I am amazed by what we have accomplished, and I can see how far international co-operation has advanced within NATO and the results we have obtained. If we look back on the immediate post-war period, it is not difficult to point out many things which, in 1945, would have seemed daring and which today have become reality; and these are the days on which my optimistic side is fully satisfied.

But there are also the days when I ask myself if, despite everything we have done, we are moving as fast as events; and sometimes it seems to me that events move faster than our wisdom, and that we must greatly increase our boldness if we want to be certain of arriving first in this race in which the world is involved. I can only urge you to continue your efforts. That, gentlemen, is what I have to tell you with regard to your relations with NATO.

I now would like to pass on to the second part of my statement and try to tell you how I view the international situation and what are, in my opinion, the problems that confront us as this situation develops.

## **HESITATION IN THE WEST?**

Am I mistaken in saying that at present there is a rather strange feeling of hesitation and vacillation in the West? Deep

down, each one of us is asking himself if it is really true that, during the past 12 months, we have passed imperceptibly from a state of cold war to "peaceful co-existence", and each one of us wonders how and why this happened.

Each of us also asks himself: what are the political, military and economic problems that this new state of affairs presents to the Atlantic Alliance? And, since we are in the midst of an evolving situation, where nothing seems definitely settled, it is not extraordinary to find this feeling of hesitation and vacillation which I believe exists today.

I would not permit myself to present a caricaturist's impression of such a serious subject or allow myself to become too critical. It seems to me that one could, without exaggeration—or, at least, without too much exaggeration—explain the present state of mind more or less as follows:

One year ago—almost to the day—we were confronted by what we then called the Russian ultimatum on Berlin. And the bravest statesmen in the West thought that Europe was faced with the most important, the most difficult and the most dangerous problem that had arisen in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Everyone thought that we were in the midst of a period of crisis and international tension. A year has gone by, and the Berlin problem has not been solved—nor have the other problems—yet many people believe that today we are in a period of relaxed international tension.

It is our duty to examine what has happened, to try to understand it and, above all, to appreciate the future consequences. In thinking it over, we can certainly find some cause for satisfaction and note some points on which the situation has improved during the year.

Today it seems evident that we are no longer faced with an ultimatum on Berlin. Last November we were told: this question must be settled by the month of May. May has gone by, much water has passed over the dam, and the Russians are again telling us: No, there is no ultimatum. But they add—and note this well—that here is a problem that cannot remain under discussion forever. Consequently, the situation has improved, but the basic problem remains.

Another piece of good news is the agreement reached, not on the basic problem of disarmament, but on the procedure by which this job will be resumed. It was heartening to see unanimity achieved for the creation of a new Committee of

Ten, which, probably at the start of the coming year, will begin to study disarmament problems in line with directives still not fully revealed but which will probably be well defined.

## **HIGH-LEVEL VISITS**

The international situation has also been improved and the atmosphere transformed by the visits of Mr. Macmillan and Vice-President Nixon to Moscow, Mr. Khrushchev's visit to the United States and the announcement of his forthcoming visit to Paris. I believe that all of this unquestionably helps to create a new atmosphere.

A new atmosphere is a good thing, but, even so, one should not exaggerate its merits, because, even in an improved atmosphere, there can still remain difficult problems. There certainly has been a change in the language that is used. And, of course, certain things can be credited to the Soviet leaders. They seem to have a better understanding of some of our positions; they seem to have abandoned at least some of their prejudices; and it seems that their verbal violence with regard to the Western world and our intentions has changed.

I hope I have overlooked nothing. That is what it seems to me to have occurred during these past few months. And, I repeat, all of this seems good to me. I long ago abandoned the idea that international relations could be changed by the wave of a magic wand. For some time I have been sure that peace is a slow and patient construction, and so I do not believe matters are minimized by presenting them in their true light.

Having said this, we should realize, however, that at the heart of these problems—whether it be the German problem or the Berlin problem—nothing has changed. On the question of disarmament, no fundamental change appears to have been made in the Soviet position, and so in this new atmosphere the problems remain just as they were.

## **WHOSE ATTITUDE HAS CHANGED?**

Who has changed during the past year? This is a rather interesting question and one that must be considered. We claim that the Russians have changed, and the Russians claim that we have changed. I still do not know how they can say

that we have changed because, as matters stand, I cannot see where we have made changes.

