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COPY NO. 28

S.G. 7/30 (FINAL)

9 January 1951

STANDING GROUP

DECISION ON S.G. 7/30

A Report by the Security Coordinating Committee
on

SECURITY SURVEYS IN GREECE AND TURKEY

1. On 26 December 1950 the Standing Group approved the recommendations on page 2 of S.G. 7/30. On 26 December 1950 the Standing Group Representatives were asked to confirm the designation of their members of the Security Coordinating Committee or name an alternate (DSGM-225-50.) The security survey will be carried out in Turkey on 17 January 1951 until 23 January 1951 (DSGM-4-51) and in Greece on 25 January 1951 until 30 January 1951 (DSGM-5-51).

2. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached as the top sheet of S.G. 7/30.

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C.H. DONNELLY

E.B.W. CARDIFF

P.L. de MONTJAMONT

Secretaries

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Per Authority RWC Date 25 Aug '58

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S.G. 7/30

28 November 1950

COPY NO. 28

Pages 1 - 7 incl.

MEMORANDUM

by the

SECURITY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

to the

STANDING GROUP

on

SECURITY SURVEYS IN GREECE AND TURKEY

Reference: D.C. 22/1-381/MED

1. The North Atlantic Council at its 5th Meeting concluded that arrangements might be made to permit Greece and Turkey to be associated, as appropriate, with certain phases of NATO military planning.
2. Turkish military representatives appeared before the Standing Group at its 37th Meeting, and Greek military representatives at its 40th Meeting. The representatives of both countries were informed that before detailed discussions were begun and classified information exchanged, it would be necessary for a security survey to be made in both countries by a team of experts on behalf of the Standing Group as was done in the case of other NATO countries before the COSMIC system was implemented. To this end it was suggested to the Greek and Turkish representatives that they inform their national staffs, in general, regarding NATO security procedures, and suggest that invitations be issued at an early date by their respective Governments for a security survey by a Standing Group Team.
3. The United Kingdom member of the Security Coordinating Committee has presented a memorandum with proposals for how the team of experts should conduct their check of security in Greece and Turkey. Excerpts from this memorandum, which are at Enclosure, also

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disclose certain information regarding security in both countries gained by preliminary investigations of United Kingdom officials on the spot. The Security Committee has no comment to make on this useful United Kingdom memorandum, and concur in general with the proposals therein contained.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- a. That each member of the Standing Group nominate a national representative to take part in the security surveys in Greece and Turkey.
- b. That such surveys be conducted along the lines proposed in the Enclosure.
- c. That the surveys, coordinated administratively by the Security Coordinating Committee, be carried out as soon as possible after invitations are received.

Excerpt: paras 1 through 3
copied for Mr. J. Brunet,
Chairman of NATO Security
Bureau, 10 Nov 54.

Wg Cdr Patchell /ms

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E N C L O S U R E

1. As in the case of the security checks already carried out in the NATO member countries, the object of the forthcoming checks in Turkey and Greece will be to obtain an accurate assessment of the security organization, powers and standards of those countries.

2. It will be necessary to inquire into not only the national security machinery but also the extent to which security procedures are enforced in any Government Departments or Ministries likely to handle NATO material.

3. Information will be required under the following main headings:

4. Organization:

What are the National Services and Personalities responsible for the formulation and implementation of security policy? Their individual spheres of action should be precisely defined, especially as regards the division of responsibility for Civil and Services security. The degree of cooperation between security authorities should also be mentioned. The means by which implementation of security procedures is achieved in Departments, Ministries, etc. should be stated, e.g. do they possess individual security officers and if so, is there any counterpart to the British Inter-Departmental Committee on Security on which they are represented?

5. Powers:

Is there a national equivalent to the British Official Secrets Act? Are the security forces adequate in strength and technique to detect breaches of security? If detected, are the legal sanctions available sufficient to ensure the adequate punishment of security offenders? Is there any form of press censorship or security control either official or unofficial, Is there any anti-Communist legislation? What is the strength of the National Communist

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Party,⁷ What is the degree of Communist penetration in official circles? Is there power to remove Communists (or Facists) from Government posts where their presence might do harm to the National interest? x

