

**NATO-SECRET**  
**ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD**  
**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION**

PLACE DU MARECHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY - PARIS (XV<sup>e</sup>) - TEL. KLE. 50-20

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BUREAU DU REPRÉSENTANT  
DU GROUPE PERMANENT

OFFICE OF THE STANDING GROUP  
REPRESENTATIVE

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EOM 421/64

8 December 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director, Standing Group  
SUBJECT : Meeting of the NATO Army Advisory  
Group (AC/225)

The attached Report of the meeting of NAAG, held on  
1 and 2 December 1964, is forwarded as matter of information.

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FOR THE STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE

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J. DE VISSCHERE  
Major General, B.A.

Enclosure: Report of the Fourth Meeting of NAAG  
Copy to : SHAPE (Attention: Col. HEFFENER, PANDP).

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ORGANISATION DU TRAITÉ DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

PLACE DU MARÉCHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY - PARIS (XVI<sup>e</sup>) - TEL. KLE. 50-20

ENCLOSURE TO LOM 421/64  
BUREAU DU REPRÉSENTANT  
DU GROUPE PERMANENT

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OFFICE OF THE STANDING GROUP  
REPRESENTATIVE

Report on the Fourth Meeting held  
by the NATO Army Advisory Group  
(AC/225)

References : (a) AC/225-A/4 (Rev) - 4/1/64  
(b) AC/225-D/47 and 56  
(c) AC/225-D/48, 49, 53, 58 and 63 - 3/10/64  
(d) AC/225-D/50, 51, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 - 4/1/64  
(e) LOM 295/64 - 3/15/64  
(f) STAND 6508 - 4/1/64

1. NAAG met on the 1st and 2nd of December, 1964, in line with Agenda, ref (a). All countries were represented except Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal. A summary of this meeting follows.
2. ITEM II - Exchange of Information on operational Concepts and National Programmes
  - a. General Concept in SHAPE
    - (1) SHAPE had no comments to offer at this time on national comments (ref (b)), made on SHAPE Concept.
    - (2) Italian Representative expressed his disappointment at the fact that SHAPE did not take position on the operational concept on which defense planning is at present based in the Italian theatre of operations.
    - (3) On the Chairman's suggestion, SHAPE agreed to reply directly to the Italian Authorities.
    - (4) NAAG agreed that, until further notice, this item would not be included in future agendas.
  - b. ABC Armies' Operational Concept
    - (1) General FISHER (Co-ordination, Production and Logistics, IS) opened the discussion by drawing NAAG's attention to the fact that, by lack of a common agreed operational concept, some AHMWGs had to establish by themselves and in their specific field of interest some sort of concept on which to base their works. This procedure entails the risk of lack of coordination between the various concepts.
    - (2) The Chairman, supporting this view, admitted that it would be extremely difficult to reach a common position on a general concept. Nevertheless, he considered necessary to agree at least on a tactical concept, for example at division and corps level, with a view to help AHMWG in their future works.
    - (3) SGREP, elaborating on STAND 6552, supported this opinion, stressing that it would be helpful for SGN to establish a common tactical concept if opinions, already discussed and agreed upon by NAAG, were available.
    - (4) Italy was in general agreement with Belgian comments (AC/225-D/48).
    - (5) FRG was also in general agreement with national comments (ref (c)), but they could not take a final position before completion of the ABC study.

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They recalled that FINABEL Countries had set up a Working Group to study a tactical concept for the period after 1970, as a basis for future weapons and equipment developments. They also considered that this could be achieved without requiring an agreement on a general concept.

(6) UK, on behalf of ABC Countries, and in order to avoid any misunderstanding, stressed that the ABC concept (D/46) reflected merely their thoughts on how a tactical battle could be conducted in the 1971-80 period and that it was in no way an operational instruction or directive.

It was intended to serve as guide lines for training purposes and for considering, in general terms, what types of equipments and organisations would be needed, to ensure that forces are maintained at highest possible level of efficiency. NAAG, therefore, should be primarily concerned with second purpose of ABC Concept (equipment requirements) because, in this field, it could help NAAG to fulfill its task: further co-operation in research and development.

(7) US, in reply to Belgian and French comments (D/48 and 53) pointed out that ABC Concept attempts to answer the question as to how a battle should be conducted in both contingencies. He admitted that the change-over from the non-nuclear to the nuclear deployment involved a risk, but considered that the risk involved in taking initially a nuclear posture would be greater; the current conventional weapons being unable to cover the wide gaps inherent to a deployment for a nuclear battle. He added that the completion of the studies including Annexes were expected for next May.