The Western World has never wanted to wage war against the U.S.S.R. and has not tried to prepare it; but the threat of war has lessened to some extent, and the reasons for this must be sought in a change in the Soviet attitude. I believe that it is possible to find these reasons.

First of all, I believe that you must credit them with the fact that they are infinitely stronger than they were a few years ago. And I repeat—because it is my absolute conviction—that the free world has never thought of waging war against the Communist world after the end of World War II. But the Communist world was never convinced of this truth.

On the contrary, it is clear that it suspected the Western world of insincerity. For a long time it lived in fear of aggression against itself. This psychological state, this kind of inferiority complex, today has disappeared. And frankly, gentlemen, I am delighted by this.

I am delighted because I would rather discuss matters with a rich Communist than with a poor Communist—and with a Communist who feels sure of himself than with a Communist who is nervous or uneasy. And if the inferiority complex that long stamped Communist policy—producing harsh verbal attacks—has disappeared, this is a favorable development.

I also believe that the Communists find themselves confronted by such economic necessities that they cannot want or hope for war. We acknowledge the progress made by the Soviet economy. We note with admiration—and sometimes with a little envy—the position they hold in certain fields. All this is true, but we also know that they are still very far from reaching the level of the free world in the social order, and that to reach this level they must look forward to a long period of peace. There is another of the reasons leading to the change in the Soviet position during the past few months.

Finally, I believe that the Communists are coming more and more to understand one of the essential truths of our time. That is that war today means total destruction for those who start it, and, gentlemen, this destruction would be as great in the Communist world as in the capitalist world.

This is something, I think, that public opinion has not yet realized sufficiently. The discovery and introduction of atomic

weapons has brought about a sensational and fundamental revolution in what we call, by a strange combination of words, "the art of war."

I have been told again and again: "Men will always fight, because men have always fought in the past." This explanation of human history is too simple. We must ask why men have always fought. The answer is simple: When men fought in the past, there was always one side (and sometimes the two sides) which foresaw victory—that is, they sincerely thought that, after a severe ordeal, the problems they had not solved in peace would be easier to solve after war. No one can believe that now.

The idea of a military victory—as it has existed and as it has played a role in human history—must be struck from our vocabulary. There are no more military victories. There is not a man, capitalist or Communist, who thinks—who can believe—that after a new world war the problems he will have to solve will be easier than those which confront him today. This is a new state of affairs which involves new consequences. Perhaps that is why the situation has changed and why perhaps—you see that I am rather cautious—the threat of war is further off.

Gentlemen, if the threat of war grows dimmer, we should fully rejoice over it; because I must emphasize that no matter what form the Communist challenge takes in the future, it will be better than war. Having emphasized this, I must confess that I am not completely reassured as to the future of the Western world.

## **INCREASED COMMUNIST THREAT**

People are in such a hurry today that they always try to put their thoughts into slogans, into brief phrases which hit the spot and which sometimes betray the truth a little bit. I have conformed to this innovation and have made up a slogan which I repeat from conference to conference. Here it is:

"The danger of war decreases—so much the better; but the Communist threat increases."

I am really convinced that if we should pass from cold war to "peaceful co-existence" in the time to come, the Communist threat will increase, become more dangerous and more difficult to cope with.

Gentlemen, it would be inexcusable for us not to see things as they are. We must recognize that Mr. Khrushchev leaves us with no illusions, and he must be given credit for his frankness and clarity. He has explained to us dozens and dozens of times what "peaceful co-existence" is. In a speech that he made on returning from China—where he had restricted himself to reasonable statements—on returning from China he made a speech at Novosibirsk in which, as reported by the news agencies, he explained in clear fashion the meaning of "peaceful co-existence":

"Peaceful co-existence is economic, social and ideological warfare which must be pursued until there is a world triumph for Communism."

It is warfare in all its forms and in all fields, except, fortunately, the military field. And if we do not settle down to this new task, if we do not see the consequences that may ensue, we run the very strong risk—after magnificently resisting during the cold war—of succumbing to "peaceful co-existence."

It is in this perspective that we must examine the problems confronting our organization—the military, political and economic problems.

With regard to the military problem, the only thing that I can say to you is: "Watch out." I know the Western world well enough to know as soon as public opinion feels, rightly or wrongly, that the danger of war is decreasing, its first concern will be to reduce drastically the military effort. This is unquestionably a problem and, I add, a danger that we must face up to.

