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A Report by the Security Coordination Committee  
on

SECURITY SURVEY IN GREECE AND TURKEYNote by the Secretaries

1. At their 57th Meeting the Standing Group amended the third line, paragraph 2(b), page 1 of S.G. 7/35, deleting "recommendations" and inserting in its place "action."
2. With the above amendment, the Standing Group approved the recommendations contained in paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c), page 1, S.G. 7/35.
3. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of S.G. 7/35.

C. H. DONNELLY,  
E. B. W. CARDIFF,  
P. L. de MONTJAMONT,  
Secretaries.

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S.G. 7/35

7 February 1951

Pages 1 - 9, incl.

REPORT

of

THE SECURITY COORDINATION COMMITTEE

to the

STANDING GROUP

on

SECURITY SURVEY IN GREECE AND TURKEY

Reference: S.G. 7/30

1. The Security Team appointed by the Standing Group to conduct a preliminary investigation in Greece and Turkey have completed their mission, and their reports are at Enclosures "A" and "B".

2. It is recommended that:

(a) The Standing Group approve the reports.

(b) The reports be referred to the Communications-Electronics Section of the Standing Group for their consideration and recommendations on the immediate installation of:

(1) A Type-X machine in the American Mission at Athens.

(2) A communications system (Typex II) to serve Turkey, the Standing Group and the European Command, with which Turkey will conduct its liaison.

(c) The Chiefs of the Greek and Turkish General Staff be requested to execute a copy of the NATO standard security agreement, and to take the other action recommended in the report.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

SECURITY SURVEY IN GREECE BY THE STANDING

GROUP TEAM FROM JANUARY 25TH-29TH

1. The North Atlantic Council decided at its 5th Meeting that arrangements might be made to permit Greece to be associated, as appropriate, with certain phases of N.A.T.O. military planning. The present security survey has, therefore, been carried out on the assumption that the exchange of information between Greece and the members of N.A.T.O. will be limited to military (including naval and air force) matters. No detailed enquiry has been made into the security arrangements existing in the purely civil departments of the Greek Government, though it is recognised that civil departments such as the Foreign Office, Finance or Supply Departments must on occasions be associated with military planning. On this important point Field Marshal Papagos and General Dovas have both stated that all Cosmic material will be kept and handled exclusively in the offices of the National Defence General Staff. This is already the practice in the case of the Greek defence plans and it is essential that Cosmic material should be treated in the same way.

2. ORGANISATION

The services responsible for security in Greece are the Intelligence Service, directly under the C-in-C, the Security Corps (Gendarmerie and Police) and a general security service under the Minister of Public Order. The Intelligence Service and the Security Corps appear to have wide powers and are responsible for the internal and external security of the country, counter-espionage, the proper handling of documents and information, morale in the Armed Forces and of the civil population. It is alleged, and seems probable, that cooperation between the Intelligence Services and the Security Corps is close, but General Dovas admits that there is little cooperation with the civilian organisations. There is no real equivalent to the western Inter-Departmental Committees on Security, but in the Armed Forces and the Security Corps special persons are charged with security duties, and they appear to function as security officers.

3. POWERS

The legal position is satisfactory. General Law 375/1936 provides punishment for espionage and breaches of security. The Military Penal Code (Articles 33-42 and 92-100) also punishes espionage and breaches of security by members of the Armed Forces. Legislation is now in draft by which more severe penalties can be inflicted for these crimes, but, by the standards of some N.A.T.O. members, punishments are already severe. Within the General Staff, the security agencies are probably adequate in strength and technique to detect breaches of security, but the same cannot be said for the civilian departments. Legal sanctions are sufficient to secure adequate punishment. For charges of espionage on behalf of an enemy country capital punishment is as a rule inflicted by Court Martial and there is no appeal.

