REPORT BY THE LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL PLANNERS

to the

STANDING GROUP

on

1953 NATO COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAMS FOR
SACEUR, SACLANT AND CHANNEL COMMAND

References:

a. M.R.C. 16
b. SHAPE/1286/52
c. SACLANT SER 816
d. STAND 350

THE PROBLEM

1. To recommend, from the point of view of military necessity,
a program of common Infrastructure for 1953 for SACEUR, SACLANT and
Channel Command for approval and financing by the Council.

BACKGROUND

2. Common Infrastructure programs were submitted by SACEUR,
SACLANT and Channel Command earlier in 1952 for consideration by the
Standing Group/Military Representatives Committee. Comments on
these programs by the SG/MRC and by national military authorities
are contained in reference a.

3. Of the three programs, SACEUR's Fourth Slice Program was
by far the largest at an estimated cost of approximately $266
million, excluding projects for Greece and Turkey. Special working
parties were set up by the Standing Group and by the Council Infra-
structure Committee to examine various aspects of the Fourth Slice
program. As a result of further study, consultations with national
authorities, the findings of the special working parties and the
comments by SG/MRC, SACEUR has submitted a revised Fourth Slice
program (reference b) at an estimated cost of $232 million,
including projects for Greece and Turkey.
4. SACLANT's original program, consisting of two maritime airbases, gave cost estimates for preparatory work only (approximately £1.35 million). A revised program, detailing cost estimates for full completion of the two airfields (approximately £6.4 millions) and including reasons to justify the projects, has now been issued by SACLANT (reference 2).

5. Channel Command program (reference d) remains unaltered (estimated cost £40,000).

6. At a meeting on 3 December 1952, the Council decided that these infrastructure programs should be placed on the agenda for consideration by the Ministerial Meeting of the Council on 15 December 1952 provided the Military Committee has approved these programs from the point of view of military necessity. By reference 2, National Chiefs of Staff were requested to advise the Standing Group at the earliest possible date whether the programs as now presented contained any projects or portions of projects which they considered should be excluded as not militarily essential.

DISCUSSION

7. The Fourth Slice program is geared to force goals only as far as the strength of air forces in 1954 is concerned. SACEUR has submitted this revised program in two increments. The first increment of the revised Fourth Slice program represents the absolute minimum hard core of infrastructure projects which SACEUR considers should be approved immediately. It is designed to provide:

a. Items which were deleted from previous programs for financial reasons.

b. For deficiencies in infrastructure for forces which are already existing.

c. Initial infrastructure for Greece and Turkey.

g. Infrastructure for air forces which SACEUR estimates will be available in 1954.
8. For the first increment, SACEUR has estimated the Air Force build-up from aircraft production forecasts obtained from replies to ARQ(52), NDAP production schedules and information from NATO International Production Staff. This estimate is considerably below the M.R.C. 12 planning goals for 1954 and consequently a considerable reduction in the number of airfields originally planned has been achieved.

9. The second increment is based on the build-up of air forces to meet the M.R.C. 12 planning goals for 1954. As goals for 1954 have not been finalized and as it is unlikely that there will be any improvement in the aircraft production as presently forecast, the question of considering the military necessity for the second increment does not arise.

10. SACEUR has stated that it is essential that a decision regarding the financing of the revised Fourth Slice program should be reached before 1 January 1953. Unless authority is given for work to commence by this date, delays in placing contracts for materials and supplies and delays in land acquisition negotiations will result in the loss of the coming construction season. Consequently, facilities for existing forces would be delayed by a further year and it might not be possible to deploy the minimum air forces which SACEUR estimates will be built up by 1954. This program, however, does not represent a military ideal either from the Supreme Commander's point of view or from the point of view of national military authorities, but financial capabilities of NATO nations preclude the submission of an ideal program. Consequently, a wide divergence of opinion exists as to what the final content of the Fourth Slice program should be. In order to examine this problem without protracting discussion indefinitely, it is considered that the revised Fourth Slice program, as now presented, should be used for the basis for discussion to the exclusion of any additional projects which SACEUR or national military authorities may wish to add for financing in the present program.
11. SACLANT's program consists of two maritime air bases. This requirement has been based on SACLANT's estimate of the percentage of the planned M.R.C. 12 forces which he forecasts will be available for deployment in 1954. The reasons for SACLANT's need for authority to commence these works in the near future are similar to the contractual reasons advanced in respect of SACEUR's program.

CHANNEL COMMAND 1953 PROGRAM

12. It was agreed in M.R.C. 16 that as the Channel Command projects for the provision of buoys for channel marking was not a static installation, it was not eligible for inclusion as common infrastructure. However, it was also agreed that this project was a military necessity. Therefore, in the absence of a suitable procedure by which this project could be financed, it must be left to the Council to decide an appropriate financial procedure.