(8) French Representative replied that their final position on the ABC concept could only be taken upon completion of the study (Annexes) which, he hoped, would contain sufficient material to help NAAG to fulfill its task.

(9) The Chairman, in conclusion, although recognising that it would be difficult to agree on a common general concept, hoped however, that further discussion would enable the Group to agree to some basic principles which, in turn, would serve as guide lines for AHMWG.

(10) NAAG invited ABC and FINABEL countries to submit a report on their respective studies, with a view to discuss it at the next meeting and to submit, if appropriate, recommendations to the NMA.

(11) In reply to General FISHER, US Representative made a statement of which the substance was similar to the views contained in SGM-40-64.

(12) SGREP confirmed that new procedures for drafting NEMR's were considered by the NMA and that studies would probably be completed early 1965. It is envisaged to establish multinational Ad Hoc Working Groups for the purpose of drafting NBMR and he was confident that their work would be based on coherent tactical concepts.

2. ITEM III - Exchange of Information on the Activities of the following A.H.M.W.G.

a. A.H.M.W.G. on Telecommunication Equipment.

- (1) Chairman AC/220 commented on the Group's Report (AC/225-D/60). 7/71  
He recalled that a Restricted Group on a "Telecommunications System for the Combat Zone" had been established under AC/220 Group. The

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task had been divided between two Sub-Groups : a Tactical, to identify where interconnections between different systems are needed, and a Technical, to define the technical compatibilities needed between these different systems, to provide for interphase.

- (2) Chairman NAAG welcomed this statement and noted that it was in the field of Telecommunications that a common tactical concept was probably most urgently needed.
- (3) U.S. considered that two main issues were in question :-
  - how far "down" should we go with the area system ;
  - will the area system supersede the conventional one (which is bound to organisational command structures) or will both systems be still needed concurrently.
- (4) Chairman AC/220 replied that a single configuration would be ideal, but that responsibility for combat communications will still remain national. NATO's objective, therefore, should be that national systems be compatible with area system.
- (5) Norwegian Representative felt that achievements in this field will be highly dependent on available funds, either individually by countries or by NATO.
- (6) F.R.G. stressed the importance of such a system in Central Europe where units of six Nations are to fight on a comparatively small space : a maximum of harmonisation is therefore desirable.
- (7) French Representative was of same opinion and insisted that an important characteristic of the system must be simplicity.
- (8) NAAG :-
  - expressed its deep appreciation for the work already performed by the Restricted Group ;
  - encouraged it to pursue its efforts in the same direction.
- (9) Chairman AC/220 noted that he did not want to belittle the problem because there were a great number of smaller, but nevertheless important question to solve such as automaticity, language, etc.

b. A.H.M.W.G. on Equipment for Combat Intelligence.

- (1) Chairman AC/183 elaborated on the Group's Report (AC/225-D/75). No significant comments were made during the discussion which followed.
- (2) NAAG :-
  - noted with interest the fact that one NATO Military test and evaluation had been completed and that a second was underway ;
  - recommended to the Armaments Committee to invite AC/183 Group to determine airborne sensors and to forward their Characteristics to AC/169 Group so that the latter could examine the possibility of mounting the equipments in the aircrafts under consideration.

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4. Item V - Discussion on Studies of Particular Interest to NATO and Capable of Leading to Future Co-operation

a. Use of Helicopters

(1) Chairman, in his opening remarks, noted that, if no comments had been made on the technical aspect of the question, some national views had been received (ref (d) on the tactical side and that more were expected from Belgium, Denmark, FRG and Italy.

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He asked if the SGN had replied to their recommendations at Para 8, Enclosure to ref (e).

(2) SGREP quoted Para 6, ref (f).

(3) Chairman wondered if NAAG should limit its role to collect national comments and send them altogether to SGN or should they attempt to reconcile these views and prepare a synthesis?

(4) US considered that it was generally agreed that four types of helicopters were needed:

- command and liaison (light)
- tactical, to transport small combat groups
- fire support
- heavy transport

He proposed to set up a Restricted Group to explore the possibility of reconciling the national points of view, and to identify the tactical requirements

(5) NAAG agreed to establish such a Restricted Group and approved its Terms of Reference as drafted by France (Annex A ). The Report of this Group will be discussed at next NAAG meeting, and, if approved, submitted to SGN as a NAAG concept.

b. Data Transmission and Processing for Land Forces

7/65

(1) Chairman, in his opening remarks, noted the document AC/225-D/61. He considered that AC/238 Group, under its present TOR, set up by the Armaments Committee, upon a formal request by the SGN, had no alternative and that it could not determine the land forces' requirements as recommended by NAAG.