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There is no press censorship in peacetime. In the event of war, however, censorship can immediately be imposed. By Law 509/1947 the Greek Communist Party was dissolved and even a capital sentence may now be imposed for Communist activities. The General Staff estimate the present number of Communist Party members to be between 50-60,000, but this figure may well be an under-estimate. It seems likely that a majority of civil departments have communist cells, and that such cells exist also among the lower ranks in the Army, Navy and Air Force despite vigorous action taken by the Greek Government to eradicate them. Within the General Staff, however, stringent security measures prevail. The number of officers is small, all have been carefully screened and selected, and it should be safe to assume that here at least there is no penetration by Communists.

4. STANDARDS

It is considered in Athens among the French, American and British Missions that Greek officials as a whole are not security minded in the accepted N.A.T.O. conception of the term, though, as stated, there are exceptions in the case of the senior officers of the General Staffs. Uniform national standards exist for security classifications, but it is impossible to say from the nature of this survey whether these standards are always enforced. But security equipment is definitely not adequate. The use of the combination safe is scarcely known, for even in the General Staff obsolete key-lock safes and cupboards are invariably used for the custody of secret material. On the other hand the General Staff building is well guarded and appears physically secure against wrongful surreptitious entry, though this cannot be said for other government offices. Government employees handling and having access to graded material are security screened by the Intelligence Service or Security Corps, but the General Staff are not prepared to give an assurance that, in the case of civil services, this screening is necessarily effective. As far as the Armed Forces are concerned papers are conveyed from office to office through a special military courier service and may be encyphered. If not, the letter is sealed. The courier system between Greece and Greek missions abroad is intermittent but this point is fortunately not in issue. It has been difficult to obtain accurate information about the custody and inviolability of cyphers, but certainly no assurance can be given that they are unbreakable. O.T.P.s are not used, and there is no paraphrasing. Wireless security is considered not to be good, and wireless communication with Korea is affected through the American Mission.

5. The main recommendation of the Standing Group Team is that N.A.T.O. material should be kept only in the General Staff building and that, if any other person has to be associated with Cosmic military planning, he must visit the General Staff building to work on the papers. As stated, this system is already in force for the Greek Defence plans and for certain classified material already passed to the General Staff by Western Attaches. The National Defence General Staff is composed of representatives of the Army, Navy and Air Force staffs, working directly under Field Marshal Papagos. Closely associated with the General Staff is the Joint Strategic Planning Committee. These organisations, composed of a few specially trusted senior regular officers are considered entirely reliable and the circle is so small that the risk of leakage should be slight. It is considered that a high standard of security is maintained to safeguard the Greek defence plans which are not even shown to Corps Commanders, information being conveyed

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orally. If the same precautions are taken for N.A.T.O. material, there need be no misgivings about exchanging information with the General Staff.

Apart from the lack of combination safes, security within the General Staff building seems good. The wholetime military guard prevents unauthorised entry, and the sentries are sufficiently numerous and alert. It is the Greek intention to keep all Cosmic papers on the Field Marshal's floor. They will be handled at all stages by regular officers only.

#### 6. CYPHERS

Field Marshal Papagos has agreed to the suggestion that a Type-X machine should be installed in the offices of the American Military Mission to Greece, to be operated by American personnel. This machine will also serve as the channel of communication between the Greek General Staff, Washington and the Command Headquarters in Europe, when established. The Field Marshal has also agreed to make use of the American courier system for the transmission of N.A.T.O. material between Greece and places abroad.

#### 7. The Standing Group Team make the following recommendations:-

(a) The standard of security only in the offices of the National Defence General Staff at Athens is sufficiently good to permit N.A.T.O. military material to be exchanged with the Greek Government when required. The standard of security in other offices at Athens, including the Ministry of Defence, is not sufficiently high for N.A.T.O. material to be held.

(b) Although the standard of security in the National Defence General Staff building is adequate, it is recommended that only that material which it is essential for the Greek General Staff to hold or know of should be passed to Athens.

(c) The Type-X machine should be installed as proposed in paragraph 6 above.

