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ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

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PLACE DU MARECHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY - PARIS (XVI<sup>e</sup>) - TÉL. KLE. 50-20

BUREAU DU REPRÉSENTANT  
DU GROUPE PERMANENT

OFFICE OF THE STANDING GROUP  
REPRESENTATIVE

LOM 134/64

16 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary, Standing Group

SUBJECT : Polish Disarmament Proposals

Reference : LOSTAN 5681

Copies of the UK and US revised draft replies to Polish memorandum together with a draft Italian reply, referred to in para 3(b) of reference, are attached for information.

FOR THE STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE

K. HUNT  
Brigadier

288.3

- Enclosures : - UK 2140/493/64
- US revised Draft dated 10 April 1964
- Italian Draft Reply

- Copies to :
- SACEUR (W/E)

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UNITED STATES DELEGATION  
TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

April 10, 1964

Dear Colleague:

There is attached the text of a revised version of the proposed reply by the United States Government to the Polish note of February 29 concerning a freeze on nuclear armaments. This text supersedes the one which was circulated on March 13, but the only changes are to be found in the third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs.

Sincerely yours,

*John W. Auchincloss*  
John W. Auchincloss

Enclosure:

As stated.

To: Members of the Political Committee  
Mr. R.W.J. Hooper

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

April 10, 1964

GOMULKA PROPOSALS

Revised Draft U. S. Reply to Polish Note of February 29

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Government of the Polish People's Republic and has the honor to refer to the Polish Government's note of February 29, 1964, proposing a "freeze" of all kinds of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments in the area of Central Europe comprising the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Germany.

The Government of the United States notes and welcomes the importance attached by the Polish People's Republic to the search for arms control and disarmament and wishes to express its gratification at the role played in this regard by the Polish representatives in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva.

3 With respect, however, to the proposal set forth by the Polish Government in its memorandum of February 29, the United States must point out some of the shortcomings which render this proposal inadequate.

4 The members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have deployed military forces in Germany to defend against the threat posed to NATO by the military forces located not only in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zone of Germany, but also in the Soviet Union. However, the proposal of the Polish People's Republic would place serious restrictions on the capabilities of important elements of the forces on which the nations of NATO must rely for their security without placing comparable restrictions on the capabilities of the Soviet forces in the western part of the Soviet Union, which are a major threat to Europe.

§. Of equal importance are the particular difficulties which arise in connection with arms control proposals limited to **Central** Europe, since it is difficult to separate security and arms control arrangements from the background of unresolved political problems there. To be successful, any approach to this problem must take full account of both political and security aspects. In the view of the United States, this draws attention to the supreme importance of making real progress toward settlement of the outstanding political problems in Central Europe. If such progress could be made, new and important possibilities for limitation of armaments could be opened up.

With these considerations in mind, the Government of the United States would like to commend to the favorable attention of the Polish People's Republic the proposal set forth by President Johnson on January 21, 1964, in his message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. This proposal was that both sides explore a verified freeze on the numbers and characteristics of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The United States believes that a more equitable beginning to a solution to the problem of disarmament and a stabilization of the arms race is to be found in the approach suggested by the United States which would go more directly to the heart of the problem than that suggested by the Polish Government and, at the same time, would not have an unequal effect upon the military position of the two sides.

The Government of the United States would also like to commend to the favorable attention of the Polish People's Republic the other proposals set forth in President Johnson's message to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. The proposals, inter alia, call for arrangements to prevent the spread of independent nuclear capabilities to additional states, to stop the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and to apply effective international safeguards to transfers between nations of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes.

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It is the earnest hope of the Government of the United States that early progress can be made on these practical and reasonable suggestions, which, if implemented, would contribute significantly to the slowing down of the nuclear armaments race and to the reducing of international tensions.

The Government of the United States appreciates this opportunity to exchange views on these vital matters with the Government of the Polish People's Republic and trusts that the exchange will contribute to mutual understanding and to fruitful discussions in the future.

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21401/493/64

April 13, 1964.

