

11th May, 1967.

NATO CONFIDENTIAL
PO/67/316

Dear Mr. Schütz,

I read your outline paper on the Political Aims of the Alliance of 14th April 1967 with great interest. I found it a very thoughtful and probing paper which raises basic questions and covers the issues in a very comprehensive manner. It has the invaluable merit of identifying the basic issues which must be examined and solved if we are to achieve a satisfactory European agreement.

Your outline has now been incorporated with one by Ambassador Watson into a single paper on the Political Aims of the Alliance dated 6th May 1967. Since your first outline has been substantially preserved, however, and as a possible contribution to the work of Sub-Group 1, I am taking the liberty of submitting to you, with copies to the other members of the Sub-Group, my comments which I had prepared on your original paper and which I have had redone.

Yours sincerely,

Manlio Brosio.

Mr. Claus Schütz,
Secretary of State.

Comments on the proposal for an outline by the
German Delegation incorporated in the paper
"The Political Aims of the Alliance" of
6th May, 1967. ✓

In order to focus better on what are the key questions, I would first like to discuss those paragraphs in Section IV (pages 9-10) which deal with the "Procedures for a solution of the European security problem, the German problem, and generally for a European settlement," and the "Measures necessary or expedient as a step towards a peaceful order in Europe". It appears to me that in order to be able to answer the questions posed under both headings, we must agree on a basic issue and this decision will serve as a guideline for our entire study. The issue is this: should the Allies seek a European settlement between Western and Eastern Europe taken as separate groups, or should they seek a continental security arrangement in which each European country would be represented individually and separately without any other links binding them together?

2. With reference to Section IV of your paper on page 9 (formerly Section IV of the German outline), (a), (c), (e) and (g) are predicated on the assumption of collective arrangements, either bilateral or multilateral, which would eliminate the present blocs and result in pluralistic systems or security outside the existing alliances. On the contrary, questions (b), (d) and (f) indicate ways of proceeding on the basis of a West-East settlement. Likewise, referring to the top of page 10 (formerly Section II of the German paper) questions (a) through (h) are compatible with a West-East settlement and in fact imply just such a basis for an agreement. On the other hand, questions (i) and (j) expressly suggest a collective security system which involves a dissolution of the present West and East pacts.

3. The questions raised in Section III, page 7, "The German problem" (also Section III in the original German paper), may be considered in the light of both approaches, the choice between the two would of course be seriously influenced by the degree to which one was more helpful than the other in achieving a peaceful solution of the German problem. Likewise, the questions of general principles contained in Section II, page 5 (formerly Section I of the German paper) may be considered neutral with regard to a basic choice between the approaches which I have indicated. Those questions seem to start from the concept of a multiple system in which each European country stands by itself without any political association with other countries of the Continent. Such questions of principle, however, seem rather theoretical

and abstract unless they are raised against the background of the existing political situation in Europe. For all these reasons, it would appear more advisable to consider the questions of procedures and measures (pages 9 and 10) first, keeping in mind their effect on the resolution of the German problem (Section III, page 7) before trying to resolve the overall question of a European settlement.

4. I think that it is necessary to state clearly the answer to the basic question underlying the issue of procedures and measures. In my opinion any European settlement should be conceived and negotiated as a way of finding a serious degree of agreement between Western and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, by ensuring a stable balance of power between the two which would be supported and guaranteed by Canada and the United States. Any other approach to the problem would not only mean the end of the Atlantic Alliance but would also make any guarantee of Canada, the United States or even of certain European countries to other European countries totally ineffective and actually meaningless. A general system of security and guarantees covering a Europe of states otherwise isolated from one another would mean no security and no guarantee; it would lead to the eventual supremacy in Europe of the strongest continental power, which is the Soviet Union.

5. The taking of a clear position on this issue is vital and very relevant at present, in view of the initiatives taken by the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. In the Declaration of Bucharest, and even more explicitly in the communiqué of Karlovy Vary, the Warsaw Pact countries have developed a determined offensive against the Atlantic Alliance which they evidently consider internally weak and ripe for dissolution. The instrument and objectives of this offensive are crystal clear: a multilateral European conference leading to a multilateral European security pact ending the Atlantic Alliance and possibly weakening, if not ending, the Western European communities. So far among the Western countries the initiative has been left to the East, and the nature of positive counter-proposals about a European conference has perhaps not been studied deeply enough. The exercise on the Future Tasks of the Alliance which we are undertaking offers a useful opportunity for re-thinking the problem and developing a strategy and tactics which will not play into the hands of the Soviet Union.