(d) The Greek Government have been provided with a copy of the N.A.T.O.'s standard operating procedure for the security system and notes on the basic principles involved. General Dovas has expressed his willingness to cooperate and Field Marshal Papagos should be asked to confirm, by signature of the standard security agreement, which has been signed by all N.A.T.O. nations, that he accepts the principles and will enforce the procedure.

(e) The Greek Government should be asked to appoint a national security authority to control the handling of all Cosmic material. This authority must be executive, not advisory, and it should be under the control of a regular officer not below the rank of colonel or equivalent.

(f) The Greek Government should be asked to confirm that no Cosmic material will, without notice, be handled or in any way dealt with outside the General Staff offices.

(g) The Greek Government should be asked to draw up a list of those officials who, in any capacity, will handle Cosmic material. This list must, in accordance with N.A.T.O. principles, be as short as possible, and a security re-check should

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be carried out by the National Government of all persons whose names appear on it.

(h) The Greek Government should be asked to ensure that Type-X cypher material and Cosmic secret and top secret documents are invariably kept, when not in use, in combination safes. If the supply of combination safes now available to the Greek Government is inadequate, safes will have to be provided from outside sources.

(i) It must be emphasised that the Standing Group Team have not carried out a security inspection in the full detailed sense of the term. No more than a preliminary survey has been possible in the time afforded. It would be advisable for the Greek Government to agree to a further and more detailed inspection by a representative of the Standing Group after reasonable opportunity has been afforded to apply the N.A.T.O. security regulations. General Dovas has in fact stated that he would welcome this.

8. The Greek General Staff made the following points:-

- A. It was not their intention to take any action pending further advice from the Standing Group.
- B. They would welcome expert advice in adapting their national security system so as to conform with N.A.T.O. security procedure and, in particular, on technical matters such as anti-microphone precautions.
- C. They asked that documents should be addressed as follows:-
  - (a) Cosmic or N.A.T.O. documents should be addressed to:

National Defence General Staff,  
Head of A' J.S.G.  
ATHENS.

(b) If a document which should be read by the Commander-in-Chief only, the address should be:

National Defence General Staff,  
Head of A' J.S.G.  
(For the C-in-C ONLY)  
ATHENS.

The Greek General Staff have been told that if they have to communicate with N.A.T.O. before this new procedure is implemented, they should do this through the American or British Military Missions.

9. The Standing Group Team met with every assistance from the Greek Government but has had no sure means of checking the accuracy of some of the statements made by General Dovas. It should, however, be recorded that the Greek General Staff had not been properly briefed by its military representatives in Washington regarding the visit of the Standing Group Team.

10. A copy of this report should not be furnished to the Greek Government.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

SECURITY SURVEY IN TURKEY BY STANDING GROUP TEAM.

FROM JANUARY 19TH TO 23RD.

1. The North Atlantic Council decided at its 5th Meeting that arrangements might be made to permit Turkey to be associated, as appropriate, with certain phases of N.A.T.O. military planning. The present security survey has, therefore, been carried out on the assumption that the exchange of information between Turkey and the members of N.A.T.O. will be limited to military (including naval and air force) matters. No detailed enquiry has been made into the security arrangements existing in the purely civil departments of the Turkish Government, though it is recognised that civil departments such as the Foreign Office, Finance or Supply Departments, may, on occasions, have to be associated with military planning. On this important point the Turkish spokesman, Admiral AZIZ ULUSAN, who is G.2 Turkish General Staff, has given an assurance that all Cosmic material will be kept and dealt with in the General Staff offices which are situated in the Ministry of Defence.

2. ORGANISATION.

In Turkey, the Security Service, acting through the Prime Minister's Department, is responsible for the formulation of security policy. The role of the Security Service is primarily advisory, orders being issued direct by the Prime Minister. The Chief of the Security Service also makes a practice of visiting departmental heads at regular intervals and discussing security problems with them. Within the civil departments there are no standard security regulations. There are also no individual security officers and therefore no organisation comparable to the British Inter-Departmental Committee on Security.