I am certainly not a rabid militarist, but I am absolutely certain that it would be the greatest madness for the Western world to slacken its military effort before the situation is completely changed.

Gentlemen, do not forget that we have just had proof of how the Communist world—and Russia in particular—passes easily from cold war to "peaceful co-existence." Have no illusions. If the Russians should someday decide that it is necessary to replace "peaceful co-existence" with the cold war for the triumph of Communism, they will do so with the same facility.

And if they should thus turn back and place us in this old position, they would find us disarmed and weakened, and, gentlemen, I would not give much for the ultimate fate of the

West—or our chances of solving our political problems, such as Germany and Berlin.

## THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTION

In this present atmosphere that we have examined, it is necessary for the United States to maintain its firm position. Let us speak frankly. Of all the NATO countries, the United States is the one which, for ten years, has carried out its military effort with the greatest constancy and fidelity. And it would be most useful if all European parliaments—if public opinion in all European countries—recalled from time to time the considerable sums of money that the United States has spent to enable us to build up our defence.

But I would regard it as a veritable disaster if, at a time when international politics is hesitant and vacillating, the United States were obliged to declare, in one way or another, that this should be revised. This is not the language that should be used.

What the United States should say is this: For sometime we have made a great effort; for sometime we have put forth the main effort within the Atlantic Alliance. Well, our Allies must know that this effort cannot continue forever if the countries of Europe refuse to accept an adequate share in this effort, which must be a collective effort.

I believe that this is the language that should be used, and I believe that this is the language that will be heard. And so, for the present, we must show ourselves to be extremely cautious and not create the impression that we are falling prey to some infantile euphoria, mistaking desires for realities and believing that our problems are definitively solved.

No, we should welcome with satisfaction the solution of certain difficulties on the international scene, but we must remain on guard. That is the main thing I have to say about the military problem.

## CONSULTATION WITHIN NATO

Does the new phase which has begun in international politics change anything as to the principles of consultation within the Atlantic Alliance? Gentlemen, you are too well acquainted with the matter for me to dwell for long on the subject.

In the field of political consultation, the progress made within the Atlantic Alliance during the past two years has been considerable. Of course, I have always been careful to say that it was not possible to declare that this political consultation, this new multilateral diplomacy among 15 nations, was a complete and definite success as of the moment.

I am convinced that we must still wait several years before we shall know if we have succeeded or failed. I have always said that there may be reverses and setbacks before the new methods of diplomacy are definitely established. I am certain that you are aware of this. While the situation was very satisfactory throughout 1958 and during the first six months of 1959, things deteriorated after the Geneva Conference—for reasons that I cannot explain—and certain decisions were taken without consultation.

The situation within NATO thus became less satisfactory and caused a more or less perceptible uneasiness, because NATO is today the only place where there is a real possibility for the less powerful nations to make known their points of view and to defend their interests. I believe I can say, and with satisfaction, that this situation has improved and that the arrangements made for a Western Summit Conference are satisfactory from NATO's point of view.

This conference will be held immediately after a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council, which will meet again after the four-nation conference, permitting all the countries of the Atlantic Organization to take part in the discussion, to express their points of view and to say what they think of current developments. Thus, the return of consultation seems to me to have been successfully carried out.

## **DIFFICULTIES IN CONSULTATION**

Gentlemen, it is obvious that this consultation within NATO, this diplomacy by 15 nations, presents certain difficulties. This cannot be denied. But we should not exaggerate these difficulties, which are inevitable and, I might add, probably necessary in an organization like NATO, which is an organization of 15 free countries.

It would be truly extraordinary if everyone from Oslo to Washington, from Athens to Canada, had the same reactions to the important and varied international events that never

cease succeeding one another. These meetings are necessary to permit study of the problems and to take decisions reached after mature consideration and careful study regarding relations between the East and the West. It should have been the same in the preparation and development of the Geneva Conference.

I do not have to tell you, gentlemen, that we must continue to improve the system. It must be added that some day we are going to be faced with questions whose magnitude goes beyond the precise problems that we have had to discuss up to now.

What will be discussed at the next Summit Conference will no longer be limited questions for which certain countries have particular responsibilities; it will be the complete range of problems of the free world facing the Communist world, the entire conception of relations between the East and the West.

This is a problem that does not interest merely one power or a few powers. It is a problem that interests every NATO country—and every country on the same basis.