6. As a consequence of the diplomatic offensive of the Warsaw Pact countries, the question of the attitude to be taken is urgent and essential. A conference on European security along the lines proposed by the Soviets, is not acceptable. As an alternative, I think that the Western

countries should seriously consider the possibilities suggested on page 9 (Section IV of the original German paper) - (b) Negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; (d) Four-Power negotiations; or (f) Western initiatives for a new East-West conference on more extensively developed peace plans. An initiative on their part at the right moment and on carefully studied terms may appear highly opportune.

7. The objection that such an attitude would be contrary to detente does not appear convincing. First of all, no decision on a line of policy can be dominated by the influence of a formula which is subject to misinterpretations and distortions. The offer of a conference between the West and the East to bring about an agreement in Europe cannot in any way be considered as a proposal against detente, as it is clearly and honestly aimed at trying to achieve peace in Europe. If detente is understood to mean the end of the blocs - which means the end of the Atlantic Alliance - then such a dangerous notion in present historical conditions should be rejected.

8. Consideration of the German problem in the context of a West-East approach to a European settlement is a separate and extremely delicate issue on which the views of the Federal Republic of Germany should be considered in the first instance. At the meeting of the Council on 15th February 1967, Secretary of State Schütz made a very important statement in this respect: "Let me make it quite clear that in the opinion of my Government a bloc-to-bloc approach is neither advisable nor feasible and that it will be a matter for the individual NATO countries to make use of the joint analysis in their national foreign policy. As it will be known, the present German Government has a policy of its own in this respect". This statement requires clarification. Does this position exclude only a specific bloc-to-bloc negotiation between the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact as such, particularly in order to avoid participation of the Soviet Zone of Germany, or is it also against any form of a West-East conference? If this question can be clarified, procedural solutions can be found to avoid prejudicing basic German positions, unless the Federal Republic in fact does desire full freedom to approach the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries by herself on a bilateral basis.

9. Perhaps the more traditional approach of a Four-Power negotiation may be the most practicable in order to place properly the German problem as the essential element of any general European settlement. This approach may not be contradictory to a broader West-East conference; it may even

be organized as a necessary preparatory step towards such a conference. In any case, the German problem should be considered from the outset because no choice of method for negotiating a European settlement should prejudice the position of our German Allies. At the same time, the Germans would certainly maintain positions consistent with the need of allied solidarity and of long term Western European security in freedom.

10. With regard to the substance of the German problem, it is clear that its solution, a detente or agreement with the Warsaw Pact countries, and the unity of the Atlantic Alliance and of Western Europe are all related and their relationship must be kept in mind. The German problem is insoluble if it is considered only as that of the earliest possible reunification of Germany. But the relationship among all these elements of a European settlement may be preserved if the solution of the German problem is considered as a gradual process which may begin with the re-establishment of normal conditions in Berlin (the demolition of the Wall, the re-establishment of regular communications between its two halves etc.); the full liberalisation of movements between Western Germany and the Soviet Zone: gradual progress towards the political liberalisation in the Soviet Zone: and the development of relations between West Germany and the Soviet Zone with a view to eventual reunification in freedom. These are only very rudimentary and vague indications of the way that the process might develop since the initiatives in this field should be left to the Federal Republic. But the main point remains: if the Alliance is to endure, a European security conference as proposed by the Soviets does not appear acceptable, while a West-East conference should and could take care of the German problem in the most appropriate way and preserve the unity of the free European countries.

11. I need hardly add that the participation of Canada and the United States in any West-East conference on a European settlement is a necessary prerequisite, for their guarantee remains an essential element of any European solution. But this is a prerequisite only and not the decisive element of a solution. Even with the participation of Canada and the United States, a multilateral conference which eliminated the West-East approach and created a general security system involving the countries of Europe, individually and separately, would destroy the Atlantic Alliance and make any new general guarantee a very poor and indeed meaningless substitute.

11th May 1967.