GENERAL

13. The approval of a program from the military standpoint and its subsequent approval by the Council would not necessarily be a binding commitment to provide all the projects within each specific category, as at present submitted. Due to the fact that most of the national governments have not had an opportunity to review thoroughly SACEUR's revised program, the projects supported by the Military Committee will be further reviewed in detail by the Standing Group/MRC, subsequent to Council agreement on cost sharing. Therefore, this approval should be considered as an agreement to the maximum common infrastructure program which should be modified at a later date, if it be found that:

a. Military requirements could be met in a more economical manner; or

b. Certain projects were no longer militarily justifiable because of subsequent changes in operational plans.

14. Recommendations by the Standing Group concerning the military necessity of each category of infrastructure, or concerning projects within each category as given at Enclosure "A" (page 7) for
the three programs. These recommendations take into account the comments contained in M.R.C. 16 and also such comments by national military authorities which have been received to date.

CONCLUSIONS

15. It is concluded that:

a. Although it does not meet the military ideal acceptable to SACEUR and national military authorities, any program greater than the revised Fourth Slice is clearly unlikely to be within the capability of NATO nations to finance.

b. The first increment of the revised Fourth Slice is not geared to force goals but is required to support forces which are already in existence and to support air forces which, by using the best available data, SACEUR believes will be available in 1954.

c. Consideration as to the military necessity for the second increment of the revised Fourth Slice will not arise unless an improvement occurs in aircraft production as presently forecast.

d. If SACLANT's estimate of the forces, which he believes will be available to him in 1954, are based on sound assumptions, SACLANT will require a common Infrastructure program.

e. In the absence of a suitable procedure for providing common finance for channel buoys, it must be left to the Council to decide a procedure for financing this project.

f. It is essential to obtain Council approval of a recommended Infrastructure program before 1 January 1953 in order to avoid loss of the coming construction season.

g. The programs as now submitted by SACEUR (Fourth Slice, first increment only) and SACLANT be used as a basis for recommending a program to the Council for financial approval, and that consideration should not be given to any projects which supreme commanders or national military authorities may wish to submit in addition.
h. The approval of a program from the military standpoint and its subsequent approval by the Council would not necessarily be a binding commitment to provide all the projects within each category, as at present submitted. Subsequently, a further detailed review will be made by the Standing Group and the Military Representatives Committee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. It is recommended that the Military Committee approve this report and transmit to the Council the recommendations at Enclosure "A" under cover of the memorandum at Enclosure "B".
STANDING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS ON EACH CATEGORY OF
COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE RECOMMENDED IN SHAPE

REVISED SLICE 4 (FIRST INCREMENT), SACLAN
1953 PROGRAM AND CHANNEL COMMAND 1953 PROGRAM

Appendix "A" - SHAPE Airfields
Appendix "B" - SHAPE Jet Fuel Facilities
Appendix "C" - SHAPE Naval Fleet Bases
Appendix "D" - SHAPE Radar Warning Installations
Appendix "E" - SHAPE Radio Navigational Aids
Appendix "F" - SHAPE Signals Communications
Appendix "G" - SHAPE Training Facilities
Appendix "H" - War Headquarters
Appendix "I" - SACLANT Common Infrastructure Program
Appendix "J" - Channel Command Buoys

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Enclosure "A"
Airfields (Air Force)

1. It was stated in M.R.C. 16 that "The number of airfields, including those provided in previous slices, must correspond to the total number of units resulting from M.R.C. 12. All airfields in excess of this total should be deleted from the Fourth Slice."

2. The original Fourth Slice program stated a requirement for work to be carried out on 60 air force airfields in order to provide bases for the build-up of forces up to the 1954 planning goals stated in M.R.C. 12. By using the best data available on which to assume the likely shortfall in aircraft production, SACFUR has estimated the likely build-up of forces by 1954. As a consequence of this, the revised Fourth Slice shows SACFUR's requirement to be for work to be carried out on 30 airfields in the first increment.

3. The United Kingdom has stated that there is no requirement for 1 main and 1 redeployment airfield for use by 2nd T.A.F.

4. The Netherlands consider that YPENBURG should be transferred from the second increment to the first increment.

5. It is considered that the air force airfield program contained in "APF revised Fourth Slice first increment is a military necessity with the following exceptions:

   a. 1 main airfield and 1 redeployment airfield for use by 2nd T.A.F. should be deleted.

   b. YPENBURG should be included in the first increment and deleted from the second increment.

Airfields (Naval)

6. The first increment includes all the maritime airfields recommended in the original Fourth Slice program.
7. It is considered that the naval airfield program contained in SHAPE revised Fourth Slice first increment is a military necessity.
SHAPE JET FUEL FACILITIES

1. M.R.C. 16 stated agreement in principle to the operational need for jet fuel facilities but deferred recommendation until the proposed project had been examined by a working party.