(2) Chairman AC/238 reported on the present status of the studies undertaken by his Group.

(3) SGREP informed the Group that the SGN had instructed EMCCC to study the problem in liaison with MNC. EMCCC did not yet submit its conclusions: the SGN is therefore still unable to take position.

(4) Chairman AC/238 anticipated that these conclusions would differ considerably from the results of their own studies.

(5) Considering the request by the SGN that references to potential military applications and requirements should be deleted from the TOR of AC/238 Group, the Chairman wondered how NAAG could expect replies to its questions with regard to the requirements in respect of data transmission and processing for land forces and of the degree of required compatibility at various levels.

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(6) During the subsequent discussion, a general agreement appeared on the following points:

- Data handling and processing was a very complex problem, and it would have been wiser to start discussing it from the land forces' point of view as recommended by NAAG rather than considering its overall aspect.

In this connection, some delegations expressed their concern about the SGN position which had prevented the AC/238 Group to make substantial progress in this urgent and important field.

- As long as the land forces' requirements are not established, no progress will be made. It was felt that, as long as AC/238 Group deals merely with collection of information, determination of a general concept and of a first approach of the problem with respect to the land forces requirements, and does not attempt to draft NBMR, it would not interfere with the SGN responsibilities.

(7) Questioned about the intentions of the SGN with regard to formulating the land forces requirements, SGREP replied that he would forward the query.

(8) Chairman considered that there is no Agency responsible for determining these requirements: EMCCC itself proposed to create a new Agency for this specific purpose.

(9) US Representative felt that the SGN possibly feared that AC/238 Group would submit requirements in their final form whereas, in his opinion, the SGN should take advantage of the studies made by Agencies such as ELDATRAWP and AC/238 Group to answer the questions put forward by NAAG.

(10) NAAG, in conclusion:-

- urged the NMA to revise their position and to authorise AC/238 Group to study the requirements of land forces in this field it being understood that requirement was intended to identify various areas in which nations desire to employ DPS and not specifications to NBMR. This task should be accomplished in close liaison with existing specialised Groups such as ELDATRAWP.

c. Tactical Concept for Infantry Fighting Vehicles

(1) Chairman AC/174 Group informed NAAG that the studies were still underway and that the conclusions were expected by mid-1965.

(2) US informed that studies are also currently carried out in his country. Now, he said, Commanders have no option but to dismount before the assault phase of the attack, due to the configuration of the personnel carriers. The purpose of these studies is to investigate the possibility of giving the Commanders the choice between two solutions: conduct the assault dismounted, which would still be the most frequent case, or from the vehicle (to be called "mechanised infantry combat vehicle").

(3) NAAG noted the statements made.

d. Field Electrical Power Sources

(1) US expressed their concern about the differences in voltage and frequency between the various equipment in service.

(2) NAAG invited the Armaments Committee to instruct AC/241 to consider in first priority the standardisation in the fields of voltage and frequency.

5. ITEM VI. - Exchange of Information on bi-, tri- and Multilateral Agreements

(1) Chairman invited to comment on Document AC/225-D/52.

(2) Italy informed that the first four items of the list could be deleted, the equipment being already delivered.

(3) FRG asked to add "and associated heavy equipment transporter" to the serial "Main Battle Tank".

(4) US asked to add two new items:

- "armoured Infantry fighting vehicle":  
agreement between FRG and US on exchange of prototypes to determine possibility of cooperative development.

- "snow tracked vehicle (XM 571)" between Canada and US.

(5) General FISHER suggested that the list of agreements would be more helpful for everybody if target dates were indicated for each equipment

(6) NAAG decided that the countries would indicate before the next meeting, the expected dates of issue for the first mass production series of their equipments.

6. ITEM VII - Exchange of Information on Possible New Techniques

a. UK informed that they were not in a position to make the announced presentation, due to the political changes and the new trials on Hovercraft, scheduled for next spring. The presentation will be made at next meeting.

b. France hoped to be able to submit to the Group, also at next meeting, the results of their studies on "ducted fans" (hélices carénées).

c. General FISHER informed the Group that the Navy Advisory Group had created a Sub-Group on hydrofoils and hovercrafts.