With his letter to you of March 21, Mr. Tomlinson enclosed a United Kingdom draft reply to the Polish Government's proposal for a freeze on nuclear weapons in central Europe. The text of this reply has now been redrafted in the light of comments made during discussions in the Political Committee, and I enclose a revised text herewith.

2. I am copying this letter and enclosure to all members of the Political Committee.

(P.H.G. Wright)

R.W.J. Hooper, Esq., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.F.C.,  
OTAN/NATO.

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Revised Draft United Kingdom Reply  
to Polish Government

Her Majesty's Government have carefully examined the Polish Government's memorandum which was handed to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Warsaw on February 29, and are grateful to the Polish Government for the opportunities which they have provided for detailed discussion of points arising from their proposals. The following are Her Majesty's Government's considered views.

2. Her Majesty's Government fully share with the Polish Government the desire to work for international détente and disarmament and to support constructive proposals designed to achieve this end. Like the Polish Government, they believe that in the interests of international détente and progress there are measures that could be taken in the field of disarmament while negotiations for a treaty on general and complete disarmament are still in progress. It is for this reason that Her Majesty's Government have advocated or supported at the Geneva Disarmament Conference a number of proposals on which agreement could now be reached. These include a system of observation posts covering the areas of the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances, an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, measures to limit the production and use of nuclear materials for military purposes, and President Johnson's proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

3. In these matters Her Majesty's Government's approach has been conditioned by the belief that it would in general be easier to make progress in these important fields by approaching the problems on a wide geographical, if not actually world-wide, basis. In many fields agreement on such a basis is clearly required if the full results are to be achieved. A good example would be an agreement to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons where it is clear that the participation of all nuclear powers and important non-nuclear powers is needed.

4. This is not to exclude the possibility of regional arms control arrangements. But it should be noted that, to the extent that any proposed arms control measure is to be confined to a particular region, or even to a small group of countries in such a region, the political problems associated with that area determine the extent to which any such arrangements are likely to be possible. And proposals which by their nature impose different obligations on different members of an alliance raise their own special difficulties.

5. Her Majesty's Government have voted, for example, in favour of further steps towards setting up a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. Her Majesty's Government have, however, always insisted that there are very special difficulties attendant on any proposals for arms control arrangements limited to Central Europe. This is not only because Central Europe is the main area of confrontation between the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances. It is also because of the impossibility in present circumstances of disassociating security and arms control arrangements in Central Europe from the exceptionally difficult political problems there. It would not be appropriate to discuss here how these

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political problems have arisen or how we might work towards a solution of them. Her Majesty's Government believe, however, that if real progress could be made towards settlement of these problems, it would then be wholly reasonable to hope that new and eventually far-reaching possibilities for limitation and reduction of arms would be opened up. It is the lack of any apparent opening for progress towards political settlement which here, as in other regions of the world, is the greatest of the obstacles in the way of arms limitations.

6. Her Majesty's Government have considered also some of the practical problems that would arise in respect of the Polish proposal for a freeze of nuclear weapons in Central Europe - problems that are not related specifically to Central Europe but would apply in any area for which a similar type of arms control might be contemplated. It seems to Her Majesty's Government only realistic, if arms limitation arrangements are to be applied to any area of military confrontation, to make provisions that would enable the military forces in the area to be re-equipped and modernised as necessary. In the Polish proposal it is not clear to Her Majesty's Government whether the replacement of nuclear warheads would be permitted, although this appears not to be excluded. Perhaps more important is the question of international verification. As the Polish Government know, Her Majesty's Government have consistently supported the need for international verification of agreements on disarmament or arms control. It has, however, always been clear to Her Majesty's Government that international verification must be adequate and effective for its declared purpose and, indeed, must be publicly believed to be effective. This raises great difficulties in the matter of nuclear warheads, which are both small and easily moved from place to place. Not only are they likely to be difficult to recognise but the number of routes over which they might be moved is clearly very large. For these purely practical reasons it seems that it may be very hard to devise a system of international verification that would at the same time be effective, practical and not so all-embracing and intrusive as to be intolerable to the Governments concerned.