But, gentlemen, having told you that matters had been going well, that we then had a little setback and that we are once again going in the right direction, I would not want you to think that I am all at once fully satisfied and that there are no further problems before us. We must have the courage—there is no other word—the intellectual courage to ask ourselves a question.

## **NEW CONCEPTION FOR NATO?**

Is the conception of NATO as it was set forth in the Treaty of Washington—and as it has been defended during these past ten years—is it still adequate? By this I mean: Does that conception in the Treaty of Washington—which assures protection only to certain territories in Europe and North America—does that conception of a regional pact meet the dangers and the threat with which we are faced?

We can say that there is one problem before the world. In other words, is it possible today to isolate the European problem from, for example, the African and Middle Eastern problems? Gentlemen, my reply is categorical, and it is negative.

It seems to me that it is entirely erroneous, strangely limited, to believe today that it is enough to have a clear conception

of what is happening in Europe in order to solve the problems before us. To see only the problems in Europe and in the Communist world is to forget the problems, probably more important, that arise today in Africa, in the Middle East and in Asia.

This idea that NATO is proceeding under a conception somewhat too limited—that the NATO of 1959 does not meet the demands of the present as NATO did in 1949—is a feeling shared by several governments and by several statesmen—and it is most certainly the position of the French Government.

When a government tells us, “Your conception, the original conception of NATO must be reviewed and must be broadened”; and when a country such as France says, “I have interests in Africa at least as important as in Europe,” nobody can contradict them. And when France adds, “NATO gives me no help in solving these problems that arise for me in the world,” it is the truth.

Consequently, even if this position may appear hostile at first glance, those who care about NATO should devote themselves to this problem and try to solve it instead of avoiding it.

I believe that it can be resolved and that, without modifying the Treaty and without asking new military commitments of any country, we must, within the global framework of the Alliance, try to make our political consultations concerning certain parts of the world more systematic. I believe that there is a system which could be set up and which could satisfy those who ask for a broadening of our geographical horizons.

## **PRIORITY FOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS**

Gentlemen, whatever may be the importance of political and military problems that present themselves, if the hypothesis I advanced a short while ago is true—and if we are to enter a period of what we shall call “peaceful co-existence”—priority will unquestionably be given to economic problems.

Permit me to say that I do not look upon that without a certain anxiety. While it is relatively easy to mobilize Western forces to meet possible aggression, I believe that it is extremely difficult to mobilize Western forces to establish a co-ordinated economic policy.

If I may offer you another slogan, I would say: “Economic nationalism is today the past refuge of all self-interests and

all illusions." And I am convinced of this when I think of our own experience in NATO. Even on the military side, we have not succeeded in creating real economic solidarity. The problem of standardizing our weapons has not been solved after ten years, although we have had modest success. This has been more true in recent years, when it was a question of reaching agreement on the common manufacture of certain modern weapons.

But the most typical example of the impossibility of reaching such agreements is that certain countries, such as France, are today forced to repeat experiments, to make discoveries that were made by others ten years ago.

I do not criticize France, the United States or the United Kingdom. I am not trying to find out who is right. I simply state that there is a squandering of intellectual effort and of wealth in re-discovering in Europe what was already discovered in the United States, and that this same policy prevents the United States from confiding to its friends secrets already known by its enemies.

But I cannot be frightened when I think that it is in the field of economic co-ordination that the essential struggle between the free world and the Communist world will take place. Gentlemen, the free world is very strong. I have confidence in it. I by no means share Mr. Khrushchev's conviction that his economic methods must triumph and that the victory of international Communism is inevitable.

But Mr. Khrushchev has made progress. He has already acknowledged that war is no longer inevitable. But as to the possibilities of the regimes that the Communist theorists still describe as capitalistic, I am convinced that the Russians are completely wrong. They have not realized the change that has taken place in the world during the past 100 years, in the relationship between classes in the United States and Canada as well as in Europe, and they strangely misjudge the possibilities of the capitalism that has evolved. Social justice remains the great objective of our time, and this social justice can be attained without resorting to the dictatorial and arbitrary methods of Communism.

## **THREAT TO UNDER-DEVELOPED LANDS**

But if I have full confidence in our possibilities, we must not under-estimate the force of our adversaries or underrate

the danger if they carry their offensive to the under-developed countries. The Western world, at least most of it, is sheltered from the Communist lure. This is not so in the under-developed world, where the methods of Communism do not run into the same traditions, the same desire for liberty and democracy. Do not forget that in the world in which the Communists will unleash their offensive, all the forces of Communism will be utilized to achieve the political goals they desire.