7. Item VIII - Recommendations to the NMA in Particular with regard to NBMR's

a. Chairman opened the discussion by asking if the SGN had explained the exact nature of the opinion required from NAAG.

b. SGREP quoted Para (3) of ref (f).

c. Chairman noted that the matter did not seem to have

made much progress since the previous meeting. He suggested therefore, that a Restricted Group should attempt to draw a list of priorities on which the delegations in NAAG could agree and wondered if this procedure would be acceptable to the SGN.

d. SGREP, referring to the similar procedure adopted by the Naval Advisory Group, considered that this proposal would certainly prove helpful to the SGN.

e. The Restricted Group met separately and submitted a draft priority list (Annex B). Their aim had been to keep this list to a minimum and they considered the three categories (X, Y and Z) of first importance and of some urgency.

f. Delegations commented on the draft list:

- France would like to see serial 34 included.

- FRG wondered if the auxiliary equipments associated with the main battle tank needed also NBMR's.

In this case, they suggested to have serials 9, 90, 91 included in the list.

- Netherlands and Turkey supported French and German views.

- UK suggested to include serials 5 and 34

- US supported German and UK proposals and questioned also the opportunity of including serial 3.

g. Chairman of the Restricted Group commented as follows on the above proposals:

- Serial 3 : there is a general agreement that the study of a third generation Atk Weapons is premature.

- Serial 5 : NBMR exists already for a close support weapon. As long as the studies on the new ammunition are not completed, it is premature to consider a NBMR for a family of artillery weapons.

- Serials 9, 90, 91 : if there is an NBMR for the main battle tank, it is obvious that the associated equipment must be designed, but without the need for separate NBMR.

SGREP confirmed this point of view by quoting the first sentence of Para 15, SGM-448-63 (NBMR 32).

h. NAAG approved the proposed list of priorities subject to the following amendments: serial 88 to be deleted and serial 34 included in category Y.

8. Item X - Action taken by the NMA and the Armaments Committee on the Proposals and Recommendations

a. Action taken by the NATO Military Authorities

(1) Chairman reviewed the recommendations listed at Enclosure to ref (e), which had not been discussed earlier during the meeting.

(2) In reply, SGREP commented as follows:

- Para 2 : SGN agrees - serial 3 appears indeed at Enclosure 3 to MCM-109-64
- Para 3 : STAND 6412 was quoted. *SGM 415-62, 19 July 62*
- Para 4 : SGN has amended NBMR 24 as requested (MCM-124-64). SGREP quoted also Para 2 ref (f).
- Para 5 : SGREP stated that no comments had been received from SGN at this date. *27/33*

SGREP comments : it is suggested that SGN, when considering the Turkish proposal, should also bear in mind, the recommendations by AC/183 Group outlined at Para 11, LOM 200/63.

- Para 7 : Reference was made to Para 5, ref (f).

(3) NAAG noted that progress had been made and that the Military Authorities had reacted favourably to some of the recommendations made by their Group.

b. Action taken by the Armaments Committee

The Group took note with satisfaction of document AC/225-D/59.

9. Item XI - Other Business

a. Belgian Representative made the following statement: a Working Group of the W.E.U. is currently considering the problem of obstacles and barriers. Three aspects of the problem, however have not been studied:

- mining at distance
- remote ignition and self-neutralization of mines
- aerial obstacles.

He felt that TOR of AC/177 and NBMR 9 allowed to deal with these problems and suggested, therefore, to recommend to Armaments Committee to invite AC/177 Group to study the matter soonest.

b. (1) SHAPE supported this proposal: there exist, in their views, alarming discrepancies between modern requirements for Landmine Warfare and performances of equipment now available. Landmine Warfare will continue to occupy an essential place in any army tactical doctrine.

(2) From the report of Chairman AC/177 Group, SHAPE did not get a clear picture of what can be expected from the Group to overcome the existing hardly acceptable situation. Therefore, they also propose to discuss the activities of this Group again at the next meeting.

c. NAAG recommended to the Armaments Committee to invite the Chairman of AC/177 Group to attend the next meeting and to report on the activities of his Group. AC/177 should also submit their views on the problems listed at Para a. above,

it being understood that "aerial obstacles" covered items such as "mines against low flying aircrafts".

10. Item XII - Date of Next Meeting

a. Next meeting of NAAG is scheduled for the 9th to 11th June 1965.

b. Maj. Gen. HOPE, UK Representative, was elected Chairman for the next year.



