

NATO - SECRET

ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

PLACE DU MARÉCHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY - PARIS (XVI<sup>e</sup>) - TÉL. KLE. 50-20

NATO SECRET

OFFICE OF THE STANDING GROUP  
REPRESENTATIVE

BUREAU DU REPRÉSENTANT  
DU GROUPE PERMANENT

LOM 391/65

29 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Standing Group

SUBJECT: Selection of Standard NATO On-Line Teletypewriter  
Cryptographic Equipment.

References: (a) PARWA 1843 SG, CEE  
(b) SHAPTO 3465 SG, CEE  
(c) PARWA 1837 SG, CEE

1. The French Representative to the Infrastructure Committee has authorised SGREP to obtain a copy of the French Delegation note dated 21 September 1965, to the US Delegation, in which the French position is given in regard to the problem of cryptographic equipment for NATO.
2. A copy of this note is forwarded for your information.

*W.W. Stromberg*  
W.W. STROMBERG  
Major General  
STANDING GROUP  
REPRESENTATIVE

ENCLOSURE: Memorandum on the Problem of Procurement  
of Cryptographic Equipment for NATO.

Copy to: SHAPE (Communication & Electronic Division)

NATO SECRET

THIS MEMORANDUM MAY BE DOWNGRADED TO  
NATO RESTRICTED WHEN DETACHED FROM ENCLOSURE

**ACTION COPY**

R11524

MS Control N° 0283.

NATO - SECRET

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLICLY DISCLOSED - PDN(2015)0004 - DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

072 3 w/e  
3 E/W/14 mel

21 September 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

MEMORANDUM ON THE PROBLEM OF PROCUREMENT OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC  
EQUIPMENT FOR NATO.

1. In the light of discussions in the Council on 9 June 1965, the French authorities consider that the problems of the point-to-point equipment and of the tactical equipment can be treated separately for the following reasons:

a. Operational compatibility between the two types of equipment is not essential even though desirable;

b. The selection of the point-to-point equipment is a matter for NATO while the selection of the tactical equipment is, in the final analysis, the responsibility of each country;

c. The costs of the point-to-point equipment will be common funded while those of the tactical equipment will be nationally funded;

d. The operational requirement for the point-to-point equipment is precise; the requirement for tactical encryption is not so precisely known.

2. With regard to the point-to-point equipment, and taking note of the statements of urgency made by the NATO military authorities, France has indicated on numerous occasions that the most effective and rapid solution to the problem before us would be the immediate

SECRET

selection of the German equipment ELCROTEL which is recognized by all as being the most advanced.

However, if the Council is not prepared to take this decision without further studies, the procedure provided in Annex II of the document MC 74/1 (Annex IV) should be initiated without delay.

A Working Group charged with the selection of the point-to-point equipment should be constituted and invited to provide a report to the Council by 31 July 1965 or latest, by 30 September 1965.

This group should consider:

- the nature of the requirement, i.e. the use of the point-to-point equipment in simplex, in duplex, in association with the automatic switching centers (TAFE);
- the characteristics of this equipment as related to the above requirements with regard to security, reliability and life expectancy, availability and possible rate of installation, and cost of each equipment bearing in mind the state of development of each and the estimated time to obsolescence and taking account of ease and cost of operation and maintenance.

With regard to points 1c and 1d above, STANT should be invited to proceed immediately with a call for proposals so that the Working Group would have the necessary information as quickly as possible.

The French authorities consider that this group could be a Working group of the Council in order to avoid the inevitable loss of time which would result if the task were entrusted to a working group of a subordinate body and from the necessary coordination between such a body and others at the same level.

As a final point, the group would be composed of national representatives and could call on the SCREP and the International Staff for assistance to the extent that they might consider it necessary.

3. With regard to the tactical equipment, the French military authorities felt that the problem was badly stated in the first instance, since the requirement was concerned with only one type of telegraphic equipment adapted exclusively to communications based on the international telegraphic code number 2. Such communications are essential but their reliability in a period of military operations

SECRET

is far from assured. There is serious doubt that minimum operations can be maintained even at the higher tactical echelons by wire communications and, above all, by radio in the tactical environment which might be anticipated. It is therefore necessary to consider other means of encryption. It is necessary to undertake a study of both the operational and technical considerations in order to determine the operational characteristics of a minimum number of equipments which should best meet the requirements of land, sea and air forces. This study should take into account currently available resources and their possible useful life.

The French authorities thus feel that in order to achieve a satisfactory compatibility between the forces of the several nations at various levels, the problem of tactical encryption should be reexamined in total.

They do not over look the urgency of the problem but they consider that the selection of a particular equipment is premature because it would lead to a situation which would be confused and costly for all countries concerned.

They propose then that the military authorities of the NATO nations be invited to resume the study of the problem of tactical encryption in its entirety and to submit to the Council in the shortest possible time their conclusions which might be set forth, for example, in the form of a STANAG or of an NEMA.

SECRET