Service security does not differ in kind from that of the civilian departments, though there is a branch within the Ministry of Defence specifically charged with the security of the building, and there is a 24 hour military guard. Civilian departments are guarded for 24 hours by detachments of gendarmerie.

COMMENT:-

Viewed as a whole this system obviously needs revision if it later becomes necessary for departments other than the Ministry of Defence to keep or handle Cosmic material in their own offices.

3. POWERS

The Turkish equivalent of the British Official Secrets Act U.S. and French espionage statutes is a chapter in the Criminal Code framed in general terms as "Acts against the Government". It seems doubtful if the security forces as now constituted are adequate in strength or technique, to detect breaches of security within the Government Depts. but the nature of the Turkish governmental machine is such that it is also doubtful whether in practice many accidental or deliberate breaches of security occur. Legal sanctions are sufficient to ensure adequate punishment for breaches of security within the purview of the Criminal Code. The maximum penalty is death. There is no form of Press Censorship, official or unofficial, but the radio is controlled as being a

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department of the Central Government.

4. The Communist Party was outlawed in 1926 and it is a criminal offence not only to be a member of the Communist Party but also to spread propaganda in favour of Communism. The strength of the Nationalist Communist Party is therefore nil, and informed opinion in Ankara and Istanbul is that Communist penetration of official circles is non-existent. It follows that there is power to remove Communists from Government posts.

COMMENT:

The recent expulsions from Bulgaria have brought a quarter of a million ex-Bulgarian subjects within the confines of the Turkish State. It is obvious that a number of these persons may be Communist agents and a few have indeed already been detected. Although the Communist party has no legal existence it cannot be assumed that there are no Communists in the country, though it seems probable that the organisation is not sufficiently effective to permit direct and consistent penetration of Government organisations. On this point it is noted that during 1949/1950 200 persons were charged with espionage, and 34 convicted. During the same period 38 persons were tried for offences connected with Communist activity of whom 12 were convicted. In these cases, sentences ranged from 2 to 30 years imprisonment.

5. STANDARDS

The Standing Group Team agree with their mutual Service Attaches in Ankara that Turkish officials are more secretive than security minded in the accepted N.A.T.O. sense of the term. Uniform national standards exist regarding security classification of documents and information but it is impossible to say from the nature of this survey whether these standards are always enforced. Security equipment is not adequate by Western standards for the retention of cyphers and TOP SECRET documents. Nearly all the safes in the Ministry of Defence are key lock of German make and antiquated. On the other hand official premises are well guarded throughout the 24 hours and are physically secure against wrongful entry. Within the Ministry of Defence there is no pass system but all visitors are escorted to and from the room of the officer whom they have to visit. All Government employees having access to classified material are screened. In the case of the Ministry of Defence only officers are permitted to handle or even type SECRET and TOP SECRET material. Screening is effected from records of the Security Service and local checks are also carried out. It can be said generally that departments and Ministries have security regulations based on principles laid down by the National authorities but the extent to which these regulations are enforced cannot be accurately gauged from a short survey. Within the General Staff building papers are conveyed from one office to another by hand of officer and a receipt book is kept for each transaction. The courier system between Turkey and the Turkish missions abroad is intermittent and on this point the Turkish Government have been asked to make use of the State Department couriers. Their reply is awaited. Cypher material is kept in key lock safes and cannot therefore be said to be adequately safeguarded.

6. The basic proposal is that N.A.T.O. material should be kept only in the General Staff building and that if any other person has to be associated with Cosmic military planning he must visit the General Staff building to work on the papers. Admiral ULUSAN said that this system was already in force for highly classified military papers and that even the President and the Prime Minister visited the General Staff building for this purpose.