R. J. T. MICHAUX  
Lt-Colonel, B.A.

- Annexes: A. TOR of Working Party on Helicopters  
(in French - No official translation  
being available).
- B. List of Priorities for Future NBMR's.

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TRANSLATED BY STANDING GROUP

ANNEX A TO LOM-421/64

TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE AC/225's TEMPORARY WORKING  
PARTY ON HELICOPTERS

1. With a view to permitting the Army Advisory Group to provide the NATO Military Authorities the data for the possible establishment of one or more NBMR's on helicopters for the 1970-1980 period, the Working Party will examine and compare the national helicopter employment Concepts as these are expressed in the documents drawn up by the countries and forwarded to the AC/225.

2. It will establish a document synthesizing the common points and will endeavor to reduce any minor divergencies and will bring to the attention of the Advisory Group the major points on which no agreement could be obtained within the Working Party.

It will be necessary to point out in this document:

- the missions contemplated for helicopters in the land battle during the decade under consideration,
- the nature of the requirements for the land forces which stem therefrom and the range of the helicopters required,
- the very general characteristics of the anticipated equipment.

3. The Working Party will be made up of delegates from the following six countries: United States, France, Italy, Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom. Initially the Chairman will be provided by France and then designated by the party membership at their first meeting. The Working Party will meet upon the call of its Chairman for the first time during the month of March 1965, and if necessary a second time so as to be in a position to submit a final report of its deliberations to the AC/225 at its June 1965 meeting.

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ANNEX A TO LOM 421/64

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## MANDAT POUR L'EQUIPE DE TRAVAIL TEMPORAIRE DE L'AC/225 SUR LES HELICOPTERES

1. En vue de permettre au Groupe Consultatif Terre de fournir aux autorités militaires de l'OTAN des éléments pour l'établissement éventuel de un ou plusieurs NEMR sur les hélicoptères pour la période 1970-1980, l'équipe de travail examinera et comparera les concepts nationaux sur l'emploi des hélicoptères tels qu'ils ressortent des documents établis par les pays et adressés à l'AC/225.
2. Elle établira un document de synthèse faisant ressortir les points communs, s'efforcera de réduire les divergences mineures, et portera à l'attention du Groupe Consultatif les points majeurs sur lesquels aucun accord n'aura pu être obtenu au sein de l'équipe de travail.

Il y aura lieu dans ce document de faire ressortir :

- les missions envisagées pour les hélicoptères dans la bataille terrestre pour la décennie considérée,
  - la nature des besoins qui en découlent pour les forces terrestres et la gamme des hélicoptères nécessaires,
  - les caractéristiques très générales des matériels envisagés.
3. L'équipe de travail sera composée des délégués des six pays suivants : Etats-Unis, France, Italie, Pays-Bas, République Fédérale d'Allemagne, Royaume-Uni. Initialement le président sera fourni par la France, puis désigné par les membres de l'équipe lors de sa première réunion. L'équipe de travail se réunira, à l'initiative de son président, une première fois dans le courant du mois de mars 1965, si nécessaire une seconde fois de façon à être en mesure de présenter un rapport final de ses travaux à l'AC/225 lors de sa réunion de juin 1965.

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ANNEX B to LOM 421/64

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## NATO ARMY ADVISORY GROUP

### WORKING PARTY ON POST-1970 NBMRs

The Working Team appointed by the Chairman of AC/225 selected what it considers the vital NBMRs which should receive the earliest attention by the military authorities. However, in view of the fact that in some cases the subjects are either handled in certain nations by the Air Force and in others by the Army, and that also in some cases the team feels that the technical possibilities are not sufficiently clear to produce an NBMR but that the subject is still of top priority to the Armies, the team has therefore divided the subjects into X, Y and Z.

- List X: are those NBMRs which the team considers should and could be produced as soon as possible.
- List Y: are those NBMRs which are of interest to more than one Service
- List Z: are those NBMRs which the team considers cannot be produced immediately due to the state of the art, but which are of great importance for the Army.

Reference: MCM-109-64 dated 2nd September, 1964.

2. List X: 1, 2, 4<sup>(x)</sup>  
8<sup>(xx)</sup>  
14  
80, 109<sup>(xxx)</sup>  
82

- List Y: 13  
15  
16  
34

- List Z: 7  
11  
18  
19  
25  
83  
85  
93

- 
- Observations: (x) serials 1, serial 4 could result in one or more NBMRs.  
(xx) To be linked with the NBMR for the Future Main Battle Tank and the Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle  
(xxx) could be considered in the same NBMR.

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