It is not that way in our countries. Competition remains the golden rule inside our countries and, alas, too often it is the golden rule among our countries in their relations with the under-developed lands. This misjudges and underrates the considerable force represented by Communism's methods under such conditions.

Now this problem of the under-developed countries is the big problem of the immediate future and, gentlemen, at the risk of possibly offending some of you, I will say that this problem of the under-developed countries must not be looked upon as a moral problem—as a sentimental problem—but as a political problem that must be handled in a realistic manner.

I am more and more impressed by the analogy that exists between the demands of the under-developed countries today and the demands of the workers in Europe in the 19th century. At that time it was a problem of the demands of the poor class against the rich class; today it is the demands of the poor countries against the rich countries. It is the same problem of production and of sharing the wealth. And just as this problem could not be settled in Europe by charity and paternalism, so will these methods not enable us to solve the problem in the under-developed countries. Gentlemen, how can it be settled?

One way would be to promote a great movement of collective self-sacrifice, a sort of night of August 4th, whereby each of us would give up part of his standard of living to come to the aid of the under-developed countries. I really wish we could accomplish such a gesture. But I have no illusions on this subject, because no one in any of the countries of the free world is ready to give up ten per cent of his income or his standard of living for the benefit of the under-developed countries. We must find another way. What should it be?

## INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING

We must find better means of production in the free world. We must put an end to shameful wastage, and the countries of the free world must accept "intelligent planning," a co-ordination of their economies.

Actually, gentlemen, the moment we enter this period of "peaceful co-existence" and the moment we agree to examine the economic problem, which will probably become the essential problem, we must restore order in the economy of the entire free world. And there is no shortage of problems here.

In Europe there is the rivalry between The Six and The Seven. There is the clash of commercial interests of Europe in general and those of the United States and Canada. There is the problem of the aid that the United States will continue to give to the countries of Europe. There is the problem of the under-developed countries. And, finally, there is this absolute necessity of pooling certain scientific research to enable us to catch up in those fields where we have lagged behind, and it is only too obvious that we have.

Gentlemen, two years ago, after the successful launching of the first Sputnik, Mr. Macmillan came to Washington to meet President Eisenhower, and the two statesmen issued a communique in which they said that the future of their two countries—and it is quite certain that they looked beyond their own countries—that the future of the entire free world was no longer tied to economic independence but to economic interdependence.

That was still a prediction two years ago, and today it is a fact. But it is high time that we left behind words and speeches in order to tackle the problems and finally solve them. And I wonder if another great new opportunity is not offered to the United States.

You see, gentlemen, and we never forget it in Europe, twice since the end of the war the United States—and I do not speak of the United States' contribution to the liberation of the free world—the United States has saved the world: Once with the Marshall Plan, permitting the reconstruction of a ruined Europe, and once with NATO, assuring protection against potential aggression.

## THE CHALLENGE AHEAD

The time of miracles has arrived, and it is necessary to take further important and spectacular initiatives to restore order in the economy of the free world. This entire problem must be studied and examined, and I am convinced that if we are in agreement on political concepts—if we are in agreement on our understanding of political affairs—technical ways and means can and must be found.

In fact, the need for a military alliance has been the cement of the Atlantic Alliance for ten years. It is most likely that in the years to come—if the threat of war recedes—we shall have to replace this cement, and, in my opinion, a common policy may be the cement that keeps the free world together.

In other words, gentlemen, we find ourselves before an absorbing but dangerous problem. I do not want to be misunderstood. We must not regret for an instant everything that has been done since 1949. On the contrary, in 1949 we took decisions which were excellent, and for ten years NATO, in the face of certain threats and certain dangers, has been a very useful structure. There is no question of destroying anything. There is no question of reducing our military defences. There is no question of minimizing the importance of our political consultations.

Everything that has been achieved must be retained, everything that has been achieved must be improved—but we must now add some new activities. The Atlantic Community can live only if NATO maintains an exemplary flexibility. In foreign policy, it must have the courage to change its position at certain times, for it must adapt itself to new problems.

The problems before us today are important and particularly difficult to resolve. That is why they require much energy and determination on the part of the member governments. You know very well that governments cannot act unless they have the support of public opinion. It is therefore up to you NATO parliamentarians to be the leaders of that public opinion.