7. Furthermore the military consequences of the freeze proposed by the Polish Government appear doubtful to Her Majesty's Government. It would certainly impose limits on the freedom of NATO to deploy its defensive resources to the best advantage, and it is not clear whether the parallel limits imposed on members of the Warsaw Pact would have equal military importance. Although these doubts might to some degree be overcome if the geographical area of the freeze were extended, any extension would intensify the problem of verification, which, as has just been stated, will be extremely difficult even within the geographical limits proposed by the Polish Government.

8. These considerations have led Her Majesty's Government to the conclusion that in present circumstances it would be difficult to reach agreement on a freeze of nuclear warheads in Central Europe as proposed by the Polish Government. At the same time Her Majesty's Government appreciate the efforts that the Polish Government have made to set out and explain their views through diplomatic discussion



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and are very ready in their turn to explain and discuss Her Majesty's Government's own views as to the best possibilities of making further progress towards better East/West relations and disarmament. In any case Her Majesty's Government believe that free and frank discussion of the problems inherent in all the measures that have been put forward for consideration can only be helpful to both sides.

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Mr. GIACOMELLI  
4713

DELEGATION DE L'ITALIE  
AUPRES DE L'OTAN

CONFIDENTIEL  
12 APR 64

Projet italien de réponse au mémorandum du Gouvernement Polonais sur le gel des armes nucléaires en Europe Centrale (Plan Gomulka).

MEMORANDUM (Traduction)

Conformément à son programme politique tendant constamment à favoriser toute possibilité concrète de détente dans les rapports internationaux, le Gouvernement Italien a apprécié à leur juste valeur les efforts du Gouvernement de la République Populaire de Pologne pour rechercher et pour proposer des mesures dont il estime que l'application pourrait engendrer une diminution de la tension en Europe Centrale.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Italien a étudié très attentivement la proposition du Gouvernement Polonais relative au gel des armes nucléaires et thermonucléaires situées sur le territoire de la République Populaire de Pologne, de la République Socialiste de Tchécoslovaquie, de la République Fédérale Allemande et de la zone d'occupation soviétique.

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2. Dans son dessein constant de favoriser le développement de toute initiative qui présente de sérieuses possibilités de contribution à une amélioration générale des relations entre les peuples, le Gouvernement Italien n'a pas manqué de donner son appui, directement ou indirectement, aussi bien aux propositions destinées à obtenir un désarmement général et progressif, qu'aux mesures particulières qui, tout en concernant des domaines limités et collatéraux, pourraient être susceptibles d'apporter des développements prometteurs dans l'amélioration de l'atmosphère internationale, puisque ces mesures sont basées sur ces critères d'équilibre, de progression et de contrôle qui sont la condition préalable et naturelle de n'importe quel point de vue concret en la matière.

L'Italie, par conséquent, tout en s'employant activement, à Genève et ailleurs, à favoriser l'approbation de différentes mesures appelées collatérales, n'a pas pu toutefois juger d'une manière positive les autres initiatives destinées à introduire le désarmement dans des secteurs géographiques particuliers et restreints. Malgré toute la bonne volonté des initiateurs, les projets concernant des territoires limités ont en effet inévitablement tendance, dans la majorité des cas, à modifier l'équilibre existant et à devenir suspects pour l'une ou pour l'autre partie. En général, donc, ces projets ne semblent pas fournir une base valable de discussion.

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Conformément à la recommandation présentée à l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies le 20 Septembre 1961 par le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et par celui de l'Union Soviétique sur les principes qui doivent être à la base des négociations sur le désarmement, le Gouvernement Italien est persuadé que le maintien de l'équilibre est une condition indispensable à toute étape sur la longue voie qui reste encore à parcourir. C'est pour cette raison que le Gouvernement Italien estime que de plus grande perspectives d'accord pourraient être atteintes en considérant attentivement d'autres propositions, comme celle présentée récemment au Comité des 18 concernant le gel de tous les vecteurs nucléaires ayant un caractère stratégique, offensifs et défensifs, quelque soit leur emplacement.