2. This subject is still under examination as to detail but SACUR's revised Fourth Slice first increment recommendations for this category have been developed in conjunction with the specialist working party set up by the Council Infrastructure Committee. The original cost estimate for the project was £54.46 millions, the revised first increment estimate £35.23 millions.

3. The first increment is designed to provide storage and pipeline facilities for airfields of previously approved programs together with those airfields recommended for approval in first increment of the revised Fourth Slice. As it has been recommended that one main and one redeployment airfield should be deleted from the first increment, this may slightly reduce the cost for jet fuel facilities.

4. The program for jet fuel facilities as outlined in the Fourth Slice first increment is a military necessity and should be considered for financing up to the maximum cost at present estimated (less the difference owing to the deletion of airfields) in order to allow preparation work to be carried out. However, further study should be made of the method of technical implementation before the scheme is embarked upon fully. While it is agreed in principle that the operational need for jet fuel facilities is of the greatest importance, its approval is subject to the issue of instructions on the management and control of the system on the lines indicated in paragraph 14, appendix "E" to Enclosure "B" of M.R.C. 16.
SHAPE NAVAL FLEET BASES

1. M.R.C. 16 stated that the recommended projects or portions of projects in this category could be classified as common infrastructure provided further justification and an estimate of the degree of common usage was made by SACEUR.

2. The information from SACEUR called for by M.R.C. 16 has been supplied in SHAPE/1286/52.

3. All the naval fleet base projects contained in the original Fourth Slice have been included in the first increment of the revised Fourth Slice. The revised cost is now estimated as £ 12.49 million which is £ 3.27 million less than the original estimate.

4. It is considered that the naval base projects, as contained in SACEUR's revised Fourth Slice Infrastructure Program, are a military necessity. The projects at Oran and Bizerte should be authorized and work started immediately. The approval of the remainder of the naval base program in the Mediterranean should be subject to confirmation by SACEUR that there is no duplication of base facilities.
1. M. R. C. 16 stated that this category was to be screened by a military working party in conjunction with SHAPE. SACEUR was also instructed to provide more information on this category.

2. The screening was carried out by EMCIC and the Air Defense Radars and the Coastal Radars, except those guarding key NATO points, have now been deleted from the original program. The revised cost is now estimated at £3.17 millions for the first increment as compared with £7.43 millions for the total original program for radar warning projects.

3. Belgium has stated that redeployment of its radar network west of the Rhine is no longer planned.

4. France agrees on the program subject to some arrangements being concluded between SHAPE and national staffs concerning the protection of the Sicilian Straits.

5. There are two main categories of installations within this category:
   a. Hard standings west of the Rhine for the tactical redeployment of radar now based east of the Rhine.
   b. Coast watching radars in the Mediterranean and on the Baltic coast.

The first category is essential but not of highest priority; the second category will be subject to such decision as will be taken as to its financing.
SHAPE RADIO NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

1. M.R.C. 16 stated that this category was to be screened by an expert military working party in conjunction with SHAPE, and that SACEUR would be required to provide more information.

2. This screening was carried out by EMCCC and the revised Fourth Slice now omits CONSUL, DECCA and GEE chains in Southern Europe. The revised cost estimate is now £ 2.27 millions as compared with the original estimate of £ 2.66 millions. Additional information on this category has been provided by SACEUR in SHAPE/1286/52.

3. France agrees on the program subject to further studies between EMCCC and national staffs in order to insure that the projects are in consonance with the technical capabilities of the equipment which nations contemplate using.

4. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom oppose the use of high power M/F beacons in this category, for technical reasons.

5. This category is a military necessity but not of a highest priority and should be subject to further justification by SACEUR.
SHAPE SIGNALS COMMUNICATIONS

1. In accordance with M.R.C. 16 recommendations, the Fourth Slice Signals Communications Program was revised by a working party of Signals experts of the Infrastructure Committee of the Council in conjunction with SHAPE and EMCCC.

2. The revised Signal Communications projects include the supplemental program for Greece and Turkey, for which projects are firm but costings are preliminary only and subject to further refinement by ELLA.

3. The total estimated cost of the Signals Communications projects recommended for inclusion in the revised Fourth Slice of Infrastructure is £19.77 millions, as against £20.63 millions in the previous program.

4. France agrees on the program subject to further technical study by EMCCC concerning Items 1, 4, 5 and 6 of the Signals Communications Program, but the present estimated total cost of the program should not be exceeded.

5. As the whole program has been screened, it is now considered to be a military necessity but not of the highest priority, except for essential military communications for Greece and Turkey. SACURRE and the Council Infrastructure Committee should continue to screen this program in order to determine the degree of national military use and the assessment of civil use.
SHAPE TRAINING FACILITIES

1. It was considered, in M.R.C. 16, that training facilities are a military requirement, but that the program was too lavish and should be reduced.

