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ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

PLACE DU MARÉCHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY - PARIS (XVI\*) - TÉL. KLE. 50-20

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BUREAU DU REPRÉSENTANT  
DU GROUPE PERMANENT

OFFICE OF THE STANDING GROUP  
REPRESENTATIVE

18th May 1966

LOM 132/66

IMS Control N° ..... 0525...

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director, Standing Group  
SUBJECT : Procedures for FALLEX 66

1. An informal meeting was held with Representatives of SHAPE on the 20th of April, 1966, to discuss procedures for the provision of operational and intelligence information for the Council Situation Room during FALLEX 66. A Representative of the International Staff was present.

2. At the meeting SHAPE raised certain questions concerning the Warning of Attack procedure. The International Staff Representative, commenting on the fact that signals containing intelligence had been very slow to arrive during FALLEX 64, asked whether Council could be a separate addressee in future, receiving such priority as would ensure a prompt receipt of the information.

3. Each of the two points referred to in paragraph two above has now been the subject of a letter received from SHAPE, a copy of which is attached. This letter was passed to the International Staff for their views and a copy of their reply is given at Annex A.

4. Warning of Attack

- a) You will see that paragraph 3 (a) of the International Staff reply asks whether the distribution of Warning of Attack messages could be amended. Would you please comment on this?
- b) Have you any comments on the points made by SHAPE in their paragraph 2. ?

5. Intelligence Summary AIG (Address Indication Groups)

You will see that the International Staff in their paragraph 3 (b) have asked SHAPE whether the increased communications facilities Council will have can be adapted to improve receipt of intelligence traffic rather than Council remaining simply one addressee on an AIG. Have you any comments on this point?

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(Approved for Public Disclosure)

Per Authority IMSM-0462-02  
By: *[Signature]* Date: 27.5.2003

*[Signature]*  
W.W. STROMBERG  
Major General  
STANDING GROUP  
REPRESENTATIVE

Enclosure : SHAPE 3070.2/17-10, 5 May 1966

**ACTION COPY**

R-5199

*252.5/Fallex-66*

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ANNEX A  
TO LOM 132/66

PROCEDURES FOR FALLEX 66

MEMORANDUM FROM : International Staff  
TO : SGREP (dated 10th May 1966)

Thank you for the opportunity of commenting on SHAPE 3070.2/17-10 of 5th May 1966, enclosed with your SGLP 285/66

2. I think it should be drawn to the attention of SHAPE that, in all matters relating to crisis management, the rôle and functions of the Council are assuming greater importance than ever before. This is certainly borne out by recent Special Committee meetings of which both SHAPE and SGREP are aware.

3. With this thought in mind, particularly in view of its function as a focal point for the "Data Base", the Council's need for the receipt of timely and vital information requires careful consideration. I would like to make the following comments :

- (a) Warning of Attack Procedures - The existing system as indicated, which envisages the Council receiving information in the Attack Warning category as an after action by SGN, MNCs or via MODS to Foreign Offices to Permanent Representatives, appears to be inappropriate in view of the Council's responsibilities. Could action be taken to have the distribution of such messages amended now?
- (b) Intelligence Summary Address Indication Groups - Notwithstanding the points raised by SHAPE, I am sure that you will agree that this system, which adds "SGREP for NAC" to an extensive multiple list of addressees, was not effective in FALLEX 64. Since that time, of course, our communication links for use in an Exercise, or in a period of tension, have been strengthened, but it does not appear that we shall benefit materially from these additions under the procedures envisaged by SHAPE. Could you therefore undertake to investigate whether or not our increased facilities can be adapted to improve the receipt of intelligence traffic of this type from SHAPE and the other MNCs, rather than remaining one of many addressees on a multiple list?

4. Your assistance in this regard would be appreciated.

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GRAND QUARTIER GENERAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIEES EN EUROPE

PARIS, FRANCE

3070.2/17-10

5 MAY 66  
05 MAY 1966

SUBJECT : Follow-Up to SCREP/SHAPE Meeting at SPOC, 20 April 1966

TO : ~~Standing Group Representative~~  
North Atlantic Council  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny  
Paris 16, France

REFERENCES: a. Intelligence Plan Allied Command Europe (IPACE).  
b. Allied Call Sign and Address Group System (ACF LCC).  
c. NATCOM 10/66, subject: Revision of Precedence, 17 Jan 66.

1. The following comments are intended to clarify further the points discussed during the subject meeting on warning of attack information of the intelligence summary report (INTSUM) address indicating group (AIG).

2. Warning of Attack - Action by Council

a. Chapter 4 of Reference a states that, normally, the only authorities empowered to originate formal warning of attack messages are MOCs and MNCs. The one exception to this order is that lower echelons are also authorized to originate such messages in situations of extreme urgency when time is of critical importance. In any case, irrespective of the originating authority, Reference a states that the originator of such a message will send this message to the SCN, MNCs, CINCEANT, MOCs concerned, and information to the MNCs immediately concerned. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the Council will receive such a message through military channels.

b. (1) A warning of attack message received by the Council through political channels would normally also have been received by SHAPE through military channels and would be further evaluated by SHAPE. SHAPE comments would then be passed to the Council. The MNC concerned would normally take action on a warning of attack message by requesting the Council's authority for increased alert state or other appropriate measures.

(2) In the unforeseen case of the Council receiving a warning of attack message which has evidently not been addressed to SHAPE, the Council should immediately pass the information to SHAPE for action.

(3) Similarly, should information received by the Council appear to be a warning of attack message originated by an agency not specifically authorized to originate such a message, it should not be considered as a fully evaluated warning of attack message, but should be reported immediately to SHAPE for further evaluation and action.

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
3070.2/17-10

SUBJECT: Follow-Up to SCREP/SHAPE Meeting at SPOC, 20 April 1966

3. INTSUM AIG. The exclusion of SCREP from the INTSUM AIG 5200 (contained in Reference b, which is presently under review) and the addressing of INTSUMs separately to SCREP in an effort to speed up delivery time has been discussed with SHAPE Communications and Electronic Division. It is considered that the time involved with either alternative is insignificant and would not speed up delivery. The allocation of higher precedence to INTSUMs for SCREP was contemplated, but this would only introduce more traffic into the communications system, thus doubling other traffic and increasing administrative handling.

4. Further comments on these subjects would be appreciated.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE:



J. M. L. GAVIN  
Major General, British Army  
Assistant Chief of Staff,  
Intelligence

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