3. En outre, le Gouvernement Italien estime que tout plan de contrôle des armements limité à l'Europe Centrale présente des difficultés particulières, étant donné qu'il semble impossible, malgré tous les efforts de bonne volonté employés, de dissocier les problèmes de la sécurité et du contrôle des armes dans cette zone des délicats problèmes politiques qui n'ont pas encore été résolus. Etant donné que ces derniers sont inséparablement liés aux problèmes d'équilibre stratégique, on est obligé de reconnaître qu'une détente durable dans cette zone pourra être réalisée seulement si l'on considère attentivement les deux types de problèmes. ./.

4. Mis à part ces considérations générales, le Gouvernement Italien a voulu explorer tous les problèmes particuliers soulevés par la proposition du Gouvernement de la République Populaire de Pologne. C'est pourquoi l'opinion exprimée par le Gouvernement Polonais, selon laquelle un gel des armes nucléaires et thermonucléaires dans la zone indiquée ne modifierait en aucune manière le rapport actuel de forces, a fait l'objet d'un examen attentif.

Le Gouvernement Italien est convaincu que pour atteindre ce but difficile consistant à ne pas modifier l'actuel équilibre des forces militaires, un gel des armes nucléaires doit de toutes façons être appliqué à des secteurs stratégiquement complets. Etant donné que le territoire considéré dans la proposition du Gouvernement Polonais ne consitue pas une zone stratégiquement complète, il s'ensuit qu'en gelant uniquement les armes nucléaires qui y sont stationnées, on arrêterait le développement éventuel du principal élément local de défense d'une partie et on laisserait au contraire libre la modernisation et l'augmentation d'une grande partie des armes que celui-ci est appelé à équilibrer.

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5. Le Gouvernement Italien a particulièrement apprécié l'exactitude méticuleuse avec laquelle le Gouvernement Polonais a considéré dans sa proposition le problème de la surveillance et des contrôles destinés à s'assurer que les accords éventuellement réalisés sont observés.

En matière de désarmement, l'Italie a toujours soutenu la nécessité de contrôles internationaux appropriés au but à atteindre, qui consiste à donner à toutes les parties intéressées une raisonnable certitude que les mesures stipulées sont effectivement observées. Par ailleurs, il semble plutôt difficile d'obtenir cette certitude dans le cas d'armes nucléaires qui peuvent être de dimensions assez réduites et par conséquent facilement dissimulables. C'est pourquoi il semblerait nécessaire d'instituer un système de contrôles non seulement aussi rigoureux que ceux normalement exercés par les douanes de tous les pays, mais aussi des contrôles qui s'étendraient, par un système capillaire, au-delà des points mentionnés dans la proposition du Gouvernement Polonais. Alors que cette dernière prévoit en effet que des "commissions mixtes paritaires" soient établies "à proximité des noeuds de frontière, des communications ferroviaires, routières, fluviales, aussi bien que dans les ports de mer et dans les aéroports", par contre la nécessité d'un strict contrôle semblerait évidente, non seulement sur toutes les voies de communication par lesquelles on

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peut introduire de nouvelles armes nucléaires, mais aussi auprès des dépôts de ces armes et auprès des unités militaires équipées par elles.

6. Les raisons mentionnées ci-dessus tendent à indiquer que la voie vers un accord pour le gel des têtes nucléaires est semée de nombreuses difficultés.

D'autre part, le Gouvernement Italien a vivement apprécié l'initiative du Gouvernement Polonais qui a fourni l'occasion pour un franc échange d'idées sur une matière d'un intérêt aussi immédiat pour tous les pays, et il espère que des discussions analogues pourront avoir lieu dans l'avenir, à l'avantage des deux parties, soit au sein du Comité des 18, soit en dehors de celui-ci.

ITALIAN DELEGATION  
TO NATO

CONFIDENTIAL

Draft of Italian Reply to the Memorandum of the Polish Government on the Freezing of Nuclear Weapons in Central Europe (Gomulka Plan).

MEMORANDUM

1. According to its political program, always tending to favor all possibility of a concrete relaxation of international relations, the Italian Government fully appreciates the efforts of the Government of the Polish Popular Republic in searching for and proposing measures, the implementation of which could lead to a lessening of tension in Central Europe.