2. Air Training Facilities. The previous SHAPE program provided for five Air Bombing and Gunnery Bases. Taking into account the air forces of Greece and Turkey, and assuming that there will be 750 German fighter-type aircraft in 1954, SHAPE now requires six bases, of which four are required in 1953. However, two are planned for joint use with first increment maritime airfields. By that means, the cost is only £10.26 millions instead of £25 millions.

3. Land Training Facilities. In spite of the recommendations made in M.R.C. 16, SHAPE strongly supports his previous program, giving justifications the main of which being that:

   a. The land forces for which training facilities are projected are essentially covering forces and should have training facilities very close to their probable area of deployment.

   b. The total program recommended will provide only approximately one-third of the training facilities necessary to the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Land Forces Europe.

   c. The deferment of any of these projects will further accentuate training deficiencies.

4. In view of the justifications given by SHAPE, it is considered that the Land and Air Training Facilities Program, as proposed by SHAPE in the revised Fourth Slice Program, is a military necessity, but is of lesser priority than other categories.
WAR HEADQUARTERS

1. M.R.C. 16 stated that War Headquarters were a military necessity but that some reductions should be made by modifying the locations or the standards.

2. The revised Fourth Slice provides for £3.47 millions (first increment) instead of £4.60 millions in the preceding program. The new projects provide the minimum essential requirements without which the War Headquarters needed on D-day will not be in a position of readiness to exercise effective command. The first increment does not provide for Air Force Headquarters where there is a likelihood that air forces will not be available.

3. The revised Fourth Slice, first increment program for War Headquarters is considered to be a military necessity.
Appendix "I"

SACLANT COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

Airfield Requirements

1. Additional details requested by M.R.C.16 have been forwarded by SACLANT in letter Ser 816. This program is considered as a military necessity provided the Military Committee is satisfied that the assumptions, on which SACLANT has forecast his forces build-up, are sound.
CHANNEL COMMAND Buoys

M.R.C. 16 stated that the CHANNEL COMMAND project for the provision of buoys for channel marking was not a static installation and was not eligible for inclusion as common infrastructure. It was agreed, however, that this project was a military necessary. In the absence of a suitable procedure by which this project could be financed, it must be left to the Council to decide an appropriate financial procedure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

SUBJECT: 1953 Infrastructure Program for SACEUR, SAACLANT and Channel Command

References:

a. M.R.C. 16
b. SHAPE/1286/52
c. SACLANT SER 816
d. STAND 356

1. Comments by the Standing Group/Military Representatives Committee on the original common Infrastructure Programs for 1953 submitted by Supreme Commanders earlier in 1952 are contained in reference a.

2. Further study of these programs by SACEUR and SAACLANT has resulted in their submitting revised programs under references b and c. The Channel Command program (reference d) has not been revised.

3. The Military Committee has examined these programs and has reached the following conclusions:

a. Although it does not meet the military ideal acceptable to SACEUR and national military authorities, any program greater than the revised Fourth Slice is clearly unlikely to be within the capability of NATO nations to finance.

b. The first increment of the revised Fourth Slice is not geared to force goals but, subject to the exceptions contained in the accompanying appendices to the enclosure, is required to support forces which are already in existence and to support air forces which, by using the best available data, SACEUR estimates will be available in 1954.

c. Consideration as to the military necessity for the second increment of the revised Fourth Slice will not arise unless an improvement occurs in aircraft production as presently forecast.
4. If SACLANT’s estimate of the forces, which he believes will be available to him in 1954, are based on sound assumptions, SACLANT will require a common infrastructure program.

5. In the absence of a suitable procedure for providing common finance for channel buoys, it must be left to the Council to decide a procedure for financing this project.

6. It is essential to obtain Council approval of a recommended infrastructure program before 1 January 1953 in order to avoid loss of the coming constructional season.

7. The approval of a program from the military standpoint and its subsequent approval by the Council would not necessarily be a binding commitment to provide all the projects within each category, as at present submitted. Subsequently, further detailed review will be made by the Standing Group/Military Representatives Committee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. The Military Committee therefore recommends that:

a. The Council approve as the 1953 NATO Common Infrastructure Program,

   (1) SACEUR’s revised Fourth Slice first increment subject to the exceptions contained in the accompanying Appendices “A” to “H” to the Enclosure.

   (2) SACLANT’s 1953 Program (Appendix “I” to Enclosure).

b. The Council take appropriate action to make funds available for the execution of the approved 1953 NATO Common Infrastructure Program.

c. The Council give consideration to the method to be adopted for financing the Channel Command project (Appendix “J” to Enclosure).