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Apart from the lack of combination safes, security within the General Staff building is adequate. The whole-time military guard prevents unauthorised entry. SECRET and TOP secret papers are kept in a strong room in the basement where it is intended that Cosmic papers will also be kept. The strong room is guarded by a triple lock Wertheim steel door, two of the keys of which are kept by the senior Duty Officer and one by the Junior Duty Officer. There are no windows. All departments of the General Staff have their own safes in this strong room. It may be necessary to remove some of these to make way for Cosmic material.

Enquiry was made concerning the locking of offices, custody of keys, destruction of waste, possibility of telephone tapping and transit of papers. On all these points the standard of security within the General Staff building appeared to be adequate.

#### 7. CYPHERS

Opinion among the Western Service Attaches in Ankara is that the present Turkish cypher system, using Swedish equipment, cannot be regarded as unbreakable. It was therefore suggested to Admiral ULUSAN that a Type-X cypher machine should be installed in the U.S. Embassy, Ankara, for communication with HQ in Washington or with the Command HQ in Europe when established. This proposal did not find favour with the Turkish spokesman who stated that his Government would prefer a Type-X machine to be installed in the General Staff building, even though this might lead to expense and delay in training operators.

Owing to the possible fallibility of their cyphers it is felt that the Turkish General Staff should be warned to use the utmost discretion in communicating SECRET and TOP SECRET material by wireless to Commands within Turkey outside Ankara.

8. The Standing Group Team make the following recommendations:

(a) In general the standard of security of the General Staff building at Ankara is such that classified N.A.T.O. military material may safely be exchanged with the Turkish Government. It cannot at this stage be said with assurance that the standard of security in other offices in Ankara is sufficiently high to enable Cosmic material to be passed to them.

(b) Despite (a) above, it is recommended that only that material which it is essential for the Turkish Government to hold or know of, should be passed to Ankara.

(c) A Type-X machine should be installed at once in the General Staff building and an expert sent to Ankara to train Turkish cypher officers in its use. The Communications Electronics Section should also consider the installation of Type-X machines in the U.S., U.K. and French Embassies in Ankara.

(d) The Turkish Government have been provided with a copy of the N.A.T.O. standard operating procedure for the security system and a note on the basic principles of security system. The reaction of the Turkish Government to these documents is that the detailed regulations and principles are almost all being enforced now and will be enforced in the few cases where Turkish security procedure differs from them. The Turkish Government, who have expressed every willingness to co-operate, should be asked to confirm, by executing the Standard Security Agreement, which has been signed by all member Nations, that they accept the principles and will

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enforce the procedure.

(e) The Turkish Government should be asked immediately to appoint a security officer (National Security Authority) to control the handling of all Cosmic material. The role of the security officer should be executive, not advisory, and he should be an Army, Navy or Air Force officer, not below the rank of Colonel or equivalent.

(f) The Turkish Government should also be asked to confirm that no Cosmic material will, without notice, be handled or in any way dealt with, outside the General Staff offices.

(g) The Turkish Government should be asked to draw up a list of those officials who, in any capacity, will handle Cosmic material. This list must, in accordance with N.A.T.O. principles, be as short as possible, and a security re-check should be carried out by the National Government, on all persons whose names appear on it.

(h) The Turkish Government should be asked to ensure that Type-X cypher material and Cosmic SECRET and TOP SECRET documents are invariably kept in combination safes. If the supply of combination safes now available to the Turkish Government is inadequate for this purpose, safes will have to be provided from American, British and French sources.

(i) It must be emphasised that the Standing Group Team have not carried out a security inspection in the full detailed sense of the term. No more than a preliminary survey has been achieved. It would be advisable for the Turkish Government to agree to a further and more detailed inspection by a representative of the Standing Group after reasonable opportunity has been afforded to comply with N.A.T.O. security regulations.

9. The Standing Group Team met with every assistance from the Turkish Government but has had no sure means of checking the accuracy of some of the statements made by Admiral ULUSAN.

10. A copy of this report should not be furnished to the Turkish Government.

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