This is why the Italian Government has studied very attentively the proposal of the Polish Government relative to the freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons situated on the territory of the Polish Popular Republic, of the Czechoslovakian Socialist Republic, and of the German Federal Republic and in the Soviet Zone of Occupation.

2. In its decision constantly to favor the development of all initiative that presents serious possibilities of contributing to a general improvement of the relations among peoples, the Italian Government has not failed to support, directly or indirectly, both proposals intended to obtain a general and progressive disarmament, as well as special measures that, while concerning limited and collateral fields, may be likely to produce promising developments in the improvement of the international atmosphere, since such measures are based on the criteria of balance, of progression and control that are the necessary and natural conditions of any concrete view on the subject.

Consequently, Italy, while working actively at Geneva and elsewhere for the approval of so-called collateral measures, has not been able, however, to pass positive judgment on other initiatives intended to introduce disarmament in special and restricted geographical sectors. In spite of good intentions of the initiators, projects concerning limited territories have inevitably the tendency, in the greater majority of cases, to disrupt the existing balance and to become suspect for one or for both parties. In general, therefore, these projects do not appear to furnish a valid basis for discussion.



According to the recommendation presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 September 1961 by the Government of the United States and by that of the Soviet Union on the principles that should be the basis of negotiations on disarmament, the Italian Government is persuaded that the maintenance of balance is an indispensable condition to all stages on the long road that still has to be travelled. This is the reason why the Italian Government considers that the greatest possibilities of an agreement would be reached by considering attentively other proposals, such as that presented recently to the Committee of 18 concerning the freeze of all nuclear vectors of a strategic character, offensive and defensive, whatever their location.

3. Furthermore, the Italian Government considers that all plans for control of armaments limited to Central Europe presents special difficulties, in view of the fact that it appears impossible, in spite of all efforts and good will employed, to dissociate security problems from armaments control problems in that zone of delicate political problems that have not yet been resolved. In view of the fact that the latter are inseparably tied in with problems connected with strategic balance, one is obliged to recognize the fact that a lasting "detente" in this zone could be brought about only by considering attentively the two types of problems.

4. Aside from general considerations, the Italian Government has wanted to explore all special problems raised by the proposal of the Government of the Polish Popular Republic. This is why the opinion expressed by the Polish Government, according to which a freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in the zone indicated would not modify in any way the relations existing presently between the forces, has been the subject of a careful study.

The Italian Government is convinced that in order to attain this difficult objective consisting of not changing the present balance of military forces, a freeze of nuclear weapons should be applied in all ways to complete strategic sectors. In view of the fact that the territory considered in the proposal of the Polish Government does not constitute a complete strategic zone, it follows that by freezing only the nuclear weapons stationed there, one would stop the possible development of the principal element of local defense of one side while permitting the modernization and augmentation of a great part of those weapons that that side is supposed to balance.

5. The Italian Government has particularly appreciated the meticulous exactitude with which the Polish Government has gone into its proposal concerning the problem of surveillance and control intended to insure that possible agreements be observed.

Regarding disarmament, Italy has always held the necessity for appropriate international control over the aim to be achieved, which consists of giving all parties concerned a reasonable assurance that the stipulated measures are actually being observed. In addition, it appears above all difficult to obtain this assurance in the case of nuclear weapons that can be of fairly small proportions and consequently easily hidden. This is why it would appear necessary to set up a system of controls not only as rigorous as that normally exercised by the customs services of all countries but also controls that would be extended by an auxiliary system beyond the points mentioned in the proposition of the Polish Government. The latter provides for a "mixed commission" to be established "near frontier rail, road, and water communications centers as well as in seaports and airports," while on the contrary the need for strict control would appear evident not only along all communication lines along which nuclear weapons could be introduced but also at depots where these arms are stored and near military units equipped with such weapons.

6. The reasons mentioned above tend to indicate that the road towards an agreement on the freezing of nuclear warheads is sown with numerous difficulties.

On the other hand, the Italian Government deeply appreciates the initiative of the Polish Government which has given it the occasion for a frank exchange of ideas on a subject of such immediate interest to all countries, and it hopes that similar discussions may take place in the future to the advantage of both parties, whether within the Committee of 18 or outside of it.