6. Standards:

Are Turkish officials as a whole, naturally or by training, Greek security-minded in the accepted NATO sense of the term? x Do uniform National standards exist in such matters as security classification of documents and information? x If so, are standard procedures in force for the handling and safe-custody of such material? x Is security equipment, i.e. safes, cupboards, etc. adequate for the proper custody of classified material? x Are official premises properly guarded and physically secure against wrongful entry? x Are pass systems enforced? Are Government employees handling or having access to classified material security screened? x By whom is such screening done and are the records on which it is based considered adequate? x Do individual Departments and Ministries endorse security regulations appropriate to their particular circumstances but based on principles laid down by the National authorities? x How are papers conveyed from one office to another? What is the courier system between the Home Country and its Missions and Representatives overseas? x Is cypher material adequately safeguarded? x

7. The foregoing are the main factors to be taken into consideration in arriving at an assessment of security conditions in each country but many other points arising out of National peculiarities will no doubt suggest themselves to those responsible for carrying out on-the-spot investigations.

8. Any security shortcomings should be clearly brought out and the possibility of any action to overcome them should be stated.

9. TURKEY

A general preliminary survey of security conditions in Turkey has been undertaken by the local representative of the

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ENCLOSURE

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British Security Services in consultation with senior members of the British Embassy staff and his conclusions may be of some assistance to those who will carry out the on-the-spot check.

10. They are as follows:-

(a) All officials, clerks, etc. of all Ministries (except the Ministry of National Defense which, being composed entirely of Service personnel, is presumed to be secure) are screened by the Turkish Intelligence Service before employment.

(b) Top Secret and Secret files and papers are handled by officers only and are passed on by hand of officer. It is not known, however, how papers are circulated between different Ministries.

(c) Cyphers are kept in safes whose combination is split and shared by two people. It is presumed that this means either an inner and outer door combination or else a combination known to one person and key held by another.

(d) Visitors fill in passes at the main entrance, are clocked in and out and escorted to and from the room they are visiting. It is the rule rather than the exception that when a visit is paid to an official in a Ministry, papers are never seen on his desk.

(e) Fairly recently a senior official of the British Embassy had occasion to approach the senior permanent official of the Turkish Foreign Office on a Top Secret matter and took with him a "bout de papier". The Turkish official concerned was disturbed that anything had been put into writing and said he would keep the paper himself and not allow it to go into the archives. As a form of security this is not altogether unknown in more advanced countries although the Turkish official concerned might possibly have been more concerned about the reliability of the Ministry's clerks and archivists.

(f) It appears to be far from unusual for these members of the British Embassy staff who deal with Turkish Government Departments to be told that papers which are needed for discussion have been either mislaid or lost but this is perhaps not to be

wondered at in a highly bureaucratic country where red tape is often regarded as more important than work.

(g) There is very little delegation of responsibility to junior officials, a factor which probably tends to security.

(h) The degree of infiltration to Government offices by Communists or fellow travellers can be described as negligible or possibly even non-existent as this is one thing about which the Turks are eternally vigilant.

(j) The general impression of the personal security of individual Turks is that they are secretive rather than security-minded in our sense of the term. They talk a great deal about security and frequently invoke it as a reason for not doing something, yet most British officials have at some time or another noticed lapses of security on their part.

11. GREECE

An interim report on Greek security has been received from the U.K. Security representative in Athens, the substance of which is as follows:-

(a) Burglar alarms and combination safes are unknown to the Greeks except that the latter exist in some Greek naval vessels.

(b) There is a clear risk that Top Secret papers, although their circulation is restricted, in practice can be seen by unscrupulous persons. The majority of senior officials are apt to gossip about delicate and secret matters in front of non-indoctrinated persons.

(c) Buildings containing official offices are guarded but in all cases appear to be so positioned as to be vulnerable to a determined burglar.

(d) Security is best in the police and gendarmerie offices, next best in the Greek General Staff and worst in the Alien's Bureau.

(e) It would not be safe to assume that security mindedness on Western European lines exists in the Greek offices on a sufficient scale to defeat any determined Communist or other would be penetrator.

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12. The general impression is that security conditions in Greece are likely to be found to be very much worse than in Turkey, largely owing to the difference in National temperament. It has been said above, that individual Turks are secretive rather than security minded and in the long run the net result is likely to be the same. The average Greek, on the other hand, is temperamentally incapable of keeping a secret. To compensate for this failing, restrictive security measures would require to be extensive and strictly enforced.

13. Consideration must be given to the installation of Typex MK II machines.

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