

3. The discussion was an opportunity for the Turkish Military Representative to make a detailed presentation of the Turkish General Staff's views on this question and to stress the following points:

a. In the event of war between USSR and NATO, the Soviet forces operating in Western Europe will depend to a large extent upon maritime traffic through the Black Sea for their logistic support.

b. Successful operations against this maritime traffic must be carried out by submarines since the balance of air and sea power in the area will be in favor of the Soviets.

c. In order to increase the patrol time of these submarines, SACEUR considers that they must be stationed in the Black Sea and that protected facilities for their supply, maintenance and emergency repair must be provided on the spot.

d. The Turkish authorities are in full agreement with SACEUR's views on this subject and are of the opinion that it would be unrealistic and dangerous to shift the submarines from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean for repair since the Bosphorus will be rendered impassable.

e. The facilities proposed by SACEUR are well protected even against an atomic blast and their cost amounts only to half the price of a submarine.

4. The following additional points were also brought forth by other representatives:

a. NATO nuclear strikes in the initial phase will greatly reduce Soviet activity in the Black Sea, reducing the prospective targets for submarine operations.

b. Subject project is of such scope as to make an attractive nuclear target and it would be unlikely to be overlooked; whereas, the supply facilities are smaller and dispersed and have a better chance.

c. The greatest usefulness of the repair facilities would be in the subsequent phase. They, therefore, have a relatively lower priority.

d. Submarine operating experience in World War II showed that damaged submarines could withdraw long distances to rear bases with only a minimum of essential hull repair. Such minimum essential repairs might be performed by the submarine crews with, at most, the assistance of mobile facilities (perhaps barges equipped with shop facilities).

5. The Military Representatives Committee:


a. Agreed that supply facilities for support of submarine operations in the Black Sea were essential.

b. Was unable to agree unanimously on the requirement for fixed submarine repair facilities in the Black Sea. Lacking such agreement the Committee had no alternative but to drop the project from the 1956 Program.

c. Agreed that the question of support of submarine operations in the Black Sea, in particular the necessity and means of providing repairs to submarines, deserves further study.

6. SACEUR is invited to prepare a study along the lines of paragraph 5c above, and to submit resulting recommendations to the appropriate authorities,

FOR THE STANDING GROUP:



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